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Tesis Gallina Versión Final Creative Commons.Pdf (1.500Mb) UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE CÓRDOBA FACULTAD DE LENGUAS MAESTRÍA EN INGLÉS CON ORIENTACIÓN EN LINGÜÍSTICA APLICADA THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: STRATEGIES USED BY POLITICAL AND MILITARY WITNESSES IN PUBLIC HEARINGS TRABAJO DE TESIS PRESENTADO POR NATALIA GALLINA DIRECTORA Dra. ISOLDA E. CARRANZA CÓRDOBA MARZO, 2012 Esta obra está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my gratitude to my director and mentor, Isolda E. Carranza PhD., whose expertise, guidance and generosity added considerably to this study. My gratitude, too, to the Secretary of Science and Technology (SECyT) who provided financial assistance for this work. Finally, I a special thank-you to my colleagues, family and friends for the support they provided me at all times. I am indebted to all of them for their unconditional love, patience and encouragement. ABSTRACT From the perspective of current situated discourse analysis and the associated disciplinary strands of conversational analysis, narrative studies and critical discourse analysis, this study examines how political and military elite witnesses construct versions of reality in the context of the public hearing and argues for the contestable nature of such versions. This study draws upon a multimodal approach which views discourse as an inherently complex process and product involving various semiotic layers, particularly, language and gesture which are intricately interwoven. The examination of the data reveals the systematic and strategic concurrence of resources of various kinds. It is shown how carefully elaborated texts are constituted through the use of evasion strategies (refusal to answer, reformulation and impersonalization), sensemaking practices and argumentative moves (scrip-formulation, counterfactual account, recourse to the lesson-deriving frame), and choreographed non-verbal resources (bodily orientation, facial expression and gesture); and how through these resources participants manage to deflect damaging attributions of personal and institutional responsibility and blame. An exploration of conversational dynamics shows that elite witnesses are often allowed to disregard the responsibilities and obligations defined by their situational roles as interrogators fail to gain, exert and maintain interactional control. It is possible to suggest hence that these witnesses benefit from some special licences which ultimately permit them to shape content, form and information flow. This study concludes by tapping into the dialectical link between discourse and society unveiling the particular ways in which strategic public discourse represents an instrument of social manipulation and hegemonic control which, far from generating genuine public dialogue, works to manufacture a false sense of debate as well as an equally false sense of consensus and resolution. Key Words: Responsibility, Multimodality, Discourse Strategies TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABSTRACT CHAPTER ONE: Introduction .................................................................................1 1.1. Background ................................................................................................2 1.2. Defining the research problem ...................................................................3 1.3. The theoretical framework .........................................................................4 1.4. The methodological approach.....................................................................7 1.4.1. The selection of the corpus ..............................................................7 1.4.2. The procedures .................................................................................8 1.5. The organization of this document ............................................................9 CHAPTER TWO: The context.................................................................................11 2.1. The Iraq War and its aftermath from a UK perspective ............................11 2.2. The Iraq Inquiry as a situational context ...................................................13 2.2.1. The protocols....................................................................................14 2.2.2. The participants................................................................................15 2.2.2.1. The inquiry board ..................................................................16 2.2.2.2. The witnesses........................................................................ 17 2.2.2.3. The audience(s) .....................................................................20 2.2.3. The hearing room ............................................................................21 2.2.4. The meanings of responsibility in inquiry testimony.......................22 CHAPTER THREE: Testimonies as complex semiotic packages .......................28 3.1. Posture........................................................................................................29 3.2. Head movement.........................................................................................32 3.3. Facial expression........................................................................................38 3.4. The convergence of discourse and technology .........................................42 CHAPTER FOUR: Slipperiness and evasion .........................................................44 4.1. Overt refusal to answer..............................................................................46 4.2. Reformulation ..........................................................................................51 4.3. Impersonalization.......................................................................................60 4.4. Power and influence in the development of inquiry testimony: the interaction of status and situated roles in committee hearings.........................69 CHAPTER FIVE: Argumentation and sensemaking ..........................................71 5.1. Script-formulation .....................................................................................72 5.2. Counterfactuality.......................................................................................82 5.3. The lesson-deriving frame.........................................................................90 5.4. The manufacturing of non-fault accounts..................................................97 CHAPTER SIX: The role of speech-accompanying gestures.................................99 6.1. Delivering a solid performance..............................................................104 6.2. Different tendencies.............................................................................................114 6.2.1. Gestures of the concrete in the testimonies of military witnesses..115 6.2.2. Gestures of the abstract in the testimony of political witnesses.....121 6.3. Gesture and discourse............................................................................127 CHAPER SEVEN: Public discourse in an age of deception.................................129 7.1. The public inquiry as apparent action and media spectacle.....................131 7.2. The public hearing as an opportunity to work on a favourable image.....133 7.3. The clash between rhetoric and reality.....................................................135 7.4. The ideology of transparency and governmental accountability..............137 REFERENCES.........................................................................................................139 SKETCH The inquiry room.........................................................................................................21 LIST OF TABLES Table 1., 2. ....................................................................................................................22 Table 3. .......................................................................................................................101 Table 4. .......................................................................................................................102 Table 5. .......................................................................................................................103 LIST OF FIGURES Figures 1., 2., 3. ...........................................................................................................17 Figures 4., 5., 6. ...........................................................................................................18 Figures 1.1., 2.1. ..........................................................................................................31 Figures 6.1., 3.1.,5.1.,5.1.1. .........................................................................................32 Figures 1.2, 1.2.1. ........................................................................................................34 Figures 2.2. & 2.2.1......................................................................................................35 Figures 3.2, 3.2.1., 4.2.,4.2.1. ......................................................................................36 Figures 5.2., 5.2.1. .......................................................................................................37 Figures 6.2., 6.2.1. .......................................................................................................38 Figures 1.3., 1.3.1.........................................................................................................40 Figures 2.3.,
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