University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2019 Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation Travis E. Robison University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Robison, Travis E., "Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3270. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Security With Solvency: Retrenchment And Strategic Reorientation Abstract What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decision makers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Political Science First Advisor Alex Weisiger Keywords Retrenchment, Security, Strategic Reorientation, Strategy Subject Categories International Relations This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3270 SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY: RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC REORIENTATION Travis E. Robison A DISSERTATION in Political Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 Supervisor of Dissertation _______________________ Alex Weisiger Associate Professor, Political Science Graduate Group Chairperson ________________________ Alex Weisiger, Associate Professor, Political Science Dissertation Committee Michael C. Horowitz, Professor, Political Science Avery Goldstein, Professor, Political Science For Andrew and Sarah ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Writing and researching a dissertation is an individual effort; however, the project would never have come to fruition without support, insights, and encouragement from numerous people. Countless individuals aided me in my doctoral endeavor, and I’m grateful for their interest, comments, and recommendations. Several individuals stand out as the crucial element for my success. Their tireless mentorship, coaching, teaching, and encouragement ensured I completed my work and, hopefully, added something of value to the academic enterprise. Any errors or faults in my work occurred because of my own failings and in no way reflect upon the following people who generously took the time to help me advance my project: Alex Weisiger, Michael Horowitz, Avery Goldstein, Brendan O’Leary, Robert Davis III, Will Reno, Buddhika Jayamaha, Ed Guelfi, Meghan Garrity, Troels Skadhauge, Chris Blair, and Josh Schwartz. To these individuals I can only offer my heartfelt gratitude and say, thank you. iii ABSTRACT SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY: RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC REORIENTATION Travis E. Robison Alex Weisiger What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework for assessing the utility of retrenchment. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT iii ABSTRACT iv LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES vii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 The Puzzle 1 Core Argument 4 The Retrenchment Debate 5 Retrenchment and its Purpose 9 Why This Matters 12 Research Design 14 Methods 15 Defining and Measuring the Variables 16 Case Selection 19 Case Summaries 21 Chapter Outline 25 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 28 Core Theoretical Argument 28 Key Assumptions 29 Retrenchment 30 Explaining Variation in Retrenchment Outcomes 32 Alternative Explanations 39 CHAPTER 3: RETRENCHMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1975 44 International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment 46 The Road to Overcommitment, 1954-1968 46 Military Overcommitment 55 Declining Domestic Capacity 57 Deciding to Withdraw 60 Framework for Retrenchment, 1969-1972 64 Lowering Costs 66 Managing Withdrawal 72 Realignment and Reorientation, 1973-1975 78 Diminishing Importance of Vietnam 78 Abandoning American Interests in Vietnam 79 Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Aftermath 82 Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 85 Level of Reduced Commitment 85 Effects on Allies and Adversaries 87 Outcome 89 v Alternatives 93 CHAPTER 4: RETRENCHMENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-2015 96 International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment 98 The Road to Overcommitment, 2001-2008 98 Military Overcommitment 103 Declining Domestic Capacity 104 Considering Withdrawal 108 Framework for Retrenchment, 2009-2011 111 Lowering Costs 113 Managing Withdrawal 118 Failing to Realign and Reorient, 2012-2015 130 Ally Failure to Uphold Existing Security Order 130 Failed Rapprochement with Iran 134 Inability to Abandon Middle East Interests 137 Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 143 Level of Reduced Commitment 143 Effects on Allies and Adversaries 147 Outcome 150 Alternatives 154 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 157 Security and Solvency 157 Findings 162 Alternatives 169 Implications for Scholarship 174 Policy Implications 177 The Future of Syrian Withdrawal 181 Relative Decline, Retrenchment, and Reorientation 189 BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 vi LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES Figures Figure 1. Four-stage strategic reorientation model 11 Figure 2. Successful American retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975 23 Figure 3. Failed American retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015 25 Figure 4. Variables affecting American retrenchment from Southeast Asia 46 Figure 5. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from the Middle East 97 Tables Table 1. Considered universe of cases 20 Table 2. Hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes 39 Table 3. Alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes 42 Table 4. Hypotheses and summary of successful retrenchment 92 Table 5. Alternative hypotheses of successful retrenchment 95 Table 6. Hypotheses and summary of failed retrenchment 153 Table 7. Alternative hypotheses of failed retrenchment 156 vii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION “A political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces.”1 The Puzzle Sustainable foreign policies balance a state’s international security commitments with its available domestic resources.2 At times, however, rising foreign competition, costly overcommitment abroad, and declining domestic resources unbalance a state’s foreign policy or constrain its ability to project power abroad.3 Given these circumstances, how does a great power realign its strategic priorities? In other words, how can leaders effectively respond to international relative decline? History shows that leaders must respond to these conditions or risk strategic insolvency that jeopardizes national security. For example, the Roman’s failure to mitigate the effects of trade disruption, political discord, and multiplying security threats during the late third century ultimately led to imperial collapse. The seventeenth century Ottoman and