Retrenchment and Strategic Reorientation Travis E

Home , Martin Neil Baily, Robert Lieber, Susanne Koelbl

University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons

Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations

2019 Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation Travis E. Robison University of Pennsylvania, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation Robison, Travis E., "Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3270. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation

Abstract What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decision makers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment.

Degree Type Dissertation

Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group Political Science

First Advisor Alex Weisiger

Keywords Retrenchment, Security, Strategic Reorientation, Strategy

Subject Categories International Relations

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270 SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY: RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC

REORIENTATION

Travis E. Robison

A DISSERTATION

Political Science

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2019

Supervisor of Dissertation

______

Alex Weisiger

Associate Professor, Political Science

Graduate Group Chairperson

______

Alex Weisiger, Associate Professor, Political Science

Dissertation Committee

Michael C. Horowitz, Professor, Political Science

Avery Goldstein, Professor, Political Science For Andrew and Sarah

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing and researching a dissertation is an individual effort; however, the project would never have come to fruition without support, insights, and encouragement from numerous people. Countless individuals aided me in my doctoral endeavor, and I’m grateful for their interest, comments, and recommendations. Several individuals stand out as the crucial element for my success. Their tireless mentorship, coaching, teaching, and encouragement ensured I completed my work and, hopefully, added something of value to the academic enterprise. Any errors or faults in my work occurred because of my own failings and in no way reflect upon the following people who generously took the time to help me advance my project: Alex Weisiger, Michael Horowitz, Avery Goldstein, Brendan O’Leary, Robert Davis III, Will Reno, Buddhika Jayamaha, Ed Guelfi, Meghan Garrity, Troels Skadhauge, Chris Blair, and Josh Schwartz. To these individuals I can only offer my heartfelt gratitude and say, thank you.

iii

ABSTRACT

SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY: RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC

REORIENTATION

Travis E. Robison

Alex Weisiger

What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT iii

ABSTRACT iv

LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 The Puzzle 1 Core Argument 4 The Retrenchment Debate 5 Retrenchment and its Purpose 9 Why This Matters 12 Research Design 14 Methods 15 Defining and Measuring the Variables 16 Case Selection 19 Case Summaries 21 Chapter Outline 25

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 28 Core Theoretical Argument 28 Key Assumptions 29 Retrenchment 30 Explaining Variation in Retrenchment Outcomes 32 Alternative Explanations 39

CHAPTER 3: RETRENCHMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1975 44 International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment 46 The Road to Overcommitment, 1954-1968 46 Military Overcommitment 55 Declining Domestic Capacity 57 Deciding to Withdraw 60 Framework for Retrenchment, 1969-1972 64 Lowering Costs 66 Managing Withdrawal 72 Realignment and Reorientation, 1973-1975 78 Diminishing Importance of Vietnam 78 Abandoning American Interests in Vietnam 79 Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Aftermath 82 Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 85 Level of Reduced Commitment 85 Effects on Allies and Adversaries 87 Outcome 89

Alternatives 93

CHAPTER 4: RETRENCHMENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-2015 96 International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment 98 The Road to Overcommitment, 2001-2008 98 Military Overcommitment 103 Declining Domestic Capacity 104 Considering Withdrawal 108 Framework for Retrenchment, 2009-2011 111 Lowering Costs 113 Managing Withdrawal 118 Failing to Realign and Reorient, 2012-2015 130 Ally Failure to Uphold Existing Security Order 130 Failed Rapprochement with Iran 134 Inability to Abandon Middle East Interests 137 Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 143 Level of Reduced Commitment 143 Effects on Allies and Adversaries 147 Outcome 150 Alternatives 154

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 157 Security and Solvency 157 Findings 162 Alternatives 169 Implications for Scholarship 174 Policy Implications 177 The Future of Syrian Withdrawal 181 Relative Decline, Retrenchment, and Reorientation 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY 194

LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES

Figures

Figure 1. Four-stage strategic reorientation model 11

Figure 2. Successful American retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975 23

Figure 3. Failed American retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015 25

Figure 4. Variables affecting American retrenchment from Southeast Asia 46

Figure 5. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from the Middle East 97

Tables

Table 1. Considered universe of cases 20

Table 2. Hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes 39

Table 3. Alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes 42

Table 4. Hypotheses and summary of successful retrenchment 92

Table 5. Alternative hypotheses of successful retrenchment 95

Table 6. Hypotheses and summary of failed retrenchment 153

Table 7. Alternative hypotheses of failed retrenchment 156

vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“A political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces.”1

The Puzzle

Sustainable foreign policies balance a state’s international security commitments with its available domestic resources.2 At times, however, rising foreign competition, costly overcommitment abroad, and declining domestic resources unbalance a state’s foreign policy or constrain its ability to project power abroad.3 Given these circumstances, how does a great power realign its strategic priorities? In other words, how can leaders effectively respond to international relative decline? History shows that leaders must respond to these conditions or risk strategic insolvency that jeopardizes national security.

For example, the Roman’s failure to mitigate the effects of trade disruption, political discord, and multiplying security threats during the late third century ultimately led to imperial collapse. The seventeenth century Ottoman and Safavid empires experienced numerous security crises that exacerbated the effects of faltering domestic economies and the rising costs of warfare. Ottoman leaders implemented policy reforms that extended their rule, while their Safavid counterparts failed to realign their priorities and were subsequently defeated. Britain’s relative economic decline at the turn of the twentieth century constrained its military spending just as several competitors emerged; however,

1 Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Routledge), 25. 2 International commitments are obligations outside of a state’s borders that may have to be defended, and “foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and…power.” See Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 9. 3 This is the often referred to as the “Lippmann Gap.” See Samuel Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann Gap,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987), 453-477. 1

British leaders realigned their priorities and continued their global hegemony for several more decades. These examples oversimplify complex histories, yet they highlight the importance of remedying the security dilemma of relative decline caused by increasing foreign policy challenges and declining domestic resources.

Conventional academic wisdom holds that relative decline generates serious security concerns for great powers. Hegemonic stability theorists contend that relative decline undermines the ability of systemic leaders to uphold a preferred international order.4

Power transition theorists argue that relative decline creates opportunities for revisionist powers to challenge the status quo.5 Balance of Power theorists note that sudden power shifts can upset the equilibrium necessary for preserving peace.6 Rationalist theories argue that differential growth can lead to commitment problems, one of the leading causes of war.7 Each of these theories cites the influence of relative decline on the devolution from peaceful stability to conflictual instability. These theories suggest that leaders must act, yet each is unclear about whether the best course of action is to delay, fight, or cut costs to improve a state’s capacity for providing security.

Leaders generally have three options for responding to relative decline.8 One possibility is to muddle along and hope for the best. Another option is to fight to restore

4 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 10-11; and Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988), 591-613. 5 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19-22; and Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 7-12. 6 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 118; and Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 42. 7 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414; and Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006), 169- 203. 8 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 191-194; Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987), 82-107; Stephen Rock, Appeasement in 2 an equilibrium. In fact, policymakers often increase military spending and replace bluff and bluster for diplomacy, provocation for deterrence, and preventive war for inexorable decline.9 These options, however, ignore a new strategic reality marked by international disruptions to the status quo and domestic resource constraints. Simply stated, the rising costs of security exceed a state’s available resources.10 In these circumstances, reorienting a state’s foreign policy and realigning its security resources are necessary despite the inherent risks of this course of action. Reducing the near-term cost of overcommitment and marshalling resources (i.e. retrenchment) may provide the best opportunity for realigning a state’s strategic ends and available means even though it can be politically disruptive and strategically risky.11

Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.12 It alleviates the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources.” Retrenchment reduces risks,

International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000); Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustment,” World Politics 15, no. 4 (1963), 659-660; and Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004), 345-373. 9 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), xxii; and Paul Kennedy, “Conclusions,” in The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, ed. Gier Lundestad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 374. 10 For example, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 11 Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 5; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), chapter 2; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 41; and Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 17. 12 For similar definitions see Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13; Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13; and Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 2-6. 3 shifts burdens, or economizes expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic solvency.13 Retrenching states can economize expenses by reducing military spending or force structures. They can reduce international risks by eliminating foreign policy liabilities, restraining foreign policy goals in certain geographic areas, or demoting the importance of some foreign interests. Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a state to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests.

Ultimately, states implementing retrenchment have more sustainable foreign policies that are less active, ambitious, and burdensome relative to the status quo.14 This sustainability is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power, without which relative decline may become absolute. States that successfully retrench end up with more sustainable foreign policies and perform comparatively well in subsequent military disputes.15 However, not all retrenchment attempts succeed. Therefore, what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes?

Core Argument

In what follows, I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are a possibility.

13 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968), 660-661. 14 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 8. 15 Ibid., 3 and 8. 4

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Retrenchment arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic solvency relative to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly preventative wars, but the merits of the policy are mired in debate.

The Retrenchment Debate

Studies of retrenchment remain divided between critics and advocates – pessimists and optimists.16 According to critics, retrenchment is a rare, high-risk endeavor that signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation among allies and adversaries.17

They assert that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and demonstrates a lack of resolve,18 both of which diminish the benefits derived from leading an existing security order.19 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics contend that it lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics

16 For an overview of the debate, see Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (2012), 7-51. 17 For theoretical and historical arguments against retrenchment see, Stephen Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 192-197; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011), 9- 40; and William R. Thompson, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment – Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 193-197. 18 For instance, Thomas Donnelly, “We Can Afford to Spend More, and We Need To,” New York Times, 9 September 2012, at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/09/how-big-should-the-defense- budget-be/we-can-afford-to-spend-more-and-we-need-to. 19 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America.” According to critics, retrenchment may convince followers to seek another partner. This is the first part of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in which a hegemon may lead an order, but it needs followers. See Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984), 358. 5 believe that leaders adopting this policy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is rational only when using force is not a viable option.20 From this perspective, the outcomes of retrenchment are all negative – diminished power, influence, and security – so it should only be a policy of last resort.

In contrast, retrenchment advocates argue that the policy can have positive outcomes.

They contend that critics overstate the costs of retrenchment while minimizing those of prolonged overcommitment.21 Great powers often accrue peripheral commitments with little inherent value, so advocates note that retrenchment can be a beneficial policy that facilitates reallocating resources to core interests.22 Moreover, advocates find that retrenchment is less costly and is often an effective policy adopted by great powers during periods of relative decline.23 Advocates also downplay reputational concerns, noting that a state’s reputation is often context-dependent, so reducing peripheral

20 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40. This is the “turbulent frontier” theory: although leaders prefer non-expansionist policies, they pursue expansionist strategies in pursuit of security. See John S. Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (1960), 150-68. 21 For theoretical and historical arguments in favor of retrenchment see, Daniel W. Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think),” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013), 52-79; Kyle Haynes, “Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015), 490-502; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011), 7-44; Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. (2011), 34; and Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004), 345-373. 22 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?”; and Barry Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 116- 130. 23 Douglas B. Atkinson and George W. Williford, “Should We Stay or Should We Go? Exploring the Outcomes of Great Power Retrenchment,” Research and Politics 3, no. 4 (2016), 1-6; MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 9-10; Parent and MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment.” Since 1870, great powers in relative decline opted to retrench in 15 of 18 cases. Of those powers that did retrench, six regained their previous standing and states that retrenched were less likely to experience interstate conflicts. 6 commitments may signal resolve in more vital regions.24 States may even be able to identify a successor to uphold a preferred security order,25 or use retrenchment as a screening mechanism to assess a rising rival’s intentions.26 Finally, advocates suggest that when a state refuses to retrench it may undermine its legitimacy and increase the likelihood of conflict or the formation of counterbalancing coalitions.27

Both sides of the retrenchment debate generally agree on the conditions under which retrenchment will likely occur, and about retrenchment’s potential costs. Internationally, retrenchment may signal weakness which alarms allies and encourages adversaries.

Disengagement may also destabilize regions and undermine the international order.

Domestically, special interests might mobilize to defend their parochial interests, and elite consensus could fracture as hardliners conflate retrenchment with defeat and accuse advocates of appeasement. Critics view retrenchment as a reactive and unfavorable strategy that is rare and only viable when vital interests are at stake or when the costs of preventive war are likely to be prohibitive.28 Advocates consider retrenchment a viable option, but “only after decline has generated overwhelming incentives [to retrench].”29

24 See Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015), 473-495; Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29, no. 1 (2012), 3-27; and Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 25 Haynes, “Decline and Devolution.” 26 Brandon K. Yoder, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019), 130-145. 27 This is the second half of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in which a dominant state may have to make concessions to retain the support of followers. See Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma,” 358. For similar arguments see Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); and Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press, “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty,” World Affairs 172, no. 2 (2009), 84-89. 28 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 192-194, 197, 232. 29 Kyle Haynes, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 192. 7

Critics and advocates view retrenchment as a costly policy that a declining state will only reluctantly adopt.30 This ignores the positive outcomes that may occur if leaders conduct retrenchment well, and misses the potential that retrenchment may be more likely to succeed if leaders meet certain conditions.

The literature recognizes that leaders may opt for various retrenchment policies, but it fails to examine the effects of these choices on retrenchment outcomes. Critics accept that retrenchment may be a viable option under some conditions and note that the way a state retrenches may avoiding some negative consequences.31 Advocates show that retrenchment occurs more frequently than critics predict, but they do not explain the conditions necessary for it to succeed. By focusing debate on retrenchment’s merits instead of its outcomes, the literature ignores the purpose of the policy and fails to provide criteria for evaluating the utility of retrenchment against alternatives.32

Under certain conditions it may be wise to retrench to facilitate prolonging the duration of a state’s power and influence. For example, between 1889 and 1914, Britain’s leaders debated how to realign the costs and distribution of its naval assets during a period of rising regional competition and relative economic decline. Some realignment decisions were relatively easy, such as removing naval assets from the Pacific coast of

North America, but others entailed more risk. During this period, British leaders abandoned interests to the United States, allied with Japan to facilitate naval redeployment, and sought rapprochement with France and Russia to lower regional

30 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 194; Haynes, “Decline and Devolution,” 192; and MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 21. 31 Gilpin, chapter 5; and Haynes, “Correspondence,” 192. 32 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000), 167-182. 8 security costs. These efforts, along with domestic reforms, alleviated Britain’s resource constraints. After Germany enacted a policy of naval expansion in 1904, Britain’s improved resource base provided its leaders with options for countering the rising

German threat. Although retrenchment risked strengthening potential regional competitors, it enabled British leaders to confront a higher priority threat without jeopardizing Britain’s strategic solvency.33 This example demonstrates that retrenchment can succeed, so the ongoing debate about its merits likely stems from a fundamental misunderstanding about what retrenchment is and what is its purpose.

Retrenchment and its Purpose

Leaders compete internationally to improve their state’s security.34 The intensity of this competition varies, which causes the pattern of a great power’s foreign policy to resemble a punctuated equilibrium model of organizational evolution.35 During stable periods with few threats and more abundant resources, leaders typically make incremental and adaptive security commitments that align with their state’s primary geostrategic orientation.36 Periodically, however, new threats may lead to increasingly maladapted or inflexible foreign policies that contribute to crises, raise the chances for war, or exacerbate the effects of relative decline.37 These episodes often reveal that a state

33 See Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999) and Jon Sumida, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 34 Leaders reside in a group comprised of the head of state and officials charged with deciding security policy. Membership in this group varies, but it remains distinct from bureaucracies charged with implementing decisions. See Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 25. 35 See Michael L. Tushman and Elaine Romanelli, “Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation,” in Research and Organizational Behavior, eds. Larry L. Cummins and Barry M. Staw (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 171-222. 36 Ibid., 173. 37 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 85; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 9 has insufficient resources or is overcommitted to a foreign policy goal. During these periods, a great power may face security challenges on multiple fronts; however, the lack of resources and overcommitment often prevents leaders from reacting effectively. In these circumstances, leaders may opt to attempt strategic reorientation, a process intended to change the direction of their state’s power projection from lesser to more important security interests. The challenge is how to successfully realign resources by cutting commitments in one region to provide additional resources for addressing more critical challenges.

Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage life-cycle that reflects the interrelated dynamics of international structure and domestic politics. These mutually- reinforcing, sequentially-linked stages have an undefined duration ex ante.38 Leaders perceive a need for retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising international threats, especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources resulting from economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support for existing foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision point regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and decide how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement and synchronize retrenchment activities. An outcome eventually emerges based on how the costs and benefits of retrenchment facilitate strategic reorientation. Retrenchment succeeds when it results in strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 1).

International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414; and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, 1973), 246. 38 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987), 335-370; and Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992), 245-270. 10

Figure 1. Four-stage strategic reorientation model.39

Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.

Leaders retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because the competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain strategically solvent.40 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives with available resources.41 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.

39 Adapted from Shamsud D. Chowdhurry, “Turnarounds: A Stage Theory Perspective,” Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 19, no. 3 (2002), 253. 40 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 88; and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978), 167. 41 Lippmann, US Foreign Policy, 7-8. 11 differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers the associated risk or price of security.42 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external policies such as redeploying military forces, removing or mitigating flashpoints, reducing security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or altogether abandoning an interest.43

This type of retrenchment reduces the risks associated with a state’s foreign policy by minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, and makes resources available for improving deterrence and defenses in more important areas. Operational retrenchment involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States free resources for investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and cutting foreign aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force structures, and reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.44

Why This Matters

Academic claims about retrenchment’s dangers shape our theoretical understanding of the causes of war and influence policymakers’ assessments of the risks of reducing

American engagement abroad. These claims also fuel concerns over how the rise of new powers will undermine the existing international order. Graham Allison reflects the widespread view that “based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and

China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely…When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions.”45 However, in the past, declining powers

42 Leaders often select policy options from both types of retrenchment, but the overall type is evident in the predominant reductions of either price or risk. 43 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 32. 44 Ibid., 26-29. 45 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?” Atlantic, 24 September 2015, accessed 13 March 2019, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/ 12 that successfully retrenched managed power shifts more peacefully and managed to limit their rate of decline and prolong their influence on the international order. Therefore, understanding the factors that influence retrenchment outcomes is deeply important for identifying strategies for success.

Most theories about retrenchment have limited empirical support to justify their bleak assertions about the policy and its potential outcomes. Retrenchment is the most common response to relative decline. States in decline are more likely to cut the costs and size of their military or form alliances and abandon interests. Moreover, rather than leading to exploitation by adversaries, declining states perform comparatively well in military disputes that occur following retrenchment.46 Despite these clear benefits, scholars and policymakers continue to believe in the importance of prestige, the need for credibility, and the dangers of appeasement. From this perspective, even the mere perception of decline or hint of retrenchment might lead to trouble.47 This flawed logic has buttressed policies of geopolitical overstretch and resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.48

Recent arguments for continued American engagement abroad rest upon this logic which holds that any decline in American engagement would destabilize the international order.49 Within the policymaking arena, the mantra about the indispensability of the

09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/; and Aaron Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” National Interest 114 (2011), 18. 46 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 3. 47 See Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Heartland, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85-111; and Jennifer Milliken, “Metaphors of Prestige and Reputation in American Foreign Policy,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, eds., Francis Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 217-238. 48 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), chapter 2; and Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 3-8. 49 Robert Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the US is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3-5; Robert Lieber, Retreat and its Consequences: 13

United States’ global leadership short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than critically evaluating the wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must maintain all its commitments regardless of the cost.50

The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East threaten important national interests, but the effects of military overcommitment and an eroding domestic resource base have resulted in America’s strategic insolvency. Despite having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of sustained combat operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to outpace modernizing rivals like China and Russia.51 Elite polarization also diminishes the political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.52 Therefore, the crux of the current debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the resources necessary for continuing global leadership.

Research Design

In subsequent chapters, I assess the claims of retrenchment critics and advocates against the empirical record. Rather than examine when retrenchment is most likely to

American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 9-12; and Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Knopf, 2012), 133-139. 50 For instance, Hillary Clinton quoted in Scott Shane and Jo Becker, “After Revolt, a New Libya ‘With Very Little Time Left’,” New York Times, 29 February 2016; Leon Panetta, “Speech on Al-Qaeda,” Center for New American Security (November 2012); Rex Tillerson, “Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” (11 January 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/01/ 267394.htm. 51 David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the US Approach to Force Planning (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), xii. 52 Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura, Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2014), 7, 9, and 34. 14 occur, I identify what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes to determine the necessary conditions for it to succeed. I conceptualize retrenchment within a process of strategic reorientation shaped by international and domestic constraints. Towards this end, I used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from

Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. One broad question motivated my effort: what explains the observed variation in the outcomes of attempted retrenchment? My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy- relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment.

Methods

This study used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis that applied structured, focused comparison of United States retrenchment from

Southeast Asia from 1969 until 1975, and the Middle East beginning in 2009 until

2015.53 Investigation focused on published or available public document collections that

53 See Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chapter 1; David Collier and Henry E. Brady (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), part II; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), chapters 3, 9, 10, and 11; and Gary 15 gathered the most important records pertaining to policy decision-making. It also included the memoirs of key actors which provided first-hand accounts of relevant considerations and reasoning despite their potential bias. Extensive secondary literature for each case rounded out considered explanations. Although secondary sources might lack historical consensus, the rich historiography for each case enabled assessing the overall weight of academic opinion regarding historical contexts and outcomes.54

The limited number of historical retrenchment attempts and inherent difficulty in quantifying key variables reduced the utility of quantitative analysis and situated the phenomenon within a research niche well-suited for a comparative approach. This method enabled developing contingent generalizations about the conditions necessary for retrenchment to succeed. Despite the difficulty of measuring the weight of causal effects, my approach facilitated considering specific contexts through in-depth exploration of the variables affecting retrenchment outcomes.55 It may have been possible to identify additional cases from the full range of history, but this would have required an unrealistic amount of case research given the scope of this project. These trade-offs were not sufficiently compelling to forego exploring an understudied phenomenon.

Defining and Measuring the Variables

The proposed model of strategic reorientation posits misalignment between a great power’s commitments and resources due to relative decline stemming from international

King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Research in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 43-46. 54 Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996), 605-618. 55 Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen, “Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and Oranges, Again,” American Political Science Association: Comparative Politics Newsletter 8 (1998), 11; and Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990), 131-150. 16 or domestic factors. This project established the strategic context for each case using secondary sources to identify the presence and nature of emerging threats, shifting locations of geopolitical competition, military overcommitment, and domestic political divisions. I also examined the political decisions and debates surrounding retrenchment.

Unit of Analysis. The unit of analysis is a retrenchment attempt where indicators show leaders sought to reduce the near-term costs of providing a state’s security.

Indicators included a speech by a leader directly expressing plans to retrench, a post- conflict reduction of military forces to below pre-conflict levels, substituting economic or diplomatic engagement for military involvement, diplomatic efforts to form alliances or enhance ally capacity, rapprochement with rivals, or abandoning goals that might undermine a regional security order.

Independent Variables. The independent variables are ally availability, rapprochement outcome, and interest abandonment. Ally availability is the presence of a potential successor state with compatible strategic preferences and the military capacity – or potential capacity – to maintain a regional security order. Whether an ally is available was coded as either yes or no. Rapprochement outcome is the result of a determined and sustained attempt by the retrenching power to negotiate with its primary regional rival to reduce potential flashpoints and limit the risk for predatory behavior. The outcome of these negotiations was either success or failure, where a rival in the former circumstance agrees to limit aggression and does not consent in the latter case. Finally, interest abandonment is whether a great power’s leaders abandoned their security interest in an area after retrenchment occurred. Interest abandonment was coded as either yes or no depending on whether the great power re-intervened or not following withdrawal.

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is a retrenchment outcome. The intent of retrenchment is to reduce near-term security costs to increase long-term strategic solvency. Evaluating the outcome of a retrenchment attempt required multi-dimensional criterion for success. Determining the degree of success required qualitatively evaluating its effectiveness, costs, and benefits as they related to the level of reduced commitment, rather than other goals which might have changed over time or been prevented by evolving circumstances.56

Retrenchment is goal-oriented, so effectiveness is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for success.57 Effectiveness is the degree to which retrenchment succeeds in realigning resources to address a more critical challenge. As a continuous variable, the degree of effectiveness depends on the level of reduced commitment as the result of burden sharing, rapprochement, or interest abandonment. Moreover, effectiveness may have a positive (i.e., effective) or negative (i.e., ineffective) value. Retrenchment can reduce the level of commitment to effectively zero, partially reduce commitments, or ineffectively reduce commitments in a meaningful way.

Determining success also requires considering incurred costs. Costs are the effort, loss, or sacrifice necessary to achieve a leader’s desired retrenchment goals. They may be material or non-material, and the most significant costs inhere directly to the retrenching state as the result of trade-offs among various interests or goals. Relevant costs also result from the effects of retrenchment on allies or regional interests. Costs may be high, moderate, or low based on the extent to which the net value of goals achieved exceeds

56 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000), 171-172. 57 Ibid., 173. 18 related costs. States facing an existential crisis might incur high costs to retrench and still succeed, while a state that achieves a modest goal at high cost gains a Pyrrhic victory and fails.

Lastly, benefits that accrue to the retrenching state also influence outcome assessments. Benefits are the advantages or improvements gained through retrenchment.

Relevant benefits relate to those gained by the retrenching state, because leaders opt to withdraw to protect their state’s national interests, not those of other states. Any benefits that accrue to other states as the result of retrenchment are incidental. Since retrenchment occurs in part because of military overcommitment, dysfunctional domestic politics, or economic decline, improvements to a state’s strategic solvency represent the most important benefits for assessing outcomes. In other words, for retrenchment to succeed it must close the resource gap and facilitate strategic reorientation.

Success occurs when leaders reduce foreign commitments in a less important region and realign resources to address a more critical threat. Failure results when leaders fail to reduce commitments and cannot reorient their state’s power projection. Threat levels do not need to decline in any outcome, since threats are exogenous to the retrenchment process; however, successful outcomes require improving a state’s capacity for responding to emerging threats. Similarly, the overall number of foreign commitments do not need to decline in any outcome, though successful outcomes should provide evidence that commitments declined in one region before increasing elsewhere.

Case Selection

The theoretical and empirical requirements for this project entailed examining historical periods when great powers maintained peripheral commitments, faced rising

19 international competition, and experienced declining domestic political or economic capacity. Under these conditions, leaders considered retrenchment as a viable policy option that they subsequently decided to attempt. I examined cases of retrenchment during periods of both international and domestic relative decline. To maintain consistency and isolate relevant variables, I focused on states with similar domestic institutions at comparable periods of technological development. Finally, the retrenchment attempts considered within this study emphasized reducing costs by changing a state’s strategic ends and the means with which it pursued security. I excluded minor adjustments to military budgets, cancellation of weapons acquisition programs, mandated base closures, or routine treaty negotiations. With these criteria I identified sixteen cases of attempted retrenchment since 1870, the period in which the modern great power system and industrialized militaries arose: seven by Great Britain, two by France, one by the Soviet Union, and six by the United States. Table 1 lists the universe of cases and provides an initial outcome coding.

Table 1. Considered universe of cases.

CASE CODING CASE CODING 1. Great Britain - 1895 Success 9. France - 1954 Success 2. Great Britain - 1908 Success 10. Great Britain - 1956 Success 3. United States - 1920 Failure 11. France - 1962 Success 4. Great Britain - 1930 Failure 12. Great Britain - 1968 Success 5. Great Britain - 1935 Failure 13. United States - 1969 Success 6. Great Britain - 1946 Success 14. Soviet Union - 1991 Failure 7. United States - 1946 Failure 15. United States - 1992 Failure 8. United States - 1953 Success 16. United States - 2009 Failure

I selected for analysis two episodes of attempted retrenchment by the United States in the post-World War II era: Southeast Asia in 1969 and the Middle East in 2009. Selecting

20 cases from an assortment of countries would likely be illuminating; however, the United

States is inherently interesting and important given its current standing and ongoing debates about the future of American hegemony. Moreover, the United States maintained foreign commitments in one or more peripheral regions, emerged as a global hegemon during a period of intense competition, and experienced intermittent periods of relative decline resulting from international or domestic factors. During this period, the United

States’ Cold War with the Soviet Union and subsequent unipolar dominance placed a premium on signaling resolve, lest competitors assess weakness and decide to challenge

American hegemony. These conditions suggest that retrenchment should not only have been rare, any attempts were risky and likely to fail because an adversary stood ready to take advantage of American withdrawal. Thus, the United States is a hard case for the arguments proposed by retrenchment critics.

Case Summaries

As mentioned above, I examined two cases of United States retrenchment. The cases include different strategic environments as defined by ally availability, regional adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to abandon an interest. These cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect retrenchment outcomes and validates my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will succeed or fail. The first case, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and

1975. The second one, a failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015.

Case 1: Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon administration assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of international and domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach. American

21 diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during America’s conflict in

Vietnam. The level of political and diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the strategic neglect of other critical areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the

Soviet Union took advantage of American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the

Soviet’s presence and influence in the region. President Nixon believed that this, along with ongoing international changes, reduced the United States’ relative power and had to be addressed.58

President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing

American involvement in Vietnam and the evolving international system needed to be addressed to alleviate their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the international system included the emergence of nascent political and economic multipolarity as the strength of the Western European and Japanese economies increased their international clout. The

Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence as a global power was another key change that developed while the United States was distracted in Vietnam.

The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging from political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing

Cold War competition along the periphery.

58 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Security, 1969-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1. 22 rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. By 1975, despite the changed dynamics of the executive and legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal from Vietnam and Watergate scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad even if it forced President Ford to abandon any American interest in South Vietnam.

Overall, President Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy.

Withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorienting towards the Middle East to counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical for the economic security of the

United States and its allies. Figure 2 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

Figure 2. Successful American retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975.

Case 2: Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. Forty years after President

Nixon, President Barack Obama faced similar security challenges in the Middle East.

President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the country’s foreign policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.59 The security context

59 Nicholas Kitchen, “The Obama Doctrine – Détente or Decline?” European Political Science 10, no. 1 (2011), 27. 23 he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors, partly because the consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.60 The Obama administration faced a tough reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s relative military and economic decline, and power diffusion throughout a changing international order. President Obama believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine the United States’ role in the world.

He sought to restore weakened relations with allies, extricate the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements in the Middle East. In other words,

President Obama aimed to retrench.

President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting to address more critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded that the ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to resolve, particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground combat operations typified by those in Iraq from 2003 onward.61 However, President Obama failed to hand off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi Arabia and failed at rapprochement with

Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges in the Middle East following American disengagement demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in the region.

The United States reluctantly participated in coalition efforts to depose the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and its unwillingness to lead post-intervention security

60 Ibid., 31. 61 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic Monthly 317, no. 3 (2016), 70-90, accessed 25 December 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 24 efforts contributed to Libya becoming a failed state and host to Islamist extremist groups.

Moreover, in the absence of American diplomacy backed by the threat of military force,

Russian military intervention into the Syrian Civil War on behalf of the Syrian government resulted in a mass exodus of refugees that destabilized Syria’s neighbors and disrupted European politics. Retrenchment also meant that the United States was unable to counter Iranian influence spreading throughout the region in direct opposition to

America’s regional security interests. Finally, American political dysfunction prevented abandonment of the United States’ interests in the greater Middle East. As a result, the attempted retrenchment failed and an American strategic reorientation to Asia was unsuccessful. Figure 3 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

Figure 3. Failed American retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015.

Chapter Outline

In the remaining four chapters I explain my theory of retrenchment outcomes and present hypotheses regarding when particular outcomes will occur. Then I test these hypotheses against two historical cases of attempted American retrenchment. Finally, I present my conclusion in which I summarize my findings and discusses their relevance to 25 scholarship and policy-making by examining the ongoing American retrenchment from

Syria. Below, I provide a summary of each chapter.

Chapter 2. This chapter presents my theoretical framework for explaining the variation in retrenchment outcomes. I argue that a policy of retrenchment can facilitate overcoming the challenges of overcommitment by redistributing resources from peripheral to core security interests to improve a state’s strategic solvency. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are possible. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argue that retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility for maintaining regional security, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest.

Chapter 3. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and tests hypotheses on the case of American retrenchment from Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975. In this case,

President Richard Nixon overcame the challenges of overcommitment and constrained power projection by implementing a policy of retrenchment. He redistributed resources from peripheral to core security interests and improved the United States’ strategic solvency. President Nixon attempted to hand off responsibility to the South Vietnamese, but ultimately failed because of their political dysfunction. However, effective rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, combined with the abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam, ultimately led to retrenchment success.

Chapter 4. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and examines why the

United States failed to retrench from the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. President

Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – to reorient American power towards East Asia. However, he could not identify a suitable successor to counter rising Iranian influence or contain regional crises, nor did he succeed at rapprochement with Iran to minimize its potential for taking advantage of American withdrawal. Subsequent Middle East crises sparked intense debate about the wisdom of withdrawal. A combination of American political partisanship and allied pressure left

President Obama unable to abandon American interests in the region. As a result, retrenchment failed.

Chapter 5. In this concluding chapter I summarize my key findings and discuss their implications for academic scholarship and policymaking. I also apply my theory to predict the likely outcome of President Donald Trump’s recent announcement to withdraw all American forces from Syria.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“For what settles practical controversy is the knowledge that ends and means have to be balanced: an agreement has eventually to be reached when men admit that they must pay for what they want and that they must want only what they are willing to pay for. If they do not have to come to such an agreement, they will never except by accident agree. For they will lack a yardstick by which to measure their interests, or their ways and means of promoting and protecting them.”62

Core Theoretical Argument

How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? A policy of retrenchment may facilitate overcoming these challenges by redistributing resources from peripheral to core security interests to improve the state’s strategic solvency. States that successfully retrench end up with more sustainable foreign policies and perform comparatively well in subsequent military disputes.63 However, not all retrenchment attempts succeed. Therefore, what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from a commitment to free resources for addressing more critical challenges.

In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these options are possible. In other words, and contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. The discussion below explains key assumptions,

62 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), 7-8. 63 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 3 and 8. 28 presents a model of retrenchment and strategic reorientation, then discusses plausible hypotheses for explaining variation in retrenchment outcomes.

Key Assumptions

The following theory of retrenchment outcomes makes three key assumptions about states that retrench, leader behaviors, and international threats. First, any state may conceivably retrench, but the most important cases of retrenchment involve great powers.

These states possess the largest share of international military, economic, and diplomatic power and they have interests distributed across geographic regions.64 I do not assume that material factors have the most substantial impact on national power. Instead, I give them equal footing with non-material factors that influence a state’s ability to react to and shape the international environment.65 Those powers that seek to maintain their status encounter more complex realignment decisions than the simpler guns versus butter calculations made by smaller states. Mid- and small-sized states do worry about the global distribution of power, but their limited stature and resources constrain their capacity to influence anything beyond local issues.

Second, I assume great power leaders focus on long-term trends rather than short- term power fluctuations when assessing national power. Furthermore, because great powers exist within a self-help system where they must maintain security against external threats, I assume leaders focus on assessments of relative rather than absolute power.66 I

64 George Modeleski, Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), 149; Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 16-17; and Karen Rasler and William Thompson, The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994), 15-16. 65 Cf. MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans. 66 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105; Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991), 1303-1320. 29 also assume leaders are generally prudent and rational actors capable of assessing relative power.67 Though leaders are undoubtedly subject to motivated biases and cognitive errors,68 the hazards associated with decline incentivize disregarding biases and opting for pragmatic policies.69

Third, while the goal of retrenchment is to lower security costs to free up resources, I do not assume that threat levels necessarily decline, since this is a structural condition independent of a state. Moreover, reorienting will likely result in threat substitution and may even result in a net increase, because threats remain in the area from which the state retrenched. Similarly, the overall level of foreign commitments does not need to decline for retrenchment to succeed, because the state will establish commitments that align with its new strategic orientation.

Retrenchment

Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.

States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline, because the competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain

67 Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 20-33; and Jonathan Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Relations,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005), 77-106. 68 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 3-10; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chapter 6; Robert Jervis, “Political Implications of Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992), 187-204; Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 42-43; and Jack Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict,” in Handbook of War Studies II, ed. Manus Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221. 69 Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000), 141; MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 27-28. 30 strategically solvent.70 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives with available resources.71 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.

The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational– differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers security’s risk or price.72 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external policies including the redeployment of military forces, removal or mitigation of flashpoints, reduction of security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or abandonment of an interest.73 This type of retrenchment reduces the risks of a state’s foreign policy by minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, which makes resources available for improving deterrence and defense in more important areas.74 Operational retrenchment involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States free resources for investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and

70 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 88; Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 167. 71 Lippmann, US Foreign Policy, 7-8. 72 Leaders often select policy options from both types of retrenchment, but the overall type is evident in the predominant reductions of either price or risk. 73 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 32. MacDonald and Parent highlight four international policies for retrenchment. I argue that their fourth, enhancing deterrence at selected strongpoints, is an outcome of retrenchment not a form of retrenchment 74 Ibid., 29. 31 cutting foreign aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force structures, and reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.75

Explaining Variation in Retrenchment Outcomes

Great powers can recover from decline if they adjust their policies regarding foreign commitments, yet this takes time, resources, and leader attention. Consequently, states require “breathing room” in which leaders can focus on making necessary adjustments.76

Retrenchment provides this “breathing room” and allows states to realign security-related resources and reorient foreign policy by shifting burdens onto allies, avoiding conflicts, and reducing expenditures.77 It is not, however, a simple or one-size-fits-all activity; instead, retrenchment is a multifaceted policy that leaders can tailor to fit their strategic circumstances.

Retrenchment success hinges on a great power’s ability to reduce overcommitment by extricating itself from existing commitments in a region to free resources for countering more pressing threats.78 When realigning resources and commitments, a great power can retrench in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. How allies or rivals react to withdrawal and the influence of domestic political divisions on foreign policy also affect retrenchment outcomes.

Burden Sharing. Retrenching states will generally be risk averse when withdrawing from a region because of the potential consequences of the collapse of the status quo. A

75 Ibid., 26-27. MacDonald and Parent highlight four domestic policies for retrenchment. I argue that their fourth, reallocating resources to non-foreign policy pursuits, is an outcome of retrenchment rather than a policy of retrenchment. As such, I exclude it as a possible form of operational retrenchment. 76 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 301. 77 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 26-27. 78 Threats may be foreign, like a rising regional competitor, or domestic, such as a severe financial crisis. 32 great power’s expectation for post-retrenchment stability will often depend on the availability of a suitable “successor state.” These states ostensibly have the ability and willingness to accept responsibility for preserving a favorable balance of power.79 The availability of such a partner facilitates withdrawal by providing deterrent benefits and maintaining local dynamics beneficial to the retrenching state’s interests.80 While offering distinct benefits, relying on a successor creates a dilemma.

Entrusting security to a successor means the retrenching state must trust another state to truthfully represent its capabilities and ambitions.81 Successor states may misrepresent their will or capability to maintain regional order or they may have revisionist intentions.82 Despite these risks, a retrenching state can use its existing resources, as well as resources gained through retrenchment, to strengthen, recruit, and reward faithful allies or punish betrayal.83 In general, a retrenching state will seek to improve the capacity of a successor state by providing bilateral economic and military aid explicitly intended to enhance the successor’s military capabilities and power projection.84 Though identifying a suitable successor or improving their military capabilities does not guarantee that the

79 Kyle Hanes, “Decline or Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2015), 490. 80 Haynes, “Decline and Devolution,” 492-494. Compatibility is the degree of similarity and overlap in two states’ preferences for international order, operationalized as a state’s ordinal ranking of its perceived security threats. Capacity is defined as the material ability to maintain an existing regional order, operationalized as a function of a successor’s power relative to potential regional rivals. 81 Retrenchment entails a commitment problem. See Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War;” Erik Gartzke, “War Is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999), 567-587; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 169-203; and Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003), 27-43. 82 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 163-172; Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patters in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990), 137-138; James Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993), 207-233. 83 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 32-34. 84 Haynes, “Decline and Devolution,” 494. 33 status quo will be maintained, retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order.

Britain’s support of Japan during the former’s withdrawal from East Asia in the early

1900s illustrates how identifying a successor can enable retrenchment success. Russian expansion in Asia and its threat to the “Open Door” policy prompted Britain to form an alliance with Japan in 1902.85 The pact was intended as a means by which Britain could maintain the status quo in the Far East by sharing the burden with another power.86

Between 1902 and 1904, Britain sought to improve Japan’s military capacity relative to the Russians and French. Britain built the bulk of the Japanese Navy and provided it with better ships than Japan could have constructed on its own. British banks also financed

Japan’s war efforts against Russia during the 1905 Russo-Japanese War.87 After Japan decisively defeated the Russian navy at the Battle of Tsushima, effectively ending the

Russian threat in East Asia, Britain could afford to withdraw the bulk of its naval forces and rely on its ally to defend British interests in the region.88

Rapprochement. Besides identifying a successor state, a retrenching great power can attempt to remove potential flashpoints through rapprochement with regional rivals.89

85 The 1899 Open Door Policy held that all nations should have equal access to the Chinese market. The United States asked the major powers – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia – to formally declare that they would uphold Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and not interfere with the free use of treaty ports within their respective Chinese spheres of influence. See, “Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900,” Milestones: 1899-1913, Office of the Historian, US Department of State, accessed 21 February 2019, at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay- and-china. 86 Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966), 1. 87 Ibid., 288-289. 88 Ibid., 353. 89 Rapprochement and appeasement are related, but distinct, activities lying along a spectrum of engagement with rivals. The former involves re-establishing amicable relations between adversaries without resolving underlying disputes, such as the relations between the United States and Britain following the French Revolution. The latter entails the reduction of disagreements through unilateral 34

Rapprochement occurs when a state makes policy concessions or engages in sustained efforts to settle disputes with another state.90 The great power can either negotiate a settlement on divisive issues, or tacitly accept limited spheres of influence to prevent friction and reduce the risk of aggression during retrenchment. Rapprochement operates by resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats.

Resolving grievances involves the hope by the retrenching power that significant, even asymmetrical, concessions will resolve an issue to prevent aggression or war in the future. Retrenching great powers might attempt to diffuse secondary threats when they face multiple security challenges and possess limited resources. Diffusing secondary threats requires the retrenching state to make extensive concessions to a less threatening rival to free resources to deter or defend against a more threatening adversary. By settling disputes and making limited concessions on outstanding disagreements, the retrenching state appears less threatening to the rival’s interests. The intent is to avoid conflict with the less threatening rival to better position the retrenching power for potential conflict with another rival.91 Though resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement does not guarantee a rival will not renege on an agreement, strategic retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries.

Britain’s rapprochement with the United States between 1898 and 1903, followed by

British retrenchment from the Western Hemisphere between 1904 and 1906 illustrates the

concessions to a rival, such as Britain’s activity towards Germany in the 1930s. See Rock, Appeasement in International Politics , 10-12. 90 Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Stephen Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 91 Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008), 154-155. 35 potential value of rapprochement to retrenchment success. Throughout the 19th century,

Britain viewed the United States as the primary threat to British interests in the Western

Hemisphere; however, budgetary constraints and the rising threat of Germany compelled

British leaders to begin rapprochement with the United States. They resolved grievances by acceding to arbitration to settle the 1895 Venezuelan Crisis, signed the Hay–

Pauncefote Treaty granting the United States the right to build and control the Panama

Canal, and settled an ongoing Alaskan boundary dispute. Moreover, by tacitly accepting the Monroe Doctrine, Britain diffused secondary threats to Canada and the West Indies, thereby allowing it to focus its resources on more salient European threats.92

Abandonment. Abandoning a security interest is an option when a great power cannot find a suitable ally for burden-sharing and regional adversaries remain implacable.

Abandonment rapidly frees resources for use in more critical areas. Abandoning an interest presents significant challenges, because it involves overcoming risk aversion to altering the status quo. Regardless, when a suitable ally is unavailable, and an adversary’s grievances remain non-negotiable, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. However, retrenchment is a Fabian strategy that seeks to trade space for time to realign a state’s foreign policy.93 The inherent political opposition to this type of strategy suggests that the likelihood of abandonment occurring will depend upon the influence of domestic politics.

92 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “British Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904-1906,” Canadian Historical Review 49, no. 4 (1968), 356. 93 See B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1967), 26-27. 36

Domestic political divisions not only affect the decision to retrench,94 they can influence retrenchment outcomes. Divisions result from party factions, bureaucratic interests, and regional or sectoral interests, or war weariness. They center on the level of polarization in perceptions about the nature and extent of security threats, similarity of policy preferences, agreement about the domestic political risks associated with retrenchment, and the amount of military versus civilian spending.95 Moreover, the defection or failure of an ally or sudden aggression by an adversary during withdrawal may strengthen political opposition to abandonment. Political opponents have an incentive to advocate for alternative policies, so they may resist abandonment or attempt to exploit its consequences for domestic political gain. This diminishes a leader’s political autonomy and may result in half-measures or contradictory policies. Therefore, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal.

Britain’s decision to withdraw “East of Suez” reflects the dynamics of abandonment in retrenchment success. Following World War II, Britain retained a chain of overseas military bases stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. These bases were historically viewed as vital for Britain’s security and economic strength. Nevertheless, the post-war strategic landscape, effects of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and severe financial crisis and economic decline ultimately resulted in British leaders deciding in 1968 to abandon these

94 Mark Brawley, Afterglow or Adjustment: Domestic Institutions and Responses to Overstretch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 539-540; Steven Lobell, The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 26-29; Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations, 28-29; Snyder, Myths of Empire, 5-25, 54; and Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 22-29. 95 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 47-48, and 54-56. 37 bases. Though economic factors motivated the desire to abandon Britain’s foreign bases, the decision was ultimately a political choice. Faced with on-going economic crises, lacking an ally with whom Britain could share their security burden, and with no opportunity for rapprochement, British leaders overcame domestic political opposition and opted to abandon their bases, so they could focus on strengthening Britain’s domestic economic circumstances.96

Outcomes. Regional overcommitment and periodic relative decline by a great power whose economy temporarily underperforms or who faces the rise of new rival are not uncommon. In fact, “strategic and geographic overextension may…be the natural state of affairs of great powers actively engaged in the world.”97 Therefore, the need for retrenchment will recur over time when a great power must realign by cutting commitments in one region to free resources to address a neglected challenge, whether domestic or international. In these circumstances, a great power might extricate itself from existing commitments by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, negotiate a deal with a regional rival, or abandon an interest and accept the consequences. If none of these options are a possibility, then retrenchment and realignment will fail. However, this implies that retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to assume responsibility for a regional security order, and 2) the great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) domestic political divisions keep the great power from accepting the consequences of abandonment. Therefore, given that all three conditions must obtain

96 Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (New York: Palgrave, 1998); Edward Longinotti, “Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice,” Contemporary British History 29, no. 3 (2015), 318-340. 97 Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann Gap,” 477. 38 for failure to occur, the probability of which is less than any single condition occurring, retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail.

Table 2 summarizes the five proposed hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.

Table 2. Hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.

Alternative Explanations

One consequence of the underdeveloped state of the retrenchment literature is that little scholarship directly examines the topic of retrenchment outcomes. The hypotheses above are theoretically plausible; however, the alternative explanations below propose other independent variables to develop testable competing hypotheses.

Source of Relative Decline. The source of relative decline may be either domestic or international – perhaps both in circumstances of terminal decline.98 The nature of relative decline hinges on the fact that, at any given time, power within the international system is finite. When the power of other states increases, the relative power of any single state decreases. These periods are particularly salient to policymakers.99 However, power

98 Relative decline often results from a mix of domestic and international circumstances. For example, when Britain withdrew some of its naval assets from the Pacific in the early 20th century it was experiencing a declining domestic economy along with the rise of new regional powers. The main reason it opted for operational retrenchment from Asia was to address domestic economic concerns. 99 John Matthews, “Current Gains and Future Outcome: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter,” International Security 21, no. 1 (1996), 112-146. 39 indicators continuously fluctuate and shift over short periods of time, thereby making accurate assessments difficult. Beyond the inherent difficulties in assessing relative power, leaders face the challenge of identifying the primary factors contributing to decline. Correctly identifying whether the source of relative decline is domestic or international is important, because each has distinct associated risks and optimal policy responses.

If decline stems from international conditions, such as the emergence of a new geopolitical rival or when regional overcommitment allows a rival in another region to rise uncontested, then the best course of action may be to decrease peripheral commitments. Though more difficult to implement, because it may require the reciprocity of allies or effective mollification of adversaries, this course of action facilitates reorienting resources to improve the security of core interests. Domestically-driven conditions, whether as the result of economic downturns, an underperforming military, or political disfunction suggest that the best solution may be to attempt internal reforms.

These are easier to implement and rely on self-help rather than the reciprocity of allies.

Therefore, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline.

Retrenchment Type. States existing in anarchy generally have a strong incentive to prefer self-help.100 Moreover, the ability to project power abroad depends on what leaders can extract domestically,101 so they typically attempt to choose policies that do not undermine domestic support.102 As a result, retrenching states will have a strong

100 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 163-172. 101 Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989), 460. 102 Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies,” 216. 40 preference for attempting operational retrenchment to achieve their goals, because all the benefits accrue solely to the state. Conversely, strategic retrenchment will be less preferred, since it requires a state to rely on another to honor commitments and because the state surrenders something it values.103

Operational retrenchment focuses on lowering the price associated with a foreign policy without reducing the level of risk. Moreover, reducing security-related expenditures and bureaucratic reforms are not guaranteed to reverse decline or overcommitment. In fact, they may exacerbate it as excessive cuts might make the state

“incompetent to every exigency.”104 A similar risk inheres during attempts to revise force structures. By altering the types and number of forces available for crises, a state may find itself without the necessary tools to confront a foreign policy challenge. Lastly institutional reform during a period of decline and fiscal austerity may be especially challenging when bureaucracies must perform numerous complex tasks.105 As a result, operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment.

Retrenchment Speed. The speed of retrenchment lies along a continuum between deliberate and hasty. Deliberate retrenchment is inherently slower as leaders implement withdrawal tied to on-the-ground conditions where reductions will occur. As events unfold during retrenchment, reductions must be calibrated to minimize disruption and ensure continued deterrence. Hasty retrenchment is faster, even potentially precipitous, as leaders implement rapid withdrawal regardless of existing security conditions or in

103 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 35. 104 George Washington quoted in MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 30; and George Washington to John Hancock (December 16, 1776), in the Papers of George Washington, Vol. 7, Revolutionary War Series, ed. Philander Chase (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997), 352. 105 Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 142-146; and Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), chapter 4. 41 reaction to changing political circumstances. Because of the increased rate of reductions, a state risks being unable to respond to aggression or unforeseen events or rapid withdrawal may create a power vacuum. Adversaries may be emboldened to act aggressively to fill the vacuum created by the retrenching state, or allies may doubt that state’s commitment to defend shared interests. Slower policies of retrenchment, however, provide time for regional dynamics to adjust and limit the uncertainty created by more rapid reductions. They signal that the retrenching state seeks to reduce tensions while gauging a rival’s intentions and remaining able to oppose revisionist ambitions.106

Domestically, slower retrenchment ensures adequate forces remain available to respond to unexpected crises or provocation. It also provides time for leaders to develop a new foreign policy consensus or attempt to correct the political dysfunction that often attends overcommitment. Therefore, slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than more rapid withdrawal or reductions.

Table 3 summarizes alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes:

Table 3. Alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes.

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align Alternative the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of Hypothesis 1 relative decline. Alternative Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic Hypothesis 2 retrenchment. Alternative Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than more Hypothesis 3 rapid withdrawal or reductions.

106 Brandon K. Yoder, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (2018), 1-15; Brandon K. Yoder, “Hedging for Better Bets: Power Shifts, Credible Signals, and Preventive Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 5 (2018), 1-27; Evan Braden Montgomery, In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 8, 11, and 20. 42

In subsequent chapters, I test the primary and alternative hypotheses explained above using two cases of post-World War II retrenchment by the United States. These cases included different strategic environments as they relate to ally availability, regional adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to abandon an interest. The cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect retrenchment outcomes and validate my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will succeed or fail.

The first, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975. The second, a failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015.

CHAPTER 3: RETRENCHMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1975

“The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision…. A small country on the rim of [Asia] has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill our map.”107

“We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to the defense of one country.”108

How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? In the case of the United States’ withdrawal from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, President

Richard Nixon overcame these challenges by implementing a policy of retrenchment.

Though he sought to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests and improve the United States’ strategic solvency, success was never assured. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are possible. The United States attempted to hand off responsibility to its South Vietnamese ally, but eventually failed because of dysfunctional South Vietnamese politics. However, effective rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, and the abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam ultimately led to success.

President Nixon inherited a stalemated war when he assumed office in 1969. By the time he became president, the Vietnam War had cost the United States hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of American servicemembers’ lives. President

Nixon contended that the war distracted previous administrations and prevented them from grappling with fundamental changes in the international system. The tenor of

107 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967), 111. 108 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1386. 44

European politics was changing with West German chancellor Willie Brandt’s Ostpolitik,

Middle Eastern conflicts were boiling over, and the Soviet Union was actively expanding its influence and cementing its superpower status. Meanwhile, the United States was mired in the rice paddies of South Vietnam. President Nixon sought to rectify this and lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy that first required retrenching from Southeast Asia.109

The Nixon administration opted to address the United States’ international relative decline by implementing a policy of retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Nixon first began the Vietnamization of the conflict, whereby the South Vietnamese accepted increasing levels of responsibility for their defense augmented by capacity building by the United States. His intent was to improve the material capability of South Vietnam so that it could prosecute the war as the United States withdrew its forces and reoriented its power projection to more critical regions. Concurrently with these efforts, President

Nixon attempted, and ultimately succeeded, at rapprochement with the United States’ two main geopolitical rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Finally, the failure by South

Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam. Faced with the prospect of re-intervening to honor its commitments, President Gerald Ford, Nixon’s successor, opted instead to abandon all interests in South Vietnam. A political consensus regarding the undesirability of providing further support to sustain South Vietnamese independence made this decision easier (figure 4).

109 Kissinger, The White House Years, 65. 45

Figure 4. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from Southeast Asia

I discuss this example of successful retrenchment by highlighting the relevant variables within the context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I demonstrate the international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United

States resulting from its overcommitment in Southeast Asia between 1954 and 1968. I then discuss the linked policies of détente and the Nixon Doctrine, both of which provided the policy framework for retrenchment from Southeast Asia between 1969 and

1973. Next, I examine the period of political and military realignment following withdrawal from Vietnam and geostrategic reorientation from 1973 to 1975. Finally, I conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of this successful retrenchment attempt.

International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment

The Road to Overcommitment, 1954-1968. America’s involvement in Vietnam stemmed from a broad spectrum of political, military, economic, and psychological concerns. Between 1946 and 1954, the United States steadily increased its financial and

46 military assistance to French efforts to restore their colonial control over Indochina.110

President Dwight Eisenhower viewed a French defeat by Indochinese communist forces as an unacceptable outcome; however, he and others within his administration debated what to do. The saliency of the conflict increased in March 1954 when the Vietminh lay siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The Eisenhower administration’s primary concern as the siege continued was the erosion of French resolve and strengthening of the

Vietminh’s negotiating position at the ongoing Geneva peace talks.111 Given the perceived global consequences of a French defeat by the communist North Vietnamese,

Eisenhower exclaimed “My God, we must not lose Asia…” since it would diminish

American credibility.112 Moreover, “It was important that we not show weakness at this critical time and that we not let the Russians think that we might not resist…in Indochina and elsewhere.”113

President Eisenhower justified the need to demonstrate resolve against the communists in Indochina by describing the “falling domino principle” at a 7 April 1954 press conference. He explained, “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the

110 By 1954, the United States contributed almost $1.4 billion to the French war efforts in Indochina – 78% of the overall costs – an increase of $1.1 billion over the average amount of aid committed during the previous three years. Between the end of World War II and 1954, United States military supplies sent to Vietnam included “554 aircraft, 347 naval vessels, 182 tanks, 1,498 combat vehicles, 20,593 trucks, 280,349 small arms and machine guns, 4,753 artillery pieces, 442,360,000 rounds of small-arms machine- gun ammunition, and 8,212,000 rounds of artillery ammunitions.” Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 16; and Lloyd C. Gardner, “Dominoes, Diem, and Death: 1952-1963, Introduction,” in America In Vietnam: A Documentary History, eds. William Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter LaFeber (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1985), 135. 111 “The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1, Document 498, accessed 25 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d498. 112 Quoted in George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited,” Journal of American History 71, no. 2 (1984), 346. 113 Quoted in Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 153. 47 first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”114 Eisenhower’s views reflected the continuation of security beliefs first espoused by the Truman administration. Both administrations believed that

“Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.”115 Although lying on the geopolitical periphery of American interests,

Southeast Asia bordered critical strategic sea and air lines of communication and contained important military bases and economic resources.116 These considerations, within a context of global turmoil, perceived threats, and ongoing ideological struggle, raised the importance of the French struggle in Indochina for United States policymakers.

The symbolic nature of the French conflict and ambiguous value of maintaining credibility resulted in a cautious, almost ad hoc, approach to the United States’ involvement in an area that was deemed important, if not worth taking too many risks. In

1954, the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement. According to the terms of the armistice, Vietnam was temporarily partitioned along the 17th Parallel, the French evacuated all forces from the North, there was a ban on increasing any military aid in

114 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “President Eisenhower’s News Conference, April 7, 1954”, Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1954 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 382- 383. 115 National Security Council (NSC), NSC 124, 13 February, 1952, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia,” FRUS 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 12, part, accessed 29 September 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1952-54v12p1/d9; NSC 5405, 16 January 1954, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia,” The Pentagon Papers, ed. Senator Mike Gravel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 434-443, accessed 29 September 2018 at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc20. htm. The beginning of the “General Considerations” section in NSC 5405 (January 1954) is identical to that in NSC 124 (February 1952). 116 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 18. 48 either part of the country, an international control commission would monitor the parties, and there would be elections to reunify the country before 20 July 1956. Though the

United States was not a signatory to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Undersecretary of

State Walter Bedell Smith issued a pledge on behalf of the United States to refrain from interfering in the execution of the armistice terms.117 However, almost immediately after the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement, the United States began lending its support to South Vietnam. In less than two years, the South Vietnamese military increased to approximately 280,000 personnel with United States training and support.

American military aid rose between 1956 and 1962, by which time the aid necessary to sustain South Vietnam’s military totaled around $300 million, and the American military mission increased from a handful of men to more than 4,000.118

When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961, he and his advisors, particularly Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, stressed the need to commit American ground forces because

the deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless…any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia…[and] would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration.

117 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Statement by the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954,” in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 89th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), 61, accessed 1 October 2018 at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a377075.pdf. 118 Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 63. 49

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara ultimately recommended sending military forces to prevent the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists, a task they estimated would take no more than six United States divisions, about 205,000 soldiers.119

By the end of 1963, there were more than 16,000 United States military personnel in

South Vietnam, Air Force sorties increased from 2,334 to 6,929, economic assistance rose to $186 million, and military aid increased from $65 million in 1961 to $185 million.120 Furthermore, the Kennedy administration’s tacit support of the 1 November

1963 coup that overthrew and killed South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, deepened American involvement in South Vietnam. According to General Maxwell D.

Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy’s principle military advisor, “In the post-Diem period when the political turbulence in South Vietnam offered the United States an excuse to withdraw from its involvement, the realization of our role in creating the Vietnamese predicament was a strong deterrent to anyone inclined to make such a proposal.”121

Shortly after becoming president in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination,

President Lyndon Johnson vowed “I am not going to lose Vietnam,” and “I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.”122 Two political beliefs framed how Johnson interpreted Vietnam: the New Deal of the 1930s and it’s

119 Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), book 2, part B, 125-133. 120 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), 24; United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), 115, 267-268. 121 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 407. 122 Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 205; Tom Wicker, “The Wrong Rubicon,” in Who We Are: An Atlantic Chronicle of the United States and Vietnam, eds. Robert Manning and Michael Janeway (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 216. 50 benefits on rural development, and European appeasement of Hitler at the Munich

Conference in 1938. Johnson believed New Deal type programs could work everywhere, but appeasement could not be tolerated anywhere.123 In early 1964, Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara explained that the situation in South Vietnam “has unquestionably been growing worse…since September [1963],” and was continuing to deteriorate rapidly.124 By late 1964, President Johnson actively considered escalating the United

States’ involvement in South Vietnam but refrained for fear of possible Chinese intervention.125 Finally, in early 1965, President Johnson ordered bombing raids ostensibly in retaliation for Communist attacks against United States forces at Pleiku,

South Vietnam.126 By mid-1965, he began the massive military build-up that immersed the United States in another land war in Asia.

Between 1963 and 1966, United States ground forces increased from 16,000 to

267,000. During that same time, National Liberation Front (i.e., Vietcong) forces rose from 25,000 to 101,000 with another 170,000 irregulars in reserve. More ominously,

North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam went from zero to 30,000, and

President Johnson’s bombing campaign accelerated the infiltration of communist forces into South Vietnam.127 However, in 1966 the United States and China reached a tacit

123 George Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 1982), 2; Walter LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of American Power, 1963-1975: Introduction,” in America in Vietnam, 216. 124 Memorandum, Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, 16 March 1964, “South Vietnam,” in The Pentagon Papers, eds. Neil Sheehan, et al. (New York: Corgi Books, 1971), 277-280. 125 Memorandum for Record, 14 September 1964, Meeting Notes File, Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, cited in Document 62, “The Fatal Contradictions of US Policy,” in America in Vietnam, 239-241. 126 President Johnson’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, noted “Pleikus are like streetcars – such an opportunity for retaliation arose regularly.” Quoted in George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The US and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 130. 127 LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of American Power,” 220. 51 agreement about Vietnam. China signaled that it would refrain from intervening in the

Vietnam conflict below the 17th Parallel if the United States did not attack China, invade

North Vietnam, or bomb the Red River dike system. The United States in turn signaled that it would adhere to these caveats. The stand-off agreement between the United States and China fundamentally transformed the American rationale for its involvement in

Indochina.128 Regardless, the Johnson administration continued to pursue its policies in

South Vietnam despite a growing awareness that the United States could not achieve its political objectives militarily.

North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in early 1968 underscored the inability of the United

States to militarily achieve its political goals in South Vietnam. During the offensive,

North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces gained control of parts of Saigon, several provincial capitals, and the ancient capital city of Hue. It took intense American bombing of the captured cities and fierce battles by American and South Vietnamese forces to dislodge the enemy.129 Despite this military victory by the United States, the psychological shock of the Tet Offensive on the American public was decisive in turning opinion against the war.130

Declining public support for the Vietnam War did not result in a reevaluation of

American objectives, but two events finally led President Johnson to realize the hopelessness of the Vietnam conflict.131 First, in February 1968, General William

Westmoreland, commander of American forces in South Vietnam, secretly requested

128 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976, 40. 129 LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of American Power,” 223. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong lost between 30,000-40,000 soldiers, and many Vietcong cadre. 130 Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 80-81. 131 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 42. 52

206,000 additional troops following the Tet Offensive. Recognizing that North Vietnam would continue to fight, Johnson’s advisors debated whether accomplishing the United

States’ objects might require 500,000 to one million additional soldiers. Secretary of

Defense McNamara conceded that those numbers might represent the potential cost. He also noted that General Westmoreland’s request was not enough to achieve American objectives.132

Second, Johnson’s changing attitudes were shaped by other administration officials.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, admitted that winning the

Tet Offensive was “a very near thing” and that the war would likely become more challenging and costly because of North Vietnam’s freedom of maneuver.133 In light of ongoing inflation, growing antiwar protests, and race riots, Secretary of Defense

McNamara cautioned that sending additional troops to Westmoreland was risky since some had to be available in the United States “to meet the possibility of widespread civil disorder…in the months ahead.”134 Newly appointed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara, also reported to the president that the military chiefs did not have a plan to win the war. He argued that the Pentagon had no tenable solutions for achieving victory short of destroying most of South Vietnam trying to eject communist forces.135 Secretary Clifford also knew first-hand how the war was harming the American economy and straining alliances with Western Europe and Japan.136

132 “Notes of Meeting, February 27, 1968,” Meeting Notes File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, cited in LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of American Power,” 223; and Sheehan, et al., The Pentagon Papers, 592- 594. 133 “Memorandum of February 27, 1968, from General Earl Wheeler to President Johnson, reprinted in Sheehan, et al., The Pentagon Papers, 615-621. 134 Gareth Porter, Vietnam: A History in Documents (New York: Penguin, 1981), 354-357. 135 “Notes of the President’s Tuesday Luncheon Meeting, February 6, 1968, reprinted in Sheehan, et al., The Pentagon Papers, 612. 136 LaFeber, “The Rise and Fall of American Power,” 224. 53

In March 1968, President Johnson appointed Secretary of Defense Clifford to chair a task force created to evaluate Westmoreland’s request and its possible domestic consequences. Secretary Clifford convened a panel of senior presidential advisors – dubbed the “Wise Men” – to examine the post-Tet situation. On 26 March 1968, the panel reported its consensus opinion to the president that the United States should reduce its involvement in South Vietnam and have the South Vietnamese assume more of the military burden. According to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a member of the group, “we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage.” The panel also expressed its belief that further escalation of the Vietnam conflict was unsupported by Congress, the business community, and the public.137 These conclusions convinced President Johnson of the futility of further escalation and continuing involvement in Vietnam. On 31 March 1968,

Johnson delivered a televised speech to the American public in which he announced a partial halt to the United States’ bombing of North Vietnam. He also declared that he would not seek a second term in office.

By late 1968, the interplay between time, economics, domestic politics, and international events led to a turning point in American involvement in South Vietnam.

President Johnson secretly raised troop levels from 486,000 to 535,000, but the Tet

Offensive had exposed the insufficiency of American military power. Despite their losses during the offensive, Communist forces controlled, or influenced, over 80% of South

Vietnamese hamlets and 65% of the total population. Ongoing negotiations with the

North Vietnamese stalemated by late 1968, and the unpopular and undemocratic South

137 “Meeting with Special Advisory Group,” March 26, 1968, Meeting Notes File, Box 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, cited in America in Vietnam, 270-272. 54

Vietnamese regime relied upon United States support for its continuing existence.

Domestically, there was a looming federal budget crisis, along with a marked upturn in the level of antiwar opposition.138

Military Overcommitment. By the end of 1968, the United States was militarily overcommitted in Southeast Asia. With a total active duty military force of over 3.4 million service members, approximately 1.2 million – over one-third of available active forces – served overseas.139 Of those serving overseas, more than 536,000, just under

46%, were in Vietnam.140 There were more than double the number of service members serving in South Vietnam than there were in West Germany, the primary area of potential military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The expanding cost of the conflict in

Vietnam siphoned economic and human resources from Germany, where facilities deteriorated, equipment fell into disrepair, and experienced military members were replaced by poorly trained conscripts.141 From an economic standpoint, war related expenditures totaled over $26.2 billion in 1968, almost 37% of the total military expenditures that year.142 Discussing the issue in 1969, President Richard Nixon declared:

138 Kissinger, The White House Years, 236. 139 US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Military Personnel on Active Duty, By Location: 1969-1976,” table 588, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980), 368. 140 US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Vietnam Conflict – US Military Forces in Vietnam and Casualties Incurred: 1961 to 1972,” table 590, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977, 369. 141 T. Michael Ruddy, “A Limit to Solidarity: Germany, the United States, and the Vietnam War,” in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, vol. 2, eds. Detlef Junker et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 130. 142 “Vietnam Statistics – War Costs: Complete Picture Impossible,” in CQ Almanac 1975, 31st ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1976), 301-305, accessed 11 October 2018 at http:// library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/ cqal75-1213988; United States Federal State and Local Government Spending Fiscal Year 1969, accessed 11 October 2018 at https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year_ spending_1969USbn_18bs2n_30#usgs302. 55

While the United States is tied down in Viet Nam, the Soviets are loose in the World – free to challenge us in the Mediterranean, free to move into the vacuum left by retreating colonial powers in the Middle East and along the vast rimland of the Indian Ocean….The war bitterly divides the people of the United States, and separates us from our allies….143

Psychological and physical factors also contributed to America’s military overcommitment. Policymakers and the publics’ frustration and impatience with the lack of military progress, questions and confusion about the purpose of military operations, uncertainty about the conflict’s outcome, and the rising imbalance between the costs of military operations and their exacerbation of declining economic and social conditions all influenced the growing perception of geostrategic overcommitment.144

The physical realities of prosecuting a war abroad also contributed to American overcommitment. United States leaders underestimated the obstacles to victory in modern war, the specific conditions unique to Vietnam, and the enemy’s fighting abilities.

Policymakers and military leaders misunderstood how to fight in South Vietnam’s terrain and climate, the logistical challenges created by Vietnam’s geographic distance from the

United States, South Vietnam’s contiguity to North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as well as its proximity to China, the underdeveloped economies of North and South

Vietnam, South Vietnam’s politics, North Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union and

China, and the deeply-rooted sense of nationalism within the Vietnamese people who had a long history of resisting foreign invaders.145 By the end of 1968, the North Vietnamese, using better tactics and armed with supplies from the Soviet Union and China, had stalemated the powerful United States military and forced policymakers to make difficult

143 Quoted in Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 51. 144 Ibid., 46. 145 Ibid., 47. 56 decisions. In the post-Tet period, policymakers and military leaders realized that

American power could destroy Vietnam, but no amount of power could achieve the

United States’ political objectives.146

In November 1968, Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphry with 43% of the popular vote, a mere. 0.7% more than his opponent. Nixon was only the second

Republican elected President since 1933 and the first new president since Zachary Taylor to face opposition control in both houses of Congress. He inherited an unpopular and stalemated war which State department officials estimated might take as many as thirteen years to win, as the war was costing 200 American dead each week and over $30 billion a year.147 According to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor:

The new Nixon Administration was the first of the post [World War II] generation that had to conduct foreign policy without the national consensus that had sustained its predecessors largely since 1947. And our task was if anything more complex. We faced not only the dislocations of a war but the need to articulate a new foreign policy for a new era.148 Nixon’s pessimism grew as he reviewed the facts and searched for policy options after becoming President in early 1969, and he finally came “to the conclusion that there’s no way to win….”149

Declining Domestic Capacity. The global activism of the preceding two decades strained American diplomacy and, by 1968, left it immobile and adrift.150 Besides its effects on public opinion, the Tet Offensive precipitated a recognition that the conflict

146 Ibid., 48. 147 Kissinger, The White House Years, 235; and Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 50-51. 148 Kissinger, The White House Years, 65. 149 Quoted in Richard J. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 137. 150 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 73-74. 57 was militarily unwinnable given existing constraints and led to a major shift in strategy towards de-escalation.151 Tet did not result in a re-evaluation of the purposes or objectives of American involvement in South Vietnam, but it did call into question the instrumentalities of American power and where they were focused. Several structural changes in the international system challenged American power projection given its overcommitment in Vietnam: the decline in the utility of military power, the advent

Soviet strategic parity, the emergence of political and economic multipolarity, and the demise of the seemingly monolithic Communist world.

The costs and frustrations of the conflict in Vietnam influenced changes in public and elite opinion that resulted in declining domestic willingness to achieve policy objectives in South Vietnam. Increasing American casualties, a declining economy, social discord, and a sense of the conflict’s futility all played a role in turning the public and political elites against the war. In contrast to the Korean War, where the number of American casualties was greatest during the first year of the conflict, the number of casualties in

Vietnam increased each year and the cumulative total exceeded that of the entire Korean

War by 1968. The increasing costs of sustaining the war also resulted in inflation, new taxes, and policymakers having to choose between waging the war and supporting domestic programs. Social divisions became more pronounced as racial strife engulfed

151 For examples see “Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, eds. Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 154, accessed 15 October 2018 at https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d154; “Editorial Note,” Ibid., Document 155, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v06/d155; “Notes of Meeting,” Ibid., Document 158, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d158; “Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk,” Ibid., Document 164, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/ d164; and “Memorandum for Record,” Ibid., Document 166, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d166. 58

American cities, a growing counterculture challenged mainstream values, and blue and white-collar workers became alienated from their respective party’s positions regarding the war. Finally, in the aftermath of Tet the war appeared to the public and policymakers alike as irretrievably stalemated with no end in sight.152

Politicians were conscious of antiwar sentiments and divisions within the American pubic regarding the war, and they recognized that these divisions reduced America’s ability to continue the conflict.153 Public support for the United States’ involvement in

Vietnam began declining as early as 1966. In October 1967, for the first time during the conflict, surveys asking whether America’s involvement was a mistake and whether it should have stayed out revealed that opposition to the war surpassed support – 46 to 44%.

The downward trend in support continued, and by March 1968 polls revealed 49% of the public opposed the war.154 During the first half of 1969, Gallup polled public preferences regarding the Vietnam War, and a majority favored the gradual withdrawal of American forces and establishing a fixed end date for involvement. A January 1969 poll showed

54% of the public favored a monthly troop reduction, with support rising to 56% by May

1969.155 When Nixon announced the first troop reductions in June 1969, 41% of survey respondents favored a faster rate of withdrawal.156 Finally, an October 1969 poll revealed

152 Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 105; John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 36, 38, and 56; and Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 44. 153 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 43. 154 Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, chapter 3. 155 Gallup Poll News Service, Survey #773 (1/1/1969-1/6/1969), Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY= AIPO0773; Gallup Poll News Service, Survey #781 (05/22/1969-05/27/1969), Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https:// proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/documents/questionnaire.aspx? STUDY=AIPO0781. 156 Gallup Poll News Service, Survey #783 (06/19/1969-06/24/1969), Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY= AIPO0783. 59

53% of the public supported completing troop withdrawals by the end of 1970; however, only 20% of those polled favored a hypothetical plan for immediate withdrawal.157

Polling clearly showed that a significant portion of the American public was unhappy with the Vietnam war and growing increasingly weary of the United States’ involvement.

Beginning in late 1967, a majority of American’s supported a cessation of bombing in

North Vietnam, gradual withdrawal of military forces, and turning over more responsibility for the conflict to South Vietnam. These opinions influenced policymakers and politicians, and political elites also considered the perspectives of friends, family members, the press, business leaders, and informed members of the uniformed military.

In general, support for the conflict among Democratic policymakers was waning, and even Republicans were moving away from a policy position advocating all-out support for the war.158

Deciding to Withdrawal. The policy debate over whether to withdraw United States forces from Vietnam began in 1968 during the Johnson administration. President Johnson asked Secretary of Defense Clifford to establish a working group to examine whether the

United States should continue its current strategy in Vietnam. Members of this group were unable to form a consensus on recommended changes or likely policy outcomes.159

Johnson’s advisors continued to debate the merits of troop increases or withdrawals

157 Gallup Poll News Service, Survey #789 (10/02/1969-10/07/1969), Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY= AIPO0789. 158 Melvin Small, “Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 2 (1987): 185-198. 159 Clark Clifford, “A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 4 (1969), 601-622. 60 throughout 1968.160 These debates carried on publicly during the 1968 presidential campaigns of Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. Although the

Vietnam War was the most significant issue during the campaign, neither candidate offered clear or distinct plans for ending the conflict. Humphrey, as Vice President, could not repudiate Johnson’s policies, and Nixon, though privately approving of Johnson’s efforts,161 publicly critiqued Johnson’s handling of the war. Both candidates agreed on the need to withdraw from Vietnam, and both rejected the idea of unilateral withdrawal.162 In other words, a bipartisan consensus existed in favor of ending the war, but how to accomplish that goal remained in debate.

Once elected, despite pledging to “end the war and win the peace in the Pacific,”

Nixon lacked a specific plan to end the conflict,163 though he did have a general framework for solving the Vietnam dilemma.164 The fact that his new administration lacked accurate information about the conflict further complicated matters. On his first day in office Nixon issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 1, “In an effort to develop an agreed evaluation of the situation in Vietnam as a basis for making

160 For illustrative examples see “Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, eds. Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 96, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/ frus1964-68v06/d96; “Editorial Note,” Ibid., Document 100, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d100; “Notes of Meeting,” Ibid., Document 104, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v06/ d104; and “Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” Ibid., Document 108, accessed 12 October 2018 at https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1964-68v06/d108. 161 “Note of Meeting,” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, eds. Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 310, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d310. 162 John E. Finney, “Nixon Asks Easing of US War Role,” New York Times, 2 August 1968; and “Transcript of a Speech by the Vice President on Foreign Policy,” New York Times, 1 October 1968. 163 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 40. Nixon made this pledge at a Republic campaign rally in Nashua, New Hampshire on 5 March 1968 and delivered variations of this theme throughout his campaign. 164 Nixon first proposed his framework in an article he wrote that was published in 1967. See Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs (October 1967) at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/asia/1967-10-01/asia-after-viet-nam. 61 policy decisions….”165 Though President Nixon “did not believe in changing policy for change sake,” he did think it was important to “rethink all of our policy tracks” with respect to Vietnam.166 NSSM 1 directed key national security-related departments and agencies to answer 28 primary and 50 subsidiary questions regarding the North and South

Vietnamese military capabilities, progress of countryside security in South Vietnam, the political situation in South Vietnam, United States military strategy and operations, and political factors that might affect peace negotiations.167

The responses to NSSM 1 “made clear that there was no consensus as to facts, much less as to policy.”168 Agency answers revealed that the United States’ national security bureaucracy was divided over the prospects of progress and victory in South Vietnam.

Agency assessments generally fell into two camps, one which was optimistic about

American prospects in Vietnam and one that was pessimistic. Optimists included the

Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of military forces in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, and the commander of all forces in the Pacific, Admiral John McCain. This group believed that military operations in Vietnam were gaining ground and influencing North Vietnam who they believed was willing to negotiate because of the North’s military weakness.

165 “National Security Study Memorandum 1,” FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 4, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76v06/d4. 166 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 5, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d5. 167 “National Security Study Memorandum 1;” Kissinger, White House Years, 238. 168 “Summary of Interagency Responses to NSSM 1,” FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 44, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d44; Kissinger, White House Years, 238-239. 62

Pessimists included civilians in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence

Agency, and the State department. This group believed that the situation in South

Vietnam was stalemated and that any gains were either inflated or tenuous, and that

North Vietnam was negotiating from a position of strength so was unlikely to make major concessions. Overall, both groups agreed on some basic positions regarding North

Vietnam’s objective, but there were significant disagreements over basic facts such as the size and deployment of enemy forces.

President Nixon faced a situation in Vietnam that closely resembled the predicament faced by French leaders in 1953. At that time, the seven-year French conflict in Indochina was at risk of defeat due to military and political failures in Vietnam, the threat of increasing Chinese support of the Vietminh, and a war-weary French public. This led

French leaders to consider a negotiated settlement that would allow them to withdraw. To achieve this diplomatic solution French leaders believed they needed to stabilize or improve their military position on the ground in Vietnam. Subsequent military decisions, ultimately leading to the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, aimed to achieve the goal of an honorable French withdrawal.169 As it was with the French in the early 1950s, so it was with Nixon in 1969.

The dilemma was not whether to withdraw from South Vietnam, but how to extricate the United States from the conflict without undermining American credibility and the survival of an independent South Vietnam. Nixon’s plan amounted to a policy of retrenchment that included the gradual withdrawal of American forces (i.e., de-

Americanization), the strengthening of South Vietnam’s government and military forces

169 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 16. 63

(i.e., Vietnamization), antiguerrilla pacification operations, détente with the Soviet

Union, and diplomatic negotiation with the Vietnamese communists. De-Americanization entailed the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and was politically necessary to appease the public’s desire to end the war. President Nixon and his National

Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, hoped that ongoing troop withdrawals would bolster public support for the president’s policy, thereby strengthening the president’s ability to negotiate with North Vietnam and pursue diplomatic initiatives elsewhere. The primary purpose of Vietnamization, the training and equipping of South Vietnam’s military forces and political reform of its government, was to compensate for American troop withdraws by strengthening South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for defending itself.170

Though distinct policy goals, the Nixon administration referred to de-Americanization and Vietnamization as “Vietnamization”, a term suggested by Secretary of Defense

Melvin Laird to highlight the positive aspects of improving South Vietnam’s governmental and military capabilities – the “right issues.”171

Framework for Retrenchment, 1969-1972

The idea of Vietnamization, the simultaneous withdrawal of American forces and of strengthening South Vietnam’s political and military capacity, emerged after the Tet

Offensive in 1968 during the Johnson administration. By the time Nixon assumed office

“the goal of victory had been abandoned and a commitment had been made…to seek a negotiated compromise solution [to the war].”172 The Nixon administration, however,

170 Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the History of Nixon Era Strategy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 12-13. 171 Kissinger, The White House Years, 272. 172 Henry Kissinger, “Ending the Vietnam War,” New York Times, 23 March 2003, accessed 28 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/books/chapters/ending-the-vietnam-war.html, excerpted 64 debated the pace at which Vietnamization should occur. On one side, Secretary of State

William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued for military de-escalation and an accelerated withdrawal of American forces. On the other side, Kissinger advocated for decelerated withdraw and military escalation. Although President Nixon generally sided with Kissinger, his policy decisions often alternated between both approaches.173 Some of Nixon’s decisions to expand the conflict into Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971 appeared to contradict a policy of United States withdrawal from

Indochina. However, the purpose of these operations was to support the overall policy of

Vietnamization, a policy of retrenchment based on building South Vietnam’s capacity for security burden sharing.

The stalemate in Vietnam prompted a reevaluation of the relationship between the military means and political ends. Throughout the conflict, the United States applied disproportionate military power against a militarily inferior opponent for a limited political goal. Regardless of the level of force applied, a United States “victory” remained elusive because America could not supply the political conditions necessary for success.

By 1969, policymakers were aware of this paradox. On one hand, America retained the preponderance of military power throughout the world. On the other hand, it was increasingly experiencing a relative decline in its global political influence.174 In other words, though America was not experiencing the erosion of its power resources relative to other countries, it did suffer relative decline in its ability to shape international

from Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 173 Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 12. 174 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 74-75. 65 outcomes.175 The challenge was how to negotiate the transition from preponderance to a position of primus inter pares. Between 1969 and 1973, retrenchment from Vietnam would be the linchpin of this transition.

Lowering Costs. President Nixon assumed responsibility for foreign policy during

America’s deepest crisis since World War II. His goal in Vietnam focused on “ending the war and winning the peace” rather than achieving victory “over any other people.”176 To win the peace, President Nixon not only had to end the fighting in Vietnam while avoiding defeat, he had to ensure a noncommunist South Vietnamese government remained in power. Therefore, achieving peace required a military and political victory over communist forces in South Vietnam and a diplomatic victory over North Vietnam.

At the start of President Nixon’s term in 1969, most policymakers prioritized achieving victory over the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

Victory took precedence because of the widely held perception that the political status of South Vietnam had strategic implications. Policymakers believed that defeat would undermine the United States’ credibility to defend allies and to contain the expanding influence of the Soviet Union and China. In other words, defeat in Vietnam would ultimately endanger the United States’ preferred global order. These beliefs generally reflected the views of successive post-World War II presidential administrations that holistically conceived the United States’ policy goals as an interrelated system of military

175 Joseph S. Nye, “American Power and Foreign Policy,” New York Times, 7 July 1976, 25. 176 Richard M. Nixon, “First Inaugural Address”, The American Presidency Project, accessed 28 September 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941. 66 balances of power, geostrategic positions, political stability, ideological compatibility, and national prestige.177 By the time Nixon ascended to the presidency, he

was eager to negotiate an honorable extraction [of American forces], which he defined as almost anything except turning over to the North Vietnamese Communists the millions of [South Vietnamese] people who had been led by his predecessors to rely on America. He took credibility and honor seriously because they defined America’s capacity to shape a peaceful international order.178

Within the legislative branch, reaction to public opinion focused not only on the implementation of American commitments, but also on the continuing utility and desirability of widespread security obligations. Less than two weeks after Nixon’s inauguration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced an investigation into executive power and the military’s role in influencing foreign policy.179 The committee also ignored State Department objections and passed a National Commitments resolution that called upon the Executive to refrain from entering into new security obligations without Congressional consent.180 These actions reflected the firm belief among influential members of the committee, especially its chairman, J. William Fulbright, that if the United States were entering a new era of diplomacy – as the Nixon administration claimed – then is should reassess its existing network of security commitments.181

Retrenchment from Southeast Asia in general, and Vietnam specifically, would facilitate the United States establishing new terms for a continuing and active role in the

177 Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 8-10. 178 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 675. 179 John W. Finney, “Senators to Sift Foreign Policies; Symington Panel to Review Influence of Military,” New York Times, 4 February 1969, accessed 16 October 2018 at https://www.nytimes.com/1969/02/04/ archives/senators-to-sift-foreign-policies-symington-panel-to-review.html. 180 John W. Finney, “Senate Panel Asks US Commitments Be Put to Congress; Senators Bid Executive Consult on Foreign Pledges,” New York Times, 13 March 1969, accessed 16 October 2018 at https:// www.nytimes.com /1969/03/13/archives/senate-panel-asks-us-commitments-be-put-to-congress-senators- bid.html. 181 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 120. 67 international system. The immediate foreign policy problem was managing the removal of United States combat forces. This challenge was part of the larger one of the overextension of America’s foreign commitments. Within this context, retrenchment not only focused on the way to mitigate the consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam, but also the nature and scope of the United States’ political and military retrenchment along the periphery. The Nixon administration acknowledged the immobility of American diplomacy resulting from the impasse in Vietnam and accepted the logic of disengagement. However, the administration consistently argued that the way disengagement occurred was important to America’s international reputation and to prevent the erosion of its domestic support for continuing global engagement.182

President Nixon summarized this sentiment during a meeting at which he said

A pull-out of the American forces precipitously would be disastrous for Asia, including countries like Japan and India. Europe would be affected. But, the most serious effect would be in the United States. When a great power fails, it deeply affects the will of the people. While the public would welcome peace initially, they would soon be asking why we pulled out and this would in turn lead an attack on the leadership and establishment and the US role in the war. Isolation could easily be the consequence.183

President Nixon believed he could end the Vietnam War quickly – within a year he hoped. His initial instincts were to attempt a knock-out blow against North Vietnam, and he ordered the military to plan for such an attack, code-named “Duck Hook.” In support of Nixon’s military moves, he hoped the Soviets would put diplomatic pressure on the

North Vietnamese government. His strategy for gaining Soviet support was “linkage,”

182 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 117-118. 183 Conversation between President Nixon and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew on 12 May 1969 quoted in “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, eds. Louis J. Smith, David H. Herschler, and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), Document 23, accessed 16 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d23. 68 whereby Nixon would refrain from negotiating arms control or trade agreements unless the Soviets complied. Domestically, Nixon sought to discredit his opponents by questioning their loyalty and patriotism. For instance, at a speech he delivered at the

United States Air Force Academy he declared, “Military programs are ridiculed as needless if not deliberate waste. The military profession is derided in some of the so- called best circles of America. Patriotism is considered by some to be a backward fetish of the uneducated and the unsophisticated.”184

Despite Nixon’s pointed rhetoric towards his opponents and attempts to pressure the

Soviets, he sought to avoid the confrontations and controversies likely to result from carrying out his ideas.185 He quickly moved away from “Duck Hook” for fear that it would raise congressional opposition or split his cabinet – “I just wasn’t ready for that”

Nixon later admitted. Furthermore, instead of escalation, Nixon opted to announce the first withdrawal of 25,000 American soldiers from South Vietnam, and implementation of “Vietnamization” to train the South Vietnamese military and government to assume the burden of self-defense. By the end of the summer of 1969, Nixon announced another planned withdrawal of 35,000 troops.186 A desire to avoid controversy also led President

Nixon to abandon linking Soviet pressure on North Vietnam with diplomatic progress in other areas. He was unwilling to sacrifice the political benefits of détente with the Soviets and agreed to open talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons without any meaningful action by the Soviets towards Hanoi. In fact, Henry Kissinger believed that the Soviets

184 Richard M. Nixon, Address at the Air Force Academy Commencement Exercises, Colorado Springs, CO, 4 June 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, accessed 5 October 2018 at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 2081. 185 Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 171. 186 Nixon, Memoirs, 484-485, 491. 69 made use of “reverse linkage” by exploiting Nixon’s need for foreign policy progress to sustain domestic support.187

The Nixon administration explicitly portrayed retrenchment under the guise of the

Nixon Doctrine as a transitional policy that would facilitate maintaining regional stability by substituting local forces for direct American involvement.188 The main thrust of the doctrine was on Indochina, with emphasis on the nature and scope of American military assistance to the region after the withdrawal of American forces. However, the administration regarded the doctrine as having wider applications, thereby linking retrenchment to the continuing role of the United States in the international system. As

Kissinger explained

[T]he relationship of the United States to other countries depends…on the legal relationships but more fundamentally on the conception the United States has of its role in the world and on the intrinsic significance of the country’s relationship to overall security and progress.189

This new approach, coupled with the Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis to only “help where it makes a real difference and is considered in [America’s] interest,”190 implied two political prerequisites. First, the United States would have to change its perception of the nature and level of threat within the international system and reduce its military accordingly. Between 1969 and 1971, the Nixon administration reduced defense spending

187 Kissinger, White House Years, 144. 188 For an example see Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace, A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 15 February 1971, 3-5, accessed 17 October 2018 at https:// babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015001691495;view=1up;seq=19; US Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program, 17 February 1972, 1, accessed 16 October 2018 at https://history. defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1973_DoD_AR. pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150625-420. 189 Kissinger, White House Years, 223. 190 “Report by President Nixon to the Congress,” FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy1969-1976, eds. Louis J. Smith, David H. Herschler, and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), Document 60, accessed 15 October 2018 at https:// history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d60. 70 to its lowest level since 1951. As a percentage of the gross national product, defense spending in 1971 was 7%, down from a high of 9.5% in 1968. Secretary of Defense Laird justified these reductions in terms of countering domestic inflation and because of the reduced level of threat American forces might plausibly encounter given the administration’s posture of strategic sufficiency. Regarding the later, the Department of

Defense also argued for reconfiguring America’s military forces from a 2 ½ to a 1 ½ warfighting capability.191 By 1974, the United States’ conventional ground forces were reduced to 16 active Army and Marine divisions, more than six fewer than in 1968 and more than three fewer than in 1964.192 Second, the administration would have to revise its perspective on the forces available to participate in the defense of allies. Towards this end, the Nixon administration’s “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence” applied a total force concept whereby the size and effectiveness of allied military capabilities were integrated into American defense planning.193

The Nixon administration implemented its policy of retrenchment across a range of military, diplomatic, and economic activities. Between 1969 and 1972, the total number of United States military personnel declined from 3.4 million to 2.3 million, a more than

32% reduction, bringing the military forces to their lowest level since before the Korean

War. More than 500,000 military personnel were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the number of troops in Japan and South Korea were reduced by one-third, and those in the

191 US Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, 20 February 1970, 10 and 19, accessed 17 October 2018 at https://history. defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1971_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014- 06-24-150603-950. 192 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, chapter 4, footnote 12, 208. 193 US Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget, 9 and 12. 71

Philippines were cut by one-half.194 Nixon justified these reductions by pointing to his articulated doctrine and noting United States allies would assume a larger burden for their own defense. In other words, the United States’ relations with its allies would change from “predominance” to “partnership.”195 In the realm of nuclear strategy, the United

States scaled back its goals from superiority to sufficiency.196 Economically, the Nixon administration decreased most areas of the defense budget and devalued the dollar twice.197 Although dedicated to pursuing a cost-conscious foreign policy, President Nixon was concerned that the United States was going “down the drain as a great power” and vowed he would not “fall into [the] dry rot of just managing the chaos better.”198

Managing Withdrawal. A central feature of the Nixon Doctrine was its ambiguity.

President Nixon and his administration believed that maintaining ambiguity would facilitate regaining diplomatic initiative and flexibility. By providing the conceptual ability to discriminate between cases of potential intervention, the doctrine freed Nixon from the confines of a more specific declaratory policy. Moreover, the perceived interests at stake were also subject to change since

the Doctrine…is given full meaning through a process that involves other countries…. To attempt to define the new diplomacy completely by ourselves would repeat the now presumptuous instinct of the previous era and violate the very spirit of our new approach.199

194 Tim Kane, “Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2005,” Heritage Foundation, 24 May 2006, accessed 5 October 2018 at https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005. 195 Nixon, RN, 488; Kissinger, and White House Years, 223-225. 196 Report by President Nixon to the Congress. 197 Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 62; and “Table 6-8, Department of Defense BA by Title,” National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013, March 2012, 136, accessed 5 October 2018 at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/ FY13_Green_Book.pdf. 198 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), 73. 199 Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace, 20. 72

Critics generally argued that it was a flawed policy that failed to provide a coherent framework for American foreign policy.200 Some noted the apparent contradiction between reducing capabilities while maintaining commitments.201 They argued that the

Nixon doctrine was merely substituting forces rather than “adjusting [American] commitments, restricting [American] objectives or modifying [the American] conception of the interests of the United States.”202 According to Nixon and Kissinger’s worldview, the first set of critical arguments were disputable. The Nixon administration reconciled the apparent contradiction between the continuance of commitments despite a reduction in forces through a policy of superpower détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, and the development of mid-range regional powers.

Nixon explicitly aimed to develop “a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations.” Guiding his approach was the idea that “[American] enmities are not immutable, and we must be prepared realistically to recognize and deal with their cause.” Doing so required “mutual self-restraint and a willingness to accommodate conflicting national interests through negotiation rather than confrontation.”203 The first step was to attempt to achieve a global modus vivendi with the

Soviet Union through a policy of détente. Though commonly perceived as an attempt by the Nixon administration to bring about more peaceful relations with the Soviets, détente

200 For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Half Past Nixon,” Foreign Policy 3 (1971), 3-21, accessed 17 October 2018 at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147828. 201 For instance, Earl G. Ravenal, “The Political-Military Gap,” Foreign Policy 3 (1971), 22-40, accessed 17 October 2018 at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147829. 202 Earl G. Ravenal, “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments,” Foreign Affairs 49, no. 2 (1971), 209, accessed 17 October 2018 at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1971-01-01/nixon- doctrine-and-our-asian-commitments 203 Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 9 February 1972, 5, accessed 19 October 2018 at https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015001691271;view=1up;seq=13. 73 was an instrumentalist strategy designed to achieve the administration’s goals in Vietnam and globally.204 Nixon and Kissinger viewed détente as “a strategy to contain and harness

Soviet use of its increasing power” by creating a “web of relationships” that the United

States would weave.205

The intent for détente, tantamount to rapprochement, was to stabilize the nuclear arms race, prevent or mitigate the consequences of crises, and to narrow the ongoing rivalry.

Détente was also a means for encouraging or coercing Soviet behavior in relation to the existing world order and in accordance with American preferences. The main instrument for achieving these aims was linkage, a stratagem of carrots and sticks that served as a

“governing device for applying incentives and penalties that [the United States] placed at the center of their concept of diplomatic strategy.”206 Positive incentives included offers of deals on divisive issues like Berlin, the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons, and economic aid in exchange for support of America’s attempt to withdraw from Vietnam.

Disincentives included diplomatic maneuvers like rapprochement with China, denial of economic aid, and military threats. Ultimately, détente was pursued to resolve grievances and diffuse secondary threats. This was so the United States could preserve its central role in maintaining the international order at a time when the Soviet Union reached strategic nuclear parity and acted as an obstacle to America’s foreign policy goals.207

America’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China was intended by

President Nixon to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment from Southeast Asia.

204 Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 13. 205 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 32-37. 206 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 33 and 36. 207 William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Tope Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, New Press, 1999), 10; Michael B. Froman, The Development of the Idea of Détente: Coming to Terms (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), chapters 1 and 2; and Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 14. 74

By improving relations with China Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate American withdrawal.208The main objective of American rapprochement was to establish a Sino-American relationship to counter-balance the Soviet Union. Regionally, the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the American threat to

China would decline post-Vietnam.209 The American opening to China was intended to elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently, rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the

Soviet Union.210 Much like détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon viewed rapprochement with China as a type of modus vivendi developed at a regional, rather than global, level.

The consensus among the national security agencies at the beginning of Nixon’s presidency was that China opposed negotiations between the United States and North

Vietnam, and the Soviets were believed to support a negotiated settlement on terms favoring North Vietnam.211 Despite these views, Nixon opted to explore options for altering the United States’ relationship with China. He issued National Security Study

Memorandum 14 in which he directed the security agencies to explore the status of

American relations with China, the nature of the Chinese communist threat in Asia, the interaction between American policy and other relevant countries towards China, and the costs and risks of alternative approaches.212 The results of this interagency study revealed

208 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 133-134. 209 Yukinori Komine, “The ‘Japan Card’ in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009), 497. 210 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 102-103; and Komine, “The ‘Japan Card’ in the United States Rapprochement with China,” 494-495. 211 “National Security Study Memorandum 1.” 212 “National Security Study Memorandum 14,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 eds. Steven E. Phillips and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 4, accessed 23 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969- 76v17/d4. 75 that the national security agencies were focused on China’s ideology and alleged military goals. Kissinger, however, criticized this focus because he believed it failed to regard the implications of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions and opportunities for a triangular relationship.213

Though the motives behind Nixon’s triangular strategy were somewhat ambiguous,214 as the process of rapprochement progressed they evolved into a means for pressuring the

Soviets and hastening the end of the Vietnam War.215 The notion of playing the “China card” against the Soviets preceded any concrete steps toward rapprochement, though it served as a motivation to achieve that goal. The timing for playing the card was influenced by a period of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions in the middle of 1969,216 as well as by Nixon’s plan to withdraw from South Vietnam. The triangular relationship between the United States, Soviet Union, and China resulting from rapprochement was supposed to assist extricating the United States from Vietnam. When combined with the carrots of détente mentioned earlier, the China card was intended to encourage the Soviet

Union to pressure North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Moreover, Nixon hoped that rapprochement with China would also intimidate the North Vietnamese and serve as an added incentive to negotiate a settlement.217

213 Kissinger, White House Years, 178. 214 Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 73-74; and Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 119-120. 215 Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 105; Kissinger, White House Years, 169. 216 Kissinger wrote President Nixon, “I believe this is solid evidence of the growing obsession of the Soviet leaders with their China problem…at least it suggests that the Soviets may become more flexible in dealing with East-West issues….Thus, Soviet concern may have finally reached the point that it can be turned to our advantage, if they are in fact attempting to ensure our neutrality in their Chinese containment policy, if not our active cooperation.” To which Nixon replied, “This is our goal.” Kissinger, White House Years, 179. 217 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 120-121. 76

Developing a new approach required changing American attitudes towards its alliances which were “no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet

Union and China behind the American shield.”218 Moving forward, the United States would adopt a new role of “accepting and encouraging initiative and leadership from our allies.”219 The Nixon administration also attempted to develop locally preponderant states into regional powers capable of burden sharing and to further stabilize the new relationship with the Soviet Union and China. These powers would become the recipients of the devolution of America’s regional security responsibilities, along with the military aid necessary to maintain and promote regional stability. The Nixon administration’s policies of détente and rapprochement ushered a period of global diplomacy. Though attempts to develop regional powers essentially fragmented the international system, they fit within the administration’s belief in an emerging multipolarity.220

Rather than being an adjunct to the modus vivendi the United States achieved with the

Soviet Union and China, the Nixon Administration’s development of regional powers aimed to stabilize superpower relations by expanding the web of relations that could influence or mitigate Soviet actions. Nixon hoped that these regional relationships would facilitate his strategy of linkage politics and mitigate the apparent contradiction between the reduction in United States capabilities and maintenance of commitments. However, the Nixon administration essentially conducted relations with its preferred regional clients – Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, and Zaire – in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner that hinted at their secondary importance. Another flaw in the administration’s approach was

218 Richard Nixon, The Emerging Structure of Peace, 6. 219 Ibid., 7. 220 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 135-136. 77 the optimistic assumption that the United States would be able to maintain long-term consonance of interests with its regional partners. This error was magnified by a failure to differentiate between contending views on security within region, where there might not be a common perception of threats, and between regions, where security criteria might vary.221

Realignment and Reorientation, 1973-1975

Diminishing Importance of Vietnam. After winning re-election in 1972, President

Nixon was determined to end American involvement in Vietnam to facilitate refocusing on other global issues.222 Of primary concern was stabilizing superpower relations to complement retrenchment from peripheral regions. First, the United States had to terminate its involvement in Vietnam. The successful negotiation of the Paris agreement between the United States and North Vietnam in January 1973 finalized the disengagement of American forces from Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States agreed to stop all military activity against North Vietnam and remove all remaining American troops from South Vietnam within 60 days.223 The last American troops departed on 29 March 1973, and the only residual American presence consisted of embassy guards and members of the Defense Attaché Office tasked to monitor South Vietnamese military activities and provide technical assistance.224

221 Ibid., 136-138. 222 Nixon, RN, 717. 223 The “Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam” was signed on 27 January 1973 and contained 17 provisions agreed to by the United States and the North Vietnam. See https://treaties. un.org/doc/ Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf. 224 James H. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How American Left and South Vietnam Lost its War (Leavenworth: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 186-187. 78

Over the next two years, the importance of the survival of South Vietnam, the resolution of other conflicts in Southeast Asia, and the political struggles stemming from the Nixon administration’s desire to continue providing support decreased. Between 1973 and 1975, the United States sent South Vietnam approximately $1.5 billion in military aid, $640 million in economic aid, and $535 million worth of food. Despite the Nixon administration’s doubts about the efficacy of Vietnamization during this period, they believed that the settlement agreement and level of aid gave South Vietnam “every opportunity to demonstrate their inherent strength.”225 This belief rested on an assumption that each year that passed improved the South Vietnamese regime’s prospects for survival. This assumption depended on the Soviet Union decreasing its arms transfers to North Vietnam as well as a domestic political consensus regarding the re-introduction of American airpower should South Vietnam’s collapse be imminent. Neither of these prerequisites occurred, however, as Soviet arms sales continued unabated and American political consensus overwhelmingly favored terminating any American involvement in

Vietnam.226

Abandoning American Interests in Vietnam

In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act which limited the President’s ability to use American military forces oversees without consultation. That same year Congress also passed a resolution forbidding the use of funds to pay for any military activities in

Vietnam. Following the Watergate scandal, the Democrats gained 43 seats in the House

225 Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 59, access 24 October 2018 at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp. 39015001691388;view= 1up;seq=7. 226 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 154-155. On 29 June 1973, a bipartisan majority in Congress voted to forbid the use of funds for American combat activities in Indochina after 15 August 1973. 79 and three in the Senate during the 1974 mid-term elections. The enhanced Democratic majority intended to use their power to “correct imbalances in the Congressional-

Presidential relationship.”227 During the early stages of the Nixon administration, the

Democrats favored and end to the war but were often hesitant to challenge the president;228 however, by 1975, Congress was unified in its opposition to any involvement in Vietnam and unconcerned about the consequences of abandoning the president’s policy goal.229

During the final months of 1974, the situation in South Vietnam increasingly deteriorated as the North Vietnamese violated the Paris agreement and began a widespread offensive. President Ford was unable to directly address the violations because of the limitations passed by Congress. Instead, he attempted to negotiate to secure additional military assistance for Cambodia and South Vietnam.230 During the negotiations, President Ford argued that continuing to provide military aid to Southeast

Asian nations was important to maintain American credibility and the validity of the

Nixon Doctrine. In a letter to Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Ford argued

It has been a basic policy of the Government to give material support to friends and allies who are willing and able to carry the burden of their own self-defense. This is a moral question that must be faced squarely. Are we to deliberately abandon a small country in the midst of its life and death struggle? Is the United States, which so far has consistently stood by its friends through the most difficult times, now to condemn, in effect, a small Asian nation totally dependent on us? Our national security and the integrity of our alliance depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner.

227 Edward A. Kolodziej, “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Years,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32, no. 1 (1975), 178. 228 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 646. 229 T. Christopher Jesperson, “Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam,” Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 3 (2002), 456. 230 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 173. 80

Countries around the world who depend on us for support – as well as their foes – will judge our performance.231

Congress answered yes to both of President Ford’s questions and refused further assistance to Cambodia or South Vietnam. North Vietnam noted these developments and took advantage of them by devising a two-year plan for a general uprising to complete taking over the South.232 Instead of two years, the North defeated South Vietnam by the end of April 1975. Shortly before the collapse, on 23 April 1975, President Ford announced that the war was finished as far as America was concerned.233

While the legislated termination of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia sparked new debates over foreign policy, the Nixon administration sought to preserve

American credibility and revitalize the domestic political consensus necessary for sustaining global engagement. Until the middle of 1973, the United States’ concentration on the situation in Vietnam came at the expense of other important issues. Kissinger noted this clearly when he observed “We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to the defense of one country.”234 President Nixon wrote “Now that the Vietnam war had ended, we could turn our attention to the other areas of the world where war was always imminent and where the danger of a great-power nuclear confrontation was far greater than in Southeast Asia.”235 Between 1973 and 1975, Vietnam continued to set the emotional tone of foreign policy discussions; however, the centrality of the United States

231 Letter from President Gerald Ford to Speaker of the House of Representatives Carl Albert, “President Ford Urges Rapid Action on Assistance to Cambodia,” Department of State Bulletin 72, no. 1864 (17 March 1975), 331, accessed 25 February 2019, at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp. 39015077199407;view=1up;seq=373. 232 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 172. 233 Gerald Ford, “Remarks of the President to the Tulane Student Body,” Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, 23 April 1975, 4, accessed 25 February 2019, at https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/ tulane%3A75293. 234 Kissinger, White House Years, 1386. 235 Nixon, RN, 786. 81 and Soviet Union relationship re-emerged as the primary thrust of American foreign policy, particularly as it related to the Middle East. As Chinese Premier Chou Enlai noted, “When the [United States] got stuck in Vietnam, the Soviet revisionists embraced the opportunity to extend vigorously their sphere of influence in…the Middle East.”236

Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Aftermath. The 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict (i.e., the

Yom Kippur War) led to a reassessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In each of the successive Middle East conflicts that occurred while the United States was mired in Vietnam – 1967, 1970, and 1973 – the Soviet Union increased its involvement and power projection into the region. Increased Soviet involvement was attributed, in part, to its attainment of strategic nuclear and military parity while the United States and its military was distracted in Vietnam.237 The political ramifications of Soviet involvement in the 1973 war extended across a range of foreign policy issues, most notably the undermining of détente diplomacy. The Soviet Union’s failure to abide by its accords with the United States regarding involvement in the conflict called into question the perceptions of Soviet intentions in the periphery. This erosion of trust then undermined confidence in strategic arms negotiations.238

The deteriorating relationship between the United States and Soviet Union following the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict reaffirmed the centrality of the bipolar superpower relationship despite an emerging political and economic multipolarity. Following the conflict, the United States’ foreign policy shifted back to a more explicit policy of Soviet containment. From this perspective, the political and military retrenchment from

236 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 103. 237 Ibid., 164. 238 Ibid., 165. 82

Southeast Asia and détente with the Soviet Union were clearly temporary conditions.

Rather than reflecting a foreign policy failure, the unstable international context during retrenchment underscored the inherent political and technological instability of the ongoing Cold War between the Americans and Soviets. Politically, the period of post- colonialization and proliferation of conflicts challenging existing state structures coincided with the rising ability of both superpowers to project power globally. Because of this development and the ongoing ideological competition of the Cold War, domestic conflicts in the periphery became international conflicts in which the United States and

Soviet Union competed – the internationalization of domestic conflict. Technological advancements in nuclear technologies and the implications of Soviet parity also renewed the challenge of integrating nuclear weapons and foreign policy.239

Free from the constraints of Vietnam, the United States’ response to the 1973 Yom

Kippur War, the first international test following America’s withdraw from Southeast

Asia, showed the benefits of retrenchment. The conflict severely tested Soviet-American relations politically divided the United States from its main European allies, and increased tensions between the United States and several Arab states in the Middle East.

In meeting these challenges American diplomacy was active, innovative, and determined throughout the crisis.240 To achieve these results, the Nixon administration temporarily abandoned the cooperative assumptions of détente and sought to gain geopolitical advantage over the Soviets in the Middle East. The United States continuously sought advantages during and after the conflict while repeatedly assuring the Soviet Union that

America remained committed to collaborative problem solving. During the conflict, the

239 Ibid., 167-168 240 Sestanovich, Maximalist, 193. 83

United States deterred possible Soviet military intervention by issuing an unprecedented alert of American nuclear forces. This act was meant to minimize conjecture that the

United States may have “provoked [Soviet intervention] by being soft” and to issue a warning “in a manner that shocked the Soviets into abandoning” notions of intervening on behalf of their Egyptian clients.241 Following the conflict, the Soviet Union had little more than a ceremonial role in the diplomacy between the Middle Eastern powers involved in the conflict. In fact, the Soviet’s client states, Egypt and Syria, sought

American diplomatic assistance believing that the United States was the only power that could deliver meaningful results.242

Because of the United States’ support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Arab oil producers used their oil monopoly power in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) to embargo oil exports to the United States and its European and

Japanese allies. The embargo raised oil prices fourfold and severely impacted the economies of the targeted countries. The economic shock of the oil embargo overshadowed fears of Soviet military threats and raised the strategic importance of the

Middle East to the American and European economic security.243 However, when the

United States attempted to unify opposition to the embargo, its European allies balked because of their dependence on Arab oil and Japan wanted to pursue other options.244 In response, Nixon declared to American allies that they could not “have it both ways. They cannot have the United States’ participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political

241 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 553, 584, 589. 242 Sestanovich, Maximalist, 194-195. 243 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 885. 244 Ibid., 897, 910. 84 front.”245 The United States also implemented a unilateral strategy that threatened countermeasures against OPEC states, including the implied threat of military force.246

The United States’ ultimate unilateral success resulted from effective diplomacy in which

Kissinger applied the principle of linkage to elicit Arab concessions. In conducting his

“shuttle diplomacy”, Kissinger successfully demanded that if Egypt and Syria wanted him to serve as a mediator between them and Israel, then they would have to mediate between the United States and OPEC states to eliminate the embargo.247

Outcome of Strategic Reorientation

Level of Reduced Commitment. Nixon and Kissinger noted the relative decline of

American power resulting from overcommitment in Vietnam and believed that changing international circumstances required the United States to realign and reorient its foreign policy. Besides the inherent challenges of devising a sustainable foreign policy, domestic constraints further exacerbated developing an appropriate response. The Nixon administration understood that a large segment of the American public wished for a return to isolationism after more than 20 years of global engagement and bipolar competition.248 Therefore, the administration had the dual challenge of reorienting

American foreign policy in line with new structural circumstances while simultaneously maintaining domestic political support.

245 Richard Nixon, “Question-and-Answer Session at the Executives’ Club of Chicago,” March 15, 1974, Public Papers of the Presidents, accessed 25 October 2018 at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ documents/question-and-answer-session-the-executives-club-chicago. 246 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 874, 880, 891. 247 Ibid., 881, 935; Sestanovich, Maximalist, 195-196. 248 Kissinger, White House Years, 56-57. Kissinger noted, “A new isolationism was growing. Whereas in the 1920s we had withdrawn from the world because we thought we were too good for it, the insidious theme of the late 1960s was that we should withdraw from the world because we were too evil for it.” 85

The first step in meeting these challenges was retrenchment from Vietnam and

Southeast Asia. Nixon consistently held that the maintenance of American credibility as an international partner relied upon providing South Vietnam a reasonable chance to determine its future. In his first speech on Vietnam after becoming president, President

Nixon explicitly rejected attempting to achieve a “purely military solution on the battlefield” in South Vietnam, as well as “a one-side withdrawal from Vietnam or the acceptance of [peace terms] that would amount to disguised defeat.”249 While the former would require a level of support Nixon knew he could not attain,250 the latter might undermine American prestige, encourage adversaries, and threaten allies’ security.251

Nixon contended that the nature of the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam would influence both international and domestic perceptions. He also realized that to maintain domestic support for his foreign policy he would not be able to halt troop withdrawals once begun.

Between Nixon’s first announcement of troop reductions on Midway Island on 8 June

1969 and November 1972, the United States reduced its troop levels from over 549,000 to less than 27,000. By 1975, the Defense Attaché Office in South Vietnam had only 50

American servicemembers and 1,200 civilians. Vietnam was no longer America’s primary concern. Regarding funding for the South Vietnamese government and military, the budget for fiscal year 1973 included $3.2 billion in aid, and this was reduced to $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1974. By fiscal year 1975, Congress only allocated $700 million.

249 Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Vietnam,” May 14, 1969, accessed 25 October 2018 at https://www. nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-vietnam-may-14-1969/. 250 Nixon, RN, 371. 251 Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Vietnam.” 86

Effects on Allies and Adversaries. Contrary to President Nixon’s assertions regarding the consequences of withdrawal and the loss of South Vietnam, United States allies continued to remain committed. In an assessment of ally sentiment following the collapse of South Vietnam, officials noted a “reverse domino” effect. They found that

Most nations in Asia apparently believe that revolutionary warfare of the Vietnamese model, like a car accident, is something that happens to other people…. On the other hand, they are worried about North Vietnamese expansionism, which they quite accurately regard as having been the principal determinant of events in Indochina. They are also worried about the danger of increased Russian and Chinese activity, though they still regard these in rather amorphous terms.252

Even though international partners were concerned about the level of American commitment, they continued to depend on the United States because they lacked other options. A review of those countries most affected by events in Southeast Asia – South

Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines – showed little willingness to forsake partnership with the United States. South Korea had no other option in the face of continuing animosity with the communist North Korean regime supported by the Soviet Union and

China. Virtually surrounded by new communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia, Thailand vacillated between conflicting desires to expel United States forces from its territory or to adopt neutrality that would imply some level of continued American support. In the

Philippines, domestic issues prompted its leader to desire a stronger commitment from the United States while reducing its overt presence, yet the Philippines’ objectives were

252 Memorandum from W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 15, 1975,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 17, accessed 25 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-76ve12/d17. 87 not hostile to American interests. Lastly, other countries like Malaysia, Australia, and

Singapore attempted to move even closer to the United States.253

Not only did allies remain committed to partnership with the United States, adversaries refrained from further aggression against American interests. At the time of the Paris peace accords ending the Vietnam War, American interest in South Vietnam remained an independent country with “the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference.”254 North Vietnam did invade and subsequently conquer South Vietnam in 1975; however, at the signing of the Paris peace accords the Nixon administration knew this would likely happen and hoped to forestall collapse by providing copious military aid. At the time of the North’s final offensive, South Vietnam possessed a numerically and technologically superior force relative to their rival. When the invasion and pending collapse occurred, the United States deliberately abandoned its goals and interests in the region. Laos and Cambodia fell to internal communist insurgents. Beyond inhibiting the general spread of communism, the

United States never maintain a committed interest in maintaining the survival of either country. In 1975, Cambodian Khmer communists seized the American container ship SS

Mayaguez, but this was deemed an act of piracy related to an ongoing territorial dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam.255 Regardless, the United States opted to take a strong

253 Ibid. 254 Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Vietnam.” 255 “Minutes of National Security Council Meeting,” FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975, Document 285, accessed 25 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d285. 88 stand against the Cambodians to send a signal to the North Koreans and Chinese that the

United States was willing to defend its interests and would not tolerate similar actions.256

Outcome.

How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? Second, what explains the variation in outcomes when states opt to attempt retrenchment. I argue that great powers correct the dilemma of overcommitment by going through a process of strategic reorientation, of which retrenchment is the critical mechanism. Retrenchment is the stage in strategic reorientation when leaders attempt to mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or, failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of these options are available, retrenchment will fail, because a great power will be unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical challenges. In this case, President Richard Nixon sought to lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy. He began by implementing a policy of retrenchment that redistributed resources from peripheral concerns in Southeast Asia to core security interests in other regions. He was successful and ultimately improved the United States’ strategic solvency.

256 “Minutes of National Security Council Meeting,” Ibid., Document 295, accessed 25 October 2018 at https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d295. 89

Much as my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicted, Nixon’s success stemmed from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement with geopolitical rivals, and abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argue that retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on Vietnamization to improve South

Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United

States of its security burden. He committed substantial financial and material resources to strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself. By the time United States military forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam had a numerically and qualitatively superior military that gave the South a fighting chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure and did not impede American retrenchment.

My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon successfully implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. He held the idea that competing interests with rivals were not immutable and could be realistically managed through negotiation. Nixon’s policy of détente with the

Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in

Vietnam. President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving relations with

China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate United States withdrawal. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the

American threat to China would decline post-Vietnam. The American opening to China was intended to elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union and facilitated American retrenchment between 1969 and 1973.

Absent an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for burden sharing, and when rapprochement fails, I predict that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. During the

United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed extensive political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s security capacity.

Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were ostensibly willing to provide their own security, and American military aid gave them the material ability to do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction hindered their effectiveness and ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of re-intervening to honor its commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon all interests in South

Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites.

Regarding my last two hypotheses – retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal, and retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail – I find evidence to support both claims. The American public and political elites favored withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war powers, cut funding for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in in that country.

President Ford did try to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam, but faced with a political consensus about remaining uninvolved, Ford acquiesced and declared that the

Vietnam War was over before the South finally collapsed. Finally, retrenchment in this case succeeded because the United States was able to find an ally for burden sharing, successfully settle disputes with its rivals, and, when South Vietnam’s demise seemed imminent, domestic political circumstances in favor of nonintervention resulted in abandonment of American interest in South Vietnam specifically, and Southeast Asia in general.

Table 4 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses.

Table 4. Hypotheses and Summary of Successful Retrenchment

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. Nixon focused on improving South Vietnam’s ability to assume Hypothesis 1 responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United States of its security burden. Nixon committed substantial financial and material resources to strengthen the South’s ability to defend itself; however, political dysfunction in that country made it an ineffective proxy. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon successfully Hypothesis 2 implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The Hypothesis 3 United States abandoned its interest in South Vietnam and declined to commit American airpower to stave off defeat by the North. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of Hypothesis 4 regional withdrawal. The American public and political elites favored withdrawal. Nixon managed to avert the risk of isolationism and maintained a political consensus on the need for engagement abroad. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. Attempts to bolster South Vietnam’s ability to secure itself ultimately failed, but the United States successfully settled issues with its main rivals which Hypothesis 5 prevented aggression. When faced the prospect of re-intervening to prevent the collapse of South Vietnam, American leaders opted instead to abandon their interests in that country.

Alternatives

How about the alternative hypotheses for retrenchment outcomes? This case provides limited to no support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does appear falls well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First, retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. President

Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with international relative decline; however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United States’ success. His ability to enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its own defense and triangular diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement facilitated America’s deliberate withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested, retrenchment likely would have failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw and rapid collapse of the South at a time when the American public still supported honoring their country’s commitment to a free and democratic South Vietnam. Therefore, while President Nixon did correctly link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American relative decline, this alone was not enough to bring about success.

Second, another possible explanation is that operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, the evidence of the case does not fully bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon implemented a mixture of operational and strategic retrenchment policy responses, yet the main thrust of cost savings involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the level of risk in foreign policy. He also provided cover for force reductions and reduced warfighting capacity by engaging in active diplomacy with Soviet and Chinese rivals.

This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East, who up to that point were slowly being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern countries quickly abandoned the

Soviets when the United States asserted itself diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted to solely cut costs through reducing the price of security or refrained from substituting diplomacy for force, it seems likely retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by withdrawing from South Vietnam, abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and significantly cutting its forces, American rivals might have opted to act more aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United States’ retreat, aggression to which it might not have been able to respond given recently reduced force structures. Therefore, the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic retrenchment has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an operative factor in this case.

Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis.

Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of servicemembers within eight months of assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement, he proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years. While the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President Nixon attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of reductions seems less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While providing some support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little evidence points to it being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the North Vietnamese that

94 the United States would no longer support the South, the North planned and initiated an offensive to capture South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted for rapid and immediate withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from the North; however, the factor determining success would have been the United States’ ability to abandon its interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have been an effect on allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore, there is limited support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes. Counterfactuals suggest, however, the need for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions matter, but how they might matter.

Table 5 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses.

Table 5. Alternative Hypotheses of Successful Retrenchment.

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of Alternative relative decline. President Nixon correctly matched cost reductions to Hypothesis 1 the nature of decline, but this played no role in the outcome. (Unsupported) Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment. President Nixon mixed and matched types of cost reductions, with the predominant being strategic retrenchment Alternative policies. His success neither proves nor disproves this hypothesis. A Hypothesis 2 counterfactual where Nixon favored operational reduction might plausibly have resulted in aggression by American rivals. (Limited support) Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. President Nixon attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to Alternative assume more responsibility for their security. The pace of reductions Hypothesis 3 may play a role, but little evidence from the case points to it being a vital factor for success. (Limited support)

CHAPTER 4: RETRENCHMENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-2015

“Any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”257

This project aims to answer how a great power realigns its strategic priorities when foreign overcommitment constrains its military power projection and diplomatic flexibility. Retrenchment is one way to realign resources and priorities, but its outcome varies. I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more vital challenges. Extrication occurs in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a partner, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandonment. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are available.

President Obama entered office in January 2009 with a desire to reverse what he perceived as foreign policy overreach by his predecessor. He inherited two stalemated wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq – and he believed that American foreign policy had ossified over the previous eight years. President Obama and his advisors thought that the

George W. Bush administration overcommitted the United States in Iraq and neglected more critical issues like institutional reform, nuclear proliferation, economic growth, and collective responses to man-made and natural disasters. These crises were believed to be symptoms of weakness in the existing international architecture.258

257 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The US President Talks Though His Hardest Decisions About America’s Role in the World,” The Atlantic Monthly 317, no. 3 (2016), 76, accessed 27 December 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 258 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 2010, 1-3. 96

Seeking to lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy, President

Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – and reorient American power towards East Asia. In the final analysis, the Obama administration failed. President Obama could not identify a suitable successor to counter rising Iranian influence and contain regional crises, nor did he succeed at offsetting his retrenchment policy with rapprochement to minimize the potential for rivals to take advantage of American withdrawal.259 Subsequent turmoil resulting from the Arab

Spring, the Syrian Civil War, the emergence of the Islamic State, and Iran’s expanding influence sparked intense post hoc debate about the wisdom of withdrawal. Despite

President Obama’s intent, political partisanship and allied pressure meant he could not abandon American interests in the region (figure 5).

Figure 5. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from the Middle East.

259 Robert B. Zoellick, “A Presidency of Missed Opportunities: Unlike Nixon in the Wake of Vietnam, Obama has Failed to Offset Retrenchment with a Strategic Initiative,” Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2014, accessed 21 December 2018, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-zoellick-a-presidency-of- missed-opportunities-1407709833. 97

In what follows, I discuss this example of unsuccessful retrenchment within the context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I demonstrate the international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United States resulting from its overcommitment in the Middle East between 2004 and 2008. I then discuss the linked policies of the nebulous Obama Doctrine and related pivot to Asia, both of which provided the policy framework for political and military retrenchment from the Middle

East between 2009 and 2011. Next, I examine the period of political and military realignment following and the attempted geostrategic reorientation towards the East Asia from 2011 to 2014. I conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of this unsuccessful retrenchment attempt.

International Decline and Strategic Misalignment

The Road to Overcommitment, 2001-2008. Attacks on 11 September 2001 made terrorism the United States’ strategic priority in a worldwide geopolitical and ideological struggle. Cast in a Manichean light, President George Bush asserted that “our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”260

Rather than leaving it to law enforcement and passive countermeasures, President Bush began a military offensive based on the “need to fight overseas by bringing the war to the bad guys,”261 while “making no distinction between the terrorists who committed [the

260 George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service,” National Cathedral, Washington, DC, 14 September 2001, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html. 261 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 281. 98

9/11 attacks] and those who harbor them.”262 Assessing terrorism as a worldwide threat led Bush to formulate a strategy for fighting a global “War on Terror.”263

Five assumptions guided the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” and military action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the world. First, American military dominance provided an unprecedented ability to fight overseas. Second, previous administrations failed to respond more expansively to terror provocations which emboldened extremist groups like Al Qaeda. Vice President Dick Cheney argued that

weakness, vacillation, and the unwillingness of the United States to stand with our friends – that is provocative. It encouraged people like Osama bin Laden…to launch repeated strikes against the United States, our people overseas and here at home, with the view that he could, in fact, do so with impunity.264

Third, the United States had to act pre-emptively because the Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence would not work against terror groups that did not have to defend territory.265 Fourth, since terrorists required state support, the War on Terror was indistinguishable from efforts to combat rogue regimes like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea who supported terror groups. Finally, alliances and multilateral organizations were not essential to American efforts to fight terrorism.266

262 George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,” White House, Washington, DC, 11 September 2011, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/ 2001/09/20010911-16.html. 263 Ibid. 264 Vice President Dick Cheney, interviewed by Tim Russert, Meet the Press, NBC News, 16 March 2003, accessed 28 December 2018, at http://www.leadingtowar.com/PDFsources_claims_noweapons2/2003_ 03_16_NBCmtp.pdf. 265 George W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, 31 January 2003” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush, Book 1, (2003), 114-117, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2003- book1/pdf/PPP-2003-book1-doc-pg114.pdf; George W. Bush, “Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy,” West Point, 1 June 2002, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html; See also George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (White House, Washington, DC, September 2002) accessed 28 December 2018, at https://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/63562.pdf. 266 Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership,” 767. 99

Afghanistan became the first battle in the War on Terror because its Taliban government harbored Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and would not turn them over to the United States following the 9/11 attacks. One day after the attacks, the United Nations

Security Council expressed its readiness “to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.”267 On the same day, and for the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5, obligating its members to come to the defense of another member.

Within a week of the attacks, Congress authorized President Bush “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September

11, 2011, or harbored such organizations or persons.”268 By October 2001, the United

States, joined by almost twenty other countries, attacked Afghanistan and succeeded in routing the Taliban by December.

Most allies who joined the United States to fight the Taliban assumed the Bush administration had an Afghanistan-only policy. In fact, President Bush was pursuing an

Afghanistan-first policy.269 Although Bush ultimately decided against invading Iraq as the first offensive in the War on Terror, he and his advisors began debating whether to invade immediately after the 9/11 attacks.270 Iraq and its dictator, Saddam Hussein, embodied the potential for the convergence of terrorists operating within rogue states in

267 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” New York, 12 September 2001, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://documents- dds-ny.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement. 268 Public Law 107-40, “Authorization for the Use of Military Force,” 18 September 2001, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. 269 Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership,” 769. 270 Woodward, Bush at War, chapter 6. 100 possession of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush’s decision was not whether but when to invade Iraq. Though Congress ultimately authorized President Bush to launch a war against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council did not. Despite that set- back, President Bush launched an attack against Iraq in March 2003 over objections by many of the United States’ allies and much of the rest of the world.

The United States defeated Iraq in less than four weeks, but by the summer of 2003 the American military found itself embroiled in an insurgency. President Bush attributed this to the “consequences of catastrophic success,”271 but the reality was misguided post- war planning that assumed the United States would hand over control to the Iraqis within a few months. This did not happen. More than half-way through President Bush’s second term, the United States was still mired in Iraq with well over 120,000 servicemembers deployed there annually, and an additional 30,000 deployed each year to Afghanistan. In

2007, after costing over half a trillion dollars and tens of thousands of casualties,

President Bush deployed an additional 20,000 troops during “the Surge” to Iraq to try and stop internecine ethnic violence and quell the insurgency.

Because of the Surge’s seeming success,272 and “recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces,”273 President Bush and Iraqi Prime

271 Quoted in John F. Dickerson and Nancy Gibbs, “George Bush: I’ve Gained Strength,” Time 164, no. 10 (6 September 2004), accessed 3 January 2019, at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,995013,00.html. 272 For a balanced assessment of how the Surge altered Iraqi military and political positions see Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012), 7-40. Perceived success provided an opportunity to negotiate the United States’ withdraw from Iraq. See “President Bush and Iraq Prime Minister Maliki Sign the Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement,” Iraqi Prime Minister’s Palace, Baghdad, Iraq, 14 December 2008, accessed 5 January 2019, at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081214-2.html. 273 “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” 20, accessed 5 January 2019, at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf. 101

Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed a comprehensive Status of Forces Agreement in

December 2008. The agreement established a framework for curtailing American military presence in Iraq and making the Iraqi government responsible for its security.274 The agreement stipulated that all American combat forces be removed from Iraqi cities no later than 30 June 2009, and that “[a]ll the United States Forces shall withdraw from all

Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”275 Moreover, the United States recognized Iraq’s right to request the withdrawal of American forces at any time.276

Administration officials believed that the agreement would ultimately be renegotiated to allow a sizable residual force to remain in Iraq after 2011.277

Meanwhile, the Taliban regained the initiative in Afghanistan because of the Bush administration’s diplomatic and military fixation on Iraq. Iran and North Korea also advanced their nuclear programs, America ineffectively opposed China as it expanded its influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and Russia brazenly demonstrated revanchist behavior in its near-abroad. Though the United States demonstrated it could topple regimes with unprecedented speed,278 it became mired in Iraq and struggled to defeat the insurgency or build a functioning democratic government. Worse, the United

States was strategically misaligned and unable to address emerging challenges in Asia because of its military overcommitment and declining capacity for action.

274 “President Bush and Iraq Prime Minister Maliki Sign the Strategic Framework Agreement.” 275 “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq,” 20. 276 Ibid. 277 For example, see Elisabeth Bumiller, “Redefining the Role of the US Military in Iraq,” New York Times, 21 December 2008, accessed 05 January 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/ 22combat.html. 278 Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82, no 4. (2003), 41-58, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-07-01/new-american-way- war. 102

Military Overcommitment. By December 2008, the United States military, particularly the Army, was overcommitted in the Middle East. All military services deployed forces in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the Army bore the brunt of these sizable land operations. As a result, the Army most clearly reflected the costs of strategic overreach. According to Defense Manpower Data Center data, between March 2003 and December 2008, the Army deployed an average of

117,000 active duty Soldiers each year to Iraq and Afghanistan. This average increased to

128,000 between September 2005 and December 2008, by which point approximately

67% of active duty Soldiers had deployed, with many on their second or third deployments. By December 2008, approximately 373,000 active Army soldiers had served in Iraq or Afghanistan: 121,000 had deployed for their first year, 173,000 for their second, and 79,000 for their third year. Over 9,000 of the latter group had deployed for their fourth year.279

The high demand for forces led the Army to change its force generation model to ensure it could maintain an adequate forward deployed force, provide rotational forces, and ensure deploying units were properly trained and equipped. The new model established a structured, event-based progression of increased unit readiness over time.

The intent was for active units to be available for deployment once every three years, reserve units every five years, and National Guard units every six years. In practice, however, it meant that the only trained and available units were those deployed or just about to be deployed. Those just returning from a deployment or recently returned were

279 Timothy M. Bonds, Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. McDonald, Army Deployments to OIF and OEF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), x, accessed 4 January 2019, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB587. html. 103 untrained, undermanned and resourced, and unavailable. For every deployed unit there were two others unavailable – one recently redeployed and one preparing for deployment.

In aggregate, the number of deployed and unavailable soldiers totaled approximately 70% of the active Army. The remaining 30 % of forces were either new soldiers or military academy cadets in training, forward-deployed soldiers at other locations, supporting operations from the United States, or injured. Less than 6% of soldiers – approximately

31,000 – in the active Army did not fall into one of these categories.280

Operational demands forced the Army to exceed desired dwell times for soldiers – the time soldiers spent at home station between deployments – to maintain required troop levels. Rather than maintaining a dwell time ratio of one year deployed and two years at home, the Army adhered to a roughly one to one ratio to generate enough replacement forces for deployed units. In addition to more frequently occurring deployments, the

Army had to increase its end strength, remove deterrent units stationed in South Korea and Europe for use in the deployment cycle, and decrease the size of its generating forces to make more soldiers available for deployment. Even with these stopgap measures, the active Army experienced an approximately 94% annual utilization rate, deployment ratios stayed the same, and it retained almost no capacity to deploy more soldiers in support of ongoing operations or in response to unexpected contingencies.281

Declining Domestic Capacity. Three main factors contributed to declining domestic capacity: a war-weary American public, fiscal austerity resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, and dysfunctional political partisanship. First, by early 2009, only 35% of

280 Ibid., xi-xii. 281 Ibid., xi. 104

Americans believed that the Iraq war was the main problem facing the United States,

57% thought that sending troops to Iraq was a mistake, and 65% believed that the costs of the war outweighed it benefits.282 Over 49% of Americans felt that the United States should “mind its own business internationally.”283 A majority of the public also felt that the United States should only assist five out of fifty of its formal defense treaty allies –

Canada, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and the United Kingdom – if required, thereby signaling serious doubt about America’s global leadership role and commitment to the exiting American-led world order.284 The effects of the 2008 financial crises heightened these concerns.

Widespread failures in financial regulation, corporate governance lapses, risky lending and borrowing, and ethics violations caused the financial crisis beginning at the end of 2007 and lasting through 2008.285 Massive bailouts of financial institutions prevented economic collapse, but the United States entered “the Great Recession” and there was a global economic downturn. Housing markets suffered in many parts of the country, resulting in high levels of evictions, foreclosures, and prolonged unemployment.

The economic crisis also contributed to widespread business failures and trillions of dollars of lost consumer wealth.286

282 Frank Newport, Jeffrey M. Jones and Joseph Carroll, “Gallup Poll Review: Key Points About Public Opinion on Iraq,” The Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing (August 2007), 42, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://link.galegroup.com/ apps/doc/A171609026/AONE?u=upenn_main&sid=AONE&xid=69cb5b3a; Alec M. Gallup, Frank Newport, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2007 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 315. 283 Pew Research Center, America’s Place in the World 2009: An Investigation of Public and Leadership Opinion About International Affairs, Washington, DC, 2009, 3, accessed 4 January 2019, at http://www.pewresearch.org/ wp-content/uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/569.pdf. 284 “Most Americans Name Just Five Countries That the US Should Defend Militarily,” Rasmussen Report, 8 September 2010. 285 Phil Angelides et al., “Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” Washington DC, accessed 5 January 2019, at https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report/conclusions. 286 Martin Neil Baily and Douglas J. Elliott, “The US Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does it Stand and Where Do We Go from Here?” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, June 2009, accessed 5 105

“The Great Recession” led to domestic economic concerns that presented President

Obama with his most pressing challenges when he entered office. The recession also highlighted the spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt that accrued between 2001 and 2009. A large portion of the debt increase resulted from the Bush administration’s decision to finance the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by borrowing instead of raising taxes. It became increasingly clear that the United States would have to reign-in federal spending or risk being unable to repay its debts or control inflation.287 In

2009, the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States would run unsustainable $1 trillion budget deficits annually, and observed that even if recovery from the recession occurred as expected, the United States would still have the highest debt-to-gross national product ratio since 1945.288

Spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt between 2001 and 2009 sparked concerns about the material foundations of American power. The weakening of the

United States’ economic and financial underpinnings suggested that it would have to either raise taxes and interest rates, consume less and save, or reduce its military expenditures.289 Significantly reducing military spending would likely force the United

States to scale back its overseas commitments with two important consequences. First, reducing defense spending would make it easier for rising great powers like China to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, declining military capacity

January 2019, at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0615_economic_crisis_ baily_elliott.pdf. 287 Associated Press, “Budget Office Warns About Debt,” New York Times, 22 June 2011, accessed 5 January 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/us/politics/23budget.html. 288 Congressional Budget Office, “A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update of the CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook,” Washington, DC, March 2009, ix, accessed 5 January 2019, at http://www.cbo. gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10014/03-20-presidentbudget.pdf. 289 Jonathan Kirshner, “Dollar Primacy and American Power: What’s at Stake?” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (2008), 431. 106 would make it more difficult for the United States to respond to crises and stabilize important regions or secure the global commons.290 Left unchecked, both consequences would hasten America’s relative decline. Regardless, the Obama administration proposed an annual defense spending cut of $400 million over eleven years, totaling approximately

$40 billion over that period – a 10% cut in annual defense spending.

By the time of President Obama’s inauguration, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had cost over $1.5 trillion with a human toll of over 6,000 dead and more than 40,000 wounded.291 These costs sapped the political will to sustain the conflicts and distorted policy making by increasingly polarizing politicians forced to simultaneously contend with terrorism, economic decline, and the steady rise of near-peer geopolitical rivals.

Whereas the decision to attack Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks received bipartisan support, the war in Iraq produced some of the highest levels of polarization recorded in the history of popular polling. A year after the United States invaded Iraq, the gap in support for the war between Republicans and Democrats reached 63%. By comparison, the gap in support for previous wars in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Vietnam, and Korea averaged 5%.292 This ongoing public polarization coincided with equally divided political elites. Regardless of party affiliation, members of Congress actively sought to frustrate or complicate opposition party initiatives, whether domestically or internationally.

The partisan lens through which political elites and the public viewed the Iraq War also influenced the lessons learned and conclusions about the efficacy of the war on

290 Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012), 210. 291 Richard N. Haass, “The Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, 92, no. 57 (2013), 59, accessed 25 December 2018, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2013-04-03/irony-american-strategy. 292 Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People (New York: Longman, 2007). 107

American security.293 One study of Republicans and Democrats showed divergent opinions about the effects of the war on the United States’ long-term security. The study found that 66% of Republicans thought the war was the right decision, while only 31% of

Democrats and 38% of independents agreed. Similarly, 69% of Republicans believed the war improved American security, while only 35% of Democrats and 40% of independents agreed.294 These views also established the parameters for adjusting national security policies. Political polarization undermined the United States’ foreign policy where the lack of unity encouraged adversaries, disheartened allies, and sapped

American resolve for taking needed action.295 Moreover, the inability of the president to get bipartisan support for foreign policy increased the political risk of subsequent military action.296

Considering Withdrawal. President Obama believed that the war in Iraq rested on flawed assumptions.297 He outlined his foreign policy views as a Senator in the 2007 article “Renewing American Leadership” in which he argued “for a new vision of

[American] leadership in the twenty-first century” that would not be “bound by outdated

293 Schultz, “Perils of Polarization,” 16. 294 These opposing views remained stable throughout the war regardless of actual events on the ground. See Jacobson, A Divider, Not a Uniter, figure 8.10; Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull, “The American Public on the 9/11 Decade: A Study of American Public Opinion,” Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, 8 September 2011, 8, accessed 7 January 2019, at https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/06/0908_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf. 295 James Q. Wilson, “How Divided Are We?” Commentary, February 2006, accessed 7 January 2019, at https:// www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/how-divided-are-we/; and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Perils of Polarization for US Foreign Policy,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2017), 7-28. 296 Ex ante support for military action from Congress is associated with a lower likelihood of subsequent criticism and votes to cut-off funding. See Douglas L. Kriner, “Obama’s Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congress’s Continued Relevance in Military Affairs,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2014), 309-327; and Philip Arena, “Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 2 (2008), 136-151. 297 Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” 4. 108 thinking.”298 Obama argued that contemporary security challenges, especially those in the

Middle East, could only be addressed by applying the full range of American power rather than narrowly focusing on military power alone.299 Key to his approach was rebalancing American engagement abroad from an overreliance on military power during the Bush administration to the use of non-military, soft-power.

During his presidential campaign, Obama promised to remove all United States combat units from Iraq within sixteen months of his inauguration. While noting that “we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in,” he argued that the

United States could remove all combat forces by the summer of 2010. However, he explained “we'll keep a residual force to perform specific missions in Iraq: targeting any remnants of al-Qaida; protecting our service members and diplomats; and training and supporting Iraq's Security Forces, so long as the Iraqis make political progress.”300 This suggested that the United States retained critical security interests in the region. In two early speeches as president, at Cairo in June 2009 and at the September 2009 address to the United Nations General Assembly, Obama also appeared to question the capacity and virtue of American efforts to spread democracy, advance human rights, and open free markets around the world.301

President Obama’s approach ultimately responded to his perspectives on the limits of

American power and an inclination to leverage the influence provided by the previous

298 Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007), 2, accessed 27 December 2018, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-07-01/renewing-american-leadership. 299 Ibid., 6. 300 Quoted in Barack Obama, “Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan,” New York Times, 15 July 2008, accessed 14 January 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html. 301 Robert G. Kaufman, Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2016), 10-11. 109 period of American primacy.302 During his first term in office, this meant that his biggest security challenges involved the extrication of the United States from the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan and changing the way America prosecuted the War on Terror.303 Benjamin

Rhodes, one of Obama’s deputy national-security advisers, said, “The project of the first two years has been to effectively deal with the legacy issues that we inherited, particularly the Iraq war, the Afghan war, and the war against Al Qaeda, while rebalancing our resources and our posture in the world.”304 “If you were to boil it all down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘Wind down these two wars, reestablish American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities’….”305

The Obama administration was not only skeptical about the limits of American power, especially military power, it focused on the constraints imposed by the rise of other states like China and India. The 2008 global financial crisis also hinted at the limits of the United States’ economic power, but the rise of regional competitors was the primary driver of American relative decline. President Obama and his aides believed that they were struggling to hold on to America’s dominant position for another few decades.306 Benjamin Rhodes explained “[w]e’re not trying to preside over America’s decline. What we’re trying to do is get America another 50 years as leader.”307

302 Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011), 803-824. 303 Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, “Did Obama Have a Grand Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no.1 (2017), 296. 304 Quoted in Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” The New Yorker, 2 May 2011, 47, accessed 21 December 2018, at https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist. 305 Ibid. 306 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 72. 307 Ibid. 110

The rise of regional powers meant that the United States’ desire to maintain primacy faced opposition in areas like the Middle East and Asia where rising powers competed for resources and influence. However, the Obama administration fundamentally sought to preserve primacy. During her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State nominee Hillary

Clinton noted that “our overriding duty is to protect and advance America’s security, interests, and values…to strengthen America’s position of global leadership so we remain a positive force in the world.”308 Similarly, during his first inaugural address, President

Obama declared, “we are ready to lead once more.”309 Despite the administration’s intent and efforts to preserve primacy and America’s leadership role, it experienced an abiding tension between this desire and balancing domestic economic and political constraints with international challenges to American leadership.

Framework for Retrenchment, 2009-2011

The Obama administration’s foreign policy rested on the notion that the United

States’ involvement in Iraq undermined its world standing and threatened America’s fundamental economic and security interests. His initial goal was to end American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan while encouraging Middle Eastern partners to assume more responsibility for providing for their security and regional stability. Success in both these areas would facilitate the United States’ disengagement from the region to focus on strengthening America’s domestic circumstances and strategically reorienting to address emerging economic and security challenges in Asia. The Obama administration

308 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination to be Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 13 January 2009, accessed 4 January 2019, at https://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rm/ 113814.htm. 309 Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, 21 January 2009, accessed 3 January 2019 at https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address. 111 envisioned leaving a small military force in the Persian Gulf region to counter the spread of Iranian influence, while focusing efforts to expand American economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent China from altering the status quo.310

President Obama opted for a mixture of policies and actions designed to calibrate

American commitments with its constrained capacity to maintain and maximize its ability to provide global leadership.311

President Obama’s worldview of the international system rested on four pillars. He believed he inherited a world that was hyper-connected, uncontrollable, and required multi-partner action. Both the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies reflected these views and redefined the United States’ relationship to the international system. Hyper- connectedness described the world in which American would act considering the condition of uncontrollability, and the belief in partnerships reflected how the United

States would exercise it leadership.312

These four pillars provided the basis for President Obama’s attempts to restore equilibrium to American foreign policy which he perceived had become misaligned during the Bush administration. President Obama saw Bush’s reaction to the 9/11 terror attack – an overreaction in Obama’s estimate – as the biggest danger to American interests. Because the Bush administration overcommitted to the War on Terror in general, and specifically the Iraq War, President Obama believed he needed to rebalance foreign policy to regain American prestige and freedom of action. To succeed, Obama

310 Chris J. Dolan, “Obama’s Retrenchment-Protraction Doctrine: The Decline of the Middle East and the Rise of Asia and the Pacific,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 1 (2017), 54. 311 Robert Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 40. 312 Toshihiro Nakayama, “Strategic Patience in a Turbulent World: The Obama Doctrine and its Approach to the World,” Asia-Pacific Review 22, no. 1 (2015), 2. 112 needed to achieve equilibrium in six interrelated areas: resetting the global War on

Terror, balancing America’s hard and soft power, pursing multilateralism in a “new era of engagement,”313 finding a balance between foreign and domestic policy needs, finding a new foreign policy consensus, and geostrategic equilibrium.314

Lowering Costs. President Obama entered office when the United States was experiencing its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. His primary task was to avoid economic collapse, and his priorities during his first year in office reflected an emphasis on domestic and economic issues. Obama’s first National Security Strategy mirrored this emphasis on domestic economic solvency and asserted “[t]he foundation of

American leadership must be a prosperous American economy.”315 President Obama’s domestic focus comported with widely held opinions in which the public, Democrats and

Republicans alike, believed America should pay less attention to foreign policy issues and focus on domestic problems.316 Accordingly, Obama made clear his determination to reduce national security spending.

In February 2009, President Obama delivered a speech in which he revised the original date of withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq from 30 June 2009 to 31 August

2010. Despite this extension, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment of complete withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011, in accordance with the

Bush administration’s agreement with the Iraq government. In the meantime, the United

313 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY, 23 September 2009, accessed 21 December 2018 at https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-nations-general-assembly. 314 Nakayama, “Strategic Patience in a Turbulent World,” 6-9. 315 Obama, National Security Strategy, 2010, 28. 316 Stephen Sestanovich, Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 302. 113

States would “retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces as long as they remain nonsectarian; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35,000 to 50,000

[American] troops.”317

As he did with Iraq, President Obama began pushing for a withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan within sixteen months of entering office.318 After initially approving an increase of 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, the debate over withdrawal lasted several months and appeared indecisive.319 However, by October 2009, Obama seemed to make up his mind. At a National Security Council meeting discussing sending more troops to Afghanistan he stated, “[w]e’ve recognized that we’re not going to completely defeat the Taliban which we all agree on,” and after hearing recommendations declared

“[t]his is not what I’m looking for…I’m not doing ten years. I’m not spending a trillion dollars. That’s not in the national interest.”320 Moreover, some on his national security team believed that the Taliban could be accommodated like Hezbollah, so President

Obama decided to pursue a policy of withdrawal rather than trying to defeat the enemy.321 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted “[for President Obama], it’s all about getting out.”322 In November, President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional soldiers to Afghanistan, far below the 60-80,000 his advisors recommended, but stressed that

317 Barack Obama, “Remarks on Military Operations in Iraq,” Camp Lejeune, NC, 27 February 2009, accessed 13 January 2019, at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-military-operations- iraq-camp-lejeune-north-carolina. 318 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 76-80. 319 Walter Russell Mead, “The Carter Syndrome,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2010), 58. 320 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 228-251. 321 Ibid., 251. 322 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 557. 114

“there needs to be a plan about how we’re going to hand off and get out of

Afghanistan.”323

President Obama’s decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan was a comprise because he was reluctant to continue devoting resources to the conflict.324 Military leaders requested what they thought were enough additional troops to win the campaign.

President Obama, however, did not want to deepen American commitment and settled on a plan he believed to be politically viable. Critics on both ends of the political spectrum panned President Obama’s decision.325 Regardless, when he announced the deployment of additional troops he simultaneously announced that they would start being withdrawn within eighteen months. Moreover, he reduced the United States’ objectives in

Afghanistan which he now “narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating

Al Qaeda and its extremist allies,” because he “[refused] to set goals that go beyond

[America’s] responsibility…means…and interests.” President Obama argued that the

United States could no longer ignore financial costs and declared that “our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended – because the nation that I’m most interested in building is our own.”326 In other words, President Obama limited further involvement in Afghanistan to conserve resources and focus on domestic priorities.

323 Ibid., 301. 324 Woodward, Obama’s Wars, chapters 13-28. 325 For instance, Tom Hayden, “Obama Announced Afghanistan Escalation,” The Nation, 2 December 2009, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.thenation.com/article/obama-announces-afghanistan- escalation/; Michael Gerson, “The Reluctant Commander in Chief,” Washington Post, 24 September 2010, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/23/ AR2010092304743.html. 326 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” White House, 1 December 2009, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/ the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 115

President Obama remained “absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region solely through military means.”327 While announcing on 1 December 2009 that he would send additional troops to Afghanistan, President Obama set July 2011 as the date to begin withdrawing all troops from that country.328 On 22 June 2011, President Obama announced that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and an additional

23,000 would leave by the summer of 2012.329 The announced drawdown would leave approximately 68,000 by the end of 2012. President Obama and Afghan president Hamid

Karzai signed a strategic partnership on 2 May 2012. The agreement stipulated that

Afghan Security forces would take the lead in combat operations by the end of 2013, and almost all US troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of 2014.330 Finally, on

27 May 2014, President Obama announced that American combat operations in

Afghanistan would end in December 2014 and that troops levels would be reduced to

9,800 troops by this time. He noted it was “time to turn the page on a decade in which so much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”331

327 Helene Cooper, “Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops,” New York Times, 17 February 2009, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/washington/18web- troops.html. 328 President's Address to United States Military Academy Cadets, West Point, NY, 1 December 2009, accessed 28 February 2009, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward- presidents-address 329 Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 22 June 2011, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/ 23prexy.html. 330 “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of American and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” Kabul, Afghanistan, 2 May 2012, accessed 28 February 2019, accessed at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196855.pdf; “Text of Obama’s Speech in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 1 May 2012, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/ world/asia/text-obamas-speech-in-afghanistan.html?ref=asia. 331 Mark Landler, “US Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016,” New York Times, 27 May 2014, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan- pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html?hp. 116

Besides the planned troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration sought to lower the cost of the War on Terror by relying on drones and special operation forces.332 It also attempted to reduce foreign commitments and share burdens with allies. These dynamics indicated the Obama administration was concerned with redefining “the circumstances under which the United States [would] use diplomacy, coercion and force to shape the world around it” at as little cost as possible.333 As

President Obama explained

the world is a tough complicated, messy, mean place, and full of hardship and tragedy. And in order to advance both our security interests and those ideals and values that we care about, we’ve got to be hardheaded at the same time as we’re bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and recognize that there are going to be times where the best that we can do is to shine a spotlight on something that’s terrible, but not believe that we can automatically solve it. There are going to be times where our security interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. There are going to be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed, but there are going to be times where we can’t.334

President Obama’s response to the Libyan crisis exemplified this approach whereby he sought to avoid additional military commitments in the Middle East unless necessary to protect American security interests.335 The Obama administration believed that other

332 See for example Woodward, Obama’s Wars; Trevor McCrisken and Mark Phythian, “The Offensive Turn: US Intelligence in the War on Terror, in Obama and the World, 188-193. 333 Ibid., xvi. 334 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The US President Talks Though His Hardest Decisions About America’s Role in the World,” The Atlantic Monthly 317, no. 3 (2016), 76, accessed 27 December 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 335 Anne Marie Slaughter, the Director of Policy Planning at the United States State Department, explained in an interview that “Obama acknowledged, rightly, that the [United States] has more direct vital interests – the preservation of [American] territory, the safety of our people, the security of our allies, and ‘our core interests.’ Protecting civilians in Libya does not fall within that category….” Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, confirmed this perspective by remarking that while “we have an interest [in Libya], it was not a vital interest of the United States.” See Anne Marie Slaughter, “Interests vs. Values? Misunderstanding Obama’s Libya Strategy,” New York Review of Books, 30 March 2011, accessed 28 December 2018 at https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2011/ 03/30/interests-values-obamas-libya-strategy/ and Jon Hilsenrath, “Gates Says Libya Not Vital National Interest,” Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2011, accessed 28 December 2018 at https://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052748704308904576226704261420430. 117 regional powers like France and Britain, both American allies, had more direct interests in resolving the crisis. Accordingly, President Obama persuaded these powers to act while he implemented a “lead from behind” strategy by which the United States applied its unique military capabilities to assist NATO allies who conducted the main operations against Libya.336 Obama’s approach to the Libyan crisis and the War on Terror amounted to a policy of “surrogate warfare” whereby he externalized the costs of conflict by using human and technological surrogates when the administration determined vital national interest were not at stake.337

Managing Withdrawal. President Obama was determined to limit the use of the military in defense of vital interests within the context of globalization and forced austerity resulting from two costly wars and the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, any use of a leaner and more flexible military force would only be considered if it were multilateral and in cooperation with allies.338 With the president’s attention focused on domestic affairs, it appeared that his approach to foreign affairs, particularly security policy, was non-interventionist. President Obama recognized the limits to the United

States’ resources and capacity,339 so his primary strategic approach relied upon the principles of “multilateral retrenchment” designed to “curtail the United States’ overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners.”340

336 Ben Barry, “Libya’s Lessons,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011), 11. 337 Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016), 104. 338 Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment?” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013), 301. 339 Fareed Zakaria, “The Strategist,” Time, 30 January 2012, accessed 25 December 2018 at http://content. time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,2104842,00.html. 340 Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011), 58, accessed 25 December 2018 at https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy 118

The 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies echoed these themes. They stated

“[t]he threshold for military action is higher when [United States] interests are not directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the burden and achieve lasting outcomes.”341 Ultimately, President Obama did not necessarily change the objectives of American foreign policy so much as the means he would use to achieve them.342 The intent for altering the means used to achieve security objectives was to reduce military commitments in the Middle East and Europe to facilitate sizable military force reductions and divert savings towards domestic programs.

President Obama demonstrated on several geopolitical issues that he preferred a policy of retrenchment and restraint over continuing engagement in unproductive and interminable conflicts. First, the Obama administration sought to minimize conflict with major powers like China despite ample opportunities for confrontation. Second, the administration’s dealings with middle powers like Iran demonstrated restraint despite

Iranian provocation. Finally, in regional flashpoints like North Africa and the Middle

East, President Obama’s actions showed the limits of American ambition and desire for constrained military engagement.343

Some viewed the Obama administration’s implementation of these policies as an abandonment of the United States’ “pivotal role as the world’s default power,” particularly in a volatile and conflict-prone region like the Middle East.344 However,

Derek Chollet, a special adviser to President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Defense

341 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 2015, 8. 342 Mark E. Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 4, accessed 21 December 2018, at https:// www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=705063. 343 Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011), 815. 344 Ibid., 198. 119 for International Security Affairs explained that the Obama administration was playing the “long game.” He claimed that “the defining element of Obama’s grand strategy is that it reflects the totality of American interests – foreign and domestic – to protect global leadership in an era of seemingly infinite demands and finite resources.”345 Essentially,

President Obama’s approach was comprised of “a set of reactions, adapting itself to reality rather than reshaping it.”346

Strategically, President Obama’s approach emphasized using collective action through coalition warfare and international partner capacity-building.347 Operationally, it prioritized covert operations and using technological platforms like drones to achieve security objectives.348 Changing the means used to achieve the United States’ foreign policy objectives resulted in three key actions taken by the Obama administration. First,

President Obama sought near-term withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and he resisted any new ground operations in the Middle East. Second, the administration sought rapprochement and Iran. Third, the administration wanted to shift the United States’ strategic focus to Asia – the “pivot to Asia” – which further justified retrenchment from the Middle East.

During his first term, President Obama conducted relations with Middle Eastern countries within the larger context of the “pivot to Asia” and desire to reduce military costs. He did not intend to reduce the importance of the Middle East, but he viewed Asia

345 Derek Chollet, The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), 132. 346 Timothy Lynch, “Obama, Liberalism and US Foreign Policy,” in Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy, 2 ed., Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge (eds.) (London: Routledge, 2014), 41. 347 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 2015, 9. 348 Michael J. Boyle, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” International Affairs, 89, no. 1 (2013), 3. 120 as the most strategically important area across all the dimensions of the United States’ national interest.349 Instead of redefining the United States’ primary objectives in the

Middle East, President Obama’s policy of retrenchment focused on achieving them at lower cost.350 For President Obama, diplomacy would become the first line of defense against becoming embroiled in the types of all-consuming commitments made by the

Bush administration. As he explained in an interview:

A president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with that strains that it’s placed on our military – any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.351

President Obama declared a formal end to United States combat operations in Iraq in

August 2010. The United States military continued to provide a stabilizing presence after this time;352 however, keeping forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011 required renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement between American and Iraq. President

Obama attempted to renegotiate an agreement and offered to leave behind 10,000 troops, about one division’s worth, for training and counterterrorism. The future number, mission, and legal status of American troops in Iraq emerged as sticking points. Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, appeared unable or unwilling to provide assurances of legal immunity for American troops and the talks finally broke down. President Obama arguably could have come to an agreement. However, political concerns about the effect

349 Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War,” 105. 350 Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific?” 4. 351 Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” 76. 352 Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 75-80. 121 of extending the United States’ mission in Iraq before his upcoming 2012 reelection bid led President Obama to abandon the attempt.353 Despite military concerns about a complete withdrawal, all remaining American forces in Iraq quickly departed to make the

31 December 2011 withdrawal deadline. The last American troops departed Iraq on 18

December 2011.354

Withdrawal from Iraq presented several risks that had the potential to disrupt

American retrenchment from the region. The risks included: logistics, terror groups, the main Iraqi groups, and neighboring countries. Logistically, withdrawing American troops would be relatively straightforward unless insurgent or terror groups disrupted the process. Terror groups had the potential to complicate withdrawal by attempting to embarrass the United States by making its withdrawal appear to be a rout. More significantly, these groups had the potential to stoke ethnic tensions that could lead Iraq back into a civil war. This possibility suggested the largest risk to withdrawal would be that associated with the ethnic disputes between the Sunnis and Shia, and between the

Arabs and Kurds. Regarding the former dispute, the main danger resulted from the possibility that the Shia-led Iraqi government would refuse to fully integrate the Sunnis into a truly unified government structure, especially if the government failed to integrate

Sunni militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. The Arab-Kurdish disputes over territories in the oil-rich north of Iraq had the greatest potential risk for erupting into a civil war that

353 Mann, The Obamians, 331-332; Gates, Duty, 555. 354 Tim Arango and Michael S. Schmidt, “Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq,” New York Times, 18 December 2011, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/ middleeast/last-convoy-of-american-troops-leaves-iraq.html. 122 would force the United States to choose between backing the government it helped form or America’s Kurdish allies.355

The risk of Sunni-Shia and Arab-Kurdish disputes heightened the role of regional actors and the roles they might play by interfering in Iraq. Iraq’s neighbors – especially

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey – had a vested interest in interfering because of the domestic consequences of Iraq becoming a failed state. Moreover, most of these states believed the United States’ invasion of Iraq was a bad decision that had negative consequences for their countries.356 These neighbors stoked potential conflicts by backing the ethnic factions most likely to advance their power and interest. Saudi Arabia and

Syria backed Iraqi Sunnis and manipulated Iraqi politics to ensure Sunni groups were integrated into Iraqi government to prevent the spread of Iranian influence in the region.357 These countries typically acted surreptitiously, unlike Turkey, who possessed the main conventional military threat to Iraq and who had a history if attacking Iraqi

Kurds in response to Kurdish terrorism. Finally, Iran had the most potential for destabilizing Iraq and a motive for embarrassing the United States. Destabilizing Iraq, whose government was predominantly Shia, might not be in Iran’s interests, but the possibility provided it leverage over the United States as a tool for managing American-

Iranian relations.358

355 James F. Dobbins, “US Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?” Middle East Policy 16, no. 3 (2009), 1-2, accessed 28 February 2019, at http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2083/ps/i.do?p= AONE&u=upenn_main&id=GALE%7CA210368250&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon. 356 Ellen Laipson, “US Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?” Middle East Policy 16, no. 3 (2009), 5, accessed 28 February 2019, at http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2083/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u= upenn_main&id=GALE%7CA210368250&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon. 357 Ibid. 358 Dobbins, “US Withdrawal from Iraq,” 3. 123

In all, the greatest potential risk affecting the prospects of American retrenchment from the Middle East was the longstanding conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

These two regional powers, the former the dominant Sunni state and the latter the dominant Shia state, often engaged in zero-sum conflict between their ethnic blocks.

While these two powers had for many years maintained a modus vivendi in the region, their mutual interest in the Iraqi state might bring them into conflict. As a result, the

United States’ withdrawal from Iraq left that country open to becoming the frontlines in

Sunni-Shia competition fought by Saudi and Iranian proxies.359 Complicating matters was the fact that Saudi Arabia was a traditional regional ally, while Iran remained a seemingly implacable foe with an active nuclear development program. Any attempt by

President Obama to diffuse the risks associated with American retrenchment would require building up the Saudi’s capacity – both is ability and willingness – to assume a larger regional security burden, as well as rapprochement with Iran.

The United States long relied on Saudi Arabia to play a vital role in maintaining

Middle Eastern security because of the country’s economic, political, and cultural importance, as well as its strategic location. Since the beginning on the War on Terror, the United States relied on Saudi Arabia to counter Islamist extremism and support counterterrorism efforts to promote regional stability. The Saudis had long been the

United States’ largest foreign military customer, receiving equipment, training, and support.360 However, after President Obama announced his intention to withdraw

359 Helena Cobban, “US Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?” Middle East Policy 16, no. 3 (2009), 8, accessed 28 February 2019, at http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2083/ps/i.do?p= AONE&u=upenn_main&id=GALE%7CA210368250&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon. 360 “US Security Cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, 30 January 2019, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/ fs/2019/288671.htm. 124

American troops from Iraq and pivot to Asia, American foreign military sales increased from $244 million in 2009 to $358 million in 2010. Sales generally increased in subsequent years, with large increases occurring after 2013 when the Syrian civil war began, and again in 2014 when ISIS began to emerge as a regional threat. In all,

American foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia increased from $244 million in 2009 to almost $3.5 billion by 2017, an over 1300% increase.361 These sales clearly illustrated an attempt to improve Saudi Arabia’s capacity to maintain regional security and its importance to the United States’ policy of regional retrenchment. However, defusing

Iranian hostility towards American interests that might destabilize regional security meant President Obama would have to attempt rapprochement.

The Obama administration’s relationship with Iran, once designated as a member of the “axis of evil,”362 demonstrated a clear preference for diplomacy over saber rattling.

President Obama explicitly campaigned with the intent to de-escalate ongoing tensions with Iran to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons.363 He argued that Iran was “acting irresponsibly” by pursuing nuclear weapons and supporting Shiite militant groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. However, Obama blamed the Bush administration and its regional policies for Iran’s behavior.364 Iran seemed to sense an opportunity and its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called two days after President Obama’s election to

361 Niall McCarthy, “The US Has Ratcheted Up Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” Statistica, 16 October 2018, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.statista.com/chart/15797/the-value-of-us-arms-exports-to- saudi-arabia/. 362 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” 29 January 2002, accessed 3 January 2019, at https:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 363 Michael R. Gordon and Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Would Engage Iran if Elected, He Says,” New York Times, 1 November 2007, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/world/americas/ 01iht-obama.5.8154185.html. 364 Michael R. Gordon and Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Envisions New Iran Approach,” New York Times, 2 November 2007, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/us/politics/ 02obama.html. 125 congratulate him, the first such call made to an American president since 1979. During

President Obama’s first inauguration speech he seemed to be replying to this overture when he declared

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.365

When mass protests erupted in Iran following its disputed 2009 presidential election,

President Obama resisted pressure to advocate for regime change. Instead, he adopted a wait-and-see approach and refused to meddle by refraining from offering any direct

American support to protesters.366 Even after more than two years of failed negotiations, regional Iranian aggression, and the apparent unwillingness of Iran to engage in rapprochement with the United States, the Obama administration continued to refrain from threatening or using military action against Iran. President Obama even declined to explicitly, even if only rhetorically, support regime change in Iran, the sworn enemy of the United States, leading state-sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East, and repeated threats to destroy Israel, a key regional American ally.367 Despite this forbearance, Iran continued to confront the United States in the region by capturing and shooting at

American unmanned aerial vehicles whose technology they threated to share with Russia

365 Obama, “Inaugural Address.” 366 David Blair, “Iran Election: Barack Obama Refuses to ‘Meddle’ Over Protests,” The Telegraph, 17 June 2009, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/ 5556155/Iran-election-Barack-Obama-refuses-to-meddle-over-protests.html. 367 Scott Wilson, “Obama Cautious on Iran Protests,” Washington Post, 15 February 2011, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/15/AR2011021503668. html. 126 and China,368 and by making repeated threats to close the Straits of Hormuz, thereby cutting off oil from the Persian Gulf.369

Though consideration of great power conflict faded following the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States.370 Over time, realities revealed that great power competition continued apace while the United States was fixated on lesser threats. One of those

“threats” was China’s rise and burgeoning regional aspirations. China increasingly displayed assertiveness during the Obama administration’s first year. It interfered with

American naval vessels, objected against combined United States-South Korea military exercises, and limited military-to-military cooperation in protest over ongoing arms sales by the United States to Taiwan.371 China’s assertiveness increasingly became a theme in official reports,372 yet the Obama administration consistently sought to avoid conflict by

368 David Blair and Alex Spillius, “Iran Shows Off Captured US Drone,” Telegraph, 8 December 2011, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8944248/ Iran-shows-off-captured-US-drone.html; and Thom Shanker and Rick Gladstone, “Iran Fired on Military Drone In First Such Attack, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 9 November 2012, A1, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/middleeast/pentagon-says-iran-fired-at- surveillance-drone-last-week.html. 369 David Blair, “Iran Threatens to Close Strait of Hormuz Over EU Oil Sanctions,” Telegraph, 23 January 2012, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/ 9032948/Iran-threatens-to-close-Strait-of-Hormuz-over-EU-oil-sanctions.html; and Joby Warrick and Steven Mufson, “Iran Threatens US Ships, Alarms Oil Markets,” Washington Post, 3 January 2012, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-in-new- provocation-threatens-us-ships/2012/01/03/ gIQAzEiGZP_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a567978a5fe6. 370 George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 19 November 1999, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ bush/wspeech.htm; and Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States. 371 Anish Dawar, “Naval Standoff Threatens US-China Military Relations,” Guardian, 13 March 2009, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/13/us-china-naval-standoff; and Andrew Browne and Evan Ramstad, “US-South Korea Exercises Rile China,” Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2010, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://www.wsj.com/articles /SB10001424052748703791804575439121959919024: Craig Whitlock, “China’s Political and Military Leaders Split Over Ties to Washington, Gates Says,” Washington Post, 4 June 2010, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/03/AR2010060304858. Html. 372 For examples see Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (2010), 1-19, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM32MS. pdf; and John Pomfret, “China’s Strident Tone Raises Concerns Among Western Governments, Analysts,” Washington Post, 31 January 2010, accessed 3 January 2019, at http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/30/ AR2010013002443.html. 127 accepting China’s growing power.373 While resisting the temptation for confrontation,

President Obama revealed his willingness to bear the burden of reassuring China regarding American intentions and willingness to manage – as opposed to stymie –

China’s rise.374

President Obama believed that the Bush administration was so preoccupied with the

War on Terror in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, that it neglected the

Asia-Pacific region and China’s rise. This view was not entirely accurate. In fact, the

Bush administration maintained forward-deployed air and naval forces at Guam and

Japan, began cooperation with Singapore to build an aircraft carrier facility at Changi

Naval Base, assigned an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the Pacific theater, and declared it would station 60% of American submarines in Asia.375 Furthermore, the Bush administration prioritized revitalizing the relations with Japan and other Asian allies and adeptly managed relations with China.376 However, despite these positive steps, the Bush administration’s Asian policies were largely reactive and arguably secondary to its primary fixation on the War on Terror and Middle East conflicts. Forward-positioned air and naval forces, the assignment of an additional aircraft carrier, and overweighting of submarine forces in the Pacific were largely stopgap measures intended to offset the reduction of American ground combat forces in the region that were removed to meet operational needs in the Middle East. Moreover, even though the Bush administration

373 Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely,” 816. 374 Ibid. 375 Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012), 70-82. 376 James A. Kelly, “George W. Bush and Asia: An Assessment,” in George W. Bush and Asia: A First Term Assessment, Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee, eds. (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 16-20; 128 maintained generally positive relations with China, it never fully settled the question of whether China was a strategic competitor or cooperative partner.377

The Obama administration viewed Asia as an arena where they could achieve foreign policy success, unlike the interminable Middle East quagmires. President Obama aimed to use the “pivot” to Asia as a means for shifting American attention away from Middle

Eastern hot spots like Iraq and Afghanistan and towards a more economically and strategically important region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted

Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia- Pacific region.378

To achieve these tasks, Secretary Clinton stated that the Obama administration would focus on six lines of effort aimed at

strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.379

The Obama administration recognized that an increasingly assertive China might cause conflicts that could undermine the Asia-Pacific region’s growing economies and emerging nations. Moreover, through geographically separated from Asia, as a Pacific power the United States would directly benefit from increased engagement with the

377 Jia Qingguo, “Partners or Competitors: A Choice to be Made,” in George W. Bush and Asia: A First Term Assessment, 117-127. 378 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (2011), 57. 379 Ibid., 58. 129 region.380 The strategic narrative accompanying the announcement of America’s turn to

Asia unsettled allies in the Middle East who feared abandonment,381 as well as Asian-

Pacific partners who questioned the determination of the United States to exert its power in that region.382 Moreover, though the administration intended to strengthen ties with long-standing regional allies and bring new energy to managing the United States’ relationship with China, it had the opposite effect. President Obama’s emphasis on strengthening security ties with its allies – Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines,

South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam – created the impression in China that the United

States was implementing a containment strategy intended to counter China’s rising power status.383

Failing to Realign and Reorient, 2012-2015

Ally Failure to Uphold the Regional Security Order. President Obama could not keep Iran from exploiting growing regional instability, because he lacked an effective

Middle Eastern ally to uphold the United States’ preferred regional security order. Iran was relatively free to exert its influence after the United States first removed Iran’s primary threat on its east, the Taliban in Afghanistan, then removed Iran’s main western threat by toppling Saddam Hussein. Once the United States withdrew most of its forces

380 Nakayama, “Strategic Patience in a Turbulent World,” 8. 381 Haass, “The Irony of American Strategy,” 64. 382 See for example, Felix K. Chang, “Obama’s Visit to Asia and US Alliances,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 30 April 2014, accessed 10 January 2019, at https://www.fpri.org/2014/04/obamas-visit-to-asia- and-u-s-alliances/; and Raul Dancel, “Obama Foreign Policy Speech: Philippine Experts Doubt US Intention to Help Asian Allies,” The Straits Times, 30 May 2014, accessed 10 January 2019, at https:// www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/obama-foreign-policy-speech-philippine-experts-doubt-us-intention- to-help-asian-allies. 383 Simon Denyer, “Obama’s Rebalancing Turns into a Big Foreign Policy Headache,” Guardian, 28 January 2014, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/obama-china- japan-relations-asia. 130 from the Middle East, Iran had virtually unconstrained freedom of maneuver. Iran effectively became the main force shaping Middle Eastern politics because America’s regional allies seemed unwilling to assist in containment. Since the effects of any confrontation would affect neighboring states, the unwillingness to assume that risk made many of America’s Middle Eastern partners ineffective.384 Saudi Arabia remained an exception. However, it pursued its own security goals, only tangentially compatible with

American interests, as it increasingly engaged in proxy conflict with Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common interest in limiting Iran’s Middle

Eastern sphere of influence. However, as the regional power in direct confrontation with

Iran, Saudi Arabia has a deeper interest that prompts it to pursue its own regional security goal. When Saudi actions benefit the United States, this is the consequence of, rather than the motivation for, Saudi Arabia’s behavior.385 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the dominant Sunni power in the region, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant Shia power, historically engaged in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East, and extending into the Caucasus, South and Central Asia, and across Northern Africa.386 Rather than

384 Gary Sick, Trita Parsi, Ray Takeyh, and Barbara Slavin, “Iran’s Strategic Concerns and US Interests,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 1 (2008), 1-18, accessed 28 February 2019, at https://www.mepc.org/irans- strategic-concerns-and-us-interests. 385 Jennifer Rubin, “The Iran-Saudi Arabia Proxy War,” Washington Post, 6 January 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2016/01/06/the-iran-saudi-arabia- proxy-war/?utm_term=.37c708d93367; 386 Josh Rogin, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Clash Inside Syria Talks,” Bloomberg, 4 November 2015, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-11-04/iran-and-saudi-arabia-clash- inside-syria-talks; and Simon Tisdall, “Iran-Saudi Proxy War in Yemen Explodes into Region-Wide Crisis,” Guardian, 26 March 2015, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ mar/26/iran-saudi-proxy-war-yemen-crisis; and Simon Mabon. “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), accessed 2 March 2019, at http://www.mepc.org/battle- bahrain-iranian-saudi-rivalry; Kim Ghattas, “Iran-Saudi Tensions Simmer in Lebanon,” BBC News, 20 May 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36335163; Ankit Panda, “Why Is Pakistan Interested in Brokering Peace Between Iran and Saudi Arabia?” The Diplomat, 22 January 2016, accessed 2 March 2016, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/why-is-pakistan-interested- in-brokering-peace-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/; Rustam Ali Seerat, “Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, 14 January 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/ 01/iran-and-saudi-arabia-in-afghanistan/; Alexander Thurston, “How Far Does Saudi Arabia’s Influence 131 engage in direct military competition, the two states participate in a “Cold War” in which their influence is brought to bear on the domestic politics of weak states throughout the region. The Saudi-Iranian Cold Was is more a struggle over domestic politics, where the political and military strength of supported parties in civil conflicts is more important that the balance of military power of the Saudis and Iranians.387

The decades old Saudi-Iranian Cold War flared up in 2011 as a result of the Arab

Spring.388 Previous episodes, such as the one lasting from 1952 to 1970, or the one from

1979 to around 1997, reflected distinct regional dynamics. However, they existed within, and were manipulated by, the larger great power conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.389 After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran formed competing blocs, the Saudis and their allies struggled to maintain the status quo while

Iran and its allies formed a revolutionary bloc.390 The United States supported the Saudi

Go? Look at Nigeria,” Washington Post, 31 October 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/ monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/31/how-far-does-saudi-arabias-influence-go-look- at-nigeria/; Tomi Oladipo, “Saudi Arabia and Iran Fight for Africa's Loyalty,” BBC News, 7 January 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www. bbc.com/news/world-africa-35252039; Abha Shankar, “The Saudi-Iran Rivalry and Sectarian Strife in South Asia,” The Diplomat, 6 October 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-saudi-iran-rivalry-and-sectarian-strife-in-south-asia/; Sebastien Peyrouse, “Iran’s Growing Role in Central Asia? Geopolitical, Economic and Political Profit and Loss Account,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 6 April 2014, accessed 2 March 2019, at http:// studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2014/04/2014416940377354.html; and James Dorsey, “Expanding Regional Rivalries: Saudi Arabia and Iran Battle it Out in Azerbaijan,” International Policy Digest, 19 February 2018, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/02/19/expanding-regional- rivalries-saudi-arabia-and-iran-battle-it-out-in-azerbaijan/. 387 F. Gregory Gause, III, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War,” Brookings Doha Analysis Paper, no. 11, Brookings Institution (July 2014), 1, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf; and Susanne Koelbl, Samiha Shafy and Bernhard Zand, “Saudia Arabia and Iran The Cold War of Islam,” Der Spiegel, 9 May 2016, accessed 2 March 2019, at http://www.spiegel.de/ international/world/saudia-arabia-iran-and-the-new-middle- eastern-cold-war-a-1090725.html. 388 Bill Spindle and Margaret Coker, “The New Cold War,” Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2011, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704116404576262744106483816. 389 Malcom Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); Morton Valbjorn and Andre Bank, “The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Middle East Regional Politics,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2011): 3- 24. 390 Curtis Ryan, The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria,” Middle East Report no. 262 (2012): 28-31, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3260/stable/41702433?pq- 132 bloc, and the Russians and Chinese supported the Iranian bloc. When the Arab Spring sparked civil uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, it presented challenges and opportunities to both blocs. Traditional patrons – the United States, Russia, and

China – favored regional stability, but they had to choose how much to support their bloc in the new circumstances.391 Russia and China decided to support their Middle East allies, but President Obama opted to remain uninvolved, which left Saudi Arabia free to pursue its interests.

The Saudis and Iranians traditionally preferred to compete through proxies, and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring – the Arab Winter – they did so again.392 The Arab Spring and subsequent Arab Winter heightened Saudi Arabia’s concerns about its internal stability and Iranian actions. Consequently, Saudi leaders acted to maintain the regional status quo in what some described as a 21st century Brezhnev Doctrine – the Saudis could intervene in any state to protect their interests.393 Iran sough to take advantage of regional instability to expand the Shia Crescent by using Shia militias to create a land corridor running from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, and into Lebanon.394 The two blocs created or exacerbated instability as they fought using proxies in countries throughout the Middle

East. For its part, Saudi Arabia’s proxy fights and contribution to instability ran at odds with American interests.

origsite=summon&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents; John Turner, “Great Powers as Client States in a Middle East Cold War,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012), 124. 391 Turner, “Great Powers as Client States in a Middle East Cold War,” 124-125. 392 Daniel Byman, “After the Hope of the Arab Spring, The Chill of an Arab Winter, Washington Post, 1 December 2011, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-the-hope-of- the-arab-spring-the-chill-of-an-arab-winter/2011/11/28/gIQABGqHIO_story.html 393 Byman, “After the Hope of the Arab Spring.” 394 Mohamad Bazzi, “The Growing U.S.-Iran Proxy Fight in Syria,” The Atlantic, 20 June 2017, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/iran-syria-trump-saudi-arabia- escalation-isis/530844/. 133

Not only did Saudi Arabia fail to uphold the regional security order, its self-interested actions in places like Syria created circumstances to which President Obama had to respond. Because of his disinclination and preferred policy of Middle East retrenchment,

President Obama often responded too slowly and reactively. Moreover, when Obama did decide to respond, in siding with Saudi Arabia and other status quo regimes affiliated with political oppression and human rights violations, his decision put the United States at odds with the rising wave of democratic, anti-authoritarian movements sweeping the region. This further benefited Iran, who remained hostile to American interests despite

President Obama’s attempted rapprochement.395

Failed Rapprochement with Iran. President Obama spent the first two years of his first term trying to achieve rapprochement with Iran. His attempts spanned a range from the mundane, such as insisting on saying the full name of Iran in a video greeting to initially refusing to speak out in support of pro-democracy protests being brutally attacked by the ruling regime.396 President Obama’s attempt to reduce Iran’s nuclear threat was in line with his earlier diplomatic efforts to lead global nuclear reduction efforts;397 however, this put the administration in the morally dubious position of accepting anti-democratic efforts by an adversary. The Obama administration was trying

395 Turner, “Great Powers as Client States in a Middle East Cold War,” 131-132. 396 Robert Mackey, “Obama Addresses Iran by Web Video,” New York Times, 20 March 2010, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/obama-adresses-iran-by-web-video/; and Josh Levs, “Fact Check: Was Obama 'silent' on Iran 2009 protests?” CNN Politics, 9 October 2012, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/08/politics/fact-check-romney-iran/index.html; “The Candidates on US-Iran Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 31 October 2012, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/candidates-us-iran-policy. 397 “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered,” Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- barack-obama-prague-delivered; “Barack Obama’s Remarks on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” Remarks Before the UN Security Council as Prepared for Delivery, The Guardian, 24 September 2009, accessed 2 March 2019, at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/24/un- security-council-nuclear-disarmament-obama. 134 to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program and drive for regional hegemony. He believed that engagement and rapprochement offered the best option, though his policy used the threat of economic sanctions to further motivate Iran.398

Unlike some of his predecessors, President Obama did not view engagement and sanctions as mutually exclusive. He was personally in favor of working with Iran, but he also saw the value in putting pressure on the regime through sanctions.399 From the start, the purpose of the administration’s policy was to help generate international support for tougher sanctions if engagement failed. When early engagement attempts ultimately failed, President Obama was able to gain more European and international support than previous administrations.400 This was crucial because of the regional threat and risk of nuclear proliferation posed by Iran. President Obama’s engagement with Iran culminated in October 2009 when representatives from Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran,

Russia, and the United States met in Geneva to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. During this meeting, representatives from the United States and Iran met separately in the highest-level bilateral meeting between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian

Revolution.401

The Geneva conference achieved a deal for Iran to give up its enriched uranium, but the deal fell apart two weeks later when Iran refused to comply. By early 2010, the

Obama administration shifted its efforts from engagement to implementation of economic sanctions intended to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. These sanctions appeared affect Iran by raising factional strife and political dissent and intensifying Iran’s

398 Mann, The Obamians, 192. 399 Ibid., 194. 400 Ibid., 196. 401 Ibid., 203-204. 135 domestic economic problems. However, three critical weaknesses hindered the extent to which sanctions could alter Iran’s behavior. First, evidence revealed that key states like

Austria, China, and Switzerland were not fully complying with the sanctioning agreement and Iran was actively trying to circumvent the sanctions.402 Second, despite clear effects on the Iranian economy, there was little evidence suggesting they were affecting the regime’s cost-benefit calculations about the value of its nuclear program. Moreover, the sanctions required strategic patience and political costs,403 something President Obama lack because of the danger nuclear weapons held for regional dynamics.404 Finally,

Iranian leaders believed they held the stronger position,405 even as President Obama sought to implement a policy of containment.406

President Obama opted for a policy of containment after rapprochement failed and sanctions appeared to be diminishing in effectiveness. Proponents of the policy argued that containment would allow the United States to mitigate the consequences of Iran’s

“nuclear defiance.” To do so, the Obama administration would have to be willing to establish “redlines” defining acceptable Iranian behavior and be willing to use military force if necessary. Moreover, it would have to reassure regional allies that the United

States remained committed to preserving the regional balance of power.407 Regardless,

402 Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, 97; and Glenn Kessler, “Iran, Trying to Skirt Sanctions, Attempts to Set Up Banks Worldwide,” Washington Post, 23 October 2010, accessed 2 March 2019, at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/20/AR2010102006139.html. 403 Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, 98. 404 Mann, The Obamians, 201. 405 Singh, Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy, 98. 406 Sohrab Ahmari, “Uncontained: Obama’s Confused Iran Policy,” World Affairs 174, no. 4 (2011), accessed 2 March 2019, at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/uncontained-obama%E2%80%99s- confused-iran-policy; and Dalia Dassa Kaye and Eric Lorber, “Containing Iran: What Does It Mean?” Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012):51-63, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu: 2894/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00522.x. 407 James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 33-49, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/persian-gulf/ 2010-02-22/after-iran-gets-bomb. 136

Iran’s continuing shadow wars with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq led Iran to believe that even if it could not militarily defeat the United States it could wear America down through exhaustion.408 President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle East and reluctance to intervene during the Arab Spring served to fuel this perception. Iran’s strategy relied on Middle Eastern volatility which the Arab Spring provided in abundance. However, by 2011, President Obama had abandoned any hopes of rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and took advantage of the turmoil from the

Arab Spring to advance its interests.

Inability to Abandon Middle East Interests. President Obama entered office intending to cut military spending, reduce military forces, and downplay the importance of military power in foreign relations. However, less than half way through his first term, he increasingly found himself bogged down in geopolitical rivalries that forced reengagement in the Middle East.409 The domestic-level “mismatch between the complexity of the global system and the simplicity of [American] foreign policy rhetoric” was another critical challenge President Obama faced in implementing his security policies.410 Political tensions between the Republican party’s antipathy towards multilateralism and the Democrat’s aversion to military power projection made it difficult for the Obama administration to implement his policies without having to confront challenges from multiple directions.411 The Obama administration’s response to the Arab

408 Michael Scott Doran, “The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011), 20, accessed 2 March 2019, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/algeria/2011-04-14/heirs-nasser. 409 Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014), 69-79, accessed 25 December 2018, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2014-04-17/ return-geopolitics. 410 Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” 67. 411 Ibid., 67. 137

Spring demonstrated a clear preference for restraint and limiting the use of American power. However, the administration’s response to the uprisings in Libya and Syria demonstrated the costs of President Obama’s policy of Middle East retrenchment and the inability of the United States to abandon its security interests in the region.

The Obama administration based its response to events in Libya during the Arab

Spring as the unfolded rather than based on a clear-cut plan. President Obama consistently demonstrated reluctance to intervene, an attitude some critics described as dithering.412 He only decided to intervene with airpower when it became clear that anti-

Gadhafi rebels faced imminent defeat and slaughter in Benghazi. Obama stressed that

“America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.”413 These declarations suggested that President Obama would use American military power in support of the United

Nations Security Council resolution 1973 to intervene under the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) principle to protect Benghazi – something that would preserve the United States’ interest in averting mass slaughter.414 However, shortly after beginning military

412 Niall Ferguson, “The Big Dither,” Newsweek, 20 March 2011, accessed 3 January 2019 at https://www. newsweek.com/big-dither-66055. 413 Barack Obama, “Address to the Nation on Libya,” National Defense University, Washington, DC, 28 March 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/ barackobamalibyanationspeech.htm. 414 United Nations Press Release, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” New York, 17 March 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine applies to how and under what circumstances the international community has the right to use force and intervene in another state to protect citizens. R2P alters the relationship between sovereignty and the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens. It derives from the international community’s interest in preventing mass slaughter of civilians. 138 operations Obama accepted the urgings of those who sought to expand the mission beyond the mandate for R2P to a mission for regime change.415

After the first wave of bombing, President Obama explained that the United States would transfer responsibility and assume “a supporting role” to ensure that “the risk and cost of this operation – to our military and to American taxpayers – will be reduced significantly.” He stressed that “to be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq…That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.” Instead, he would “[create] the conditions and coalitions for others to step up…to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.”416 Allied burden sharing aside, post-Gadhafi Libya became marked by lawlessness,417 extralegal imprisonments,418 weapons proliferation,419 infiltration of Islamist terror groups,420 and spillover in the

415 British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options,” Third Report of Session 2016–17, 6 September 2016, 11- 12, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/119. pdf. 416 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya,” White House, 28 March 2011, accessed 3 January 2019, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/ remarks-president-address-nation-libya; and Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely,” 821. 417 David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution,” New York Times, 1 November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/africa/in-libya-the-fighting- may-outlast-the-revolution.html; Nick Meo, “Libya: Revolutionaries Turn on Each Other as Fears Grow for Law and Order,” Telegraph, 31 October 2011, accessed 1 March 2011, at https://www.telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-each-other-as- fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html; and Nick Meo, “Libya Dispatch: As Lawlessness Spreads, are the Rebel ‘Good Guys’ Turning Bad?” Telegraph, 5 November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8871825/Libya-dispatch-as- lawlessness-spreads-are-the-rebel-good-guys-turning-bad.html. 418 Kim Sengupta, “Leaked UN Report Reveals Torture, Lynchings and Abuse in Post-Gaddafi Libya,” Independent, 24 November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ africa/leaked-un-report-reveals-torture-lynchings-and-abuse-in-post-gaddafi-libya-6266636.html. 419 “UN Security Council Concern Over Libya Arms Stockpile,” BBC News, 1 November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15531816. 420 Rod Nordland and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamists’ Growing Sway Raises Questions for Libya,” New York Times, 14 September 2011, accessed 1 March 2011, at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/ africa/in-libya-islamists-growing-sway-raises-questions.html; Staff Writer, “Benghazi Declared ‘Islamic emirate’ by Militants,” Al Arabiya News, 31 July 2014, accessed 1 March 2019, at http://english. alarabiya.net/en/News/ middle-east/2014/07/31/Libya-s-Ansar-al-Sharia-declares-Islamic-state-in- Benghazi.html. 139 neighboring states.421 President Obama still refused to step in even as Libya descended into chaos and lay on the brink of becoming a failed state. According to one State

Department official,

“Obama remained intent upon leaving the Middle East, and he was not going to let himself be distanced from that mission by sudden eruptions of pro-democracy protests, teetering dictators, and looming civil wars. He did not know whether the Arab Spring would lead to ubiquitous democracy or a prolonged period of instability, but regardless, he was determined that America would not try to influence the outcome – not if it meant reversing course to get involved in the region.…”422

This intent was in line with a retrenchment policy, but the aftereffects of the Libya intervention unsettled the trans-Sahel region and expanded the influence of Islamist terror groups. These factors forced the Obama administration to escalate its level of military engagement throughout North Africa over the remainder of Obama’s term.423

Similar events occurred during the Syrian Civil War in 2011. In March of that year, antigovernment protests erupted over the Assad family’s four-decade rule. As protests spread, the level of violence committed by Syrian government forces and rebel groups escalated and numerous political and armed opposition groups emerged. President

Obama openly called on Syrian president Bashar al Assad to step down and was ignored.

The increasing level of violence, death toll, and use of chemical weapons by the Assad government put pressure on the Obama administration to support the resistance despite

421 Nick Amies, “Growing Threat of al Qaeda in North Africa Prompts EU Action,” Deutsche Welle, 17 November 2011, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.dw.com/en/growing-threat-of-al-qaeda-in-north- africa-prompts-eu-action/a-15573516. 422 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday, 2013), 164. 423 John Reed, “Mapped: The US Military’s Presence in Africa,” Foreign Policy, 1 May 2013, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/01/mapped-the-u-s-militarys-presence-in-africa/; and Kathryn Watson, “Where Does the US Have Troops in Africa, and Why?” CBS News, 23 October 2017, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-does-the-u-s-have-troops-in-africa- and-why/. 140 his desire to remain uninvolved in the conflict. In 2013, Congress debated whether to provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to suitable Syrian opposition groups, ultimately authorizing nonlethal aid. Moreover, Congress refrained from authorizing President

Obama to use force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.424

In 2014, the Obama administration requested that Congress grant authority and funding for providing lethal support to selected Syrian opposition groups. The administration’s original request aimed to support defending Syrian people against Assad regime attacks: however, the subsequent rise and expansion of ISIS across Syria and portions of Iraq forced the administration to refocus on counterterrorism efforts in the region. Congress authorized the Department of Defense to lead a train and equip program for Syrian groups fighting terror groups. In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria aimed at preventing ISIS from using Syria as a base of operations for its efforts in Iraq. A month later, the Department of Defense established Combined Joint

Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve to “formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” American military personnel on the ground in Syria increased from 50 in late 2015 to over 2,000 by 2017.425

The Obama administration also deployed several thousand more American servicemembers in June 2014 to fight ISIS in Iraq. The deployment was made at the invitation of the Iraqi government in response to successful offensives conducted by ISIS that defeated Iraqi Security Forces and seized large portions of territory in western Iraq.

The United States now had several thousand servicemembers committed in Iraq less than

424 Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response,” Congressional Research Service, RL33487, 1, 2 January 2019, accessed 1 March 2019, at https:// crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33487. 425 Ibid. 141 three years after they were withdrawn under President Obama’s policy of retrenchment.

He justified his actions by saying

…the world is confronted by many challenges. And while America has never been able to right every wrong, America has made the world a more secure and prosperous place. And our leadership is necessary to underwrite the global security and prosperity that our children and our grandchildren will depend upon. We do so by adhering to a set of core principles. We do whatever is necessary to protect our people. We support our allies when they’re in danger. We lead coalitions of countries to uphold international norms. And we strive to stay true to the fundamental values – the desire to live with basic freedom and dignity – that is common to human beings wherever they are. That’s why people all over the world look to the United States of America to lead. And that’s why we do it.426

This justification for intervention directly contradicted the one he provided to justify non-intervention in Libya despite the similarities between the two situations. President

Obama’s decision also ran counter to his express intent to extricate the United States from the Middle East. Instead, the recommitment of thousands of troops to Iraq and Syria once again embroiled the United States in a conflict that pitted America and its regional allies – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates – against Russia, Iran, and the Iranian-backed terror group Hezbollah. Moreover, as the spillover from the Syrian

Civil War affected neighboring states, the Saudis and Iranians pursued their own security interests and fought proxy conflicts that further destabilized the region against American interests.427 In the end, the United States could not abandon its security interest in the

Middle East.

426 Barack Obama, “Statement on the Crisis in Iraq,” White House, Washington, DC, 7 August 2014, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/08/07/president-obama- makes-statement-iraq. 427 Fawaz Gerges, “Saudi Arabia and Iran Must End Their Proxy War in Syria,” Guardian, 15 December 2013, accessed 01 March 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/15/saudia- arabia-iran-proxy-war-syria; Kim Ghattas, “Iran-Saudi Tensions Simmer in Lebanon,” BBC News, 20 May 2016, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36335163; “Saudi 142

Outcome of Strategic Reorientation

Level of Reduced Commitment. President Obama successfully withdrew all

American forces out of Iraq and significantly reduced the number of soldiers in

Afghanistan; however, major cost savings resulted from decreasing the defense budget.

There were multiple rounds of military cuts beginning in 2009, and defense spending declined significantly as domestic spending increased.428 As a proportion of the United

States’ gross domestic product, the military budget was 5% in 2010 and approximately

3% by 2016. The national defense budget declined from $722 billion in 2010 to $580 billion by 2015. Rather than directly engaging in key regions, the 2012 Defense Strategic

Guidance sought to develop low-cost, small-footprint approaches to achieving security objectives. These included heavy reliance upon exercises, rotational units to maintain a military presence, and advising partner militaries.429 More importantly, the Obama administration decided that the military would no longer be required to be prepared to fight two wars simultaneously; instead, the military would only be sized to fight one large-scale operation in one region, while denying an adversary’s objectives in a second region (i.e., fighting one and a half instead of two wars).430 The Obama administration also de-prioritized large-scale counterinsurgency and ground campaigns in favor of

“innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve…security objectives.”431

Arabia’s Use of Soft Power in Iraq is Making Iran Nervous,” The Economist, 8 March 2018, accessed 1 March 2019, at https://www.economist.com/ middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/08/saudi-arabias-use-of- soft-power-in-iraq-is-making-iran-nervous. 428 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Historical Tables (Washington DC), 158-159, 165-166, accessed 4 January 2019 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/hist-fy2019.pdf. 429 US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for a 21st Century Defense (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3. 430 Ibid., 4. 431 Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC, 2012), 3, 6, accessed 4 January 2019, at http://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_ strategic_guidance.pdf. 143

Finally, the administration decreased spending on military research and development, procurement, and modernization.432

The Obama administration’s cost reductions saved money but entailed another, intangible, cost. Reducing the size of the military increased the level of risk in America’s strategic engagements and commitments. Primary strategic documents, like the 2012

Defense Strategic Guidance, did not address the trade-offs between costs and risks.

Instead, the guidance tacitly assumed that the resulting risk increase would be manageable.433 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did concede “Because [the United

States military] will be somewhat smaller…risks will be measured in time and capacity.”434 One way the administration sought to minimize these risks was through

“reversibility,” maintaining the ability to reconstitute personnel, the defense industrial base, and science and technology capabilities the administration cut. This, however, ignored how requiring longer time to rebuild capacity might affect a future operation’s cost, whether financial or human, and the likelihood of success. It also did not address how the military would be able to overcome the loss of leadership and trained personnel cut during retrenchment. Finally, guidance did not address how long key portions of the defense industrial base could remain operating under the policy of reversibility.435

These issues assumed added significance once sequestration became a fiscal reality.

Sequestration was an austerity fiscal policy that required automatic spending cuts to federal government spending under the 2011 Budget Control Act. The cuts required by

432 OMB, Historical Tables, 168. 433 Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, In Brief: Assessing DOD’s New Strategic Guidance, Congressional Research Service, 2012, 6, accessed 4 January 2019, at http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2012/01/CRS-Defense-Strategic-Guidance-R42146.pdf. 434 Quoted in Dale and Towell, In Brief, 6. 435 Dale and Towell, In Brief, 6-7. 144 sequestration exacerbated those already enacted by the Obama administration, to the point where American military capabilities were unaligned with even the administration’s more modest commitments. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assumed that the

Department of Defense would experience an approximately $500 billion budget reduction over ten years; however, when sequestration occurred the department suddenly faced $1 trillion in cuts. This jeopardized what one analyst noted were the “irreducible requirements in American defense policy – winding down current wars responsibly, deterring Iran, hedging against a rising China, protecting global sea lanes vital for commerce, attacking terrorists and checking state sponsors of terror, and ensuring a strong all-volunteer military as well as a world-class defense scientific and industrial base.”436 It was not just analysts and government observers who were concerned, but senior military leaders as well. In a congressional hearing, three of the four assembled

Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the military under sequestration would be incapable of handling even a single major armed conflict.437 Critics might argue this should be expected from chiefs seeking to increase their service’s budgets, but the unity of the chiefs and consequences they described reflected far more than previous inter-service budgetary rivalry or jockeying for defense dollars.

Outside of readiness issues, the Obama administration’s military reductions and the effects of sequestration constrained the envisioned pivot to Asia. Obama’s policy looked to counterbalance China’s military power and assertiveness in the Pacific. One key

436 Michael O’Hanlon, The Wounded Giant: America’s Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity (New York: Penguin, 2011), xv. 437 Colin Clark, “US Military Could Not Handle One Major Theater Operation if Sequestration Sticks,” Breaking Defense, 18 September 2013, accessed 4 January 2019, at https://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/ us-military-could-not-handle-one-major-theater-operation-if-sequester-sticks/. 145 element of achieving this goal was increasing United States naval forces in the region; however, force structure cuts and the consequences of sequestration effectively prevented this. Because of force reductions, the United States military in East Asia remained about as strong as it was ten years before. Over that same period China’s military expenditures grew dramatically, a fact likely noticed by China and American allies.438 This resulted in continuing American relative decline in the Pacific.

While the Obama administration managed to retrench from Iraq and Afghanistan, it came at a significant cost. The United States forfeited the ability to influence the behavior or shape preferable policies when President Obama withdrew completely from Iraq and announced a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already hard-pressed to control political events in these two countries when the United States maintained a sizable contingent of forces in each, that lack of presence made it virtually impossible to do so.

This led to several problems. First, the United States was unable to assist the Iraqi government fight resurgent Sunni jihadists in ISIS between 2012 and 2014. Second, a lack of American influence resulted in Iran gaining sway over much of the Iraq government, to the point where Iraqi prime minister Maliki allowed Iranian overflights to deliver weapons to Assad during the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Maliki increasingly became authoritarian and cracked down on political opposition and Iraq’s Sunni minority.

The latter became increasingly alienated and increased the level of sectarian violence and support for ISIS.439 Increased tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia also ran the risk of reigniting Iraq’s sectarian civil war as Saudi Arabia and Iran used proxies in Iraq to fight

438 Ibid., 32-33, 42; Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 98-99. 439 Dueck, The Obama Doctrine, 90-91. 146 each other. Kurdish-Arab relations in Iraq remained strained as the result of territory disputes, and ongoing sectarian and ethnic rivalries made governing Iraq more challenging and contested.440 Finally, the sharp reduction in American ground personnel in Afghanistan coincided with a resurgence of the Taliban and increased involvement by

Pakistan in Afghan affairs.

Effects on Allies and Adversaries. President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle

East was intended to extricate the United States from its regional overcommitment and to complement the “pivot” to Asia. The pivot, however, rested upon flawed assumptions.

First, was the assumption that the rising economic and political importance of Asia not only required additional American engagement, but the assignment of additional military forces to the region. The Obama administration placed Asia at the center of its security strategy; however, this appeared to Chinese leaders as if the United States was adjusting its defense policy to contain China.

The underlying premise of the pivot to Asia was that the region’s growing economic importance made it more globally important relative to other regions like the Middle

East. This suggested an economic response – for instance, joining the Asia Infrastructure

Investment Bank at China’s invitation. However, not only did the administration decline

China’s invitation, it included a sizable military component to its rebalancing efforts. For instance, the release of the United States’ Air-Sea Battle doctrine in 2010 outlined an operational doctrine for military confrontation with China. Official proclamations by

440 Tony Karon, “Iraq’s Government, Not Obama, Called Time on the U.S. Troop Presence,” Time, 21 October 2011, accessed 13 January 2019, at http://world.time.com/2011/10/21/iraq-not-obama-called- time-on-the-u-s-troop-presence/; Ishaan Tharoor, “The Saudi-Iranian Cold War: Is This the Future of the Middle East?” Time, 17 May 2011, accessed 13 January 2019, at http://world.time.com/2011/05/17/the- saudi-iranian-cold-war-is-this-the-future-of-the-middle-east/. 147 prominent administration officials like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who discussed the importance of countering China’s growing military capabilities further signaled to

China that the United States intended to contain China’s power in the region. As a result,

China began acting more assertively throughout East Asia in general, and the South

China Sea and Senkakus more specifically.

The Obama administration attempted to counter China’s assertive territorial claims over the Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by conducting freedom of navigation operations and increasing military support to

American allies. It also made diplomatic overtures to India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and

Vietnam, and aimed to develop closer economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region by increasing trade through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Finally, the Obama administration began developing new military doctrines to conducting potential combat in the Pacific

Theater. These goals all focused on three components of the military aspect of the pivot to Asia: strengthening alliances and building new partnerships, adjusting force postures, and strategic planning. First, the Obama administration reemphasized existing formal alliances and began building new ones to expand its ally network in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, the administration sought to maintain a visible military presence in the region, promising not to cut military budgets for forces in Asia, despite being forced to do so because of sequestration. Third, the Department of Defense updated its strategic battle plans and devised the Air-Sea Battle concept to counter an adversary’s anti-access and area denial capabilities.

The expanding network of American allies reached China’s border, the increased presence of United States military forces throughout the Pacific brought them into more

148 frequent contact with Chinese forces, often in contested areas, and the fact that China was the likely rival against which Air-Sea battle would be used, all heighten China’s concerns about being contained. The main reason the Obama administration increased the saliency of the military component of the Asian pivot was ostensibly in reaction to growing

Chinese assertiveness; however, China had made no new claims and its “assertiveness” was intended to strengthen its position in established claims or defend outstanding claims. In most instances, the Chinese were reacting, or overreacting, to a rival’s actions.441 The United States arguably already had enough air and naval assets in the region to counter Chinese overreactions. However, the Obama administration misread

China’s leadership. As a result, subsequent policies to enhance American’s Pacific presence compounded China’s insecurities, motivated Chinese assertiveness, and undermined regional stability.442 This occurred at a time when Middle Eastern turmoil was forcing the United States to refocus its attention back on that region.

The Syrian Civil War resulted in the rise of the Islamic State whose actions and regional success at seizing territory forced the Obama administration to refocus on the

Middle East at the expense of its Asian efforts.443 This highlighted the second, and perhaps most important, flawed assumption. The Obama administration wrongly assumed that the United States could afford to withdraw from the Middle East despite ongoing social, economic, and political challenges in a region critical to American and global economic security. While generally ignoring the Arab Spring uprisings, President

Obama’s reluctance to act during the Syrian Civil War resulted in a conflict that

441 Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China.” 442 Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot.” 443 Dolan, “Obama’s Retrenchment-Protraction Doctrine”, 54. 149 displaced eleven million people and caused a refugee crisis that further destabilized countries in the Middle East and Europe. American disengagement also allowed the

Islamic State to exploit the conflict and move into, and subsequently occupy portions of

Iraq

Intervening in Syria presented the Obama administration with few good options.

However, a counterfactual argument could be made that President Obama should have worked harder to renegotiate a status of forces agreement. Had he kept some level of forces in Iraq, the United States would likely have been better postured to combat ISIS and counter Iran. Meanwhile, the spread of Iranian influence to fill the vacuum created by withdrawing American power weakened American relationships with Gulf State partners and allies. Therefore, the Obama administration’s approach not only increased tensions in

Asia, it allowed the Middle East to descend further into chaos due the United States’ relative neglect.

Outcome. Retrenchment occurs when leaders attempt to mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or, failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of these options are available, retrenchment will fail because a great power will be unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical challenges. In this case, President Barack Obama sought to lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy by implementing a policy of retrenchment from the

150

Middle East and pivoting to Asia. He was unsuccessful and ultimately failed to improve the United States’ strategic solvency.

As my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicts, Obama’s failure stemmed from unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed rapprochement with rivals, and an inability to abandon American interests in the Middle East. I argue that retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Obama committed substantial material resources to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain regional security favorable to American interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi Arabia engaged in a new Cold War with

Iran which was attempting to expand its influence after the American withdrawal. This competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East.

Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted from Saudi and Iranian intervention, they served to destabilize the region. Therefore, while Saudi Arabia pursed its interests, the results of its efforts undermined the United States preference for regional stability.

Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama to recommit diplomatic energy and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of his Asian pivot.

My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to fail when a state is unsuccessful at rapprochement with a rival. President Obama attempted to engage with Iran, especially over its nuclear program. However, Iran remained implacable and refused to abandon its nuclear program or its attempt to achieve regional hegemony. By early 2010, the Obama administration shifted its efforts to the implementation of economic sanctions intended to coerce Iran into altering its behavior and engage in negotiations. The effects of the sanctions clearly affected Iran’s domestic

151 economy, but they had an ambiguous effect of Iran’s leaders who continued to pursue their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By 2011, President Obama abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and stoked turmoil during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The turmoil of these conflicts, particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as a regional threat, forced

President Obama to reengage in the Middle East.

Without an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for maintaining security, and with rapprochement failure, the last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great power to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President

Obama was unwilling or unable to abandon the United States’ interest in the Middle East.

The Arab Spring proved to be the undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment attempt. Though initially refraining from intervention, President Obama half-heartedly reversed course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to effect regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama administration debated how best to respond though there was a clear preference for a hands-off approach. However, as ISIS emerged during the conflict then spread into Iraq the administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the threat. Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and retrenchment had failed.

152 political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred.

President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent collapse of talks to extend the Status of Forces Agreement provided the political cover necessary to complete full withdrawal. Republicans and Democrats both supported intervening during the Arab Spring – though for different reasons – so President Obama likely could have gained support for intervention had he wanted to do so. Retrenchment in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an ally for burden sharing, failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East turmoil erupted during the

Arab Spring, could not abandon its interest in a region vital for global economic security.

Table 6 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses.

Table 6. Hypotheses and summary of failed retrenchment

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a Hypothesis 1 suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at Hypothesis 2 rapprochement with adversaries. President Obama failed at rapprochement with Iran after trying engagement then sanctions. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The Hypothesis 3 United States could not abandon its interest in an economically important region. Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of Hypothesis 4 regional withdrawal. American public and political elites favored withdrawal then reengagement. Obama squandered this support because of his personal desire to avoid Middle East entanglements Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. President Obama might have invested more political effort in strengthening Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iranian influence throughout the region. Instead, he focused on pivoting to Asia. President Obama might also Hypothesis 5 have opted to abandon American interests in the region regardless of the consequences, since the United States would not suffer from them nearly as much as others. Either action would have likely resulted in successful retrenchment.

153

Alternatives. How about my alternative hypotheses? This case provides limited support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does appear falls well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First, retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the nature of relative decline. There is limited support for this, though the case does offer avenues for additional research along these lines. President Obama simultaneously enacted strategic and operational retrenchment when he withdrew military forces from the Middle

East and subsequently reduced the size of the military, particularly the Army, and significantly reduced the defense budget. While the Obama administration focused on the domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, it failed to adjust its policies to ensure it could address the source of America’s international relative decline, namely

China. The reduced force structure and low readiness resulting from sequestration meant

President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously execute his pivot to Asia and respond to the turmoil of the Arab spring. As a result, intervening in Iraq and Syria in

2014 came at the expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of retrenchment failure, but a consequence.

States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China.

However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness.

154

China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’ circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the

Middle East. The military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s strategy also raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of containment. Both factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which the United States had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after the Arab Spring forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East. Having to make this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly since the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic concerns. Therefore, the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic retrenchment has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an operative factor for failure in this case.

Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis.

There is little evidence to support the claim that the rate of retrenchment matters.

However, a counterfactual argument can be made that had President Obama kept some level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured to combat ISIS.

President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in Iraq to demonstrate

American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms to a new Status of Forces agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics. However, his desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia likely weakened his resolve. When Iraqi leaders would not concede to legal protections for remaining American servicemembers,

President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. President Obama left the United

155

States at a strategic disadvantage by removing all American forces and forfeiting the

United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi government increasingly coming under the influence of Iran. As in the successful case of retrenchment from Southeast Asia, counterfactuals in this case suggest the need for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions matter, but how they might matter.

Table 7 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses.

Table 7. Alternative hypotheses of failed retrenchment

Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. President Obama faced international relative decline Alternative because of China’s rise, and domestic relative decline resulting from Hypothesis 1 the 2008 financial crises. Of the two, while the latter drove pressing domestic concerns, the former presented the biggest potential threat. (Limited Support) Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment. By enacting operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. As a result, Alternative intervention forced a choice between Asia and the Middle East, Hypothesis 2 indicating operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly since the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic concerns driving the decision to reduce the price of defense. (Limited support) Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. There is little evidence to support the claim that the rate of retrenchment matters. However, a counterfactual Alternative argument can be made arguing that had President Obama kept some Hypothesis 3 level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured to combat ISIS. (Limited support)

156

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

“We must achieve both security and solvency.”444

Security and Solvency

At times is appears that security and solvency are antimonies. The costs of pursing national security, whether through military expenditures or in defense of a national interest, often leads to insolvency. Similarly, achieving solvency, economic or strategic, often requires leaders to accept higher levels of security risk than they might otherwise prefer. For example, the Eisenhower administration’s policy of retrenchment beginning in

1953 reflected the paradox of security and solvency. President Eisenhower sought to reduce military expenditures to divert the savings towards domestic economic concerns.

His administration’s top foreign policy goal was to reduce the cost of the Cold War to preserve America’s economic solvency.

President Eisenhower wanted to reduce the cost of the Cold War through a two- faceted policy of retrenchment. The first facet was a policy aimed at lowering the risk of security by shifting burdens onto allies (i.e., strategic retrenchment).445 Eisenhower wanted to conclude American involvement in the Korean war by reaching a negotiated settlement with China and North Korea.446 This would facilitate the administration going beyond a mere “spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies” and reorienting its diplomatic efforts to address challenges in Europe and Latin America.447 Unfortunately,

444 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in James Reston, “Eisenhower Asks ‘Security’ for US and ‘Solvency’ Too: Urges Bipartisan Commission be Set Up to Study Operation of Defense Department,” New York Times, 26 September 1952, 1, accessed 14 March 2019, at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2072/docview/112390296/ 11EED66B086C4702PQ/1?accountid=14707. 445 Sestanovich, Maximalist, 67. 446 Ibid, 68-69. 447 President Eisenhower, quoted in ibid., 67. 157 the United States lacked an ally to assume South Korea’s security burden, and

Eisenhower faced resistance from European allies to assume more responsibility for their security interests.448 Moreover, he was politically unable to abandon American interests on the Korean peninsula and Western Europe. Regardless, this facet of President

Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy succeeded because of his rapprochement with wartime rivals.

The second facet of Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy was lowering the price of security by cutting defense spending (i.e., operational retrenchment). Ending the Korean

War afforded the opportunity to realize a peace dividend to help restore America’s economic solvency. President Eisenhower cut his predecessor’s last defense budget proposal from $41.2 billion to $35.8 billion, a more than 13% reduction. In his first budget proposal for fiscal year 1955, Eisenhower proposed only $30.9 billion, a cumulative 25% reduction of the United States defense budget.449 Eisenhower thought his predecessor’s goal of making the United States less reliant on nuclear weapons was too expensive. In the age of nuclear weapons, deterrence would only be effective if the

United States focused on those things most likely to deter the Soviet Union. Accordingly,

President Eisenhower he cut American ground forces by a third between 1953 and 1955.

He off-set these cuts by considering the use of nuclear weapons more often and for a wider range of security problems than any other president.450

Both facets of President Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy were successful at reducing the costs associated with providing security. On the one hand, strategic

448 Ibid., 72.76. 449 Sestanovich, Maximalist, 70. 450 Ibid., 70-71. 158 retrenchment from Korea lowered the risks associated with preventing the spread of international communism. On the other hand, it facilitated lowing the price of American security by allowing Eisenhower to claim a peace dividend and cut military budgets and force structure. However, this was not security and solvency; instead, what Eisenhower managed to achieve was security with solvency. Perhaps this is the best any leader can accomplish. After all, the risks to security are potentially limitless, while the domestic resources available for defense are undeniably limited. Normatively, security with solvency – the ability to defend national interests with enough power in reserve to address emerging threats – is the goal to which great power leaders should aspire. The question is how, particularly in circumstances characterized by relative decline. How can a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad results in diplomatic inflexibility and constrained power projection in the face of increasing foreign policy challenges and decreasing domestic resources?

In this project I argued that a policy of retrenchment conducted within a larger process of strategic reorientation allows leaders to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests. Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage life- cycle with mutually-reinforcing, sequentially-linked stages. Leaders perceive a need for retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising international threats, especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources resulting from economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support for existing foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision point regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and decide how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement and

159 synchronize retrenchment policies. An outcome eventually emerges based on whether retrenchment facilitates strategic reorientation. Retrenchment succeeds when it results in strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 6).

Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment.

States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because the nature of great power politics incentivizes them to remain strategically solvent.451

Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline by implementing more sustainable foreign policies. This is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power. The international system ultimately punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives with available resources. States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. Therefore, remaining strategically insolvent will result in relative decline becoming absolute.

451 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 88; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167. 452 Leaders often select policy options from both types of retrenchment, but the overall type is evident in the predominant reductions of either price or risk. 160 areas. Operational retrenchment lowers the price of security and increases the amount of available resources. However, regardless of the type, not all retrenchment attempts succeed. Therefore, I aimed to identify what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes.

Retrenchment arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic solvency relative to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly preventative wars. I argued that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and is therefore unable to free resources to address more critical challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are available.

Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argued that retrenchment will generally succeed unless there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and a great power fails at rapprochement, and the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Using primary and secondary sources, I conducted in-depth historical analysis using structured, focused comparison of two cases of post-World War II retrenchment attempts by the

United States. The first, a success, explored American retrenchment from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975. The second, a failure, looked at an attempted retrenchment from the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. Below, I discuss my findings and their significance to scholarship and policymaking

161

Findings

Case 1 (Success): Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon administration assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of international and domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach.

American diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during the American conflict in Vietnam where political objectives remained elusive. The level of political and diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the strategic neglect of other critical areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union took advantage of

American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the Soviet presence and influence in the region. President Nixon believed that ongoing international changes reduced the

United States’ relative power and had to be addressed.453

President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing

American involvement in Vietnam and the nature of the evolving international system needed to be addressed to solve their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the international system included the emergence of nascent political and economic multipolarity as the strength of the Western European and Japanese economies increased their international clout. The Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence as a global power was another key development during the United States’ distraction in

Vietnam. The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging from political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing

Cold War competition along the periphery.

453 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Security, 1969-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1. 162

President Nixon opted for a policy of retrenchment from Vietnam and Southeast Asia to facilitate strategically reorienting towards more important regions of geopolitical competition. He managed to retrench successfully by using a policy of gradual and orderly withdrawal supported by burden sharing with an ally, South Vietnam, and rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Differentiating between the ends of foreign policy helped President Nixon develop a consensus regarding American engagement with the world. By 1975, despite the changed dynamics of the executive and legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad even if though forced

President Ford to abandon American interests in South Vietnam. Overall, President

Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy. American withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorientation towards the Middle East to counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical to the economic security of the

United States and its allies. Figure 7 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

Nixon’s success stemmed from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement with geopolitical rivals, and abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argued that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on

Vietnamization to improve South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United States of its security burden. Vietnamization also facilitated the United States’ troop drawdown between 1969 and 1973. Nixon committed substantial financial and material resources to strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to

163 defend itself. By the time United States military forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam had a numerically and qualitatively superior military that gave the South a fighting chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South

Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure and did not impede American retrenchment.

I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon believed that competing interests with rivals were not immutable and could be realistically managed through negotiation.

Therefore, he attempted, and ultimately succeeded at, implementing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Nixon’s policy of détente with the

Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in

Vietnam. Similarly, President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving relations with China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate

American withdrawal. The American opening to China was intended to elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently, rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union which facilitated American retrenchment.

Without an ally to assume more responsibility for burden sharing, and when rapprochement fails, I predicted that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed the more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal.

During the United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed

164 extensive political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s security capacity. Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were ostensibly willing to provide their own security, and American military aid gave the

South the material ability to do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction hindered military effectiveness and ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of re-intervening to honor its commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon all interest in South Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites.

In this case of successful retrenchment, I also found evidence to support the predictions that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal, and that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail . The American public and political elites favored withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war powers, cut funding for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in in that country. President Ford tried to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam, but faced with a political consensus about disengagement he acquiesced and declared that the Vietnam War was over shortly before the South finally collapsed.

Case 2 (Failure): Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. President Barack

Obama attempted, and ultimately failed, to retrench from the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the country’s foreign policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.454

The security context he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors,

454 Nicholas Kitchen, “The Obama Doctrine – Détente or Decline?” European Political Science 10, no. 1 (2011), 27. 165 partly because the consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.455 The Obama administration faced a tough reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s relative military and economic decline, and power diffusion through a changing international order. President Obama believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine the United States’ role in the world. He sought to restore weakened relations with allies, extricate the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements in the Middle East. In other words, President Obama aimed to retrench.

President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting policy to address more critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded that the ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to resolve, particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground operations.456

However, President Obama failed to hand off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi

Arabia and failed at rapprochement with Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges in the Middle East demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in the region. Figure 8 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case.

President Obama’s failure stemmed from unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed rapprochement with rivals, and an inability to abandon American interests in the Middle

East. I argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Obama

455 Ibid., 31. 456 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic Monthly 317, no. 3 (2016), 70-90, accessed 25 December 2018, at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 166 committed substantial material resources to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain regional security favorable to American interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi

Arabia engaged in a Cold War with Iran which was attempting to expand its influence after the American withdrawal. This competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East. Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted from Saudi and Iranian intervention, they served to destabilize the region. While Saudi

Arabia pursed its interests, the results of its efforts undermined the United States preference for regional stability. Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama to recommit diplomatic energy and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of his Asian pivot.

I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to fail when a state is unsuccessful at rapprochement with a rival. President Obama attempted to engage with Iran, especially regarding its nuclear program. However, Iran remained implacable and refused to abandon its nuclear program or its attempts to achieve regional hegemony. By early

2010, the administration shifted its efforts to implementing economic sanctions intended to coerce Iran into altering its behavior and engaging in negotiations. The sanctions clearly affected Iran’s domestic economy, but they had an ambiguous effect on Iranian leaders who continued to pursue their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By

2011, President Obama abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and stoked turmoil during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The turmoil of these conflicts, particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as a regional threat, forced President Obama to reengage in the Middle East.

167

The last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great power to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President Obama was unable to abandon the United States’ Middle East interests. The Arab Spring proved to be the undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment attempt. Though initially refraining from intervening in the popular uprisings, President Obama half-heartedly reversed course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to effect regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama administration debated how best to respond, though there was a clear preference for a hands-off approach. However, as ISIS arose during the conflict and spread into Iraq, the administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the threat.

Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and retrenchment had failed.

I found limited evidence to support the claim that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal. The American public favored withdrawal from Iraq, political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred.

President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent collapse of talks to extend the Status of Force Agreement to let American forces remain after the deadline provided the political cover necessary to complete full withdrawal.

During the debates over intervention during the Arab Spring, Republicans and Democrats both supported it – though for different reasons – so President Obama likely could have gained support to intervene had he wanted to do so.

168

This case provided evidence for my claim that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. Retrenchment in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an ally for burden sharing, failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East turmoil erupted during the Arab Spring, could not abandon its regional interests. If any of these three things occurred, President Obama’s retrenchment attempt likely would have succeeded. Had Saudi Arabia better protected American interests instead of pursuing its own interests, President Obama may have been better able to remain disengaged.

Similarly, had President Obama’s rapprochement with Iran or Russia succeeded in alleviating security concerns much of the great power rivalry that re-emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring might have been less contentious. Alternatively, security challenges may have been resolved before escalating to a point where President Obama could no longer remain disengaged. Lastly, if President Obama could have withstood calls for reintervention in the Middle East made by Congress and European allies, he would have been able to follow through with his preference to withdraw from the Middle East and focus on Asia. However, he was unable to do so, and intervened in the Middle East even though the prospects for success were dim.

Alternatives

Both cases provided limited or no support for any of my three identified alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. Even when the cases provided limited support, it fell well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims.

The first alternative was that retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. President Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with

169 international relative decline; however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United

States’ success. His ability to enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its own defense and triangular diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement facilitated America’s deliberate withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested, retrenchment likely would have failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw and rapid collapse of the South at a time when the American public still supported honoring their country’s commitment to a free and democratic South Vietnam. While

President Nixon did correctly link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American relative decline, this alone was not enough to bring about success.

There is limited support for this alternative in the case of retrenchment from the

Middle East, though the case offers avenues for additional research along these lines.

President Obama simultaneously enacted strategic and operational retrenchment when he withdrew military forces from the Middle East and subsequently reduced the size of the military, particularly the Army, and significantly reduced the defense budget. The Obama administration focused on domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, but it failed to adjust its policies to ensure it could address the source of America’s international relative decline. Reduced force structure and low levels of readiness resulting from sequestration meant President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously execute his pivot to Asia and respond to Middle East turmoil. As a result, when President

Obama decided to intervene in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the intervention came at the expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of retrenchment failure, but a consequence.

170

A second alternative was that operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, evidence does not fully bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon implemented a mixture of operational and strategic retrenchment policies, yet the main thrust of cost savings involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the level of foreign policy risk. He also off-set force reductions and reduced warfighting capacity by engaging in active diplomacy with America’s rivals. This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East, who up to that point were slowly being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern countries quickly abandoned the Soviets when the United States asserted itself diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted to solely cut costs through reducing the price of security or refrained from substituting diplomacy for force, it seems likely retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by withdrawing from South Vietnam, abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and significantly cutting its forces, American rivals might have opted to act more aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United

States’ retreat, aggression to which America might not have been able to respond with its recently reduced force structures.

The evidence in President Obama’s retrenchment attempt also did not fully bear out this alternative, though it suggests the need for further investigation. By enacting operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. The United

States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China, which remained focused on defending its current position and outstanding claims.

However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness.

171

China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’ circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the

Middle East. Moreover, the military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s pivot strategy raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of containment. Both factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which the United States had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after the Arab Spring forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East.

Having to make this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly since the cost savings did little to address domestic economic concerns.

Therefore, the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic retrenchment has some support in both cases and warrants further investigation even though it was not an operative factor in either case.

Finally, the third alternative was that slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence did not fully support this hypothesis. Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of troops within eight months of assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement, he proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years.

While the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President

Nixon attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of reductions seems less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While providing some support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little evidence points to it being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the

172

North Vietnamese that the United States would no longer support the South, the North planned and initiated an offensive to takeover South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted for rapid and immediate withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from the North; however, the factor determining success would have been the United States’ ability to abandon its interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have been an effect on allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore, there is limited support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes.

The evidence from President Obama’s retrenchment also did not fully support this hypothesis. However, a counterfactual argument can be made arguing that had President

Obama kept some level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured to combat ISIS. President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in

Iraq to demonstrate American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms for a new

Status of Forces agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics.

However, his desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia weakened his resolve. When

Iraqi leaders would not concede to legal protections for any remaining American servicemembers, President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. By removing all American forces and forfeiting the United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi government increasingly coming under the influence of Iran, President Obama left the

United States at a strategic disadvantage. Counterfactuals in both cases suggest the need for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions matter, but how they might matter.

173

Implications for Academic Scholarship

My findings have implications for retrenchment scholarship and other tangential literatures. They refute assertions made by critics and extend some arguments advanced by retrenchment advocates. Critics contend that retrenchment is a rare, high-risk endeavor that signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation.457 They also assert that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and demonstrates a lack of resolve.458 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics contend that it lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics believe that leaders adopting this strategy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is rational only when using force is not a viable option.459 From this perspective, retrenchment will rarely, if ever, succeed since the outcomes are all negative – diminished power, influence, and security.

Available evidence does not support these claims. First, it appears that retrenchment is commonplace. While presenting only two cases of American retrenchment attempts, others exist – in the 1920s during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, in 1946 under President Truman, in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration, and in 1992

457 For theoretical and historical arguments against retrenchment see, Stephen Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 192-197; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011), 9- 40; and William R. Thompson, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment – Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 193-197. 458 For instance, Thomas Donnelly, “We Can Afford to Spend More, and We Need To,” New York Times, 9 September 2012, at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/09/how-big-should-the-defense- budget-be/we-can-afford-to-spend-more-and-we-need-to. 459 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40. This is the “turbulent frontier” theory: although leaders prefer non-expansionist policies, they pursue expansionist strategies in pursuit of security. See John S. Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (1960): 150-168. 174 when President George H. W. Bush retrenched at the end of the Cold War. Plenty of non-

American examples exist as well. The universe of cases for this project included ten non-

American retrenchment attempt since 1870. Extending the search prior to 1870 would undoubtably reveal many more examples. Retrenchment is not rare – it is after all the most common response to relative decline.460 It does, however, appear to be largely confined to great powers who have wide-ranging security commitments.

Second, at least in the American cases, it does not appear that retrenchment signaled waning power or weakness. In fact, overcommitment in pursuit of a foreign policy goal in one region contributed to relative decline and provided opportunities for a rival power to advance their interests and sphere of influence in another region. America’s diplomatic and military focus on Vietnam created a vacuum in the Middle East which the Soviet

Union attempted to exploit. President Nixon had to reorient American foreign policy to counter the Soviet threat, and that meant retrenching from Southeast Asia. Similarly,

American overcommitment in the Middle East resulted in its inability to effectively counter China’s rising economic and military clout in East Asia. No leader could reasonably argue that the United States was weak given its overall economic and military dominance. However, by rapidly withdrawing forces and diplomatically deemphasizing the Middle East, President Obama did create conditions in which Iran expanded its influence. This was not the result of retrenchment, however, but the failure of President

Obama to achieve rapprochement with Iran and Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to protect

American security interests. Therefore, my findings show that it is not retrenchment that

460 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; and MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?”. 175 signals waning power, but overcommitment, and leaders can effectively correct this through retrenchment and strategic reorientation.

Third, the belief that leaders attempting retrenchment will hasten their state’s decline seems misguided. If overcommitment is the primary international cause of relative decline, then continuing overcommitment will only hasten decline. Retrenchment clearly has costs, but these costs pale when compared to the costs of prolonging the diplomatic and military inflexibility that comes from overcommitment. Retrenchment can facilitate reallocating resources to core interests which may signal resolve in more vital regions.

President Nixon recognized that the American focus on Vietnam was distracting it from other pressing challenges like the Soviet Union’s achievement of strategic parity and growing influence in the Middle East. Continuing to slog in the quagmire of Vietnam would only have drained resources better used for military modernization to outpace the

Soviets. Moreover, prolonging the United States’ diplomatic fixation on Vietnam would only serve to provide time for the Soviets to solidify their diplomatic gains in the Middle

East. Retrenchment freed the resources necessary for the Nixon Administration to counter both challenges. Similar dynamics existed during President Obama’s retrenchment attempt; however, his failure to retrench resulted in the continuing inability to effectively counter a rising China. Both cases clearly show that retrenching does not hasten a state’s decline but failing to retrench does.

Finally, my findings support and extend advocates’ claims in recent retrenchment scholarship. MacDonald and Parent show that retrenchment is a common occurrence that is remarkably successful. My findings confirm this and go further by showing retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. MacDonald and Parent argue that the

176 rate and magnitude of a state’s decline explains the extent and form of its retrenchment choices. States with only limited decline will opt for operational retrenchment strategies focused on the price of security, while in severe cases states will select strategic retrenchment to minimize risks and burdens.461 One issue with their parsimonious, structural model is that it basically presents a unidimensional prediction about whether there will be more or less retrenchment. My findings do not dispute this, but they do show leaders seem to prefer combining retrenchment types rather than pursuing a single policy. That said, my findings extend MacDonald and Parent’s theory by revealing the conditions in which retrenchment will succeed or fail, thereby building upon their baseline realist theory.

Policy Implications

What lessons does my theory of retrenchment outcomes yield for contemporary policymakers? Many observers argue that the United States’ position atop the international hierarchy has become tenuous following the long wars Afghanistan and

Iraq, along with the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Even though the United

States spends more on defense than any other nation – it accounts for over 37% of world military expenditures and spends more than the combined spending of the next seven largest military budgets – its annual budget deficit exceeds $1 trillion. These levels are unsustainable and will need to be reduced. The re-emergence of overt great power competition in international relations also suggests that the capacity of the United States to sustain its current strategic commitments will be contested and constrained. As a result, the United States will eventually face the decision to retrench to reduce the price

461 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; and MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?”. 177 and risk of security to free resources for focusing on protecting core interests. My model of retrenchment outcomes offers useful insights to policymakers by providing guidance on when retrenchment will most likely succeed.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, ceaseless

Middle East turmoil, Russian revanchism, and China’s rapid growth have led to the realization of America’s relative decline. The United States undoubtably sits atop the international hierarchy, but some question whether the current budgetary and geopolitical circumstances will change this.462 Given its outsized expenditures on defense, future deficit reduction measures will likely come at the expense of military spending. Reducing defense budgets will constrain the United States’ capacity to station forces abroad, sustain weapons research, development, and procurement, and respond to a wide range of contingencies at the level required by its current foreign commitments. Even absent large defense spending cuts, the intensifying level of great power competition suggests that the

United States will eventually be forced to abandon peripheral commitments to free resources to confront a resurgent Russia or assertive China. Put simply, the United States will likely have to retrench in the future, just as it has to in the past.

America’s geographically expansive and longstanding commitments to allies and regional stability mean that any retrenchment attempt should not be implemented lightly or without consideration of the likelihood of success. America’s military underwrites the

462 For example, see Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “The End of Pax Americana: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes Sense,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 6 (2015), 2-10, accessed 15 March 2019, at https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/end-pax-americana; Christopher Layne, “The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018), 89-111, accessed 15 March 2019, at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2223/ia/article/94/1/89/ 4762695; and Davis Rothkopf, “How Bush, Obama, and Trump Ended Pax American,’ Washington Post, 27 June 2017, accessed 15 March 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/global-opinions/wp/ 2017/06/27/how-bush-obama-and-trump-ended-pax-americana/. 178 security order and stability in many areas around the world, so American withdraw may jeopardize regional stability – security and economic. Without a dependable ally or rapprochement with a regional rival, the only option left for American leaders is to abandon national interests in an area. If they cannot, then retrenchment will fail.

Attempting to retrench under these conditions will only result in instability and force

American leaders to intervene later and at higher cost than they would have incurred if they opted to remain engaged.

Therefore, before attempting retrenchment, American leaders will need to evaluate regional commitments according to the three criteria my theory identifies as crucial for successful retrenchment. First, leaders need to assess the availability of willing and able allies to assume a security burden. Any ally should be militarily capable and, to a large degree, should share America’s threat perceptions in the region. The former criteria may be supplemented by negotiating arms sales and military assistance agreements much as

Nixon and Obama did with South Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, respectively. The latter criteria are important, because they suggest the extent to which an ally might pursue its own versus American interests. South Vietnam shared the United States’ threat perception of North Vietnam and fought until the end. Saudi Arabia, though sharing the perception of an Iranian threat, opted instead to pursue its own regional interests at the expense of America’s even after receiving sizeable arms and assistance packages.

Second, leaders will need to determine the ability to reach a settlement through rapprochement with regional rivals or other great powers with regional interests. This is particularly important if there is no viable regional ally or an ally who does not share

America’s threat perception. Achieving rapprochement requires a high degree of

179 diplomatic focus and a willingness to forego previous claims to achieve a peaceful settlement on outstanding security issues. Nixon and Kissinger successfully opened relations with China and eased tensions with the Soviet Union, both of which facilitated

American retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Obama unsuccessfully negotiated with Iran. Though eventually reaching a nuclear weapons agreement, Obama was unable to convince Iran to refrain from spreading its influence throughout the Middle East following American withdrawal.

Finally, leaders will have to judge whether the United States is willing and can afford to abandon a commitment if all else fails. This will require level-headed consideration of the strategic importance of regional commitments. Anywhere America retains a commitment has a degree of strategic importance; however, levels of importance are unequal, so leaders will need to focus on those most vital to national security. Doing so may mean abandoning a previous foreign commitment. President Nixon and President

Ford retained an interest in maintaining a free and democratic South Vietnam, but in the face of congressional opposition and more critical security challenges Ford opted to abandon South Vietnam. President Obama preferred to leave the interminable security challenges in the Middle East to focus on reengaging in East Asia. As pressure from

Congress and allies increased in the wake of the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War,

Obama was forced, however reluctantly, to reengage in the region at the expense of

American reorientation to Asia. While America might have withstood the economic and security shocks resulting from its continued disengagement, it allies could not which forced reintervention. Ultimately, President Obama misjudged the degree to which he

180 could reduce American commitments in the Middle East. So, how will these factors play out in future retrenchment attempts?

The Future of Syrian Withdrawal

Given the criteria mentioned above and elaborated upon in this project, it is worth considering the prospects of success for President Donald Trump’s recent decision to withdraw American military forces from Syria. The reaction from the media and foreign policy elites following President Trump’s announcement largely treated the decision as reckless and borderline illegitimate, while simultaneously implying that indefinite military deployments were the only legitimate option.463 To be clear, I am not examining the wisdom of President Trump’s decision, I am only assessing whether the relevant conditions exist for a successful outcome. Below I briefly provide a background on the

Syrian conflict, discuss President Trump’s decision to withdraw all American military forces from Syria, and apply the three criteria for retrenchment success – ally availability, ability to affect rapprochement with a rival, and ability to abandon an interest – to determine whether this attempted retrenchment is more likely to succeed or fail.

Syria was ruled by the Assad family for more than forty years, but antigovernment protests broke out in Syria in March 2011 during the Arab Spring. As protests spread and violence escalated, Syrian government forces began aggressively battling emerging political and armed opposition groups. By August 2011, the violent Syrian crackdown prompted President Obama to call for Syrian president Bashar al Assad to resign. Assad refused, and the rising Syrian civilian death doll and Syrian government’s use of

463 Conor Friedersdorf, “How the Press Sustains the Forever War,” The Atlantic, 21 December 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/forever-war/578800/. 181 chemical weapons resulted in Congress debating whether to assist Syrian opposition groups with lethal and non-lethal aid – they approved the latter.

President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress in 2014 to provide lethal support. The administration’s initial focus for support was for vetted opposition groups who would protect the Syrian people from Assad regime forces. However, the subsequent advance of ISIS from Syria across northern and western Iraq shifted the focus of support to counterterrorism efforts. Congress finally authorized an American-led train and equip mission to combat terror groups in Syria to defend the United States and its allies, and to establish the necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement to the Syrian conflict. The United States began air strikes in Syria in September 2014. In October

2014, it established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, which eventually included more than 70 partner countries. The Obama and Trump administrations also slowly increased the number of American military personnel in Syria from a few dozen to almost 2,000 by late 2017.464

The United States and coalition-backed forces in Syria managed to retake almost all the territory held by ISIS between 2015 and 2018. However, during this same period,

Russia, Iran, and the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah all intervened on behalf of Assad’s regime during military campaigns against opposition groups. The conflict between the opposing coalitions complicated the chaotic situation within Syria and contributed to a humanitarian crisis where more than 5.6 million Syrians fled to other countries and another 6.3 million became internally displaced. Though American-backed forces

464 Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response,” Congressional Research Service, RL33487, 21 September 2018, 1 and Appendix A, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33487/154. 182 contributed to the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control in Syrian, the Assad regime took advantage of this to make significant military and territorial gains at the expense of opposition groups.465 By February 2018, the conflict decisively shifted in Assad’s favor, thereby enabling Russia and Iran to entrench themselves in Syria and expand their influence throughout the region.466

President Trump called for an accelerated withdrawal of American forces from Syria in early 2018. His administration remained divided, however, with some officials arguing for a continued American presence to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS.467 The Syrian government under Assad had managed to weaken, defeat, or geographically isolate most of the American-backed opposition groups, so it faced little pressure to make concessions.468 Administration officials declared that the United States was committed to defeating ISIS.469 Retired ambassador James Jeffrey, the Secretary of State’s Special

Representative for Syria Engagement, stated on 6 September 2018 that the Trump administration intended to keep military forces in Syria beyond the end of the year to ensure the defeat of ISIS.470 However, on 19 December 2018, President Trump asserted

465 Ibid. 466 Daniel R. Coats, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, 13 February 2018, 20-21, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified- SSCI.pdf. 467 “Trump: Withdraw Troops from Syria. Trump’s Advisers: F That, “ Daily Beast, 3 April 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2084/apps/doc/A542663047/OVIC?u=upenn_main& sid=OVIC&xid= 2ddb37c4. 468 Humud, Blanchard, and Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria,” 2. 469 David M. Satterfield and Brett McGurk, “Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts to Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS,” US State Department, Washington, DC, 17 August 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/285202.htm. 470 Karen DeYoung “Trump Agrees to an Indefinite Military Effort and New Diplomatic Push in Syria, US Officials Say,” Washington Post, 6 September 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/ national-security/in-a-shift-trump-approves-an-indefinite-military-and- diplomatic-effort-in-syria-us-officials-say/2018/09/06/0351ab54-b20f-11e8-9a6a-565d92a3585d_ story.html. 183

ISIS was defeated in Syria, stating “[w]e have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency.”471 He then abruptly announced the full and immediate withdrawal of American forces, a policy the drew immediate criticism from

Congress, allies, the military, and within his administration.472

Regardless of the widespread criticism surrounding President Trump’s troop withdrawal from Syria – de facto retrenchment – what is the likelihood it will succeed? I argue that retrenchment will fail when a great power is unable to extricate itself from an existing commitment and is unable to free resources to address more critical challenges.

A great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are a possibility. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless

1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest.

How do these factors play out in the current case of attempted American withdrawal from Syria? First, is there an ally willing and able to accept responsibility for defeating

471 Quoted in Daniel L. Byman, “Trump’s Syria Pullout: A Quick Assessment,” Brookings Institution, 20 December 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/ 20/trumps-syria-pullout-a-quick-assessment/. 472 For example, see Marianne Levine, “Senate Rebukes Trump on Syria Withdrawal Plan,” Politico, 31 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/31/senate-passes- middle-east-policy-bill-1139338; Julian Borger and Martin Chulov, “Trump Shocks Allies and Advisers with Plan to Pull US Troops Out of Syria,” The Guardian, 19 December 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/us-troops-syria-withdrawal-trump; Ryan Browne, “Top US General Says Trump Did Not Consult Him on Syria Announcement,” CNN Politics, 5 February 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www. cnn.com/2019/02/05/politics/votel-trump-syria- withdrawal/index.html; and Paul Sonne, Josh Dawsey, and Missy Ryan, “Mattis Resigns After Clash with Trump Over Troop Withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 20 December 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ trump-announces- mattis-will-leave-as-defense-secretary-at-the-end-of-february/2018/12/20/e1a846ee-e147-11e8-ab2c- b31dcd53ca6b_story.html. 184

ISIS, creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement between Assad and oppositions groups, and countering Russian and Iranian influence in Syria? The answer appears to be no. Three potential candidates exist – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurds – but none appear willing or capable of filling the vacuum created by the United States’ departure.

While Turkey supports American withdrawal, it remains less concerned with defeating

Assad or ISIS than it is with America’s Kurdish ally, the People’s Protection Units

(YPG). Turkey views the YPG as an ally of the Kurdish Workers Party, a Kurdish militant group Turkey views as an enemy and terror group, a view shared by the United

States. Even before the American withdrawal, Turkey threatened to raid YPG areas. This threat not only risked confrontation with the United States, it demonstrated that Turkey is more interested in pursuing its own regional interests rather than America’s.473

Saudi Arabia was previously discussed, but it mimics Turkey’s behavior in that the

Saudis remain more concerned with conducting their proxy war against Iran than with promoting American interests in Syria. The Kurdish YPG, though arguably the best fighters against ISIS will be unable to focus on that threat if Turkey attacks them.

Moreover, abandonment of their Kurdish allies provided another example American abandonment of allies and lack of commitment so the YPG will likely be reluctant to pursue anything but their own interests. Lastly, allies outside of the region, like France and Britain who both have forces in Syria, sent those troops on the assumption that the

United States was committed to the fight. President Trump’s abrupt contradiction of his administration’s policy and failure to consult with these key allies will likely result in their unwillingness to help.474

473 Byman, “Trump’s Syria Pullout.” 474 Ibid. 185

Absent an ally willing to assume the United States’ security burden in Syria, can the

Trump administration pursue rapprochement with Russia and Iran? Again, the answer appears to be no. Russia began providing support to Assad in 2011 at the beginning of the

Syrian conflict. Over the course of 2015, Russia built up the number of its military personnel in Syria, introduced combat aircraft and other military equipment, then launched an active military intervention in September 2015.

Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the Assad regime simultaneously improved the capacity of the Syrian government forces and complicated operational and technical aspects of the United States’ military mission in Syria.475 This represents a strategic win for Russia, who backed President Assad and who will likely be unwilling to engage in rapprochement with the United States. Russia has a strong interest in maintaining its economic and political influence in Syria, which has long been a lucrative market for the Russian defense and intelligence sectors.476 The United States has almost no incentives it can offer the Russians to induce them to abandon their Syrian interests, nor does the United States have much leverage in negotiations over a situation which is effectively a de facto victory by the Syrian government. Therefore, rapprochement with

Russia regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely.

Iran also intervened in Syria at the invitation of President Assad. It began to empower pro-Assad militant groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, and the intervention placed

Iranian forces within Syria, a circumstance that Israel viewed as directly threatening its security. United States officials also viewed the Iranian intervention as a strategic threat

475 Humud, Blanchard, and Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria,” 27-30. 476 Lara Seligman, “The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria,” Foreign Policy, 28 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/28/unintended- consequences-trump-decision-withdraw-syria/. 186 to American interests in Syria and the Middle East. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated in 2018 that a goal of American policy in Syria was to reduce Iran’s influence,477 and other Trump administration officials described Iran’s presence in Syria as a potentially greater threat than the continuation of the Assad regime.478 Iran is using soft power and exerting its influence throughout Syria to create a land bridge from Iran to

Lebanon. Iran’s leaders are using strategies like ones they used with Hezbollah in

Lebanon to embed Iranian influence militarily, politically, economically, and culturally.

Iran is purchasing real estate, constructing Shiite mosques, and schools, and replacing

Sunni communities with pro-Assad ones, and even offering jobs to unemployed

Sunnis.479

Given Syria’s strategic importance to Iran’s regional goals, it seems unlikely Iranian leaders would be willing to engage in rapprochement with the United States. Moreover,

President Trump’s unilateral decision to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action, commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, and reimplement sanctions against Iran further incentivizes Iranian intransigence. President Trump might attempt to divide Russia and Iran by offering to ease sanctions against the latter; however, both have an interest in maintaining their influence in Syria and in sticking together in defiance of

American, European, and Middle Eastern pressure.480 Therefore, as with Russia, rapprochement with Iran regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely.

477 Ibid., 30. 478 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, “Review of the FY2019 Budget Request for the Department of State,” Washington, DC, 27 June 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/ hearings/review-of-the-fy2019-budget-request-for-the-department-of-state; and National Security Advisor John Bolton, “Full Transcript, Face the Nation,” CBS News, 1 July 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-transcript-face-the-nation-on-july-1-2018/. 479 Seligman, “The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria.” 480 Ibid. 187

Finally, absent an ally to assume America’s security burden in Syria, and Russian and

Iranian unwillingness to engage in rapprochement with the United States, can the Trump administration abandon American interests in Syria? Here again, the answer appears to be no, though President Trump’s idiosyncratic behavior may make it possible. When

President Trump announced the full withdrawal of American military forces from Syria, he essentially reduced to zero the United States’ ability to influence events. As Russia and Iran coordinate to expand their regional interests, this may bring them into contact with more vital declared American interests, for instance the uninterrupted flow of oil shipments through the Persian Gulf or Israeli security. These challenges would likely prompt a response that would reintroduce American forces in the region to protect interests and support diplomacy. President Trump’s decision also sparked immediate backlash from Congress, even from within his own party,481 so it seems likely that this domestic political opposition will influence plans for Syrian withdraw. This already appears to be happening as President Trump’s original call for the withdrawal of

American forces within thirty days was adjusted to allow approximately 1,000 troops to remain with no timeline for removal.482 So, it appears unlikely that the United States can

481 Levine, “Senate Rebukes Trump on Syria Withdrawal Plan,”; Rebecca Shabad, “McConnell Bucks Trump as Senate Votes Against Withdrawing Troops from Syria, Afghanistan,” NBC News, 31 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/mcconnell-bucks-trump- senate-votes-against-withdrawing-u-s-troops-n965561; Emma Dumain, “Lindsey Graham Slams Trump for Declaring Victory Over ISIS in Syria,” McClatchy DC Bureau, 19 December 2018, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.mcclatchydc. com/news/politics-government/congress/article223309535. html. 482 Spencer Ackerman, “Trump Wanted Out of Syria Immediately. Now US Says ‘No Timeline’ to Leave,” Daily Beast, 4 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https://www.thedailybeast.com/now-us-says- theres-no-timeline-to-leave-syria?ref=scroll; Paul Szoldra, “How the US Went from ‘Rapid Withdrawal’ to ‘No Timeline’ in Syria,” Task & Purpose, 4 January 2019, accessed 19 March 2019, at https:// taskandpurpose.com/syria-withdrawal-timeline. 188 abandon its interest in Syria and the Middle East. Therefore, President Trump’s retrenchment from Syria is likely to fail.

Relative Decline, Retrenchment, and Reorientation

The narratives of decline and retrenchment are distinct yet interconnected. Leaders have three choices when faced with a period of relative decline in which geopolitical competition reveals a mismatch be their country’s foreign commitments and resources.

First, they can muddle along and hope for the best. This, however, is not a strategy, but only a policy of inaction. Second, leaders can “rage against the dying of the light” and launch an attack against the perceived source of decline. This choice implicitly assumes that necessary resources for this course of action will be available and that the outcome will be favorable. In fact, neither may be true. Third, leaders can come to grips with emerging realities and adjust their policies within a process intended to reverse, or at least mitigate, the consequences of decline. This option, retrenchment and strategic reorientation, appears to offer the best chance for success, defined as regaining strategic solvency by reducing existing commitments to free resources for addressing more critical challenges. In evaluating these options, it is important to avoid conflating what is with that of what is preferred.

Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.483 It is the

483 For similar definitions see Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13; Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13; and Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 2-6. 189 core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. Retrenchment alleviates the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources” by reducing risks, shifting burdens, or economizing expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic solvency.484 Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a state to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests. This is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power, without which relative decline may become absolute.

States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension.

Despite retrenchment’s benefits, scholars and policymakers continue to believe in the importance of prestige, the need for credibility, and the dangers of appeasement. From this perspective, even the mere perception of decline or hint of retrenchment could lead to trouble.485 This flawed logic has buttressed policies of geopolitical overstretch and resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.486 Recent arguments for continued American engagement abroad rest upon this logic which holds that any decline in American engagement will destabilize the international order.487 Within the policymaking arena, the

484 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 660-661. 485 See Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Heartland, eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85-111; and Jennifer Milliken, “Metaphors of Prestige and Reputation in American Foreign Policy,” in Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, eds., Francis Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 217-238. 486 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), chapter 2; and Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 3-8. 487 Robert Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the US is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3-5; Robert Lieber, Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 9-12; Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Knopf, 2012), 133-139; and Robert Kaplan, “Where’s the American Empire When We Need It?” Washington Post, 3 December 2010, at 190 mantra about the indispensability of United States leadership for global peace and prosperity short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than critically evaluate the wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must maintain all its commitments and credibility regardless of the cost.488

The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East threaten important national interests, but the effects of America’s military overcommitment and eroding domestic resource base have resulted in strategic insolvency. Despite having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of sustained combat operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to outpace modernizing rivals like China and Russia.489 Elite polarization also diminishes the political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.490 Therefore, the crux of the current debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the resources necessary for continuing global leadership.

Moving forward, American foreign policy must confront two distinct challenges over the coming decades. The first challenge is how to develop a new approach to evolving

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 12/03/AR2010120303448.html? noredirect=on. 488 For instance, Hillary Clinton quoted in Scott Shane and Jo Becker, “After Revolt, a New Libya ‘With Very Little Time Left’,” New York Times, 29 February 2016; Leon Panetta, “Speech on Al-Qaeda,” Center for New American Security (November 2012); Rex Tillerson, “Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” (11 January 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/01/ 267394.htm. 489 David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the US Approach to Force Planning (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), xii. 490 Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura, Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2014), 7, 9, and 34. 191 patterns of geopolitical competition that fits within the United States’ intellectual and historical context of unfettered growth over the past two centuries. Another challenge involves evaluating the wisdom of attempting to sustain American primacy within the changing international order. These challenges, distinct but intertwined, exist at different levels of analysis and timeframes. The first focuses on the strategic ends and the means used to achieve them by successive presidential administrations, while the second concerns the trajectory of American power. Each challenge grapples with a different core question: the first concerns how American leaders use the country’s power, and the second deals with the quantity of available national power.491

Despite these differences, the two challenges of American foreign policy are interconnected in three ways. First, the United States’ ability to influence the international order and shape the strategic environment will decline in proportion to the extent that America experiences relative decline. This has implications for what exactly the United States will be able to achieve through any strategy that links ends and means.

Second, the policy decisions of American leaders have consequences for the country’s relative power, because these decisions will result in fiscal and strategic solvency or insolvency. Wise decisions to adjust the nation’s strategic ends to match its means will slow the inevitable long-term trajectory of decline, while poor decisions will have the opposite effect. Finally, leaders’ decisions must account for both an assessment of the country’s current relative power and an estimate of future levels. Misjudging either will

491 Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011), 803, accessed 20 March 2019, at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2894/doi/ epdf/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01005.x. 192 likely result in a mismatch between foreign policy and the strategic environment, which can hasten decline.492

If American leaders adopt a foreign policy focused on managing the loss of primacy and relative decline, then retrenchment offers the means for reducing commitments and ambitions. This will allow the United States to realign and reorient its power, so it can use its available resources to preserve core security interests. The alternatives involve maintaining a profligate foreign policy of securing every interest everywhere or escalating conflictual relations with rivals at the risk of not having the necessary resources when a moment of crisis arises. Either of these latter options will only hasten relative decline, since additional resources will be drained away in strategic rivalry with

China, military provocation of Iran, involvement in interminable Middle Eastern quagmires, and military interventions across northern Africa.493

492 Ibid. 493 Ibid., 822. 193

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Budget and an Update of the CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook. Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, March 2009.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq. US Department of State, Baghdad, Iraq, 17 November 2008.

Angelides, Phil et al. Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Washington DC, 2011).

British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. “Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options.” Third Report of Session 2016–17, 6 September 2016.

Bush, George W. “A Distinctly American Internationalism.” Speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 19 November 1999.

Bush, George W. “President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service.” National Cathedral, Washington, DC, 14 September 2001.

Bush, George W. “Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy.” West Point, 1 June 2002.

Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address.” Congress, Washington, DC, 29 January 2002.

Bush, George W. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.” White House, Washington, DC, 11 September 2011.

Bush, George W. “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, 31 January 2003.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush, Book 1, (2003).

Bush, George W. The National Security Strategy of the United States (White House, Washington, DC, September 2002).

Coats, Daniel R. “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, 13 February 2018.

194

Conversation between President Nixon and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew on 12 May 1969 quoted in “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972. Edited by Louis J. Smith, David H. Herschler, and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), Document 23.

Department of Defense. Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC, 2012).

Department of Defense. United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971).

Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970. Edited by Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 5.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. “President Eisenhower’s News Conference, April 7, 1954.” Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1954: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1954 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of American and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. US Department of State, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2 May 2012.

Ford, Gerald. “Remarks of the President to the Tulane Student Body.” Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, 23 April 1975.

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination to be Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 13 January 2009, accessed 4 January 2019, at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rm/ 113814.htm.

Humud, Carla E., Christopher M. Blanchard, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response.” Congressional Research Service, RL33487, 21 September 2018.

195

Letter from President Gerald Ford to Speaker of the House of Representatives Carl Albert, “President Ford Urges Rapid Action on Assistance to Cambodia,” Department of State Bulletin 72, no. 1864 (17 March 1975).

Manyin, Mark E. et al. “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

Memorandum for Record. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968. Edited by Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 166.

Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January- August 1968. Edited by Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 164.

Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January- August 1968. Edited by Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 154.

Memorandum from W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 15, 1975. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976. Edited by Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman, David Nickles, and Edward C. Keefer (2010), Document 17.

Minutes of National Security Council Meeting. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975. Edited by Bradley Lynn Coleman and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 285.

National Security Study Memorandum 1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970. Edited by Edward C. Keefer

196

and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 4.

National Security Study Memorandum 14. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972 eds. Steven E. Phillips and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 4.

Nixon, Richard M. “Address at the Air Force Academy Commencement Exercises.” Colorado Springs, CO, 4 June 1969, Public Papers of the Presidents, at http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 2081.

Nixon, Richard M. “Address to the Nation on Vietnam.” May 14, 1969, https://www. nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-vietnam-may-14-1969/.

Nixon, Richard M. “First Inaugural Address.” The American Presidency Project, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941.

Nixon, Richard M. “Question-and-Answer Session at the Executives’ Club of Chicago.” Public Papers of the Presidents, 15 March 1974.

Nixon, Richard M. US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace (Washington, DC, 1971).

Nixon, Richard M. US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973).

Nixon, Richard M. US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace (Washington DC, 1972).

Note of Meeting. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968. Edited by Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 310.

Notes of Meeting. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968. Edited by Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 104.

Notes of Meeting. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970. Edited by Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 158.

Obama, Barack. “Inaugural Address.” White House, Washington, DC, 21 January 2009.

Obama, Barack. “Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan.” New York Times, 15 July 2008.

197

Obama, Barack. “President's Address to United States Military Academy Cadets.” West Point, NY, 1 December 2009.

Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” White House, Washington, DC, 1 December 2009.

Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya.” White House, Washington, DC, 28 March 2011.

Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly.” United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY, 23 September 2009.

Obama, Barack. “Remarks on Military Operations in Iraq.” White House, Camp Lejeune, NC, 27 February 2009.

Obama, Barack. “Statement on the Crisis in Iraq.” White House, Washington, DC, 7 August 2014.

Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables (Washington DC).

Panetta, Leon. “Speech on Al-Qaeda.” Center for New American Security (November 2012).

President Bush and Iraq Prime Minister Maliki Sign the Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement. US Department of State, Iraqi Prime Minister’s Palace, Baghdad, Iraq, 14 December 2008.

Public Law 107-40. “Authorization for the Use of Military Force.”

Remarks by President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered. US Department of State, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009.

Report by President Nixon to the Congress. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy 1969-1976. Edited by Louis J. Smith, David H. Herschler, and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2003), Document 60.

Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, eds. Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 96, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1964- 68v06/d96.

Satterfield, David M. and Brett McGurk. “Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts to Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS.” US State Department, Washington, DC, 17 August 2018.

198

Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900. Milestones: 1899- 1913. Office of the Historian, US Department of State. Accessed 21 February 2019, at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. “Review of the FY2019 Budget Request for the Department of State.” Washington, DC, 27 June 2018.

Summary of Interagency Responses to NSSM 1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970. Edited by Edward C. Keefer and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), Document 44.

Table 6-8, Department of Defense BA by Title. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013, March 2012.

Text of Obama’s Speech in Afghanistan. New York Times, 1 May 2012.

The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1. Edited by Neil H. Petersen and John P. Glennon (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), Document 498.

Tillerson, Rex. “Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” Washington, DC, 11 January 2017.

United Nations Press Release. “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions.” United Nations, New York, 17 March 2011.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368. “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts.” United Nations, New York, 12 September 2001.

United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia. National Security Council 124/2, 13 February 1952. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, East Asia and the Pacific, XII, part 1, edited by David W. Mabon John P. Glennon (1984), Document 36.

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. “Military Personnel on Active Duty, By Location: 1969-1976.” Table 588, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980).

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. “Vietnam Conflict – US Military Forces in Vietnam and Casualties Incurred: 1961 to 1972.” Table 590, Statistical

199

Abstract of the United States, 1977 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980).

US Department of Defense. “Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget.” Washington, DC, 20 February 1970.

US Department of Defense. “Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973- 1977 Program.” Washington, DC, 17 February 1972.

US Department of Defense. “Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget.” Washington, DC, 17 February 1972.

US Federal State and Local Government Spending Fiscal Year 1969, at https://www. usgovernmentspending.com/year_spending_1969USbn_18bs2n_30#usgs302.

US Security Cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, 30 January 2019.

US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. “Statement by the Undersecretary of State at the Concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954.” In Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 89th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965).

US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967).

Vietnam Statistics-War Costs: Complete Picture Impossible. CQ Almanac 1975, 31st edition (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1976).

Books

Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel. Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Betts, Richard. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, 1973).

Brands, Hal. What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

200

Brawley, Mark. Afterglow or Adjustment: Domestic Institutions and Responses to Overstretch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Brooks, Stephen and William C. Wohlforth. World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Burr, William, editor. The Kissinger Transcripts: The Tope Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, New Press, 1999).

Chase, Philander, editor. Papers of George Washington, Vol. 7, Revolutionary War Series (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997).

Chollet, Derek. The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2016).

Claude, Inis. Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962).

Collier, David and Henry E. Brady, editors. Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2nd edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010).

Copeland, Dale. The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

Dueck, Colin. The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Eichengreen, Barry. Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Friedberg, Aaron. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Froman, Michael B. The Development of the Idea of Détente: Coming to Terms (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

Gallup, Alec M. and Frank Newport. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2007 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).

Gardner, Lloyd C. “Dominoes, Diem, and Death: 1952-1963, Introduction.” In America In Vietnam: A Documentary History, edited by William Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter LaFeber (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1985).

Garthoff, Raymond L. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, revised edition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

201

Gates, Robert. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014).

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Glaser, Charles. Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994).

Hart, B.H. Liddell. Strategy, 2nd revised edition (New York: Meridian, 1967).

Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The US and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979).

Hersh, Seymour. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983).

Ikenberry, G. John. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Indyk, Martin, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon. Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

Jacobson, Gary C. A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People (New York: Longman, 2007).

Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

Kagan, Robert. The World America Made (New York: Knopf, 2012).

Kaufman, Robert G. Dangerous Doctrine: How Obama’s Grand Strategy Weakened America (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2016).

Kelly, James A. “George W. Bush and Asia: An Assessment.” In George W. Bush and Asia: A First Term Assessment, edited by Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005).

202

Kennedy, Paul. “Conclusions.” In The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, edited by Gier Lundestad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).

Kerr, Malcom. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998).

Kimball, Jeffrey. The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the History of Nixon Era Strategy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004).

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Research in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994).

Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).

Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982).

Komine, Yukinori. Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008).

Kupchan, Charles. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Kupchan, Charles. The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Lacouture, Jean. Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).

LaFeber, Walter. “The Rise and Fall of American Power, 1963-1975: Introduction.” In America in Vietnam: A Documentary History, edited by William Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter LaFeber (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1985).

Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999).

203

Larson, Deborah Welch. “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” In Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Heartland. Edited by Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 85-111.

Layne, Christopher. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

Lemke, Douglas and Jacek Kugler, editors. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

Levy, Jack. “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict.” In Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221.

Levy, Jack. War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983).

Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam (London: Oxford University Press, 1980).

Lieber, Robert. Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the US is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Lieber, Robert. Retreat and its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Lippmann, Walter. US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950).

Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Security, 1969-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Lobell, Steven. The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

Lynch, Timothy. “Obama, Liberalism and US Foreign Policy.” In Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy, 2 ed., edited by Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge (London: Routledge, 2014).

204

MacDonald, Paul K. and Joseph M. Parent. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

Mann, James. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

McCrisken, Trevor and Mark Phythian. “The Offensive Turn: US Intelligence in the War on Terror.”, In Obama and the World.

McDermott, Rose. Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

Milliken, Jennifer. “Metaphors of Prestige and Reputation in American Foreign Policy.” In Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, edited by Francis Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 217-238.

Modeleski, George. Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972).

Montgomery, Evan Braden. In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

Mueller, John E. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973).

Mueller, John. The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Narizny, Kevin. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

National Security Council 5405, 16 January 1954, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia,” The Pentagon Papers, edited by Senator Mike Gravel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

Nish, Ian. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894- 1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966).

Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985).

Nixon, Richard M. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990).

O’Hanlon, Michael. The Wounded Giant: America’s Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity (New York: Penguin, 2011).

205

Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

Pickering, Jeffrey. Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (New York: Palgrave, 1998).

Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: A History in Documents (New York: Penguin, 1981).

Posen, Barry. Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

Powell, Robert. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Preble, Christopher A. The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

Press, Daryl G. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Rasler, Karen and William Thompson. The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490- 1990 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994).

Qingguo, Jia. “Partners or Competitors: A Choice to be Made.” In George W. Bush and Asia: A First Term Assessment, edited by Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (Princeton: Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2005), 117-127.

Reedy, George. Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 1982).

Rock, Stephen R. Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000).

Rock, Stephen. Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein, editors. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Ruddy, T. Michael. “A Limit to Solidarity: German, the United States, and the Vietnam War.” In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, vol. 2, edited by Detlef Junker et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

206

Schandler, Herbert Y. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Schweller, Randall L. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

Sestanovich, Stephen. Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

Singh, Robert. Barack Obama’s Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012).

Snyder, Jack. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Spruyt, Hendrik. Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Spykman, Nicholas J. America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942).

Sumida, Jon. In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972).

Thayer, Thomas C. War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

Tushman, Michael L. and Elaine Romanelli. “Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation.” In Research and Organizational Behavior, edited by Larry L. Cummins and Barry M. Staw (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 171-222.

Vali Nasr. The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday, 2013).

Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Weisiger, Alex. Logics of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

Whalen, Richard J. Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

207

Wicker, Tom. “The Wrong Rubicon.” In Who We Are: An Atlantic Chronicle of the United States and Vietnam, edited by Robert Manning and Michael Janeway (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).

Wicker, Tom. JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1968).

Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How American Left and South Vietnam Lost its War (Leavenworth: University of Kansas Press, 2004).

Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

Woodward, Bob. Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

Woodward, Bob. Obama’s Wars (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Journal Articles

Ahmari, Sohrab. “Uncontained: Obama’s Confused Iran Policy.” World Affairs 174, no. 4 (2011): 47-55.

Arena, Philip. “Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 2 (2008): 136-151.

Atkinson, Douglas B. and George W. Williford. “Should We Stay or Should We Go? Exploring the Outcomes of Great Power Retrenchment.” Research and Politics 3, no. 4 (2016): 1-6.

Baldwin, David A. “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy.” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 167-182.

Barry, Ben. “Libya’s Lessons,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011): 5-14.

Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 7-40.

Boot, Max. “The New American Way of War.” Foreign Affairs 82, no 4. (2003): 41-58.

Boyle, Michael J. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” International Affairs, 89, no. 1 (2013): 1-29.

Brooks, Stephen, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment.” International Security 37, no. 3 (2012): 7-51.

208

Carlsnaes, Walter. “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis.” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 245-270.

Chowdhurry, Shamsud D. “Turnarounds: A Stage Theory Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 19, no. 3 (2002): 249-266.

Christensen, Thomas and Jack Snyder. “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patters in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137- 168.

Clare, Joe and Vesna Danilovic. “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29, no. 1 (2012): 3-27.

Clarke, Michael and Anthony Ricketts. “Did Obama Have a Grand Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no.1 (2017): 295-324.

Clifford, Clark. “A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How it Evolved.” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 4 (1969): 601-622.

Dobbins, James F, Ellen Laipson, Helena Cobban, and Lawrence J. Korb. “US Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?” Middle East Policy 16, no. 3 (2009): 1-27.

Dolan, Chris J. “Obama’s Retrenchment-Protraction Doctrine: The Decline of the Middle East and the Rise of Asia and the Pacific” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 1 (2017): 54-58.

Doran, Michael Scott. “The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 17-25.

Dorsey, James “Expanding Regional Rivalries: Saudi Arabia and Iran Battle it Out in Azerbaijan.” International Policy Digest, 19 February 2018.

Drezner, Daniel W. “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Time.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4. (2011): 57-68.

Drezner, Daniel W. “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think),” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 52-79.

Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414.

Galbraith, John S. “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (1960): 150-168.

209

Gartzke, Erik. “War Is in the Error Term.” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 567-587.

Geddes, Barbara. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990): 131-150.

Gerges, Fawaz A. “The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment?” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 299-323.

Gilpin, Robert. “The Theory of Hegemonic War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613.

Haass, Richard N. “The Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 57 (2013): 57-67.

Haynes, Kyle. “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 189-203.

Haynes, Kyle. “Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015): 490-502.

Herring, George C. and Richard H. Immerman. “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’ Revisited.” Journal of American History 71, no. 2 (1984): 343-363.

Huntington, Samuel. “Coping with the Lippmann Gap.” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987): 453-477.

Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167-214.

Jervis, Robert. “Political Implications of Loss Aversion.” Political Psychology 13, no. 2 (1992): 187-204.

Jesperson, T. Christopher. “Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam.” Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 3 (2002): 439-473.

Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Eric Lorber. “Containing Iran: What Does It Mean?” Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012):51-63.

Kirshner, Jonathan. “Dollar Primacy and American Power: What’s at Stake?” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (2008): 418-438.

Kitchen, Nicholas. “The Obama Doctrine – Détente or Decline?” European Political Science 10, no. 1 (2011): 27-35.

210

Kolodziej, Edward A. “Congress and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Years.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32, no. 1 (1975): 167-179.

Komine, Yukinori. “The ‘Japan Card’ in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): 494-514.

Krieg, Andreas. “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 97-113.

Kriner, Douglas L. “Obama’s Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congress’s Continued Relevance in Military Affairs.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2014): 309- 327

Layne, Christopher. “The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the ‘Pax Americana’.” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 89-111.

Layne, Christopher. “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the ‘Pax Americana’.” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012): 203-213.

Levy, Jack. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987): 82-107.

Lindsay, James M. and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications.” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 33-49.

Locke, Richard and Kathleen Thelen. “Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and Oranges, Again,” American Political Science Association: Comparative Politics Newsletter 8 (1998): 1476-1487.

Longinotti, Edward. “Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: From Economic Determinism to Political Choice.” Contemporary British History 29, no. 3 (2015): 318-340.

Lustick, Ian S. “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias.” American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996): 605-618.

Mabon, Simon. “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.” Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012): 84-97.

MacDonald, Paul K. and Joseph M. Parent. “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment.” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 7-44.

Mastanduno, Michael, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry. “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action.” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 457-474.

211

Matthews, John. “Current Gains and Future Outcome: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter.” International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): 112-146.

Mead, Walter Russell. “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 69-79.

Mercer, Jonathan. “Rationality and Psychology in International Relations.” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 77-106.

Monteiro, Nuno P. “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful.” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 9-40.

Morrow, James. “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security.” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 207-233.

Nakayama, Toshihiro. “Strategic Patience in a Turbulent World: The Obama Doctrine and its Approach to the World.” Asia-Pacific Review 22, no. 1 (2015): 1-15.

Nixon, Richard M. “Asia After Viet Nam.” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967): 111-125.

Obama, Barack. “Renewing American Leadership.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 2- 16.

Parent, Joseph M. and Paul K. MacDonald. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment.” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (2011): 32-47.

Posen, Barry. “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 116-130.

Powell, Robert. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991): 1303-1320.

Powell, Robert. “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203.

Quinn, Adam. “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power.” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 803-824.

Ravenal, Earl G. “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments.” Foreign Affairs 49, no. 2 (1971): 201-217.

Reiter, Dan. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 27-43.

Ripsman, Norrin M. and Jack S. Levy. “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s.” International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 148-181.

212

Ross, Robert. “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive.” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 70-82.

Ryan, Curtis. “The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria.” Middle East Report no. 262 (2012): 28-31.

Sapolsky, Harvey M., Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press, “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty.” World Affairs 172, no. 2 (2009): 84-94.

Schultz, Kenneth A. “Perils of Polarization for US Foreign Policy.” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2017): 7-28.

Shabad, Rebecca. “McConnell Bucks Trump as Senate Votes Against Withdrawing Sick, Gary, Trita Parsi, Ray Takeyh, and Barbara Slavin, “Iran’s Strategic Concerns and US Interests.” Middle East Policy 15, no. 1 (2008): 1-18.

Simon, Steven and Jonathan Stevenson. “The End of Pax Americana: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes Sense.” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 6 (2015): 2-10.

Small, Melvin. “Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience.” Journal of Peace Research 24, no. 2 (1987): 185-198.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. “Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustment.” World Politics 15, no. 4 (1963): 655-688.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources.” World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 660-693.

Stein, Arthur A. “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order.” International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 355- 386.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000): 128-161.

Thompson, William R. “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment – Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 193-197.

Treisman, Daniel. “Rational Appeasement.” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 345-373.

Turner, John. “Great Powers as Client States in a Middle East Cold War.” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 124-134.

213

Valbjorn. Morton and Andre Bank. “The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Middle East Regional Politics.” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2011): 3-24.

Weisiger, Alex and Keren Yarhi-Milo. “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics.” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 473-495.

Wells, Jr., Samuel F. “British Strategic Withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere, 1904- 1906.” Canadian Historical Review 49, no. 4 (1968): 335-356.

Wendt, Alexander E. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-370.

Yoder Brandon K. “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals.” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019): 130-145.

Yoder, Brandon K. “Hedging for Better Bets: Power Shifts, Credible Signals, and Preventive Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 5 (2018): 1-27.

Newspaper and Magazine Articles

Ackerman, Spencer. “Trump Wanted Out of Syria Immediately. Now US Says ‘No Timeline’ to Leave.” Daily Beast, 4 January 2019.

Allison, Graham. “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, 24 September 2015, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.

Amies, Nick. “Growing Threat of al Qaeda in North Africa Prompts EU Action.” Deutsche Welle, 17 November 2011.

Arango, Tim and Michael S. Schmidt. “Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq.” New York Times, 18 December 2011.

Associated Press. “Budget Office Warns About Debt.” New York Times, 22 June 2011.

Barack Obama’s Remarks on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Guardian, 24 September 2009.

Bazzi, Mohamad. “The Growing U.S.-Iran Proxy Fight in Syria.” The Atlantic, 20 June 2017, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/iran-syria-trump- saudi-arabia-escalation-isis/530844/.

Blair, David and Alex Spillius. “Iran Shows Off Captured US Drone.” Telegraph, 8 December 2011.

214

Blair, David. “Iran Election: Barack Obama Refuses to ‘Meddle’ Over Protests” Telegraph, 17 June 2009.

Blair, David. “Iran Threatens to Close Strait of Hormuz Over EU Oil Sanctions.” Telegraph, 23 January 2012.

Bolton, John. “Full Transcript, Face the Nation.” CBS News, 1 July 2018.

Borger, Julian and Martin Chulov. “Trump Shocks Allies and Advisers with Plan to Pull US Troops Out of Syria,” The Guardian, 19 December 2018.

Browne, Andrew and Evan Ramstad. “US-South Korea Exercises Rile China.” Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2010.

Browne, Ryan. “Top US General Says Trump Did Not Consult Him on Syria Announcement.” CNN Politics, 5 February 2019.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “Half Past Nixon.” Foreign Policy 3 (Summer, 1971): 3-21.

Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Redefining the Role of the US Military in Iraq.” New York Times, 21 December 2008.

Byman, Daniel L. “After the Hope of the Arab Spring, The Chill of an Arab Winter.” Washington Post, 1 December 2011.

Cheney, Dick. Interviewed by Tim Russert. Meet the Press, NBC News, 16 March 2003.

Clark, Colin. “US Military Could Not Handle One Major Theater Operation if Sequestration Sticks.” Breaking Defense, 18 September 2013.

Clinton, Hillary. “America’s Pacific Century.” Foreign Policy 189 (2011): 56-63.

Cooper, Helene. “Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops.” New York Times, 17 February 2009.

Dancel, Raul. “Obama Foreign Policy Speech: Philippine Experts Doubt US Intention to Help Asian Allies.” The Straits Times, 30 May 2014.

Dawar, Anish. “Naval Standoff Threatens US-China Military Relations.” The Guardian, 13 March 2009.

Denyer, Simon. “Obama’s Rebalancing Turns into a Big Foreign Policy Headache.” The Guardian, 28 January 2014.

215

DeYoung, Karen. “Trump Agrees to an Indefinite Military Effort and New Diplomatic Push in Syria, US Officials Say.” Washington Post, 6 September 2018.

Dickerson, John F. and Nancy Gibbs. “George Bush: I’ve Gained Strength,” Time 164, no. 10 (6 September 2004).

Donnelly, Thomas. “We Can Afford to Spend More, and We Need To.” New York Times, 9 September 2012.

Dumain, Emma. “Lindsey Graham Slams Trump for Declaring Victory Over ISIS in Syria.” McClatchy DC Bureau, 19 December 2018.

Reston, James. “Eisenhower Asks ‘Security’ for US and ‘Solvency’ Too: Urges Bipartisan Commission be Set Up to Study Operation of Defense Department.” New York Times, 26 September 1952.

Ferguson, Niall. “The Big Dither.” Newsweek, 20 March 2011.

Finney, John E. “Nixon Asks Easing of US War Role.” New York Times, 2 August 1968.

Finney, John W. “Senate Panel Asks US Commitments Be Put to Congress; Senators Bid Executive Consult on Foreign Pledges.” New York Times, 13 March 1969.

Finney, John W. “Senators to Sift Foreign Policies; Symington Panel to Review Influence of Military.” New York Times, 4 February 1969.

Friedberg, Aaron. “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics.” National Interest 114 (2011): 18-27.

Friedersdorf, Conor. “How the Press Sustains the Forever War,” The Atlantic (2018), accessed at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/forever-war/578800/.

Gerges, Fawaz A. “Saudi Arabia and Iran Must End Their Proxy War in Syria.” The Guardian, 15 December 2013.

Gerson, Michael. “The Reluctant Commander in Chief.” Washington Post, 24 September 2010.

Ghattas, Kim. “Iran-Saudi Tensions Simmer in Lebanon.” BBC News, 20 May 2016.

Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic Monthly 317, no. 3 (2016): 70- 90.

Gordon, Michael R. and Jeff Zeleny. “Obama Envisions New Iran Approach.” New York Times, 2 November 2007.

216

Hayden, Tom. “Obama Announced Afghanistan Escalation.” The Nation, 2 December 2009.

Hilsenrath, Jon. “Gates Says Libya Not Vital National Interest.” Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2011.

Kaplan, Robert. “Where’s the American Empire When We Need It?” Washington Post, 3 December 2010.

Karon, Tony. “Iraq’s Government, Not Obama, Called Time on the US Troop Presence.” Time, 21 October 2011.

Kessler, Glenn. “Iran, Trying to Skirt Sanctions, Attempts to Set Up Banks Worldwide.” Washington Post, 23 October 2010.

Kirkpatrick, David D. “In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution.” New York Times, 1 November 2011.

Kissinger, Henry. “Ending the Vietnam War.” New York Times, 23 March 2003.

Koelbl, Susanne, Samiha Shafy and Bernhard Zand. “Saudi Arabia and Iran The Cold War of Islam.” Der Spiegel, 9 May 2016.

Landler Mark. “US Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016.” New York Times, 27 May 2014.

Landler, Mark and Helene Cooper. “Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan.” New York Times, 22 June 2011.

Levine, Marianne. “Senate Rebukes Trump on Syria Withdrawal Plan.” Politico, 31 January 2019.

Levs, Josh. “Fact Check: Was Obama 'silent' on Iran 2009 protests?” CNN Politics, 9 October 2012.

Lizza, Ryan. “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy.” The New Yorker, 2 May 2011.

Mackey, Robert. “Obama Addresses Iran by Web Video.” New York Times, 20 March 2010.

Mead, Walter Russell. “The Carter Syndrome.” Foreign Policy 177, no. 177 (2010): 58- 64.

Meo, Nick. “Libya Dispatch: As Lawlessness Spreads, are the Rebel ‘Good Guys’ Turning Bad?” Telegraph, 5 November 2011.

217

Meo, Nick. “Libya: Revolutionaries Turn on Each Other as Fears Grow for Law and Order.” Telegraph, 31 October 2011.

Most Americans Name Just Five Countries That the US Should Defend Militarily. Rasmussen Report, 8 September 2010.

Nordland, Rod and David D. Kirkpatrick. “Islamists’ Growing Sway Raises Questions for Libya.” New York Times, 14 September 2011.

Nye, Joseph S. “American Power and Foreign Policy.” New York Times, 7 July 1976.

Oladipo, Tomi. “Saudi Arabia and Iran Fight for Africa's Loyalty.” BBC News, 7 January 2016.

Panda, Ankit. “Why Is Pakistan Interested in Brokering Peace Between Iran and Saudi Arabia?” The Diplomat, 22 January 2016.

Peyrouse, Sebastien. “Iran’s Growing Role in Central Asia? Geopolitical, Economic and Political Profit and Loss Account.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 6 April 2014.

Pomfret, John. “China’s Strident Tone Raises Concerns Among Western Governments, Analysts.” Washington Post.

Ravenal, Earl G. “The Political-Military Gap.” Foreign Policy 3 (1971): 22-40.

Reed, John. “Mapped: The US Military’s Presence in Africa.” Foreign Policy, 1 May 2013.

Rogin, Josh. “Iran and Saudi Arabia Clash Inside Syria Talks,” Bloomberg, 4 November 2015.

Rothkopf, Davis. “How Bush, Obama, and Trump Ended Pax America.’ Washington Post, 27 June 2017.

Rubin, Jennifer. “The Iran-Saudi Arabia Proxy War.” Washington Post, 6 January 2016.

Saudi Arabia’s Use of Soft Power in Iraq is Making Iran Nervous. The Economist, 8 March 2018.

Seerat, Rustam Ali. “Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan.” The Diplomat, 14 January 2016.

Seligman, Lara. “The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from Syria.” Foreign Policy, 28 January 2019.

218

Sengupta, Kim. “Leaked UN Report Reveals Torture, Lynchings and Abuse in Post- Gaddafi Libya.” Independent, 24 November 2011.

Troops from Syria, Afghanistan.” NBC News, 31 January 2019.

Shane, Scott and Jo Becker. “After Revolt, a New Libya ‘With Very Little Time Left’.” New York Times, 29 February 2016.

Shankar, Abha. “The Saudi-Iran Rivalry and Sectarian Strife in South Asia.” The Diplomat, 6 October 2016.

Shanker, Thom and Rick Gladstone. “Iran Fired on Military Drone in First Such Attack, U.S. Says.” New York Times, 9 November 2012, A1.

Slaughter, Anne Marie, “Interests vs. Values? Misunderstanding Obama’s Libya Strategy.” New York Review of Books, 30 March 2011.

Sonne, Paul, Josh Dawsey, and Missy Ryan. “Mattis Resigns After Clash with Trump Over Troop Withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan.” Washington Post, 20 December 2018.

Spindle, Bill and Margaret Coker. “The New Cold War.” Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2011.

Staff Writer. “Benghazi Declared ‘Islamic emirate’ by Militants.” Al Arabiya News, 31 July 2014.

Swaine, Michael D. “Perceptions of an Assertive China.” China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (2010): 1-19.

Szoldra, Paul. “How the US Went from ‘Rapid Withdrawal’ to ‘No Timeline’ in Syria.” Task & Purpose, 4 January 2019.

Tharoor, Ishaan. “The Saudi-Iranian Cold War: Is This the Future of the Middle East?” Time, 17 May 2011, at http://world.time.com/2011/05/17/the-saudi-iranian-cold-war- is-this-the-future-of-the-middle-east/.

Thurston, Alexander. “How Far Does Saudi Arabia’s Influence Go? Look at Nigeria.” Washington Post, 31 October 2016.

Tisdall, Simon. “Iran-Saudi Proxy War in Yemen Explodes into Region-Wide Crisis.” The Guardian, 26 March 2015.

Trump: Withdraw Troops from Syria. Trump’s Advisers: F That. Daily Beast, 3 April 2018.

219

UN Security Council Concern Over Libya Arms Stockpile. BBC News, 1 November 2011.

Warrick, Joby and Steven Mufson. “Iran Threatens US Ships, Alarms Oil Markets.” Washington Post, 3 January 2012.

Watson, Kathryn. “Where Does the US Have Troops in Africa, and Why?” CBS News, 23 October 2017.

Whitlock, Craig. “China’s Political and Military Leaders Split Over Ties to Washington, Gates Says.” Washington Post, 4 June 2010.

Wilson, James Q. “How Divided Are We?” Commentary, 1 February 2006, at https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/how-divided-are-we/.

Wilson, Scott. “Obama Cautious on Iran Protests.” Washington Post, 15 February 2011.

Zakaria, Fareed. “The Strategist.” Time, 30 January 2012.

Zoellick, Robert B. “A Presidency of Missed Opportunities: Unlike Nixon in the Wake of Vietnam, Obama has Failed to Offset Retrenchment with a Strategic Initiative.” Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2014.

Other Secondary Sources

Baily, Martin Neil and Douglas J. Elliott. “The US Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go from Here?” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, June 2009.

Bonds, Timothy M. Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. McDonald. Army Deployments to OIF and OEF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010).

Byman, Daniel L. “Trump’s Syria Pullout: A Quick Assessment.” Brookings Institution, 20 December 2018.

Chang, Felix K. “Obama’s Visit to Asia and US Alliances.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 30 April 2014.

Gallup Poll News Service. Survey #773 (1/1/1969-1/6/1969). Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/documents/ questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO077.

Gallup Poll News Service. Survey #781 (05/22/1969-05/27/1969). Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/ documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0781.

220

Gallup Poll News Service. Survey #783 (06/19/1969-06/24/1969). Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/ documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0783.

Gallup Poll News Service. Survey #789 (10/02/1969-10/07/1969). Gallup Brain Database, accessed 12 October 2018 at https://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5952/ documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO078.

Gause, III, F. Gregory. “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War.” Brookings Doha Analysis Paper, no. 11, Brookings Institution (2014): 1-33.

Kane, Tim. “Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2005.” Heritage Foundation, 24 May 2006.

McCarthy, Niall. “The US Has Ratcheted Up Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia.” Statistica, 16 October 2018.

Newport, Frank, Jeffrey M. Jones, and Joseph Carroll. “Gallup Poll Review: Key Points About Public Opinion on Iraq.” The Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing (August 2007).

Ochmanek, David, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price. U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the US Approach to Force Planning (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017).

Pew Research Center. America’s Place in the World 2009: An Investigation of Public and Leadership Opinion About International Affairs (Washington, DC, 2009).

Smeltz, Dina, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura. Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2014).

Telhami, Shibley and Steven Kull. “The American Public on the 9/11 Decade: A Study of American Public Opinion.” Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks, 8 September 2011.

The Candidates on US-Iran Policy. Council on Foreign Relations, 31 October 2012.

221