The coalition of 1915 – 1916 preLuDe to Liberal DisAster The coalition of 1915– 1916 has not had a very good press. Liberals have traditionally disliked it because it signalled the end of the last Liberal government to hold power in the United Kingdom. Conservatives have not been much happier with it, seeing it as still dominated by the Liberal ‘old gang’ headed by Asquith, and insufficiently willing to take drastic action to support the army and organise the economy during the First World War. Ian Packer analyses the record of the 1915–16 coalition. Does it represent a bove all, the coalition to form a new coalition, which health warning against did not deliver mili- did emerge triumphant in 1918. tary victory and it col- In these circumstances, not many Liberal coalitions with lapsed in acrimony in historians have had a kind word to December 1916, leav- say for the first wartime coalition Conservatives? Aing the field free for Lloyd George of 1915–1916.1 However, it was not 26 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 The coalition of 1915 – 1916 preLuDe to Liberal DisAster necessarily a particularly incompe- Edwardian politicians were, there- this could be read as implicit sup- tent administration, nor one that fore, scarcely averse to cross-party port for a coalition, if necessary.4 demonstrated that Liberals were cooperation. However, Asquith’s skillful han- unable to adapt their ideology to In August 1914, a Liberal– dling of his Cabinet banished the winning a modern war – it was just Conservative coalition was, for a spectre that the Conservative lead- in power during some of the most moment, a distinct possibility. The ers’ letter had summoned up. While desperate times of the First World leading figures in the Liberal gov- the Conservatives had twenty- War. The coalition did, though, ernment, particularly the prime five more MPs than the Liberals in prove disastrous for Liberalism minister, Asquith, and the Foreign August 1914, the Liberals retained by paving the way for the power Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, were a secure parliamentary majority struggle between Asquith and determined that Britain must inter- through the support of the thirty- Lloyd George which destroyed the vene in a continental war on the seven Labour MPs and eighty-five Edwardian Liberal Party. If the side of Russia and France.2 But a Irish Nationalists. Both Labour Liberal Party needs a warning that few other Cabinet members were and the Irish, under the leadership coalitions can be dangerous for your implacably opposed to this conti- of John Redmond, supported the health than the experience of 1915– nental ‘entanglement’, while the decision to declare war, though 1916 provides a salutary example. majority wavered in between. Until both parties, like the Liberals, con- That the First World War would two tense Cabinet meetings on 2 tained opponents of this decision.5 lead to a coalition government was August decided to support a dec- But once they had decided to sup- a possibility that hung over British laration of war if German troops port the Liberals they became bound politics from the very beginning invaded Belgium or German ships even more tightly to the govern- of the war. The political era before entered the Channel, it was pos- ment. If the Liberals were replaced 1914 is often seen as the classic time sible that the Liberal government by the Conservatives or a coali- when the ‘swing of the pendulum’ would collapse. In fact, only two tion government that contained ensured alternating Liberal and Cabinet ministers, Lord Morley Conservatives, then Labour and the Conservative governments, with and John Burns, resigned in protest Irish Nationalists feared that objec- secure parliamentary majorities. at this decision, while a maximum tives they held dear would be threat- But the existence of other parties of about twenty MPs harboured ened. Labour was worried that trade ensured that the picture was actu- serious doubts about entering the union privileges would be eroded ally far more complicated. The war.3 This outcome allowed the and particularly disliked the pos- Conservative government of 1886– Liberal government to survive vir- sibility of industrial conscription; 1892 relied on the Liberal Unionists tually intact and direct Britain into the Irish hoped above all to protect for its majority and the government the war. But if there had been an the Home Rule Act that was put on of 1895–1905 was a formal coali- avalanche of resignations from the the statute book in September 1914, tion of Conservatives and Liberal Liberal government it was possible though suspended until no later than Unionists. The Liberals relied on the that Asquith and the pro-interven- the end of the war. Irish Nationalists to support them tion ministers would have tried The Liberal government seemed in power in 1892–1895 and again in to survive in power by forming a safe for the time being. In wartime 1910–1914, with the infant Labour coalition with the Conservatives. the Conservative opposition could Party also providing help on the Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, not even criticise the government, latter occasion. In the whole period the Conservative leaders in the for fear of seeming unpatriotic, 1886–1914, only the Liberal govern- House of Commons and House of Left: especially when Asquith pulled ment of 1906–1910 was not either a Lords respectively, had written to H. H. Asquith, off the political masterstroke of coalition or reliant on another party Asquith on 2 August pledging their Liberal Prime appointing the leading general, for its majority. Late Victorian and full support for intervention and Minister 1908–16 Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 27 tHe coalition of 1915–1916: preLuDe to Liberal DisAster State for War.6 Divisions of course what under- lead to coalition was amply dem- of the ‘sudden curves’ in politics arose about how to conduct the onstrated in the early days of the he liked to think he had a special war, but they were not fatal to the mined the war in France. When German aptitude for spotting.12 On 17 May, Cabinet’s unity, which had been troops threatened Paris the out- Bonar Law called on Lloyd George built up over nine years of suc- Liberal gov- come was a national coalition under to confirm that Fisher had resigned. cessful peacetime administration. René Viviani on 28 August 1914. In the course of their conversation The crucial dispute was about how ernment and Many British politicians of course the idea of an all-party coalition much of the country’s economic hoped the war would be ‘over by government seems to have arisen and manpower resources should be paved the Christmas’ – and Liberal politicians (though who initiated the idea and committed to the war.7 A group of believed no doubt that a grateful in what context has remained a Liberal ministers, centred around way for the electorate would reward them for matter of dispute).13 When Lloyd McKenna, Runciman and Harcourt coalition was leading the nation to victory. But George reported his conversation took a cautious approach, fear- this prediction proved an illusion. to Asquith, the latter summoned ing that massively disrupting the simply its The decisive battle on the western Bonar Law to 10 Downing Street economy would lead to Britain’s front never came and was replaced and, in a conversation that alleg- financial collapse. Lloyd George, inability to by the stalemate of a line of trenches edly lasted only fifteen minutes, on the other hand, rapidly associ- from Switzerland to the North Sea. the termination of the last Liberal ated himself with a policy of ‘total win the war. In early 1915 the Liberal govern- government was agreed. Asquith war’, calling for a massive expan- ment still remained hopeful of an probably felt the need to strike a sion of munitions production and early victory, but these predictions, deal as quickly as possible, before his increasing government interven- too, came to nothing. Instead, a Cabinet’s authority and the Liberal tion in the economy. This was series of military and diplomatic Party’s popularity waned any fur- partly a temperamental difference, setbacks rattled the Cabinet’s opti- ther. A coalition would force the but it also reflected, to a certain mism. The spring Anglo-French Conservatives to share responsibil- extent, pre-war attitudes. Lloyd offensive on the Western Front ity (and blame) for wartime deci- George had been an advocate of failed to break the German lines. sions. It was, for this very reason, expanding the state’s role in social Instead it backfired on the govern- distinctly unpopular with many reform, while McKenna and his ment, when reports, inspired by Conservative leaders, but they felt allies had been much more dubious. military figures, appeared in The they could not refuse for fear of In wartime, Lloyd George merely Times on 14 May 1915, suggesting seeming to run away at a moment expanded his enthusiasm for state that British troops were being held of supreme national crisis.14 Labour, intervention to include organising back by a shortage of ammunition. too, accepted a Cabinet post to pro- the country for victory. This was At the same time, Churchill’s brain- tect trade union interests, while the certainly not a dispute between one child of a landing at the Dardanelles Irish Nationalists declined as they approach that was Liberal and one merely provided another military did not wish to be too closely associ- that was not: Liberalism before 1914 stalemate and neither forced the ated with a British government, or had accommodated itself to a great Ottoman Empire out of the war nor face taunts at home that they had deal of state intervention, espe- brought the neutral Balkan states accepted paid posts from the British cially in the field of social welfare.8 into the war on Britain’s side.