Hillary Wasserman, Michael Quinn, and Tyler Jacobs Conflicts, Cuisine
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Hillary Wasserman, Michael Quinn, and Tyler Jacobs Conflicts, Cuisine, and Diaspora: A Case Study in Iraq Johanna Mendelson Forman, School of International Service Wasserman and Jacobs: University Honors Quinn: University Honors in International Studies Spring 2014 2 Abstract This paper explores the relationship of a country’s cuisine and its history of conflict through the lens of a Washington, D.C. area restaurant. Specifically focusing on Iraq, the paper provides historical context for the Iran-Iraq War and the First Gulf War and follows the story of local restaurateurs Laheeb and Mowafak Ashagra. Their journey from Iraq to Sweden to the United States, and their experience opening a restaurant, shows the unexpected and important role that a country’s food plays during conflict, as a connector in the Diaspora, and as a source of healing. 3 Conflicts, Cuisine, and Diaspora: A Case Study in Iraq Conflict in Iraq has been a part of Laheeb and Mowafak Ashagra’s lives for decades. Mowafak fought during the Iran-Iraq War and the family chose to leave Iraq at the start of the First Gulf War. They then watched with horror as the Second Gulf War continued to destroy the country they loved so dearly and rendered it unrecognizable. Their restaurant, Tigris Grill in Oakton, VA, shows Americans the positive side of Iraqi culture that they do not learn about in the news. The Iraqi cuisine served at the restaurant is comforting to both Iraqis and Americans alike, and brings a piece of home to the Ashagras and to the broader Iraqi community in the DC area. A History of Conflict The Iran-Iraq War was one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts of the twentieth century, lasting nearly eight years from 1980-1988, resulting in over one million deaths in both countries. The war was the thought child of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who sought to take advantage of Iran’s weakness in the aftermath of their Islamic Revolution in 1979 to annex territory that he claimed to be part of the Arab homeland. He also had hopes to tilt the regional balance of power from Iran to Iraq and to curb the new revolutionary regime’s influence on Iraq’s Shia majority.1 Although Saddam had hoped for an easy victory over Iranian military forces that had been weakened by post- revolution purges, this was not to be the case. Despite gaining territory for the first two years of the war, by June of 1982, Iraq was on the defensive, and would remain so until 1988 when a UN-sponsored a ceasefire that saw a return to prewar borders.2 The Iran- 1 Ian Black, “Iran and Iraq remember a war that cost more than a million lives,” The Guardian, September 23, 2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary. 2 Afshin Molavi. The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Journey to Freedom, (London: WW Norton & Company, 2005): 152. 4 Iraq War has often been compared to World War I, both seeing heavy use of trench- warfare, human wave attacks through no-man’s land, and use of chemical weapons.3 Like World War I, however, it has been overshadowed by other wars. In the West especially, the Iran-Iraq War is largely forgotten in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite this, the war continues to cast a shadow over the people of Iran and Iraq, where its brutality is not forgotten.4 Following the World War I comparison, the Iran-Iraq War became a war of attrition after June 1982, when Ayatollah Khomeini rejected a ceasefire offer by Saddam.5 As Saddam’s envisioned quick annexation became a prolonged and brutal affair, the civilian populations of both countries were strongly affected. In Iraq, the Dynamic Defense strategy was adopted in 1986, and it was announced that all civilians had to take part in the war effort. All male university students were drafted, and the universities shut down. Saddam began to strengthen his personality cult, and an increasing number of demonstrations were held in support of him.6 As early as 1982 Saddam had already begun a domestic terror campaign: he executed officers for failures in the battlefield, and cracked down on the Shia community.7 The worst internal actions taken by Saddam at this time were against the Kurds, mostly through the al-Anfal Campaign from 1986-1988. As the Iranians supported Kurdish insurgents, Saddam undertook genocidal action, killing 50,000-100,000 Kurds, including through the use of 3 Ervand Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran, (Cambridge University Press, 2008): 171. 4 Black. 5 Roger Hardy. “The Iran-Iraq War: 25 years on.” BBC News, September 22, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4260420.stm. 6 Efraim Karsh. The Iran-Iraq War: 1980-1988, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002): 1-8. 7 Ibid: 12-16. 5 chemical weapons.8 Likewise, Saddam and his Baathist Party increased repression against Shia Muslims, including the massacre of 143 civilians in Dujail.9 Iran likewise saw repression and civilian suffering. There were mass executions of members of the left- wing MEK party, who were opposed to the war. The economic toll was also quite hard on Iran, and it saw a deep decline in morale from 1987-1988 as its citizens grew weary of total war, contributing to Iran’s eventual acceptance of a ceasefire in 1988.10 Ultimately, the Iran-Iraq War produced one of the largest conflicts of the post-World War II world, with great suffering on both sides, while neither saw any strategic gain. It would also open the door to even more conflict in the future. The first continuation of the conflict that began during the Iran-Iraq War was the Gulf War. Like the war before it, the Gulf War had elements of irredentism. Saddam claimed that Kuwait was part of Iraq, and had been separated only by colonial adventurism by the British.11 The more immediate cause, however, was the massive debt Iraq had incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq had a debt of $130 billion after the war, $67 billion of which had been loaned by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Jordan.12 Iraq accused Kuwait of producing oil beyond quotas set by OPEC to keep oil prices low, which hurt both Iraq’s ability to pay back its debt and its economic recovery from the damage inflicted by the war.13 Amidst these disputes, Saddam made the decision to invade Kuwait in early August 1990, quickly defeating the smaller Kuwaiti forces. 8 Human Rights Watch. “Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds,” July 1993. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. 9 James Menendez. “Seeking justice in Dujail.” BBC News, November 25, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4350104.stm. 10 Abrahamian: 182-85. 11 Jose Stork and Ann M. Lesch. “Background to Crisis: Why War?” Middle East Report 167, 1990: 11-18. 12 John Pike. “Iraq debt: Non-Paris Club Creditors,” GlobalSecurity.org, September 30, 2004. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/ch2_anxd_img06.jpg. 13 Stork and Lesch: 23-24. 6 Despite having supported Iraq during its war against Iran, after the invasion of Kuwait and Saddam’s subsequent verbal attacks on Saudi Arabia, the United States intervened in January 1991 with aerial bombardment. Unlike the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War was swift. Only 100 hours after the U.S. and its allies began a ground assault in late February, a ceasefire was declared.14 The true toll on Iraq of the war was not the actual conflict, which saw relatively low casualties, but the aftermath. Immediately after the ceasefire, goaded by broadcasts from CIA radio stations and Voice of America, an uprising against Saddam began in March 1991. Nearly 100,000 civilians were killed in the military’s suppression of the uprisings, and some two million people were displaced, many fleeing the country.15 The other enduring effect of the Gulf War were the sanctions against Iraq imposed by the UN Security Council with the intent to force payment of war reparations and prevent the further development of weapons of mass destruction. These sanctions placed restrictions on imports and exports, greatly restricting oil exports.16 The oil sector formed 61% of Iraq’s GNP in 1989, and the effects of restrictions on oil exports was devastating. Per capita income fell from $3,510 in 1989 to $450 in 1996. As well, Iraq was forced to introduce food rations of 1000 calories per person per day, which is only 40% of the daily requirement.17 The food situation only began to improve after 1997 when the Oil-for-Food Program was initiated, with consumption eventually reaching 2150 calories per day in 1999. However, it was still 14 Frontline. “Chronology of the Gulf War,” PBS. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/cron/ 15 Human Rights Watch. “Endless Torment: Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath,” June, 1992. http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm. 16 UN Security Council Resolution 687. April 8, 1991. http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf. 17 B. Sen. “2003 IRQ: Iraq Watching Briefs – Overview Report, July 2003,” UNICEF. http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_29697.html. 7 estimated that in 2000 families spent 75% of their income on food.18 As a result of post- war turmoil and the sanctions, UNICEF estimates that as many 500,000 unnecessary deaths of children occurred.19 A further and far more costly legacy of the sanctions is that they were used as one of the pretexts for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.