Sudan ISSUE BRIEF Human Security Baseline Assessment Number 2 Small Arms Survey, Geneva October 2006 Armed groups in Sudan The South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration Almost a year has passed since the Juba Declaration1 formally merged the Sudan People’s Liberation Army The CPA stipulates that no (SPLA) and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), armed groups allied to either an umbrella of government-aligned armed groups. As the SPLA or the SAF shall part of the HSBA’s ongoing review of Sudan’s numerous armed groups,2 this Issue Brief examines the role played be allowed to operate. by the SSDF in Sudan’s intra-South conflicts, highlight- ing its origins, leadership, areas of operation, and recent change of fortune. In examining the extent to which the While the Juba Declaration is almost as significant as security threat posed by its members has been neutral- the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)3 in terms of ized, it asks a number of key questions: ensuring South Sudan’s security, a variety of structural and logistical roadblocks to its implementation remain. • Has the SSDF been fully integrated into the The agreement has successfully eroded Khartoum’s ca- SPLA? pacity to draw on alternative forces of armed southern- • What are the obstacles hindering a meaningful ers to challenge the SPLA militarily, but a small number reconciliation process? of SSDF commanders who have rejected the Juba Decla- • Why are some SSDF factions continuing to align ration are continuing to generate insecurity in the South, themselves with Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces particularly in greater Upper Nile. (SAF)? Understanding the dynamics and structures of the • What threats do armed groups pose to peace in SSDF and its relationship with the SPLA and the SAF is the South? critical for successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and violence reduction in the South.4 The context Conflict in South Sudan occurs on two axes: North–South and intra- South. The North–South conflict for- mally ended with the CPA on 9 January 2005. The CPA was signed by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A5 and signaled a historic compromise: the government in Khartoum was guaranteed Sharia law in the North while the South gained the right to self-determination after an in- terim period of six years. With its SPLA soldiers mourn during the funeral of former Sudanese vice-president and SPLA rebel leader provisions for a permanent inter- John Garang in Juba, August 2005. © Morten Hvaal/WPN nationally monitored ceasefire, Other Armed Groups in South Sudan: main areas of operation as of September 2006 SOUTH el-Renk el-Damazin SOUTH WEST KORDOFAN DARFUR KORDOFAN BLUE Kadugli NILE Melut Maban Pariang Akoka Abyei Tonga Malakal UPPER Bentiu NILE NORTHERN Mayom Adong Longchuk BAHR EL- War-awar Kaldak/ GHAZAL Maluaikon Wankai Nhialdiu Doleib Hill Nasser Gogrial Raja Aweil UNITY WARAB Adok Ayod Waat ETHIOPIA WESTERN Warrap Akobo BAHR EL- Wau GHAZAL JONGLEI Pochalla CENTRAL Rumbek AFRICAN LAKES Yirol Pibor REPUBLIC Bor Boma Tambura Terakeka Mundri WESTERN EASTERN Ezo EQUATORIA Juba Lafon EQUATORIA Yambio Ibba Maridi Kapoeta BAHR Chukudum Yei Torit Kajo-Kaji Nimule KENYA EGYPT LIBYA UGANDA South Sudan region Group/faction reportedly aligned Khartoum International boundary CHAD with SPLA State boundary with SAF Capital city State capital 0 km 200 Town S o u t h ETHIOPIA CAR S u d a n R e g i o n DRC UGANDA KENYA power-sharing and access to oil wealth, the separation operating in the South were excluded from the negotiat- of religion and state, autonomy and a separate army, the ing process—cementing Garang’s power base as well as CPA responded to key southern grievances. that of his movement. Meanwhile, intra-South conflicts continued to fester An index of the discontent was the increased vio- and present threats to South Sudan’s overall security en- lence between the SPLA and the SSDF during the peace www.smallarmssurvey.org » sudan www.smallarmssurvey.org vironment. Despite its name, the CPA is not truly com- negotiations. This exclusionary approach was grafted prehensive. The deal was in fact a carefully crafted agree- into the CPA, which stipulates that no armed groups al- Page ment between two dominant military élites. While the lied to either the SPLA or the SAF shall be allowed to 2 SPLM/A controls most of South Sudan, other militias operate.6 Box 1 Defining armed groups In 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement formalized the alliance between the northern government and the Defining the characteristics of organized armed groups is groups that henceforth became known as the SSDF. The surprisingly difficult. Several definitions exclude govern- agreement included a commitment to a vote on southern ment-aligned forces, or paramilitary entities. The con- self-determination but, crucially, failed to specify when ventional definition of an armed group as an actor that ‘is it would take place. armed and uses force to achieve its objectives and is not In response to the government’s failure to observe under state control’7 or simply as a ‘non-state actor’8 does key provisions of the agreement, Riek Machar broke not easily apply to Sudan. away. He formally rejoined the SPLA in January 2002, The HSBA favours the broad definition put forward though most of his troops stayed behind with the SSDF. by Pablo Policzer (2005), which incorporates groups with Meanwhile, in April 2001 Gatlauk Deng, the chairman defined links to, or receiving support from, the state. He of Khartoum’s Southern Coordinating Council, had defines these as ‘challengers to the state’s monopoly of le- gitimate coercive force’. This wider definition facilitates an arranged a meeting in Juba that brought together the analysis of the varied relationships between armed groups Equatoria-based militias and the government-aligned and the state, which are often fluid and rapidly chang- liberation movements to bolster SSDF strength. ing. This was particularly true in both Sudanese civil wars (1956–72, 1983–2005), in which individuals and groups routinely changed their allegiances. Leadership and organization Maj.-Gen. Paulino Matieb, a Bul Nuer from Unity State, The SSDF represents the foremost of the excluded was appointed chief of staff of the SSDF in 2001 and held armed entities, referred to as Other Armed Groups this position until the Juba Declaration of January 2006. (OAGs) in the text of the CPA. Estimated to number But Paulino’s position and those of his high command between 10,000 and 30,000 fighters at the time of the were considered largely symbolic. agreement,9 the SSDF comprised more than 30 mili- In fact, real power was held by the SAF’s Military In- tias that were aligned with the government. The SSDF telligence (MI) and exercised through local-level SSDF not only threatened to undermine the authority of the commanders. These included Peter Dor in Western Up- SPLM/A and the legitimacy of the CPA, but also se- per Nile, Gordon Kong in Eastern Upper Nile, Gabriel verely disrupted civilian livelihoods in many parts of Tangyangi and Thomas Maboir in Central Upper Nile, the South. Benson Kwany in the Doleib Hill area, and Chayout in The situation changed dramatically in early 2006. Longochok, together with Ismael Konye from the Mur- After John Garang’s unexpected death in July 2005, his le, Kelement Wani from the Mundari, Martin Kenyi in successor Salva Kiir negotiated the Juba Declaration in Eastern Equatoria, Abdel Bagi from the Dinka of north- January 2006, which called for the immediate integra- ern Bahr El Ghazal, and Atom Al-Nour, who led the Fer- tion of the SSDF into the SPLA. Most, though not all, tit militia. SSDF members have since aligned themselves with the Although the SSDF and the SAF were aligned in op- SPLA. But the small number who remain aligned with posing the SPLA, the relationship was far from robust. Khartoum (so-called ‘rump’ forces) present a linger- The SSDF’s considerable military capacity, support for ing threat to broader efforts to disarm, demobilize, and southern independence, and intense dislike of its north- reintegrate former combatants and to civilian security ern patrons represented a constant threat to the gov- more generally. ernment. To minimize these threats, MI kept the SSDF under close scrutiny and control, and worked to ensure Origins of the SSDF that it did not develop a strong leadership. By deliber- ately encouraging ambitious or dissenting local-level The SSDF derives its origins from two main sources: commanders to challenge their superiors or establish » sudan www.smallarmssurvey.org first, local tribally based armed groups that arose to breakaway components, MI was effective in keeping the protect their communities from the SPLA, and second, SSDF vertically weak. from the forces that followed senior members Riek Ma- The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was char and Lam Akol out of the SPLA when they split with maintained by providing resources and status to SSDF its leader John Garang in 1991. The first group was made commanders and playing the ‘ethnic card’. By providing up mostly of militias from Equatoria with no developed high-ranking positions and cash payouts to senior com- political programme, while the second group sought manders while simultaneously drawing on popular prej- southern self-determination against Garang’s commit- udices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group ment to a united ‘New Sudan’. Both components gained (the SSDF was primarily a Nuer organization),11 Khar- the support of the SAF, which saw them as important toum assured itself control. As the SSDF leaders became instruments to weaken the southern insurrection.