A Dissertation Entitled the Effects of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race on Mock Jurors' Decisions for a Child Sexual
A Dissertation
entitled
The Effects of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race on Mock Jurors’ Decisions
for a Child Sexual Abuse Case
by
Alissa Anderson Call
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Experimental Psychology
______Dr. Kamala London Newton, Committee Chair
______Dr. Jason P. Rose, Committee Member
______Dr. John D. Jasper, Committee Member
______Dr. Stephen Christman, Committee Member
______Dr. Jerry Van Hoy, Committee Member
______Dr. Amanda Bryant-Friedrich, Dean College of Graduate Studies
The University of Toledo
August 2018
Copyright 2018, Alissa Anderson Call
This document is copyrighted material. Under copyright law, no parts of this document may be reproduced without the expressed permission of the author. An Abstract of
The Effects of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race on Mock Jurors’ Decisions for a Child Sexual Abuse Case
by
Alissa Anderson Call
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Experimental Psychology
The University of Toledo August, 2018
In the extant literature on mock jurors’ perceptions of child sexual abuse victims, little attention has been paid to the potential impact of child race on legal judgments. The present research investigated the influence of child race (Black vs. White), defendant race
(Black vs. White), and child age (12 years vs. 17 years) on mock jurors’ legal judgments for a hypothetical teacher-student sexual abuse case. Child race did not solely impact mock jurors’ legal judgments or perceptions of the mock CSA case, but did interact with other variables to influence case outcomes and mock jurors’ perceptions. Child age directly affected legal judgments and interacted with additional extralegal factors as well as mock juror gender. No significant main effects of defendant race were observed in the present study, yet this extralegal factor interacted with child race and age to impact mock jurors’ defendant guilt ratings. Mock juror gender differences as well as mock jurors’ racial and authoritarian attitudes, beliefs in a just world, and endorsements of racially- based sexual stereotypes were also examined in the present study. Mock juror gender differences were found for various legal judgments related to both the defendant and child complainant. Mock jurors’ endorsements of the “Jezebel” stereotype was strongly
iii related to legal judgments for the case while mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes, racial attitudes, and beliefs in a just world were minimally associated with their legal judgments. The study’s findings may be used to educate legal professionals—as well as jurors—on the impact of extralegal factors and individual biases in child sexual abuse cases.
iv
For Blake—my love, my husband, my best friend, my life line—I would not have been able to get through these past six years without your love, strength, and unwavering support. This is for you.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my mentor and dissertation chair, Dr. Kamala London
Newton, for her guidance throughout the development of this scholarly project and for her mentorship over the past four years. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Jason Rose, Dr. John Jasper, Dr. Stephen Christman, and Dr. Jerry VanHoy for their valuable feedback on this project.
I am very appreciative of the Forensic Developmental Research Laboratory ladies at the University of Toledo for taking the time to review my materials, my document drafts, and for providing valuable feedback on this project: Amy Capparelli, Quincy
Miller, Raghad Hassabelnaby, Bertha Lopez, and Christina Perez. I also appreciate the
Psychology Department at the University of Toledo for funding this research project via the Meritorious Research Grant.
Also, thank you Dr. Erin Vogel and Susan Yamamoto for your help and consultation regarding the statistical analyses for this project. Thank you Dr. Twila
Wingrove and Dr. Evelyn Maeder, for your mentorship and collaboration over the years, and for your wisdom regarding the psychological study of juror decision making.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my husband, Blake Call, my parents,
Renee and Greg Anderson, and my sister, Madelyn Anderson, for their love, encouragement, and relentless support of my education and academic goals.
vi Table of Contents
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements vi
Table of Contents vii
List of Tables xii
List of Figures xiv
List of Abbreviations xv
I. Literature Review 1
A. Child Victim Race 3
a. Stereotypes and prejudice in CSA cases 6
b. The Jezebel stereotype 6
B. Defendant Race 8
C. Perceptions of Child Credibility and Child Age 10
a. The Adultification of Black girls 12
D. Juror Prejudice and Attitudes that may affect CSA Cases 14
a. Aversive racism 15
b. Color-blind racial attitudes 16
c. Belief in a just world 17
d. Right-wing authoritarianism 18
E. Juror Gender 20
II. The Present Study 22
A. Research Questions and Hypotheses 23
a. Research question 1 23
vii i. Hypothesis 1 23
ii. Hypothesis 2 23
iii. Hypothesis 3 23
iv. Hypothesis 4 24
v. Hypothesis 5 24
b. Research question 2 24
i. Hypothesis 1 24
ii. Hypothesis 2 24
c. Research question 3 25
i. Hypothesis 1 25
ii. Hypothesis 2 25
iii. Hypothesis 3 26
iv. Hypothesis 4 26
III. Method 28
A. Design 28
B. Participants 28
C. Procedure 31
D. Materials 32
a. Mock juror instructions 32
b. Case and trial summaries 32
i. Case and trial summary pilot study 34
c. Trial character information and photographs 34
i. Photographs 35
viii 1. Photograph pilot study 36
d. Judge’s charge to members of the jury 40
E. Measures 40
a. Juror verdict form 40
b. Punishment recommendations 40
c. Student and teacher culpability 41
d. Case-related survey 42
i. Defendant guilt 43
ii. Student credibility and maturity 43
e. Racial stereotype scale 45
f. Manipulation and attention check survey 46
g. The Just World Scale 46
h. Color-Blind Racial Attitude Scale (CoBRAS) 47
i. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Short Form 47
j. Demographic survey 48
IV. Results 49
A. Analyses of Research Questions and Hypotheses 49
a. Research questions 1 & 2 49
i. Verdict decision 49
ii. Defendant guilt ratings 53
iii. Sentencing recommendations 58
iv. Defendant culpability 61
v. Child culpability 64
ix vi. Child credibility 65
vii. Child maturity 70
b. Research questions 3 71
i. Preliminary analyses 71
ii. Hypothesis 1 73
iii. Hypothesis 2 73
iv. Hypothesis 3 74
v. Hypothesis 4 74
V. Discussion 79
A. The Effects of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race 79
a. Child race 80
b. Defendant race 80
c. Child complainant-defendant race similarities 82
d. Child age 83
e. Child race and age interaction 84
B. The Effects of Mock Juror Gender 84
a. Mock juror gender 85
b. Child complainant race and mock juror gender interaction 87
c. Child complainant age and mock juror gender interaction 88
C. The Effects of Mock Jurors’ Prejudice and Attitudes 89
a. Authoritarian attitudes 89
b. Beliefs in a just world 90
c. Color-blind racial attitudes 91
x d. Jezebel stereotype endorsements 92
D. General Limitations to the Present Study 93
E. Conclusion 96
References 98
Appendices
A. Instructions 117
B. Case and Trial Summary 118
C. Trial Character Sheet & Photographs 125
D. Judge’s Charge to Members of the Jury 130
E. Juror Verdict Form 132
F. Defendant Punishment Recommendations 133
G. Defendant and Victim Culpability Ratings 134
H. Case-Related Survey 135
I. Racial Stereotype Scale 137
J. Manipulation & Attention Checks Survey 138
K. The Just World Scale 140
L. Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) 142
M. Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Short Form 144
N. Demographic Survey 147
O. Descriptive Analyses of Punishment Recommendations 149
P. Descriptive Analyses of Racial Stereotype Scale Scores 150
xi List of Tables
Table 1 Frequencies for character race regarding selected photograph stimuli from
pilot study...... 38
Table 2 Descriptives for selected child complainant photograph stimuli from pilot
study...... 39
Table 3 Descriptives for selected defendant, attorney, and judge photograph stimuli
from pilot study...... 40
Table 4 Correlations and descriptive statistics for student culpability and teacher
culpability items...... 42
Table 5 Correlations and descriptive statistics for student credibility items...... 44
Table 6 Correlations and descriptive statistics for student maturity items...... 45
Table 7 Frequency of guilty verdict decisions as a function of child race, child age,
defendant race, and mock juror gender...... 51
Table 8 Logistic regression analysis predicting guilty verdicts...... 53
Table 9 Summary of defendant guilt ratings as a function of child race, child age,
defendant race, and mock juror gender...... 55
Table 10 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on
continuous guilt ratings...... 56
Table 11 Summary of sentencing recommendations as a function of child race, child
age, defendant race, and mock juror gender...... 59
Table 12 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on
sentence recommendations...... 60
xii Table 13 Summary of defendant and child culpability ratings as a function of child
race, child age, defendant race, and mock juror gender...... 63
Table 14 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on
defendant culpability ratings...... 64
Table 15 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on child
culpability ratings...... 65
Table 16 Summary of child credibility and maturity ratings as a function of child race,
child age, defendant race, and mock juror gender...... 67
Table 17 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on child
credibility ratings...... 68
Table 18 Main effects for experimental manipulations and mock juror gender on child
maturity ratings...... 70
Table 19 Descriptive statistics for scale scores...... 71
Table 20 Dependent measures and scale scores correlations...... 72
xiii List of Figures
Figure 1 Mock jurors’ verdict decisions by experimental group variables and mock
juror gender...... 50
Figure 2 Mean values for mock jurors’ continuous guilt ratings concerning the
defendant by child age, child race, and defendant race...... 58
Figure 3 Mean sentencing recommendations by child race and mock juror gender
interaction...... 61
Figure 4 Mean child credibility ratings by child age and mock juror gender
interaction...... 69
xiv List of Abbreviations
ANCOVA ...... Analysis of Covariance ANOVA...... Analysis of Variance
CoBRAS ...... Color-Blind Racial Attitude Scale CFD ...... Chicago Face Dataset CSA ...... Child Sexual Abuse
JWS ...... Just World Scale
MTurk...... Amazon Mechanical Turk
NIMH-ChEFS ...... National Institute of Mental Health, Child Emotional Faces Picture Set
RWA ...... Right-Wing Authoritarianism
SES ...... Socioeconomic Status
WEIRD ...... Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic
xv Chapter One
Literature Review
Child sexual abuse (CSA) remains to be a significant problem today in society. A recent report published on child maltreatment in the United States indicated that out of
794,790 child victims, 8.4% were sexually abused during the federal fiscal year of 2015
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, Administration on Children, Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau, 2017).
Many children who are alleged victims of maltreatment or sexual abuse testify about their experiences in court (Quas & Goodman, 2012). However, due to the secretive nature of
CSA, physical evidence and corroborating witnesses are often unavailable to verify an alleged child complainant’s claim (Myers, 1998). As such, jurors tend to rely largely on the child’s testimony and characteristics (e.g., age, demeanor) to render their legal judgments (Bottoms, Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007; Myers, 1998). For instance, 53% of jurors who participated in actual CSA trials stated that child complainant characteristics were the most important for determining case outcomes
(Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999). Therefore, it is important to understand how jurors react to child witnesses in court.
The extant literature on CSA cases suggests extralegal factors such as child age
(e.g., Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Schaaf, & Kenney, 2002; Leippe & Romanczyk,
1987), demeanor (e.g., Golding, Fryman, Marsil, & Yozwiak, 2003), and intellectual disability (e.g., Bottoms, Nysse-Carris, Harris, & Tyda, 2003) impact jurors’ legal judgments for CSA cases. Moreover, mock juror gender (e.g., Bottoms & Goodman,
1994), pretrial attitudes (e.g., Gabora, Spansos, & Joab, 1993; Goodman-Delahunty,
1 Cossins, & O'Brien, 2010), and defendant race (e.g., Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004) can influence juror decision-making for CSA cases. These extralegal factors have been found to impact mock jurors’ verdict decisions—guided by judicial instructions such as specific case elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt—as well as less structured and more subjective decisions about child complainant’s perceived credibility, responsibility, and the defendant’s responsibility for the alleged crime (for a review, see
Bottoms et al., 2007).
Interestingly, child victim race is one potential extralegal factor that has not received much attention in this field of study. This gap in the literature warrants further examination since race is one of the first physical features that jurors are likely to notice and may possibly consider when adjudicating a CSA case. In the United States, racial minorities have a history of being discriminated against compared to the White majority
(Bonilla-Silva, 2017). Racial stereotypes and evaluations of non-White racial groups have been noted to influence peoples’ decision-making in legal contexts (Gordon, 1990;
Maeder, Yamamoto, & Saliba, 2015; Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, & Moore, 2002) as well as in non-legal situations (Wyatt, 1982). Identifying certain factors that could prejudice legal judgments is necessary to ensure that all alleged victims and perpetrators are treated fairly in the pursuit of justice.
The current research aimed to address this gap by systematically investigating the influence of child race on mock jurors’ decisions for a mock CSA trial. In addition to child race, the effects of child age, defendant race, mock juror gender, and mock jurors’
(prejudicial) attitudes were examined. In order to ensure that justice is served to all those who enter the American criminal justice system, it is imperative that the effects of race be
2 thoroughly investigated. Implications of the present study may influence attorney’s strategies for identifying and removing jurors during voir dire (i.e., jury selection), a process that proceeds all criminal court trials including CSA case trials.
Child Victim Race
The majority of child victims of maltreatment in 2015 consisted of three racial or ethnic groups: White (43.2%), Hispanic (23.6%), and Black (21.4%; U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Administration on
Children, Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau, 2017). Black “children had the highest rate of victimization at 14.5 per 1000 children in the population of the same race or ethnicity” (p. 20). However, this national study does not report a breakdown of maltreatment type by child race/ethnicity. Could child race be a risk factor for CSA?
According to some studies, Black children are sexually abused as often as White children
(Finkelhor & Baron, 1986; Wyatt, 1985), but other studies report that Black children are sexually abused at a higher rate than White children (Epstein & Bottoms, 1998; Linholm
& Wiley, 1986, Pierce & Pierce, 1984). Nevertheless, child race may impact jurors’ decisions for a CSA trial.
Victim race effects have been studied in the context of various types of criminal cases. For example, Mazzella and Feingold (1994) conducted a meta-analysis incorporating 29 experimental studies to investigate the effects of race on conviction decisions, defendant guilt ratings, and sentencing recommendations. They found a small effect for victim race on sentencing recommendations; harsher punishments were prescribed to the defendant when the victim was White. Other studies indicate that defendants accused of murdering a White victim are sentenced to death more often than
3 defendants accused of murdering a Black victim (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990;
Bohm, 1994; Keil & Vito, 1995). Victim race bias has also been observed in studies on rape cases. Defendants accused of raping White women are more likely to be convicted than those accused of raping Black women (LaFree, Reskin, & Visher, 1985). In the context of actual day-care CSA cases, Williams and Farrell (1990) found that arrest rates and conviction decisions were more likely when the case involved a White girl victim compared to cases where the victim was a Black girl. Therefore, CSA cases involving
White victims may be viewed as more nefarious and deserving of punishment compared to cases involving Black victims.
Two studies have been conducted to specifically examine the racial bias within the context of CSA cases. Foley and Chamblin (1982) surveyed Black and White participants’ views of an audio-recording of a sexual assault trial involving an 11-year- old child. The authors varied the races of both the child victim and defendant (i.e., Black vs. White). Child victim and defendant race impacted perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, but only for White mock jurors. White mock jurors judged the Black defendant to be guilty more often when the child victim was White, compared to all other victim- defendant race dyads. Black mock jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s guilt were greater for the intraracial (i.e., matched defendant and victim races) case versus the interracial (i.e., different defendant and victim races) case. However, these effects of racial bias disappeared when perceptions of the defendant and child victim’s socioeconomic status
(SES) were controlled for in the model. In short, this means that victim/defendant SES augments racial bias for both Black and White mock jurors who are asked to report their perceptions of a CSA case. In the present study, defendant/victim SES was
4 experimentally controlled for to specifically assess the influence of child and defendant race on legal judgments for a CSA case.
Bottoms and colleagues (2004) conducted a series of experiments to investigate the role of victim race on undergraduate mock jurors’ decision-making for a mock CSA case involving a male teacher and a female student. In Experiment 1, they manipulated student race (i.e., Black, White, Hispanic) and age (i.e., 12- vs. 16-year-old). They found that both the Black and Hispanic student complainants were seen as more responsible for the alleged sexual assault compared to the White student, regardless of age. Interestingly, student race did not impact defendant guilt ratings or student credibility judgments. In
Experiment 2, the researchers manipulated the race of both the 12-year-old student and teacher (i.e., White vs. Black). Results indicated that White mock jurors assigned greater guilt ratings to the defendant when the defendant and student were the same race compared to cases involving a teacher and student of different races. These findings suggest that White mock jurors are sensitive to racial dyads.
Importantly, Bottoms and colleagues (2004) extended Foley and Chamblin’s
(1982) findings regarding intraracial CSA cases to a sample of White undergraduate mock jurors. The authors conducted a third experiment to follow up the interaction between defendant and student race on defendant guilt ratings by asking undergraduate students to rate the plausibility of interracial (i.e., White defendant/Black student, Black defendant/White student) and intraracial (i.e., White defendant/White student, Black defendant/Black student) CSA cases. Results supported their hypothesis that cases involving intraracial CSA allegations were deemed more plausible and believable than cases predicated on interracial CSA claims, thus providing an explanation as to why
5 participants attributed greater guilt ratings to defendants who allegedly abused a child of the same race.
Stereotypes and prejudice in CSA cases. In the absence of hard legal evidence, mental representations or stereotypes may be used to determine the child’s credibility and even the degree to which he or she was responsible for the alleged sexual assault or pattern of abuse. Stereotypes can be defined as “a generalized belief about the characteristic of a group” (Bodenhausen & Richeson, 2010, p. 345). Typically, but not always, stereotypes have a negative connotation associated with targeted out-groups (e.g., non-White racial groups). Stereotypes often result in negative perceptions and, in some cases, disparaging evaluations of out-group members (e.g., Allport, 1958; Bodenhausen
& Richeson, 2010; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987).
Stereotypical beliefs differ from the concept of prejudice in that prejudice is considered to be a global disposition or attitude against an out-group and its members. For example, individuals who are highly prejudiced against people of African American descent may be more likely to endorse an array of stereotypes concerning Black individuals. When prejudice escalates to behavioral action, discrimination occurs. This process is known as the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen, & Fishbein, 1972), where stereotypical beliefs give rise to global attitudes that in turn influence behavior.
The Jezebel stereotype. Stereotypical beliefs about individuals of differing races and ethnicities are pervasive in American culture (e.g., Devine, 1989; Thomas,
Witherspoon, & Speight, 2004; Wyatt, 1985). Stereotypes surrounding Black individuals often involve sexual information: Blacks are more sexually experienced (Wyatt, 1982) and sexually promiscuous than Whites (Powell, Wyatt, & Bass, 1983; Weinberg &
6 Williams, 1988), and are sexually perverse (Devine, 1989). The Jezebel stereotype has been used to describe Black women as sexually experienced, promiscuous, and more apt to use her sensuality to her advantage against men (Mitchell & Herring, 1998; West,
1995). Therefore, the credibility of Black females’ claims of sexual abuse and assault could be compromised, especially if jury members endorse the Jezebel stereotype. For example, Willis (1992) surveyed participants’ perceptions of a fictional date rape case and found that the rape was rated as “more acceptable” when the victim was a Black female compared to when the rape victim was a White female. Black women—and perhaps adolescents and young girls—who report sexual assault may be believed less and even blamed more for their victimization compared to White women, especially by individuals who hold racially prejudiced attitudes. One major aim of the present research was to investigate the extent to which mock jurors prescribed the Jezebel stereotype to young Black female complainants of CSA.
The conception of the Jezebel stereotype dates back to the historical times of
American slavery where the sexual exploitation of enslaved Black women was justified by labelling the woman as sexually aggressive and seductive (Thomas et al., 2004). The
Jezebel stereotype of Black women has persisted throughout the decades and is still referenced today, particularly within the sexual entertainment industry (Cowan &
Campbell, 1994).
Given these findings, it is reasonable to believe that biased perceptions of Black girls may also lead to discrimination within the context of the criminal justice system.
Considering all of the extant evidence, Black girls’ behaviors may be viewed as less innocent, thus potentially increasing mock jurors’ skepticisms about CSA complaints as a
7 function of their perceived (or known) race. Fact-finders may go so far as to consider the child complainant’s race for determining whether she consented to an alleged sexual abuse/assault. The role of consent is prohibited from consideration in the context of CSA cases due to the fact that minors younger than the age of consent mandated by the State are legally incapable of consenting to engage in sexual activity with an adult.
Nevertheless, the extant literature on racially based victim-blaming in sexual assault cases suggests that Black females may be perceived as either consenting to or even responsible for their victimization more so than White females. One focus of the present research was to systematically assess the influence of race on victim-blaming within the context of a CSA case involving a female student and male teacher.
Defendant Race
Much research has been conducted to study the effects of defendant race on mock jurors’ decision-making for a variety of legal cases. Some studies report that White defendants are favored by jurors more than Black defendants (e.g., Dane & Wrightsman,
1982; Sweeney & Haney, 1992). For example, Black defendants are often sentenced longer when they are convicted of murder or rape than White defendants (Feild, 1979;
Klein & Kreech, 1982; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Radelet & Pierce, 1985; Ugwuegbu,
1979). Moreover, the interaction of defendant and victim race has been shown to influence mock jurors’ decisions on rape and sexual assault cases (Bottoms et al., 2004;
Hagan, 1974; Howard, 1975; Maeder et al., 2015; Wuensch et al., 2002). However, some studies did not find evidence to support discrimination against defendants in the courtroom due to their race (e.g., for a review, see Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Sommers
8 & Ellsworth, 2001). These mixed findings may be due to the extent to which participants endorse stereotypical attitudes towards Black defendants.
Stereotypical views of Black males as being particularly aggressive and deviant
(e.g., Devine, 1989) may lead mock jurors to believe that a Black defendant accused of
CSA is more likely to have actually committed the crime compared to White defendants.
In the context of adult sexual assault, rape myths regarding defendant and victim race suggest that Black men lust after White women, potentially escalating to rape (Maeder et al., 2015). Varelas and Foley (1998) found evidence to support this particular rape myth.
In their study, White college students assigned less responsibility to White victims compared to Black victims for a sexual assault perpetrated by a Black male defendant
(Varelas & Foley, 1998). These findings have also been observed in the context of CSA cases. Recall the findings from Foley and Chamblin (1982), wherein the interaction of victim and defendant race was found to impact mock jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt, but importantly, this effect was contingent upon the mock jurors’ race.
In other words, White mock jurors perceived cases involving a White complainant of
CSA allegedly perpetrated by a Black defendant as especially egregious and resulted in greater defendant guilt attributions.
Defendant race may interact with child complainant race to influence mock jurors’ perceptions of victim-blaming in a mock CSA trial. Bottoms and colleagues
(2004) found that Black victims of CSA were viewed to be more responsible for the alleged sexual assault perpetrated by a White defendant than White victims. Additionally, cases that involved a defendant and child complainant of the same race increased jurors’
9 beliefs that the alleged sexual victimization actually occurred, and thus, resulted in greater defendant guilt ratings (Bottoms et al., 2004).
Since intraracial CSA claims are more likely to result in higher ratings of defendant guilt, interracial CSA claims may provide a foundation for studying the impact of child race on victim-blaming. For instance, a Black female complainant may be viewed to be sexually mature and/or sexually aggressive compared to a White female complainant. Therefore, the Black female complainant may be viewed as less credible and, in turn, blamed for her victimization, when a White defendant is involved, especially if her behavior is perceived to represent that of the stereotypical Jezebel. Consequently, mock jurors may be less likely to deem the defendant guilty, believing instead that the student brought it upon herself to be sexually assaulted. On the other hand, an interracial case involving a Black defendant and a White female student may be perceived differently. Since Black males are often viewed as sexually deviant, a Black defendant who sexually abuses a White child may appear particularly guilty while the likelihood that the White child complainant was responsible for the abuse is nil. As such, the present research also examined the effects of defendant race and the defendant and child complainant race interaction on mock jurors’ perceptions of a mock CSA trial.
Perceptions of Child Credibility and Child Age
Studies report that individual mock jurors are more likely to perceive a younger
CSA complainant (i.e., younger than 12 years; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994) as credible and vote guilty more often compared to cases involving an older child (e.g., Bottoms, et al., 2004; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Duggan, Aubrey, Doherty, Isquith, Levine, &
Scheiner, 1989; Gabora et al., 1993; Golding, Alexander, & Stewart, 1999a; Golding,
10 Sanchez, & Sego, 1997; Golding, Sanchez, & Sego, 1999b; Goodman et al., 2002;
Nightingale, 1993; Rogers & Davies, 2007). Bottoms and Goodman (1994) added to this explanation by proposing that the CSA complainant credibility depends on views of the child’s honesty as well as the child’s lack of sexual knowledge and cognitive capacity to confabulate CSA claims—more commonly known as the sexual naiveté hypothesis.
Younger children are also viewed as less likely to possess the ability to legally provide consent to participate in sexual acts or have prior sexual experience, which may also contribute to the view that a younger child is more credible than an older child or adolescent (Borgida & Brekke, 1985; Brownmiller, 1975; Reitz-Krueger, Warner,
Newsham, & Reppucci, 2016).
Case context may also affect mock jurors’ legal judgments for sexual abuse and assault cases involving minors. For instance, judicial decisions regarding teacher-student sexual relationships have been affected by perceived maturity and consensual responsibility for engaging in sexual activity based on the child’s age. In Montana, judge
Todd Baugh presided over a case involving a sexual relationship between a 54-year-old male teacher and his 14-year-old female student (Johnson, 2013). Neither the teacher’s race nor the student’s race were formally disclosed via the media. Baugh sentenced the teacher to one month in jail, asserting that the student was partially responsible for the sexual relationship. Baugh stated that the student was “older than her chronological age” and “as much in control of the situation” (Johnson, 2013).
Empirical evidence supports these effects of student age on perceptions of teacher-student sexual relationships. For example, Fromuth and Holt (2008) found that student-teacher sexual relationships involving a 15-year-old were viewed as least abusive
11 compared to a 12-year-old and 9-year-old. Considering the potential impact of the
Jezebel stereotype on mock jurors’ decision-making for a CSA case, it is reasonable to assume that child race may interact with child age when an illicit teacher-student sexual relationship is tried in court. This assumption was empirically tested in the present study.
The Adultification of Black girls. The notion of childhood is a social construct that is influenced by more than a child’s chronological age (Goff, Jackson, Di Leone,
Culotta, & DiTomasso, 2014). A common misperception that children are believed to be older than their chronological age occurs more for Black versus White children. Child age and race may interact together to influence perceptions of a maturity thereby removing or reducing the innocence of “childish” behaviors for racial minorities. This child age and race interaction has been thoroughly studied within the context of the educational system (e.g., Epstein, Blake, & Gonzalez, 2017). Research findings may generalize to other contexts such as the criminal justice system.
Black women, and girls, are stereotyped as becoming aware of their sexuality, learning about sex, and engaging in sexual activity at an earlier rate than Whites (Epstein et al., 2017; Wyatt, 1982). Black and White girls do in fact mature and reach puberty at different rates. Menarche signals the final stage of female puberty. The average age of menarche for Black girls is 12.16 years and 12.88 years for White girls (Kaplowitz &
Oberfield, 1999). Girls who experience menarche at an early age have also been found to show a greater interest in sex and greater frequency of engaging in sexual activities (e.g.,
Brown, Halpern, & L’Engle, 2005; Flannery, Rowe, & Gulley, 1993). Furthermore, research on sexualized behavioral differences between Black and White females is inconsistent. Belcastro (1985) reported negligible racial differences concerning female
12 sexual behaviors. However, other studies report that Black females display sexual behaviors earlier and engage in sexual activity more often than White females (Barone,
Ickovics, Ayers, Katz, Voyce, & Weissberg, 1996; Muram, Rosenthal, Tolley, Peeler, &
Dorko, 1991). Nevertheless, perceptions of female sexual behaviors may depend on the female’s race, and thus, may impact views of her responsibility in a legal case of sexual assault or even CSA.
The theory of adultification posits that compared to White children, Black children are viewed to be older than their chronological age, and therefore, their behaviors as less innocent. Specifically, Black girls’ behaviors are viewed as less innocent compared to White girls of the same age (Epstein et al., 2017). Moreover, compared to White girls of the same age, Black girls are perceived to know more about adult topics, including sex (Epstein et al., 2017). In this study conducted by Epstein and colleagues (2017), adults of differing racial and educational backgrounds viewed Black girls to be more independent than White girls, wherein Black girls are assumed to need less nurturing, protection, support, and comfort (Epstein et al., 2017). Further, Black girls can fall victim to “age compression” where their behaviors and expressions are likened to that of Black women, thus Black girls are believed to be as responsible as Black adult women for their behaviors (Morris, 2016). In other words, the behaviors of White girls, in comparison with Black girls of the same age, are believed to be more representative of childhood innocence. Epstein and her colleagues (2017) contend that the erasure of
Black girlhood innocence contributes to biased perceptions and discriminatory actions that take place in the both educational and juvenile justice systems.
13 In the present research, White girls were predicted to be judged more favorably by mock jurors with regard to a CSA case. If stereotypes regarding the development of adolescent sexuality, sexual knowledge, and promiscuity differ by race, mock jurors who are more likely to endorse these stereotypes may attribute more blame to Black versus
White complainants of CSA. An interaction between child race and age was also expected. Specifically, young Black girls were predicted to be viewed as more responsible for the alleged sexual contact than young White girls.
Juror Prejudice and Attitudes that may affect CSA Cases
In addition, juror prejudice, attitudes, and beliefs may influence legal judgments of child complainant and defendant culpability, and in turn, may impact verdict decisions.
Racial attitudes have been found to influence mock juror legal decision-making (e.g.,
Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997). The present research also examined racial discrimination in the context of a mock CSA case via the theory of aversive racism (e.g.,
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005) and color-blind racial attitudes (e.g., Neville, Lilly, Duran,
Lee, & Browne, 2000), both of which are reviewed in detail below. Further, jurors’ beliefs that individuals get what they deserve and are fully responsible for their misfortune has been associated with the propensity to blame victims (e.g., Furnham,
2003; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Walster, 1966). Authoritarian attitudes have also been linked pro-prosecution attitudes and severe punishment recommendations in a legal context (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003 for a review).
Therefore, racial attitudes, beliefs in a just world, victim-blaming attitudes, and authoritarian views were predicted to influence mock jurors’ decisions and perspectives in the present study. Recall that CSA cases typically involve a degree of ambiguity due to
14 the lack of physical and/or corroborating evidence to support a child’s allegation of sexual assault/abuse. As such, this specific case context may liberate jurors from the constraints of case evidence and instead provide an opportunity for mock jurors to render legal judgments based on their prior experiences and pre-existing—and potentially prejudicial—attitudes.
Aversive racism. Aversive racism may impact mock jurors’ decisions for CSA cases. Aversive racism refers to the negative affect exhibited by Whites towards other racial minorities even when they believe themselves to hold egalitarian views regarding racial prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racism theory suggests that racist attitudes may result in discrimination, especially in situations where expectations to adhere to socially egalitarian norms are weak or lacking (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991).
Support for the theory of aversive racism has been found in contexts involving legal decision making (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997). For example, racial disparities have been noted with regard to sentencing recommendations prescribed to defendants convicted of sexual assault especially in the absence of juror instructions concerning the elements of the charge, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt (Hill & Pfeifer, 1992;
Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005; Pfeifer, & Ogloff, 1991; 2003). Further, cases that involve weak and/or ambiguous case evidence have also presented support for aversive racism as an underlying explanation for mock jurors’ legal judgments
(Ugwuegbu, 1979). Aversive racism theory also explains why race many not impact verdict decisions, but instead may influence legal judgments such as perceptions of both victim and defendant culpability, and sentencing recommendations (Klein & Creech,
15 1982; Mitchell et al., 2005; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 2003) which are less constrained by evidence standards and judicial instructions to render impartial judgments.
Color-blind racial attitudes. The idea of color-blind racial attitudes is an additional theoretical approach to studying racial prejudice. Color-blind racial attitudes refer to the extent to which an individual believes that race “should not and does not matter” (Neville et al., 2000, p. 60). While the first part of this belief statement reflects prosocial and egalitarian attitudes, the second half of this perspective is idealistic and potentially problematic. Due to a continuance of racist behaviors and the prevalence of racism exhibited within our current societal climate, it is impossible to ignore issues of racism. Moreover, racial color-blindness can be classified as a perspective where the treatment of individuals in no way depends on their racial group membership. This perspective may lead to biased decision-making where individuals refuse to consider and/or discuss a person’s racial identity for fear of appearing racially prejudiced.
Racial color-blind attitudes have also been found to relate to greater endorsements of racism (Carr, 1997). Despite appearing egalitarian and emphasizing equal treatment for all peoples of various racial groups, individuals who exhibit color-blind racial attitudes may endorse pejorative attitudes towards other racial minorities. For example,
Frankenberg (1993) contended that racial color-blindness leads individuals to believe that everyone has the same opportunities to be successful despite an individual’s race, yet failed attempts to succeed can only be explained by the faults (e.g., laziness) of racial minorities. In the context of a CSA case, individuals who hold racial color-blind attitudes may be more apt to believe that a child of any race can be sexually victimized.
Accordingly, a Black female child who claims to have been sexually abused may be
16 blamed more for her alleged victimization or viewed to have deserved the alleged sexual abuse based on her individual behavior, thus rendering her complaint less credible and deserving of legal action compared to a similar complaint made by a White child.
Belief in a just world. Social perception is often influenced by an individual’s desires. For example, Lerner (1980) proposed that people have an inherent need to believe that the world is fair and just, wherein individuals get what they deserve. In other words, bad things happen to bad people and good things happen to good people.
Moreover, the belief that people get their “just deserts” gives rise to hope for the future and reinforces the attitude that justice will prevail. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that the adjudication of criminal cases may also be influenced by just world beliefs.
Research on the just world hypothesis suggests that people who endorse these beliefs are more likely to blame victims for their misfortune (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Hafer
& Bègue, 2005; Walster, 1966). Threats to the assumption of and desire for a just world—such as a violent attack on a seemingly innocent person—may illicit personal discomfort. In order to rectify these feelings, individuals may alter their perception of the innocent victim as being somewhat responsible for the heinous act (e.g., rape) committed against them (Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Gorman, 1985). Furthermore, some studies show that stronger beliefs in a just world predict greater attributions of blame afforded to victims (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Thomas, Amburgey, & Ellis, 2016; VanDeursen, Pope, &
Warner, 2012; Yamawaki, 2009) and rape myth acceptance (e.g., Hayes, Lorenz, & Bell,
2013).
17 Mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world may also impact their legal judgments for
CSA cases, particularly when an adolescent is involved. Consent laws concerning the age at which a minor is legally able to engage in consensual sexual activity with an adult varies widely across the country. For example, the youngest—and most common—age of consent in the United States is 16 years old (e.g., Ohio, North Carolina, Nevada), while the oldest age of consent is 18 years old (e.g., Tennessee, North Dakota, and California).
Jurors’ perceptions of victim responsibility may vary for adolescent victims since this subset of victims may be legally capable of consenting to sexual activity depending on case jurisdiction. In other words, due to the variability in consent laws across the nation, lay people may hold differing views regarding the legality of adult-minor sexual relations. As such, jurors who believe in a just world may be less likely to believe adolescents’ CSA reports because they are presumed to be of age to legal consent to sexual activity, and thus blaming the victim is more accepted compared to cases involving “underage” CSA complainants.
Right-wing authoritarianism. Right-Wing Authoritarianism is an individual difference variable that is traditionally measured using the Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA) scale developed by Altemeyer (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism is comprised of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Saunders &
Ngo, 2017). The RWA scale measures the degree to which defer to established authoritative figures (i.e., authoritarian submission), display aggression toward out-group members when authorities sanction that aggression (i.e., authoritarian aggression), and support values that are endorsed and enforced by authorities (i.e., conventionalism;
Saunders & Ngo, 2017).
18 Peoples who highly endorse RWA tend to view the world as unsafe, dangerous, and full of threat (Saunders & Ngo, 2017). Further, individuals who highly endorse RWA are also more likely to exhibit hostility and aggression towards perceived social deviants
(e.g., criminals), especially in conjunction with the view that these pejorative attitudes and behaviors are approved by authority figures (Saunders & Ngo, 2017).
RWA has been found to associate with political party affiliation, the punishment of social deviants, and the severity of jurors’ sentencing recommendations (Jost et al.,
2003). Importantly, RWA has been found to be a persistent predictor of prejudice toward
Black individuals and those who identify themselves as lesbian, gay, or bisexual
(Altemeyer, 1988). People high in authoritarianism tend to be punitive and hold negative beliefs about homosexuals and child molesters (Altemeyer, 1996), and are generally considered to be pro-prosecution jurors (Cramer, Adams, & Brodsky, 2009). As such, authoritarianism is often an individual difference variable that is considered in legal processes as well as cases involving sex crimes (Butler & Moran, 2007; Cramer, Adams,
& Brodsky, 2009; Liberman & Sales, 2007). Jurors high in authoritarianism may be more likely to convict a defendant accused of CSA based on their views of the defendant as an immoral, deviant person. Similarly, these jurors may be more liable to proffer a severe sentencing recommendation based on their inclination toward punishment. Although jurors may not be asked to render sentencing recommendations for a CSA case— depending on case jurisdictions—jurors who highly endorse authoritarian attitudes, and thus favor punishment, may be more likely to return conviction decisions.
19 Juror Gender
With regard to rape cases, women tend to hold more negative views about the alleged perpetrator than men (Borgida & Brekke, 1985; Burt, 1980). Similarly, the effects of mock juror gender on legal judgments in CSA cases show that women are more likely to report pro-victim attitudes (e.g., child credibility and believability judgments) and render legal decisions more in favor of the prosecution than men (Bottoms, 1993;
Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Bottoms et al., 2003; Bottoms et al., 2004; Bottoms et al.,
2007; Crowley, O'Callaghan, & Ball, 1994; Duggan et al., 1989; Gabora et al., 1993;
Golding et al., 1999b; Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali, & Sanchez, 2000; Haegerich
& Bottoms, 2000; Isquith, Levine, & Scheiner, 1993; Kovera, Levy, Borgida, & Penrod,
1994; Maynard & Weiderman, 1997; McCauley & Parker, 2001; Nightingale, 1993;
Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Redlich, Myers, Goodman, & Qin,
2002; Ross, Hopkins, Hanson, Lindsay, Hazen, & Eslinger, 1994; Schmidt & Brigham,
1996; Yozwiak, Golding, & Marsil, 2004). Compared to women, men tend to view children’s CSA reports with more skepticism and are less likely to render guilty verdicts compared to women (Clark & Nightingale, 1997; ForsterLee, Horwitz, Ho, ForsterLee, &
McGovern, 1999; Golding et al., 1999b; Golding, Sego, Sanchez, & Hasemann, 1995).
These mock juror gender effects have also been replicated in studies that employ more ecologically valid methods such as presenting case evidence using a mock trial paradigm rather than written case summaries or trial transcripts (e.g., Goodman, Tobey,
Batterman-Faunce, Orcutt, Thomas, Shapiro, & Sachsenmaier, 1998; Orcutt, Goodman,
Tobey, Batterman-Faunce, Thomas, & Shapiro, 2001). Gender differences have also been noted in civil cases of CSA. Griffith, Libkuman, Dodd, Shafir, and Dickinson (2002)
20 found that women awarded more monetary damages to the plaintiff and remembered more information from the mock trial than men.
Mock juror gender was also examined in the present study. Male mock jurors were predicted to be more skeptical of a child complainant’s claims of sexual assault thereby rating the child as less credible compared to female mock jurors. These effects were expected to generalize across cases involving child complainants that differed by age and race.
21 Chapter Two
The Present Study
The overarching goal of the present study was to examine the impact of extralegal factors related to the child complainant (i.e., race and age) and the defendant (i.e., race) on case judgments and mock jurors’ perceptions of a defendant and child complainant involved in a mock CSA case. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight different between-subjects conditions. The main independent variables were child race and age, defendant race, and mock juror gender. Child complainant age was manipulated by two levels (12 years old or 17 years old), as was child complainant race (Black or
White). Mock jurors’ reactions to either a Black or a White defendant were also measured. A second goal was to examine the effects of mock juror gender on case judgments and mock jurors’ perceptions for a mock CSA case. The third goal was to examine the degree to which mock jurors’ attitudes influenced their judgments and perceptions. Specifically, mock jurors’ endorsements of racially-based sexual stereotypes, racial attitudes, beliefs in a just world, and authoritarian attitudes were measured.
In the present study, mock jurors read a mock CSA case and trial summary that involved a teacher and a student. All versions of the case and trial summaries were paired with corresponding character information and photographs of the defendant, child complainant, attorneys and judge involved in the trial. After reviewing the trial, mock jurors rendered legal judgments along with their perceptions of both the defendant and the child complainant (i.e., alleged victim/student).
22 The main dependent variables of interest were verdict, defendant guilt ratings, sentencing recommendations, defendant and child culpability ratings, and views of the child complainant’s credibility and maturity. Mock jurors’ endorsements of racially- based sexual stereotypes, racial attitudes, beliefs in a just world, and authoritarian attitudes were also measured and examined as influences on case judgments and mock jurors’ perceptions.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research question 1. Does child complainant race, age, and defendant race impact case outcomes and mock jurors’ legal decisions for a mock CSA case?
Hypothesis 1. Regarding the research on stereotypical views of Black males as being aggressive and deviant, a main effect for defendant race on mock jurors’ decision making was expected (e.g., Devine, 1989). The Black defendant was predicted to receive more guilty verdicts, to receive higher defendant guilt ratings, more severe sentencing recommendations, and higher culpability ratings than the White defendant.
Hypothesis 2. A two-way interaction involving defendant race and child race was expected. In accordance with Bottoms et al. (2004), greater defendant guilt ratings— measured by a continuous verdict item—were anticipated for an intraracial case (e.g.,
Black defendant, Black child complainant) compared to an interracial case (e.g., Black defendant, White child complainant).
Hypothesis 3. Based on the theory of adultification (Epstein et al., 2017) and prior research (Bottoms et al., 2004), the Black child complainant was expected to be viewed as more responsible for her victimization, more mature, and less credible than the White child complainant.
23 Hypothesis 4. In accordance with research on child credibility (e.g., Bottoms &
Goodman, 1994), it was expected that mock jurors would view an older child complainant (17 years old) as more responsible for her victimization and less credible compared to a younger child complainant (12 years old).
Hypothesis 5. Based on the theory of adultification (Epstein et al., 2017), an interaction between child race and age on perceptions of the child complainant was expected. It was hypothesized that the 17-year-old Black girl would be viewed as most responsible for the encounter and least credible than all other child age and race dyads.
Also, mock jurors were expected to view the 12-year-old Black child complainant as more culpable and less credible than the 12-year-old White child complainant.
Research question 2. Does mock juror gender impact case outcomes and legal judgments for a mock CSA case?
Hypothesis 1. A main effect of gender was expected based on prior research (e.g.,
Bottoms et al., 2003; Bottoms et al., 2004; Quas et al., 2002). Female mock jurors were anticipated to render more guilty verdicts and to attribute greater defendant guilt ratings compared to male mock jurors. Female mock jurors were also predicted to view the child complainant as more credible and less culpable for the sexual encounter compared to male mock jurors.
Hypothesis 2. Male mock jurors were predicted to be more affected than female mock jurors by the child’s age. In accordance with Bottoms et al. (2004), male mock jurors were expected to view a younger child complainant as less responsible for the sexual encounter and more credible than an adolescent child complainant. On the other
24 hand, child complainant age was not expected to bias female mock jurors’ perceptions regarding the mock CSA case.
Research question 3. Do mock jurors’ attitudes and beliefs impact case outcomes and legal judgments in a mock CSA case?
Hypothesis 1. Based on prior research, a relationship between mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes and legal judgments was expected (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Cramer et al., 2009; Saunders & Ngo, 2017). Mock jurors who strongly endorsed authoritarian attitudes were hypothesized to render pro-prosecution judgments (i.e., greater frequency of conviction decisions, greater defendant guilt ratings, and harsher sentencing recommendations).
Hypothesis 2. In accordance with research on the just world hypothesis, a relationship between mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world and child complainant culpability ratings was expected (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Thomas, Amburgey, & Ellis,
2016; VanDeursen, Pope, & Warner, 2012; Yamawaki, 2009). Mock jurors with stronger beliefs in a just world were expected to attribute greater culpability ratings to the child complainant.
It was also predicted that child age would moderate the relationship between mock jurors’ just world beliefs and child culpability ratings; an adolescent complainant would be blamed more for her victimization than a younger complainant. To the best of my knowledge, child complainant race has not been found to moderate the impact of just world beliefs on child complainant culpability. Therefore, complainant race was explored as a moderator variable on the association between mock jurors’ just world beliefs and perceptions of child culpability.
25 Hypothesis 3. Aversive racism theory suggests that White people may understand that racism is socially unacceptable yet may continue to discriminate against people of different races. Similarly, individuals who are in denial of or appear “blind” to issues of racial inequality may react negatively to advocates of equal rights and anti-racial discrimination (Maeder et al., 2015). In other words, those who are worried about appearing racist may present a façade of holding egalitarian racial attitudes when instructed to render an impartial verdict decision. In the absence of strict instructions provided to the jury to remain impartial in determining less structured legal judgments
(e.g., child complainant credibility), racial attitudes were anticipated to influence mock jurors’ decisions for the mock CSA case.
Defendant race was hypothesized to moderate the relationship between mock jurors’ racial attitudes and their legal judgments. Specifically, mock jurors who are
“blind” to societal issues concerning racial prejudice were expected to discriminate against a Black defendant when asked to rate the defendant’s guilt, culpability, and render sentencing recommendations. Child race was also predicted to moderate the association between racial attitudes and perceptions of the child’s culpability; color-blind jurors would rate the Black child complainant as more culpable than the White child complainant.
Hypothesis 4. A relationship between the Jezebel stereotype and mock jurors’ perceptions of child complainant credibility and culpability for her alleged victimization was also expected. Mock jurors who strongly endorsed the Jezebel stereotype were predicted to rate the child complainant as less credible. Conversely, strong endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype were expected to result in greater child culpability ratings.
26 Based on prior research, Black child complainants were hypothesized to be viewed as more representative of a Jezebel than White child complainants (e.g., Mitchell & Herring,
1998; West, 1995). As such, child race was predicted to moderate the association between Jezebel stereotype endorsements and perceptions of the child complainant (i.e., credibility and culpability judgments).
27 Chapter Three
Method
Design
The present study used a 2 (child complainant race: Black vs. White) x 2
(defendant race: Black vs. White) x 2 (child complainant age: 12 years vs. 17 years) between-subjects design. The child complainant’s age was explicitly stated throughout the case and trial summaries. The race of the child complainant and the defendant were experimentally manipulated by the individual’s name, photographed headshots, and listed demographics presented via the character information sheet. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these eight conditions.
Participants
To enhance the external validity and generalizability of my research findings, I recruited a national sample of jury-eligible individuals rather than a sample of undergraduate students. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows researchers to recruit participants for their research studies. The MTurk sample was recruited from the United
States. Individuals who signed up to participate through MTurk were directed to the study materials hosted by an online survey website called Qualtrics. MTurk respondents who completed all study materials received $2.00 compensation for their participation in the present study. This monetary value equates to a payment of approximately $0.08 per
28 minute of participation. On average, participants took approximately 24.63 minutes to complete (SD = 20.93, Mdn = 21.65, Min = 1.67, Max = 308.63) the present study.1
All respondents were at least 18 years of age, as is the required legal age for individuals to participate in jury duty. In order to ensure that all participants were of legal age, a screening question was used asking participants to report their date of birth.
Participants born after February 19, 2000 (i.e., the initial date of data collection) were deemed ineligible and were not permitted to complete the present study.
A statistical power analysis for an ANCOVA with eight groups and three covariates was conducted in G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to determine a sufficient sample size to observe a medium effect size at 80% power (f =
2 0.25, hp = 0.06, a = .05, b = .80). Based on the aforementioned assumptions, the desired total sample size was 233. However, I decided to recruit a sample of 320 to ensure that 40 participants would be randomly assigned to each of the eight experimental conditions, in order to detect potential interaction effects. I expected—from past experience using
MTurk—that at least 25% of participants would not pass manipulation and attention checks, therefore, an additional 80 participants were recruited. Consequently, the total recruitment goal for this study was 400 participants.
A total of 416 participants signed up to participate in the current study. Despite having signed up to participate in the current study, 37% (n = 155) were not included in
1 No participants took less than 2 standard deviations below the mean completion time. Two participants took more than 2 standard deviations above the mean completion time for the present study (z-score = 13.57 and 3.59, respectively). These two participants answered all manipulation and completion check items correctly and thus, their scores were retained for subsequent analyses. A possible explanation of the high length of time is that they stepped away from their computer during the study and then resumed after a delay. The average completion times for the included (n = 261; see above) and the excluded (n = 154, M = 35.37, SD = 123.02, Mdn = 16.98, Min = 1.33, Max = 1257.68) participant samples were not statistically 2 significant, F(1,415) = 1.90, p = .169, hp = .01. 29 subsequent analyses due to failing manipulation and comprehension check items.
Specifically, 54 participants did not pass the manipulation checks. Twenty-seven participants incorrectly recalled the child’s age, 16 participants incorrectly recalled the child’s race, and 11 participants incorrectly recalled the defendant’s race. An additional
101 participants failed comprehension check items and were dropped from all analyses.
Three participants incorrectly recalled the child’s name, six participants incorrectly recalled the teacher’s name, six participants did not correctly identify the font color of the all presented materials, four participants did not correctly identify the defense attorney’s race, 44 participants did not correctly identify the judge’s age, and 38 participants did not correctly identify the defendant’s age (see Appendix J for more information pertaining to these specific items). 2
The final sample consisted of 261 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) respondents (137 women, 123 men)3 who each received $2.00 for completing the study.
The majority of participants identified themselves as “White” (70%, n = 183) followed by
“Black” (10%, n = 27), “Asian” (8%, n = 21), “Hispanic” (6%, n = 14), “Multiracial”
(3%, n = 9), “American Indian or Alaska Native” (2%, n = 4), and “Native American or
Other Pacific Islander” (1%, n = 3). The sample was jury eligible; that is, they were at least 18 years old (M = 37.89, SD = 12.24, Mdn = 35.00, ages ranged from 18 to 73 years) and were United States citizens.
2 This exclusion technique has been used in prior research (e.g., Maeder et al., 2015a; 2015b; Quas et al., 2002). 3 One participant did not identify as either a woman or a man and, when prompted, did not disclose their gender identity. 30 Additional demographic analyses indicated that 53% of participants recruited had a college and/or advanced degree (n = 139), the majority of participants reported having never served on a jury (84%, n = 218), and 51% self-reported as being a “parent” (134 parent, 127 not a parent). Furthermore, on a scale ranging from 1 (conservative) to 7
(liberal) participants reported predominantly neutral political ideologies (M = 4.45, SD =
1.78, Mdn = 4.00) and, on average, 92% (n = 241) were not affiliated with any sexual assault/abuse campaign (e.g., #MeToo).
Procedure
The present study (IRB#202356) was reviewed by the Social, Behavioral, and
Education Institutional Review Board at the University of Toledo and was exempt from full committee review on January 31, 2018.
Participants were recruited by an advertisement posted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows researchers to recruit participants for their research studies. The MTurk sample was recruited from the United
States. Individuals who signed up to participate through MTurk were then directed to the study materials hosted by an online survey website called Qualtrics. All study materials were administered online via Qualtrics. After participants accessed the online Qualtrics study and voluntarily provided consent to participate, they were asked to assume the role of a mock juror and to adjudicate a criminal case involving the sexual battery of a student allegedly committed by her teacher. Mock jurors were then prompted to read one of eight randomly assigned mock cases and trial summary vignettes, each containing a portion of the child’s testimony. A character sheet containing a headshot photograph and information about each individual involved in the trial (i.e., the defendant, alleged victim,
31 judge, prosecution and defense attorneys) was available for mock jurors to review while reading the mock case. Then, mock jurors were presented information about the elements of sexual battery, the burden of proof, the standard of evidence, and the defendant’s right not to testify via the judge’s charge to mock jury members.
Next, mock jurors were asked to render a verdict and, in the event of a guilty verdict, to answer questions related to the defendant’s punishment and teacher/student culpability. After rendering a verdict decision, mock jurors responded to question items contained in a case-related survey and a racial stereotype scale. Then, mock jurors completed a manipulation/attention check survey and were instructed to respond to three scales: (a) the Color-Blind Racial Attitude Scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000), (b) the
Just World Scale (JWS; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and (c) the Right-Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA) Short Form scale (Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007). Last, mock jurors’ demographics were collected. After completing the study, mock jurors were thanked for their time and debriefed, online.
Materials
Mock juror instructions. Each individual participant was instructed to assume the role of a mock juror, to evaluate a criminal case of child sexual assault, and to make legal judgments about the case. For more information about the participant/mock juror instructions see Appendix A.
Case and trial summaries. Mock jurors were then asked to review summaries of the case charges and the trial (see Appendix B). Previous media reports of teacher-student sexual cases were referenced when creating the case summary. Both the case and trial summaries explain the details leading up to the report of the sexual abuse: a) the student
32 claims that she and her teacher/soccer coach had sexual intercourse three times over three months, twice in the teacher’s classroom and once in the teacher’s car on the way to a soccer practice coached by the alleged perpetrator; and b) the student made an official report approximately five months after the last alleged sexual encounter.
A trial transcript contained within the trial summary was modified from a prior study (Buck, London, & Wright, 2011) to reflect details specified in the case and trial summaries. The trial summary was comprised of the prosecution’s case, the student’s testimony, the defense’s case, and closing statements from both the prosecution and defense. First, the prosecution claimed that the defendant sexually assaulted the student using his position of power to influence her into having sexual intercourse with him. The prosecution claimed the defendant threatened to remove the student from the community soccer league that he coached if she did not comply.
Next, the prosecution questioned the student about the alleged abuse. The student described each of the three alleged sexual encounters and answered the prosecutor’s questions. The defense did not cross-examine the student complainant.
Then, the defense attorney presented his case; he claimed the alleged abuse did not actually occur. The defense attorney based his defense on the fact that the student delayed her report for five months. He also claimed that the allegations she made were in response to a grudge held against the defendant; specifically, he suspended her from the youth soccer league due to her poor school grades.
In his closing statement, the defense attorney maintained his client’s innocence reiterating the student’s motive to confabulate her allegation. The prosecution’s closing arguments concluded that the defendant was guilty and explained the student’s delayed
33 disclosure was a result of her fear of the consequences for reporting the abuse. Following these closing arguments, mock jurors rendered individual verdict decisions and responded to a number of questions regarding their views about the case.
Case and trial summary pilot study. A pilot study was conducted to examine verdict decisions for the case absent of the experimental manipulation (i.e., child race, child age, defendant race). The purpose of this pilot study was to ensure that participants would more often decide on a conviction rather than an acquittal. A conviction decision establishes belief in the occurrence of sexual abuse (i.e., three counts of sexual battery), therefore allowing for the examination of how culpable both the student and teacher were for the crime.
A convenience sample of 32 participants was recruited for the pilot study.
Participants included 17 individuals from the Forensic Development Psychology
Laboratory at the University of Toledo and 15 individuals recruited through personal correspondence. Participants read through the 6-page case and trial summaries and rendered a verdict decision (i.e., guilty or not guilty). The results of the pilot study indicated that mock jurors more often voted guilty (72%, n = 25) for the case, absent of experimental manipulations. Based on these findings, the case and trial summaries were deemed appropriate for use in the present study.
Trial character information and photographs. A trial character information sheet was presented to mock jurors as they read through the case and trial summaries.
The character sheet contained headshot photographs and personal information about each individual involved in the trial. Personal information included the individual’s name, role
34 in the trial (e.g., defendant, alleged victim), race, and age. For more information, see
Appendix C.
Photographs. Nine photographs were decided on for use in the present study including: (a) a 12-year-old Black girl, (b) a 12-year-old White girl, (c) a 17-year-old
Black girl, (d) a 17-year-old White girl, (e) a 38-year-old Black defendant, (f) a 38-year- old White defendant, (g) a 32-year-old White Prosecutor, (h) a 33-year-old White defense attorney, and (i) a 41-year-old White judge. To review all photographs involved in the present study, see Appendix C.
Photographed headshots of the alleged student victims were obtained from the
National Institute of Mental Health, Child Emotional Faces Picture Set (NIMH-ChEFS;
Egger et al., 2011). Photographs of the White and Black defendants, White attorneys, and
White judge were selected from the Chicago Face Dataset (CFD; Ma, Correll, &
Wittenbrink, 2015). The purpose for including photographs of the attorneys and judge is to prevent participants from discerning the main focus of the present study (i.e., race effects on victim blaming, victim credibility, and legal decisions for a CSA case).
Photographs of both children and adults were photographed portraying a neutral gaze.4
In order to make the judge and attorneys appear more professional, Adobe Photoshop was used to modify the clothing for the judge and attorneys. Photographs of legal professionals were obtained via a Google images search and were then layered onto the selected photographs for the present study. To view these modified photographs, see
Appendix C.
4The child and adult faces portraying a neutral gaze were collected to prevent any displays of emotion from influencing mock jurors’ decisions for the case. 35 Photograph pilot study. All photographs were piloted to confirm that the representation of each experimental manipulation (i.e., child race, child age, defendant race) would be salient for mock jurors recruited for the present study. Seventy-five undergraduate students (69% White, 83% female, Mage = 20.23 years, SDage = 4.43 years) were recruited from the University of Toledo Psychology SONA System to participate in this pilot study. Participants rated a total of 26 girl faces (6 Black, 20 White) and 25 adult male faces (10 Black, 15 White) on perceived age, race, attractiveness, and likability.5
Participants were asked to report how old the photographed individual was via an open textbox question item. Race was measured using a multiple-choice question containing six response options (1 = American Indian or Alaska Native, 2 = Asian, 3 = Black or
African American, 4 = Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 5 = White, and 6 =
Hispanic).6 Both attractiveness and likability were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Attractiveness and likability ratings were included to control for confounding variables that may affect mock jurors’ legal judgments.
Student photographs were matched based on participants’ perceptions of student age (i.e., 12 years old and 17 years old) and race (i.e., White and Black). Defendant photographs were also matched based on participants’ views of defendant age (i.e., 38 years old) and race (i.e., White and Black). The race and gender of both attorneys and the judge were kept constant (i.e., White males) so as not to introduce the race and/or gender
5It is important to note that the small number of Black girl photographs used in this pilot study was not due to selectivity. Rather only six photographs of Black girls were available via the NIHM-ChEFS picture set. 6Multiple race categories were included to fully examine participants’ perceptions of the photographed individuals’ race. 36 of these individuals as a confounding variable. See Table 1 for frequencies of selected
(i.e., matched) characters by race.
Ultimately, four child photos were selected that matched best across the different measured characteristics: age, likability, and attractiveness. In order to verify that the selected (i.e., matched) girl photos were seen as the same age, likability, and attractiveness I ran multiple t-test analyses. Due to the multiple analyses conducted a
Bonferroni correction was applied, and thus, the alpha level was reduced to p < .003 for detecting significance (a = .05; 17 comparisons = .003). The results on the selected photos indicated that the Black and the White 17-year-old girls did not differ in ratings of age, t(74) = 1.07, p = .289, likability, t(74) = -2.48, p = .02, or attractiveness, t(74) = .70, p =.489. Similarly, the Black and the White 12-year-old girls did not differ in age, t(74) =
2.28, p = .03, likability, t(74) = -2.04, p = .05, or attractiveness, t(74) = -1.75, p = .08.
Photos of the 12- and 17-year-old White girls differed in age, t(74) = 13.21, p < .001, but not likability, t(74) = .00, p = 1.00, or attractiveness, t(74) = 2.82, p = .01. Photos of the
12- and 17-year-old Black girls significantly differed on measures of age, t(74) = -10.17, p < .001, likability, t(74) = -4.30, p < .001, and attractiveness, t(74) = -4.73, p < .001.7
7Two minor limitations to the present study are that similarity in likability and attractiveness could not be ruled out with regard to comparing photographs of the 12- and 17-year-old Black female students. These confounding variables were taken into consideration while interpreting the results of the present study. 37
The results also indicated that the 12-year-old Black girl and the 17-year-old
White girl differed by age, t(74) = 11.49, p < .001, and attractiveness, t(74) = 4.57, p <
.001, but not likability, t(74) = 2.51, p = .01.8 The 17-year-old Black girl and the 12-year- old White girl differed by age, t(74) = -11.31, p < .001, but not likability, t(74) = -2.57, p
= .012, or attractiveness, t(74) = -2.69, p = .01 (see Table 2).
8Another limitation to the present study is that the 12-year-old Black and 17-year-old White students were viewed as significantly different in attractiveness. This confounding variable was taken into consideration while interpreting the results of the present study. 38 Table 2
Descriptives for Selected Child Complainant Photograph Stimuli from Pilot Study
Age Likability Attractiveness Victim Photographs M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Black 12-year-old 12.17 (2.86) 3.55 (1.42) 2.93 (1.30) 17-year-old 16.55 (4.17) 4.15 (1.25) 3.47 (1.34) White 12-year-old 11.41 (2.76) 3.83 (1.37) 3.15 (1.38) 17-year-old 17.08 (3.69) 3.83 (1.20) 3.55 (1.53) Note. M = means; SD = standard deviation. N = 75. Both attractiveness and likability were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).
Multiple t-tests were also conducted to assess differences between the selected
White and Black defendant photos on measures of age, likability, and attractiveness. Due to the multiple analyses conducted a Bonferroni correction was applied, and thus, the alpha level was reduced to p < .017 for detecting significance (a = .05;.05/3 comparisons
= .017). The results indicated that Black and White defendants did not significantly differ by age, t(74) = -.27, p = .792, likability, t(74) = 1.17, p = .246, or attractiveness, t(74) = -
1.17, p = .248. Further, views of the attorneys were examined to control for confounding variables related to likability and attractiveness. Due to the multiple analyses conducted a
Bonferroni correction was applied, and thus, the alpha level was reduced to p < .017 for detecting significance (a = .05;.05/3 comparisons = .017). T-test results indicated that the selected White attorney photos did not differ age, t(74) = -.65, p = .517, likability, t(74) =
-1.55, p = .124, or attractiveness, t(74) = .10, p = .921 (see Table 3).
39 Table 3
Descriptives for Selected Defendant, Attorney, and Judge Photograph Stimuli from Pilot Study
Age Likability Attractiveness Character Photographs M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Black Defendant 37.61 (9.66) 3.13 (1.28) 2.01 (1.01) White Defendant 37.84 (8.59) 2.95 (1.49) 2.15 (1.15) White Prosecuting Attorney 32.24 (6.71) 3.20 (1.27) 2.55 (1.26) White Defense Attorney 32.73 (6.81) 3.41 (1.34) 2.53 (1.40) White Judge 40.91 (7.81) 3.57 (1.33) 2.07 (1.08) Note. M = means; SD = standard deviation. N = 75. Both attractiveness and likability were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).
In summary, photographs were selected that matched as best as possible on characteristics outside of the manipulated variables (age and race).
Judge’s charge to members of the jury. The judge’s charge to mock jurors (see
Appendix D) contained the elements of a sexual battery charge, the burden of proof, and the standard of evidence to be used to adjudicate the case. The legal age of consent for the state of Ohio (i.e., 16 years old) was also mentioned in the judge’s charge. In addition, the judge instructed mock jurors that the defendant evoked his constitutional right not to testify at trial and this fact should not be taken into consideration when rendering a verdict for the case.
Measures
Juror verdict form. Participants were asked to render a dichotomous verdict
(i.e., “guilty” or “not guilty”) using a mock juror verdict form (see Appendix E).
Punishment recommendations. If participants voted “guilty,” then they were directed to a separate survey containing questions about the defendant’s punishment.
Participants who voted “not guilty” were not asked to respond to these punishment
40 questions. The sentencing recommendation item was measured on a scale from 0 to 15 years. An open text box option was also presented for those who felt that the defendant’s sentence should extend past 15 years. The following three items concerning the defendant’s punishment were measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree): (a) the defendant losing his teaching license, (b) termination of the teacher’s position at the school, (c) punishment is not necessary because the student did not object to the alleged contact. To review these question items, see Appendix F.9
Student and teacher culpability. In addition to the punishment judgments, mock jurors who rendered a guilty verdict were prompted to answer six questions concerning the culpability of both the teacher and the student. Each item was measured using a 5- point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal). Both student and teacher culpability were measured using three items regarding how much the student/teacher was (a) responsible for, (b) wanted, and (c) caused the sexual contact. To review these question items, see
Appendix G.
As expected all three student culpability items were correlated, thus, a student culpability composite item was created (see Table 4). Similarly, all three teacher culpability items were correlated, thus, a teacher culpability composite item was created
(see Table 4).
9Only the scaled sentencing recommendation item was considered important for the analyses included in the dissertation. The remaining punishment items were not central to the hypotheses of the dissertation and will not be discussed further. Descriptive analyses for alternative sentencing recommendations and punishment judgments by experimental conditions are reported—for the interested reader—in Appendix O. 41 Table 4
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Student Culpability and Teacher Culpability Items.
Student Culpability Items 1 2 M (SD) Mdn S K 1. Student responsibility - 1.43 (.84) 1.00 2.31 5.54 2. Student cause .43** - 1.31 (.88) 1.00 3.16 9.55 3. Student want .38** .49** 1.20 (.60) 1.00 3.58 14.99 Student culpability composite 1.32 (.61) 1.00 2.29 4.99 score Teacher Culpability Items 4 5 M (SD) 4. Teacher responsibility - 4.69 (.84) 5.00 -3.20 10.98 5. Teacher cause .29* - 4.76 (.60) 5.00 -3.28 13.52 6. Teacher want .19** .37** 4.75 (.62) 5.00 -3.29 13.39 Teacher culpability composite 4.73 (.50) 5.00 -1.86 2.51 score Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, Mdn = median, S = skewness, K = kurtosis. Only participants who convicted the defendant responded to these items (n = 122). All items were measured using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal). Student culpability composite scores ranged from 1 to 4. Teacher culpability composite scores ranged from 3 to 5. *p < .05, **p < .01
Case-related survey. The case-related survey included a continuous verdict decision item in addition to question items specific to student credibility and student maturity. One open ended textbox item asked participants to report “the most important piece of evidence considered for deciding the case verdict.”10 These measures are described in detail below and can be reviewed in Appendix H.
10 This qualitative item was not included in subsequent analyses because it was not central to the hypotheses of the present dissertation project. Interested readers should follow up with the author to obtain results. 42 Defendant guilt. All participants responded to a continuous variable regarding defendant guilt (i.e., verdict). This variable is measured on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all guilty, 7 = absolutely guilty).
Student credibility and maturity. Mock jurors were asked to answer a total of 11 items regarding the student’s credibility and maturity. All question items were measured using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), including a neutral point
(4 = neither agree nor disagree).
Eight questions pertained to the credibility of the student and her allegation. All eight student credibility items were also correlated; thus, a student credibility composite item was created (see Table 5). Three items assessed mock jurors’ views of the student’s maturity level. All three items were correlated; thus, a student maturity composite item was created (see Table 6).
43 Table 5
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Student Credibility Items.
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M (SD) Mdn S K 1. Testimony 4.56 5.00 -.22 -1.23 credibility - (1.87) 2. False allegationa -.86** 4.50 4.00 -.04 -1.28 - (1.89) 3. Student credibility .93** -.87** 4.61 5.00 -.26 -1.04 - (1.80) 4. Testimony .90** -.87** .93** 4.73 5.00 -.35 -1.14 - believability (1.85) 5. Student .91** -.85** .96** .93** 4.55 4.00 -.21 -1.04 - trustworthiness (1.79) 6. Student .92** -.87** .94** .95** .94** 4.60 5.00 -.22 -1.16 - believability (1.83) 7. Knowledge to -.68** .75** -.70** -.67** -.71** -.69** 3.89 3.00 .38 -1.20 - fabricate allegationa (1.96) 8. Testimony .89** -.84** .87** .87** .86** .88** -.68** 4.60 5.00 -.32 -1.10 trustworthiness (1.84) Student credibility 4.50 4.38 -.13 -1.13 composite score (1.72) Note. N = 261. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, Mdn = median, S = skewness, K = kurtosis. aItems were reverse coded before creating the child credibility composite score. All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Student credibility composite scores ranged from 1 to 7. **p < .01
44 Table 6
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Student Maturity Items.
Item 1 2 M (SD) Mdn S K 1. Student consented - 3.00 (1.60) 3.00 .19 -1.05 2. Sexual involvement decision .43** - 2.27 (1.91) 2.00 .85 -.58 3. Student maturity .37** .83** 2.84 (1.99) 2.00 .74 -.85 Student maturity composite score 2.85 (1.54) 2.67 .63 -.65 Note. N = 261. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, Mdn = median, S = skewness, K = kurtosis. All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Student maturity composite scores ranged from 1 to 6.67. **p < .01
Racial stereotype scale. Mock jurors viewed 22 adjectives and rated the extent to which they thought each adjective described the alleged student victim involved in the criminal case. The purpose of including this scale was to assess the degree to which mock jurors endorsed racial stereotypes of Black and White women and, in turn, how these stereotypes relate to their views of the CSA complainant’s culpability and credibility.
Each adjective was measured using a 7-point scale ranging from 0 = not at all descriptive of the student to 6 = very descriptive of the student. Adjectives were selected to represent two specific racial stereotypes of Black women: (a) the Black woman/girl Jezebel (8 items), and (b) the Black woman/girl Sapphire (7 items). The last category contained adjectives related to traditional feminine stereotyped traits (7 items). The Jezebel stereotype describes a Black woman as being sexually active and experienced, promiscuous, and seductive (Thomas et al., 2004; West, 1995). The Sapphire stereotype includes descriptions of a woman as being stubborn, outspoken, angry, and independent
(Thomas et al., 2004; West, 1995). Laypeople have been found to endorse both the
Jezebel and Sapphire stereotypes with regard to Black women (Thomas et al., 2004). The
45 traditional femininity stereotype adjectives describe a woman as being accommodating, friendly, conservative and submissive (Bem, 1974; Hill, 2007) and is often attributed more to White females than Black females (Harris, 1996; Millham & Smith, 1981).
Question items for each of the three stereotypic categories were summed together to obtain three separate scores. Higher scores indicate a greater acceptance of the specific stereotype prescribed to the alleged student victim. In this study, the Jezebel, Sapphire, and Traditional stereotype scales demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s a = .91,
Cronbach’s a = .82, Cronbach’s a = .72, respectively).11 To review the list of adjectives included in this scale, see Appendix I.
Manipulation and attention checks survey. This survey contains ten items that were used to assess the salience of the experimental manipulations and to identify participants who did not pay close attention to the details of the case and trial summaries.
Participants were asked to respond to three multiple-choice questions pertaining to the student’s age and race and the defendant’s race. The remaining items were used to check that participants were paying attention to other details described in the case and trial summary. To review these question items, see Appendix J.
The Just World Scale. The Just World Scale (JWS; Rubin & Peplau, 1975) was used to assess participants’ beliefs in a just and fair world. Just world beliefs are related to victim-blaming, wherein the individual believes the victim caused and/or deserved whatever crime that happened to him or her. For those who believe in a just world, blaming the victim reinforces the notion that people get what they deserve and gives rise
11 For the purposes of this dissertation, only the Jezebel scale was analyzed. The other two scales were not central to the dissertation and will not be discussed further. The interested reader should refer to Appendix P for descriptive information for each scale by child race. 46 to hope for the future. Just world beliefs have been found to be related to rape myth acceptance (Hayes et al., 2013).
This scale is comprised of 20 items measured on a 6-point scale (-3 = strongly disagree, +3 = strongly agree). Participant responses to each item were summed together to result in a total scale score. Scale scores ranged from 0 to 110.12 Higher scores on this scale indicate a greater belief in a just world. This scale has been validated as a reliable measure (Cronbach’s a = .79; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). In this study, the scale demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s a = .83). To review these question items, see
Appendix K.
Color-Blind Racial Attitude Scale (CoBRAS). The Color-Blind Racial
Attitudes Scale (Neville et al., 2000) was developed to assess individuals’ beliefs in the prevalence and acceptance of racism in the United States. The scale does not target any one racial group. The scale is comprised of 20 items measured using a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a greater “blindness” or unawareness of racially prevalent issues and prejudice in society. The scale demonstrates adequate reliability (Cronbach’s a = .94) compared to past research (Cronbach’s a = .86;
Neville et al., 2000). To review these question items, see Appendix L.
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Short Form. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism
Short Form scale (Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007) is used to measure right-wing authoritarianism. Right-wing authoritarianism is comprised of two factors: (a) authoritarian submission and aggression and (b) conservatism. Authoritarianism has been
12 A constant of 50 was added to make participant scores positive. 47 found to relate to verdict decisions in criminal trials (Altemeyer, 1981). This is a shorter version of the original 30-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale developed by
Altemeyer (1981). The scale is comprised of 14 items measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = undecided, 7 = strongly agree). The conservatism factor items were reverse scored. Higher scores indicated greater endorsements of authoritarian attitudes. The scale demonstrates adequate reliability (Cronbach’s a = .93) compared to past research (Cronbach’s a = .97, .77; Rattazzi et al., 2007). To review items on the
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Short Form scale, see Appendix M.
Demographic survey. Participants were asked to complete a demographic information survey. This survey contains nine questions using a variety of question formats (i.e., continuous scale items, multiple-choice questions, and open-ended questions). Demographic question items include participant: (a) age, (b) race, (c) sex, (d) gender identity, (e) jury service experience, (f) current membership in campaigns advocating for sexual assault victims, (g) parenthood status, (h) education level, and (i) political affiliation. To review these question items, see Appendix N.
48 Chapter Four
Results
The results of analyses are presented by research question and dependent variables. Specific hypotheses are discussed within the results for each dependent variable. I present the results of (a) logistic regression analyses concerning dichotomous verdict decisions; (b) separate 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x
Mock Juror Gender) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) concerning continuous defendant guilt ratings, sentencing recommendations, teacher/student culpability judgments, and student credibility and maturity ratings. Then, I present correlational analyses exploring the associations between mock jurors’ attitudes, beliefs, and case judgments and perceptions. Moderation analyses were also conducted to examine the effects of previously specified independent variables on the associations between mock jurors’ attitudes and beliefs on case judgments and perceptions.
Analyses of Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research questions 1 & 2. Does child complainant race, age, defendant race, and mock juror gender impact case judgments and mock jurors’ perceptions for a mock CSA case?
Verdict decision. Collapsed across the independent variables, the case yielded a fairly even split in terms of verdict; 47% (n = 122) of mock jurors voted guilty, and 53%
(n = 139) of mock jurors voted not guilty. Figure 1 displays the verdict breakdown by grouped independent variables and mock juror gender. Guilty verdict frequencies by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender are reported in Table 7.
49 Female mock jurors 48% 52%
Male mock jurors 59% 41%
Black defendant 55% 45%
White defendant 51% 49%
Black child 56% 44%
White child 50% 50%
17-year-old 59% 41%
12-year-old 47% 53%
Overall Breakdown 53% 47%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Not Guilty Guilty
Figure 1. Mock jurors’ verdict decisions by experimental group variables and mock juror gender.
50 Table 7
Frequency of Guilty Verdict Decisions as a function of Child Race, Child Age, Defendant Race, and Mock Juror Gender.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child Judgment 12 17 12 17 12 17 12 17 M M M M Type years years years years years years years years Guilty
Verdictsa (%) Women 67 29 49 60 52 55 61 57 59 57 33 44 Men 46 43 44 27 53 43 50 41 46 44 13 30 M 58 36 47 46 53 50 56 48 52 50 24 37 Note. N = 122. aSignificant main effect of child age, Wald χ2 = 4.61, p = .032.
51 A logistic regression analysis was conducted on dichotomous verdict decisions
(coded as 0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty), as the criterion variable, and with child race, child age, defendant race, and mock juror gender entered (as well as the interactions between these variables) as predictor variables. A test of the full model against a constant-only model was not statistically significant, indicating that the predictor variables and interactions did not significantly enhance the predictive power of the model (-2LL =
338.72, χ2(15) = 20.47; p = .155, Nagelkerke’s R2 = .101). 13 See Table 8 for full results.
However, child age emerged as a significant predictor of verdict decisions (p =
.032). A greater percentage of mock jurors voted guilty when the child was 12 years old
(53%) than when she was 17 years old (41%). The value of the odds ratio (.21) was less than one. In order to make the odds ratio positive and better suited for interpretation, I divided one by the original odds ratio (.21) resulting in an odds ratio of 4.76. Therefore, when a younger complainant (12 years) was involved in the case, mock jurors were 4.76 times more likely to convict the defendant than when an older complainant (17 years) was involved (see Table 8). Contrary to my expectations the main effects for defendant race and mock juror gender were not significant (p = .729 and p = .257; see Table 8).
Mock jurors convicted Black (45%) and White (49%) defendants at a relatively equal rate. Similarly, the frequency of conviction decisions was relatively equal for both male
(41%) and female (52%) mock jurors. No other main effects or interactions significantly predicted verdict decisions (all Wald χ2’s < 2.09, p’s > .05).
13 -2LL is the deviance statistic (deviance = -2 x log-likelihood). Deviance was reported because it has a chi-square distribution, which makes it easy to calculate the significance of the overall model compared to the constant-only model (Field, 2013). 52 Table 8
Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Guilty Verdicts.
95% CI for Odds Ratio Wald Variable β (SE) χ2 p LL OR UL Constant .69 (.50) 1.92 2.00 Child Race -.29 (.73) .16 .692 .18 .75 3.12 Child Age* -1.57 (.73) 4.61 .032 .05 .21 .87 Defendant Race -.24 (.60) .12 .729 .20 .79 3.07 Mock Juror Gender -.85 (.75) 1.28 .257 .10 . 43 1.86 Child Race X Child Age 1.25 (.99) 1.59 .208 .50 3.49 24.43 Child Race X Defendant Race .12 (1.03) .01 .904 .15 1.13 8.46 Child Race X Mock Juror Gender -.54 (1.14) .22 .636 .06 .58 5.43 Child Age X Defendant Race 1.40 1.86 .172 .54 4.07 30.60 (1.03) Child Age X Mock Juror Gender 1.44 1.82 .178 .52 4.20 33.88 (1.07) Defendant Race X Mock Juror .40 (1.01) .15 .695 .21 1.49 10.70 Gender Child Race X Child Age X -2.07 2.08 .149 .01 .13 2.01 Defendant Race (1.43) Child Race X Child Age X Mock -.02 (1.51) .00 .990 .05 .98 18.96 Juror Gender Child Race X Defendant Race X .48 (1.51) .10 .750 .08 1.62 30.94 Mock Juror Gender Child Age X Defendant Race X -1.63 1.25 .264 .01 .20 3.42 Mock Juror Gender (1.50) Child Race X Child Age X -.46 (2.15) .05 .831 .01 .63 42.65 Defendant Race X Mock Juror Gender Note. SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; OR = odds ratio; UL = upper limit. * p < .05
Defendant guilt ratings. On average, mock jurors (n = 259) rated the defendant— collapsed across all cases—as moderately guilty (M = 4.18, SD = 2.36, Mdn = 4.00).
Defendant guilt ratings by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender
53 are reported in Table 9. Defendant guilt ratings were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child
Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock Juror Gender) ANOVA.
54 Table 9
Summary of Defendant Guilt Ratings as a function of Child Race, Child Age, Defendant Race, and Mock Juror Gender.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child Judgment 12 17 12 17 12 17 12 17 M M M M Type years years years years years years years years Defendant Guilt Ratingsab Women 5.28 3.65 4.49 4.79 4.36 4.53 5.00 4.79 4.91 4.93 3.61 4.19 (2.14) (2.32) (2.34) (2.46) (2.32) (2.35) (2.40) (2.58) (2.44) (2.13) (2.30) (2.29) Men 4.15 3.57 3.85 3.18 4.35 3.89 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94 2.87 3.45 (2.54) (2.34) (2.41) (2.56) (2.64) (2.63) (2.39) (2.30) (2.31) (2.26) (1.69) (2.06) M 4.81 3.61 4.21 4.08 4.36 4.25 4.47 4.32 4.40 4.38 3.27 3.82 (2.34) (2.29) (2.38) (2.58) (2.35) (2.48) (2.42) (2.43) (2.41) (2.23) (2.05) (2.19) a 2 b Note. n = 258. Significant main effect mock juror gender, F(1, 242) = 7.44, p = .007, ηp = .03. Significant child age, child race, and 2 defendant race interaction, F(1, 242) = 4.74, p = .031, ηp = .02. Bolded text indicates the significant difference observed in the three- way interaction.
55 As predicted, female mock jurors rendered greater defendant guilt ratings than did
2 male mock jurors, F(1, 242) = 7.44, p = .007, ηp = .03 (see Table 10). Defendant guilt
2 ratings did not significantly differ by child race, F(1, 242) = .94, p = .334, ηp = .004, or
2 defendant race, F(1, 242) = .02, p = .895, ηp = .00, or child age, F(1, 242) = 2.98, p =
2 .086, ηp = .01 (see Table 10). Contrary to my expectation, the child race by defendant
2 race interaction was not significant, F(1, 242) = .99, p = .320, ηp = .004 (see Table 9).
Table 10
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Continuous Guilt Ratings.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age 12 years (n = 124) 4.45 2.37 4.03 4.87 17 years (n = 134) 3.91 2.33 3.51 4.31 Child Race White (n = 129) 4.31 2.38 3.89 4.73 Black (n = 129) 4.03 2.34 3.62 4.44 Defendant Race White (n = 126) 4.23 2.42 3.80 4.66 Black (n = 132) 4.11 2.31 3.72 4.51 Mock Juror Gender* Females (n = 135) 4.53 2.34 4.13 4.92 Males (n = 123) 3.78 2.33 3.36 4.20 Note. n = 258. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .05.
However, a significant three-way interaction involving child age, child race, and
2 defendant race emerged, F(1, 242) = 4.74, p = .031, ηp = .02. In order to probe the three- way interaction further, I ran separate ANOVAs exploring the child race by defendant race interaction for the 12-year-old and the 17-year-old child complainant age conditions.
The child race by defendant race interaction was significant for the 17-year-old
2 complainant, F(1, 130) = 5.02, p = .027, ηp = .04. Simple effects analyses showed that in cases that involved a 17-year-old Black child, mock jurors attributed less guilt to the
56 Black defendant than the White defendant, F(1, 130) = 3.95, p = .049, d = .49 (see Figure
2). Yet, when the case involved a 17-year-old White child, mock jurors’ attributions of defendant guilt were similar whether the defendant was Black or White, F(1, 130) = 1.46, p = .229, d = .31 (see Figure 2). In cases where the defendant was Black, mock jurors’ guilt ratings did not significantly differ by the 17-year-old’s race, F(1, 130) = 3.30, p =
.072, d = .48. Further, in cases where the defendant was White, mock jurors’ guilt ratings did not significantly differ between the 17-year-old’s race, F(1, 130) = 1.80, p = .182, d
=.32.
The defendant race by child race interaction was not significant for the 12-year-
2 old complainant, F(1, 121) = .36, p = .549, ηp = .003. When the case involved the 12- year-old Black child, mock jurors attributed similar ratings of guilt to both the Black and
White defendant, F(1, 121) = .08, p = .773, d = .13 (see Figure 2). Additionally, when the case involved the 12-year-old White child, there was no significant difference in mock jurors’ attributions of defendant guilt between the Black defendant and the White defendant conditions, F(1, 121) = .33, p = .569, d = .15 (see Figure 2). In cases where the defendant was Black, mock jurors’ guilt ratings did not significantly differ by the 12- year-old’s race, F(1, 121) = .03, p = .867, d = .04. Further, in cases where the defendant was White, mock jurors’ guilt ratings did not significantly differ by the 12-year-old’s race, F(1, 121) = .93, p = .336, d = .30.
57
Figure 2. Mean values for mock jurors’ continuous guilt ratings concerning the defendant by child age, child race, and defendant race.
Sentencing recommendations. Collapsed across all independent variables and mock juror gender, participants who convicted the defendant (n = 113) prescribed an average prison sentence of 9.17 years (SD = 4.39, Mdn = 10.00). Sentencing recommendations by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender are reported in Table 11. Sentencing recommendations were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2
(Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock Juror Gender) ANOVA.
58 Table 11
Summary of Sentencing Recommendations as a function of Child Race, Child Age, Defendant Race, and Mock Juror Gender.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child Judgment 12 17 12 17 12 17 12 17 M M M M Type years years years years years years years years Sentenceab Women 10.60 10.60 10.60 9.56 7.18 8.25 12.11 8.43 10.50 11.25 6.00 9.00 (4.45) (6.07) (4.82) (3.25) (3.84) (3.70) (3.92) (4.28) (4.37) (4.92) (3.69) (5.05) Men 9.17 7.67 8.42 15.00 10.00 11.50 7.56 7.00 7.31 8.75 7.50 8.50 (4.54) (4.97) (4.60) (.00) (4.44) (4.35) (2.65) (4.83) (3.63) (4.43) (3.54) (4.12) M 10.06 9.00 9.63 10.92 8.28 9.33 9.83 7.71 8.91 10.00 6.38 8.79 (4.39) (5.42) (4.77) (3.70) (4.20) (4.16) (4.00) (4.45) (4.27) (4.71) (3.46) (4.60) a 2 b Note. n = 113. Significant main effect for child age, F(1, 97) = 7.94, p = .006, ηp = .08. Significant child race and mock juror gender 2 interaction, F(1, 103) = 6.40, p = .013, ηp = 06.
59 The results showed that convicted defendants received a greater sentence when the case involved a 12-year-old complainant versus a 17-year-old complainant, F(1, 97) =
2 7.94, p = .006, ηp = .08 (see Table 12). Contrary to my expectation, the main effect of defendant race was not significant concerning sentencing recommendations, F(1, 97) =
2 2.58, p = .112, ηp = .03 (see Table 12). No significant main effects were observed for
2 child race, F(1, 97) = .09, p = .763, ηp = .001, or mock juror gender, F(1, 97) = .20, p =
2 .658, ηp = .002 (see Table 12).
Table 12
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Sentence Recommendations.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age* 12 years (n = 62) 10.51 4.16 9.09 11.20 17 years (n = 51) 7.98 4.40 6.74 9.22 Child Race White (n = 59) 9.24 4.48 8.07 10.40 Black (n = 54) 9.09 4.32 7.91 10.27 Defendant Race White (n = 57) 9.47 4.42 8.30 10.65 Black (n = 56) 8.86 4.37 7.69 10.03 Mock Juror Gender Females (n = 65) 9.51 4.46 8.40 10.61 Males (n = 48) 8.71 4.29 7.46 9.95 Note. n = 113. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .05
There was, however, a significant mock juror gender and child race interaction,
2 F(1, 103) = 6.40, p = .013, ηp = 06. Simple effects analyses indicated that women’s (M =
10.55, SD = 4.52) and men’s recommendations (M = 7.79, SD = 4.03) significantly differed for the White child, F(1, 109) = 6.08, p = .015, d = .65, but not for the Black child (Women M = 8.56, SD = 4.25; Men M = 10.00, SD = 4.40), F(1, 109) = 1.42, p =
.237, d = .34 (see Figure 3). Further, a marginally significant difference for women’s
60 sentencing recommendations by child race was observed (Black M = 8.56, SD = 4.25;
White M = 10.55, SD = 4.52), F(1, 109) = 3.47, p = .065, d = .46. Men’s recommendations did not significantly differ by child race (Black M = 10.00, SD = 4.40;
White M = 7.79, SD = 4.03), F(1, 109) = 3.10, p = .081, d = .54 (see Figure 3).
11
10.5
10
9.5 Female Mock Juror 9 Male Mock Juror
8.5
8 Mean Sentencing Recommendations Sentencing Mean
7.5 White Child Black Child
Figure 3. Mean sentencing recommendations by child race and mock juror gender interaction.
Defendant culpability. Collapsed across the independent variables, mock jurors
(n = 122), on average, viewed the defendant as highly culpable (M = 4.73, SD = .50, Mdn
= 5.00). Defendant culpability ratings by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender are reported in Table 13. Defendant culpability ratings were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock Juror Gender) ANOVA.
2 A main effect for mock juror gender emerged, F(1, 105) = 10.02, p = .002, ηp = .09.
Women viewed the defendant to be more culpable than men (see Table 12). Contrary to
61 my hypothesis, defendant culpability did not differ by defendant race, F(1, 105) = .025, p
2 2 = .874, ηp = .00 (see Table 14). Neither child race, F(1, 105) = .061, p = .806, ηp = .001,
2 nor child age, F(1, 105) = .10, p = .750, ηp = .001, significantly affected defendant culpability ratings (see Table 14). No interactions were significant (F’s < 3.81, p’s > .05).
62 Table 13
Summary of Defendant and Child Culpability Ratings as a function of Child Race, Child Age, Defendant Race, and Mock Juror Gender.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child 12 17 12 17 12 17 12 17 M M M M Judgment Type years years years years years years years years Defendant
Culpabilitya Women 4.89 5.00 4.92 4.93 4.86 4.89 5.00 4.83 4.93 4.96 4.33 4.69 (.38) (.00) (.32) (.22) (.26) (.24) (.00) (.36) (.24) (.12) (.76) (.58) Men 4.11 4.39 4.25 4.78 4.59 4.64 4.48 4.81 4.63 4.58 4.67 4.60 (.72) (.39) (.57) (.38) (.66) (.59) (.86) (.38) (.69) (.53) (.47) (.49) M 4.63 4.67 4.64 4.89 4.75 4.80 4.77 4.82 4.79 4.77 4.42 4.65 (.63) (.42) (.55) (.30) (.48) (.42) (.61) (.35) (.51) (.42) (.68) (.53) Child
Culpabilitybc Women 1.00 1.07 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.09 1.83 1.40 1.17 1.22 1.19 (.00) (.15) (.08) (.11) (.21) (.17) (.30) (.96) (.74) (.47) (.40) (.43) Men 1.22 1.33 1.28 1.78 1.67 1.69 1.59 1.48 1.54 1.54 2.00 1.63 (.54) (.30) (.42) (1.07) (.75) (.78) (1.11) (.47) (.87) (.69) (1.41) (.79) M 1.07 1.21 1.13 1.22 1.33 1.29 1.32 1.67 1.47 1.35 1.42 1.38 (.31) (.27) (.30) (.57) (.58) (.57) (.80) (.77) (.79) (.60) (.73) (.63) a 2 Note. n = 121. Significant main effect for mock juror gender on defendant culpability ratings, F(1, 105) = 10.02, p = .002, ηp = .09. b 2 c Significant main effect for mock juror gender on child culpability ratings, F(1, 105) = 10.79, p = .001, ηp = .09. Marginally 2 significant main effect of defendant race on child culpability ratings, F(1, 105) = 3.36, p = .069, ηp = .03.
63 Table 14
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Defendant Culpability Ratings.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age 12 years (n = 66) 4.75 .52 4.62 4.88 17 years (n = 55) 4.70 .48 4.57 4.83 Child Race White (n = 64) 4.72 .53 4.59 4.86 Black (n = 57) 4.74 .47 4.61 4.86 Defendant Race White (n = 62) 4.75 .48 4.60 4.85 Black (n = 59) 4.73 .52 4.60 4.87 Mock Juror Gender* Females (n = 71) 4.87 .35 4.78 4.95 Males (n = 50) 4.53 .61 4.36 4.71 Note. n = 121. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .05
Child culpability. Collapsed across the independent variables, mock jurors (n =
122), on average, mock jurors attributed little culpability to the child complainant (M =
1.32, SD = .61, Mdn = 1.00). See Table 13 for a breakdown of child culpability ratings by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender. Child culpability ratings were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock
Juror Gender) ANOVA. As expected, men rated the child complainant as more
2 responsible for her victimization than did women, F(1, 105) = 10.79, p = .001, ηp = .09
(see Table 15). A marginally significant main effect of defendant race on child culpability
2 ratings was observed, F(1, 105) = 3.36, p = .069, ηp = .03. Greater culpability ratings were rendered to the child when the case involved a Black defendant compared to a
White defendant (see Table 15). I predicted that the older child complainant would be viewed as more responsible for the encounter than the younger child complainant,
2 however, this main effect was not significant, F(1, 105) = 1.75, p = .189, ηp = .02 (see
64 Table 15). My hypothesis that the Black child would be viewed as more responsible for
2 her victimization was also not statistically significant, F(1, 105) = .86, p = .355, ηp = .01
(see Table 15).
Additionally, I predicted a) the 17-year-old Black child would be rated as most culpable for her victimization and b) the 12-year-old Black child would be rated as more responsible compared to the 12-year-old White child, yet, the child age and race
2 interaction was not significant, F(1, 105) = .14, p = .709, ηp = .001. Last, the mock juror
2 gender and child age interaction was not significant, F(1, 105) = .36, p = .549, ηp = .003, therefore, my hypothesis that child age would impact men’s child culpability ratings more than women’s was not supported. No other interactions were significant for child culpability (all F’s < 3.80, p’s > .05).
Table 15
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Child Culpability Ratings.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age 12 years (n = 66) 1.24 .60 1.09 1.39 17 years (n = 55) 1.41 .39 1.24 1.58 Child Race White (n = 64) 1.31 .64 1.15 1.47 Black (n = 57) 1.33 .59 1.17 1.48 Defendant Race* White (n = 62) 1.22 .47 1.10 1.33 Black (n = 59) 1.43 .73 1.24 1.62 Mock Juror Gender** Females (n = 71) 1.17 .46 1.06 1.28 Males (n = 50) 1.53 .74 1.32 1.74 Note. n = 121. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .10, ** p < .05
Child credibility. Collapsed across the independent variables, mock jurors (N =
261), on average, viewed the child to be moderately credible (M = 4.50, SD = 1.72, Mdn
65 = 4.38). Child credibility ratings by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender are reported in Table 16.
66 Table 16
Summary of Child Credibility and Maturity Ratings as a function of Child Race, Child Age, Defendant Race, and Mock Juror Gender.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child Judgment 12 17 12 17 12 17 12 17 M M M M Type years years years years years years years years Child
Credibilityabc Women 5.59 3.80 4.72 5.19 4.48 4.76 5.19 4.66 4.96 4.71 3.81 4.20 (1.57) (1.89) (1.93) (1.82) (1.90) (1.88) (1.76) (1.38) (1.60) (1.89) (1.87) (1.90) Men 4.13 4.29 4.21 4.38 4.87 4.67 4.56 4.09 4.33 4.46 3.54 4.04 (1.73) (1.22) (1.46) (2.08) (1.48) (1.72) (1.69) (1.37) (1.54) (1.61) (1.34) (1.54) M 4.98 4.02 4.50 4.84 4.64 4.72 4.88 4.35 4.63 4.57 3.69 4.12 (1.77) (1.61) (1.75) (1.94) (1.72) (1.80) (1.73) (1.38) (1.59) (1.71) (1.63) (1.72) Child
Maturityde Women 1.96 3.49 2.70 1.76 3.42 2.76 1.52 3.14 2.23 1.62 3.61 2.74 (1.28) (1.65) (1.64) (.96) (1.36) (1.46) (.54) (1.38) (1.27) (.52) (1.64) (1.61) Men 2.56 3.95 3.28 2.03 4.24 3.37 2.13 3.55 2.82 2.15 4.31 3.13 (1.81) (1.27) (1.68) (.72) (1.56) (1.68) (.86) (1.69) (1.50) (.83) (.87) (1.38) M 2.22 3.70 2.96 1.87 3.77 3.02 1.82 3.37 2.54 1.92 3.93 2.94 (1.53) (1.48) (1.67) (.86) (1.49) (1.57) (.77) (1.54) (1.42) (.75) (1.37) (1.50) a 2 b Note. N = 261. Significant main effect for child age on child credibility ratings, F(1, 244) = 7.59, p = .006, ηp = .03. Marginally 2 c significant main effect of mock juror gender on child credibility ratings, F(1, 244) = 3.44, p = .065, ηp = .01. Marginally significant 2 d child age by mock juror gender interaction on child credibility ratings, F(1, 244) = 3.58, p = .06, ηp = .01. Significant main effect for 2 e child age on child maturity ratings, F(1, 244) = 121.17, p < .001, ηp = .33. Significant main effect for mock juror gender on child 2 maturity ratings, F(1, 244) = 11.99, p = .001, ηp = .05.
67 Child credibility ratings were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock Juror Gender) ANOVA. The results showed that, as expected, the younger child complainant (12 years) was rated as more credible than the older child
2 complainant (17 years), F(1, 244) = 7.59, p = .006, ηp = .03 (see Table 17). As predicted, female mock jurors viewed the child as more credible than male mock jurors,
2 although this difference was marginally significant, F(1, 244) = 3.44, p = .065, ηp = .01
(see Table 17). Contrary to my hypothesis that the Black child would be viewed as less credible compared to the White child, results indicated that the main effect of child race
2 was not significant, F(1, 244) = .265, p = .607, ηp = .001 (see Table 17). The main effect
2 of defendant race was also not significant, F(1, 244) = 1.01, p = .316, ηp = .004 (see
Table 17).
Table 17
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Child Credibility Ratings.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age** 12 years (n = 125) 4.82 1.77 4.02 5.13 17 years (n = 135) 4.20 1.63 3.92 4.48 Child Race White (n = 129) 4.57 1.66 4.28 4.86 Black (n = 131) 4.42 1.77 4.12 4.73 Defendant Race White (n = 128) 4.61 1.77 4.30 4.92 Black (n = 132) 4.38 1.67 4.09 4.66 Mock Juror Gender* Females (n = 137) 4.67 1.84 4.36 4.98 Males (n = 123) 4.30 1.56 4.02 4.58 Note. n = 260. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .10, ** p < .05
My hypotheses that a) 17-year-old Black child would be rated as least credible and b) the 12-year-old Black child would be rated as less credible than the 12-year-old
68 White child were not supported; the child age and race interaction was not significant,
2 F(1, 244) = .13, p = .724, ηp = .001. A marginally significant child age by mock juror gender interaction was observed regarding child credibility ratings, F(1, 244) = 3.58, p =
2 .06, ηp = .01. Simple effects analyses showed that women rated the 12-year-old child as more credible (M = 5.20, SD = 1.74) than did men (M = 4.40, SD = 1.71), F(1, 256) =
7.06, p = .008, d = .47. No significant difference was observed between men’s (M = 4.21,
SD = 1.41) and women’s (M = 4.19, SD = 1.80) credibility ratings for the 17-year-old complainant, F(1, 256) = .007, p = .932, d = .02 (see Figure 4). Further, women rated the
12-year-old child as more credible (M = 5.20, SD = 1.74) than the 17-year-old child (M =
4.19, SD = 1.80), F(1, 256) = 12.39, p = .001, d = .58. Contrary to my expectation, men’s credibility ratings were not affected by child age (12-year-old M = 4.40, SD = 1.71; 17- year-old M = 4.21, SD = 1.41), F(1, 256) = .38, p = .536, d = .12 (see Figure 4).
5.4
5.2
5
4.8 Female Mock Juror 4.6 Male Mock Juror
4.4
Mean Child Credibility Ratings Credibility Child Mean 4.2
4 12-year-old 17-year-old
Figure 4. Mean child credibility ratings by child age and mock juror gender interaction.
69 Child maturity. Overall, mock jurors (N = 261) did not perceive the child— collapsed across all conditions— as being “mature” (M = 2.85, SD = 1.54, Mdn = 2.67).
Child maturity ratings by child age, child race, defendant race, and mock juror gender are reported in Table 16. Child maturity ratings were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Child Age x Child Race x Defendant Race x Mock Juror Gender) ANOVA. Unsurprisingly,
2 maturity ratings differed significantly by child age, F(1, 244) = 121.17, p < .001, ηp =
.33. The 17-year-old child was viewed as more mature than the 12-year-old child (see
Table 18). Female mock jurors rated the child as significantly less mature compared to
2 male mock jurors, F(1, 244) = 11.99, p = .001, ηp = .05 (see Table 18). Based on the theory of adultification, I predicted that maturity ratings would differ by child race, yet
2 this prediction was not supported, F(1, 244) = .418, p = .519, ηp = .002 (see Table 18).
Perceptions of child maturity also did not differ by defendant race, F(1, 244) = 1.18, p =
2 .278, ηp = .01 (see Table 18). No interactions were observed (all F’s < 2.64, p’s > .05).
Table 18
Main Effects for Experimental Manipulations and Mock Juror Gender on Child Maturity Ratings.
95% CI Group Variable M SD LL UL Child Age* 12 years (n = 125) 1.95 1.02 1.77 2.14 17 years (n = 135) 3.70 1.47 3.45 3.95 Child Race White (n = 129) 2.74 1.55 2.47 3.01 Black (n = 131) 2.98 1.53 2.71 3.24 Defendant Race White (n = 128) 2.99 1.61 2.71 3.27 Black (n = 132) 2.73 1.47 2.48 2.99 Mock Juror Gender* Females (n = 137) 2.62 1.50 2.36 2.87 Males (n = 123) 3.13 1.55 2.85 3.41 Note. N = 261. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. * p < .05
70 Research question 3. Do mock jurors’ attitudes and beliefs impact case outcomes and mock jurors’ perceptions for a mock CSA case?
Preliminary analyses. Descriptive statistics for all scales are presented in Table
19. Overall, mock jurors did not readily endorse the Jezebel stereotype. Mock jurors in this sample reported moderate beliefs in a just world, were moderately aware of racial issues and prejudice in society, and somewhat endorsed authoritarian attitudes. Bivariate correlations between the dependent variables and four scales used in the present study are presented in Table 20.
Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for Scale Scores.
Item M SD Mdn Range S K Jezebel stereotype 13.84 10.77 13.00 0 - 45 .33 -.85 JWS scores 52.31 16.86 53.00 0 - 110 -.18 1.11 CoBRAS scores 62.05 21.08 62.00 20 - 115 .09 -.54 RWA scores 44.66 18.29 46.00 14 - 96 .10 -.54 Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, Mdn = median, S = skewness, K = kurtosis, JWS = Just World Scale, CoBRAS = Color-blind Racial Attitudes Scale, RWA = Right- Wing Authoritarianism.
Separate t-tests were conducted to examine whether mock jurors’ attitudes and beliefs differed by mock juror gender. The results indicated that female mock jurors’ endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype (M = 12.13, SD = 10.55) were significantly less than those of male mock jurors (M = 15.85, SD = 10.68), t(258) = -2.82 , p = .005, d =
.35. No significant gender differences were observed for mock jurors’ just world beliefs
(Men M = 53.43, SD = 17.13; Women M = 51.69, SD = 16.07), t(258) = -.84, p = .40, d =
.11, racial attitudes (Men M = 63.00, SD = 20.18; Women M = 61.50, SD = 21.68), t(258)
= -.58, p = . 564, d = .07, or authoritarian attitudes (Men M = 42.65, SD = 14.96; Women
M = 46.68, SD = 20.59), t(258) = 1.77, p = . 075, d = .22.
71 Table 20
Dependent Measures and Scale Scores Correlations.
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. Verdict decisiona - 2. Defendant guilt .91** - 3. Sentencingb . c .19* - 4. Defendant . c .41** .18 culpabilityb - 5. Child . c -.08 -.07 -.42** culpabilityb - 6. Child .83** .85** .30** .45** -.48** credibility - 7. Child maturity -.38** -.41** -.24* -.33** .45** -.44** - 8. Jezebel -.42** -.49** -.23* -.27** .45** -.59** .59** stereotype - 9. JWS scores -.04 -.13* -.03 .04 .03 -.10 .04 .11 - 10. CoBRAS -.10 -.12 .10 -.07 .02 -.19** .01 .12* .41** scores - 11. RWA scores .05 .02 .14 -.01 .17 -.09 -.03 .19** .25** .58** Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation, JWS = Just World Scale, CoBRAS = Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale, RWA = Right- Wing Authoritarianism. aOverall, 53% (n = 139) of mock jurors voted “not guilty,” and 47% (n = 122) of mock jurors voted “guilty.” bOnly mock jurors who convicted the defendant (n = 122) responded to these items. cCannot be computed because at least one of the variables is a constant. *p < .05, **p < .01
72 Hypothesis 1. Based on prior research, I predicted mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes to relate to case outcomes for a mock CSA trial. Specifically, I expected that mock jurors who strongly endorsed authoritarian attitudes would render pro-prosecution judgments (i.e., greater frequency of conviction decisions, greater defendant guilt ratings, and harsher sentencing recommendations). Correlational analyses indicated that mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes were not significantly related to conviction decisions (p =
.409), defendant guilt ratings (p = .723), or sentencing recommendations (p = .136; see
Table 20).
Hypothesis 2. In accordance with research on the just world hypothesis, a relationship between mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world and child complainant culpability ratings was expected (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Thomas, Amburgey, & Ellis,
2016; VanDeursen, Pope, & Warner, 2012; Yamawaki, 2009). Specifically, I predicted mock jurors with stronger beliefs in a just world to attribute greater culpability ratings to the child complainant. Correlational analyses indicated this relationship was not significant (p = .769, see Table 20).
I predicted that mock jurors with greater beliefs in a just world would view the adolescent complainant as more responsible for than the younger complainant. Model 1 of the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012) was used to test the relationships between mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world, child culpability ratings, and child age. Just world beliefs were entered as the predictor variable, child age and child race were entered as separate moderator variables, and child culpability ratings were entered as the criterion variable. The results revealed a nonsignificant interaction effect, β = -.003, 95% CI [-.02,
.01], t = -.48, p = .633, indicating that the relationship between mock jurors’ beliefs in a
73 just world and ratings of the child’s culpability was not moderated by child age. An exploratory moderation analysis was conducted to examine the effect of child race on the relationship between just world beliefs and child culpability using PROCESS Model 1
(Hayes, 2012). The results revealed a nonsignificant interaction effect, β = -.001, 95% CI
[-.01, .01], t = -.20, p = .84, indicating that this relationship was also not moderated by child race.
Interestingly, mock jurors who were more likely to believe in a just world were less likely to rate the defendant as guilty (r = -.13, p = .037). To investigate this relationship further, I conducted a regression analysis having entered participants’ beliefs in a just world as the predictor variable and defendant guilt ratings as the outcome variable. The results indicated that the model significantly predicted mock jurors’ ratings of the defendant guilt, R2 = .02, F(1, 257) = 4.37, p = .037, where beliefs in a just world accounted for approximately 2% of mock jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt.
Specifically, greater beliefs in a just world significantly predicted lower attributions of guilt to the defendant, β = -.02, 95% CI = [-.04, -.001], t = -2.09, p = .037.
Hypothesis 3. Racial attitudes were hypothesized to influence mock jurors’ decisions for the mock CSA case. Specifically, I predicted that mock jurors who are
“blind” to societal issues concerning racial prejudice were expected to discriminate against a Black defendant when asked to rate the defendant’s guilt, culpability, and render sentencing recommendations. Correlational analyses revealed nonsignificant relationships between racial attitudes and defendant culpability ratings (p = .48), and sentencing recommendations (p = .274). Racial attitudes were marginally associated with defendant guilt ratings (p = .051). To investigate this relationship further, I conducted a
74 regression analysis having entered participants’ racial attitudes as the predictor variable and defendant guilt ratings as the outcome variable. The results indicated that the model significantly predicted mock jurors’ perceptions of child credibility, R2 = .02, F(1, 257) =
3.83, p = .051, where racial attitudes accounted for approximately 2% of mock jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s guilt. Specifically, greater “color-blindness” to racial prejudice and issues significantly predicted lower defendant guilt ratings, β = -.01, 95%
CI = [-.03, .00], t = -1.96, p = .051.
Moderation analyses to test for the effects of defendant race on the associations between racial attitudes and defendant guilt, culpability, and sentencing recommendations were conducted using PROCESS Model 1 (Hayes, 2012). The results did not support my prediction that defendant race would moderate the relationships between racial attitudes and mock jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s guilt, β = -.01, 95%
CI = [-.04, .01], t = -.99, p = .325, views of the teacher’s culpability for the sexual encounter, β = .004, 95% CI = [-.01, .01], t = .90, p = .373, or sentencing recommendations, β = -.01, 95% CI = [-.10, .08], t = -.26, p = .798.
Child race was also predicted to moderate the association between racial attitudes and perceptions of the child’s culpability; color-blind jurors would rate the Black child complainant as more culpable than the White child complainant. Racial attitudes were not related to child culpability ratings (p = .793). Nevertheless, moderation analyses to test for the effects of child race on the association between racial attitudes and child culpability ratings were conducted. The results did not support my prediction, β = -.003,
95% CI = [-.01, .01], t = -.42, p = .674; child race was not observed to moderate the association between racial attitudes and child culpability ratings.
75 Further, a significant negative relationship between racial attitudes and child credibility ratings emerged (r = -.19, p = .002). To investigate this relationship further, I conducted a regression analysis having entered participants’ racial attitudes as the predictor variable and child credibility ratings as the outcome variable. The results indicated that the model significantly predicted mock jurors’ perceptions of child credibility, R2 = .04, F(1, 259) = 10.04, p = .002, where racial attitudes accounted for approximately 4% of mock jurors’ perceptions of the child’s credibility. Specifically, greater “color-blindness” to racial prejudice and issues significantly predicted lower child credibility ratings, β = -.02, 95% CI = [-.03, -.006], t = -3.17, p = .002. Based on this observation, I chose to explore the effects of child race on the relationship between racial attitudes and child credibility using moderation analyses. Model 1 of the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012) was used to test the relationships between these variables. Racial attitudes were entered as the predictor variable, child race was entered as the moderator, and child credibility ratings were entered as the criterion variable. No specific predictions were made regarding the effects of child race on the relationship between racial attitudes and child credibility ratings. The results revealed a nonsignificant interaction effect, β = -.003, 95% CI [-.02, .02], t = .32, p = .75, indicating that the relationship between mock jurors’ racial attitudes and their child credibility ratings was not moderated by child race.
Hypothesis 4. As expected, correlational analyses revealed relationships between the Jezebel stereotype and mock jurors’ perceptions of child complainant credibility (p <
.001) and culpability (p < .001). Mock jurors who strongly endorsed the Jezebel stereotype attributed less credibility to the child complainant while those who strongly
76 endorsed the Jezebel stereotype rated the child as more culpable for her victimization.
Additionally, the Jezebel stereotype was significantly related to a number of other dependent variables. Viewing the child as more representative of the Jezebel stereotype corresponded with less frequent conviction decisions (p < .001)14, lower defendant guilt ratings (p < .001)15, less harsh sentence recommendations (p = .014)16, lower ratings of defendant culpability (p = .003)17, and greater child maturity ratings (p < .001).18
Based on prior research, mock jurors were expected to apply the Jezebel stereotype to the Black child complainant more than the White child complainant (e.g.,
Mitchell & Herring, 1998; West, 1995). A t-test revealed that the Jezebel stereotype did not significantly differ by child complainant race (White M = 13.29, SD = 11.20; Black
M = 14.36, SD = 10.34), t(259) = -.80, p = .424. Despite this nonsignificant difference in
Jezebel stereotype endorsement by child race, moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) to test for the effects of child race were conducted on the relationships between the
14 A logistic regression analysis indicated that greater endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype significantly predicted verdict, β = -.09, Wald c2 (1) = 40.57, p < .001. The interaction effect of mock juror gender and mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements on conviction decisions was not significant, Wald c2 = 1.48, p = .224. Both men, β = -.07, Wald c2 (1) = 12.38, p < .001, and women, β = -.11, Wald c2 (1) = 26.75, p < .001, who endorsed the Jezebel stereotype (concerning the child complainant involved in the case) were reluctant to convict the defendant. 15 Moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of mock juror gender on the relationship between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and defendant guilt ratings, β = .04, 95% CI [-.01, .09], t = 1.68, p = .094. 16 Moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of mock juror gender on the relationship between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and sentencing recommendations, β = - .05, 95% CI [-.22, .12], t = -.59, p = .554. 17 Moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) indicated mock juror gender to moderate the relationship between Jezebel stereotype endorsements (pertaining to the child complainant) and defendant culpability ratings, β = -.02, 95% CI [-.04, -.001], t = -2.31, p = .023. Men who strongly endorsed the Jezebel stereotype rated the defendant as less culpable for the encounter, β = -.02, 95% CI [-.03, -.001], t = -3.34, p = .001. On the other hand, defendant culpability ratings did not fluctuate by women’s endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype, β = -.001, 95% CI [-.01, .01], t = -.09, p = .927. 18 Moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of mock juror gender on the relationship between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and child maturity ratings, β = -.02, 95% CI [-.05, .01], t = -1.32 p = .187. 77 Jezebel stereotype endorsements and mock jurors’ ratings of child credibility as well as child culpability. The results revealed a nonsignificant effect of child race on the association between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and child culpability ratings, β = -.002, 95% CI [-.02, .02], t = -.17, p = .863. Similarly, moderation analyses
(PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of child race on the relationship between Jezebel stereotype endorsements and child credibility, β = -.02, 95% CI [-.05,
.01], t = -1.29, p = .197. In sum, mock jurors’ endorsements in the Jezebel stereotype were associated with both child culpability and credibility ratings, however, child race did not moderate either relationship.19
19 Moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of mock juror gender on the relationship between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and child credibility ratings, β = .03, 95% CI [-.01, .06], t = 1.56, p = .121. Similarly, moderation analyses (PROCESS, Model 1) revealed a nonsignificant effect of mock juror gender on the relationship between mock jurors’ Jezebel stereotype endorsements and child culpability ratings was also observed, β = .001, 95% CI [-.02, .02], t = .11, p = .911. 78 Chapter Five
Discussion
This study was designed to examine the effects of child race, child age, and defendant race on mock jurors’ perceptions and decisions for a simulated CSA case.
Specifically, this study was designed to test three core research questions. First, do the effects of child race, child age, and defendant race impact legal judgments for a mock
CSA case? Second, do legal judgments for a mock CSA case differ by mock juror gender? And third, do mock jurors’ racial attitudes, beliefs in a just world, authoritarian attitudes, and endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype (pertaining to the child complainant involved in the case) relate to their legal judgments for the mock CSA trial? Several hypotheses were tested to answer each of the three research questions. As such, the results from the present study are discussed in order of each research question and organized by subsequent hypotheses.
The Effects of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race
The first goal of this study was to examine whether child complainant race, age, and defendant race impacted case outcomes and mock jurors’ legal decisions for a simulated CSA case. The findings indicate that child complainant race did not solely impact mock jurors’ legal judgments or perceptions of the mock CSA case, rather child race interacted with other variables to influence case outcomes and mock jurors’ perceptions. Child age—on the other hand—directly influenced verdict, child credibility ratings, and perceptions of the child’s maturity. Child age also interacted with child race and defendant race to influence perceptions of the CSA case. Child culpability ratings
79 marginally differed by defendant race. Moreover, defendant race interacted with child race and age to impact mock jurors’ legal decisions.
Child race. I predicted mock jurors would rate the Black child complainant as more responsible for her victimization, as more mature, and less credible than the White child complainant. However, the present study did not corroborate my predictions. Both the Black and White child complainants were perceived to be equally responsible for the alleged encounter, mature for their age, and were viewed as equally credible. These findings conflict with prior research on the theory of adultification (Epstein et al., 2017), wherein Black girls are viewed as more mature than their White female peers. Moreover, these findings counter previous research reporting child race as an influence for mock jurors’ credibility ratings. For example, Bottoms and colleagues (2004) found that White
CSA complainants were perceived as more credible than both Black and Hispanic CSA complainants. Perhaps the salience of the child complainant’s race made mock jurors aware of the hypotheses for the present study and thus, diluted the effects of child race on mock jurors’ perceptions. Further, mock jurors’ desire to remain impartial and render socially acceptable judgments may have prevented them from reporting their true reactions to the simulated CSA case. Another potential explanation could be that child race interacts with other extralegal factors to influence mock jurors’ legal judgments for a
CSA case, but child race alone does not impact their decisions.
Defendant race. Given the racially-based sexual stereotype literature (Devine,
1989; Powell, Wyatt, & Bass, 1983; Weinberg & Williams, 1988), I predicted the Black defendant would receive more guilty verdicts, higher defendant guilt ratings, more severe sentencing recommendations, and higher culpability ratings than the White defendant,
80 given the sexual nature of the alleged offense. I found no support for my first hypothesis.
Defendant race did not impact verdict decisions, guilt ratings, sentencing recommendations, or perceptions of the defendant’s culpability. However, the non- significant effect of defendant race on verdict decision does coincide with earlier research demonstrating that, based on the aversive racism theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), dichotomous verdicts would not be affected by defendant race. Recall that aversive racism theory is premised on White juror bias where White jurors are more likely to render impartial legal judgments when instructed to do so or when race is made salient throughout the trial. Importantly, this study extends the theory of aversive racism to a diverse sample of mock jurors, rather than an all-White sample of mock jurors.
Interestingly, a marginally significant effect of defendant race emerged for mock jurors’ ratings of child culpability. Specifically, mock jurors rated the child as more culpable for her victimization when the defendant was Black versus White, regardless of child race. Black men have been stereotypically labeled as sexually experienced, deviant, and aggressive (e.g., Devine, 1989). Therefore, the child complainant may have been blamed more for the sexual encounter with a Black man because she was perceived as wanting the encounter to occur, or even having consented to engage in sexual activity with the Black teacher. Perhaps mock jurors believed the child complainant wanted to gain sexual experience and sought to build a sexual relationship with the Black teacher
(versus the White teacher) in order to achieve this goal because of the racially-based sexual stereotypes attributed to Black men (e.g., Black men are sexually deviant). In the future, researchers should assess jurors’ perceptions of the child complainant’s motive for
81 engaging in a sexual relationship with men of different races/ethnicities to better understand how defendant race influences views of the child’s culpability.
Child complainant-defendant race similarities. For my second hypothesis, I expected to replicate findings from Bottoms et al. (2004), demonstrating that mock jurors would attribute more guilt to the defendant involved in an intraracial case (e.g., Black defendant, Black child complainant) versus an interracial case (e.g., Black defendant,
White child complainant). Contrary to my expectations, this finding was not supported in the present study.
However, a three-way interaction was observed for defendant guilt ratings by child race, child age, and defendant race. Mock jurors rated the defendant as least guilty when the sexual encounter involved a 17-year-old Black complainant and a Black defendant. This finding opposes previous studies reporting that mock jurors attributed more guilt to the defendant accused of sexually abusing a child complainant of the same race (Bottoms et al., 2004; Foley & Chamblin, 1982). However, the child’s age was not manipulated in these two previous studies. One explanation for this finding from the present study could be that mock jurors consider the age of the child complainant as a primary factor when asked to adjudicate intraracial CSA cases, especially when both the defendant and child complainant are Black. Perhaps mock jurors were most reluctant to attribute guilt to the Black defendant because they believed the 17-year-old Black complainant to have been more sexually experienced, promiscuous, interested in pursuing a sexual relationship, and/or more mature and thus capable of deciding when (and with whom) she wanted to become sexually active. The judge’s charge to the jury explicitly stated that the age of consent for Ohio—where the alleged sexual abuse took place—was
82 16 years, yet even so, when the sexual relationship involved a teacher and student enrolled at the same institution, the sexual abuse was still illegal. Therefore, one interpretation of this finding may imply that mock jurors in the present study actively disregarded the Ohio consent laws when the case involved a 17-year-old Black complainant and Black defendant.
Interestingly, I found no evidence to support the notion that the Jezebel stereotype was prescribed more to the Black complainant versus the White complainant.
Researchers interested in the effects of race on jurors’ decisions for CSA cases should continue to explore the consequences of child complainant age and further explore potential factors that may explain why an alleged perpetrator of CSA is viewed as least guilty when involved with an adolescent Black child complainant.
Child age. I expected mock jurors to view an older child complainant (17-year- old) as more responsible for her victimization and less credible compared to a younger child complainant (12-year-old) for my fourth hypothesis, which was partially supported.
Mock jurors’ views of the child’s credibility differed by child age; the 12-year-old was rated as more credible than the 17-year-old. This specific finding replicates previous research reporting child age as influential for mock jurors’ perceptions of child credibility
(e.g., Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Nightingale, 1993).
Contrary to my prediction, child complainant age did not influence mock jurors’ perceptions of the child’s responsibility for her victimization. Perhaps mock jurors who convicted the defendant were reluctant to assign responsibility to the child complainant given their verdict decision. However, child age influenced mock jurors’ verdict
83 decisions. When the case involved a 12-year-old complainant, mock jurors convicted the defendant more often than in the case that involved the 17-year-old complainant.
Child age also impacted mock jurors’ sentencing recommendations. Defendants who allegedly sexually abused a younger complainant received a harsher sentence than defendants accused of being sexually involved with an older adolescent complainant.
These finding corroborate previous research on child age as a major influence on mock jurors’ legal judgments for CSA cases involving a teacher and student (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015). Perhaps mock jurors viewed the older child as more mature and capable of consenting to the alleged sexual encounter. Less harsh sentencing recommendations may be due to the perception that the older adolescent complainant shared partial responsibility for the occurrence of the sexual encounter due to her assumed maturity level. In fact, results from the present study support this notion. The older complainant was viewed as more mature compared to the younger complainant.
Child race and age interaction. Finally, in my fifth hypothesis, I predicted that child race and child age would interact to influence mock jurors’ views of the child’s culpability and credibility, yet I found no evidence to support my prediction. This non- significant child age by child race interaction does not extend the theory of adultification to the legal system, or rather, for CSA cases. Nevertheless, researchers should adjust their focus to investigating institutional prejudice that may prevent allegations of CSA reported by girls of minority races from reaching the inside of a courtroom.
The Effects of Mock Juror Gender
The second goal of this study was to examine whether legal judgments and perceptions concerning a simulated CSA case differed by mock juror gender. Mock juror
84 gender effects were found in the context of the present study. While mock juror gender did not impact verdict decisions or sentencing recommendations, mock juror gender was found to influence defendant guilt ratings, judgments of the defendant’s culpability, child culpability, child credibility and child maturity. Moreover, mock juror gender interacted with child race to influence sentencing recommendations and (marginally with) child age with regard to perceptions of the child’s credibility. These findings are discussed in the context of my hypotheses below.
Mock juror gender. For my first hypothesis, I predicted that female mock jurors would render legal judgments in favor of the prosecution more than male mock jurors.
Specifically, I predicted that women would convict the defendant more often and would also attribute more guilt to the defendant than men. This hypothesis was partially supported. Surprisingly, verdict decisions did not differ between mock juror gender; both women (52%) and men (41%) convicted the defendant at a similar rate. However, when asked to rate the defendant’s guilt via a continuous scaled item, female mock jurors’ ratings revealed a pro-prosecution bias while male mock jurors’ ratings leaned more in favor of the defense. Perhaps the continuous guilt rating item was more sensitive, revealing a clearer picture of how juror gender impacts CSA case outcomes.
Additionally, female mock jurors may interpret the “standard of proof” for a CSA case differently compared to male mock jurors. In the future, researchers should examine whether male and female mock jurors would convict the defendant of CSA differently given various degrees of offense pertaining to the sexual assault of an alleged child victim.
85 Mock juror gender differences were also observed for a number of peripheral legal judgments. Women rated the defendant as more culpable for the sexual encounter than men, while for men the opposite was observed for child culpability ratings; men attributed more responsibility to the child complainant compared to women. Female mock jurors also viewed the child to be more credible than male mock jurors. Finally, men perceived the child complainant as more mature compared to women.
Bottoms (1993) explained gender differences in attitudes about children as due to empathetic trait differences between men and women. Because women have a greater capacity to empathize they are also more inclined to hold positive beliefs about a child victim and react negatively to allegations of CSA. Furthermore, the disproportionate rates for which women are sexually targeted and victimized may also contribute to these observed gender differences. In other words, women may empathize and/or sympathize more with the victims of sexual crimes because they may readily identify with these victims or know of someone who has been sexually victimized (Bottoms, 1993; Bottoms,
Peter-Hagene, Stevenson, Wiley, Mitchell, & Goodman, 2014; Haegerich & Bottoms,
2000). These gender differences may also be explained by gender role stereotypes where women are presumed (and perhaps strongly encouraged) to be nurturing in character and to care more about the welfare of children (Barnett & Sinisi, 1990). This begs the question as to why women, who clearly perceived the defendant as guilty, rendered relatively similar verdicts as men for the simulated CSA case? One potential explanation is that extralegal factors did in fact resonate with mock jurors and introduced doubt in mock jurors’ minds when they were asked to render a verdict. Future researchers should continue to examine the effects of child race, child age, and defendant race on mock
86 jurors’ decision making for a CSA trial and especially investigate the manner to which these extralegal factors are interpreted by the women and men who are responsible for adjudicating the case.
Child complainant race and mock juror gender interaction. A significant main effect of mock juror gender on sentencing recommendations was not observed in the present study. However, the interaction between mock juror gender and child race influenced mock jurors’ sentencing recommendations. When the child complainant was
White, female mock jurors recommended a longer sentence for the defendant than male mock jurors. However, when the child complainant was Black, there was no difference in sentencing recommendations by mock juror gender. Women, rather than men, may have sought retribution for the alleged abuse perpetrated on the White female child because they perceived her as more similar and thus empathized more with her rather than the
Black child complainant. Although the sample recruited for the present study was diverse and representative of various races and ethnicities, the majority of both men (72%) and women (69%) were White. White female mock jurors may have been particularly distraught by the defendant’s actions which lead them to render more punitive sentencing recommendations. Another possible explanation is that female mock jurors may have felt overly protective of the White female complainant since 59% reported that they were parents, while only 43% of male mock jurors reported having children of their own. On the other hand, male mock jurors may have sympathized with the male defendant, even when they convicted him of CSA, wherein their reservations manifested as less severe punishment recommendations.
87 Child complainant age and mock juror gender interaction. For my second hypothesis, I expected male mock jurors to be more affected than female mock jurors by the child’s age. In accordance with Bottoms et al. (2004), male mock jurors were expected to view a younger child complainant as less responsible for the sexual encounter and more credible than an adolescent child complainant. On the other hand, child complainant age was not expected to affect female mock jurors’ perceptions regarding the mock CSA case. This hypothesis was partially supported. I found no evidence for the child age by mock juror gender interaction with regard to child culpability ratings.
However, a marginally significant interaction between mock juror gender and child age influenced perceptions of the child complainant’s credibility. Women rated the 12-year- old as more credible than men, but no gender differences were observed for credibility ratings pertaining to the 17-year-old. Further, my prediction that the child’s age would influence men’s credibility ratings was not supported. Instead, women were more affected by child age than men in that women viewed the 12-year-old as more credible than the 17-year-old. This finding contradicts previous research (e.g., Bottoms et al.,
2004) and should be interpreted with caution. Perhaps this particular sample of female mock jurors viewed the 12-year-old complainant as more sexually naïve compared to the
17-year-old, whom may have been viewed as more motivated to confabulate the CSA allegation to serve her own interests (vengeance for being suspended from her soccer league), and thus, tarnishing her credibility. Conversely, men remained skeptical of the child complainant’s allegation of sexual abuse regardless of child complainant age.
Future research should be conducted to examine whether this particular child age by
88 mock juror gender interaction can be generalized to various case contexts (e.g., familial abuse vs. teacher-perpetrated abuse).
The Effects of Mock Jurors’ Prejudice and Attitudes
The third goal of this study was to examine the extent to which mock jurors’ attitudes and beliefs were related to case outcomes and legal judgments rendered for a mock CSA case. In the present study, the associations between legal judgments for a simulated CSA case and mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes, beliefs in a just world, racial attitudes, and endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype were assessed. Authoritarian attitudes were not found to impact mock jurors’ legal judgments. Contrary to my prediction, mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world did not influence child culpability ratings, however, an association between these attitudes and defendant guilt ratings was observed.
Mock jurors’ “color-blind” racial attitudes were associated with child credibility ratings.
Interestingly, mock jurors’ endorsement of the Jezebel stereotype (pertaining to the child complainant) was related to verdict decisions, defendant guilt ratings, sentencing recommendations, as well as perceptions of the defendant culpability and the child’s maturity. Further, mock jurors’ Jezebel endorsements were related to views of the child’s credibility, culpability, and differed by mock juror gender. These findings are discussed in the context of my hypotheses specific to my third research question below.
Authoritarian attitudes. First, I predicted mock jurors who strongly endorsed authoritarian attitudes would render pro-prosecution attitudes in the form of greater conviction decisions, greater ratings of defendant guilt, and harsher sentencing recommendations. This prediction was not supported, and further, findings taken from the present study contradict previous research on mock jurors’ legal judgments (e.g.,
89 Altemeyer, 1996; Cramer et al., 2009; Saunders & Ngo, 2017). One potential explanation as to why I did not observe a relationship between authoritarian attitudes and legal judgments is that attitudes are weak predictors of individual behavior. The ability to predict verdict decisions and legal judgments based on laypeople’s attitudes may prove difficult and unsuccessful as other areas of psychology consistently encounter difficulties in predicting behavior from attitudinal measures (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).
Researchers contend the ability to predict specific behaviors is often weak when general attitudes are measured (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Timko, 1986; Fazio, 1986). Therefore, a more specific measure of legal authoritarianism may have been more useful to elucidate the influence of mock jurors’ attitudes on their judgments for the CSA case presented in the present study.
Beliefs in a just world. For my second hypothesis, I expected to observe a relationship between mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world and child complainant culpability ratings. Contrary to previous research (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Thomas,
Amburgey, & Ellis, 2016; VanDeursen, Pope, & Warner, 2012; Yamawaki, 2009), child culpability was unrelated to mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world. However, an interesting relationship between mock jurors’ beliefs in a just world and defendant guilt ratings emerged. Those who were more likely to believe the world to be fair and just were less likely to attribute guilt to the defendant. It is important to note that only a small amount of variance in defendant guilt ratings was accounted for by mock jurors’ just world beliefs (R2 = .02). Nevertheless, this finding potentially supports the notion that mock jurors may have engaged in victim blaming, and in turn, did not perceive the defendant to be totally at fault for the ongoing sexual relationship with his student. Mock jurors may
90 have believed the child complainant could have prevented or stopped her involvement with her teacher at any time over the course of the ongoing abuse. Since the child complainant’s allegation included three separate sexual encounters, it is reasonable to interpret this finding such that mock jurors believed she “deserved” the ongoing sexual abuse. Of course, one would hope that mock jurors in this sample did not actually blame the child complainant for being sexually abused. Future research should be conducted to better understand the influence of just world beliefs in the adjudication of CSA cases.
Color-blind racial attitudes. For my third hypothesis, I expected mock jurors’ racial attitudes to influence child culpability ratings, yet this hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, verdict decisions, defendant guilt and culpability ratings, as well as sentencing recommendations were not swayed by mock jurors’ racial attitudes. One explanation for these null findings is that the sample recruited for the present study was racially and ethnically diverse as opposed to previous research conducted using only
White mock juror samples (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). Another explanation is that the salience of the defendants’ and child complainants’ race may have attenuated mock jurors’ legal judgments and perceptions surrounding the case. It is also possible that the jury instructions included in this study obscured the effects of racial prejudice on mock jurors’ legal judgments. Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) argued that when instructions to remain impartial are presented to jurors, otherwise ambiguous sexual assault cases are then interpreted in a more structured and forthright manner by reminding mock jurors to suppress their preexisting biases and prejudices when rendering case-related judgments.
On the other hand, mock jurors’ racial attitudes were observed to influence child credibility ratings. Mock jurors “blind” to the issues of racism and discrimination were
91 less likely to view the child as a credible witness. Interestingly, child race did not moderate this relationship. This finding is particularly perplexing. Perhaps mock jurors who reported more egalitarian racial views were not biased by child race compared to those who were more aware of the racial issues prevalent in today’s society.
Jezebel stereotype endorsements. Mock jurors’ endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype were found to influence mock jurors’ legal judgments and perceptions for the mock CSA case over all other attitudinal measures. In support of my fourth hypothesis, mock jurors’ endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype were positively related to child culpability views and negatively related to child credibility ratings. Interestingly, the
Black child complainant was not viewed as more representative of a Jezebel than the
White child complainant, a finding that contradicts previous research (e.g., Mitchell &
Herring, 1998; West, 1995). Perhaps the Jezebel stereotype depends on the child’s age rather than the child’s race. In fact, post hoc analyses revealed that the older child complainant was perceived as more characteristic of the Jezebel stereotype compared to the younger child complainant (r = .38, p < .001). Once a child complainant is no longer viewed to be sexually naïve, the degree to which an adolescent’s behavior is viewed to coincide with that of a Jezebel may further explain mock jurors’ decision-making strategies relevant for adjudicating CSA cases.
Moreover, viewing the child as more representative of the Jezebel stereotype corresponded with less frequent conviction decisions, lower defendant guilt ratings, less harsh sentence recommendations, lower ratings of defendant culpability, and greater child maturity ratings. Endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype were weaker for women compared to men. Further, mock juror gender moderated the relationship between the
92 Jezebel stereotype and defendant culpability ratings; men who strongly endorsed the
Jezebel stereotype rated the defendant as less culpable for the sexual encounter, yet views of the defendant’s responsibility did not fluctuate by women’s Jezebel stereotype endorsements. Compared to female mock jurors, the Jezebel stereotype may have magnified male mock jurors’ suspicions of the child complainant’s allegation and thus, tempered their perceptions that the defendant was most responsible for the alleged CSA.
Conversely, female mock jurors may not have thought it appropriate to view the child complainant as sexually experienced or even promiscuous. In the future, researchers should adjust their lens to focus on how the Jezebel stereotype influences CSA case outcomes as a function of child age.
General Limitations to the Present Study
This study was designed with the aim that the results could be generalized to an actual legal context concerning a CSA case. For example, only jury eligible (i.e., individuals 18 year and older), United States citizens were recruited to participate in the present study. Further, a diverse sample of mock jurors was tested in the present study which more closely resembles an actual jury panel than testing a sample of undergraduate students. The case and trial summaries used in the present study were created after thorough research of actual CSA cases. Jury instructions specific to child sexual abuse and assault cases for the state of Ohio were presented to mock jurors, a routine practice seen in actual trials.
Undoubtedly, there were a few limitations to the present study regarding the design of the experiment and materials employed, external validity and generalizability, and analyses and statistical power. First, the trial character’s race was explicitly stated in
93 the character information sheet provided to mock jurors as they reviewed the case and trial summaries. This information may have notified mock jurors of the hypotheses and goals pertaining to the present study, thus diluting the effect of race on their legal judgments and perceptions concerning the defendant and child complainant. Second, mock jurors may have viewed the 12-year-old Black student as less likable and attractive compared to both the Black and White 17-year-old student complainants, therefore introducing two confounding variables that may have partially accounted for the variability in participants’ decisions regarding the mock CSA case. A third limitation to the present study is that mock jurors reviewed a collection of written summaries and transcripts pertinent to the simulated CSA case. Although photographs of the characters involved in the case were presented to mock jurors, these stimuli are no substitute for the experience of actually witnessing a live CSA trial (Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Another limitation is that mock jurors reviewed only a single photograph of each trial character, which may have driven the findings observed in the present study. By including multiple photographs of each trial character, I could have been more confident that the empirical findings were due to the experimental conditions rather than the effects of the selected visual stimuli.
An important part of the criminal justice system is that a defendant has the constitutional right to be judged by a group of his or her peers, however, this study investigated individual mock jurors’ decisions instead of case decisions rendered after jury deliberation. Therefore, these results cannot necessarily generalize to actual CSA trials. In regard to the American jury, the sequence of events and evidence presented at trial are evaluated and oftentimes debated by a jury panel ranging from six to 12
94 demographically diverse individuals, representative of the attitudes and beliefs shared by a community. This suggests that jurors’ perceptions of the child complainant and case outcomes may have been different if participants were required to deliberate as a mock jury panel until a unanimous verdict was rendered (Diamond, 1997; Weiten & Diamond,
1979). Nevertheless, it is important to first assess individuals’ attitudes and beliefs related to CSA cases in order to provide a basis for understanding the effects of extralegal factors, attitudes, and beliefs that may be discussed in the privacy of jury deliberations.
Further, it is important to note that by recruiting a national sample instead of relying on undergraduate participants, the results of the present study may be more representative of the perceptions and biases held by jury-eligible individuals and may be more typical of actual jurors’ legal and case decisions. Yet, employing a survey study outside of the laboratory does limit the internal validity and experimental control that is more likely to be maintained in a laboratory setting.
A sixth limitation is that mock jurors were asked to review a number of materials and respond to multiple measures which may have induced fatigue and/or distracted them from attending to key details presented in the simulated CSA case. To circumvent this limitation, manipulation and comprehension checks were used to identify and exclude mock jurors who were not paying close attention to the materials. However, I excluded data from 37% (N = 155) of my total recruited sample resulting in a drastically reduced sample size (N = 261) which may have limited the statistical power to detect effects.
Admittedly, I may have been too strict when developing my criteria for excluding participants based upon their responses to manipulation and comprehension checks. For example, 44 participants were excluded from analyses for incorrectly identifying the age
95 of the judge presiding over the simulated CSA trial. In hindsight, excluding participants based on manipulation checks alone may have been satisfactory to ensure the integrity of the data for which analyses were conducted. Moreover, mock jurors were asked to respond to attitudinal measures after having reviewed the simulated CSA trial which may have contaminated their responses. Assessing mock jurors’ authoritarian attitudes, racial attitudes, beliefs in a just world, and endorsements of the Jezebel stereotype prior to reviewing the CSA trial materials may have resulted in different findings.
The last limitation to this study is that results may not generalize to a population that is not predominantly Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic
(WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Yet, the purpose of this study was to assess mock juror decision-making for CSA cases prosecuted in the United States where the population is, for the most part, WEIRD.
Conclusion
This study represents an analysis of the combined influences of child race, child age, defendant race, mock juror gender, and mock jurors’ prejudice and beliefs as influential factors related to mock jurors’ legal decision-making concerning the adjudication of a CSA case. More importantly, the results from this study indicate that case evidence is not the only relevant information for which jurors consider for adjudicating CSA cases. Findings from the present study reveal answers to all three of my research questions: (1) the direct effects of child race, defendant race, and
(particularly) child age influenced mock jurors legal judgments and perceptions pertinent to the case, as did many of the interactions between these extralegal factors; (2) mock juror gender also directly affected the adjudication of a mock CSA trial and interacted
96 with extralegal factors to influence case judgments; and (3) mock jurors’ prejudices, attitudes, and beliefs—particularly stereotypical views of the child complainant as a
Jezebel—were found to impact the CSA case-related outcomes. The results of this study shed light on how mock jurors may be affected by characteristics of the defendant and child complainant in the courtroom, and also by their own individual differences and attitudes. Importantly, this study focused on mock jurors’ views of an alleged female
CSA complainant and male perpetrator, however, future research should be conducted to determine whether these results generalize to mock CSA cases that involve an alleged male complainant and female perpetrator. Understanding how laypeople perceive alleged child victims and perpetrators of CSA as a function of their physical characteristics is important for maintaining justice inside the courtroom. Importantly, the implications from the present study may lead to a more educated courtroom where jurors are more aware of their own individual biases and the effects of extralegal factors that affect cases of child sexual abuse and assault.
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115 Yozwiak, J. A., Golding, J. M., & Marsil, D. F. (2004). The impact of type of out-of-
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116 Appendix A
Instructions
You will read two summaries of a criminal case involving a girl who is an alleged victim of sexual battery. The case summary is one-page long and provides general information regarding details leading up to the girl’s allegation. The trial summary is about eight pages long and contains brief descriptions of the prosecution’s and defense’s arguments, a transcript of the alleged victim’s court testimony, and the prosecution’s and defense’s closing statements.
In this case, the alleged victim made a report to her mother, who in turn contacted the authorities. A social worker with the Department of Human Services was assigned to conduct an interview with the minor about the event to assess whether the allegation had any basis. The case was moved forward for prosecution.
When reading this case and trial summary, try to place yourself in the role of a juror in a sexual battery trial. You will be asked to answer questions about what you believe happened and your perceptions of the alleged victim’s and defendant’s responsibility for the situation. You should not form any definite or fixed opinion on the merits of the case until you have heard everything that will be presented to you today.
117 Appendix B
Case and Trial Summary
Case Summary
Mr. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker], a 38-year-old English teacher and community league youth soccer coach, is being charged with statutory sexual battery of one of his students, Ms. [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller]. [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] is
[12/17] years old.
[Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] first reported the alleged sexual contact to her mother who then made an official report to the authorities. [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie
Miller] was then interviewed by a social worker with the Department of Human Services.
[Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] told the social worker, that she and [Darius Jones/Noah
Baker] began having sex in March 2017, while she was in the [7th/12th] grade at Colima
[Middle/High] School. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] was also her community league youth soccer coach and had set up an arrangement with [Aisha Jackson’s/Stephanie Miller’s] parents to drive her to soccer practice after school.
According to [Aisha Jackson’s/Stephanie Miller’s] criminal complaint, the two allegedly had sexual intercourse twice in [Darius Jones’s/Noah Baker’s] classroom at the school and once in his car. [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] stated that the first time
[Darius Jones/Noah Baker] forced her into having sexual intercourse with him after winning an important soccer game. [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] claimed that the defendant threatened to drop her from the soccer team if she did not comply with his demands to have sexual intercourse with him.
118 After [Aisha Jackson’s/Stephanie Miller’s] interview with the social worker, the prosecution moved forward with the case. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] is being charged with three counts of sexual battery. The alleged episodes of sexual intercourse spanned over the course of three months. [Aisha Jackson’s/Stephanie Miller’s] formal criminal complaint against [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] was filed approximately five months after the last alleged episode of illicit sexual conduct. The court date for this case is set for
February 2018.
Trial Summary
Prosecution Case
Mr. Brian O’Connell represented the State in this criminal trial and presented the prosecution’s case. The prosecution argued that [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] sexually battered his student [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller]. They claimed that the defendant used his position of power to force himself on [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller]. In exchange for sex, they claimed the defendant promised to keep [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie
Miller] on the youth soccer team that he was currently coaching.
[Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] agreed to testify in court during the trial. Her testimony is presented on the next page.
CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY
PA = Prosecuting Attorney AJ = Aisha Jackson SM = Stephanie Miller
PA: [Aisha/Stephanie], can you please tell the court why you are here today?
[AJ/SM]: Yes, my teacher, Mr. [Jones/Baker] did something bad to me.
PA: Ok. Can you tell me what he did to you that was bad?
119
[AJ/SM]: We had sex.
PA: Ok, and did you have sex just once?
[AJ/SM]: No, three times.
PA: Ok. Where did you and Mr. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] have sex three times?
[AJ/SM]: His classroom at school and one time in his car.
PA: What school do you go to [Aisha/Stephanie]?
[AJ/SM]: Colima [Middle/High] School.
PA: Do you remember when you and Mr. [Jones/Baker] had sex this first time?
[AJ/SM]: Yes, it was in March.
PA: Ok. Thank you. Can you tell me what happened when you and Mr. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] had sex the first time in March at your school?
[AJ/SM]: Yes, I go to Mr. [Jones’s/Baker’s] classroom after school to ride with him to my soccer practices. He is my coach. One day, he told me that I was the best player, but if I wanted to stay on the team, we had to have sex. He put me on the desk, pulled my skirt up, and pulled my underwear down… he put his penis inside of me… we had sex. That’s what happened the second time too.
PA: Did anything else happen? Did he say anything else to you?
[AJ/SM]: Yes, kept saying I was ‘really pretty’ and I was ‘the best.’ He told me he didn’t want to kick me off the team because my grades were bad, but maybe I could stay if we did it again.
PA: What do you mean by it?
[AJ/SM]: Have sex.
PA: Ok. Thank you for clarifying. Then what happened?
120 [AJ/SM]: We got dressed in our soccer clothes and went to my soccer practice. He is my teacher and my coach.
PA: Do you usually change clothes in Mr. [Jones’s/Baker’s] classroom?
[AJ/SM]: Yeah.
PA: Is Mr. [Jones/Baker] in the room when you are changing clothes?
[AJ/SM]: Yeah. He changes clothes too. For coaching.
PA: Ok. Thank you. You said this happened the second time, right?
[AJ/SM]: Yeah.
PA: When was the second time that you and Mr. [Jones/Baker] had sex?
[AJ/SM]: The second time happened in April.
PA: Ok. Do you remember anything that happened this second time that was different from the first time?
[AJ/SM]: No, not really.
PA: Ok. Thank you. When was the third time that you and Mr. [Jones/Baker] had sex?
[AJ/SM]: It was in May.
PA: Can you tell me what happened the third time? You said you were in Mr. [Jones’s/Baker’s] car. Where was the car parked?
[AJ/SM]: Yes. We were in his car, on the way to soccer practice. He parked at the mall. It was close to the practice fields. No one was around…it was just us.
PA: What happened?
[AJ/SM]: We were in the back of the car. He told me I was so pretty and he said he wanted me…that it was ok…and he knew I liked it. We got naked, then he got on top of me and we had sex.
121 PA: Was that the last time you and Mr. [Jones/Baker] had sex?
[AJ/SM]: Yes.
PA: How did you feel when you and Mr. [Jones/Baker] were having sex?
[AJ/SM]: I was scared and just wanted to stay on the team. I really love playing soccer. It’s super fun and I’m the best on my team.
PA: Why did you wait to tell someone about what happened between you and Mr. [Jones/Baker]?
[AJ/SM]: I was scared that I was going to get into trouble. That I did something bad. And I really wanted to keep playing soccer on my team.
PA: Are you playing on the team now?
[AJ/SM]: No. Mr. [Jones/Baker] kicked me off my team because my grades are kinda bad right now.
PA: I’m sorry to hear that. Is there anything else you want to tell me or the court about what happened to you?
[AJ/SM]: No. I don’t think so.
PA: One more thing, can you please point out the person who did this to you?
[AJ/SM]: Yes, he is sitting right over there (points to Mr. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker]).
PA: Thank you, [Aisha/Stephanie]. You may step down from the witness stand.
Defense Case
[Darius Jones/Noah Baker] hired Mr. Hayden Wilson to represent him during the criminal trial. The defendant, [Darius Jones/Noah Baker], evoked his constitutional right not to testify during the trial. The defense argued that [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] did not sexually batter [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller]. The defense argued that [Darius
Jones/Noah Baker] never threatened to take [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] off the
122 community league soccer team if she did not have sexual intercourse with him. The defense also argued that because [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] did not disclose the sexual conduct until months later, it was unlikely that the defendant and [Aisha
Jackson/Stephanie Miller] actually had sex. Rather, he argued that [Aisha
Jackson/Stephanie Miller] intentionally made up the story because she was angry that
[Darius Jones/Noah Baker] suspended her from the youth soccer league until her school grades improved.
Defense Closing Statement
In his closing arguments, the defense argued that [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] did not sexually batter [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller]. He stated that the defendant regarded [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie Miller] as a “talented soccer player and bright student.” The defense claimed that [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] only wanted the “best for her success as a student” which supported his decision to suspend [Aisha
Jackson/Stephanie Miller] from the soccer team until her grades improved. He argued that her delayed report of the alleged sexual conduct was suspicious since she disclosed soon after her suspension from the team. The defense concluded stating that [Darius
Jones/Noah Baker] did not ever engage in sexual intercourse with [Aisha
Jackson/Stephanie Miller] and should be found “not guilty.”
Prosecution Closing Statement
In his closing statements, the prosecution argued that [Aisha Jackson/Stephanie
Miller] was afraid she would get in trouble for coming forward with her complaint against [Darius Jones/Noah Baker], who was both her teacher and soccer coach. He reread a portion of her testimony to the court where she said she was afraid of getting
123 kicked off the soccer team if she did not have sexual intercourse with [Darius
Jones/Noah Baker]. The prosecution argued that the initial delay of her disclosure was understandable because she feared the consequences of telling someone about the sexual conduct. Lastly, the prosecution urged the court to find the defendant, [Darius
Jones/Noah Baker] “guilty” of sexual battery.
124 Appendix C
Trial Character Sheet & Photographs
The Honorable Jonathan A. Smith
Role: Judge Race: White Age: 41 years
125
Mr. Brian O’Connell
Role: Prosecuting attorney Race: White Age: 32 years
Mr. Hayden Wilson
Role: Defense attorney Race: White Age: 33 years
126
Mr. Darius Jones
Role: Defendant Race: Black Age: 38 years
Mr. Noah Baker
Role: Defendant Race: White Age: 38 years
127
Ms. Aisha Jackson
Role: Alleged Victim Race: Black Age: 12 years
Ms. Aisha Jackson
Role: Alleged Victim Race: Black Age: 17 years
128
Ms. Stephanie Miller
Role: Alleged Victim Race: White Age: 12 years
Ms. Stephanie Miller
Role: Alleged Victim Race: White Age: 17 years
129 Appendix D
Judge’s Charge to Members of the Jury
If you were a juror in a real case, the judge would give instructions to you. These are some judicial instructions to keep in mind when evaluating the case:
“This is a criminal case. [Darius Jones/Noah Baker] is charged with sexual battery. Ohio law allows sexual battery to be enforced as a statutory charge, meaning that the charge can be applied to cases in which the alleged victim is younger than the state’s legal age of consent, even if the alleged victim willingly engages in sexual relations with the defendant. The legal age of consent in Ohio is 16 years old.”
The definition of the elements of sexual battery according to the state laws in Ohio is one or more of the following acts:
(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: (1) The offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. (2) The offender knows that the other person's ability to appraise the nature of or control the other person's own conduct is substantially impaired. (3) The offender knows that the other person submits because the other person is unaware that the act is being committed. (4) The offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other person. (5) The offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or serving in a school for which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards pursuant to division (D) of section 3301.07 of the Revised Code, the other person is enrolled in or attends that school, and the offender is not enrolled in and does not attend that school. (6) The other person is a minor, the offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or serving in an institution of higher education, and the other person is enrolled in or attends that institution. (7) The other person is a minor, and the offender is the other person's athletic or other type of coach, is the other person's instructor, is the leader of a scouting troop of which the other person is a member, or is a
130 person with temporary or occasional disciplinary control over the other person.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of sexual battery. Except as otherwise provided in this division, sexual battery is a felony of the third degree. If the other person is less than thirteen years of age, sexual battery is a felony of the second degree, and the court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term equal to one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the second degree.
(C) As used in this section: (1) "Minor" means a person under the age of eighteen. (2) "Sexual conduct" means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
R.C. § 2907.01
It is your solemn responsibility to determine if the State, meaning the prosecution, has proven its accusation beyond a reasonable doubt against [Darius Jones/Noah Baker]. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence, or lack of evidence, and the law. Further, a defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. Do not consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not let it influence your decision in any way. Finally, it is your responsibility to decide what the facts of this case may be, and to apply the law to those facts.”
131 Appendix E
Juror Verdict Form
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHWESTERN DISTRICT OF OHIO LUCAS COUNTY DIVISION Criminal No. 01cr655
THE STATE OF OHIO
v.
MR. {Darius Jones/Noah Baker},
Defendant
JUROR VERDICT FORM
1. Concerning the charges of Sexual Battery ______,
I, Juror # 7 , find the defendant:
a) NOT GUILTY
b) GUILTY
132 Appendix F
Defendant Punishment Recommendations
1. I would recommend ____ years of imprisonment for the teacher.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Other: [open text box; options from 16 to 100 years]
2. The teacher should lose their teaching license because of this experience.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly strongly disagree agree
3. The teacher should be fired because of this experience.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly strongly disagree agree
4. Because the student did not object to what happened, the teacher should not be punished.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly strongly disagree agree
133 Appendix G
Defendant and Victim Culpability Ratings
1. How much do you think the teacher caused the sexual contact to occur? b
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
2. How responsible was the teacher for the contact? b
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
3. How responsible was the student for the contact? a
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
4. How much do you think the teacher wanted the sexual contact to occur? b
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
5. How much do you think the student wanted the sexual contact to occur? a
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
6. How much do you think the student caused the sexual contact to occur? a
1 2 3 4 5 Not at all A little A moderate amount A lot A great deal
Note. a = student culpability; b = teacher culpability
134 Appendix H
Case-Related Survey
Continuous Verdict Decision
1. Based on the evidence presented, I find the teacher______.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all very guilty guilty
Most Important Piece of Evidence
2. In the text box below, please report the most important piece of evidence you considered when deciding the verdict for this case: [Open Text Box]
Additional Questions
3. The student’s testimony is trustworthy. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
4. The student consented to the sexual contact. d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
5. The student’s testimony is credible. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
6. The student made up her allegation against the teacher. c (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
135 7. The student had the knowledge to make up her allegation against the teacher. c (R)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
8. The student is credible. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
9. The student’s testimony is believable. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
10. The student is trustworthy. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
11. The student is old enough to be sexually involved with whomever she chooses. d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
12. The student is mature enough to give her consent to sexual activities. d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
13. The student is believable. c
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Neither agree nor Strongly disagree disagree agree
Note. c = student credibility; d = student maturity
136 Appendix I
Racial Stereotype Scale
Directions. Below is a listing of adjectives people often use to describe others’ characteristics. For each word, consider whether or not the term describes the student in the case that you just read about. Rate each term on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 = not at all descriptive of the student to 6 = very much descriptive of the student to indicate how accurately the adjectives describe the student in the case. Please be as thoughtful and honest as you can; there are no right or wrong answers.
Very Not at all much descriptive descriptive of the of the Student Student Nice c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Manipulative a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Submissive c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Promiscuous a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sensual a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Competitive b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Loud b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Slutty a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Friendly c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Conservative c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Assertive b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Accommodating c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stubborn b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Prudent c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stimulating a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Quiet c 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Arousable a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Independent b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Outspoken b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sexually experienced a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sexually active a 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Angry b 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Note. a = Jezebel stereotype; b = Sapphire stereotype; c = Traditional femininity schemas
137 Appendix J
Manipulation & Attention Checks Survey
The three manipulation check questions are items 1, 4, and 5. The other questions are the attention checks. Bolded responses indicate the correct answer.
Directions: Please answer the following questions about the case you just read.
1. How old was the student? a. 9 years old b. 12 years old c. 15 years old d. 17 years old
2. How old did the student appear to be? [open text box]
3. What font (text) color was the story written in that you just read? a. Black b. Blue c. Red d. Brown
4. What was the defense attorney’s race? a. American Indian or Alaska Native b. Asian c. Black or African American d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander e. White f. Hispanic
5. What was the student’s race? a. American Indian or Alaska Native b. Asian c. Black or African American d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander e. White f. Hispanic
6. What was the student’s name? a. Sandy Byrd b. Aisha Jackson c. Jennifer Phillips d. Stephanie Miller
138
7. How old was the judge? a. 41 years old b. 31 years old c. 35 years old d. 50 years old
8. What was the teacher’s name? a. James Lopez b. Mark Singer c. Darius Jones d. Noah Baker
9. How old was the defendant? a. 45 years old b. 38 years old c. 30 years old d. 27 years old
10. What was the teacher’s race? a. American Indian or Alaska Native b. Asian c. Black or African American d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander e. White f. Hispanic
139 Appendix K
The Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975)
Directions: The following is a set of statements that deal with fairness in the world. Using the 6-point scale, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement. Please be as open and honest as you can; there are no right or wrong answers.
-3 = strongly disagree, -2 = disagree somewhat, -1 = slightly disagree, +1 = slightly agree, +2 = agree somewhat, +3 = strongly agree
1. I’ve found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he or she has. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 2. Basically, the world is a just place. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 3. People who get “lucky breaks” have usually earned their good fortune. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 6. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 7. People who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 8. The political candidate who sticks up for his or her principles rarely gets elected. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 9. It is rare for an innocent person to be wrongly sent to jail. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 10. In Professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 11. By and large, people deserve what they get. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 12. When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
140 14. Although evil people may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 15. In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 16. American parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 19. Crime doesn’t pay. -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3 20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own. (R) -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Note. R = reverse score items.
141 Appendix L
Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee & Browne,
2000)
Directions. The following is a set of questions that deal with social issues in the United States (U.S.). Using the 6-point scale, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement. Please be as open and honest as you can; there are no right or wrong answers.
1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree
1.____ Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich. 2. ____ Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of healthcare or daycare) that people receive in the U.S. (R) 3. ____ It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African American, Mexican American or Italian American. 4. ____ Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help create equality. (R) 5. ____ Racism is a major problem in the U.S. (R) 6. ____ Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not. (R) 7. ____ Racism may have been a problem in the past, but it is not an important problem today. 8. ____ Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as White people in the U.S. (R) 9. ____ White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color their skin. 10. ____ Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension. 11. ____ It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve society’s problems. (R) 12. ____ White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. (R)
142 13. ____ Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and adopt the values of the U.S. 14. ____ English should be the only official language in the U.S. 15. ____ White people are more to blame for racial discrimination in the U.S. than racial and ethnic minorities. (R) 16. ____ Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against White people. 17. ____ It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial and ethnic minorities. (R) 18. ____ Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 19. ____ Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 20. ____ Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison. (R)
Note. R = reverse scored items.
143 Appendix M
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Short Form (Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova,
2007)
Directions: Using the 7-point scale, please give your honest rating about the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement. Please be as open and honest as you can; there are no right or wrong answers.
1. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create useless doubts in people’s mind. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
2. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else. b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
3. It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom “to make their own rules” and to protest against things they don’t like. b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
4. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
5. People should pay less attention to the Church and/or the Pope, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
144 6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
7. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional family values.” b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
8. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
9. A lot of our rules regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow. b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
10. The fact on crime, sexual immorality and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers, if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
11. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.b (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
145 12. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest method would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
13. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
14. What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law and order. a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Undecided Strongly Disagree Agree
Note. a = authoritarian submission and aggression factor; b = conservatism factor; R = reverse code item. Higher scores indicate greater endorsement in authoritarianism views.
146 Appendix N
Demographic Survey
We would like to know a little more about the people who complete this study. The information you provide is completely anonymous and confidential.
Directions: Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
1. What is your age? [Text Box]
2. What is your race? a. American Indian or Alaska Native b. Asian c. Black or African American d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander e. White f. Hispanic
3. What is your sex? a. Female b. Male c. Other [Text Box]
4. What gender do you most identify with? a. Woman b. Man c. Other [Text Box]
5. Have you ever served as a jury member? a. Yes b. No
6. Are you a member of any of the following campaigns and/or use/endorse any of the following hashtags? a. It’s On Us b. Start by Believing c. Seek then Speak d. Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) e. Stop It Now f. National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC) g. ONE in FIVE
147 h. #MeToo i. #TimesUp j. #NoMoore, #NeverMoore, or #MeAt14 k. NO, I am not a member of any of these campaigns
7. Are you a parent? a. Yes b. No
8. What is the highest level of education you have attained? a. High school degree or less b. Associates degree or trade certificate c. College degree (B.A./B.S) d. Graduate degree (M.A./M.S./Ph.D./Psy.D) e. Law degree (J.D.) f. Medical degree (M.D.)
9. Please rate your political affiliation based on the scale below. 1 = extremely conservative, 2 = moderately conservative 3 = slightly conservative, 4 = neither conservative nor liberal 5 = slightly liberal, 6 = moderately liberal, 7 = extremely liberal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix O
Descriptive Analyses of Punishment Recommendations
Summary of Mean Punishment Recommendations as a function of Child Race, Child Age, and Defendant Race.
Defendant Race White Black White child Black child White child Black child Punishment 17 12 17 12 years 12 years 17 years 12 years 17 years M (SD) Judgment years years years Extended 21.50 25.00 25.00 27.00 sentencea - 25.00 50.00 - - (2.12) (5.00) (7.07) (9.47) (n = 9) Revoked 6.39 6.27 6.85 6.57 6.45 6.53 6.69 6.75 6.55 teaching license (1.46) (.65) (.38) (.60) (.89) (1.55) (.60) (.46) (.95) (n = 122) Job terminationb 6.61 6.55 6.92 6.81 6.50 6.47 6.81 6.75 6.67 (n = 122) (.70) (.57) (.28) (.40) (1.10) (1.55) (.40) (.46) (.81) No necessary 1.39 1.64 1.69 1.71 1.35 1.53 1.31 1.38 1.50 punishment (1.42) (.67) (1.65) (.96) (.81) (1.06) (.70) (.52) (1.04) (n = 122) Note. All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Dash marks indicate that no extended sentencing recommendation were rendered for specific case. aSignificant main effect of child age, F(1, 4) = 8.44, p = .004. bMarginally significant main effect of child race, F(1, 114) = 3.59, p = .061. No other main effects were significant (p > .05).
149 Appendix P
Descriptive Analyses of Racial Stereotype Scale Scores
Summary of Mean Racial Stereotype Scale Scores by Child Race
Racial M SD Mdn Range Skewness Kurtosis stereotype Jezebel Black child 14.36 10.34 14.50 0 – 39 .17 -.93 White child 13.29 11.20 11.00 0 – 45 .48 -.75 Total 13.84 10.77 13.00 0 – 45 .33 -.85 Sapphire Black child 17.37 7.86 18.50 0 – 37 -.14 -.55 White child 17.60 8.38 18.00 0 – 42 .11 -.23 Total 17.48 8.11 18.00 0 – 42 -.001 -.37 Traditional Black child 20.45 6.62 21.00 0 – 38 -.17 .69 White child 20.36 6.72 21.00 4 – 38 .08 .19 Total 20.41 6.66 21.00 0 – 38 -.04 .40 Note. N = 261. Item scale poles ranged from 0 = not at all descriptive of the student to 6 = very descriptive of the student. Cronbach’s alpha for Jezebel = .91. Cronbach’s alpha for Sapphire = .82. Cronbach’s alpha for Traditional = 72. No main effects of child race were significant (p > .05).
150