Deterrence As the Macguffin: the Case for Arms Control in Outer Space

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Deterrence As the Macguffin: the Case for Arms Control in Outer Space Deterrence as the MacGuf®n: The Case for Arms Control in Outer Space David A. Koplow* INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 294 I. SECURITY IN SPACE ............................................ 297 A. The Use of Space.................................. 297 B. Threats to Space .................................. 300 C. Types of Anti-Satellite Weapons ...................... 305 II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DETERRENCE ....................... 307 A. Deterrence by Threat of Retaliation . 311 1. Deterrence by Threat of Symmetric Retaliation . 312 2. Deterrence by Threat of Asymmetric Retaliation . 312 B. Deterrence by Denial .............................. 314 1. Deterrence by Interception ....................... 315 2. Deterrence by Self-Protection ..................... 316 C. Weaknesses in the Concept of Deterrence . 318 III. ARMS CONTROL............................................... 322 A. The Success of Nuclear Arms Control . 323 B. The Lack of Arms Control in Space .................... 327 C. Weaknesses in the Concept of Arms Control . 334 IV. LIMITATIONS ON DETERRENCE IN SPACE ........................... 336 A. Limitations on Deterrence by Threat of Symmetric Retaliation in Space ........................................ 336 B. Limitations on Deterrence by Threat of Asymmetric Retaliation in Space ............................... 338 C. Limitations on Deterrence by Denial via Interception in Space 339 D. Limitations on Deterrence by Denial via Protection or Resiliency in Space ................................ 340 V. ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE ...................................... 341 CONCLUSION....................................................... 344 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments from the following experts, colleagues and friends who reviewed prior drafts of this manuscript: Michael R. Cannon, Dean Cheng, Brian G. Chow, William R. Gade, Nancy W. Gallagher, Peter L. Hays, Henry R. Hertzfeld, Newell Highsmith, Theresa Hitchens, Peter Hulsroj, Christopher D. Johnson, Daniel H. Joyner, Barry Kellman, Paul B. Larsen, Irmgard Marboe, Al Mauroni, Scott Pace, Brad Roberts, Victoria Samson, and James B. (Bart) Wager, Jr. The author also thanks Danielle Ellison for her extraordinarily effective research assistance throughout this project. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. government or any other entity. © 2020, David A. Koplow. 293 294 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:293 INTRODUCTION Legendary Hollywood directors Alfred Hitchcock and John Huston perfected the literary device of the ªMacGuf®nº in classic ®lm noir thrillers such as ªThe 39 Stepsº and ªThe Maltese Falcon.º A MacGuf®n is an object, goal, or other motivator, not always fully explained or justi®ed, that drives the plot's action, by inspiring the protagonists to pursue it with ceaseless zeal, determination, and sac- ri®ce. It doesn't matter all that much just what the MacGuf®n really consists of ± some pilfered secret government plans for a silent aircraft engine, an elusive an- cient jewel-encrusted statuette of a bird, or in later incarnations, the Lost Ark of the Covenant or the rebels' vulnerability analysis for the Death Star ± as long as the actors value it and devote themselves to seeking, acquiring, protecting, and exploiting it. They may voyage all over the world in suspenseful hot pursuit of the MacGuf®n, never being sure just where the adventure will take them, how much it may cost, or what bodily harm they may have to endure in the quest.1 In like fashion, the concept of deterrence has long been the MacGuf®n of mod- ern U.S. defense strategy and doctrine. For decades, deterrence has been por- trayed as the Holy Grail of strategic thought and action, to be stalked and husbanded relentlessly. Key actors and commentators perpetually extoll its vir- tues and underscore its importance, while the intricate plot lines of international relations bubble around it. Fervent writings parse the arcane sources and the diverse meanings of deterrence, scrutinize its many applications, and expound upon its extension to all manner of additional targets and sectors. We worry breathlessly about whether we have it, or does someone else have it, or have we suddenly lost it (deterrence is frequently said to be sacri®ced when we are ªlulled to sleepº by erstwhile favorable security developments that can nonetheless be exploited by cunning rogues). We certainly devote limitless time and treasure to the pursuit of deterrence, and we indefatigably inject military and diplomatic per- sonnel into danger zones all around the globe to support and promote it. This Article argues that deterrence is not enough; sound national security pol- icy requires a more complicated, multi-pronged approach, pairing the leitmotif of deterrence with additional methods. In one regard, this contention is not at all sur- prising. Indeed, within the realm of nuclear weapons, the trophy of deterrence has always been tightly paired with the art and science of another distinct strategic concept: arms control and disarmament. Generations of SALT, START, test ban, and other nuclear agreements have long recognized that judicious diplomatic and legal measures can accomplish what the craft of deterrence alone cannot: arms control treaties can emplace direct reductions in the numbers, types, and capabil- ities of the deadly weapons that adversaries can ®eld against us, and can help shape their deployment and use. 1. See MICHAEL WALKER, HITCHCOCK'S MOTIFS 296-306 (2005); MacGuf®n, WIKIPEDIA, https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/MacGuf®n (last updated Sept. 23, 2019); What Is a MacGuf®n?, ELEMENTSOFCINEMA. COM, https://perma.cc/5Y8X-LF6Q; Frequently-Asked Questions, `THE MACGUFFIN' WEB PAGES, https:// perma.cc/LP29-M4ZM (last updated Mar. 22, 2016). 2019] THE CASE FOR ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE 295 But, oddly, that insight from the nuclear realm of mating deterrence with arms control has not been applied to outer space. Regarding space, when the United States confronts, as it does today, a growing perception of a rising inter- national threat, it is deterrence ± and deterrence alone ± that has been sum- moned. Concepts for arms control ± even relatively modest initial and partial steps ± are categorically ruled off the table, as U.S. security professionals con- ®ne their analyses, rhetoric, and deployment programs to a reinvigorated quest for heavily weaponized pure deterrence in all its manifestations. This single- minded vision of arms racing is particularly problematic today because, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, the prospects for effective deterrence are consid- erably weaker, and the opportunities for meaningful arms control are appreci- ably stronger, in space than in the nuclear sector. A return to a more balanced approach, drawing upon both concepts in pursuit of security in space, is there- fore overdue and imperative. The Article is organized to advance that thesis as follows. After this Introduction, Part I provides essential background regarding the patterns of ex- ploitation of space by the United States and others, for a wide and growing array of both military and civilian applications. It also describes the modern elevated threat to the stability and security of satellite services, and it highlights the recent U.S. responses to those provocations ± including via bellicose leadership rhetoric, organizational reforms, and muscular new operational programs. Part II then describes the theory and practice of deterrence. In the classic for- mulation, there are two complementary types of deterrence, each of which com- prises two alternative sub-types. First, there is deterrence by threat of retaliation: the communication to adversaries that if they undertake hostile action X, we will respond with counter-action Y, which they would ®nd so unpleasant, damaging, or expensive that it would deprive them of any gains or advantages that X might initially have seemed to offer. The two sub-types arise because our threatened re- taliatory action Y might be symmetric or asymmetric ± that is, it might roughly correspond to X in terms of quality, venue, and nature, or it might occur in a rather different mode or theater of operations. The second main type is deterrence by denial, an effort to persuade the adver- saries not to undertake actions we dislike because those actions will not succeed; we have the capability to frustrate the accomplishment of the harmful goals they have in mind. The sub-types here are interceptive (interrupting enemy action while it is underway) and self-protective (sheltering ourselves and our assets to withstand the potential effects of their attack). In all of this, it should be noted, the vocabulary and structure of the various types and sub-types of deterrence are not completely standardized, and the com- ponents of the 2x2 matrix are not always clean and pure ± there may be quali®ca- tions, overlaps, and fuzzy edges. But the key concept is that deterrence is a heavily psychological ploy: it attempts to persuade the opponents not to act in ways we disfavor, by altering their own calculations of the expected probabilities and payoffs. 296 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:293 Part III then introduces the alternative concept of arms control, which, in con- trast to deterrence, undertakes to directly reduce the adversaries' military prow- ess, shaving their physical capability for
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