Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan

Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro August 18, 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Security Indicators

1.1 Estimated Number of Afghan Civilian Fatalities as a Direct Result of Fighting Between Pro-Government Forces 4 and Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), 2006-2009 UPDATED 1.1.A Estimated Total Afghan Civilian Casualties by Month, 2007 & 2008 5 1.1.B Detail of Estimated 2008 Afghan Civilian Fatalities, by Incident Type 5 1.2 U.S. and Coalition Troop Fatalities since October 7, 2001 6 1.3 Cause of Death for U.S. Troops 6 1.4 American Military Fatalities by Category, October 7, 2001-Present 7 1.5 U.S. Troops Wounded in Action since October 7, 2001 7 1.6 British Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since 2006 8 1.7 Canadian Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since 2006 8 1.8 Non-US Coalition Troop Fatalities by Country since October 2001 9 1.9 Proportion of Annual U.S. and Coalition Fatalities by Various Causes NEW 9 1.10 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Fatalities, January 2007-Present 10 1.11 American Troops Deployed to Afghanistan by Mission 10 1.12 Troops Committed to NATO’s International Security Assistance Mission (ISAF) by Country 11 1.13 Total NATO-ISAF Manpower by Regional Command, Since October 2006 11 1.14 Size of Afghan Security Forces on Duty 12 1.15 Annual Growth of Afghan National Army (ANA), by Number of Troops, 2003-Present 12 1.16 Annual Recruitment Figures for Afghan National Army (ANA) 12 1.16.A Capability Milestone (CM) Assessment of Afghan National Army (ANA) Units and Headquarters 13 1.17 Detailed Breakdown of Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces 13 1.18 Defense Assessment of Afghan National Police (ANP) Capabilities 14 1.19 Recruitment Figures for the Various Programs of the Afghan National Police (ANP), March 2007-March 2008 14 1.20 Number of U.S. and NATO Teams/Personnel Required and Assigned to Train and Mentor Afghan National 15 Security Forces (ANSF) 1.21 Number and Nationality of Personnel Devoted to the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission to Afghanistan 16 1.22 U.S. Departments of Defense and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 17 2002-2009 UPDATED 1.22.A Appropriated U.S. Funding for Afghanistan by Agency, FY 2001-FY 2009 Bridge 17 1.23 Number of Insurgent Attacks by Month and Type, January 2007-Present 18 1.23.A Number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Events by Month, 2007-Present 18 1.24 Comparison of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Events by Province and Regional Command (RC), Weeks 1- 19 22 (January thru Late May), 2008 and 2009 1.25 U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Authorized/On Hand Staffing by Location 20 1.26 Country Leadership and Location of Non-U.S. PRT’s 20 1.27 Estimated Number of Afghan Refugees in the Region by Location 21 1.28 Afghan Refugees Voluntarily Repatriated by Country, 2002-2008 21 1.29 Estimated Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) 21

2 Governance and Rule of Law Indicators

2.1 Afghanistan Population and Demographic Information 22 2.2 Size, Gender, and ethnic Makeup of Afghanistan’s Main Legislative Bodies 22

2 2.3 Where Afghans Choose to Take Different Types of Legal Cases 23 2.4 Highest Level Degree Acquired by Judges Responding to a Random Survey 23 2.5 Access to Legal Resources for Judges Responding to a Random Survey 23 2.6 Annual Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (Hectares) and Percentage of Global Cultivation, 1990-2008 24 2.7 Annual Opium Production in Afghanistan (Metric Tons) and Percentage of Global Production, 1990-2008 24 2.8 Opium Poppy Cultivation Levels in Afghanistan (with Top-Producing Provinces), 2004-2008 25 Snapshot Comparison of Afghanistan’s Top Opium-Producing Provinces, Based on Amount of Land Devoted to 2.9 25 Cultivation, 2004 & 2008 2.10 Monthly Farm-Gate Cost of Dry Opium Since September 2004 (US$/KG) 26 2.11 Afghanistan’s Rank in Reporters Without Borders’ Index of Press Freedom, 2002-2008 26 2.12 Afghanistan’s Rank in Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perceptions Index 27 2.13 Afghanistan’s Rank in the Brookings Institution’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, 2008 27

3 Economic and Quality of Life Indicators

3.1 Annual Inflation 28 3.2 Nominal GDP (Total and Growth), 2003-2009 UPDATED 28 3.3 GDP Growth and Sector Contributions to Growth, 2003-2007 28 3.3.A Annual Production of Major Agricultural Produce, by Planting Season 29 3.3.B Value of Exported Afghan Agricultural Produce, 1999-2007 29 3.4 Breakdown of Afghan Annual Budget (Core vs. External), FY 2005/2006 thru 2008/2009 UPDATED 30 3.5 Comparison of Electricity Supply Sources and Capacity: 1979, 2002 and 2007 30 3.6 Estimated Number of Telephone Users in Afghanistan by Year, 2002-2007 30 3.7 Estimated Percentage of Afghans with Access to Water/Sanitation Facilities 30 3.8 Education Metrics 31 3.9 Poverty Levels, 2007 31 3.10 Foreign Aid Pledged, Committed and Disbursed, 2002-2011 32 3.11 Annual Value of Imports and Exports, with Top Trade Partners, 2002-2006 32 3.12 Microfinance Clients, Borrowers and Loan Amounts 32 3.13 Healthcare Metrics 33

4 Pakistan

4.1 Comparison of Various Metrics from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) vs. the Rest of 34 Pakistan 4.2 Health Metrics for FATA 34 4.3 Force Strength of Pakistani Security Forces Who Regularly Operate in FATA 34 4.3.A A U.S. Special Forces (USSOF) Conducting Counterinsurgency Training to Frontier Corps (FC) Officers 34 4.4 Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed Towards Various Programs in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 35 (FATA) and Border Region, 2002-2007 4.5 Pakistani Public Opinion 35

5 Polling and Public Opinion

5.1-5.6 Afghanistan: Where Things Stand (ABC News/BBC/ARD) 36 5.7-5.18 Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation) 39 5.19-5.24 Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications (Charney Research) 44

For more information please contact Jason Campbell at [email protected]

3

Note on the Methodology of the Afghanistan Index:

Although the footnotes to the Afghanistan Index document our sources in detail, it is worth noting here a few broad points. The majority of our information comes from the U.S. Government, though we must often analyze it and process it further to show trends over the full period since 2001. Some information comes from foreign journalists on the ground and from nongovernmental organizations; a very modest amount to date comes from Afghan sources. Most tables and charts are straightforward representations of data as we obtain it from the above primary sources, with only modest further analysis and processing required. However, a few graphics, such as those on crime and unemployment rates, require more methodological work (and more assumptions) on our part—and are as a result also perhaps somewhat less precise than most of the tables and charts. 1. SECURITY INDICATORS

FIGURE 1.1 Estimated Number of Afghan Civilian Fatalities as A Direct Result of Fighting Between Pro-Government Forces and Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), 2006-20091

2500

2000

1500

Non-Attributable AOG Pro-Government

1000

500

0 2006 2007 2008 2009*

*THRU JULY

FIGURES IN DETAIL 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 929 1,523 2,118 1,080 Attributed to: Pro-Government Forces 230 (25%) 629 (41%) 828 (39%) 266 (25%) Armed Opposition Groups 699 (75%) 700 (46%) 1,160 (55%) 711 (66%) Could not be attributed 0 194 (13%) 130 (6%) 103 (10%)

NOTE: Pro-Government Forces (PGF) include Afghan Government and all international forces. Figures from 2006 are from Human Rights Watch. Subsequent figures provided by UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan. HRW’s estimate for 2007 was 1,633 total such civilian fatalities, with 434 (27%) attributable to PGF and 950 (58%) attributable to AGE. “Non-attributable” deaths refer to those caused by such things as crossfire, mines and any other violence not directly connected to a conflicting party.

4 FIGURE 1.1.A Estimated Total Afghan Civilian Fatalities by Month, 2007 to Present2

400

350 341

323 300

250 253

213 218 200 194 198 176 168 172 187 160 162 150 155 147 164 143 138 131 136 111 104 122 100 104 97 88 85 80

56 50 50 45

0

7 y r 8 il 9 y y ril l er ch r ly er ch ril a l 00 p Ju b Ju ber 00 r p Ju ruary arch A May June ober mbe 200 ruary ar Ap May June m ruary A M June M M ugust e Ma August A v Feb Oct ece Feb Octob Feb Septem NovemberD September No December January 2 January January 2

Signifies start of a new calendar year

FIGURE 1.1.B Detail of Estimated 2008 Afghan Civilian Fatalities, By Incident Type3

Executions by AGE* 13%

Other Incidents 25%

Suicide & IED Attacks by AGE* 34%

Air Strikes by Pro-Gov't Forces 26%

Escalation of Force by Pro-Gov't Forces 2%

*AGE= Anti-Government Entities (i.e. Taliban and other insurgents) NOTE: Percentages based on an estimate of 2,118 total civilian fatalities in 2008.

5 FIGURE 1.2 U.S. and Coalition Troop Fatalities since October 7, 20014

80

70

60 30

50

Non-US 40 US 18 18 24 10 13 30 2 16 10 18 46 32 15 1 15 20 4 19 14 6 109 15 12 3 4 16 11 24 5 6 10 12 28 27 1 7 11 27 26 14 5 22 25 1 2 6 7 20 8 10 18 18 18 9 15 1 3 17 2 17 16 5 2 15 5 14 3 15 12 3 12 11 13 12 1011 4 2 11 4 11 10 10 11 1011 9 7 9 8 9 8 8 6 8 6 7 6 1 7 6 7 1 7 4 6 7 6 7 6 5 4 5 2 4 4 4 5 4 5 2 4 3 5 5 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 l il l 5 il r l 9 l 0 ri er 03 ly ri er 0 ly er ri ly er 08 ly 0 ri 0 p b 0 p b 0 b p b 0 p 2 A July Apr Ju A July 2 Apr Ju obe April July A Ju April Ju A July to cto t cto to 2 ry 2002 ry ry 2007 y ry 20 a Oc October O a Oc O a Oc Octobera u u nuary 2 n nuar n ctoberanu a anuary 2004 a anuary 2006 anu a a O J J J J J J J J

Total from October 7, 2001 through August 17, 2009: ALL HOSTILE NON-HOSTILE FATALITIES U.S. 788 549 239 Non-U.S. 533 427 106 TOTAL 1,321 976 345

Indicates the start of a new calendar year

FIGURE 1.3 Cause of Death for US Troops, By Year5

Improvised Other Non- Suicide Mortars/RPG’s/ Helicopter Aircraft Total Year Explosive Landmine Hostile Hostile Bombs Rockets Losses* Losses* Device Fire Causes* 2001 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (16.7%) 0 (0%) 4 (33.3%) 6 (50.0%) 12 2002 5 (10.2%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.0%) 1 (2.0%) 4 (8.2%) 18 (36.7%) 12 (24.5%) 8 (16.3%) 49 2003 1 (2.1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 19 (39.6%) 0 (0%) 12 (25.0%) 16 (33.3%) 48 2004 12 (23.1%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (1.9%) 2 (3.8%) 3 (5.8%) 10 (19.2%) 23 (44.2%) 52 2005 18 (18.2%) 0 (0%) 2 (2.0%) 5 (5.1%) 36 (36.4%) 1 (1.0%) 20 (20.2%) 17 (17.2%) 99 2006 27 (27.6%) 3 (3.1%) 1 (1.0%) 1 (1.0%) 21 (21.4%) 0 (0%) 33 (33.7%) 12 (12.2%) 98 2007 33 (28.2%) 1 (0.9%) 9 (7.7%) 1 (0.9%) 13 (11.1%) 0 (0%) 35 (29.9%) 25 (21.4%) 117 2008 84 (54.2%) 4 (2.6%) 7 (4.5%) 2 (1.3%) 2 (1.3%) 0 (0%) 36 (23.2%) 20 (13.3%) 155 2009 79 (50.0%) 3 (1.9%) 8 (5.1%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.3%) 2 (1.3%) 43 (27.2%) 21 (13.3%) 158 Total 259 11 29 11 101 24 205 148 788 (32.9%) (1.4%) (3.7%) (1.4%) (12.8%) (3.0%) (26.0%) (18.9%) Through August 17, 2009 *Helicopter and aircraft losses include deaths caused by both non-hostile accidents and those downed by hostile fire. The “Non-Hostile Causes” data then does not include non-hostile helicopter or aircraft losses.

6 FIGURE 1.4 American Military Fatalities by Category: October 7, 2001–August 1, 20096

Total fatalities as of August 1, 2009: 759 Category Male: 741 Gender Female: 18 Younger than 22: 156 22-24: 149 Age 25-30: 207 31-35: 106 Older than 35: 141 Active: 611 Component Reserve: 34

National Guard: 114 Army: 572 Marines: 97 Military service Navy: 49 Air Force: 41 Officer: 117 Officers/Enlisted E5-E9: 317 E1-E4: 325 American Indian or Alaska Native: 10 Asian: 9 Black or African American: 60 Race/Ethnicity Hispanic or Latino: 58 Multiple races, pending or unknown: 5 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander: 10 White: 607

FIGURE 1.5 U.S. Troops Wounded In Action since October 7, 20017

350

300 316

250

200

174 184

150 139 121 129 122 121 100 101 88 86 85 76 70 65 79 65 58 57 53 44 50 50 58 44 36 36 46 44 45 30 40 50 21 29 32 27 16 30 28 24 11 17 23 23 21 17 22 21 6 5 17 27 6 9 9 11 9 12 12 23 5 8 19 8 4 0 2 3 3 2 7 15 l l r l 1 er er ly ly 8 ly 9 ri ly 0 b b pril pri -0 pri -0 p April July April July April July April July A Ju A Ju A Ju A Ju Oct- Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan Jan Octo Octo October October October October Octobe

Total from October 7, 2001 through August 17, 2009: 3,613

The daily Department of Defense casualty reports that we use for our monthly estimates on U.S troops wounded does not make it entirely clear when in a 24-hour period casualties were incurred. Since the reports are published at 10AM daily, there is possibility that our numbers for January 2005 and onwards are slightly off due to uncertainties about whether casualties occurred on the first or the last of each month. 7 FIGURE 1.6 British Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since the start of 20068

25

22

20 19

15

13 13 12

10 9 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

6 y r 7 y r y y r 9 y y e ch e er h a l e er h a l -0 July -0 July b Ju b b Ju n Ma mb n Ma mb arc M arc M Ja March te Ja Mar te Jan-08 M Jan-0 M Sep November Sep Novem Septem Novem

Total through August 17, 2009: 204

NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: From 2002-2005, the British military suffered 5 fatalities that are reflected in the total.

FIGURE 1.7 Canadian Military Fatalities in Afghanistan since the start of 20069

12

10 10

9 9

8 8 8

6 6

5 5 5

4 4 4 4 4 4

3 3 3 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

h ly y y h y 06 ber ul ber 08 ul May Ju Ma J n- May July May J mber mber a mber Jan- Marc em Jan-07 March J Marc te Jan-09 March pte vem epte o Se Nov S N Sep November

Total through August 17, 2009: 127 NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: From 2002-2005, the Canadian military suffered 8 fatalities that are reflected in the total. 8 FIGURE 1.8 Non-U.S. Coalition Troop Fatalities by Country since October 200110

250

204 200

150

127

100

50 33 29 25 24 19 15 11 11 10 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0

m e k y ia d ia n d a m c ain ar gal ni rea u do any p Ital ralia an way tv gary u rkey lan o m an S m lands ol r rt u n lgi ng r st P La o T i Canada Fr u No Estonia Swede Fi ithua Ger Den Roman A Hun P L th K Be ou Nethe S United K Czech Republic

Total through August 17, 2009: 534

FIGURE 1.9 Proportion of Annual U.S. and Coalition Fatalities by Various Causes11

100%

31 35 90% 47

61 36 19 80% 58

31 32 31 70% 42 59 8 58

24 60% Non-Hostile Incidents 10 63 Other Explosives 50% Other Hostile 1 IED* 3 48 40% 3

10 42 30% 163 18 169 15 20% 91 4 58 14 10% 21 9 7

0% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

*Improvised Explosive Device

Figures for 2009 Updated Thru: August 17

NOTE: Figures depicted on the graph illustrate the raw number of such fatalities in a given year. Percentages are calculated based on overall totals for each respective year. “Other Explosives” includes hostile attacks carried out with rockets, grenades and/or mortars. Fatalities from downed aircraft and helicopters are classified under either “Other Hostile” or “Non-Hostile Incidents” depending on whether they were shot down or crashed due to mechanical failure. 9

FIGURE 1.10 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Fatalities, January 2007-Present12

180

160

140

120

133 100 100 84 ANP ANA 80 71 90 100 102 74 60 85 89 67 104 65 88 50 72 67 63 59 42 40 65 40 55 65 63 52 51 20 43 29 31 38 37 27 29 19 24 24 21 25 24 25 19 17 16 17 18 17 19 11 14 8 6 6 5 0 1 2 3 2

y h il r r y il e r r h il 07 r c r ne st er er 08 r r st 09 r a r u July be b b a p July u be p 20 ru a Ap May J 20 A May Jun 20 A May M ugu m m March m Marc y A te e y Aug te ry ar p Octo c ar p October a u Feb e u Febru u February Se NovembeD Se NovembeDecember Jan Jan Jan

ANNUAL TOTALS 2007 2008 2009* ANA 209 226 114 ANP 803 880 341 *Thru MAY 2009

NOTE: Figures provided by NATO-ISAF and differ from those published in a January 2009 report released by the U.S. Department of Defense. This report estimated 332 ANA fatalities and 692 ANP fatalities for 2007, with 2008 figures shown only through October 2008.

FIGURE 1.11 American Troops Deployed To Afghanistan by Mission13

Operation Enduring NATO International Security Month TOTAL U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Freedom (OEF) Assistance Force (ISAF) September 2008 19,000 15,000 34,000 January 2009 19,000 18,000 37,000 May 17,670 25,510 43,180 June 26,000 30,000 56,000

NOTE: U.S. troop levels depicted for ISAF mission differ from those given on the following page. This is primarily due to discrepancies in figures commonly reported by Western media outlets and those provided on the NATO-ISAF website. One explanation for this may be that the data n the NATO-ISAF website is a snapshot depiction and may count overlapping rotations.

10

FIGURE 1.12 Troops Committed to NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) By Country14

AS OF: July 23, 2009

1Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name 2 Snapshot figure that includes overlapping rotations.

FIGURE 1.13 Total NATO-ISAF Manpower by Regional Command (RC), Since October 200615

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000 CAPITAL EAST SOUTH WEST 15,000 NORTH

10,000

5,000

0

7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 -06 -0 0 -0 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 -09 -0 c b r- g r-08 n g-08 t c ct-06 e p u p u u O De F A Jun A Oct-07 Dec-07 Feb- A J A Oc De Feb Apr Jun-09

NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: Data points represent months for which a precise estimate is available. As the figures for a given month provide a snapshot assessment, they should be considered approximations. Figures do not reflect U.S. troops that are part of Operation Enduring Freedom. 11

FIGURE 1.14 Size of Afghan Security Forces on Duty16

Ministry of Defense Ministry of Interior Total Afghan Month Forces Forces Security Forces April 2008 57,800 79,910 137,710 October 2008 68,000 79,910 147,910 March 2009 82,780 79,910 162,690 July 2009 91,900 81,020 172,920

FIGURE 1.15 Annual Growth of Afghan National Army (ANA), By Number of Troops, 2003-Present17

100,000

91,900 90,000

79,068 80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000 50,000

40,000 36,000

30,000 26,000 24,000

20,000

10,000 6,000

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*

NOTE: Figures for 2003-2008 are as of year end. *2009 figures are as of JULY 2009

FIGURE 1.16 Annual Recruitment Figures for Afghan National Army (ANA)18

YEAR* RECRUITS RE-ENLISTMENT RATE AWOL RATE Soldiers NCOs 2003-2004 9,671 2004-2005 15,790 2005-2006 11,845 2006-2007 21,287 2007-2008 32,135 50% 56% 7% 2008-2009 ~34,000 57% 63% 9%

*Years run from March through the following February of respective periods.

12

FIGURE 1.16.A Capability Milestone (CM) Assessment of Afghan National Army (ANA) Units, By Month since June 200619

90

80

70

60

50 CM 4 CM 3 CM 2 40 CM 1

30

20

10

0

r r l 6 ly e h y ly er er y i y ly er ry ril y 0 e 07 ary rc ne er pr ne er 09 rch p a Ju ber u Ma Ju gust b b ber b uar Ma Ju ber ua M mber April Ju u m r A Ju e mber A me Ma March y 20 Ma August Octob ry 20ebr A Octo August Octobve ebr F pteme Feb o F June 20 NoveDecembua e NoveDecem N Decembuar Septe S Septem Jan January 2008 Jan

NOTE ON THIS GRAPH: Number of units and headquarters based on an end goal of 80,000 personnel, 70,000 of whom are projected to be operational by the end of 2008 with the remainder operational by the end of 2009. CM levels are rated on a scale from 1-4 (definitions below).

CM 1: capable of operating independently CM 2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces CM 4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting

FIGURE 1.17 Detailed Breakdown of Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces20

Number Authorized Number Assigned Percent Assigned Ministry of Interior 5,059 4,273 84% Headquarters Uniformed Police 47,384 51,406 108% Border Police 17,621 12,792 73% Civil Order Police 5,365 2,462 46% Anti-Crime 5,103 4,013 79% Counternarcotics 2,519 3,572 142% Fire/Medical/Training 3,149 2,388 76% Customs Police 600 603 101% TOTAL 81,956 81,020 99% AS OF: May 2009

13

FIGURE 1.18 Defense Assessment of Afghan National Police (ANP) Capabilities21

600

500

400

CM 4 CM 3 300 CM 2 CM 1

200

100

0

r ril ly er 9 y rch p ne ust er rch ay 008 May Ju be 00 uar M A Ju ug tob mber mb April Ma A c br Ma ry 2 ptem O e ary 2 Fe ua S Nove Dece ebr F Janu

AS OF: December 2008

CM 1: capable of operating independently CM 2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support CM 3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces CM 4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions N/A: Not yet formed or not reporting

FIGURE 1.19 Recruitment Figures for the Various Programs of the Afghan National Police (ANP), March 2007-February 2008 and March 2008-February 200922 March 2007-February 2008 March 2008-February 2009 Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) 4,795 2,737 Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) 1,414 3,562 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) 11,265 9,468 ALL ANP RECRUITS 17,474 17,191

NOTE: The AUP serve at the regional, provincial and district levels and carry out local day-to-day policing activities. The ABP provide law enforcement at borders and entry points. The ANCOP is a highly skilled, specialized police force that is split into urban and rural units and conducts operations in areas where government control may be weak or where added support is needed for counterinsurgency operations.

14

FIGURE 1.20 Number of U.S. and NATO Teams/Personnel Required and Assigned to Train and Mentor Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)23

U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) Personnel for Afghan National Army (ANA)

3000

2,663

2500 2,391

2,225

2000

ETT Personnel Assigned (%) 1500 ETT Personnel Required 1,175 1,138 (44%) 1,062 (51%) (44%) 1000

500

0 March 2008 November 2008 May 2009

U.S. Police Mentor Team (PMT) Personnel for Afghan National Police (ANP)

2500 2,358 2,375 2,375

2000

1500

PMT Personnel Assigned (%) 1,050 PMT Personnel Required (44%) 921 886 1000 (39%) (37%)

500

0 March 2008 November 2008 May 2009 NOTE: Each PMT is comprised of approximately 16 U.S. personnel.24 1,200 of the 3,400 U.S. Marines deployed to southern Afghanistan during the spring of 2008 are assigned to conduct ANP training missions, but only for approximately 7 months, thus they are not included in the “Number Assigned” column.

NATO Operating Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT’s) for Afghan National Army (ANA)

120

103 103

100

80

71

OMLT's Provided (%) 60 53 OMLT's Required (51%)

42 (41%) 40 31 (44%)

20

0 March 2008 December 2008 April 2009

NOTE: NATO OMLT teams number between 12-19 personnel each, depending on the size of the unit with which they are embedded.

15

Nations That Have Contributed Full ETT’s/OMLT’s:25

Canada Germany Poland United States Croatia Italy Spain France Netherlands United Kingdom AS OF: September 2007

Nations that have Contributed Personnel for Multinational ETT’s/OMLT’s:

Canada France Norway United Kingdom Croatia Germany Slovenia Czech Republic Netherlands Sweden AS OF: September 2007

FIGURE 1.21 Number and Nationality of Personnel Devoted To the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission to Afghanistan26

POLICE STRENGTH

EU CONTRIBUTORS Czech Republic (2) France (1) Lithuania (2) Spain (9) Denmark (12) Germany (31) Netherlands (3) Sweden (4) Estonia (1) Hungary (3) Poland (3) United Kingdom (14) Finland (3) Italy (12) Romania (5) TOTAL EU CONTRIBUTION: 105

NON-EU CONTRIBUTORS Canada (8) Croatia (2) Norway (6) TOTAL NON-EU CONTRIBUTION: 16

TOTALS TOTAL POLICE CONTRIBUTION 121 OTHER INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN EXPERTS 56 LOCAL STAFF 91 TOTAL STAFFING FOR EUPOL MISSION 268

AS OF: DECEMBER 16, 2008

16 FIGURE 1.22 U.S. Departments of Defense and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002- 2009 (Dollars In Millions)27

6,000

5,000 4,872

4,000 4,043

ANA 3,000 ANP $ (millions) $ 2,523

2,000 1,778 1,633 1,512 1,217

1,000 964 719 736 624 361 86 160 0 24 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

NOTE: FY 2008 figures reflect requested funds. Annual totals rounded to the nearest million.

TOTAL AID (FY 2002-2009): ANA $14,228,000,000; ANP: $7,024,000,000

FIGURE 1.22.A Appropriated U.S. Funding For Afghanistan by Agency, FY 2001-FY 2009 Bridge28

$9,000.0

$8,000.0

$7,000.0

$6,000.0 DoD $5,000.0 State USAID USDA $4,000.0 $ Millions Treasury Other $3,000.0

$2,000.0

$1,000.0

$0.0 FY 2009 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 Bridge DoD $0.0 $12.7 $176.2 $403.9 $1,909.4 $2,231.2 $8,167.8 $3,381.2 $2,272.0 State $45.9 $351.8 $297.7 $784.6 $1,207.4 $305.7 $304.5 $517.5 $218.0 USAID $42.0 $42.0 $507.9 $456.3 $1,209.5 $1,581.2 $805.9 $1,493.4 $472.5 USDA $104.3 $47.7 $28.4 $39.1 $50.1 $48.1 $149.1 $159.6 $254.0 Treasury $0.0$0.9$1.0$2.0$1.0$0.2$0.0$0.0$0.0 Other $0.4 $25.5 $26.6 $52.1 $147.0 $136.1 $236.6 $180.7 $166.0

17 FIGURE 1.23 Number of Insurgent Attacks by Month and Type, January 2007-Present29

1600

1400

1200

1000

Surface to Air Fire Indirect Fire 800 IEDs Direct Fire

600

400

200

0

y e y t r l y t r y 07 ry a s er er 08 e er 09 ry a pril Jul b b 0 rch July ber pril arch A M Jun tobe ruary a Apri Ma June to mb arch A M brua M ugu c b M brua M y 20 A tem vem Augus y 20 ar O ary 2 Oc ce ar Fe u Fe Fe Sep No December September NovembDe anu anu J Jan J

FIGURE 1.23.A Number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Events by Month, 2007-Present30

600

500

400

Detonations Turn-Ins 300 ANSF Finds ISAF Finds

200

100

0

l y y t h l y e r r h l y 07 ry ri ul s er er ry a st e 09 ry ri 0 J 008 un July u ber 0 a rua Ap Ma June ob mb 2 arc Apri M J ru arc Ap Ma March M ctob m M ry 2 Augu e Aug e ry 2 a Oct ary ebrua O a Feb u F ec Feb September Nov December Septembe NovemberD an Janu J Janu

NOTE: “IED Events” are inclusive of those that detonate as well as those found or turned in. “ISAF” refers to the NATO-sponsored International Security Assistance Forces and “ANSF” refers to Afghan National Security Forces. 18

FIGURE 1.24 Comparison of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Events by Province and Regional Command (RC), Weeks 1-22 (January thru Late May), 2008 and 200931 2008 2009 REGIOANAL COMMAND/ Successful Failed Total Successful Failed Total % CHANGE % CHANGE PROVINCE IEDs IEDs IEDs IEDs IEDs IEDs (Successful IEDs) (Total IEDs) RC CAPITAL KABUL 6 9 15 13 13 26 117% 73% RC EAST PARWAN 3 1 4 3 2 5 0% 25% WARDAK 9 5 14 18 20 38 100% 171% PANJSHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A LOGAR 5 11 16 10 32 42 100% 163% KAPISA 2 6 8 1 7 8 -50% 0% KHOST 50 47 97 85 103 188 70% 94% PAKTYA 8 19 27 20 21 41 150% 52% GHAZNI 13 5 18 34 21 55 162% 206% PAKTIKA 18 16 34 25 55 80 39% 135% NANGARHAR 16 36 52 42 47 89 163% 71% LAGHMAN 9 36 45 10 24 34 11% -24% NURISTAN 0 0 0 0 2 2 N/A N/A KUNAR 22 5 27 23 28 51 5% 89% BAMYAN 1 0 1 0 3 3 -100% 200% RC EAST TOTAL 156 187 343 271 365 636 74% 85% RC SOUTH KANDAHAR 70 58 128 108 147 255 54% 99% HELMAND 49 20 69 47 50 97 -4% 41% NIMROZ 6 2 8 1 10 11 -83% 38% URUZGAN 10 13 23 27 29 56 170% 143% ZABUL 20 13 33 41 19 60 105% 82% DAI KUNDI 0 0 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A RC SOUTH TOTAL 155 106 261 224 256 480 45% 84% RC WEST BADGHIS 1 5 6 0 1 1 -100% -83% HERAT 3 3 6 5 8 13 67% 117% GHOR 0 0 0 1 5 6 N/A N/A FARAH 4 2 6 8 6 14 100% 133% RC WEST TOTAL 8 10 18 14 20 34 75% 89% RC NORTH FARYAB 7 8 15 3 5 8 -57% -47% JAWZJAN 1 1 2 2 1 3 100% 50% SARI PUL 0 0 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A BALKH 1 2 3 1 2 3 0% 0% SAMANGAN 0 0 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A KUNDUZ 6 5 11 9 23 32 50% 191% BAGHLAN 7 6 13 3 4 7 -57% -46% TAKHAR 1 2 3 2 4 6 100% 100% BADAKSHAN 0 5 5 3 5 8 N/A 60% RC NORTH TOTAL 23 29 52 23 46 69 0% 33% TOTAL, ALL REGIONS 348 341 689 545 700 1,245 57% 81%

NOTE: Successful IEDs are those that detonate. Failed IEDs are those that are either detected or turned in prior to detonation.

19

FIGURE 1.25 U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Authorized/On Hand Staffing by Location32 MILITARY CIVILIAN DATE U.S. Department of PRT PROVINCE Department of State USAID CREATED Authorized On Hand Agriculture Authorized On Hand Authorized On Hand Authorized On Hand RC EAST Asadabad Konar Feb. 2004 85 82 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bagram Parwan/Kapisa Nov. 2003 63 63 1 0 1 1 1 1 Gardez Paktia Feb. 2003 88 81 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ghazni Ghazni March 2004 84 81 1 1 1 1 1 1 Jalalabad Nangrahar Jan. 2004 88 81 1 1 1 1 1 1 Khowst Khowst March 2004 88 86 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mehtar Lam Laghman April 2005 85 81 1 1 1 1 1 1 Kalagush Nuristan Nov. 2006 88 84 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bazarak Panjshir Nov. 2005 55 55 1 1 1 1 1 1 Sharana Paktika Oct. 2004 88 83 1 1 1 1 1 1 RC SOUTH Qalat Zabul April 2004 99 92 1 1 1 1 1 1 RC WEST Farah Farah Sept.2004 99 96 1 1 1 1 1 1

TOTAL 1,010 965 12 11 12 12 12 12

NOTE ON THIS TABLE: The United States operates 12 out of the 26 PRT’s in Afghanistan. All American PRT’s are under military command and led by a military officer.

AS OF: APRIL 2009

FIGURE 1.26 Country Leadership and Location of Non-U.S. PRT’s33

DATE CREATED AND PREVIOUS COMMAND PRT LEAD NATION DATE OF COMMAND NATION (IF DIFFERENT) RC NORTH Konduz Germany November 2003 March 2003 (USA) Mazar-e-Sharif Sweden March 2006 February 2003 (United Kingdom) Feyzabad Germany July 2004 Pol-e-Khomri Hungary October 2006 October 2004 (Netherlands) Meymaneh Norway September 2005 July 2004 (United Kingdom) RC WEST Herat Italy June 2005 December 2003 (USA) Qala-e-Naw Spain August 2005 Chaghcharan Lithuania August 2005 RC SOUTH Kandahar Canada August 2005 December 2003 (USA) Lashkar-Gah United Kingdom May 2006 September 2004 (USA) Tarin Kowt Netherlands August 2006 September 2004 (USA) RC EAST Bamyan New Zealand August 2003 Wardak Turkey November 2006 Logar Czech Republic March 2008

20 FIGURE 1.27 Estimated Number of Afghan Refugees in the Region By Location34

COUNTRY NUMBER OF REFUGEES Pakistan 2,000,000 Iran 910,000 Other 90,000 TOTAL 3,000,000

AS OF: March 2008

FIGURE 1.28 Afghan Refugees Voluntarily Repatriated by Country, 2002-200735

1,600 5.0

4.5 1,400

4.0

1,200

3.5

1,000 3.0

Pakistan 800 2.5 Iran Cumulative

2.0 600 Returnees Per Year (thousands) 1.5 Total Number of Returnees (millions)

400

1.0

200 0.5

0 0.0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*

*Through September 2008

FIGURE 1.29 Estimate Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s)36

TOTAL 150,000 Southern Provinces 110,000

AS OF: May 2008

21

2. GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW INDICATORS

FIGURE 2.1 Afghanistan Population and Demographic Information37

TOTAL MALE FEMALE POPULATION 16.8 15.9 32.7 (millions) (51%) (49%)

ETHNICITY Pashtun 13.7 (42%) Tajik 8.8 (27%) Hazara 2.9 (9%) Uzbek 2.9 (9%) Aimak 1.3 (4%) Turkmen 1.0 (3%) Baloch 0.7 (2%) Other 1.3 (4%)

FIGURE 2.2 Size, Gender, And Ethnic Makeup of Afghanistan’s Main Legislative Bodies38

Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 249 184 (74%) 65 (26%) ETHNICITY Pashtun 118 (47%) Tajik 53 (21%) Hazara 30 (12%) Uzbek/Turkmen 25 (10%) Non-Hazara Shi’a 11 (4%) Arab 5 (2%) Ismaili 3 (1%) Pashai 2 (<1%) Baluchi 1 (<1%) Nuristani 1 (<1%)

NOTE: The Wolesi Jirga consists of directly elected provincial representatives. The number of representatives each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces receives is calculated according to population. The Wolesi Jirga constitutes the first step in passing legislation, with all bills passing with two-thirds majority being forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and then the President. The Wolesi Jirga also has final say on the appointment of government ministers and other high-ranking officials.

Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 102 76 (75%) 26 (25%) ETHNICITY Pashtun 36 (35%) Tajik 32 (31%) Hazara 16 (16%) Uzbek/Turkmen 8 (8%) Baluchi 3 (3%) Nuristani 3 (3%) Others 4 (3%)

NOTE: Two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga is indirectly elected by the Provincial and District Councils while the remaining third is appointed directly by the President. Provincial Councils (34 total, one for each Province) TOTAL SEATS MEN WOMEN GENDER 420 296 (70%) 124 (30%) NOTE: Provincial Councils consist of between 9 and 29 directly elected representatives, based on the population of the Province.

22 FIGURE 2.3 Where Afghans Choose To Take Different Types of Legal Cases39

Dispute Over Land 55% 38% 7%

Other Property Dispute 40% 43% 17%

Commercial Dispute 50% 32% 18%

Divorce 62% 27% 11% State Court Shura/Jirga Other Community Forum Pick-pocketing 53% 30% 17%

Robbery/Burglary 58% 26% 16%

Physical Assault 50% 32% 18%

Murder 82% 12% 6%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

NOTE: Results based on survey of approximately 6,200 Afghans polled in February 2007. Answers refer to a hypothetical situation and not actual events.

FIGURE 2.4 Highest Level Degree Acquired By Judges Responding To a Random Survey40

50%

45% 44.0%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20.5% 20%

16.1% 15% 11.6%

10% 7.7%

5%

0% University (Shariat) University (Law) Other University Non University (Madrassa Non University or Equivalent) (Primary/Secondary) NOTE: Results based on a May 2006 random survey of 157 judges, of whom 17 work with the Supreme Court, 48 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 92 on Urban or District Primary Courts. “Shariat” refers to a degree received from an Islamic Law faculty. “Madrassas” are schools below the university level whose curriculum focuses mostly on traditional Islamic scholarship.

FIGURE 2.5 Access to Legal Resources for Judges Responding To a Random Survey41

ACCESS YES NO Statutes or other governmental regulations 63.7% 36.3% Textbooks on the law 45.2% 54.8% Written decisions of the Supreme Court 17.2% 82.8% Professional support from an experienced mentor 19.1% 80.9% NOTE: Results based on a May 2006 random survey of 157 judges, of whom 17 work with the Supreme Court, 48 on Provincial Appeals Courts and 92 on Urban or District Primary Courts

23

FIGURE 2.6 Annual Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (Hectares) and Percentage of Global Cultivation, 1990-200842

250 90%

82% 82% 80% 79% 200 70% 69% 67%

60%

150 50% 47% Hectares (000's) 42% % Global Cultivation 41% 40% 100 37% 193

165 30% 157 26% 27% 23% 131 22% 22% 18% 21% 20% 50 16% 19% 104 90.6 82.2 80.0 71.5 74.1 63.7 58.3 56.8 58.4 10% 50.8 49.3 53.8 41.3 5% 7.6 0 0%

5 6 99 00 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2 2007 2008

FIGURE 2.7 Annual Opium Production in Afghanistan (Metric Tons) and Percentage of Global Production, 1990-200843

9000 100% 93% 92% 93% 90% 8000 89% 8,200 87% 7,700 79% 80% 7000 75% 75%

70% 70% 6000 6,100 62% 61% 60% 58% 5000 52% Metric Tons 51% 52% 50% 48% 4,565 % Global Production 4000 46% 4,200 42% 4,100 40% 3,600 3,416 3,400 3000 3,276 30% 2,8042,693

2000 2,330 2,3352,248 1,9801,970 20% 1,570 11% 1000 10%

185 0 0%

0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 3 4 6 7 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 19 19 1 19 1994 1 19 1 1 19 2 20 2002 2 20 2005 2 20 2008

24

FIGURE 2.8 Opium Poppy Cultivation Levels in Afghanistan (With Top-Producing Provinces), 2004-2008 (Hectares)44

200,000

180,000

160,000

140,000

120,000 2004 2005 100,000 2006 2007 Hectares 2008 80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 All Afghanistan Helmand Farah Kandahar Nangarhar

FIGURE 2.9 Snapshot Comparison of Afghanistan’s Top Opium-Producing Provinces, Based on Amount of Land Devoted to Cultivation, 2004 & 2008

Nangarhar Uruzgan Rest of Afghanistan 0% Nangarhar 6% 9% 22% Kandahar 9%

Rest of Afghanistan 42% Farah 10%

Uruzgan 8%

Kandahar 4% Farah 2%

Helmand Helmand 66% 22%

2004 2008 (131,000 total hectares) (157,000 total hectares)

25 FIGURE 2.10 Monthly Farm-Gate Price for Dry Opium since September 2004 (US$/Kg)45

220

200

180

160

140

US$ per Kilogram 120

100

80

60

5 y y y 04 er ch er ch ay July b Jul ber Jul b Jul ber 20 200 May May m May M m y March March e y 2007 Mar ember y 2008 Mar ember ber ovember ovember pt pt ove N uar November ept N uar Novem uar N em Septem S Se Se pt Jan January 2006 Jan Jan e S

Through DECEMBER 2008

FIGURE 2.11 Afghanistan’s Rank in Reporters without Borders’ Index of Press Freedom, 2002-200846

YEAR SCORE RANK NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED 2008 59.3 156 173 2007 56.5 142 169 2006 44.3 130 168 2005 39.2 125 167 2004 28.3 97 167 2003 40.2 134 166 2002 35.5 104 139

NOTE ON INDEX OF PRESS FREEDOM TABLE: The Index is based on a questionnaire with 50 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country. It includes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation issues, searches and harassment). In addition to taking into account abuses attributable to the state, those carried out by armed militias, clandestine organizations or pressure groups are also considered.

The lower the score attained, the higher the degree of press freedom in that respective country. Although there is no specific information given regarding how the overall score was compiled, the top-rated countries for 2007 received an overall score of 0.75, with the median receiving a score of 25.3. The overall average score for the 2007 Index was 31.5.

26

FIGURE 2.12 Afghanistan’s Rank in Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)47

YEAR RANK NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SURVEYED 2008 176 180 2007 172 (T) 180 2006 NO DATA 163 2005 117 (T) 159 (T): Indicates years Afghanistan’s score tied with one or more other country.

NOTE: The CPI is a composite index that draws on 14 expert opinion surveys. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption. Due to a lack of reliable data, Afghanistan was not included in the CPI survey for the years 2006.

FIGURE 2.13 Afghanistan’s Rank in the Brookings Institution’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, 200848

RANK COUNTRY OVERALL SCORE 1 Somalia 0.52 2 Afghanistan 1.65 3 Democratic Republic of Congo 1.67 4 Iraq 3.11 5 Burundi 3.21

NOTE: 141 nations were surveyed. Each nation was allocated a score of 0-10 points for each of 4 broad categories (Economic, Political, Security, and Social Welfare). Overall scores were calculated by taking the average of the 4 scores. The median score (Benin, #71) received a score of 6.36 while the highest score (Slovak Republic, #141) received a score of 9.41.

27

3. ECONOMIC & QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS

FIGURE 3.1 Annual Inflation49

30

25 24.1

20

15 13.2 12.3

10.2 9.8 10

7.2

5.1 5

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 FORECAST

FIGURE 3.2 Nominal GDP (Total and Growth), 2002/2003-2009/201050 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009* 2009-2010* TOTAL 4.0 4.4 5.4 6.5 7.7 9.7 11.7 13.4 ($US billions) GROWTH - 15.1% 8.8% 16.1% 8.2% 12.1% 3.4% 9.0% (% change YOY)

*Data based partly on estimates.

FIGURE 3.3 GDP Growth and Sector Contributions to Growth, 2003-200751

20

16.4 15 15.1 13.9 6.6 5.5 5.6 10 8.2 9.4 1.5 6.4 6.1 Industry 6.1 3.9 Services 5 % Agriculture 8.1 6.5 6.0 GDP Growth 3.7 4.4

0

-3.6

-8.1 -5

-10 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

NOTE: Data for 2007 are estimated.

28

FIGURE 3.3.A Annual Production of Major Agricultural Produce, by Planting Season52

7000

6000

5000

Wheat 4000 Potatoes Grapes Corn Barley 3000

000's Metric Tons Metric 000's Rice, Milled

2000

1000

0 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09

FIGURE 3.3.B Value of Exported Afghan Agricultural Produce, 1999-200753

200000

180000

160000

140000

120000

100000

Thousands $US 80000

60000

40000

20000

0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

29

FIGURE 3.4 Breakdown of Afghan Annual Budget (Core vs. External), FY 2005/2006 thru FY 2008/200954

8

7

6

5

Core Budget 4 External Budget Total Budget $ US $ US (billions)

3

2

1

0 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009

NOTE: The Afghan government has direct control of the Core Budget, while having only limited or no control over the External Budget.

FIGURE 3.5 Comparison of Electricity Supply Sources and Capacity: 1979, 2002 And 200755

HYDRO (MW) THERMAL IMPORTED OTHER* (MW) TOTAL SUPPLY YEAR (MW) (MW) (MW) 1979 259 137 0 0 396 2002 16 16 87 0 243 2007 90 90 167 133 652 *Includes diesel, micro-hydro and renewable

NOTE: As of 2007, it is estimated that only 20% of the population (13% in rural areas) have access to public power on certain days for a limited number of hours.

FIGURE 3.6 Estimated Number of Telephone Users in Afghanistan by Year, 2002-200856

9,000,000

8,000,000

7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

FIGURE 3.7 Estimated Percentage of Afghans with Access to Water/Sanitation Facilities57

Access to safe drinking water 23% Access to adequate sanitation 12% AS OF: June 2008 30

FIGURE 3.8 Education Metrics58 Estimated Annual Enrollment in Elementary and Secondary Education, 2002-2009

7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

Girls Boys

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

NOTE: It is estimated that in 2001 less than 1 million students were enrolled in primary/secondary education, virtually none of them girls.

Primary/Secondary Education 2007 2008 NUMBER OF SCHOOLS 9,062 10,998 All Girls 1,337 Co-ed 4,325

NUMBER OF TEACHERS 147,641 157,244 Women ~40,000

SINCE APRIL 2006*: Schools Razed/Burned Down 238 Schools closed due to severe threats 650+ Students and Teachers killed by violence 290 *Thru March 2009

NOTE: APRIL 2009 It is estimated that approximately 500,000 children in four southern provinces are currently prevented from attending school due to the threat of violence.

Literacy Overall 28% Male 36% Female 18%

FIGURE 3.9 Poverty Levels, 200759

% Population Living % Population Living Slightly % Population Experiencing Below the Poverty Line* Above the Poverty Line Food Poverty^ 42% 20% 45%

*Defined as living on a monthly income of US $14/month or less ^Those unable to purchase sufficient food to guarantee world standard minimum food intake of 2,100 calories/day

31

FIGURE 3.10 Foreign Aid Pledged, Committed and Disbursed, 2002-2011 ($ Millions)60

AID COMMITTED BUT AID DISBURSED AID PLEDGED 2002-2011 DONOR NOT DISBURSED 2002-2008 (NOT COMMITTED/DISBURSED) 2002-2008 US/USAID 5,022.9 5,377.0 12,389.1 Japan/JICA 1,393.5 16.9 0 United Kingdom 1,266.3 188.9 0 European Commission 1,074.1 646.7 19.2 World Bank 852.7 750.7 1,023.8 Germany 767.8 458.2 0 Canada 730.7 48.1 338.9 Asian Development Bank 547.8 1,009.7 183.1 Italy 424.4 0 0 Netherlands 407.1 85.5 0 Norway 277.0 122.3 0 Sweden 217.3 41.2 11.3 Iran 213.9 13.9 126.2 ECHO* 207.7 2.2 58.3 India 204.3 650.9 86.9 Australia 194.8 0 27.6 UN Agencies 171.0 0 0 Denmark 152.8 59.9 63.0 Russian Federation 139.0 0 0 Aga Khan 119.3 0 0 France 79.9 29.5 0 Saudi Arabia 76.9 30.0 113.1 Finland 46.1 29.9 14.0 Switzerland 51.6 44.0 0 China 41.0 20.4 84.2 Spain 25.6 37.2 190.5 Turkey 20.8 22.8 46.4 TOTAL 14,726.3 9,685.9 14,775.6 AS OF: February 2008 *ECHO: European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office

NOTE: PLEDGED aid is promised but yet to be devoted for a specific purpose, COMMITTED aid has been earmarked for a specific purpose but not yet changed hands and DISBURSED aid has been earmarked and delivered.

FIGURE 3.11 Annual Value of Imports and Exports, With Top Trade Partners, 2002-2006 ($ Millions)61

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Exports (TOTAL) 87 210 185 239 274 Pakistan 28 28 45 48 57 India 17 32 39 51 59 United States 4 57 23 62 42

Imports (TOTAL) 1,034 1,608 1,971 3,002 3,633 Pakistan 245 449 511 1,172 1,375 United States 88 67 173 288 459 Germany 57 103 130 167 275 India 57 137 170 158 186 Republic of Korea 141 137 85 66 77 Turkmenistan 31 81 107 122 143 Japan 92 114 73 84 74

FIGURE 3.12 Microfinance Clients, Borrowers and Loan Amounts62

Active Active Number of Amount of Loans Loans Outstanding ($

Clients Borrowers Loans Disbursed Disbursed ($ millions) millions) TOTAL 443,740 375,114 1,155,562 $453.3 $111.3 URBAN 308,882 262,042 801,472 $327.1 $81.2 RURAL 134,858 113,072 354,090 $126.2 $30.2 AS OF: May 2008

32

FIGURE 3.13 Healthcare Metrics

% People Living In Districts Where Basic Package of Health Care Program (BPHC) Is Being Implemented63 2003 9% 2005 77% 2006 82%

NOTE: The BPHC is a program started in 2002 by the Ministry of Public Health to provide essential basic healthcare throughout Afghanistan’s districts.

Life Expectancy64 2004 2006 Men 42 44 Women 42 43

Infant and Children Under-Five Mortality Rates (Per 1,000 Live Births)65 2003 2006 Infant 165 129 Children Under Five 257 191

% OF AFGHAN CHILDREN RECEIVING VARIOUS VACCINATIONS66 2003 2006 BCG Vaccine 57% 70% Polio Vaccine 30% 70%

NOTE: The BCG is a vaccination to prevent tuberculosis.

33

4. PAKISTAN

FIGURE 4.1 Comparison of Various Metrics from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) vs. The Rest of Pakistan67

FATA REST OF PAKISTAN PER CAPITA INCOME $250 $500 (ANNUAL, $ US) % POPULATION LIVING ~66% 24%^ BELOW POVERTY LINE

OVERALL LITERACY RATE 17% 56% Women 3% 32%

^FY 2005/2006 estimate68

FIGURE 4.2 Health Metrics for FATA69

Hospitals to serve population of 3.1 million 41 Doctor-to-Population Ratio 1-to-6,762

FIGURE 4.3 Force Strength of Pakistani Security Forces Who Regularly Operate in FATA70

Constabulary Forces 23,000+ Frontier Corps (FC) 65,000

NOTE: The Constabulary Forces operate under the local political agent and are trained to do light policing, guard government facilities and secure public figures. The FC is the primary paramilitary force in FATA, traditionally serving as a border control and counter-smuggling force that is on call for law enforcement duties. It is locally trained and administered, yet reports to Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior and has historically been greatly under-resourced.

FIGURE 4.3.A U.S. Special Forces (USSAF) Personnel Conducting Counterinsurgency Training To Frontier Corps (FC) Officers71

PROVINCE FATA Baluchistan Number of USSOF Trainers 32 25-50 Number of senior FC Trainees 116 Unknown

AS OF: May 2009

NOTE: As of November 2008 the training is limited in scope and focused on training a select number of senior Frontier Corpsmen who will then become the principal counterinsurgency trainers for the remainder of the force. This training is being conducted at an undisclosed location in northwest Pakistan.

34 FIGURE 4.4 Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed towards Various Programs in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) And Border Region, FY 2002-200772

Devlopment Assistance, $40 , 1% Border Security Program, $187 , 3%

Military Efforts, $5,573 , 96%

NOTE: Total $ shown in $US millions. Percentages based on an approximate expenditure of $5.8 billion. Total aid to Pakistan for this period was approximately $10.5 billion.

PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION

TERROR FREE TOMORROW/NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION SURVEY, July 200873 (1.306 Pakistanis were surveyed throughout the country from May 25-June 1, 2008)

FIGURE 4.5 Question: What Is Your Opinion Of Each Country?

United States 17% 74% 9%

Afghanistan 26% 49% 26%

Saudi Arabia 90% 5% 6%

Very/Somewhat Favorable Very/Somewhat Unfavorable Refused/Don't Know India 36% 53% 11%

United Kingdom 21% 61% 18%

Iran 69% 15% 15%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

NOTE: Not all line items add up to 100% due to rounding

35 5. POLLING & PUBLIC OPINION

AFGHANISTAN: WHERE THINGS STAND74 ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, February 2009 (1,534 Afghan adults from throughout the country were interviewed) Previous surveys depicted took place March 2004, September 2005, September 2006 and November 2007

FIGURE 5.1 Question: Generally Speaking, Do You Think Things in Afghanistan Today Are Going In the Right Direction, or Do You Think Things Are Going In The Wrong Direction? (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 & 2009)

90%

80% 77%

70%

64% 60%

55% 54% 50% Right direction 40% Wrong direction 40%

38%

30%

24% 22% 20%

10% 11% 6%

0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009

Surveys Released: March 2004, September 2005, September 2006, November 2007 and February 2009, Respectively

FIGURE 5.2 Performance Ratings for Various Entities*

90% 83%

80% 80%

70% 67% 68% 63% 63% 60% 59% 57% 52% 50% Hamid Karzai 48% Afghan Government 43% U.S. in Afghanistan 40%

32% 30%

20%

10%

0% 2005 2006 2007 2009

*% of respondents who answered “Excellent” or “Good” to the Question: How would you rate the work of…? 36

FIGURE 5.3 Question: Is Your Opinion of the Taliban Very Favorable, Somewhat Favorable, Somewhat Unfavorable Or Very Unfavorable?

90%

79% 80% 76% 74%

69% 70%

60%

50% 2005 2006 2007 40% 2009

30%

20% 15% 15% 13% 12% 10% 10% 8% 6% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 0% Very favorable Somewhat favorable Somewhat unfavorable Very unfavorable No opinion

FIGURE 5.4 Question: Who Would You Rather Have Ruling Afghanistan Today?

100%

91% 90% 88% 84% 82% 80%

70%

60% 2005 2006 50% 2007 2009 40%

30%

20%

10% 10% 6% 6% 5% 6% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 1% 2% 0% Current government Taliban Other No opinion

37

FIGURE 5.5 Question: Which Of The Following Do You Think Poses The Biggest Danger In Our Country?

41% 57% Taliban 52% 58%

28% 20% Drug Traffickers 23% 13%

22% 2005 9% 2006 Local Commanders 9% 2007 7% 2009

4% 8% United States 10% 8%

2% 3% Current Afghan government 1% 1%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

FIGURE 5.6 Question: How Much of A Problem Is the Issue of Corruption among Government Officials or the Police in this Area?

70%

63%

60% 55%

50% 45%

40% 2006 2007 2009 30% 27%

23% 21% 20%

11% 11% 10% 9% 10% 8% 6% 4% 3% 2%

0% Big problem Moderate problem Small problem Not a problem No opinion

38 AFGHANISTAN IN 2008: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE75 Asia Foundation, October 2008 (6,593 Afghan adults from throughout the country were interviewed)

FIGURE 5.6 Question: Generally Speaking, Do You Think Things in Afghanistan Today Are Going In the Right Direction, or Do You Think Things Are Going In The Wrong Direction? (2006, 2007 & 2008)

60%

50%

44% 42%

40% 38%

32% 2006 30% 29% 2007 2008 25% 24% 23% 21% 20%

10%

0% Right Direction Wrong Direction Some in right, some in wrong direction

Surveys Released: September 2006, September 2007, And October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.7 Question: Why Do You Say Things Are Moving In The Right Direction? (Comparison with 2006 & 2007)

50%

40% 39% 39%

34% 32% 31% 30% 29% 2006 2007 21% 21% 2008 20% 19% 19% 16% 16%

11% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9%

3%

0%

t ng ed ech n War e ildi pe the Sp bu O of ree Re d F n/ ave Good Security En tio h om/ irls ce/ ed truc G Good Governmen ea re ns P F o ec ls for R hoo c S

Surveys Released: September 2006 And September 2007, And October 2008, Respectively

39 FIGURE 5.8 Question: Why Do You Say Things Are Moving In The Wrong Direction? (Comparison with 2006 & 2007)

60%

50% 50% 48%

40%

2006 30% 2007 27% 2008

22% 22%

20% 19% 17% 15% 15% 15% 15% 13% 12% 12% 10% 10% 9% 6%

2% 1% 0% 0% 0% Insecurity Corruption Bad economy Unemployment Bad government High Prices Administrative Corruption

Surveys Released: September 2006 and September 2007, and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.9 Question: What Is The Biggest Problem In Your Local Area? (Comparison with 2006 & 2007)

40%

35% 35%

30% 30% 28% 27% 26% 25% 25%

22% 21% 21% 2006 20% 19% 19% 2007 18% 2008 17%

15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13%

10% 8% 7%

5%

1%

0% Unemployment Electricity Water Insecurity High Prices Healthcare Education Roads

Surveys Released: September 2006 and September 2007, and October 2008, Respectively

40

FIGURE 5.10 Present Condition of Various Infrastructure in Localities, 2007 & 2008

INFRASTRUCTURE VERY/QUITE GOOD (%) QUITE/VERY BAD (%) 2007 2008 2007 2008 Availability of clean drinking water 63 62 36 38 Availability of water for irrigation 59 47 40 49 Availability of jobs 30 21 69 78 Supply of electricity 31 25 68 74 Security situation 66 33 Availability of medical care 56 49 44 50 Availability of education for children 72 70 28 29 Freedom of movement 72 28

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.11 Public Feelings towards the Performance of Central Government in Specific Aspects of Its Work, 2007 & 2008

VERY/QUITE GOOD JOB (%) SOMEWHAT/VERY BAD JOB ASPECT OF WORK (%) 2007 2008 2007 2008 Education 88 84 11 15 Healthcare system 72 66 28 33 Creating job opportunities 35 24 64 75 Maintaining relations with 68 62 29 34 neighboring countries Reviving/developing the economy 46 33 53 64 Fighting corruption 36 31 64 66

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.12 Question: Would You Say That Today Your Family Is More Prosperous, Less Prosperous or About as Prosperous as Under The Taliban Government? (2006, 2007 & 2008)

60%

54%

50% 49%

40% 39% 36%

2006 30% 28% 2007 26% 2008

20% 16% 14% 13%

10% 8% 7% 7%

0% More Prosperous Less Prosperous About as Prosperous Absent During Taliban Rule

Survey Released: September 2006 and September 2007, and October 2008, Respectively 41

FIGURE 5.13 Public’s Agreement and Disagreement towards Various Statements about the Afghan National Army (ANA) And Afghan National Police (ANP), 2007 & 2008

STATEMENT Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%) Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%) 2007 2008 2007 2008 Is honest and fair with the Afghan people: ANA 90 89 8 10 ANP 86 80 14 18 Is unprofessional and poorly trained: ANA 62 55 36 41 ANP 65 60 33 37 Needs the support of foreign troops and cannot operate by itself: ANA 77 69 21 27 ANP 77 69 21 27 Helps improve the security: ANA 89 86 10 12 ANP 86 80 13 17

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.14 Question: How Confident Are You That The Afghan Government On Its Own Will Be Able To Conduct Free And Fair Elections? (2007 & 2008)

60%

52%

50% 49%

40%

2007 30% 2008

23%

20% 19%

12% 10% 10% 10% 10% 8% 7%

0% Very Confident Somewhat Confident Somewhat Not Confident Not Confident At All Refused/Don't Know

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.15 Public’s Agreement or Disagreement with Various Statements about Democracy and Governance

STATEMENT Strongly/Somewhat Agree (%) Strongly/Somewhat Disagree (%) Democracy may have its problems, but it is better 85 10 than any other form of government. Despite our differences, as Afghans we have many 88 11 values that unite us. Politicians seek power for their own benefit and 79 19 don’t worry about helping people. Survey Released: September 2007

42 FIGURE 5.16 Percentage of People Who Strongly/Somewhat Agree With Respect To Various Statements Related to the State Court and Jirgas/Shuras, 2007 & 2008

State Court (%) Jirgas/Shuras (%) STATEMENT 2007 2008 2007 2008 They are accessible to me 78 68 83 76 They are fair and trusted 58 50 78 70 They follow local norms and values of our people 57 50 76 69 They are effective at delivering justice 58 52 76 69 They resolve cases timely and properly 51 38 72 59

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.17 Question: Do You Own Any of the Following Here in Your Household in Functioning Order? (2007 & 2008)

100%

90% 88% 84%

80%

70%

60% 58%

51% 2007 50% 2008 42% 40% 40% 37% 38%

32% 30% 25%

20%

10%

3% 2% 0% Radio Bicycle Mobile phone TV set Motorcycle Fixed phone line

Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

FIGURE 5.18 Question: Which Is The Main Source From Where You Normally Get Information About What Is Happening In The Country? (2007 & 2008)

70%

64% 61% 60% 57% 57% 54% 51% 50%

40% Radio TV Friends/Family/Neighbors 30% 28% 28% 27% 26% 23% 21% 20% 16% 16% 14% 12% 11% 10% 5%

0% All Rural Urban All Rural Urban 2007 2008 Survey Released: September 2007 and October 2008, Respectively

43

AFGHANISTAN: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS76 Charney Research (Multiple Surveys Conducted from March 2004- November 2007, each with 800-2,400 Afghan respondents)

FIGURE 5.19 Opinion on the Direction of the Country

90%

80% 77%

70%

64% 62% 60%

55% 54% 50% 51% Right Direction 44% Wrong Direction 42% 40%

30% 28% 24% 24% 24% 22% 20% 21%

10% 11% 6%

0% Mar 04 Oct 05 Jun 06 Oct 06 Nov 06 Jun 07 Sep 07 Nov 07

FIGURE 5.20 Question: How Would You Rate The Work Of The United States In Afghanistan?

80%

70% 68%

60% 57%

52% 50%

42% 42% Excellent/Good 40% Fair/Poor

30% 30%

20%

10%

0% 2005 2006 2007

44

FIGURE 5.21 Question: Do You Think The Following Things Can Be Justified Or Not?

TACTICS JUSTIFIED (%) UNJUSTIFIED (%) Attacks against government officials 2 94 Attacks against the police 6 91 Attacks against teachers or schools* 4 95 Attacks against civilians* 5 94 Suicide bombings 8 89 Attacks against US military forces 17 75 *2006 data. All other data reflects 2007 survey.

FIGURE 5.22 Question: How Would You Rate The Work Of Hamid Karzai As President Of Afghanistan?

90%

83% 80%

70% 67%

62% 63% 60%

50% Excellent/Good Fair/Poor 40% 36% 32% 30% 31%

20% 16%

10%

0% 2004 2005 2006 2007

Survey Released: November 2007

45 FIGURE 5.23 Question: In Your View, What Is The Biggest Problem Facing Afghanistan As A Whole? What Is The Next Biggest Problem? (Problems Mentioned By 15% Or More In 2007)

60%

51% 50% 47%

43% 41%

40% 38% 38%

35% 34% 33% 33% 32% 2004 2005 30% 27% 2006 25% 2007

20%

10%

3%

0% 0% 0% Security Taliban Economy Corruption

FIGURE 5.24 Question: What Is The Biggest Problem In Your Local Area? What Is The Next Biggest Problem? (Problems Mentioned By 15% or More In 2007)

45%

40% 39% 39%

35% 35% 34% 33% 32% 32% 32% 30% 30%

26%

25% 2004 2005 21%21% 2006 20% 19% 19% 2007 18% 16% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 12%

10% 9% 8% 8%

5%

0% Electricity Economy Roads Education Security Water

46

1 David Wood, “Afghan Air War Grows in Intensity”, Baltimore Sun, July 28, 2008. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Humanitarian Factsheet”, June 29, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_fact-sheets/2008/08June29-Humanitarian-fact-sheet-English.pdf United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Armed conflict and Civilian Casualties, Trends and Developments 01 January-31 August, 2008” Accessed at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-7JJMA8-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Protection of Civilians”, January 5, 2009. UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Monthly Humanitarian Update for Afghanistan”, January 2009 (and subsequent monthly reports) 2 UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Protection of Civilians”, January 5, 2009. UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Monthly Humanitarian Update for Afghanistan”, January 2009 (and subsequent monthly reports) 3 Ibid. 4 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Historical data accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm Icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=US 5 Icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=US 6 Military Casualty Information, Statistical Information and Analysis Division, Department of Defense. Accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/OEFDEATHS.pdf 7 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Historical data accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm 8 Country specific data for the United Kingdom on icasualties.org website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=UK 9 Country specific data for the Canadian military on icasualties.org website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=Canada 10 icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/OEF/Default.aspx 11 Icasualties.org Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=US 12 Strategic Advisory Group Headquarters ISAF, “Metrics Brief February 2009”, unclassified briefing slides (and subsequent updates) 13 Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, “Plan Would Shift Forces From Iraq to Afghanistan”, New York Times, September 5, 2008. Fisnik Abrashi, “NATO: 3,000 US troops deploy near Afghanistan”, Associated Press, January 27, 2009. 14 “ISAF Troops Placemat”, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf 15 Ibid. 16 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 22. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf GAO-08-661, “Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces”, Government Accountability Office, June 2008, p. 33. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf Major General Robert Cone, Press Conference from Afghanistan, November 12, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4314 “ISAF Troops Placemat”, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf 17 Ann Scott Tyson, “More Recruits, U.S. Arms Planned for Afghan Military”, Washington Post, December 5, 2007. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, p. 35 (and subsequent reports). Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf “ISAF Troops Placemat”, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf 18 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 18 (and subsequent reports). Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf 19 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, p. 42. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf 20 GAO-08-661, “Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces”, Government Accountability Office, June 2008, p. 33. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf 21 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, p. 49. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf 22 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 27 (and subsequent reports). Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf 23 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 18. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf 24 Michael Gisick, “Afghan Police Depend Heavily on U.S. Support”, Stars and Stripes, August 10, 2008. 25 NATO-ISAF website, “Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Programme”, September 2007. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html 26 European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, “Police Strength Fact Sheet”, July 21, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/POLICE.pdf European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, “EU Police Mission for Afghanistan, Mission Fact Sheet”, June 2008. Accessed at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/0806-FACTSHEET_EUPOL_Afg-version10_EN.compressed.pdf 27 GAO-08-661, “Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces”, Government Accountability Office, June 2008, p. 11. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf 28 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, January 30, 2009, p. 35. Accessed at: http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan09/pdf/Report_-_January_2009.pdf 29 Strategic Advisory Group Headquarters ISAF, “Security Metrics: March 2009”, prepared April 16, 2009 30 Tom Vanden Brook, “Afghan Roadside Bombs At Record”, USA Today, January 26, 2009 31 Attack figures compiled and provided by Sami Kovanen, Tundra Group, http://www.tundra-security.com/ 32 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2009, p. 62. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf Robert M. Perito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan”, Special Report: United States Institute of Peace, October 2005, p. 15. Accessed at: http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf 33 NATO-ISAF website, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” Topic Page. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html 34 Center for Policy and Human Development, “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007”, pp. 129-130. Accessed at: http://www.cphd.af/nhdr/nhdr07/download/pdfs/eng/nhdr07_complete.pdf United Nations High Commission on Refugees, “10,000 Returnees in First Month of Repatriation from Pakistan”, UNHCR Kabul Briefing Note, March 31, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=kabul&id=47f0e7662 35 UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, “International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, Paris 2008 Fact Sheet”. Accessed at: http://www.unama- afg.org/news/_londonConf/_factsheet/paris-con-factsheet.pdf United Nations High Commission on Refugees, “UNHCR helps more than 250,000 Afghans return home since January”, UNHCR Kabul Briefing Note, October 7, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/48eb80d02.html 36 United Nations High Commission on Refugees, “First Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Convoy leaves Heart for Badghis””, UNHCR Kabul Press Information, May 5, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=kabul&id=481f2a6d2

47

37 CIA World Factbook, “Afghanistan Country Page”, last updated July 24, 2008. Accessed at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/af.html 38 PBS, “A Woman Among Warlords: Afghanistan’s National Assembly” Accessed at: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/a-woman-among- warlords/afghanistans-national-assembly/67/ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, “The A to Z Guide to Afghan Assistance”, Sixth Edition, February 2008, pp. 56-61. Accessed at: http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=25 39 Center for Policy and Human Development, “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007”, p. 74. Accessed at: http://www.cphd.af/nhdr/nhdr07/download/pdfs/eng/nhdr07_complete.pdf 40 Center for Policy and Human Development, “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007”, p. 70-71. Accessed at: http://www.cphd.af/nhdr/nhdr07/download/pdfs/eng/nhdr07_complete.pdf 41 Ibid. 42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “2008 World Drug Report”, p. 38. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008”, November 2008, p. 5. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf 43 Ibid. 44 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey”, February 2008, p. 3. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghan-winter-survey-Feb08-short.pdf United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 Executive Summary”, August 2008, p. 7. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf 45 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey”, February 2008, p. 9. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghan-winter-survey-Feb08-short.pdf Jon Boone, “Wheat versus poppy on Helmand front line”, Financial Times, August 18, 2008. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Winter Assessment”, January 2009. Accessed at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/ORA_report_2009.pdf 46 Press Freedom Index 2007, compiled by “Reporters Without Borders” and released October 16, 2007. Accessible at: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025 47 Transparency International Annual CPI reports accessed at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 48 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World”, The Brookings Institution, 2008, p. 10. 49 Mohammad Ishaque Sarwari, “Development Outlook 2008: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, Asian Development Bank. Accessed at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2008/AFG.pdf 50 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, July 30, 2009, p. 341. Accessed at: http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Default.aspx 51 Mohammad Ishaque Sarwari, “Development Outlook 2008: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, Asian Development Bank. Accessed at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2008/AFG.pdf 52 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, p. 67. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf 53 Ibid, p. 68 54 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p. 31. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, July 30, 2009, p. 341. Accessed at: http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Default.aspx 55 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 78. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf 56 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 97. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, p. 13. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2009, p. 51. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/1230_June­2009Final.pdf 57 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Humanitarian Factsheet”, June 29, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_fact- sheets/2008/08June29-Humanitarian-fact-sheet-English.pdf 58 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, pp. 114-116. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf Susan Wardak and Michael Hirth, “Defining the GAPS: The Case of Afghanistan”, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Education, April 2009. Accessed at: http://www.afghan- web.com/education/case_afg_education.pdf Strategic Advisory Group Headquarters ISAF, “Metrics Brief March 2009”, unclassified briefing slides 59 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p. 27. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf 60 Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan”, Oxfam International, March 2008, p. 25. Accessed at: http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf 61 Asian Development Bank, “Key Indicators 2007”, p. 162-163. Accessed at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2007/pdf/Key- Indicators-2007.pdf 62 Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, “Microfinance Sector Update”, May 2008. Accessed at: http://www.misfa.org.af/uploads/files/MF%20Sector%20update%20March%2008_1.pdf 63 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health, “A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan, 2005/1384”, November 2005, p. vii. Accessed at: http://www.msh.org/afghanistan/pdf/Afghanistan_BPHS_2005_1384.pdf Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 108. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf 64 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 124. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf World Health Organization, “Afghanistan Mortality Country Fact Sheet 2006”. Accessed at: http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort_emro_afg_afghanistan.pdf 65Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 109. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf 66 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Government Report, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013”, p 108. Accessed at: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf 67 GAO-08-622, “Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, April 2008, p. 12. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt”, Council on Foreign Relations web report no. 36, July 2008, p. 3. Accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf 68 CIA World Factbook, “Pakistan Country Page”, last updated July 24, 2008. Accessed at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/pk.html 69 GAO-08-622, “Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, April 2008, p. 12. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf

48

70 Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt”, Council on Foreign Relations web report no. 36, July 2008, pp. 7-8. Accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf Tony Capaccio, “Pakistan’s Frontier Corps Will Get U.S. Body Armor”, Bloomberg News, June 5, 2009 71 Kevin Maurer, “1-star: Special Forces in Iraq for Long Haul”, Army Times, November 3, 2008. Yochi J. Drezen and Siobahn Gorman, “U.S. Special Forces Sent To Train Pakistanis”, Wall Street Journal. May 16, 2009. 72 GAO-08-622, “Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”, April 2008, p. 12. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf 73 Terror Free Tomorrow/New America Foundation, Pakistani Public Opinion Poll, Released July 9, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf 74 ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand”, released February 9, 2009. Accessed at: http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf 75 Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People” .Accessed at: http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/20 Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People”. Accessed at: http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php 76Craig Charney, “Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications”, Charney Research, briefing given at the Center for National Policy, April 3, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.cnponline.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/3258

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