A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

No.5 • November 25, 1982 : What Kind of Change? by William J. Foltz

Discussion of the prospects for "meaningful" or just installed. Thanks in large part to the electoral "significant" change in South Africa has engaged success of 1948, his ethnic community has now pro­ Marxist, liberal, and conservative scholars for years. duced a substantial entrepreneurial and managerial Like other participants in this perennial debate, I have class which has challenged the English-speaking com­ tripped over my own predictions often enough to have munity for control over the economy and which is bruised my hubris. I am afraid that I must disappoint now busy integrating itself with that community. In anyone who wants a firm schedule and route map as 1948 the income ratio between Afrikaners and English to where South Africa goes from here. This does not was 1:2, it is now about 1:1.3, and in urban areas it imply that important changes are not taking place in is nearly 1:1. South Africa. Indeed, some of the changes that have The African population has also changed substan­ occurred or become apparent in the last seven years tially. Despite the fictions of grand , more have been momentous, and at the least they allow us than half the African population lives in "white" areas, to exclude some possibilities for the future. There are, and by the end of the century 60 percent of the total however, simply too many uncontrolled variables in African population is expected to be urban. While the South African equation to permit anyone whose African education and income have been scandalously vision is not armed with perfect faith to predict the repressed, both are increasing at a greater rate than future with any degree of confidence. is true for the white community. South African plan­ The past year has been a momentous one in South ning is now based on the assumption that by the end Africa, marked in particular by the open split within of the 1980s the majority of those completing secon­ the political ranks of Afrikanerdom and the formal an­ dary school will be Africans. nouncement of plans to give Coloureds and Indians These demographic changes reflect and influence some representation in government. In political terms, the evolution of the South African economy. The the government has progressed almost to the stage it economy has moved through classic stages from one had reached prior to 1948. But this shift is based on based predominantly on farming, to mining, to labor­ a cumulation of social and economic trends that make intensive manufacturing, to one which is now increas­ South African society today very different from what it ingly capital-intensive. The leading sectors of the was in 1948 when the National Party first came to South African economy, including the most recently power. developed mining operations, are capital-intensive and The demographic changes are perhaps most impor­ thus require a skilled labor force. The demographic tant. Since 1948 the white population has declined changes dictate that this labor force be increasingly from almost one-quarter of the total to about 15 per­ black, and that much of black labor be permanently cent, and it likely will account for no more than 12 and stably settled, educated, and organized. This does percent by the end of the century. The white popula­ not require, it must be noted, that all, or even the tion has also undergone major qualitative changes majority, of blacks be included in this advanced sector which have most greatly affected its Afrikaans­ of the labor force, only that much of that sector be speaking portion. The modal Afrikaner is no longer a black. Thus the black homelands need no longer func­ bible-toting, ill-educated boer; he is a middle-class tion to provide a reserve army of the unemployed to civil servant living in a suburban split-level home, hold down wage rates in unskilled occupations; whose most immediate worries concern balancing in­ rather, they are becoming dumping grounds for un­ stallment payments on his color television, his new skilled surplus labor no longer needed by the domi­ car, and the electronic burglar alarm system he has nant economy. Blacks have another key role to play

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in the .emerging South African economy. They are creased pressures on South Africa, Vorster and par­ consumers of the goods that economy produces, and ticularly Botha have worked to construct a modern the importance of that market is attested to by the state apparatus. Although that apparatus is riven with vigor with which its tastes are being prospected by the same cleavages that affect the white electorate South African industry and market research and is less responsive to government initiative than organizations. many would wish, there can be little doubt that its ab­ The last few years have seen a new relationship solute level of power has increased. Nevertheless, develop between government and private industry. given the external and internal challenges the South Although South African big business remains to the African system faces, the ability of the government to left of government on racial issues, the old an­ do much with that power is probably decreasing. tagonism between the English/ Jewish-dominated private sector and the Afrikaner-dominated public sec­ Black Politics tor has been greatly attenuated. Government and in­ In at least one sense, African politics in South Africa dustry see themselves, somewhat reluctantly, as part­ has also returned to the status quo ante 1948: The ners in a joint task of technocratic modernization of African National Congress (ANC) has been reestab­ the country. In this partnership, industry sometimes lished as the leading organization providing symbolic takes on quasi-governmental functions (the Urban expression of black aspirations. Recent opinion polls Foundation, for example), while government has confirm the casual impression that the ANC has reciprocated in selling off parts of the large state­ substantially increased its audience at the expense of owned industrial sector to private industry. the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Inkatha, AZAPO, Political change in the southern Africa region-the and various forms of Black Consciousness. Various re­ coming to power of black governments in the cent polls show that the imprisoned neighborhood-is another underlying trend affecting remains the most frequent choice of the urban African change in South Africa. The most immediate effect of population as the leader who comes closest to this change was economic: it ended the "Outward representing people's aspirations. Even aside from the Policy" of the early Vorster years, which looked for imprecision and transitory nature of opinions ex­ the rapid expansion of markets in Africa for fairly un­ pressed to pollsters, this endorsement should be sophisticated South African manufactures which viewed with caution. Mandela has become a mythical might have allowed South Africa to continue to rely figure during his years on ~hose under­ on an unskilled and miserably paid work force of standable popularity (like that of Kenya's Jomo migrant blacks. The political effects are no less impor­ Kenyatta in the 1950s) is aided by his inability to do tant. The shock of Robert Mugabe's electoral victory anything that might put it to the test. in Zimbabwe in 1980 still reverberates through white Nor does this popularity necessarily rub off on lead­ opinion and unquestionably has raised black spirits ers of the exile wing of the ANC. There is little evi­ and confidence within the Republic. In the short run, dence that formal ANC ideology plays a major role in Mugabe's victory has strengthened the South African that organization's appeal, although its emphatic op­ government's intransigence and undercut its will­ position to the country's division into ethnic home­ ingness to compromise in Namibia and to negotiate lands has widespread support. Rather, the ANC's openly with potentially cooperative black leaders such popularity appears to rest principally on its role of sys­ as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Dr. Nthato Motlana. tematically rejecting the South African system and on The white population has furthermore been the symbolic importance of its sabotage and augmented by the addition of highly conservative, but assassination campaign as tangible evidence of that non-Afrikaner, immigrants from Mozambique, Angola, rejection. The ANC's campaign of selective violence is and Zimbabwe who will be joining the electorate in an important recruiting and morale-boosting device. significant numbers over the next few years. Although ANC acts of violence have steadily in­ The augmented sense of threat and isolation, ritual­ creased over the last three years, they have not yet ized in the slogan "Total Onslaught," has assisted reached the point where large numbers of blacks are (and been promoted by) the rise of the military to a obliged to pay a price for them in police repression. key position of influence in the government. The ac­ When that occurs, the ANC's popularity will be put to cession of P. W. Both a to the Prime Ministership has a new test, a test the government seems to want to brought General Malan's military to replace H.J. van avoid. den Bergh's Bureau of State Security as the principal Trade unions represent the most dynamic sector of adjunct to state power, if not the power behind the African organization within South Africa and are a throne. The military's influence within the government direct response to the changing nature and needs of complements the increased influence within the Prime the South African economy, and to African initiative Minister's office of comparatively young and well­ as expressed notably in the Durban strikes of 1973. educated technocrats, mostly Afrikaners, whose loyal­ As yet, the trade union movement includes some ty is to the state rather than to any particular 10-12 percent of the non-agricultural African labor ideological or ethnic identity, and who deal on easy force, but it speaks for many more. It is not an in­ and equal terms with their counterparts in the private tegrated movement-far from it-and individual sector. unions' relationship with political movements like the As a result of these long-term trends and of the in- ANC varies from clandestine cooperation to overt ...... 3

hostility. Despite their highly decentralized and fledgl­ White Politics ing nature, the trade unions represent the only formal, In 1982 the South African government faced two ma­ legal, and above-ground demand organizations for jor substantive decisions-internal constitutional re­ blacks with which the state and private industry must ordering with a limited political role for Coloureds and contend. For their own thoroughly capitalist purposes, Indians, and acquiescence in a Namibia settle­ the most dynamic sectors of industry have welcomed ment-and faced them in dispersed array. The May and even fostered the growth of unions, in some cases 1981 elections resulted in a comparatively poor show­ forcing government's hand; even the mining industry ing for the ruling National Party, which suffered seems likely to accept black unionization. The state significant disaffection from Afrikaner voters to the apparatus is badly divided on how to treat unions (and right, especially in the , and some loss to frequently enough treats them with brutal stupidity), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) on the left. but the economic and international costs of general­ Overall electoral participation continued its decline ized repression would now be such that the govern­ from 80 percent 15 years ago to 65 percent. The for­ ment would be unlikely to undertake such a policy in mal split came in February 1982 over the symbolic the absence of a major crisis. issue of "healthy power-sharing" with Coloureds and The trade union movement lias concentrated on Indians, in effect the implementation of decisions trade-union issues narrowly defined; these are ex­ taken by the National Party back in 1977. Although tended at most (as in the Eastern Cape) to include P. W. Botha retained leadership of the party and freed some -focai .issues of community. organizafion. Neither himself from having to face the verkrampte carping of from the trade unions nor from any other base has Andries Treurnicht in the parliamentary caucus, he any clear leader or group of leaders emerged to speak won out only thar:tks to the support of the conservative confidently in the name of a broad cross-section of Transvaal "centrists" led by F.W. de Klerk-not a black opinion. Gatsha Buthelezi may corrie closest to group likely to approve bold new reforms. this, but it is increasingly apparent that his support The name of the new right-wing opposition party rests on and is limited by his control over kwaZulu. tells us much about the new face of white South The government has gone out of its way to undercut African politics. It is the "Conservative Party," a name his attempts to appeal to a wider constituency and which contains no ethnic overtones. It appeals to con­ may yet succeed in destroying his base in his home servative English-speaking voters (especially in Natal), territory. Other leaders attain prominence as spokes­ to the new immigrants, and above all to the lower men for particular grievances (the Committee of Ten, and middle-level Afrikaner civil servants in their for example), but they are captives of these grievances suburban split-levels. It projects an image of stolid and lack the political resources to shape and mobilize social respectability and leaves to the Herstigte Na­ opinion and to create loyal followings. In short, they sionale Party (HNP) the vulgar racial appeals to the cannot really lead, nor are they able to form more Afrikaner and Portuguese working class. This division than transitory, tactical alliances with other "leaders." of clientele, as much as leadership rivalry, has kept This leadership vacuum does not completely re­ the right-wing opposition from merging, or even dound to the benefit of a government seeking some developing an electoral non-aggression pact. The form of stable accommodation with blacks. The South political divisions have seriously affected Afrikanerdom African government has clearly lost whatever and have repercussions through most of the parallel ideological or psychological hegemony it may once cultural, religious, and professional organizations, in­ have had over blacks. At best it can coerce a sullen cluding the press and the . compliance. To get more, it will have to risk allowing With the National Party itself divided into several real leaders to emerge and to depioy real political ideological (or at least programmatic) factions, and resources. This is a step which the government is still with Afrikaner intellectuals now leading the PFP, far from willing to contemplate seriously. ethnic unity appears to be a thing of the past. Formal government policy toward Africans has The National Party's poor showing in the August undergone very little change in its broadest outlines. 1982 by-election appears to have convinced Botha P.W. Botha appears to be still bent on implementing that he could take on only one contentious decision. grand apartheid under the guise of the Constellation Unfortunately, he chose to proceed with domestic of Southern African States (hence the pressures on "power-sharing" and to put Namibia on the shelf. I Swaziland and Lesotho and the preference for an in­ say unfortunately, because there is very much less ternal settlement in Namibia), with a more limited here than meets Dr. Treurnicht's eye. It is not at all Confederation of (white) South Africa and the clear that the Coloureds, at least, will support the homelands as a fallback. Domestically, the govern­ proposal or for very long back up any leader who ment hopes to create a reasonably stable, basically does. It does seem very clear, however, that fairly lit­ urban African work force led by a collaborating mid­ tle real power will be shared under the new "dispensa­ dle class (hence the "Orderly Movement and Settle­ tion" and that the framework is not one that can ment of Black Persons" bill). But government action practically be extended some day to include Africans. and resources, both for coercion and inducement, are More important than the power-sharing provision is incommensurate with the aims. Hence the overall the power-concentrating effect of the proposal, which paralysis of political initiative toward Africans that would create an executive largely independent of has afflicted South African governments since the parliament and capable of ruling through an increas­ uprisings in 1976. ingly centralized state apparatus. It is this latter aspect4~------~ of the proposal which has aroused greatest persons in government circles see the problem in concern within the professional ranks of the. National those terms, they are politically hamstrung by the Party, and it is not yet clear that Botha and his workings of South Africa's peculiar white democratic technocratic senior civil servants, supported in this by system and by deep divisions within the state ap­ much of the business community, will end up having paratus. If the South African political system has not their way. yet enthusiastically co-opted a Buthelezi, a Motlana, a The factionalism in the Afrikaner community returns Percy Qoboza, it has little hope of co-opting black Afrikaner politics to its normal state prior to 1948. It leaders of the future, whatever constitutional rear­ is in large part a consequence, however, of the great rangements it may produce. success of 1948, which allowed Afrikaners to use the The policies of the great powers will play a role in state to promote members of their community to lead­ South Africa's future, but they seem likely to play that ing positions throughout South African society, par­ role largely by default. In the absence of dramatic ticularly in business. The Afrikaner community is now regional events, the United States and the other riven with the class, institutional, and intellectual divi­ Western nations will continue to deal with South sions that are the normal lot of mankind in industrial Africa at arm's length, but deal with it nonetheless. society. Rather than coming together under pressure The emergence of any internal, strong black leader­ from their own black population and a largely hostile ship would evoke a positive response in Washington, world, the Afrikaners are fragmenting, with each but in the absence of such leadership U.S. policy in­ group seeking its own vision of security and im­ novations will mostly continue to come as a reaction mediate self-interest. to violent episodes within South Africa. The Soviet Union's principal role for the moment seems to be "Violent Evolution" that of useful support for the South African regime's Where does all this leave the prospects of change? "total onslaught" ideology. (Just as South Africa pro­ First, we can say with some confidence that South vides helpful support for Moscow's policy in the rest of Africa is not on the verge of imminent revolution. The Africa.) Although the Soviet Union will certainly con­ government's repressive apparatus is too effective; the tinue to aid the ANC's political and military efforts, it military has too much sway over neighboring states; shows no sign of willingness to risk any direct involve­ the divisions within the white population do not yet ment in the struggle or to use its own production of seriously undermine the consensus on the necessity for gold and other minerals to bring pressure on the white political domination; and above all the black South African economy. In the absence of more population lacks access to the resources that might positive external involvement, the most important permit effective leadership to arise. Black grievances sources of change will be internal to South Africa. are such that the country may be in a "pre-revolu­ Change in South Africa will most likely continue to tionary situation," but it has been there for a long occur in a discontinuous, sometimes violent, manner, while. which will satisfy few. Initially at least, interactions Increasingly, South Africa is becoming what many between trade unions, industry, and the government Marxist writers have wrongly claimed it has been all will be keys to the pattern of change. They are most along- a system of rule by big business in alliance likely to proceed (and in the process to increase the with the military and state sector technocrats. This status and material welfare of many blacks) according development has produced new cleavages in the white to what former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa population and will increasingly shift the ideological William Edmondson has aptly called "violent evolu­ basis for repressive rule from crass racism to a ra­ tion." Over the next several years South Africa will tionale based on technocratic efficiency. This will per­ change further, as the effects of underlying social, mit many of the daily humiliations of petty apartheid economic, and regional trends continue to work to fall by the wayside but will not seriously undermine themselves out. These in time will force a divided the willingness of whites to defend their privileges. white population and the government into new at­ Although class divisions within white society are tempts at political accommodation with the black ma­ becoming increasingly important politically, South jority. Nothing in the present situation suggests that Africa is far from providing conditions for a classic those attempts will succeed until black leaders acquire class struggle. Race is much too powerful a cross­ the resources for independent political organization cutting cleavage in South Africa, not because it and action. When they do, the pattern of accommoda­ evokes primordial prejudices, but because for whites, tion that emerges will likely bear little relation to and many Coloureds and Indians, it is linked to real anyone's current projections. material interests. William J. Foltz is Professor of Political Science and If blacks lack the resources to force revolutionary Chairman of the Council on African Studies at Yale change, the white government lacks the power, the vi­ University, and Associate Director of the Yale-Wesleyan Southern Africa Research Project. During 1978-80, he sion, and the will to do what would be necessary to was a Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Project bring about peaceful progress. Minimum requirements at the Council on Foreign Relations. Professor Foltz has for such progress would include drastic modifications written widely on African domestic and international in the homeland system, including very large eco­ politics and on ethnic conflict. His recent research has nomic transfers to build up the black rural economy, concentrated on conflict in southern Africa and its ef­ and above all allowing a black middle class to develop fect on the rest of the continent and on the policies of independent political resources. Even though a few the great powers.