Elena Volkova Communist Christianity As Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia Look Like Trump's Dream?

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Elena Volkova Communist Christianity As Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia Look Like Trump's Dream? Journal of the European Society of Women in Theological Research 27 (2019) 279-298. doi: 10.2143/ESWTR.27.0.3286565 ©2019 by Journal of the European Society of Women in Theological Research. All rights reserved. Elena Volkova Communist Christianity as Russian Political Religion: Does Putin’s Dystopia look like Trump’s Dream? Abstract It is common knowledge that Trump admires dictators and lavishes praise on Putin who, as journalists counted, “he has discussed approvingly more than 80 times since 2013.” This includes gems such as “You have to give [Putin] credit that what he’s doing for that country in terms of their world prestige is very strong” and praising the Russian dictator’s “very strong control over [his] country.”1 This article offers a brief introduction into Trump’s dream – the authoritarian oppressive regime with a quasi-religious foundation, a hybrid of Communism and Christianity, that is ready to sacralise the leader and demon- ise his enemies, approve of any aggressions abroad or repressions within the country. Zusammenfassung Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass Trump Diktatoren bewundert und Putin so überschwäng- lich mit Lob bedenkt, so dass Journalisten zählen, „seit 2013 wurde er [Trump] mehr als 80 Mal anerkennend diskutiert.“ Dazu gehören Bonmots wie: „Man muss anerken- nen, dass das, was er [Putin] für dieses, sein Land tut in Bezug auf das Prestige in der Welt, ist sehr stark“ und das Lob auf den russischen Diktator angesichts der „sehr starken Kontrolle über [sein] Land.“ Dieser Artikel bietet eine kurze Einführung in Trumps Traum über das autoritäre, andere unterdrückenden Regime mit einer quasi- religiösen Grundlage, mit einer Mischung aus Kommunismus und Christentum, bereit, den Führer zu sakralisieren und seine Feinde zu dämonisieren, und jegliche Attacken im Ausland wie die Unterdrückung im Land zu billigen. Resumen Es bien sabido que Trump admira a los dictadores y elogia a Putin, quien, según cuentan los periodistas, “ha discutido aprobantemente más de 80 veces desde 2013”. 1 Kirsten Powers, “Donald Trump has always expressed love for authoritarian leaders, but we failed to listen,” in: USA Today, 20 June 2018 (https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/06/20/ donald-trump-authoritarian-leaders-north-korea-russia-turkey-column/712221002, 3 December 2018). 279 Elena Volkova Communist Christianity as Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia look like Trump's dream Esto incluye gemas como “Debe reconocer a [Putin] que lo que está haciendo por ese país en términos de prestigio mundial es muy fuerte” y elogiar el “muy fuerte control del dictador ruso sobre [su] país”. Este artículo ofrece una breve introducción al sueño de Trump: el régimen autoritario y opresivo con una base casi religiosa, un híbrido del comunismo y el cristianismo, que está listo para sacrificar al líder y demonizar a sus enemigos, aprobar cualquier agresión en el extranjero o represión dentro del país. The woman fled into the wilderness to a place prepared for her by God… (Rev 12:6) Dr Marina Salye (1934-2012) was in her mid-sixties, when in 2001 she fled from Saint Petersburg to a remote village isolated by muddy roads. She was an eminent geology scientist and a popular democracy activist: “With a ciga- rette dangling from her lips, she could lead a crowd up and down Nevsky, stopping traffic,” a political opponent of hers recalled twenty years later. “I saw her do it once, and it made a very strong impression. No one had a chance competing with her.”2 In 1992, as an elected member of the City Council, she was the first in Rus- sia to accuse Vladimir Putin, then the head of the Committee for External Relations of Saint-Petersburg Mayor’s office, of corruption: Salye collected evidences to prove that he stole 92 million dollars from the city via legally invalid contracts with shell firms to export raw materials to Europe in return for food supplies. Oil, timber, cotton, rare metals were duly exported, but the city never received any food. The prosecutor’s office would not charge Putin and the City Council was dissolved. When in 2000 Putin was elected President, Marina Salye went into hiding after being threatened by a KGB officer whose name she never disclosed. A decade later, journalist Masha Gessen found Salye in the wilderness and described her story in her book about Putin. How many of Putin’s opponents have left cities or fled abroad to avoid his revenge? Nobody has ever counted, but there must be dozens of them. How many of them have been murdered within the country or beyond it? Nobody expects Russian secret police to release the full list of victims, so we can 2 Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (Penguin Group: New York 2012), 96. 280 Elena Volkova Communist Christianity as Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia look like Trump's dream enumerate only those political murders and mysterious deaths that were demonstrative or came to light: – 2018: Sergei Scripal, former Russian military officer, and his daughter Yulia Skripal poisoned in Salisbury, England; – 2017: Denis Voronenkov, Communist politician who criticised Putin after fleeing Russia in 2016, shot in Kiev, Ukraine; – 2015: Boris Nemtsov, prominent liberal politician and protest leader, assas- sinated on a bridge near the Kremlin in Moscow; – 2013: Boris Berezovsky, tycoon in exile, found dead inside a locked bath- room at his home in England; – 2009: Sergei Magnitsky, lawyer investigating a massive tax fraud, died in prison after being brutally beaten and denied medical care; – 2009: Natalya Estemirova, journalist and human rights activist investigat- ing abductions and murders in Chechnya, kidnapped and shot; – 2006: Anna Politkovskaya, journalist and human rights activist whose book Putin’s Russia (2004) accused the Kremlin leader and Federal Security Service of usurping the political power, assassinated in an elevator in her building on the day of Putin’s birthday. As Politkovskaya wrote, We are hurtling back into a Soviet abyss, into an information vacuum that spells death from our own ignorance. All we have left is the internet, where information is still freely available. For the rest, if you want to go on working as a journalist, it’s total servility to Putin. Otherwise, it can be death, the bullet, poison, or trial—whatever our special services, Putin’s guard dogs, see fit.3 – 2006: Alexander Litvinenko, former KGB agent and vocal critic of Putin, died after drinking a cup of tea with deadly polonium-210 in a London café; – 2003: Sergei Yushenkov, former army colonel and liberal politician gather- ing evidence to prove that Putin was behind the apartment bombing in Russia in 1999, gunned down outside his home in Moscow. Craig Unger dedicated his book House of Trump, House of Putin, The Untold Story of Donald Trump and the Russian Mafia (2018), “In memory of Paul Khlebnikov, Alexander Litvinenko, Sergei Magnitsky, Anna Politkovskaya, 3 Anna Politkovskaya, “Poisoned by Putin,” in: The Guardian, 9 September 2004. 281 Elena Volkova Communist Christianity as Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia look like Trump's dream and the dozens of other journalists, investigators, and dissidents who lost their lives investigating Putin’s kleptocracy.”4 “To flee or not to flee” debates in protest circles often sound like “to be or not to be a true freedom fighter” – meaning the true one must stay in Russia to keep struggling – but the “place prepared by God” for refugees might be as insecure as Moscow or Chechnya. At Anna Politkovskaya funeral service, Father Georgy Chistyakov, a liberal Orthodox priest, spoke of a new type of martyrdom, emerging beyond church walls, that may be called civil martyrdom, civil testimony. Because a martyr is first and foremost a witness who testifies to justice, fearlessly works for the sake of justice […] There are few people among us who tell nothing but the truth. Anya was such person, and she was killed for that.5 While Christian liberals see their martyrs as Christ-like figures, the state and church establishment manipulate with idea of Holy Russia ruled by God-sent leaders. For example, the trigger for the Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” was the official announcement of Putin’s decision to become president for a third term and, particularly, Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill’s hailing of him as a mir- acle sent from God to rectify the crooked path of Russian history.6 Clash of religions: Christianity vs Marxism-Leninism Under Communism, the policy of militant atheism excluded religion from the political scene, with faith being marked as either lack of education or a sign of opposition. Those who were disillusioned with the official ideology and the Church (which collaborated with the anti-Christian regime) were looking for an alternative religious way. They organised underground groups that gathered and distributed banned books, produced samizdat (hand-made) magazines, 4 Craig Unger, House of Trump, House of Putin: The Untold Story of Donald Trump and the Russian Mafia (Penguin Random House: New York 2018). 5 Alexander Soldatov, “Бесстрашный свидетель [Fearless Witness],” in: Огонёк 27 (July/2007) (http://damian.ru/Actualn_tema/Chistakov/soldatov.html, 3 April 2019). Transla- tion here and throughout the article: Elena Volkova. 6 “Стенограмма встречи председателя Правительства РФ В.В. Путина со Святейшим Патриархом Кириллом и лидерами традиционных религиозных общин России [Transcript of Prime-Minister V.V. Putin’s Meeting with Patriarch Kirill and Leaders of Rus- sian Traditional Religions)]” in: Официальный сайт Московского Патриархата, 8 Feb- ruary 2012 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2005767.html, 11 November 2018). 282 Elena Volkova Communist Christianity as Russian Political Religion: Does Putin's Dystopia look like Trump's dream studied the Bible and the Church Fathers, and discussed religious aspects of Russian classical literature and philosophy.
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