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Home , Charles Masterman, Conservative government, May 1915

The coalition of 1915 – 1916 prelude to Liberal disaster

The coalition of 1915– 1916 has not had a very good press. Liberals have traditionally disliked it because it signalled the end of the last Liberal government to hold power in the United Kingdom. Conservatives have not been much happier with it, seeing it as still dominated by the Liberal ‘old gang’ headed by Asquith, and insufficiently willing to take drastic action to support the army and organise the economy during the First World War. Ian Packer analyses the record of the 1915–16 coalition.

Does it represent a bove all, the coalition to form a new coalition, which health warning against did not deliver mili- did emerge triumphant in 1918. tary victory and it col- In these circumstances, not many Liberal coalitions with lapsed in acrimony in historians have had a kind word to , leav- say for the first wartime coalition Conservatives? ingA the field free for Lloyd George of 1915–1916.1 However, it was not

26 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 The coalition of 1915 – 1916 prelude to Liberal disaster

necessarily a particularly incompe- Edwardian politicians were, there- this could be read as implicit sup- tent administration, nor one that fore, scarcely averse to cross-party port for a coalition, if necessary.4 demonstrated that Liberals were cooperation. However, Asquith’s skillful han- unable to adapt their ideology to In , a Liberal– dling of his Cabinet banished the winning a modern war – it was just Conservative coalition was, for a spectre that the Conservative lead- in power during some of the most moment, a distinct possibility. The ers’ letter had summoned up. While desperate times of the First World leading figures in the Liberal gov- the Conservatives had twenty- War. The coalition did, though, ernment, particularly the prime five more MPs than the Liberals in prove disastrous for Liberalism minister, Asquith, and the Foreign August 1914, the Liberals retained by paving the way for the power Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, were a secure parliamentary majority struggle between Asquith and determined that Britain must inter- through the support of the thirty- Lloyd George which destroyed the vene in a continental war on the seven Labour MPs and eighty-five Edwardian Liberal Party. If the side of and .2 But a Irish Nationalists. Both Labour Liberal Party needs a warning that few other Cabinet members were and the Irish, under the leadership coalitions can be dangerous for your implacably opposed to this conti- of , supported the health than the experience of 1915– nental ‘entanglement’, while the decision to declare war, though 1916 provides a salutary example. majority wavered in between. Until both parties, like the Liberals, con- That the First World War would two tense Cabinet meetings on 2 tained opponents of this decision.5 lead to a was August decided to support a dec- But once they had decided to sup- a possibility that hung over British laration of war if German troops port the Liberals they became bound politics from the very beginning invaded or German ships even more tightly to the govern- of the war. The political era before entered the Channel, it was pos- ment. If the Liberals were replaced 1914 is often seen as the classic time sible that the Liberal government by the Conservatives or a coali- when the ‘swing of the pendulum’ would collapse. In fact, only two tion government that contained ensured alternating Liberal and Cabinet ministers, Lord Morley Conservatives, then Labour and the Conservative governments, with and John Burns, resigned in protest Irish Nationalists feared that objec- secure parliamentary majorities. at this decision, while a maximum tives they held dear would be threat- But the existence of other parties of about twenty MPs harboured ened. Labour was worried that trade ensured that the picture was actu- serious doubts about entering the union privileges would be eroded ally far more complicated. The war.3 This outcome allowed the and particularly disliked the pos- Conservative government of 1886– Liberal government to survive vir- sibility of industrial conscription; 1892 relied on the Liberal Unionists tually intact and direct Britain into the Irish hoped above all to protect for its majority and the government the war. But if there had been an the Home Rule Act that was put on of 1895–1905 was a formal coali- avalanche of resignations from the the statute book in , tion of Conservatives and Liberal Liberal government it was possible though suspended until no later than Unionists. The Liberals relied on the that Asquith and the pro-interven- the end of the war. Irish Nationalists to support them tion ministers would have tried The Liberal government seemed in power in 1892–1895 and again in to survive in power by forming a safe for the time being. In wartime 1910–1914, with the infant Labour coalition with the Conservatives. the Conservative opposition could Party also providing help on the Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, not even criticise the government, latter occasion. In the whole period the Conservative leaders in the for fear of seeming unpatriotic, 1886–1914, only the Liberal govern- House of Commons and House of Left: especially when Asquith pulled ment of 1906–1910 was not either a Lords respectively, had written to H. H. Asquith, off the political masterstroke of coalition or reliant on another party Asquith on 2 August pledging their Liberal Prime appointing the leading general, for its majority. Late Victorian and full support for intervention and Minister 1908–16 Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 27 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster

State for War.6 Divisions of course What under- lead to coalition was amply dem- of the ‘sudden curves’ in politics arose about how to conduct the onstrated in the early days of the he liked to think he had a special war, but they were not fatal to the mined the war in France. When German aptitude for spotting.12 On 17 May, Cabinet’s unity, which had been troops threatened Paris the out- Bonar Law called on Lloyd George built up over nine years of suc- Liberal gov- come was a national coalition under to confirm that Fisher had resigned. cessful peacetime administration. René Viviani on 28 August 1914. In the course of their conversation The crucial dispute was about how ernment and Many British politicians of course the idea of an all-party coalition much of the country’s economic hoped the war would be ‘over by government seems to have arisen and manpower resources should be paved the Christmas’ – and Liberal politicians (though who initiated the idea and committed to the war.7 A group of believed no doubt that a grateful in what context has remained a Liberal ministers, centred around way for the electorate would reward them for matter of dispute).13 When Lloyd McKenna, Runciman and Harcourt coalition was leading the nation to victory. But George reported his conversation took a cautious approach, fear- this prediction proved an illusion. to Asquith, the latter summoned ing that massively disrupting the simply its The decisive battle on the western Bonar Law to 10 Downing Street economy would lead to Britain’s front never came and was replaced and, in a conversation that alleg- financial collapse. Lloyd George, inability to by the stalemate of a line of trenches edly lasted only fifteen minutes, on the other hand, rapidly associ- from Switzerland to the . the termination of the last Liberal ated himself with a policy of ‘total win the war. In early 1915 the Liberal govern- government was agreed. Asquith war’, calling for a massive expan- ment still remained hopeful of an probably felt the need to strike a sion of munitions production and early victory, but these predictions, deal as quickly as possible, before his increasing government interven- too, came to nothing. Instead, a Cabinet’s authority and the Liberal tion in the economy. This was series of military and diplomatic Party’s popularity waned any fur- partly a temperamental difference, setbacks rattled the Cabinet’s opti- ther. A coalition would force the but it also reflected, to a certain mism. The spring Anglo-French Conservatives to share responsibil- extent, pre-war attitudes. Lloyd offensive on the Western Front ity (and blame) for wartime deci- George had been an advocate of failed to break the German lines. sions. It was, for this very reason, expanding the state’s role in social Instead it backfired on the govern- distinctly unpopular with many reform, while McKenna and his ment, when reports, inspired by Conservative leaders, but they felt allies had been much more dubious. military figures, appeared in The they could not refuse for fear of In wartime, Lloyd George merely Times on 14 May 1915, suggesting seeming to run away at a moment expanded his enthusiasm for state that British troops were being held of supreme national crisis.14 Labour, intervention to include organising back by a shortage of ammunition. too, accepted a Cabinet post to pro- the country for victory. This was At the same time, Churchill’s brain- tect trade union interests, while the certainly not a dispute between one child of a landing at the Irish Nationalists declined as they approach that was Liberal and one merely provided another military did not wish to be too closely associ- that was not: Liberalism before 1914 stalemate and neither forced the ated with a British government, or had accommodated itself to a great out of the war nor face taunts at home that they had deal of state intervention, espe- brought the neutral Balkan states accepted paid posts from the British cially in the field of social welfare.8 into the war on Britain’s side. On Crown.15 But it did lay the basis for some of 15 May Lord Fisher, the head of the The government that was the most acrimonious quarrels that Admiralty, resigned in opposition formed, though, reflected the real- rocked the 1915–1916 coalition and to the whole Dardanelles policy.10 ity of the parliamentary situation a lasting enmity between McKenna Under these circumstances, and the continued majority in par- and Lloyd George (though they Asquith had to accept that it was liament of Liberals, Labour and Irish had been rivals long before 1914).9 very unlikely the war could be Nationalists. Asquith remained However, McKenna’s approach, won in the near future. His govern- prime minister; in a Cabinet of whatever its merits, was gradu- ment had to bear the responsibil- twenty-two members there were ally being superseded in 1914–1915 ity for this situation. Its reputation twelve Liberals, plus Arthur because of Kitchener’s decision to was also constantly battered by the Henderson as the representative of train a volunteer army of millions. Conservative press, which hounded Labour, while the Conservatives This started to seriously warp the the government as insufficiently held only eight posts (the remain- economy as munitions and engi- patriotic in its attitude towards ing minister was the non-party neering expanded, while other sec- enemy aliens and even hinted that Kitchener).16 Bonar Law was rel- tors of the economy shrank, starved ministers like Haldane, who was egated to the lowly post of Colonial of manpower and resources. Prices known for his links to Secretary and several Conservatives rose by 40 per cent by May 1915 as before 1914, were secret traitors.11 received non-executive jobs, shortages appeared, and the Cabinet The combination of the ‘shells including Curzon as Lord Privy was increasingly drawn into man- scandal’ and Fisher’s resignation Seal and Lansdowne as Minister aging the economy in an attempt to threatened to seriously damage the without Portfolio. No Conservative supply both the army and the home government’s already waning cred- had a central role in the direction of front. ibility. It was certainly unlikely that the war, other than Balfour, who However, what undermined the Bonar Law would be able to restrain was given the Admiralty. Asquith Liberal government and paved the his backbenchers from openly criti- could feel he had achieved his aim. way for the coalition was simply cising the government. The Conservatives were compelled its inability to win the war. That In this worrying situation to share responsibility for the con- military crisis would probably Asquith took advantage of one duct of the war and any future

28 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster disasters would not just damage the that Asquith could be displaced as Liberal Party under strain. The Liberals. But it was still very much prime minister, as no Conservative most significant of these was how Asquith’s government. Many other could take the job, given the party’s the nation’s manpower should be Liberals outside the leadership were minority status in the Commons. directed. The army was demand- dismayed though. The last purely In May 1915 this kind of specula- ing more and more recruits and Liberal government had been dis- tion must have seemed very tenu- it was increasingly clear that the mantled without any consultation, ous. But, by December 1916, it system of volunteering could not and of course most Liberals con- had become a reality and the coa- provide these recruits. Moreover, tinued to see the Conservatives as lition had fallen, and with it the the army was competing for men their main political enemies and had Edwardian Liberal Party. who were desperately needed in no wish to cooperate with them. A number of factors pushed the munitions factories and on the Asquith had to be at his very best to events in this direction. The first land, as Lloyd George well knew convince a meeting of Liberal MPs was that, as part of the coali- from his experience at the Ministry on 19 May to back the new coali- tion arrangements, Asquith had of Munitions.23 He had come to tion: ‘Some of the members were intended to remove Kitchener the conclusion that only conscrip- moved even to tears, as was the P.M. from the , where he was tion could solve these difficul- himself’, as Christopher Addison widely perceived to be obstructive ties and he made his views public wrote.17 But in the end Liberal MPs and unimaginative, and replace in .24 For the first had no choice but to go along with him with Lloyd George. When time in a great public controversy, their leaders, especially as Asquith clear evidence of the general’s Lloyd George aligned himself with pleaded that the very survival of the popularity made this impossible, the Conservatives, who strongly country was at stake. he appointed Lloyd George head Cooperation supported conscription, while the The real difficulty that Asquith of a new Ministry of Munitions, views of his own party were much created for himself in May 1915 was charged with increasing production between less enthusiastic. The forty or so one that he may not have foreseen. and avoiding any future ‘shells scan- Liberal MPs organised in the Liberal He was the unchallenged leader dals’, like that of May 1915.20 Lloyd Lloyd George War Committee enthusiastically of the Liberal Party. No competi- George would have been happy supported Lloyd George’s views tor had emerged since his unop- to remain as Chancellor of the and the as the only way to secure victory.25 posed coronation in 1908. It was Exchequer, but his new role gave But some Liberal Cabinet ministers, certainly very unlikely that Lloyd him the opportunity to immensely Conserva- headed by Reginald McKenna, who George could replace him. While enhance his reputation as a success- had been installed as Chancellor of the Welshman was very popu- ful wartime leader. It allowed him tives would the Exchequer in May 1915, were lar with the Liberal rank and file, to tackle one of the greatest crises bitterly opposed. McKenna argued he had no supporters or friends confronting Britain’s participation have seemed that conscription would be a disas- in the Liberal Cabinet other than in the war and, in the judgment of unthinkable ter. The country could not afford Churchill, whose reputation had his contemporaries and most histo- an even bigger army and, by tak- been temporarily eclipsed by rians, he did so successfully.21 Lloyd before 1914. ing more men from industry, con- the Dardanelles fiasco anyway.18 George’s role at Munitions suited his scription would ruin the economy Many of the leading Liberals, like temperament ideally. Rather than But in war- and prevent the army, and Britain’s McKenna, openly despised Lloyd being faced by a huge bureaucracy allies, from being properly sup- George and he had been unable to he created his own organisation, time it might plied. Outside the Cabinet, most build up a core of supporters at the exercising his considerable talents Liberal MPs were reluctant to highest level – all his acolytes like for picking the right man for the be feasible, accept conscription – some on prag- Rufus Isaacs or Charles Masterman job. The famous ‘men of push and matic grounds, others because they who had reached Cabinet rank had go’ undertook the detailed admin- as Lloyd felt it breached fundamental Liberal been failures.19 But once a coali- istration (never Lloyd George’s principles of freedom of conscience. tion was formed, it was no longer strong point), while he inspired his George’s However, perhaps only about necessary to be Liberal leader to be subordinates, fought their battles in thirty Liberal MPs were implac- prime minister. If Lloyd George Whitehall and planned out grand plans for ably opposed to conscription in all could attract at least a modicum of strategy. The only yardstick by circumstances.26 If pressed hard, Liberal support he could add this which the ministry’s success would organis- the rest were prepared to accept the to the Conservative MPs (and pos- be judged was its ability to increase policy as the necessary price to win sibly Labour as well) and form a new munitions production, and, as Lloyd ing the the war. But the conscription issue majority government. Cooperation George boasted in his War Memoirs, caused tremendous soul-searching between Lloyd George and the this meant it was a resounding suc- economy and and disquiet in Liberal circles at Conservatives would have seemed cess. Britain produced 70,000 shells increasing the same time as it started to seal unthinkable before 1914. But in a week in May 1915, but by January Lloyd George’s growing reputation wartime it might be feasible, as 1916 the total was 238,000 a week.22 munitions among Conservatives. Lloyd George’s plans for organising This huge increase in production The policy of conscription was the economy and increasing muni- kept the British war effort going. production eased through in stages in 1916, tions production were shared by But it also made Lloyd George a with united backing from the most Conservatives. In May 1915 potential alternative to Asquith as were shared Conservatives and increasingly soft this must have seemed a very far- war leader. opposition from within Liberalism. fetched possibility. But the creation Lloyd George’s success at by most Con- Legislation to conscript single men of the coalition meant it was possi- Munitions also raised crucial ques- aged 19–41 was passed in January ble. In fact it was about the only way tions that put the coalition and the servatives. 1916, and extended to married men

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 29 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster in .27 With a huge offensive crush the need for such discussions. Conservative leaders and that he planned for the summer of 1916, The Conservative backbenches and could ride out Lloyd George’s resig- conscription had become crucial to press were awash with this sort of nation, as he had withstood so many replace British losses in the field. In a criticism by the autumn of 1916, political storms. This was a fatal sense, passing conscription was one and plans began to circulate about mistake, as Lloyd George’s resigna- of Asquith’s last great parliamen- the need for a small War Cabinet to tion was swiftly followed by indica- tary triumphs. He sensed the inevi- take over the direction of the war. tions that he, not Asquith, had the tability of the measure and used his But the Conservative leaders could support of the Conservative leaders. cautious approach to bring most not act on this kind of criticism. As a last throw of the dice, Asquith Liberals with him. Only Sir John If they threatened resignation it dissolved his own government by Simon resigned from the Cabinet would look like desertion in war- resigning himself on 5 December, over the issue, with McKenna and time, and, as the minority party, challenging his critics to see if they his allies refusing to go with him. they could not hope to replace could put together an administra- But, ironically, Asquith’s triumph Asquith with a Conservative. If he tion. This too was a miscalcula- also weakened him. Lloyd George was to be toppled it had to be by a tion. George V asked Bonar Law to was willing to admit Asquith member of his own party, and the see if he could form a government was ‘the only man who can get only person who was both promi- as leader of the next biggest party Compulsion through the House of nent enough to attempt this and in the Commons. He swiftly con- Commons at present’, but once he acceptable to the Conservatives was cluded this was impossible and the had piloted conscription through Lloyd George. baton passed to Lloyd George. In parliament he was no longer so In late 1916 Lloyd George was a few days he put together a new useful to the Conservatives as increasingly amenable to some sort coalition of the Conservatives, war leader. 28 Moreover, his cau- of reconstruction of the government, Labour and some Liberal support- tious, conciliatory approach alien- in particular one that might exclude ers (though none from the previous ated both many Tories and Lloyd his enemies like McKenna from the Cabinet). The coalition of 1915–1916 George, who complained ‘[I]f he centre of power. He may also have was dead. were in the pay of the Germans he been worried that his move from the This outcome was not inevita- could not be of more complete use Ministry of Munitions to Secretary ble even after the December cri- to them’.29 The idea that he might of State for War in had not sis began – after all Lloyd George need to be replaced started to circu- been a success. Lloyd George had to had not planned to replace Asquith late more freely. take some responsibility for the fail- as prime minister. But it was a Events later in 1916 pushed this ure of the Somme offensive, and he reformulation of politics that was idea further forward. The crucial had been unable to politically out- The fatal determined by the peculiar politi- context, as at the creation of the manoeuvre the generals, such as Sir step in cal circumstances of 1915–1916, coalition in May 1915, was mili- William Robertson and Sir Douglas which had brought the Liberals and tary and diplomatic.30 The great Haig.32 Lloyd George may have felt ending the Conservatives together in coalition. Somme offensive of July 1916 came the need to reassert his role in the Its impact on the Liberal Party was to nothing; Britain suffered a major conduct of the war and his standing coalition of catastrophic. The party was cut in reverse when its invasion of central in the Cabinet. In two from top to bottom and one was defeated by the Ottoman he started to turn increasingly to the 1915–1916 section of it was in alliance with Empire; and Rumania collapsed idea of a War Cabinet that would the Conservatives – a disaster it had on the eastern front. Food produc- direct strategy. In Lloyd George’s was taken on sedulously avoided since the split tion remained perilously close to version, Asquith would be excluded with the Liberal Unionists in 1886. the minimum needed to feed the from this body (as would McKenna), 1 December In 1918 the Liberals would suffer an population while conscription had but would remain as prime minister electoral catastrophe even greater not solved the basic shortage of and leader of the Liberal Party. Lloyd 1916, when than that of 1886, when Asquith’s manpower needed for the army, George’s key ally was Bonar Law, followers were annihilated, while industry, agriculture and transport. who was equally keen to reconstruct Lloyd George Lloyd George’s emerged as prison- Meanwhile, the whole economy the government, if only to show his ers of the Conservatives. The end was increasingly dependent on backbenchers and the Conservative met Asquith, of the 1915–1916 coalition also put loans from the and press that something was being done a full stop to the ‘progressive alli- thus the goodwill of the American to try and turn around the dire stra- put the War ance’ with the infant Labour Party. government and financial sector. tegic situation.33 Henderson had functioned more Some senior politicians came to The fatal step in ending the coa- Cabinet plan or less as part of the Liberal group believe victory was impossible and lition of 1915–1916 was taken on 1 to him, and in the 1915–1916 Cabinet, but in Lord Lansdowne circulated a mem- December 1916, when Lloyd George December 1916 he refused to act orandum, calling for a compromise met Asquith, put the War Cabinet suggested with Asquith and his ministers and peace, which the Cabinet dis- plan to him, and suggested he Labour took on an enhanced role cussed on 22 November 1916.31 The would resign if the proposal was not he would in Lloyd George’s new coalition Cabinet rejected the idea as imprac- accepted.34 Initially, Asquith was government.36 This development tical and an admission of defeat. cautious and seemed to be willing to resign if the helped ensure that there would be But it made Asquith increasingly negotiate around the proposal. But an independent successor waiting vulnerable to the accusation that then he backtracked.35 Possibly he proposal was in the wings once the Liberal Party he was not providing the leadership came to believe that Lloyd George suffered electoral disaster in 1918, needed to inspire the nation and did not have the support of the not accepted. rather than a friendly ally.

30 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to liberal disaster

Chamberlain memorandum, 1–5 But if the 1915–1916 coalition Ingenious controls and rationing in 1918, des- August 1914. paved the way for a set of disas- perately engaging in crisis man- 5 D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, (2nd ters for the Liberal Party, it also as it was, it agement, only gradually accepting edn., Richard Cohen Books, 1997), slaughtered a number of Liberal radical new forms of state interven- pp. 164–85; A. Jackson, Home Rule: an sacred cows. In addition to enact- could only tion and constrained all the time by Irish History, 1800–2000 (Weidenfeld & ing conscription the famous party bickering and sectional inter- Nicolson, 2003), pp. 142–48. ‘McKenna duties’ were included in produce ests.40 In other words, it behaved 6 J. Pollock, Kitchener (Robinson, 2002), pp. 371–74. the September 1915 budget, impos- political much as Asquith’s government had 7 The terms of this debate are set out in ing exceptionally high duties on done. Behind the rhetoric there was D. French, British Economic and Strate- various luxury imports, includ- a great deal of continuity and, if gic Planning 1905–1915 (George Allen & ing motor cars.37 Their intention stability if Lloyd George’s regime took a more Unwin, 1982), esp. pp. 98–123. was obviously protectionist and the govern- active role in organising the econ- 8 I. Packer, Liberal Government and Poli- no pretence could be maintained omy, it was in the winter of 1917– tics, 1905–15 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 142–56. that free trade had survived in ment could 1918, under the impact of a series of 9 For McKenna see M. Farr, Reginald wartime. The coalition also failed crises, rather than as a result of any McKenna: Financier among Statesmen, to enact some crucial Liberal poli- actually start new vision. 1863–1916 (Routledge, 2007). cies, especially Irish home rule. With a great deal of hindsight it 10 The military and strategic back- After the Easter Rising of April to produce is possible to take a more balanced ground to these events is dealt with 1916 the Liberals within the gov- view of the 1915–1916 coalition. in D. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914–1916 (Allen & Unwin, 1986), ernment insisted there should be military suc- Its birth had been inauspicious. pp. 78–99. The classic account of the a concerted attempt to keep Irish Neither Conservative nor Liberal political struggle in May 1915 remains Nationalist opinion behind the war cess. Without MPs or activists had wanted it and M. Pugh, ‘Asquith, Bonar Law and the effort by trying to reach an agreed its real author, Asquith, hoped to First Coalition’, Historical Journal, 17 settlement on home rule. Lloyd this crucial use the Conservatives as a sort of (1974), pp. 813–36. George took on a central role in the human shield for the Liberals, or at 11 D. Sommer, Haldane of Cloan: His Life negotiations and suggested that the factor, the least make them share the blame for and Times (George Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 317–22, 384. Home Rule Bill, enacted but sus- the government’s inability to win 12 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. pended in September 1914, might call for new the war. This was a scheme of some c.6990, Margot Asquith papers, H. H. be implemented immediately, but ingenuity, probably conceived on to Margot Asquith, 25 Feb. 1909. not in the six counties of Northern men and new the spur of the moment. But, ingen- 13 R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (John Mur- . Necessarily, there was ious as it was, it could only produce ray, 1999), pp. 184–86 summarises vir- some ambiguity about whether measures political stability if the government tually all that is known of these events. 14 Austen Chamberlain to Bonar Law, this exclusion would be temporary would not could actually start to produce mili- 17 May 1915, in Sir Charles Petrie, The or permanent. But this eminently tary success. Without this crucial Life and Times of the Rt Hon Sir Austen Liberal policy was undermined by go away, and factor, the call for new men and new Chamberlain, 2 vols. (Cassell, 1939–40), the Conservatives in the Cabinet measures would not go away, and in vol. ii, pp. 50–1. who disliked any notion of home in Decem- December 1916 it destroyed the coa- 15 C. Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (GPC rule. By insisting on clarification lition and ultimately the Edwardian Books, 1990), pp. 89–90; Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 148–50. of the future status of Northern ber 1916 it Liberal Party. 16 From a Liberal point of view Haldane, Ireland they killed the scheme and Samuel, Montagu, Pease, Emmott, the last chance of implementing destroyed Dr Ian Packer is Reader in History at Lucas, Hobhouse and Beauchamp all Gladstone’s home rule policy.38 the University of Lincoln and author lost their places in the Cabinet to make So – one verdict on the coalition the coalition of a number of works on Edwardian room for the new arrivals, though the might be that not only did it lead to Liberalism, including Lloyd George, Conservatives had only specifically disaster for the Liberals, it was not and ulti- Liberalism and the Land: the Land insisted that Haldane be sacked. 17 Addison’s Diary, 19 May 1915 in C. even very successful in protecting issue and Party Politics 1906–1914 Addison, Four and a Half Years, 2 vols. Liberalism. But from a wider per- mately the (Royal Historical Society, 2001) and (Hutchinson, 1934), vol. i, p. 80. spective, does it deserve its repu- Liberal Government and Politics 1905– 18 Churchill was demoted to Chancellor tation of lack of competence in Edwardian 1915 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). of the Duchy of Lancaster in the coa- pursuing the war effort? Here, the lition government and resigned alto- coalition’s reputation has started to Liberal Party. 1 This approach goes all the way back gether in . to Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and 19 Rufus Isaacs had resigned from the rise, if only because it has become Cabinet in 1913 and Masterman in Feb- increasingly clear that the distinc- the War, 1914–1916 (Thornton Butter- worth, 1928). For a later example, from ruary 1915. tion between the coalition and its a Lloyd Georgian perspective, R. J. Q. 20 S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Politi- successor of 1916–1918 has been Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd cal Press in Britain (Fontana, 1990), pp. overdrawn. The new War Cabinet George and the Ministry of Munitions, 716–17. of five that Lloyd George set up to 1915–16 (Cassell, 1978). 21 Adams, Arms and the Wizard. 2 These matters are dealt with succinctly 22 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2 vols. conduct the war gradually grew (Odhams, 1938), vol. i, p. 388. larger as more and more ministers in K. M. Wilson, ‘’ in K. M. Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 23 The conscription debate is dealt with and soldiers attended and it soon 1914 (Routledge, 2003), pp. 175–208. in R. J. Q. Adams and P. Poirier, The found itself just as clogged with 3 For these MPs see Bodleian Library, Conscription Controversy in Great Brit- details as Asquith’s old Cabinet.39 Oxford, Denman Papers, 4 (3), Minute ain, 1900–1918 (Macmillan, 1987), pp. On crucial issues like food distribu- Book 1914–1915. 89–110. tion Lloyd George’s new Cabinet 4 Birmingham University Library, stumbled gradually towards price Austen Chamberlain papers 14/2/2, concluded on page 51

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 31 crisis, coalition and cuts: the liberals and the national government, 1931

431. Sinclair, 18 Aug. 1931. Maclean 49 Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump, Budgetary Situation’, memoran- 17 See HM Treasury, Budget 2010 had led the independent Liberal pp. 220–7; G. C. Allen, ‘Eco- dum by Sir Herbert Samuel, 3 (: The Stationery Office, opposition to the Lloyd George nomic Advice for Lloyd George’, Aug. 1931, and A/77/7, ‘Course of June 2010), p. 89. Coalition in 1919–20, follow- in G. C. Allen, British Industry and Events’. 18 Middleton, ‘British monetary ing Asquith’s defeat at East Fife; Economic Policy (London: Macmil- 54 These issues are explored in David and fiscal policy’, p. 431; Robert a solicitor by profession, he had lan, 1979), pp. 196–207. Skidelsky Dutton’s article. Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: become a company director when understates the centrality of the 55 Ernest Simon papers, M11/16/32, The Labour Government of 1929– out of parliament in the 1920s. proposed reduction in current Ernest Simon to Ramsay Muir 1931 (London: Macmillan, 1967), See Philip Williamson, ‘Maclean, government spending to the Lib- (copy), 2 Feb. 1934. p. 379. Sir Donald (1864–1932)’, Oxford erals’ new policy. 56 For an example of teachers’ disaf- 19 Andrew Thorpe, The British Gen- Dictionary of National Biography 50 Compare Sir Herbert Samu- fection with the Liberals, see Par- eral Election of 1931 (Oxford: OUP, (Oxford: OUP, 2004; online edi- el’s speech in the debate on the liamentary Archives, David Lloyd 1991), pp. 220–1. tion, Jan. 2008). National Economy Bill, Han- George papers, G/33/3/74, Haydn 20 Hansard, H.C. Deb., fifth series, 34 , 13 Aug. 1931. sard, H.C. Deb., fifth series, 256, Jones to , 12 257, 28 Sept. 1931, cols. 83–7, at 35 Thurso papers, THRS III 3/5, Sir 14 Sept. 1931, cols. 537–54, with Oct. 1932. Jones sat on the execu- col. 84. Archibald Sinclair to Sir Herbert Vince Cable, ‘Keynes would tive committee of the National 21 News Chronicle, 1 and 22 Aug. Samuel (copy), 14 Aug. 1931. be on our side’, New Statesman, Association of Schoolmasters. 1931; Trinity College Library, 36 Bodleian Library, Maclean papers 12 Jan. 2011, available online 57 On London, see Sir , Cambridge, Layton papers 101/4, (dep. c. 468), 121–2, Sir Donald at http://www.newstates- Forty Years In and Out of Parlia- Sir Walter Layton to Philip Snow- Maclean to Lady Maclean, 24 man.com/economy/2011/01/ ment (London: Andrew Melrose, den (copy), 11 Aug. 1931. Aug. 1931, and 127, Sir Donald investment-keynes-essay. 1947), p. 90, and Guard- 22 A group of Liberal activists Maclean to his family, 24 Aug. 51 Samuel papers, A/77/7, ‘Course ian, 6 March 1934; on Darwen, and economists led by Nor- 1931. of Events’; Maclean papers (dep. see Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, man Crump and E. A. Lessing 37 For MacDonald’s attempt to c. 468), 116, Sir Donald Maclean to pp. 370–1. A useful overview of attempted to revive the national persuade the Liberals to accept Lady Maclean, 18 Aug. 1931. local election trends in the 1930s treaty idea in September 1931, a smaller cuts package than the 52 Samuel papers, A/77/7, ‘Course appears in Chris Cook, ‘Liber- as a means of staving off an elec- Conservatives demanded, see of Events’. Lothian urged als, Labour and Local Elections’, tion fought on the tariff issue: Williamson, National Crisis, p. Samuel to emphasise this argu- in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook see National Archives of Scot- 325. ment in public: Lothian papers, (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal, land, Edinburgh, Lothian papers, 38 Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert GD40/17/143/37–8, Lord Lothian 1918–1939 (London: Macmillan, GD40/17/144/57–67, ‘Liberalism Samuel: A Political Life (Oxford: to Sir Herbert Samuel (copy), 7 1975). and the Crisis of the £’, undated OUP, 1992), p. 312. For Samuel’s Sept. 1931. 58 Middleton, ‘British monetary and but probably 16 Sept. 1931. support for public works pro- 53 Samuel papers, A/77/1, ‘The fiscal policy’, pp. 436–8. 23 News Chronicle, 3 Sept. 1931; Wil- grammes after 1932, see Hansard, liamson, National Crisis, p. 424. H.C. Deb., fifth series, 274, 16 24 British Library, Reading private Feb. 1933, cols. 1242–56. papers (Eur. F118), 112–7, Lord 39 Maclean papers (dep. c. 468), Lothian to Sir Herbert Samuel, 25 143–6, Walter Runciman to Sir Aug. 1931. Donald Maclean, 25 Aug. 1931; 25 Williamson, National Crisis, p. Manchester Guardian, 29 Aug. 1931. 364–5. 40 Williamson, National Crisis, p. The coalition of 1915–1916: prelude to Liberal disaster 26 Samuel papers, A/77/12, David 354. continued from page 31 Lloyd George to Sir Herbert Sam- 41 Reading private papers (Eur. uel, 25 Aug. 1931. F118), 131–3, memorandum by 24 Lloyd George’s ‘Preface’ to his and the Generals (Associated Uni- 27 Lothian papers, GD40/17/143/12, Lord Reading on meeting with collected wartime speeches, versity Press, 1983). Samuel to Lothian, 21 Aug. 1931, David Lloyd George, 11 Sept. Through Terror to Triumph (Hodder 33 Adams, Bonar Law, pp. 220–9. and GD40/17/143/26–28, Lothian 1931; Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, and Stoughton, 1915), published 34 House of Lords Record Office, to Samuel (copy), 31 Aug. 1931; pp. 320–1. on 13 Sept. 1915. Bonar Law papers 53/4/27, Churchill Archives Centre, Cam- 42 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 25 M. Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Asquith to Lloyd George, 1 Dec. bridge, Thurso papers, III 3/5, 394–7, 413, 433–6. Committee and the Liberal Advo- 1916 (copy). Philip Oliver to Sir Archibald 43 MSS. Simon, 68 fo. 163, Sir John cacy of Conscription in Britain, 35 The literature on the December Sinclair, 27 Aug. 1931. Simon to Ramsay MacDonald 1914–1916’, Historical Journal, 51 1916 crisis is enormous. See in par- 28 Manchester City Archives, Ernest (copy), 5 Oct. 1931. (2008), pp. 399–420. ticular, M. Fry, ‘Political Change Simon papers, M11/11/5, Diary, 44 Peter Clarke, The Keynesian Revo- 26 Thirty-four Liberal MPs voted in Britain, August 1914 to Decem- 1929–35, entry for 21 Sept. 1931. lution in the Making, 1924–1936 against the first reading of the ber 1916: Lloyd George replaces 29 David Marquand, ‘1924–1932’, in (Oxford, 1988), pp. 95, 99. National Service Bill in January Asquith: the Issues Underlying David Butler (ed.), Coalitions in 45 Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, p. 1916. the Drama’, Historical Journal, 31 British Politics (London: Macmil- 312; Duncan Tanner, ‘The strange 27 J. Turner, British Politics and the (1980), pp. 609–27; J. M. McEwen, lan, 1978), p. 61. death of Liberal ’, His- Great War: Coalition and Conflict, The Struggle for Mastery in Brit- 30 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. torical Journal, 37 (1994), p. 975. A 1915–1918 (Yale University Press, ain: Lloyd George versus Asquith, 249–50. similar argument appears in Ross 1992), pp. 64–90. December 1916’, Journal of British 31 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MSS. McKibbin, Parties and People: Eng- 28 F. Stevenson Diary, 18 April Studies, 18 (1978), pp. 131–56. Simon, 249 fos. 45–6, Note by land 1914–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1916, in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd 36 Wrigley, Henderson, pp. 107–11. Sir John Simon, 1 Dec. 1930. For 2010), pp. 66–7. George: a Diary by Frances Stevenson 37 French, British Strategy and War the continued attachment to free 46 The Times, 28 March and 11 April (Hutchinson, 1971), p. 107. Aims, pp. 124–6. trade of most of Lloyd George’s 1929. The distinction between the 29 Ibid., 12 Oct. 1915, Lloyd George: a 38 Jackson, Home Rule, pp. 152–74. critics, see Thurso papers, THRS pledge and the policy was coined Diary, p. 68. 39 J. Turner, ‘Cabinets, Committees I, Sir Archibald Sinclair to C. E. by Maclean. 30 French, British Strategy and War and Secretariats’ in K. Burk (ed.), Taylor (copy), 26 May 1931, and 47 L o t h i a n p a p e r s , Aims, pp. 220–43. War and the State: the Transforma- Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 29 GD40/17/140/456–8, ‘The Views 31 National Archives, Cabinet papers tion of British Government, 1914–19 June 1931. of Mr. J. M. Keynes’, memoran- 37/159/32, Lord Lansdowne, (Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 57–83. 32 MSS. Simon, 249 fos. 5–8, mem- dum by G. C. Allen, undated but ‘Terms on which a Peace might be 40 J. Harris, ‘Bureaucrats and Busi- orandum by Sir John Simon at summer 1930. considered’, 13 Nov. 1916. nessmen in British Food Control, meeting of leading Liberals, 20 48 Lothian papers, GD40/17/134/88– 32 Lloyd George’s fraught relations 1916–19’ in Burk (ed.), War and the Nov. 1930. 116, memorandum by Lothian on with the army are explored in State, pp. 135–56. 33 Thurso papers, THRS III 3/5, Sir the unemployment problem, 10 D. R. Woodward, Lloyd George Herbert Samuel to Sir Archibald June 1930.

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