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The Criminal Law of South Carolina Sixth Edition

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The Criminal Law of South Carolina Sixth Edition The Criminal Law of South Carolina Sixth Edition Table of Contents Chapter I General Principles of Criminal Law Introduction . 1 A. Mental State . 1 1. Alternative Approaches to Mental State . 1 a. Specific Intent and General Intent . 1 b. The Hierarchical Approach: Purpose, Knowledge, Recklessness, Negligence, and Strict Liability . 2 2. How to Determine What Mental State Is Required. 4 3. Particular Types of Mental States . 5 a. Purposeful or Intentional Conduct . 5 b. Willfulness . 9 c. Knowledge . 10 d. Unintentional Conduct: Recklessness or Criminal Negligence and Simple Negligence . 12 4. Strict and Vicarious Liability . 15 a. Strict Liability Offenses . 15 b. Vicarious Liability . 17 5. Problems of Disparity Between Mental State and Consequences of Act; “Transferred Intent” . 18 a. Unintended Victim . 18 b. Intended Victim, Unintended Degree of Harm . 20 c. Unintended Type of Harm . 20 B. The Act . 22 1. Voluntary Nature of the Act; Omissions; the Act of Possession . 22 a. Voluntary Nature of the Act . 22 b. Omissions . 23 i Table of Contents c. The Act of Possession . 24 2. Related Acts and Multiple Charges . 27 C. Classification of Offenses . ...30 1. Felonies and Misdemeanors . ....30 a. Felonies Distinguished from Misdemeanors . .30 b. Distinctions Between Felonies and Misdemeanors . 33 2. Common Law and Statutory Offenses . 37 3. Lesser Included Offenses . 41 a. Basic Rules . 41 b. Other Representative Greater and Lesser Included Offenses . 47 4. Moral Turpitude . 49 5. Violent Crime . 53 6. No Parole Offenses . 57 7. “Most Serious Offenses” and “Serious Offenses” . 57 D. Burden of Proof and Presumptions . 62 1. Burden of Proof . 62 a. The State’s Burden and the Presumption of Innocence . .. 62 b. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt . 63 c. Reasonable Doubt and Individual Elements of an Offense . 66 d. Affirmative Defenses . 67 e. Statutory Exemptions or Exceptions . 68 f. Validity of Prior Convictions Used to Enhance Punishment . 69 2. Presumptions . 70 a. The Basic Rules . 70 b. Harmless Error . 76 E. Jurisdiction . 78 1. Basic Rules . 78 a. Geographic Concerns . 78 b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Jurisdiction . 79 c. Sufficiency of the Indictment . 82 2. The State Grand Jury . 83 Chapter II Offenses Against the Person A. Homicide . 85 1. Basic Issues . 85 a. Types of Homicides and Definitions . 85 b. Corpus Delicti . 88 c. Human Being . 89 ii Table of Contents d. Causation . 90 e. Venue and Jurisdiction . 95 2. Murder and Attempted Murder . .96 a. Basic Elements of Murder . 96 b. Related and Lesser Included Offenses . 98 c. Malice Aforethought . 101 d. Felony Murder . 117 e. Capital Murder . 124 3. Voluntary Manslaughter . 199 a. Definition, Rationale, and Relation to Murder . 199 b. The Focus of Manslaughter: Heat of Passion on Adequate Provocation . 203 4. Involuntary Manslaughter, Reckless Homicide, and Felony DUI. 218 a. Alternative Offenses Concerning Involuntary Homicides . 218 b. An Important Historical Digression: State v. Barnett and the Traditional Definition of Negligence in Involuntary Manslaughter . 220 c. Current State of the Law . 221 5. Lynching / Assault and Battery by Mob . 230 6. Homicide by Child Abuse . 232 B. Assault and Battery . 236 1. The Statutory and Common Law Crimes . 236 2. Common Law Assault and Battery . 240 a. Intentional Creation of Apprehension of Bodily Harm . 241 b. Attempted Battery Type Assaults . 241 c. Mens Rea . 242 d. The Act . 243 e. Relationship to Other Offenses . 245 3. Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature and Other Degrees of Assault and Battery . ..
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