THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues ISSUE NO. 86 FEBRUARY 2010 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BWC PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS Ambassador (Ret.) Donald A. Mahley A number of articles – even books – have been written to (“Verex”) convened five times over two years and submitted analyze the negotiations toward a Protocol for the Biological a report whose adoption was the subject of the 1994 Weapons Convention (BWC) during the period from 1994 to Conference. The report mastered indecision: there was no 2001. The various works have researched extensively views consensus (and thus no recommendation) on how to of delegations, observers, and those responsible for managing accomplish verification of the BWC; nonetheless, each of and directing the negotiations. Their arguments, evidence, the 21 measures examined by the group was reported to and analysis provide some valuable insights into the kinds of have some characteristics that “could potentially strengthen problems that anyone contemplating pursuit of a legally- the BWC.” binding international instrument to control the actions of Such wording vexed the participants in the 1994 nations with regard to national security issues needs to take Conference. The issue was supposed to be whether the Verex fully into account. But some of the interactions and nuances Report formed a reasonable basis for initiating formal of those negotiations have either been ignored or downplayed negotiations on a legally-binding document to modify the because the observers believed their understanding of the BWC. (Whether this would be a Protocol, an Annex, or a motivations were too speculative. This short article will revision was a question that persisted into the negotiations.) attempt to raise some of those subjects, and perhaps to take The Conference was scheduled for two-weeks’ duration in a slightly different (some will argue more biased) look at Geneva. The ambiguous wording of the Report meant that some that inevitably are subjective and political. to reject the concept of negotiating a legally-binding document The last session of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) was almost would require the participants in the 1994 Conference to reject ten years ago, and the international push to launch it focused the work done over two years by the technical group – and ten years before that. Twenty years is a generation or more the 1994 Conference participants (or at least the decision- in the career patterns of those holding responsibility for such makers) were drawn more from the political spectrum of security portfolios in governments, so perhaps recalling the their respective countries than from technical bodies. international context of the start of the negotiations is relevant, The United States faced a particularly difficult situation. at least to put the discussion in perspective. The US had long been the most skeptical country on the Formal negotiations began in 1995, following a special question of whether a formal verification mechanism could conference of States’ Parties in 1994 to establish the AHG. be devised for the BWC. (At the same time, the US was in But the impetus for a “verification protocol” to the BWC the forefront of charging various countries with violating their began earlier. In the aftermath of the 1979 anthrax event at obligations under the BWC by operating, or at least developing Sverdlovsk in the then-USSR and assorted intelligence the capabilities for, illicit covert offensive BW programs.) concerns about “rogue state” BW programs as alternatives The Clinton Administration, in a policy review prior to the to nuclear or chemical programs for “cheap” weapons of 1994 Conference, had subtly but significantly altered the mass destruction, a number of states decried the absence of overall US policy approach to international instruments on any “compliance or enforcement mechanism” in the BWC. WMD by declaring that it would be an objective of the Admin- As the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) modified its safeguards istration to strengthen the BWC. This policy document did protocol to increase surveillance of nuclear facilities and the not propose a verification mechanism for the BWC – but it Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations made real progress toward agreement to include an extensive Invited Article by Don Mahley ............................... 1-5 verification mechanism, international clamor for a parallel BWC mechanism intensified as the 1991 BWC Review Invited Article by John Walker ............................ 6-11 Conference approached. Report from Geneva ......................................... 12-39 In 1991 the United States resisted the pressure for a straightforward agreement to commence verification News Chronology August - December 2009 ........ 40-73 negotiations outright, but agreed to the establishment of a set Forthcoming Events ............................................. 74 of international technical discussions to examine the feasibility Recent Publications ......................................... 74-78 of technological capability to strengthen the BWC. This group February 2010 page 1 CBWCB 86 did propose to strengthen the Convention, and that was what the globe where those chemicals either constituting chemical the wording in the Verex report had argued: that the proposed weapons or immediate precursors of chemical weapons are measures had the potentialto strengthen the Convention. manufactured. And, before the advent of microreactor So the question at the Conference quickly ceased being technology and when the target was national chemical whether there would be formal negotiations, and focused on weapons capability rather than terrorist chemical weapons what the mandate of those negotiations would be. Discussion capability (which can be both much smaller and less efficient), surfaced a fundamental difference among groups of states at batch production of enough CW or precursors was both the Conference, a fundamental difference that would remain expensive and created at least elements of a recognizable unresolved even in the final draft of a Protocol considered by footprint. All of this meant a reasonably affordable number the AHG in 2001. of reasonably competent CW inspectors could deter a One group of states, principally but not entirely Western proliferator, or at least make a successful clandestine program states, believed the negotiation was about a security extremely expensive and subject to penetration by interested enhancement to the BWC. There were significant differences national intelligence operations. among those states about what the content of any security- Contrast that picture to biology. There are no large-scale enhancing document should include, but all agreed the basic reactions or significant stockpile accumulations required for aim was to make the BWC a stronger instrument against the even a national BW program. Prophylaxis against infecting threat of biological weapons. The other group of states, the work force or the surrounding community can be primarily but not exclusively members of the Non-Aligned approached multiple ways with a low profile. There are no Movement, saw the negotiation primarily as one about potential catastrophic accidents of the magnitude of a Bhopal technology transfer: how advanced biological and (which was certainly not a chemical weapons accident, but pharmaceutical knowledge and technology could be pried away rather an indication of what can happen with those kinds of from those more developed states that were, in the eyes of chemical reactions even for peaceful and legitimate purposes), these developing states, monopolizing capabilities needed in or even necessarily like that of Sverdlovsk. Given the nature developing areas. The principle that disarmament instruments of both research and production, along with the explosive should not be perverted into a rationale for suppressing growth of legitimate civilian research, the number of facilities legitimate, peaceful development in the technology associated capable of handling BW-relevant materials is in the multiple with the document (e.g. nuclear, chemical, biological) had been thousands and expanding almost daily. Even assuming some enshrined in the basic Conventions, but the proponents of way to identify all such locations, to staff an international putting extensive means to “facilitate” technology sharing in organization with enough even reasonably competent the Protocol argued that the principles in the basic Convention inspectors to create an inspection probability able to function text were being too narrowly interpreted by those states as a deterrent would require a budget well beyond what any possessing advanced technology. nation or group of nations would (or even could) pay. If there had been no other significant stumbling blocks to The inherent ambiguity between natural disease and be overcome in the negotiations (and, in fact, there were a offensive BW creates another anomaly when compared with number of other obstacles), this schism, enshrined in the very the CWC. If one discovers Sarin, it is reasonable to conclude mandate of the AHG, would have made successful outcome there is a CW program there. If one discovers anthrax, is it of the negotiations nearly impossible. There was no way to BW or a prophylaxis effort against endemic animal disease? try to strike a consensus-based compromise between the two Probably