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Israeli Counterterrorism Decision-Making: the Causes and Costs of A-Strategic Incoherence

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Israeli Counterterrorism Decision-Making: the Causes and Costs of A-Strategic Incoherence Wesleyan University The Honors College Israeli Counterterrorism Decision-Making: The Causes and Costs of A-Strategic Incoherence by Rachel E. Tecott Class of 2011 A thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Government Middletown, Connecticut April, 2011 2 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Erica Chenoweth, for consistently going above and beyond the call of duty as a professor and as an advisor. She pushed me to push myself, and I am a stronger student and a stronger person for having worked with her. I am also grateful to the Israeli counterterrorism experts who took the time to speak with me. Their insights opened a window into the Israeli counterterrorism decision-making process, and I appreciate their time and candor. Lastly, I would like to thank the professors, friends, and family members who supported me throughout the thesis process, whether by offering their eyes, their ears, or simple words of encouragement. This material is based upon work supported by the Science and Technology directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008-ST-061-ST0004, made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, www.start.umd.edu). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security at START. 3 Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction ...............................................................................................4 Central Assertions ....................................................................................................................... 5 Defining Terrorism ..................................................................................................................... 7 A Brief History of Palestinian Terrorism............................................................................... 9 Measuring the “Efficacy” of Counterterrorism..................................................................11 A Brief History of Israeli Counterterrorism .......................................................................13 Theoretical Explanations of Defense Decision-Making.....................................................16 Methodology ...............................................................................................................................22 Thesis Layout..............................................................................................................................26 Chapter Two: Israeli Counterterrorism is Ineffective and Incoherent................ 27 Extant Findings..........................................................................................................................27 Israeli Counterterrorism is Ineffective .................................................................................32 Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy is Incoherent................................................................44 Chapter Three: Organizational Routines and International Pressures............... 54 Overview of NSE Organizations ............................................................................................55 An Autonomous NSE................................................................................................................61 Organizational Routines Within the NSE ............................................................................74 Politicians' Sensitivity to International Pressures..............................................................82 In Sum..........................................................................................................................................92 Chapter Four: Inconsistency Yields Inefficacy ......................................................... 94 Explanatory Models of Terrorist Behavior .........................................................................94 Consistency is Crucial for Counterterrorism Success.................................................... 102 Chapter Five: Conclusion.............................................................................................107 An Overview ............................................................................................................................ 107 Policy Implications ................................................................................................................. 107 Study Limitations and Future Research ........................................................................... 114 Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 117 Appendix ..........................................................................................................................120 List of Acronyms..................................................................................................................... 120 Consent Script ......................................................................................................................... 120 Sample Interview .................................................................................................................... 121 References........................................................................................................................122 4 Chapter One: Introduction “The United States would do well to emulate the Israeli model” (Tucker “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience,” 2003). “Why can’t we learn from Israel? Israelis are forced to confront this issue every hour of every day” (Husick “Expert: U.S. Should Emulate Israel in Fight Against Terror,” 2006). According to popular wisdom, Israeli counterterrorism works. Scholars and policymakers such as Tucker and Husick laud the Israeli counterterrorism model as an example the United States “would do well to emulate.” They assume that because Israelis “confront [terrorism] every hour of every day,” that is, because the terrorist threat combated is persistent and the stakes are high, Israel must have developed a coherent and effective approach to counterterrorism. The evidence suggests otherwise. Israeli counterterrorism has been largely ineffective. It has been ineffective because Israel has failed to implement a coherent counterterrorism strategy consistently connecting counterterrorist tactics to end goals. Most rationalist scholars assume that states learn lessons over time, improving upon policies as they update their information (Reiter 2003). Yet, despite being one of the few states in the world that has been engaged in a protracted counterterrorism struggle, Israel seems to have exhibited little rational learning; it has not abandoned ineffective tactics or consistently implemented effective tactics as a means towards achieving clearly articulated objectives. Why not? 5 Central Assertions In this thesis, I argue that Israeli counterterrorism is incoherent because the improvisational routines of the Israeli National Security Establishment (NSE) and the sensitivity of Israeli politicians to international pressures preclude the rational strategic thinking integral to the formulation and implementation of a coherent counterterrorism strategy. I further argue that the inconsistent implementation of counterterrorist tactics resultant from the absence of a coherent counterterrorism strategy inflames Palestinian grievances without durably deterring attacks, and thus accounts for the inefficacy of Israeli counterterrorism. I bring to bear a wealth of evidence from original, primary interviews to support these assertions. Figure 1 represents the causal model outlined above. Figure 1 To Illustrate Consider, for example, the NSE practice of targeted killings. The Israeli Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet or Shabak) routinely gathers the intelligence necessary to arrest or “intercept” (kill) Palestinian terrorist targets and passes that intelligence on to the Israel Police , appropriate Israel Defense Forces 6 units, or Mossad (depending on the location of the target). Rather than engage in a rational analysis of the efficacy of targeted killings, NSE organizations, which have developed improvisational routines that prize speed and flexibility over consistency, seek to demonstrate organizational proficiency by implementing successful interceptions, with little consideration for whether or not these short-term operational successes actually advance the long-term strategic objectives of the Israeli state. While organizational routines account for the a-strategic incoherence of Israeli NSE counterterrorism decision-making, Israeli politicians1 are concerned primarily with “appearing legitimate” in the international community and only secondarily with responding strategically to Palestinian terrorist activity. For example, in 2008, Israeli politicians went to remarkable lengths to delegitimize the barrage of Palestinian attacks so as to legitimate the Israeli entry into Gaza in October (David, interview with author, 12 January 2011), and then conducted the war with extraordinary attention to international law in order to demonstrate adherence to international norms (David, interview with author, 12 January 2011). In contrast, international
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