China's Post-Socialist Inequality

“The country’s sharp increase in income inequality is not the result of the rich getting richer while the poor become poorer.” China’s Post-Socialist Inequality MARTIN KING WHYTE ince the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and zens lose jobs, housing, and health insurance, the launch of market reforms under Deng with some destitute Chinese even forced to sell SXiaoping’s leadership in 1978, China has un- their blood to buy food. However, this picture of dergone dramatic changes that have affected the a nation transformed from egalitarianism under lives of Chinese citizens in multiple ways. With Mao into rampaging inequality over the past three the step-by-step dismantling of China’s system of decades is at best oversimplified, and in some re- centrally planned socialism and other reforms, spects dead wrong. China at the end of the Mao growth rates have accelerated, producing rising era was, in reality, a highly unequal and unfair so- living standards, reduced poverty, and rapid in- ciety, and while the country today is much more creases in the skyscrapers, unequal in many respects, most Chinese view the Inequality highways, and other symbols current social order as fairer. On the Rise of a modern society. First in a series However, in many analyses THE SOCIALIST LEGACY there is also concern about The social revolution carried out by the Chi- one consequence of these reforms. Whatever the nese Communist Party (CCP) after 1949 under the problems of the Mao era, in this view, social equal- leadership of Mao (with Deng as one of his lead- ity was a primary goal, and China in the 1970s ing lieutenants) was aimed at transforming China boasted an unusually egalitarian social order, one from a very unequal, petty capitalist society into that was popular at home and admired by many a centrally planned socialist economy modeled around the world. Since 1978, in pursuing eco- after the Soviet Union. That transition was com- nomic growth at all costs, so this argument goes, pleted by 1956. Until Mao’s death two decades lat- the goal of social equality has been abandoned, er, familiar institutions of a state socialist system and China has become an increasingly unequal shaped the contours of inequality in China. and unfair society. Many suggest that the widening In the countryside, the Chinese-style collective gaps between rich and poor in China, and the con- farms created in 1955–56 were consolidated into trasts of such gaps with the egalitarianism of Mao’s larger variants, people’s communes, in 1958. In day, are creating anger and resentment among the the 1960s and 1970s, following Soviet precedent, citizens, fueling mass protests that increasingly peasant families retained small private plots and threaten China’s political stability. could raise food and a few animals there for their Certainly there is much about this view that is own consumption, or for sale in nearby markets accurate. One can imagine Mao turning over in (but not in the cities). However, most of their la- his crystal sarcophagus in Beijing at the news of bor time and energy were spent in collective field foreign capitalists once again exploiting Chinese work directed by production team cadres, with the workers and of Chinese millionaires residing in efforts of family members recorded in work points palatial mansions while many of their fellow citi- whose value would not be known until after the harvest. After 1960, strict enforcement of the CCP’s household registration (hukou) system prohibited MARTIN KING WHYTE is a professor of sociology and faculty villagers from leaving farming or their villages to associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Har- seek better opportunities in the cities. vard University. His books include Myth of the Social Vol- cano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice As a result, while inequalities among families in in Contemporary China (Stanford University Press, 2010). a production team were relatively modest, income 229 230 UÊ 1,, /Ê-/",9Ê UÊ -i«ÌiLiÀÊÓä£Ó differences across teams, brigades, communes, tions and locales. Those working in high priority and rural regions were larger. Moreover, income organizations located in China’s largest cities oper- and other gaps between villagers and favored ur- ated under higher wage scales and enjoyed access banites became much wider than they had been to more generous benefits and scarce commodities before the revolution, when no restrictions pre- that were not available to those at the lower end vented geographical and social mobility. Ironically, of the bureaucratic hierarchy. As in other state so- the result of China’s rural revolution was a system cialist systems, inequality was organized more in of de facto socialist serfdom for the peasantry, who terms of local variations in organizational affilia- constituted over 80 percent of the population. tion and rank, rather than via differential incomes In the urban economy, socialist transformation and property that translated into class differences meant that all private ownership of businesses and in purchases and lifestyles. (From 1962 onward other productive assets disappeared after 1956, Mao convulsed society with class struggle cam- and all production and employment were orga- paigns, even though China lacked social classes in nized into state-owned or state-controlled firms any meaningful sense after the socialist transfor- subject to bureaucratic rather than market regula- mation was completed in 1956.) tion. Upon completing school, urban youths were The Cultural Revolution launched by Mao in bureaucratically assigned to jobs, and with each 1966 added new radical elements to China’s Soviet- job came a bureaucratically designated ladder of inspired organizational template. All material in- wage grades, a package of benefits, and often as- centives, production bonuses, and prizes were signment to subsidized housing, with access as eliminated, and any remaining displays of status well to dining, child care, recreational, and other differences in clothing or adornment (even signs facilities. Such facilities frequently were organized of rank on military uniforms) became taboo, within work unit compounds, many demarcated leading to the fairly uniform (and unisex) style by walls with gatekeepers. of dress that struck visitors to China during the 1970s. Also, intellectuals, political elites, and pro- THE IRON RICE BOWL fessionals were required to spend extended peri- The security of this employment package in ods away from their offices, cleansing themselves state-owned enterprises (SOEs), often referred to of their elitist attitudes through manual labor and as the “iron rice bowl,” contrasted sharply with other menial tasks (for example, surgeons empty- the insecurity of jobs, incomes, and much else ing hospital bedpans). before the revolution. However, individuals were University entrance exams were abolished, and expected to accept their assignments and continue youths finishing secondary school had to work their labors unless bureaucratically transferred, for several years in a commune, factory, or mili- and they had very little ability to choose their first tary unit before they could even be considered for jobs, seek other work, move elsewhere, or refuse college, with selection based on recommendations to accept a transfer. In some periods authorities from workmates and supervisors, rather than on mobilized educated youths by the millions to leave academic records or test scores. These Cultural cities and settle down in the countryside, rather Revolution reforms all pursued greater social than assigning them urban jobs. equality by “leveling down” to the “masses,” rath- As in the Soviet Union, within any urban work er than through any affirmative action assistance organization there were relatively modest differ- to the disadvantaged. ences in wages, the size and quality of housing To sum up, the increased equality at the end of assigned, and other benefits, although those with the Mao era was of a very unusual and selective the highest ranks were often entitled to special sort. Primarily it entailed reduced gaps in incomes, privileges, such as access to a chauffeured lim- consumption, and lifestyles within each local unit, ousine and special medical clinics and vacation but across organizations and locales, and across resorts. The paucity of supplies in state stores in the rural-urban divide, if anything inequalities in- combination with strict rationing of grain, cook- creased. Furthermore, the remaining inequalities ing oil, cotton cloth, and much else also tended to were not ones that Chinese citizens were likely to keep urban consumption differences within mod- view as fair, since they were based on where you est ranges. were born (for villagers) or where you had been However, as in the countryside, socialism did bureaucratically assigned (for urbanites), rather not equalize or redistribute across urban organiza- than on your own talents and efforts. Within orga- China’s Post-Socialist Inequality U 231 nizations Chinese were likely to see such patterns rapidly village families redirected their energies to as inequitable because they violated the socialist growing produce and making handicrafts for sale formula of “rewards according to contributions.” in the cities, and to establishing factories that made Mao condemned any desires for rewards or ad- goods for sale elsewhere and even overseas. Migra- vancement as “bourgeois” sentiments. tion restrictions were relaxed, and soon millions of rural migrants began leaving their villages

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