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Trends and Challenges Until 2035 the Russian Demography Problem and the Armed Forces

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Trends and Challenges Until 2035 the Russian Demography Problem and the Armed Forces Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitos Julkaisuja 6 The Russian demography problem and the armed forces Trends and challenges until 2035 Arseniy Svynarenko Finnish Defence Research Agency Publications 6 Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 6 THE RUSSIAN DEMOGRAPHY PROBLEM AND THE ARMED FORCES TRENDS AND CHALLENGES UNTIL 2035 Lic.Soc.Sci. Arseniy Svynarenko FINNISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY PUOLUSTUSVOIMIEN TUTKIMUSLAITOS RIIHIMÄKI 2016 Cover photo: Arseniy Svynarenko ISBN 978-951-25-2837-0 (PDF) ISSN 2342-3137 (online publication) Finnish Defence Research Agency Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitos Riihimäki 2016 Esipuhe Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitos (PVTUTKL) on Pääesikunnan alainen sotilaslaitos. Monitieteinen tutkimuslaitos tuottaa puolustusalan tutki- mus-, kehittämis- ja testauspalveluja strategian ja sotataidon, käyttäy- mistieteiden ja useiden eri teknologioiden alueilla. Tutkimuslaitoksen doktriiniosasto arvioi tulevaisuuden sotilaallista toimintaympäristöä ja uhkia. Tämän perusteella osasto analysoi vaihto- ehtoja, joilla Puolustusvoimat voi vastata tulevaisuuden haasteisiin, sekä samalla kehittää uusia käyttöperiaatteita ja toimintatapoja Puolustusvoi- mille. Puolustusvoimien strategiseen ennakointiin liittyen doktriiniosasto on tilannut tutkimuksia myös Puolustusvoimien ulkopuolella työskentele- viltä tutkijoilta. Nyt julkaistava Arseniy Svynarenkon tutkimus The Russian demography problem and the armed forces: Trends and challenges until 2035 (Venäjän demografiaongelma ja asevoimat: trendit ja haasteet vuoteen 2035) on osa laajempaa tutkimuslaitoksen strategisen ennakoinnin tutkimuskokonaisuutta. Kansakunnan tulevaisuutta indikoitaessa väestöpohja on yksi merkittä- vimmistä menestymisen mahdollisuuksia ennustavista tekijöistä. Poliit- tisten ja taloudellisten suhdanteiden vaihtelusta huolimatta kansakunnat rakentavat tulevaisuutensa 20–30 vuoden tarkastelujaksolla, ellei merkit- tävää maahanmuuttoa ja sitä tukevaa politiikkaa ole, pääosin olemassa olevalla väestöllään. Arseniy Svynarenkon tutkimus kohdistuu Venäjän demografiseen ongelmaan ja siihen miten se vaikuttaa asevoimien henkilötäydennyksen mahdollisuuksiin. Palveluskelpoisen 20–24-vuotiai- den miesten ikäluokan koko pienenee nykyisestä noin 4,5 miljoonasta miehestä yli neljänneksen vuoteen 2020 mennessä, ja nykyinen taso saa- vutetaan vasta 2030-luvun puolivälissä. Venäjällä demografisen ongel- man vaikutukset asevoimien täydentämismahdollisuuksiin on tunnustettu. Maassa on ryhdytty toimenpiteisiin syntyvyyden lisäämiseksi, ase- palveluksen houkuttelevuuden lisäämiseksi sekä varusmiespalveluksen kutsuntapohjan laajentamiseksi. Tämän tutkimusraportin näkemykset ovat tutkijan omia, eivätkä näin ol- len välttämättä heijasta Puolustusvoimien tutkimuslaitoksen kantaa. Riihimäellä toukokuussa 2016 Doktriiniosaston päällikkö ev.luutn., sotatieteiden tohtori Petteri Lalu Abstract The composition of the Russian military forces does not wholly reflect the social composition of Russian society, although it does reflect the demo- graphic changes. Smaller cohorts of young people in 2012–2015 resulted in a lower number of young men being drafted for military service. The biggest cohort of young people born at the end of the 1980s was clearly reflected in 2010 in a very high number of conscripts (549.4 thousand). A rapid drop in fertility rates and high mortality rates during the early 1990s resulted in a 44 per cent decrease in the number of annually drafted young people in 2014. Between 2015 and 2035 the number of young men of conscription age will grow by around 46 per cent. During the same time period the number of 30- to 34-year-olds will decline by almost 50 per cent. According to UN estimates based on medium fertility, the size of the most significant recruitment resource of 20- to 24-year-olds will be highest in 2015 (4 million 587 thousand), will decline in 2020 (3 million 460 thousand), and will recover in 2035 almost to the same level as in 2015 (4 million 382 thousand). Starting from 2018–2020, the army may experience a lack of human resources comparable to 1965, when the smallest cohort of young people born during the Second World War reached military service age. The cohort born in the late Soviet years and who are 25-30 in 2015 will compose the core of the army reserves in 2035. The growth of the conscription-age cohort will not make conscription campaigns any easier for the Russian armed forces. The number of urban young people will grow much faster (+53% change between 2015 and 2030) compared to rural young people (+35% change between 2015 and 2030). Young, well-educated urban males are the most reluctant to join the armed forces. The core of contemporary conscripts are from rural areas and small towns. All in all, age, place of residence, income level and level of attained education are all factors that influence respondents’ attitudes towards the armed forces. A cross-examination of opinion polls reveals that the more positive people are in their evaluations of the president, the more positive they are about the army in general and military service in particular; and the more contact they have with the army, the more neutral they are in their evaluation of it. Recently, the number of young people who are fit for military service has been growing mostly due to legal measures and a new definition of “fit for service”. In fact, in the past two decades in Russia, young people’s health has been deteriorating. One of the most significant factors affecting the poor health condition of today's young people is excessive use of alcohol starting from an early age. Recent studies underline the significance of excessive alcohol consumption as an explanatory factor in the unusually high mortality rate among young Russian men. The fact that Russia now allows foreigners aged 18–30 to serve five-year contracts in the Russian armed forces indicates that the Russian leadership has a realistic view of the demographic problem facing the armed forces in terms of the quantity and quality of conscripts. Tiivistelmä Tutkimuksen tehtävänä on selvittää Venäjän demografisen kehityksen vaikutuksia joukkotuotantoon vuoteen 2035 asti. Tutkimuksessa tarkas- tellaan Venäjän palveluskelpoisen ikäluokan kehitykseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä, eritellään tärkeimmät syyt palveluskelpoisuudettomuudelle ja esitetään arvio reservin ikä- ja palveluskelpoisuuden kehityksestä vuoteen 2035. Lisäksi eritellään em. tekijöiden vaikutukset joukkotuotantoon ja demografisen kehityksen sekä aivovuodon vaikutukset Venäjän tutkimuk- seen, tuotekehittelyyn ja tuotantoon asevoimiin liittyen. Venäjän väestötilastojen mukaan väestön väheneminen on hidastunut vuoden 2005 jälkeen. Vuonna 2012 rekisteröitiin luonnollinen väestön- kasvu ensimmäisen kerran 1990-luvun alun jälkeen. Venäjällä syntynei- den määrä on lähes sama kuin kuolleiden ja on odottavissa, että vuonna 2030 asevelvollisten määrä on edellisvuosia suurempi. Merkittävä väestönkasvuun vaikuttava tekijä on maahanmuutto ulkomailta Venäjälle. Venäjän alueiden väliset erot ovat suuria ja väestön luonnollinen kasvu on suurinta Pohjois-Kaukasuksella sekä joillakin Siperian ja Kaukoidän alueilla. Luonnollinen väestönkasvu tapahtuu ensisijaisesti kaupungeissa ja maaseudulla väestö vähenee edelleen. Ympäristön saastuminen, ruuan laatu, aikainen alkoholin ja tupakan käytön aloittaminen ja alkoholismi ovat merkittäviä yksittäisiä väestönkasvuun vaikuttavia tekijöitä. Vuosien 2015 ja 2035 välillä palveluskelpoiseen ikäluokkaan kuuluvan osan (20–24 -vuotiaat miehet) arvioidaan kasvavan noin 46 prosenttia. Samaan aikaan 30–34 -vuotiaiden määrä tulee laskemaan puoleen. YK:n tekemän ja hedelmällisyyden keskimääräiseen kasvuun perustuvan arvion mukaan 20–24 -vuotiaiden määrä on korkeimmillaan vuonna 2015 (4,587 milj.), laskien vuonna 2020 (3,460 milj.) ja jälleen palautuen vuonna 2030 likipitäen vuoden 2015 tasolle (4,382 milj.). Demografisen kehityksen valossa voidaan arvioida, edellyttäen ettei lainsäädäntöön tehdä tulevai- suudessa isoja muutoksia, että vuonna 2035 asevelvollisten määrä säilyy lähes nykyisellä tasolla ja on noin 396 000. Reserviläisien ydinjoukon vuonna 2035 muodostavat 1980-luvun lopulla syntyneet suuret ikäluokat, jotka vuonna 2015 ovat 25–30 -vuotiaita. Palveluskelpoisen ikäluokan kasvu ei itsessään helpota, saatikka ratkaise, Venäjän armeijan ongelmia varusmiesten rekrytoinnissa. Kaupungissa asuvien määrä tulee kasvamaan paljon nopeammin kuin maaseudulla asu- vien nuorien määrä. Kuitenkin nimenomaan maalta lähdetään innok- kaammin varusmiehiksi. Oletettavasti jatkossakin Venäjän armeijan on vaikeampi houkutella korkeakoulutettuja kaupunkilaisnuoria riveihinsä. Vastikään tehty päätös hyväksyä ulkomaiden kansalaiset ns. sopimus- sotilaiksi Venäjän armeijaan on yksi merkki ongelmien vakavuudesta. Tärkeimpiä syitä palveluskelpoisuudettomuudelle ovat yleinen nuorten terveydentilan heikentyminen, erityisesti tuki-, liikunta-, verenkierto- ja ruuansulatuselimistön sairaudet. Myös mielenterveyden häiriöt nuorten ikäluokassa ovat kasvaneet. Sen sijaan nuorten miesten väkivaltaiset kuolemat ja itsemurhat ovat 2000-luvun aikana vähentyneet, vaikka ver- rattuna esimerkiksi Viroon ja Ukrainaan, luvut ovat korkeita. Tähän on- gelmavyyhtiin on pyritty vastaamaan kehittämällä ns. patrioottista kou- lutusta, jonka toivotaan ylläpitävän nuorten maanpuolustustahtoa, sekä höllentämällä varusmiesten kelpoisuusvaatimuksia. List of figures Figure 1. Death rates and birth rates in Russia from 1970 to 2013, illustrating the second demographic transition in Russia. Figure
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