NCSEJ WEEKLY NEWS BRIEF Washington, D.C. August 8, 2016

UN warns of escalating tension in eastern Ukraine as casualties hit highest since last August UN, August 3, 2016 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54615#.V6OZyOTzM6E

Civilian causalities in eastern Ukraine spiked in June and July, prompting the United Nations human rights chief to call on the parties to the conflict to make protection of civilians a priority and take urgent steps to de- escalate the increasingly tense situation at the contact line.

“The escalation of hostilities and the accompanying civilian casualties in eastern Ukraine over the last two months are very worrying,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein said today in a news release.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented 69 civilian casualties in June, including 12 dead and 57 injured, and 73 civilian casualties in July, including eight dead and 65 injured, the highest figures since August 2015. The average of 71 for these two months was more than double the monthly average of 34 from September 2015 through May 2016.

“The many casualties we have documented in recent weeks suggest that neither Ukrainian forces nor the armed groups are taking the necessary precautions to protect civilians,” Mr. Zeid said, urging all sides to respect the ceasefire provisions, to remove combatants and weapons from civilian areas, and to scrupulously implement the provisions of the Minsk agreements.

More than half of all the casualties recorded in the past two months were caused by shelling. Between 1 June and 31 July 2016, 72 civilians were injured and six killed by shelling, including allegedly through the use of weapons expressly prohibited by the Minsk agreements. Mines, explosive remnants of war, booby traps and improvised explosive devices were responsible for most of the remaining casualties.

UN human rights teams on both sides of the contact line have documented reports of civilian homes looted, schools and hospitals shelled or used by Ukrainian forces and armed groups.

An estimated 25,000 to 30,000 people cross the contact line each day, using five crossings that are surrounded by inadequately marked minefields, according to OHCHR. In recent weeks, the situation has become even more dangerous as exchanges of fire have reportedly taken place between Ukrainian forces and armed groups, particularly around the footbridge at Stanytsia Luhanska, the only crossing point in Luhansk region.

Mr. Zeid urged the parties to heed the calls of the international community to disengage from the contact line and adhere to a full and sustainable ceasefire.

The High Commissioner recalled that Ukraine has committed to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but has yet to do so. “The ratification of the Statute, with its focus on individual criminal responsibility, will serve as incentive for all parties to the conflict to respect the law and ensure the protection of civilians,” he said.

In total, from mid-April 2014 to 31 July 2016, the UN human rights office has documented 31,690 casualties, including 9,553 killed and 22,137 injured in the conflict area in eastern Ukraine, including Ukrainian forces, civilians and members of the armed groups.

Ukraine Rebels Warn of Return to Full Fighting 'Very Soon' By Damien Sharkov Newsweek, August 4, 2016 http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-rebels-warn-return-full-fighting-very-soon-487129

Russian-backed rebels in Ukraine’s east have threatened a return to full-scale conflict “very soon” if Kiev does not recall forces away from the contact line, newspaper Izvestia has reported.

Over the last two months violence in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, known collectively as Donbas, has risen to the highest levels in a year. Donetsk rebel representative Denis Pushilin said that “the situation worsens every day;” government forces have reported Moscow-backed rebel violations frequently average between 50-70 a day.

A February 2015 ceasefire agreement demanded both sides recall heavy weapons from the contact line, grant amnesty to prisoners of war and implement a series of other measures. But neither side has fully complied and both accuse the other of violating the ceasefire and provoking them.

“The situation worsens with each day,” Pushilin told the Russian newspaper. “There has been no progress to regulate the conflict politically since the last negotiations. The situation remains tense and at any moment it can heat up and escalate into fully-fledged fighting.”

“If Ukraine does not meet at least the first three points (of the ceasefire) in Donbas, open fighting will be renewed very soon,” Pushilin said. The points he was referring to include the stipulation that both sides must divert heavy artillery and tanks from the contact line.

According to the latest report from international observer Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), both sides have either anti-tank guns, artillery and/or howitzers in an advanced position beyond the agreed withdrawal lines.

Obama Says Alleged Russian Hack Wouldn't Change Relations RFE/RL, August 3, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/obama-says-alleged-russian-hack-wouldnt-change-us-russia- relations/27897152.html

U.S. President Barack Obama said the alleged Russian hack of Democratic Party computers, if confirmed, would not dramatically change already troubled relations between the two countries.

Obama’s comments on August 2 came as the FBI continued to probe the hack, which occurred in June.

Thousands of internal e-mails from the Democratic Party Committee were later leaked, embarrassing the party at the start of its convention to nominate Hillary Clinton as its presidential candidate.

Clinton has blamed Russia for the hack. The Kremlin has denied involvement.

Speaking at the White House, Obama said "the United States already has a lot of differences with Russia on a whole bunch of issues, but I think that we've been able to try to stay focused on those areas where we still have a common interest."

"If, in fact, Russia engaged in this activity, it's just one on a long list of issues that me and Mr. Putin talk about and that I've got a real problem with," he added.

Meanwhile, three more top Democratic Party officials resigned on August 2 amid a shake-up following the release of the e-mails, some of which indicated Democratic Party chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz and other officials favored Clinton over rival Bernie Sanders during the primary campaign.

Lithuanian mayor urged to stop parties at former concentration camp JTA, August 3, 2016 http://www.jta.org/2016/08/03/news-opinion/world/lithuanian-mayor-urged-to-stop-parties-at-former- concentration-camp

A prominent Nazi-hunter from Israel, and the Jewish Community of Lithuania called on the city of Kaunas to stop the use for recreational purposes of what used to be a concentration camp for Jews during the Holocaust.

Efraim Zuroff, the Israel director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, on Tuesday wrote a letter about the area known as the Seventh Fort to Kaunas Mayor Visvaldas Matijosaitis following the publication last month of a JTA expose about various activities held on the grounds, including treasure hunts, summer camps, costume parties for adults, camping excursions and BBQ parties.

“As you no doubt are aware, the site of the mass murder of several thousand Jews in 1941 was privatized several years ago, and has now been turned into a recreation and entertainment center which violates the memory of the victims,” wrote Zuroff, who conducted his own investigation of the site together with the Lithuanian novelist Ruta Vanagaite for a book they co-authored and published in January titled “Musiskiai,” Lithuanian for “our own.”

“I urge you to immediately suspend such activities at the Seventh Fort and find a way to restore the site to the municipality or to an organization whose purpose will be to honor the memory of the victims, rather than insult them,” added Zuroff, who provided a copy of the letter to JTA.

The city privatized the Seventh Fort in 2009, handing over the land to a nonprofit called Military Heritage Center, which is headed by a 37-year-old amateur historian and informatics expert, Vladimir Orlov.

Orlov told JTA that while many Jews are buried at the Seventh Fort, the mass graves account for two percent of the area. He said that recreational activities do not take place near or on the graves, which are largely unmarked except for a few poles, where relatives of the victims sometimes light candles in their memory.

The JTA article prompted critical articles in mainstream Lithuanian media and abroad, including by Britain’sDaily Mail.

According to “Musiskiai,” sometime after 2009 Orlov exhumed bones of Jews killed at the Seventh Fort, which were reburied in 2014. The Jewish Community of Lithuania in a July 26 statement said it made sure the reburial complied with Jewish religious laws, but added that Orlov’s NGO has not complied with their repeated appeals for plaques commemorating the dead. Orlov said proceeds from events and tours that his staff of 11 give at the Seventh Fort go to maintenance work.

But the Jewish Community of Lithuania clearly is not convinced.

“The Lithuanian Jewish Community believes Lithuanian institutions must make sure the memory of the victims of the Holocaust doesn’t become subject to private business schemes,” read the community’s statement. “Unfortunately, the Seventh Fort, the first concentration camp in Lithuania, has become an notorious example of this sort of exploitation, despite constant calls by the Lithuanian Jewish Community.”

Poles observe 72nd anniversary of Warsaw Uprising AP, August 1, 2016 https://www.yahoo.com/news/poles-observe-72nd-anniversary-warsaw-uprising- 095116699.html?nhp=1

People across Warsaw observed a minute of silence as a siren wailed on Monday, marking the 72nd anniversary of the start of the Warsaw Uprising, a struggle against Nazi Germany in 1944 that lasted 63 days and ended tragically for the Poles.

The minute of silence is a yearly tradition that always takes place at 5 p.m., the hour when the uprising began on Aug. 1, 1944.

On Monday, people across the capital of 1.7 million people stopped in their tracks, some holding flags or torches.

There were several other observances involving Poland's political leaders, war veterans and ordinary people.

The Warsaw Uprising was the largest act of resistance by any nation under the German occupation during World War II, and the heroism of the insurgents remains a defining element in Polish national identity.

The Germans suppressed the rebellion brutally, destroying most of Warsaw and killing around 200,000 people, most of them civilians.

Poles felt betrayed by the Soviets, whose troops had arrived on the outskirts on Warsaw in their westward push against Adolf Hitler's forces. The Red Army remained on the Warsaw outskirts without helping the Poles — allegedly their allies.

The city-wide revolt took place a year after the April 19, 1943, start of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, a separate revolt by doomed Jews that also ended in tragedy.

Ukraine rejects Russia's proposed ambassador to Kiev Reuters, August 4, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-diplomacy-idUSKCN10F1KP

Ukraine has rejected Russia's proposed candidate for its next ambassador to Kiev, a senior Ukrainian foreign ministry official said.

Mikhail Zurabov, who was Moscow's envoy in Kiev during anti-Russian street protests, Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, stepped down in July.

The Kremlin has proposed Mikhail Babich, who has held a number of senior official posts in Russia including with the FSB security service, but Ukrainian foreign ministry official Olena Zerkal said Kiev had decided not to consider the proposal.

"The way it was proposed, it has been removed from the agenda," she said in a televised interview on channel 5 on Wednesday, without giving further detail on why the candidate was rejected.

"I think this will not have any sort of impact. What's more, the role of the former ambassador in building normal relations was completely minimal," she said.

In remarks to news agency Interfax Ukraine, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said the rejection was "not a question of the candidates or anything concrete, but about creating a positive dynamic in what's happening within the context of Russian aggression."

Ukraine replaced its own ambassador to Moscow with a temporary representative in 2014 following the collapse in relations between the former allies.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said it would continue to offer Babich as a potential ambassador to Ukraine.

"However, if the Ukrainian side takes a decision to lower the level of our diplomatic relations and considers this reduced mode of diplomatic relations to be appropriate - that's the decision of the Ukrainian side," he told journalists.

Kiev and NATO accuse Russia of supporting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine with troops and weapons, fuelling a conflict that has killed over 9,400. The Kremlin denies involvement.

Sarkisian Calls For 'National Accord' Government Excluding 'Terrorists' RFE/RL, August 02, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/armenian-president-sarkisian-calls-for-national-accord-government- excluding-terrorists/27894124.html

Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian promised to form a government of "national accord" within months, but vowed it would not include "terrorists and their defenders," in an apparent reference to an armed opposition group that surrendered after a two-week standoff with Yerevan police.

Over 1,000 people took to the streets of Yerevan on August 1 to call for leniency for the 20 gunmen, who were arrested this weekend after ending their occupation of a police compound in a confrontation that left two policemen dead.

While pledging to form a new, more harmonious government, Sarkisian vowed to keep "terrorists and their defenders" out of it -- words police had used in arresting the gunmen, who had demanded Sarkisian's resignation.

Sarkisian said after meeting with civil society representatives, religious leaders, and government officials, that the gunmen "hid their emphatically terrorist actions...under the guise of patriotic calls for social justice."

Interfax reported that two opposition Heritage party officials who had worked with the gunmen were arrested on August 1 and charged with organizing and participating in mass disturbances: party spokesman David Sanasarian and deputy chairman Armen Martirosian.

Sarkisian vowed that the country would not allow anyone to "undermine the foundation of our state."

"Problems in Armenia will not be solved through violence or arms," he said. "Yerevan is neither Beirut nor Aleppo."

Sarkisian said he has ordered a "thorough investigation, a comprehensive and unbiased examination and an open trial" over the incident.

Human Rights Watch on August 1 accused the Armenian police of using "excessive force against peaceful protesters" and said they had "assaulted journalists reporting on the demonstrations" on July 29.

RFE/RL’s Armenian Service said three of its correspondents reporting on the protest were beaten with batons apparently by plainclothes policemen.

Giorgi Gogia, South Caucasus director at the human rights group, told AFP that Armenia's investigation into the assaults on demonstrators "should be swift and thorough."

In light of the standoff, Sarkisian said, "One thing is clear, the process of the radical changes in Armenia's social and political life" must be sped up.

"Yes, it is true that the Armenian authorities are not perfect. Yes, it is true that there are many problems and complex issues in Armenia. Our goal is to give them a speedy resolution."

Ukrainian Official Resigns, Citing 'Attacks On Journalists' RFE/RL, August 3, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-deputy-minister-popova-resigns-media-freedom/27898439.html

Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Information Policy Tetyana Popova has announced her resignation, citing what she described as attacks on journalists and freedom of speech.

"I am resigning. I don't agree with attacks on journalists and attacks on freedom of speech by political organizations and individual political officials. I can't tolerate the absence of a proper reaction to that kind of attacks," she wrote in a Facebook posting on August 3.

"As a protest, I am leaving the government, but will continue fighting for the Maidan ideas, for freedom and democracy as a citizen and a volunteer. I'll continue fighting for everything our patriots are fighting for at the front line," she said.

In a later interview with RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, Popova linked her resignation to the massive disclosure of journalists' personal data -- including her own -- by a website called Myrotvorets (Peacekeeper) in May.

The website's creators claimed the 4,500 targeted journalists had collaborated with Russia-backed separatists in the east of the country.

The website went down a few days after publishing the disclosure, but was back online a few weeks later.

The publishing of the journalists' personal details, including phone numbers and e-mail addresses, was widely criticized in Ukraine and abroad, with the G7 saying it "contravenes the spirit and the letter of Ukrainian law."

Many of the listed journalists said they have received threatening letters and phone calls.

In her interview with RFE/RL, Popova said she grew disillusioned with what she felt was a failure by authorities to take action against Myrotvorets.

"I went to a police investigator once and he asked what is really the problem with the publication of the list of journalists, if journalists have the right to publish data from the Panama Papers," Popova said, referring to the trove of leaked documents that uncovered secretive financial dealings of officials and businesspeople across the globe, including some in Ukraine, including President Petro Poroshenko.

Poroshenko did voice support for the journalists over the disclosure scandal, and the Ukrainian Security Service have promised to look into the matter.

However, other Ukrainian officials have voiced support for Myrotvorets, most prominently among them Anton Herashchenko, an Interior Ministry adviser and member of parliament, who is believed by some to have played a role in instigating the publication.

Popova said Herashchenko and other leading members of the Peoples' Front faction had demanded her resignation.

"I have resigned. If I remained in the government, then I support this," Popova told RFE/RL. "I cannot in that case remain in government. I come from the media business, I know that I will still work with the journalists and my reputation -- that's all I have."

Ukraine's ambassador: Trump's comments send wrong message to world By Amb. Valeriy Chaly The Hill, August 4, 2016 http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/290411-ukraines-ambassador-trumps-comments- send-wrong-message-to

The U.S. presidential race has captured attention of the world, sometimes posing serious challenges for foreign diplomats when they find their country in the campaign's spotlight. Ukraine, which came to the world's attention two years with its Revolution of Dignity and then worked to remain on the world's radar after Russian aggression, has found itself in the spotlight once again.

Recent comments by Republican nominee Donald Trump about the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea — occupied by Russia since March 2014 — have raised serious concerns in Kyiv and beyond Ukraine. Many in Ukraine are unsure what to think, since Trump's comments stand in sharp contrast to the Republican party platform. Since the Russian aggression, there has been bipartisan support for U.S. sanctions against Russia, and for such sanctions to remain in place until the territorial integrity of Ukraine is restored. Efforts to enhance Ukraine's defense capacity are supported across the aisle, as well, to ensure that Ukraine becomes strong enough to deter Russia’s aggression.

Even if Trump's comments are only speculative, and do not really reflect a future foreign policy, they call for appeasement of an aggressor and support the violation of a sovereign country's territorial integrity and another's breach of international law. In the eyes of the world, such comments seem alien to a country seen by partners as a strong defender of democracy and international order. The United States was among the 100 nations which supported the U.N. resolution "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" not recognizing Russia's attempt to annex Crimea.

A candidate for the presidency in any country ought to realize the challenges he or she will face to ensure consistency in foreign policy and uphold his or her country's international commitments. Ukraine — a strategic partner of the United States — entered the 1994 Budapest multilateral commitment, giving away the world's third largest nuclear arsenal in return for security assurances to its territorial integrity from three nuclear powers: the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia.

This commitment has been broken by one signatory country, which attempted to annex Crimea and invaded Ukraine's Donbas region. While Ukraine was recovering from the bloodshed in Maidan orchestrated by then- President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia seized control over Crimea's Supreme Council and its security infrastructure. The sham referendum carried out at a gunpoint had nothing to do with a free and fair expression of the people's will and ignored the choice of the indigenous people of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars.

Russia has unleashed its repressive machine against those who protest against the occupation. Censorship, arrests, assassinations, abductions, the banning of the Crimean Tatars' representative body — the Mejlis — all threaten another tragedy and ethnic cleansing.

The attempted annexation of Crimea has also posed new threats to nuclear safety. International institutions like the U.N. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) do not recognize the annexation and, from a jurisdictional standpoint, cannot control nuclear facilities and radiation security in those areas. Moreover, Russia has already threatened to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea in direct vicinity of NATO and EU states. Russia is restoring Soviet-era nuclear storage facilities and has already deployed the means for carrying the weapons, including warships and combat aircrafts.

Russia did enter Ukraine in 2014 and would undoubtedly keep on invading should the position of the most important global actors be favorable or neutral, or one of appeasement, and should Ukraine not continue enhancing its defense potential. Right now, Russia is flexing its muscles, building military capacity and testing state-of-the-art weapons in the Ukrainian Donbas. In numbers, Russia's presence in Ukraine means on average 400 shells a week.

Last week, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense identified and reported 22 flights of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operated by Russia-backed militants. Russia continues to pour its weapons and military equipment to Donbas: For instance, from July 22 to July 28, nearly 6,000 tons of fuel, 80 tons of ammunition and 120 tons of military cargo (including repair parts for military vehicles) were delivered through an uncontrolled part of the Ukrainian- Russian border. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's monitoring mission has reported that Russian-backed militants have used a wide array of heavy weapons, including mortars, high-caliber artillery and tanks.

This bloody war, which has already taken more than 10,000 Ukrainian lives and internally displaced almost 2 million, is a fight of a young democracy for independence and its choice to be part of the West and embrace Western values. Neglecting or trading the cause of a nation inspired by those values — cemented by Americans in their fight for independence and civil rights — would send a wrong message to the people of Ukraine and many others in the world who look to the U.S. as to a beacon of freedom and democracy.

Chaly is Ukraine's ambassador to the United States.

Donald Trump’s Many, Many, Many, Many Ties to Russia By Jeff Nesbit Time, August 2, 2016 http://time.com/4433880/donald-trump-ties-to-russia/

Russian intelligence agencies have allegedly recently digitally broken into four different American organizations that are affiliated either with Hillary Clinton or the Democratic Party since late May. All of the hacks appear designed to benefit Donald Trump’s presidential aspirations in one fashion or another.

When asked about this, and his affection for Russian president Vladimir Putin, Trump said any inference that a connection exists between the two is absurd and the stuff of conspiracy. “I have ZERO investments in Russia,” he tweeted after the Democratic National Committee was apparently hacked by Russia and the emails released by Wiki Leaks on the eve of the DNC convention to nominate Clinton as its 2016 presidential candidate.

Most of the coverage of the links between Trump and Putin’s Russia takes the GOP presidential nominee at his word—that he has lusted after a Trump tower in Moscow, and come up spectacularly short. But Trump’s dodge—that he has no businesses in Russia, so there is no connection to Putin—is a classic magician’s trick. Show one idle hand, while the other is actually doing the work.

The truth, as several columnists and reporters have painstakingly shown since the first hack of a Clinton- affiliated group took place in late May or early June, is that several of Trump’s businesses outside of Russia are entangled with Russian financiers inside Putin’s circle.

So, yes, it’s true that Trump has failed to land a business venture inside Russia. But the real truth is that, as major banks in America stopped lending him money following his many bankruptcies, the Trump organization was forced to seek financing from non-traditional institutions. Several had direct ties to Russian financial interests in ways that have raised eyebrows. What’s more, several of Trump’s senior advisors have business ties to Russia or its satellite politicians.

“The Trump-Russia links beneath the surface are even more extensive,” Max Boot wrote in the Los Angeles Times. “Trump has sought and received funding from Russian investors for his business ventures, especially after most American banks stopped lending to him following his multiple bankruptcies.”

What’s more, three of Trump’s top advisors all have extensive financial and business ties to Russian financiers, wrote Boot, the former editor of the Op Ed page of the Wall Street Journal and now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Trump’s de facto campaign manager, Paul Manafort, was a longtime consultant to Viktor Yanukovich, the Russian-backed president of Ukraine who was overthrown in 2014. Manafort also has done multimillion-dollar business deals with Russian oligarchs. Trump’s foreign policy advisor Carter Page has his own business ties to the state-controlled Russian oil giant Gazprom. … Another Trump foreign policy advisor, retired Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, flew to Moscow last year to attend a gala banquet celebrating Russia Today, the Kremlin’s propaganda channel, and was seated at the head table near Putin.

But it is Trump’s financing from Russian satellite business interests that would seem to explain his pro-Putin sympathies.

The most obvious example is Trump Soho, a complicated web of financial intrigue that has played out in court. A lawsuit claimed that the business group, Bayrock, underpinning Trump Soho was supported by criminal Russian financial interests. While its initial claim absolved Trump of knowledge of those activities, Trump himself later took on the group’s principal partner as a senior advisor in the Trump organization.

“Tax evasion and money-laundering are the core of Bayrock’s business model,” the lawsuit said of the financiers behind Trump Soho. The financing came from Russian-affiliated business interests that engaged in criminal activities, it said. “(But) there is no evidence Trump took any part in, or knew of, their racketeering.”

Journalists who’ve looked at the Bayrock lawsuit, and Trump Soho, wonder why Trump was involved at all. “What was Trump thinking entering into business with partners like these?” Franklin Foer wrote in Slate. “It’s a question he has tried to banish by downplaying his ties to Bayrock.”

But Bayrock wasn’t just involved with Trump Soho. It financed multiple Trump projects around the world, Foer wrote. “(Trump) didn’t just partner with Bayrock; the company embedded with him. Bayrock put together deals for mammoth Trump-named, Trump-managed projects—two in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a resort in Phoenix, the Trump SoHo in New York.”

But, as The New York Times has reported, that was only the beginning of the Trump organization’s entanglement with Russian financiers. Trump was quite taken with Bayrock’s founder, Tevfik Arif, a former Soviet-era commerce official originally from Kazakhstan.

“Bayrock, which was developing commercial properties in Brooklyn, proposed that Mr. Trump license his name to hotel projects in Florida, Arizona and New York, including Trump SoHo,” the Times reported. “The other development partner for Trump SoHo was the Sapir Organization, whose founder, Tamir Sapir, was from the former Soviet republic of Georgia.”

Trump was eager to work with both financial groups on Trump projects all over the world. “Mr. Trump was particularly taken with Mr. Arif’s overseas connections,” the Times wrote. “In a deposition, Mr. Trump said that the two had discussed ‘numerous deals all over the world’ and that Mr. Arif had brought potential Russian investors to Mr. Trump’s office to meet him. ‘Bayrock knew the people, knew the investors, and in some cases I believe they were friends of Mr. Arif,’ Mr. Trump said. ‘And this was going to be Trump International Hotel and Tower Moscow, Kiev, Istanbul, etc., Poland, Warsaw.’”

The Times also reported that federal court records recently released showed yet another link to Russian financial interests in Trump businesses. A Bayrock official “brokered a $50 million investment in Trump SoHo and three other Bayrock projects by an Icelandic firm preferred by wealthy Russians ‘in favor with’ President Vladimir V. Putin,’” the Times reported. “The Icelandic company, FL Group, was identified in a Bayrock investor presentation as a ‘strategic partner,’ along with Alexander Mashkevich, a billionaire once charged in a corruption case involving fees paid by a Belgian company seeking business in Kazakhstan; that case was settled with no admission of guilt.”

Trump Soho was so complicated that Bayrock’s finance chief, Jody Kriss, sued it for fraud. In the lawsuit, Kriss alleged that a primary source of funding for Trump’s big projects with Bayrock arrived “magically” from sources in Russia and Kazakhstan whenever the business interest needed funding.

There are other Russian business ties to the Trump organization as well. Trump’s first real estate venture in Toronto, Canada, was a partnership with two Russian-Canadian entrepreneurs, Toronto Life reported in 2013.

“The hotel’s developer, Talon International, is run by Val Levitan and Alex Shnaider, two Russian-Canadian entrepreneurs. Levitan made his fortune manufacturing slot machines and creating bank note validation technology, and Shnaider earned his in the post-glasnost steel trade,” it reported.

Finally, for all of his denials of Russian ties lately, Trump has boasted in the past of his many meetings with Russian oligarchs. During one trip to Moscow, Trump bragged that they all showed up to meet him to discuss projects around the globe. “Almost all of the oligarchs were in the room” just to meet with him, Trump said at the time.

And when Trump built a tower in Panama, his clients were wealthy Russians, the Washington Post reported. “Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our assets. We see a lot of money pouring in from Russia,” Trump’s son, Donald Jr., said at a real estate conference in 2008, according to a trade publication, eTurboNews.

The only instance that Trump acknowledges any sort of Russian financial connection is a Florida mansion he sold to a wealthy Russian. “What do I have to do with Russia?” Trump said in the wake of the DNC hack. “You know the closest I came to Russia, I bought a house a number of years ago in Palm Beach, Florida… for $40 million and I sold it to a Russian for $100 million including brokerage commissions.”

But it should be obvious to anyone trying to pay attention to these moving targets that Trump is saying one thing and doing something else. When it comes to Trump and Russia, the truth may take awhile to emerge.

Bloomberg reported in June that the Clinton Foundation was breached by Russian hackers. “The Russians may also have acquired the emails that Hillary Clinton sent as secretary of State. Putin might be holding back explosive material until October, when its release could ensure a Trump victory,” it reported.

In the 1970s, burglars broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate office complex. President Richard Nixon, a Republican, was forced out of office for the White House cover up of its involvement in the DNC break in.

Now, a generation later, a digital break in to the national headquarters of one of our two major parties by a foreign adversary in order to leak information that benefits the other national party’s presidential candidate seems to be just the normal course of doing business. The Trump era, it is safe to assume, is like nothing we’ve ever seen before.

U.S. weighs dangers, benefits of naming Russia in cyber hack By Warren Strobel and John Walcott Reuters, August 1, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-russia-policy-idUSKCN10C3BI

Wary of a global confrontation with Russia, U.S. President Barack Obama must carefully weigh how to respond to what security experts believe was Moscow's involvement in the hacking of Democratic Party organizations, U.S. officials said.

Publicly blaming Russian President Vladimir Putin's intelligence services would bring instant pressure on Washington to divulge its evidence, which relies on highly classified sources and methods, U.S. intelligence officials said.

One option for Washington is to retaliate against Russia in cyberspace. But the intelligence officials said they fear a rapid escalation in which, under a worst-case scenario, Moscow's sophisticated cyber warriors could attack power grids, financial systems and other critical infrastructure.

Washington also has diplomacy to manage with Russia in Secretary of State John Kerry's long-shot attempt to enlist Moscow's help in ending the Syrian civil war and sustaining the Iran nuclear deal, as well as Russia- NATO tensions over Ukraine and Eastern Europe to manage.

"Despite how outrageous it is to interfere with a democratic election, the costs of coming out and saying the Russians did it would far outweigh the benefits, if there would be any benefits," said one intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

Russia has denied responsibility for hacking the emails of the Democratic National Committee. Also attacked were a computer network used by Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton's campaign and the party's fundraising committee for House of Representative candidates in the Nov. 8 election.

Other current and former officials are arguing for a firm response, however. They said the hack was the latest in a series of aggressive moves by Putin, including Russia's annexation of Crimea, military intervention to rescue Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and funding of right-wing and anti-European Union groups in Europe.

Columbia University cyber security expert Jason Healey said at an annual security forum in Aspen, Colorado, on Saturday that the Russians had been very aggressive in cyberspace too.

"I think the president needs to start looking at brush-back pitches," Healey said, referring to a baseball thrown near the batter as a warning.

NAME AND SHAME?

Intelligence officials and cyber experts said the intrusions themselves were not that unusual. American spy agencies conduct similar electronic espionage outside U.S. borders.

What made this hack a game-changer, they said, was the public release of the DNC emails, via the pro- transparency group WikiLeaks, in an apparent attempt to affect the election.

Government and party officials said they were unaware of any evidence that WikiLeaks had received the hacked materials directly from Russians or that WikiLeaks’ release of the materials was in any way directed by Russians.

The Justice Department's National Security Division, which is overseeing the investigation, has publicly charged U.S. adversaries - known as "naming and shaming" - before.

The U.S. government blamed North Korea for a damaging attack on Sony Pictures, and in 2014 indicted five members of the Chinese military for computer hacking and economic espionage.

Among adversary nations with significant cyber capabilities, a list that also includes Iran, the Russian government is the only one the Justice Department has not yet charged.

Obama's homeland security and counter-terrorism advisor Lisa Monaco said the government has developed "best practices" to investigate cyber attacks and decide when to make the results public.

Monaco, also speaking at the Aspen forum, said that in the Sony case, FBI investigators had high confidence North Korea was responsible. The attack was deemed destructive, as well as coercive, because it was retaliation for a movie parodying North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

"Those two things, along with our confidence in the attribution and the ability to talk about it in a way that would not disclose sources and methods and hinder our ability to make such attribution in the future all combined to say, ‘We’re going to call this out’," she said.

Elissa Slotkin, an acting assistant secretary of defense, said that for the next decade, the U.S. government faced a fundamental question in dealing with Russia: "How do you get the balance right?"

"Are we being too charitable and giving them too many opportunities to come back to the table, or are we providing such a high level of deterrence that we’re potentially provoking them?" Slotkin asked.

Why Putin reshuffled his political deck By Marina Obrazkova Russia Direct, August 1, 2016 http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/why-putin-reshuffled-his-political-deck

The Kremlin has once again reshuffled the political elites in the Russian regions - and this time, the moves extended as far as Crimea. President Vladimir Putin dismissed the head of the Federal Customs Service, Andrei Belianinov, and replaced three presidential envoys to federal districts as well as a few governors. Meanwhile, he made the Crimean Federal District part of the Southern Federal District.

As might be expected, there are many interpretations of what actually happened. The main conclusion made by experts about Putin's decisions is that he has attempted a "fine tuning" of political life in the regions. In addition, he delivered a message to the regional elites that they are under supervision. It is also important to note that a majority of the new appointees are individuals who are loyal to Putin personally (some of them coming from the law enforcement structures), rather than just some functionaries with the right managerial experience.

Tightening of financial discipline

Essentially, the reshuffling announced last week can be grouped into four directions. The first includes resignations and appointments. The Presidential Envoy to the Northwestern Federal Region, Vladimir Bulavin, has replaced Belianinov as the head of the Federal Customs Service, while the post of envoy has been given to Nikolai Tsukanov, who formerly headed the Kaliningrad Region. In turn, Russia's westernmost region has come under the governance of the head of the regional department of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Yevgeny Zinichev.

According to Pavel Salin, the director of the Center for Political Studies at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, this is a way of signaling to the elites that it is time to tighten financial discipline. "This accounts for the replacements in the Federal Customs Service," says Salin. "As to the strategically important Kaliningrad Region, the authority has been passed to a man from the security services."

Crimean direction

The second direction is the Crimean one. Here, the Crimean Federal District has been merged with the Southern District. The head of the old Crimean Federal District, Oleg Belaventsev, has been appointed to the North Caucasian Federal District, while its former head, Sergei Melikov, has been sent to serve in Russia's new law enforcement structure, the Russian National Guard. Another change in Crimea is that Sevastopol Governor Sergei Meniaylo has been made Envoy to the Siberian Federal District. Its former head,Nikolai Rogozhkin, appears to be going into retirement.

This is a message to the Crimean elites, Salin says with confidence. "The national leader has virtually cancelled the special status that Crimea enjoyed after its incorporation into Russia and demonstrated that privileges are not forever. Crimea has been attached to the Southern Federal District," says the political analyst.

It is important to realize, he argues, that Sevastopol, which houses a major military base, is now going to be governed by a civilian, although with a law enforcement past.

"The military have been displaced, they were not up to it. Meniaylo and Belaventsev were not up to the job. They are good performers, but today more flexible people are needed," says Salin.

Problem regions

The third direction includes the heads of problem regions. Putin has replaced the head of Kirov Region, Nikita Belykh, who for the past few weeks has been in custody on a bribery charge. Now Kirov has been given a new governor in the person of Igor Vasilyev, a former head of the Russian Registry (Rosreestr). The head of Yaroslavl Region, who was considered the weakest of the regional representatives, has been dismissed. His post has been passed to the former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitry Mironov.

"In the regions, civilians proved unable to control the situation, they are replaced with 'siloviks'," says the analyst. "Primarily, such decisions have been taken about two typical Russian regions: the Kaliningrad Region and the Yaroslavl Region. Both are of a problem sort, one peripheral, the other central. In fact, governor- generals have been appointed to both regions," explains Salin.

Alexey Mukhin, the director of the Center for Political Infrastructure, is certain that, by doing so, Putin is trying to strike a balance in the power verticals in these particular regions.

"Here, we're talking of Russia's strategic regions - Kaliningrad, Crimea, Yaroslavl. Government reshuffles and the coming to power of people from law enforcement and security communities is also understandable," the analyst said.

"Since the 2000s, this is where Putin has found officers to act as crisis managers." Mukhin added. "They are capable of doing their job in a battle-like environment, which makes them the most efficient performers. When they have gained political weight, they will be able to run as candidates in the future elections."

The fourth category includes the dismissal of Russia's ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov. He is going to be replaced with another officer from the law enforcement structures, Mikhail Babich, which reflects the general trend: the most problematic regions and countries neighboring Russia require appointees from Putin's milieu. That is, people whom he trusts the most.

The personnel shakeup won't impact upcoming elections

According to experts, the sweeping character of personnel changes is in line with Putin's governing style. Most often, he takes a number of personnel decisions at once.

"The President's personnel policy has this peculiar feature. If personnel questions do not require a swift solution, he accumulates a certain package and then, once every three to six months, a rotation takes place," Mukhin explains. "For example, about a half year ago he replaced a huge number of generals in the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

Salin shares this view. He is certain that currently there is a demand for new faces in politics. This is true of elections and, partly, of administrations of various levels.

"At the moment, society is bringing forth a demand for the renovation of power as a whole and renovation of the approaches of particular persons. It is not a first step. Also, this impulse will play out in elections," he points out.

The pundits, including Mukhin, point out that the reshuffles are not essentially connected to the upcoming elections and are not going to impact the electoral process. The most conspicuous feature of the reshuffles is the coming to power of many people with the law enforcement background. However, as liberal politician Leonid Gozman points out, it is not the main point.

"In my opinion, the key point is that the new appointees are people who the President trusts personally. The fact that loyalty of that kind is necessary already indicates that there is a crisis of the system," he explains. "Of course, the appointments of people from enforcement agencies are noteworthy, but this is secondary."

The institution of the Presidential Envoy in the regions is losing importance - this is another conclusion that can be drawn from the President's decision, Salin argues.

"These people have a status of deputy heads of the presidential administration, but in reality, they perform the functions of a presidential assistant," he said. "Fifteen years ago, they were the sovereign's eyes in the regions, but since the regions were brought to submission, the importance of Presidential Envoys has reduced greatly. Envoys not going to be abolished, but they have been losing weight steadily, and the latest reshuffles are another blow to them."

In contrast, Mukhin is certain that this institute is obviously important and should not be underestimated.

"It is their business to see that the regional legislation is consistent with the federal one, and that money is spent as decreed," he said. "They are intermediaries between the regionals and President, creating a feedback between the two. If this institution is eliminated, chaos will ensue"

The next step

Salin believes that new reshuffles can be expected as early as this fall, after the 2016 parliamentary elections.

"The future the regional elites will be given more shake-ups," he said. "They have been sent a message already as three governors have been arrested.

Nothing else is going to happen now, on the eve of the elections, but afterwards, some measures against the regional elites will be taken," he says. "The population shows their dissatisfaction with the everyday activity of the regional government - roads and clinics leave much to be desired. And the regional heads are incapable of meeting this demand."

With Kerry Meeting, Washington Seeks New Path In Central Asia By Bruce Pannier RFE/RL, August 3, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/central-asia-us-seeks-new-path/27898135.html

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has welcomed the foreign ministers from the five Central Asian states -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- to Washington. Their meeting, dubbed the C5+1, follows up on the inaugural session of the group, which was held last year in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

With its involvement in Afghanistan winding down, the United States is attempting to restructure the relationship it has had with Central Asia for the last 15 years -- where for Washington, security had been the priority.

Washington is hoping to open new trade ties with Central Asia, a difficult task at a time when Central Asia's neighbor China has come to dominate the region economically during the last decade.

The United States is also seeking to reemphasize the need for the Central Asian governments to show greater respect for basic human rights and take more credible and visible steps toward establishing and developing democratic institutions. Washington was active in prodding Central Asian governments towards democratic reforms in the 1990s, but after the September 11, 2001, attacks its focus shifted to counterterrorism efforts in neighboring Afghanistan.

Some critics have said that the U.S. change in policy was unpopular with the governments and many people in Central Asia and changed the region's view of the United States.

While Kerry is likely to encourage the five foreign ministers to move toward greater regional integration and cooperation, the reality on the ground in Central Asia is the opposite. The five countries have been drifting further apart since they became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

That might mean Washington will choose to focus on its relationships with the individual countries.

Talking Democracy

For Western governments, including the United States, Kyrgyzstan still remains the great hope for democracy taking root in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is holding a presidential election next year and the incumbent, Almazbek Atambaev, has repeatedly said he will abide by the constitutional one-term limit and step down. Peaceful transitions of power and strict observance of constitutional term limits are something Washington would like all the Central Asian governments to embrace, so U.S. officials will likely hold lengthy discussions with Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Erlan Abdyldaev.

On the agenda might also be the case of Azimjon Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek rights activist and journalist jailed in the wake of interethnic riots in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. The United States has criticized the jailing and the U.S. State Department gave Askarov its Human Rights Award in July 2015. That recognition immediately soured ties between the two countries, with Kyrgyzstan renouncing a 1993 cooperation agreement with the United States.

Separate meetings with Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov will likely focus on economic ties. The largest U.S. investment in Central Asia is Chevron's participation in Kazakhstan's massive Tengiz oil field. The TengizChevroil project in western Kazakhstan has provided a basis for U.S.-Kazakh ties for more than two decades.

However, Kazakhstan has regressed in recent years in its attempts to implement democratic reforms. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev has amended legislation to allow himself to remain president until he dies. Snap parliamentary elections earlier this year excluded any genuine opposition parties and reestablished a subservient parliament bound to do the bidding of the president. Nazarbaev just turned 76 at the start of July and has no apparent successor. Kazakhstan doesn't have a system designed to produce a second president genuinely chosen by the masses.

Individual meetings with the foreign ministers of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are likely to cover the same ground. All three states have entrenched presidents, repressive political systems, and all three are vulnerable to security threats emanating from their neighbor to the south, Afghanistan.

Afghan Insecurity

With Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, security will likely remain the focus, with their foreign ministers undoubtedly seeking guarantees that the United States will not withdraw from Afghanistan -- and leave the problem of Afghanistan's worsening security situation on their doorsteps.

For a while, Washington has been engaged in ongoing consultations with all three countries about the situation in Afghanistan and has provided military aid and infrastructure support, particularly to Uzbekistan, which in early 2015 received more than 300 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles to help guard its frontier with Afghanistan.

Most likely, Washington will be seeking some indications that the three governments are open to moving forward on long-stalled political reforms. That might be a futile hope at this point, as all three countries are led by presidents who show no sign of ever leaving office and are resistant to altering their political systems to allow the inclusion of opposition voices.

Washington officials will likely discuss with Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov the Uzbek-U.S. car- making joint venture GM Uzbekistan, which has been mired in scandal after it emerged that the Uzbek management at the plant had allegedly embezzled millions of dollars. Those officials are in custody and facing trial in Uzbekistan but the incident will damper any enthusiasm from other U.S. companies to invest in Uzbekistan.

There is also the question of what to do with the approximately $800 million of Uzbek assets frozen by U.S. authorities, which Tashkent is attempting to get back. The frozen millions are connected to Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Karimova is under house arrest in Uzbekistan after a series of bribery and money-laundering scandals became public in several European countries.

With Russia still the major guarantor of security in Central Asia and China the dominant economic power, the United States is attempting to craft a role that includes security and trade, but crucially offers something those two great powers can't.

Tajikistan Mulls EEU Membership, Feels Pull of Russia By Samuel Ramani RFE/RL, August 1, 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-mulls-eeu-feels-pull-of-russia/27893070.html

On July 19, Abdufattoh Ghoib, the head of Tajikistan's Customs Service, announced that the Tajik government was considering making an application to enter the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Ghoib's declaration followed an announcement from Leonid Slutsky, the Russian State Duma member overseeing Eurasian integration, in which he stated that Tajikistan would likely apply for EEU membership in 2017.

If Tajikistan joins the EEU, Tajikistan will be entrenched further into the Russian sphere of influence. From a purely economic standpoint, Tajikistan's dependence on remittance revenues from guest workers living in Russia makes EEU integration a natural step. Yet deeper integration with Russia has been surprisingly controversial in Tajikistan.

Even though Tajikistan is economically beholden to Moscow, a sizable minority of Tajiks are opposed to EEU accession. In addition, some Tajik military officers are angered by Russia's lack of consultation with Tajik officials on important military-base activities and crimes perpetrated by Russian soldiers at Moscow's Tajik base.

Why Many Tajiks Oppose Economic Integration With Russia

Although Russia and Tajikistan have been allies since Tajikistan's creation as an independent state in 1991, many Tajiks fear that deeper economic integration with Russia will stymie Tajikistan's long-term economic development for two reasons.

First, some Tajik business elites fear that EEU accession will damage Dushanbe's economic and diplomatic relationships with non-EEU actors. In particular, China and other important secondary trade partners, like Qatar and Iran, could view Tajikistan as a Russian client state if it joins the EEU. This perception could cause vital foreign investors to scale back their capital provisions to the Tajik economy.

Zafar Abdullayev, director of the Content think tank, argued in a July 2015 Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) briefing that heightened Kremlin control over Tajikistan's economy and political system could also severely strain Washington-Dushanbe relations. Deeper U.S. involvement in Tajikistan's internal politics would likely result in Russia reciprocally tightening its grip over Tajikistan. This scenario could compromise Tajikistan's sovereignty and inextricably link Tajikistan's economic future to the trajectory of the Russian economy.

Second, economic crises in the EEU's two largest countries, Russia and Kazakhstan, have reduced public support for Eurasian integration. Tajikistan's diminished enthusiasm for the EEU can be demonstrated by a decline in Tajik labor migration to Russia. According to a July 21 statement by Tajikistan's minister of labor, migration, and employment, Sumangul Tagoyzoda, the number of migrant workers leaving Tajikistan decreased by 8 percent during the first half of the 2016 calendar year.

Anti-immigration sentiments in Russia, the declining value of the Tajik currency, and tighter visa restrictions for non-EEU migrants played a major role in this decline. Nevertheless, as Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fellow Paul Stronski notes, the steepness of the decline in Tajik migration to Russia can be at least partially explained by a sizable number of Tajiks returning home by choice.

As economic prospects for Tajik workers in Russia decline, many Tajiks have concluded that the negative attributes of life as a guest worker in Russia outweigh the economic opportunities. In the first six months of this year, 436 Tajik citizens died in Russia. Many of these deaths were attributable to accidents and racist attacks. According to RFE/RL's Tajik Service, 6,000 Tajik workers who typically would have migrated to Russia have settled in Kazakhstan instead.

Large-scale Tajik emigration from Russia the year before a potential EEU membership application differs strikingly from the situation in Kyrgyzstan before Bishkek joined the EEU in July 2015. While much of the 5.4 percent increase in Kyrgyz worker migration to Russia in 2015 can be attributed to Kyrgyzstan's EEU accession, the trend line in the first half of last year was uniformly positive.

As Catherine Putz argued in a recent article for The Diplomat, Kyrgyzstan's Eurasian integration struggles could have sullied Tajik perceptions of the EEU and contributed to a decline in Tajik migration to Russia. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon will likely support EEU accession to preempt unrest caused by rising poverty levels and returning guest workers.

To appease anti-EEU Tajiks who fear growing Russian hegemony over Tajikistan, Rahmon will try his best to strengthen economic ties with Dushanbe's extra-regional allies. As Tajikistan lacks the natural resources Kazakhstan possesses and has an even poorer investment climate than Kyrgyzstan, Rahmon's bid to combine EEU membership with trade diversification is an uphill struggle.

Concerns About Russia's Role As Guarantor Of Tajik Security

Russia has been the primary guarantor of Tajikistan's security since the 1992-97 civil war. But Moscow's commitment to preserving Tajikistan's security was called into question by Russia's February decision to downgrade its military presence from a "division" to a "brigade." As Tajik nationalists resent Russia's military presence in Tajikistan and Russia had announced plans a few months earlier to expand its division from 7,000 to 9,000 men, some analysts speculated that tensions between Rahmon and Putin were responsible for Russia's change in policy.

While rumored frictions between the Russian and Tajik presidents are unsubstantiated, Dmitry Popov, a Central Asia expert at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, claims that Russia's military downgrade was motivated by a desire to appease Tajik officials who resisted Moscow's dictation of Tajikistan's security policy. Some Tajik officials disdain Russia's policy of expanding and reducing its troop presence in Tajikistan without consulting the Tajik government. As Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Aslov admitted to Deutsche Welle that he was not informed about February's redistribution, opposition to Russia's secrecy on military base activities has continued to fester.

Frustrations with Russia's unwillingness to consult the Tajik government on military activities impacting Tajikistan's security have been exacerbated by criminal activity on Russia's military base. Joshua Kucera of Eurasianet described in July 2015 how Russian military personnel had been implicated in a string of violent crimes in Tajikistan. These crimes included the murder of a Tajik taxi driver in fall 2014, and an assault of a Tajik waiter in early 2015. As Russian military base personnel are given de facto immunity for crimes committed on Tajik soil, a sense of injustice has created strains between Russian troops and their Tajik hosts. On July 28, the Tajik government lodged a protest over a Russian soldier's killing of a Tajik woman named Shoira Jabborova, and urged Moscow to crack down on violent crime by servicemen at Russia's Tajik base.

In March 2015, Tajik courts lifted a ban on Tajiks serving in the Russian military to reduce unemployment rates in Tajikistan. This decision allows Tajiks who speak Russian and have received Russian military training to find employment in their home country. The Tajik government's aim is to stop Russia's use of its Tajik military base as a dumping ground for poorly trained and insubordinate conscripts.

This policy has angered opponents of deeper economic integration with Russia. As Russian military participation gives Tajiks Russian citizenship and an opportunity to work in Russia full-time, EEU integration could result in the defection of the most capable Tajik military personnel to Moscow's military base. This would drastically increase Tajikistan's security dependence on Russia and compromise Dushanbe's sovereignty.

Increased Tajik presence at Russia's base has not made Moscow's military activities more transparent to Tajiks. A December 2015 report from Tajik private media outlet Asia-Plus alleged that Russian diplomats held a covert diplomatic summit with Taliban representatives in Tajikistan without the Tajik government's consent. The veracity of this report was confirmed by the Russian ambassador to Tajikistan, Igor Lyakin-Frolov, who insisted that Russia merely held discussions with Taliban officials, and did not negotiate with the Taliban. Frolov's calibration response did little to assuage Tajik frustration with the opacity of Russian interventions into Tajikistan's internal politics.

In light of Russia's breaches of Tajikistan's sovereignty, deeper economic integration with Russia could result in a backlash from Tajikistan's military command and a possible repeat of last fall's highly destabilizing mutiny. The Tajik Defense Ministry has vehemently denied military brain-drain speculation. But if EEU integration causes too many Tajiks to pursue Russian citizenship, Rahmon could reinstate his ban on Tajiks enlisting in the Russian military. That move would appease Tajik nationalists, but could exacerbate poverty at a time when the Tajik financial system is veering toward insolvency.

The majority of Tajiks support Rahmon's push for EEU integration. But closer ties with Russia have also proven to be more controversial than Tajik policymakers expected. In order to prevent instability and appease nationalists, Rahmon has to demonstrate that deeper integration with Russia will not jeopardize Tajikistan's sovereignty and relationships with non-EEU trade partners. As Russia shows few signs of backing off on its hegemonic aspirations in Central Asia, Rahmon could have a difficult time proving his case for swift EEU integration.

Two myths about nationalism and anti-Semitism in Ukraine By Taras Kuzio Washington Post, August 1, 2016 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/01/ukraine-is-seeing-nationalism- and-anti-semitism-from-both-right-and-left-wing-forces/

During the ongoing turmoil in Ukraine, many observers have commented on strains of nationalism, xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism in the country. But unfortunately, these comments have often missed the mark. How identity and prejudice shape Ukrainian politics is far more complicated than is commonly depicted.

It is particularly important to understand these questions now. We are in the middle of a U.S. presidential election in which Donald Trump has praised Vladimir Putin and raised questions about whether he might reverse U.S. opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognize its annexation of the Crimea.

I have conducted 15 research trips to eastern and southern Ukraine, including time visiting the front lines of the conflicts in the Donbas and Crimea regions. Based on this research, I can debunk two myths about nationalism and anti-Semitism in Ukraine.

Myth #1: Ukraine has extraordinarily high levels of anti-Semitism.

Jewish monitors of anti-Semitism in Ukraine find levels of physical and media attacks against Jews to be very low in Ukraine in comparison with Europe and Russia. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman is Jewish, as are many oligarchs.

Moreover, one of the most nationalist forces in Ukrainian politics — the far-right Svoboda (Freedom) Party — has had little success. Like all far-right parties in Ukraine, Svoboda has been unpopular.

Emerging from the neo-Nazi Social National Party in the 1990s, it was briefly in power in the Galician region of western Ukraine and gained seats in parliament only once — in 2012 — when it received protest votes against the authoritarian regime of Viktor Yanukovych. Svoboda has had much less success than many other populist nationalist and neo-Nazi parties throughout Europe.

This is not to suggest that there is no anti-Semitism in Ukraine, as I discuss below. But Ukraine fares well in comparison to many other countries.

Myth #2: The anti-Semitism that does exist in Ukraine exists only among the right wing.

It’s a common mistake to focus only on Svoboda and the far right. Nationalist and anti-Semitic sentiments are present not only on the right wing, but on the left wing, too.

For example, you see nationalism among “Sovietophile” forces like Communists, Russian nationalists, or the Party of Regions, who supported Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin’s ethnic cleansing of the Crimean Tatars in 1944. The Tatar annual commemoration of this act as “genocide” has been banned by Russian occupation authorities in the Crimea, who have closed down Tatar organizations and media outlets, deported or arrested leaders and murdered activists.

Moreover, anti-Semitism in Ukraine appears to be most prevalent in the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, not the western regions where Svoboda has more influence. These two separatist republics, which declared their independence from Ukraine in May 2014, are kept afloat financially, economically and militarily by Russia through a shadow government. Russian anti-Semitism in these republics is a response to the support given by the country’s Jewish minority to the Euromaidan and Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.

For example, Sergei Aksyonov, leader of the neo-Nazi Russian Unity party, was installed as prime minister by Russian occupation forces in the Crimea. His anti-Semitic and homophobic political forces believe the Crimea is part of Russia, Ukraine belongs in the Russian world, Ukrainians are “Little Russians” and the Ukrainian language is a dialect of Russian.

In the Donbas conflict, “internationalist” volunteers from France, Italy, Serbia, Hungary and as far away as Brazil mingle with Russian neo-Nazis and Cossacks. But these volunteers also include those from the extreme left who have come to fight “NATO,” “U.S. imperialism” and “Ukrainian fascism.” In Europe the far left and far right are united in their anti-Americanism, antagonism toward the European Union and NATO and love of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.

And some volunteers appear to be bringing anti-Semitism into the Ukrainian conflict. In Donetsk and Luhansk, separatist political leaders accuse the Ukrainian leadership of being Jews who have Slavicized their names. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is allegedly hiding his real Jewish name of “Valtsman,” for instance.

Ukraine’s foremost expert on anti-Semitism, Vyacheslav Likhachev, has concluded there is a “high level of anti-Semitism in the public discourse” of the Donbas separatists. He added that “anti-Semitism has long become an important component of the official ideology of the puppet regimes declared on the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, occupied by Russia.”

As a result, much of the Jewish population in these regions has fled to other parts of Ukraine, fearing official anti-Zionism (camouflaged anti-Semitism), an influx of Russian Cossacks and neo-Nazis to fight on the separatist side, and lawlessness and economic breakdown.

What does this mean for Ukraine?

Debunking these myths helps us better understand how nationalism and anti-Semitism actually operate in Ukraine. It’s not just a story about the far right, even though politicians and scholars often focus on far-right forces.

Rather than focus on Svoboda and its kindred, politicians and scholars must also understand the pro-Soviet, Pan-Slavic and Russian nationalists who are especially prevalent in the Crimea, Odessa and Donbas. For example, although Anton Shekhovtsov keeps track of these disparate Russian nationalist, fascist and neo-Nazi groups fighting for the separatist cause, we know relatively little about how these groups impact Ukrainian politics.

And these forces have been anti-Maidan, occasionally separatist and always Ukrainophobic. They strongly oppose European integration, believe Ukraine is a natural part of the Russian world and feel strongly that Ukrainians and Russians are, as Putin has repeatedly said, “odyn narod” (one people).

These forces are clearly important not only to Ukrainian politics, but to how Western countries, and a newly elected American president, must approach the region.

Taras Kuzio is a senior research fellow at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, and author of “Ukraine. Democratization, Corruption and the New Russian Imperialism” (2015). His book “Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Nationalism, Identity and Crime” is to be published later this year.

National Memory in Ukraine By Alexander J. Motyl Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2016 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-08-04/national-memory-ukraine

Are you a fascist?” I ask. “And are you an anti-Semite?”

Volodymyr Viatrovych, the 39-year-old director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, in Kiev, whose critics in the West demonize as an apologist of fascism and anti-Semitism, laughs. “Under no circumstances! I consider myself an anti-fascist. I value freedom, above all, and have the greatest respect for Jews. Indeed, I consider the Jewish struggle for liberation and equality to be a model for Ukrainians.”

“Well,” I continue, “are you a Banderite?” The reference is to the followers of Stepan Bandera, the controversial leader of the radical wing of the organized Ukrainian nationalist movement from the mid-1930s until his murder by a Soviet assassin in 1959.

“That depends on what you mean by ‘Banderite,’” Viatrovych answers. “According to Russian propaganda, every nationally conscious Ukrainian is a Banderite. In that case, so am I. If by Banderite you mean a supporter of an interwar form of nationalism, then no.”

We are sitting in Viatrovych’s spacious office on the second floor of a building constructed in 1912 as a personal dwelling for Count Uvarov. The interior has seen better days. The floors squeak and haven’t been varnished in decades. The corridors are dimly lit. The institute, founded as a governmental institution in 2007 by President Viktor Yushchenko, shares the building with a variety of nongovernmental organizations. Viatrovych has a staff of about 30, mostly young historians from various parts of Ukraine. Last year, there were about 40, but budgetary constraints and low salaries led ten to leave. All in all, the institute receives six million hryvnias (about $240,000) from the government for salaries and operating expenses and another five million (about $200,000) for its publications, conferences, and the like.

This shabby outfit is where, critics allege, Viatrovych is directing a full-fledged campaign to whitewash Ukraine’s past, falsify documents, and impose censorship on scholarship and the media—all charges that he unconditionally rejects.

“I have never falsified a single document in all my work,” he says. Viatrovych served as head of the Ukrainian secret police archive in 2008–10 and is proud of having provided access to the formerly secret materials to researchers and of having begun to digitize the documents. “Various Polish scholars who are critical of my work have enjoyed open access to the archive and have never lodged a single complaint. When the [Viktor] Yanukovych regime fired me in 2010, they formed a commission to investigate my activity as director in the hope of finding compromising materials. Despite their best efforts, they found nothing, because there is nothing. The unconditional openness of the archives is a question of principle for me.”

The charge of censorship derives from one of the four “decommunization” laws that Ukraine’s parliament adopted in mid-2015. It states that insulting the organizations, groups, parties, and movements deemed “fighters for independence” is illegal, but it fails to specify what the legal mechanisms for dealing with such views might be. It’s clear to me and most Ukrainians that the injunction, legally daft as it is, is exclusively exhortative. In any case, Viatrovych’s institute didn’t write that law; the son of one of the commanders of the Ukrainian nationalist underground did.

Likewise, “there hasn’t been a single instance of censorship or repression,” Viatrovych emphasizes. “Quite the contrary, scholars are actively studying Ukraine’s communist past. After all, the point of the decommunization laws is not to stop discussion and research but to provide complete access to archives while removing the communist past from the everyday Ukrainian present—hence, the removal of monuments and the changing of street, city, town, and village names.”

In truth, Viatrovych says, “what critics of the law find hardest to accept is its equation of communism with Nazism. As far as Ukraine is concerned, however, that equation is perfectly valid.”

It’s hard to disagree if one knows anything about twentieth-century Ukrainian history. In the 40 years between 1914, when World War I began, and 1953, when Stalin died, Ukraine experienced over 15 million “excess deaths” due to war, famine, and repression, a point emphasized by the historian George Liber in his recently published book, Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine, 1914–1954. More than half were at the hands of the Communists. Mass deaths perpetrated against the Ukrainians, even genocide—the 1932–33 Holodomor, in which four million Ukrainian peasants died as a result of Stalin’s forced famine, is generally considered to be a genocide—does not absolve Ukrainians in general or Ukrainian nationalists or Communists in particular of unethical or criminal behavior. But nor can the fact that Ukraine is a central element in the region called “the bloodlands” by the historian Timothy Snyder be ignored, diminished, or relativized to the point of insignificance.

The controversy over how to interpret recent Ukrainian history underlies the controversy over Viatrovych. He is simply a stand-in for a form of Ukrainian history that some, mostly Western, historians reject. At first glance, the battle positions appear to be perfectly clear: good, enlightened, liberal Western historians versus bad, unenlightened, nationalist Ukrainian historians. That’s also how Viatrovych’s critics like to paint the confrontation. In fact, the conflict is far more complex and requires significant deconstruction in order to make sense of it.

One has to start with the fact that as a people, the Ukrainians lacked the opportunity to develop their own narrative—their own self-understanding of their place in history, their own voice—for most of the twentieth century and the preceding centuries. And this was for a simple reason: they lacked statehood and full-fledged political, intellectual, and economic elites.

In fact, what all other states take for granted—a national history—is something that the Ukrainians have had the opportunity to develop only since attaining independence in 1991. Before 1918, what passed for Ukrainian history was subsumed under Russian, Austrian, or Polish history. From 1918 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainian history was transformed into part of the Russian-led class struggle that the Communist Party decreed as the only valid form of history. There were of course genuine scholars, both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian, who wrote intelligent, fair histories of Ukraine and the Ukrainians, but they were isolated, because an explicitly Ukrainian national project was banned in the Soviet Union.

Things began to change after the Soviet Union collapsed, but only slowly. Soviet-era institutions, elites, symbols, and language continued to dominate the Ukrainian intellectual landscape (and arguably still do). Complicating things was that after communism collapsed, other nations with a historical presence in Ukraine, such as the Russians, the Poles, and the Jews, had far more intellectual, political, and financial capital to structure postcommunist narratives, ones that, once again, tended to marginalize the Ukrainians. At their worst, these histories, like the Soviet one, reduce Ukrainians to lazy, irresponsible, prejudiced country bumpkins with exaggerated penchants for vodka and violence.

These historical narratives depicted Ukrainian nationalists as cutthroats, killers, murderers, and rapists— unsurprisingly so, as the nationalists actively and violently rejected the stereotyping to which they and their nation had been subjected. Just as unsurprisingly, the nationalists countered these histories with their own— one that generally glorified the fighters and all their deeds. In effect, then, contemporary Ukraine has witnessed the ongoing clash of two competing narratives—the overwhelmingly powerful Soviet one (and its offshoots, such as contemporary Russian, Polish, and Jewish narratives) and the infinitely weaker nationalist story. They are binary opposites and are mutually exclusive. Just as the Soviet narrative charges all nationally conscious Ukrainians with being nationalist demons, so does the nationalist take glorify all Ukrainian nationalists and encourage all nationally conscious Ukrainians to become nationalists. There is little room for alternatives that avoid these two extremes.

Seen in this light, Viatrovych’s Western critics are not quite the enlightened liberals they claim to be. Rather, they are exponents of a neo-Soviet narrative whose roots go back to the very earliest Russian Bolshevik excoriations of non-Russian opponents. Far from revisionist, such historians are in fact the continuators of a long tradition seeped in colonialist assumptions about non-Russians in general and Ukrainians in particular.

A view shows the Independence Monument and the Ukrainian national flag in Independence Square in central Kiev, Ukraine, April 11, 2016. Especially striking is the way in which these critics implicitly equate Ukrainian national identity, in even its most innocent forms, with a potentially virulent fascism. The historian Stephen Cohen provides a plethora of examples, having fully agreed with the Putin regime’s characterization of the demonstrators during the 2013– 14 Euromaidan protests and the post-Yanukovych government as fascist. To be sure, the organized nationalist movement of the interwar period was not democratic. Some Banderites flirted with fascism; others were true believers. But the vast majority were indifferent to questions of regime type and instead were willing to sacrifice their lives for the one tenet that all Ukrainian nationalists, and indeed all nationalists, have in common: the liberation of the nation and the construction of a national state.

Unsurprisingly, given their equation of Ukrainian identity with proto-fascism and fascism, Viatrovych’s critics have spilled enormous amounts of ink warning of potential fascist threats in independent Ukraine, tending to magnify their importance far beyond what the reality justifies. There are several right-wing groups in Ukraine, but they have remained tiny and marginal. In contrast, the extremist left, as represented by the Communist Party and its successors, such as the Party of Regions, which catapulted Yanukovych to power in 2010, has remained less feared, even though its capacity to do harm, and the harm that it actually did, is immeasurably greater.

Within this field of neo-Soviets and nationalists, scholars such as Viatrovych are hoping to tread a middle way between the two extremes. Viatrovych’s book Drukha polsko-ukrayinska vyina, 1942–1947 (The Second Polish-Ukrainian War, 1942–1947, which I have reviewed positively) is a case in point. The neo-Soviets focus only on the ethnic cleansing of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943 in Volhynia. (Poland’s parliament recently labeled Ukrainian nationalist actions in Volhynia a genocide.) The nationalists speak only of a national- liberation struggle. Viatrovych tries to place the violence of 1943 within the context of the interethnic Polish- Ukrainian violence of 1942–47 and condemns the criminal activity of both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists at the time.

Another young Ukrainian historian, Oleksandr Zaytsev, vigorously disputes the fascist label for the Ukrainian nationalists while arguing that Bandera is undeservedly lionized and that the nationalists shared commonalities with the Ustasha, Croatia’s World War II fascist movement—hardly a laudatory comparison. Still another historian, Ivan Patryliak, has written the equivalent of a social history of the nationalist movement without shirking from a discussion of the nationalists’ moral lapses. Good history is perfectly possible in Ukraine, but only if the two extremes are avoided and historians are willing to be subjected to vicious criticism from both sides.

“Have you ever been attacked by the nationalist right?” I ask Viatrovych.

“Of course,” he says, smiling. “The neo-Soviets call me a nationalist, while the nationalists accuse me of being a liberal. I know I must be doing something right.” Viatrovych openly acknowledges that Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists participated in anti-Jewish pogroms and in the ethnic cleansing of Poles. He insists only that that is not the whole story—and he is right. He also insists that the Ukrainian nationalists had no programmatic commitment to ethnic violence, a view that fully accords with my reading of the archival sources. His critics accuse him of whitewashing the crimes of the nationalists. Quite the contrary: by shifting the responsibility for ethnic violence from a small group of ideologically motivated individuals to the people at large, Viatrovych is effectively suggesting that Ukrainians— and Poles, Russians, and others—participated in violence. This seemingly small shift in focus has enormous consequences; it opens the door to an honest investigation of the social roots of violence and of the interethnic relations that spawned violence, both by Ukrainians and against Ukrainians. Naturally, this kind of complex argument, one of moral grays, cannot appeal to extremist neo-Soviets or to nationalists who prefer to see the world in terms of black and white.

By the same token, it is important to remember that Ukrainian nationalists are not just cutthroats and murderers; they are not just victimizers. They are also victims. And most important, although most banal, they are human beings who deserve to have a voice like any other people. Like all marginalized people, the Ukrainians should be able to participate in the writing of their own history. A fully open and frank discussion of all of Ukraine’s history thus requires that the grand narratives that have stifled freedom of expression in the past be reduced to mere points of view that must compete in the marketplace of ideas.

Viatrovych’s demonization by both the left and the right may be a testament to the fact that both extremes are losing influence and know it—and, as a result, are fighting rear-guard actions to hold on to their power. There is nothing inevitable about their ideas’ demotion to mere points of view. Fortunately, Ukraine’s remarkable post-Euromaidan ability to retain its democratic institutions, eschew right- and left-wing extremism, move toward the West, and regain its memory and voice bode well for the emergence of a contentious but honest middle ground. When that happens, Viatrovych is likely to be one of the heroes.