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Panentheism Is Still Vague: a Reply to Lataster and Bilimoria ______ Journal of World Philosophies Responses/204 Panentheism is Still Vague: A Reply to Lataster and Bilimoria _________________________________________ R. T. MULLINS University of St. Andrews, UK ([email protected]) In a recent paper on panentheism, Raphael Lataster and Purushottama Bilimoria offer a critique of several contemporary attempts to define what panentheism is and what panentheism is not. Lataster and Bilimoria find the recent attempts to define panentheism deficient. In particular, they find my approach to panentheism to be riddled with problems. In my reply, I explain that Lataster and Bilimoria have failed to explain what panentheism is and what it is not. Key words: panentheism; pantheism; God; universe Raphael Lataster and Purushottama Bilimoria’s recent article, “Panentheism(s): What It Is and Is Not,” attempts to offer a description of what panentheism is.1 This is an important goal because panentheism is a notoriously vague position that fails to demarcate itself from well-defined rival models of God. As Benedikt Paul Göcke points out, there appears to be no clear paradigm for what counts as panentheism.2 Lataster and Bilimoria would seem to agree when they assert that recent attempts to define panentheism fail to adequately capture this model of God. I am sympathetic to this assertion because I have previously argued that many of the recent attempts to clearly demarcate panentheism from its rivals have failed.3 However, Lataster and Bilimoria find my arguments wanting, and assert that they have offered a clear definition of what panentheism is. A bit of background is necessary to understand the debate. In my previous work, I identify the Demarcation Problem, which says that panentheism cannot distinguish itself from well-established and clearly articulated rival models of God such as classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. These other models of God have clearly stated what they are and what they are not. To be sure, there is a range of diversity of views within each model, but the diversity within each model of God is unified by unique claims about God that are not contained within other rival models. In setting up the Demarcation Problem, I explain what the unique claims are of each model of God, then ask what are the unique defining claims of panentheism that demarcates it from its rivals. I consider several different attempts to avoid the Demarcation Problem, and argue that each fails to establish any unique claims for panentheism—thus calling into question if panentheism is even a model of God. For example, I consider contemporary panentheists, such as Philip Clayton and Benedikt Paul Göcke, who recognize this taxonomy of models of God and try to demarcate panentheism accordingly.4 Their awareness of this problem and the various rival models of God is one reason why I focus on their attempts to avoid the Demarcation Problem in my previous work (Mullins 2016). I consider Clayton’s attempt to demarcate panentheism from pantheism, and argue that his attempt fails, thus collapsing panentheism into pantheism. I also consider Göcke’s attempt to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, and argue that his account of panentheism collapses into classical theism. This leaves us with no identifiable thing that one can call panentheism. _______________ Journal of World Philosophies 4 (Summer 2019): 204-207 Copyright © 2019 R. T. Mullins. e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.4.1.15 Journal of World Philosophies Responses/205 The Demarcation Problem is a serious issue for panentheism in general, and for Lataster and Bilimoria in particular. I will note three reasons why this is the case. First, Lataster and Bilimoria claim to have stated what panentheism is and what it is not. However, if they have failed to avoid the Demarcation Problem, they have failed to state what panentheism is and what it is not. As I will explain below, they have offered an account of panentheism that explicitly collapses into pantheism. This leads to the second reason why this is a serious problem. If panentheism is unable to demarcate itself from its rivals, it cannot be considered an actual rival model of God because it simply collapses into an already well-defined model of God. Thus, panentheism would fail to even be a position that one can affirm or deny. Third, if panentheism cannot clearly demarcate itself from rival models, it cannot claim to be an ancient concept found in the history of human thought among the world religions. Lataster and Bilimoria wish to say that panentheism is in fact an ancient, Eastern concept that can be found among the world religions.5 However, if one wishes to find panentheism among the world religions, one will need to know what panentheism is and what it is not. Otherwise, one will not know what to look for. In order to avoid the Demarcation Problem, panentheism needs to develop clear and unique claims about God that are not captured by other models of God. It is far from obvious that this has been done. Contemporary scholarship agrees that panentheism is meant to be a rival model of God that sits between different kinds of theism and pantheism.6 There is a standard story that scholars tell in this regard. Standard Story: Theism claims that God and the universe are distinct substances, whereas pantheism claims that God and the universe share the same substance. Panentheism wishes to say that God is in the universe, but somehow more than the universe. Thus, panentheism is a middle ground between theism and pantheism. The Demarcation Problem lies in trying to figure out how exactly panentheism is different from theism and pantheism without collapsing panentheism into either theism or pantheism. Again, if the Demarcation Problem cannot be avoided, then panentheism ceases to be a position at all. It is not difficult to see how the Standard Story runs into the Demarcation Problem. For example, theists maintain that God is immanent and omnipresent in the universe, and yet transcends the universe. Hence, one can rightly ask, “What is the difference between theism and panentheism? How exactly is panentheism a middle ground if it seems to be saying the exact same thing as theism?” What is needed to avoid the Demarcation Problem is more content than what the Standard Story provides. How do Lataster and Bilimoria measure up with the Demarcation Problem? Lataster and Bilimoria agree with the Standard Story, but they do not add any more content to panentheism (Lataster and Bilimoria 2018: 52). Instead, they seem to diminish the Standard Story by continually claiming that panentheism is a version of pantheism. They even say that God and the universe share the same stuff or substance (Lataster, and Bilimoria 2018: 53, 57, 58). I take it as obvious that one cannot demarcate panentheism from pantheism by making panentheism a version of pantheism. In continually affirming that panentheism is a version of pantheism, they have fallen victim to the Demarcation Problem. Thus, Lataster and Bilimoria have failed to tell us what panentheism is and what it is not. Of course, Lataster and Bilimoria assert, without argument, that there is something wrong with the way that I have set up the Demarcation Problem. They assert, without argument, that I am arbitrarily, illogically, and dishonestly defining numerous types of theism in order to justify my claim that panentheism has nothing unique to say about God (Lataster and Bilimoria 2018: 57). _______________ Journal of World Philosophies 4 (Summer 2019): 204-207 Copyright © 2019 R. T. Mullins. e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.4.1.15 Journal of World Philosophies Responses/206 Arbitrary, illogical, and dishonest are their words, not mine. I find it difficult to know exactly what their assertion amounts to, but I gather the idea is supposed to be something as follows. The Arbitrary, Illogical, and Dishonest Assertion: The Demarcation Problem says that there are other well-defined models of God that make unique claims about God, and thus there is nothing left for a panentheist to say that is not already captured in a different model of God. In order to establish this claim, Mullins is just arbitrarily making up different models of God in order to push panenthiesm out of the running. As stated, I hope that I have captured what Lataster and Bilimoria intended when they accuse me of being arbitrary. I must confess that I am not sure what they intend when they accuse me of being illogical. To be honest, I am not sure what they meant when they accuse me of being dishonest. What do I make of this assertion of arbitrariness? I find it dubious at best. As I stated in my previous work, this taxonomy of models of God is not of my own making, but is instead widely endorsed by contemporary scholars working on rival models of God. Thus, I am not arbitrarily making up models of God to fit my fancy. But one might think that I have the charge of arbitrariness wrong. Perhaps one will say that Lataster and Bilimoria cannot be accusing me of arbitrarily making up models of God. Why might one think a thing like that? I explicitly state in my previous work that I am taking my taxonomy from Asa Kasher and Jeanine Diller’s (2013) large collection of scholarly essays, Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. One might say that Lataster and Bilimoria must be aware of this, and thus cannot be accusing me of making up models of God to fit my fancy. Perhaps, instead, Lataster and Bilimoria are saying that Kasher, Diller, and the dozens of scholars who contributed to their volume and adopted this taxonomy of models of God are the ones who are arbitrarily, illogically, and dishonestly making up models of God.
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