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No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011
No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011 ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre 60 Farringdon Road London EC1R 3GA United Kingdom Tel: +44 20 7324 2500 Fax: +44 20 7490 0566 E-mail: [email protected] www.article19.org International Media Support (IMS) Nørregarde 18, 2nd floor 1165 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: +45 88 32 7000 Fax: +45 33 12 0099 E-mail: [email protected] www.i-m-s.dk ISBN: 978-1-906586-27-0 © ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS), London and Copenhagen, August 2011 This work is provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.5 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative works, provided you: 1) give credit to ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS); 2) do not use this work for commercial purposes; 3) distribute any works derived from this publication under a licence identical to this one. To access the full legal text of this licence, please visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ legalcode. ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS) would appreciate receiving a copy of any materials in which information from this report is used. This report was written and published within the framework of a project supported by the International Media Support (IMS) Media and Democracy Programme for Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It was compiled and written by Nathalie Losekoot, Senior Programme Officer for Europe at ARTICLE 19 and reviewed by JUDr. Barbora Bukovskà, Senior Director for Law at ARTICLE 19 and Jane Møller Larsen, Programme Coordinator for the Media and Democracy Unit at International Media Support (IMS). -
Public Broadcasting in Ukraine
РОЗДІЛ 1 ДЕРЖАВНЕ МОВЛЕННЯ: ВІД ПРОПАГАНДИ ДО АДМІНРЕСУРСУ Svitlana Ostapa, Vadym Miskyi, Ihor Rozkladai under the general editorship of Natalia Lyhachova Svitlana Ostapa, Vadym Miskyi, Ihor Rozkladai Miskyi, Ihor Rozkladai Svitlana Ostapa, Vadym PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN UKRAINE: History of Creation and Challenges PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN UKRAINE: HISTORY OF CREATION AND CHALLENGES IN UKRAINE: HISTORY OF CREATION PUBLIC BROADCASTING 1 2 Svitlana Ostapa, Vadym Miskyi, Ihor Rozkladai under the general editorship of Natalia Lyhachova PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN UKRAINE: History of Creation and Challenges UDC 654.19 О 76 Production of this brochure was made possible with the financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Government of Sweden. The content of the brochure is the sole responsibility of Detector Media NGO and does not necessarily reflect the po- sition of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, or the Government of Sweden. S.V. Ostapa, V.V. Miskyi, I.Ye. Rozkladai under the general editorship of Natalia Lyhachova. О 76 Public broadcasting in Ukraine: History of Creation and Challenges. — Kyiv: VIOL PRINTING HOUSE LLC, 2018. — 168 p. Fig. Media experts directly involved in the establishment of the Public Broadcasting in Ukraine reveal the history of the transformation of state broadcasters into the National Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine. It was a path from advocating for the legislation necessary for the formation of a legal entity and its first steps. This brochure also describes the main challenges faced by the National Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine at the end of the first two years of its operation. -
Minsk II a Fragile Ceasefire
Briefing 16 July 2015 Ukraine: Follow-up of Minsk II A fragile ceasefire SUMMARY Four months after leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia reached a 13-point 'Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements' ('Minsk II') on 12 February 2015, the ceasefire is crumbling. The pressure on Kyiv to contribute to a de-escalation and comply with Minsk II continues to grow. While Moscow still denies accusations that there are Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted in March 2015 to having invaded Crimea. There is mounting evidence that Moscow continues to play an active military role in eastern Ukraine. The multidimensional conflict is eroding the country's stability on all fronts. While the situation on both the military and the economic front is acute, the country is under pressure to conduct wide-reaching reforms to meet its international obligations. In addition, Russia is challenging Ukraine's identity as a sovereign nation state with a wide range of disinformation tools. Against this backdrop, the international community and the EU are under increasing pressure to react. In the following pages, the current status of the Minsk II agreement is assessed and other recent key developments in Ukraine and beyond examined. This briefing brings up to date that of 16 March 2015, 'Ukraine after Minsk II: the next level – Hybrid responses to hybrid threats?'. In this briefing: • Minsk II – still standing on the ground? • Security-related implications of the crisis • Russian disinformation -
REGLUGERÐ Um Breyting Á Reglugerð Um Þvingunaraðgerðir Varðandi Úkraínu Nr
Nr. 745 9. júlí 2015 REGLUGERÐ um breyting á reglugerð um þvingunaraðgerðir varðandi Úkraínu nr. 281/2014, ásamt síðari breytingum. 1. gr. Þvingunaraðgerðir. Á eftir 33. tölul. 1. mgr. 2. gr. reglugerðar um þvingunaraðgerðir varðandi Úkraínu nr. 281/2014, ásamt síðari breytingum, komi eftirfarandi töluliðir sem hljóði svo: 34) Ákvörðun ráðsins 2014/933/SSUÖ frá 18. desember 2014 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2014/386/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir vegna ólöglegrar innlimunar Kríms og Sevastopol. 35) Ákvörðun ráðsins (SSUÖ) 2015/959 frá 19. júní 2015 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2014/386/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir vegna ólöglegrar innlimunar Kríms og Sevastopol. 36) Reglugerð ráðsins (ESB) nr. 1351/2014 frá 18. desember 2014 um breytingu á reglugerð (ESB) nr. 692/2014 um þvingunaraðgerðir vegna ólöglegrar innlimunar Kríms og Sevastopol. 37) Ákvörðun ráðsins 2014/801/SSUÖ frá 17. nóvember 2014 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2015/145/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir með tilliti til aðgerða sem grafa undan eða ógna landamærahelgi, fullveldi og sjálfstæði Úkraínu. 38) Ákvörðun ráðsins 2014/855/SSUÖ frá 28. nóvember 2014 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2015/145/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir með tilliti til aðgerða sem grafa undan eða ógna landamærahelgi, fullveldi og sjálfstæði Úkraínu. 39) Ákvörðun ráðsins (SSUÖ) 2015/241 frá 9. febrúar 2015 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2015/145/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir með tilliti til aðgerða sem grafa undan eða ógna landamærahelgi, fullveldi og sjálfstæði Úkraínu. 40) Ákvörðun ráðsins (SSUÖ) 2015/432 frá 13. mars 2015 um breytingu á ákvörðun 2015/145/SSUÖ um þvingunaraðgerðir með tilliti til aðgerða sem grafa undan eða ógna landamærahelgi, fullveldi og sjálfstæði Úkraínu. 41) Framkvæmdarreglugerð ráðsins (ESB) nr. -
Crimea: Anatomy of a Decision
Crimea: Anatomy of a decision Daniel Treisman President Vladimir Putin’s decision to seize the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia was the most consequential of his first 15 years in power.1 It had profound implications for both foreign and domestic policy as well as for how Russia was viewed around the world. The intervention also took most observers—both in Russia and in the West—by surprise. For these reasons, it is a promising case from which to seek insight into the concerns and processes that drive Kremlin decision-making on high-stakes issues. One can distinguish two key questions: why Putin chose to do what he did, and how the decision was made. In fact, as will become clear, the answer to the second question helps one choose among different possible answers to the first. Why did Putin order his military intelligence commandos to take control of the peninsula? In the immediate aftermath, four explanations dominated discussion in the Western media and academic circles. A first image—call this “Putin the defender”—saw the Russian intervention as a desperate response to the perceived threat of NATO enlargement. Fearing that with President Viktor Yanukovych gone Ukraine’s new government would quickly join the Western military alliance, so the argument goes, Putin struck preemptively to prevent such a major strategic loss and to break the momentum of NATO’s eastward drive (see, e.g., Mearsheimer 2014). 1 This chapter draws heavily on “Why Putin Took Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2016. A second image—“Putin the imperialist”—cast Crimea as the climax of a gradually unfolding, systematic project on the part of the Kremlin to recapture the lost lands of the Soviet Union. -
Inside Russia's Intelligence Agencies
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu PUTIN’S HYDRA: INSIDE RUSSIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Mark Galeotti For his birthday in 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was treated to an exhibition of faux Greek friezes showing SUMMARY him in the guise of Hercules. In one, he was slaying the • Russia’s intelligence agencies are engaged in an “hydra of sanctions”.1 active and aggressive campaign in support of the Kremlin’s wider geopolitical agenda. The image of the hydra – a voracious and vicious multi- headed beast, guided by a single mind, and which grows • As well as espionage, Moscow’s “special services” new heads as soon as one is lopped off – crops up frequently conduct active measures aimed at subverting in discussions of Russia’s intelligence and security services. and destabilising European governments, Murdered dissident Alexander Litvinenko and his co-author operations in support of Russian economic Yuri Felshtinsky wrote of the way “the old KGB, like some interests, and attacks on political enemies. multi-headed hydra, split into four new structures” after 1991.2 More recently, a British counterintelligence officer • Moscow has developed an array of overlapping described Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as and competitive security and spy services. The a hydra because of the way that, for every plot foiled or aim is to encourage risk-taking and multiple operative expelled, more quickly appear. sources, but it also leads to turf wars and a tendency to play to Kremlin prejudices. The West finds itself in a new “hot peace” in which many consider Russia not just as an irritant or challenge, but • While much useful intelligence is collected, as an outright threat. -
Non-Enforcement of Court Decisions
01 July – 30 September 2020 QUARTERLY REPORT REPORT FOCUS: NON-ENFORCEMENT OF COURT DECISIONS THE BOC IS FUNDED through the Multi-donor Account for Ukraine set up at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2014. The donors of the Multi-donor Account for Ukraine include: the European the Netherlands Union Denmark Norway Finland Poland France Sweden Germany Switzerland Italy the United Kingdom Japan the United States 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword of the Business Ombudsman 04 Q3 2020 at a glance 06 1. COMPLAINTS TRENDS 08 1.1. Volume and nature of complaints received 08 1.2. Timelines of the preliminary review of complaints 13 1.3. Number of investigations conducted and grounds for dismissing complaints 13 1.4. Timelines of conducting investigations 15 1.5. State bodies subject to the most complaints 16 1.6. Geographical distribution of complaints received 18 1.7. Complainants’ portrait 19 1.8. Report focus: non-enforcement of court decisions 22 1.9. Feedback 30 2. SUMMARY OF KEY MATTERS AND FOLLOW-UP OF RECOMMENDATIONS 32 2.1. Information on closed cases and recommendations provided 32 2.2. Systemic issues identified and solved 38 2.3. Summary of important investigations 40 3. COOPERATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS 68 3.1. The status of the draft law #3607 “On the Business Ombudsman Institution in Ukraine” 68 3.2. Cooperation with state bodies 71 3.3. Regional webinars with the Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture 72 3.4. Knowledge webinars with ACC and UNBA 73 3.5. Public outreach and communications 75 The BOC and the Council are used interchangeably throughout the text to refer to the Business Ombudsman Council. -
Kremlin-Linked Forces in Ukraine's 2019 Elections
Études de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Reports 25 KREMLIN-LINKED FORCES IN UKRAINE’S 2019 ELECTIONS On the Brink of Revenge? Vladislav INOZEMTSEV February 2019 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-981-7 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2019 How to quote this document: Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Kremlin-Linked Forces in Ukraine’s 2019 Elections: On the Brink of Revenge?”, Russie.NEI.Reports, No. 25, Ifri, February 2019. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Author Dr Vladislav Inozemtsev (b. 1968) is a Russian economist and political researcher since 1999, with a PhD in Economics. In 1996 he founded the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies and has been its Director ever since. In recent years, he served as Senior or Visiting Fellow with the Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna, with the Polski Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych in Warsaw, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Berlin, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. -
List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine
dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine List of Persons Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 1. Sergey Valeryevich DOB: 26.11.1972. Aksyonov was elected 'Prime Minister of Crimea' in the Crimean 17.3.2014 AKSYONOV, Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian POB: Beltsy (Bălţi), gunmen. His 'election' was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Sergei Valerievich now Republic of Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March 2014. He actively AKSENOV (Сергей Moldova lobbied for the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 and was one of the co- Валерьевич signatories of the ’treaty on Crimea´s accession to the Russian AKCëHOB), Federation’ of 18 March 2014. On 9 April 2014 he was appointed acting Serhiy Valeriyovych ‘Head’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’ by President Putin. On 9 AKSYONOV (Сергiй October 2014, he was formally ‘elected’ 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic Валерiйович Аксьонов) of Crimea'. Aksyonov subsequently decreed that the offices of ‘Head’ and ‘Prime Minister’ be combined. Member of the Russia State Council. 1/83 dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information 2. Rustam Ilmirovich DOB: 15.8.1976 As former Deputy Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role 17.3.2014 TEMIRGALIEV in the decisions taken by the ‘Supreme Council’ concerning the POB: Ulan-Ude, ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014 against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. (Рустам Ильмирович Buryat ASSR He lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Темиргалиев) (Russian SFSR) Federation. -
Temptation to Control
PrESS frEEDOM IN UKRAINE : TEMPTATION TO CONTROL ////////////////// REPORT BY JEAN-FRANÇOIS JULLIARD AND ELSA VIDAL ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// AUGUST 2010 /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// PRESS FREEDOM: REPORT OF FACT-FINDING VISIT TO UKRAINE ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 2 Natalia Negrey / public action at Mykhaylivska Square in Kiev in November of 2009 Many journalists, free speech organisations and opposition parliamentarians are concerned to see the government becoming more and more remote and impenetrable. During a public meeting on 20 July between Reporters Without Borders and members of the Ukrainian parliament’s Committee of Enquiry into Freedom of Expression, parliamentarian Andrei Shevchenko deplored not only the increase in press freedom violations but also, and above all, the disturbing and challenging lack of reaction from the government. The data gathered by the organisation in the course of its monitoring of Ukraine confirms that there has been a significant increase in reports of press freedom violations since Viktor Yanukovych’s election as president in February. LEGISlaTIVE ISSUES The government’s desire to control journalists is reflected in the legislative domain. Reporters Without Borders visited Ukraine from 19 to 21 July in order to accomplish The Commission for Establishing Freedom the first part of an evaluation of the press freedom situation. of Expression, which was attached to the presi- It met national and local media representatives, members of press freedom dent’s office, was dissolved without explanation NGOs (Stop Censorship, Telekritika, SNUJ and IMI), ruling party and opposition parliamentarians and representatives of the prosecutor-general’s office. on 2 April by a decree posted on the president’s At the end of this initial visit, Reporters Without Borders gave a news conference website on 9 April. -
International Crimes in Crimea
International Crimes in Crimea: An Assessment of Two and a Half Years of Russian Occupation SEPTEMBER 2016 Contents I. Introduction 6 A. Executive summary 6 B. The authors 7 C. Sources of information and methodology of documentation 7 II. Factual Background 8 A. A brief history of the Crimean Peninsula 8 B. Euromaidan 12 C. The invasion of Crimea 15 D. Two and a half years of occupation and the war in Donbas 23 III. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 27 IV. Contextual elements of international crimes 28 A. War crimes 28 B. Crimes against humanity 34 V. Willful killing, murder and enforced disappearances 38 A. Overview 38 B. The law 38 C. Summary of the evidence 39 D. Documented cases 41 E. Analysis 45 F. Conclusion 45 VI. Torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 46 A. Overview 46 B. The law 46 C. Summary of the evidence 47 D. Documented cases of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment 50 E. Analysis 59 F. Conclusion 59 VII. Illegal detention 60 A. Overview 60 B. The law 60 C. Summary of the evidence 62 D. Documented cases of illegal detention 66 E. Analysis 87 F. Conclusion 87 VIII. Forced displacement 88 A. Overview 88 B. The law 88 C. Summary of evidence 90 D. Analysis 93 E. Conclusion 93 IX. Crimes against public, private and cultural property 94 A. Overview 94 B. The law 94 C. Summary of evidence 96 D. Documented cases 99 E. Analysis 110 F. Conclusion 110 X. Persecution and collective punishment 111 A. Overview 111 B. -
RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government
N°66 - November 22 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN P. 1-4 Politics & Government c KREMLIN The highly-orchestrated launching into orbit cThe highly-orchestrated launching into orbit of of the «national leader» the «national leader» Only a few days away from the legislative elections, the political climate in Russia grew particu- STORCHAK AFFAIR larly heavy with the announcement of the arrest of the assistant to the Finance minister Alexey Ku- c Kudrin in the line of fire of drin (read page 2). Sergey Storchak is accused of attempting to divert several dozen million dol- the Patrushev-Sechin clan lars in connection with the settlement of the Algerian debt to Russia. The clan wars in the close DUMA guard of Vladimir Putin which confront the Igor Sechin/Nikolay Patrushev duo against a compet- cUnited Russia, electoral ing «Petersburg» group based around Viktor Cherkesov, overflows the limits of the «power struc- home for Russia’s big ture» where it was contained up until now to affect the entire Russian political power complex. business WAR OF THE SERVICES The electoral campaign itself is unfolding without too much tension, involving men, parties, fac- cThe KGB old guard appeals for calm tions that support President Putin. They are no longer legislative elections but a sort of plebicite campaign, to which the Russian president lends himself without excessive good humour. The objec- PROFILE cValentina Matvienko, the tive is not even to know if the presidential party United Russia will be victorious, but if the final score “czarina” of Saint Petersburg passes the 60% threshhold.