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Royal United Services Institution. Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19 The Rumanian Campaign, 1916–17 Major T. E. Compton Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Major T. E. Compton (1918) The Rumanian Campaign, 1916–17, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 63:451, 418-437, DOI: 10.1080/03071841809421873 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071841809421873

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TO tlie Entente peoples of tlie \Vest of Europe, and indeed to all licr well-uGliers, the result of tlie intervention of Runiania in tlic vast conflict between Right and Alight was profoundly disappointing. Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015

h'.'cu. The (hick blurh fi/w-niurk.sbie limit of thc artwiicz of (At- Roumanimt I&Zl Armic-s nmtiwirds in iTwfsjfIwtiu.

IIer entry into tlic war was one of the great events of the year ~glG, and following on the successes of tlie Sonirne, Verdun, Goritzn, and in Galicia, seemed to even well-informed opinion to be tlie heginning of the final stage of the struggle leading to victory. IIIEI:UN.\SI.\S c.\>II’.\IGS, I~IG-I7 419 In all the capitals there was but one opinion, visibly espressed 1)y rejoicing in Idondon, Roilit‘, Paris, and by corresponding depres- sio~iin \’ienna, Hudapvst, and 13erlin. I\/lasimilian IJarden wrote in the Zukziujt (since suppressed): “ It is no use pretending not to see tlie gravity of the situation for Germans, Austrians, 1 Tunprians, 13uIgarians, and Turlts. It is the fight for our existence that is being played, and the play may end in tragedy. If the enemy can have his way, Bulgaria will be crushed, Hungary dismenibered, Greece gained over, Turkey isolated, and Germany hunted down like a dangerous wild beast.” It is even now somewhat of an enigma why the Rumanian offensive i~asso feeble and tlie defence of the greater part of her territory and capital so futile, not~ithstanding tlie undoubted gdlantry of the Rumanian troops. TVhat were the Rhssians about to allow their allies to be crushed in this fashion? ?’hey would seem to have been quite satisfied n-ith the estension of their front to the Dlacii Sea, by tlie line of the Sereth to the nioutli of the Danube. In the following pages it will be described how the unfortunate Rumanians were twice betrayed : once by Imperial Russia, at the opening of the campaign, for mliich a reason is suggested, and again by Revolutionary I< ussia, when the Rumanian Army, reorganized and well-equipped and commanded, was in the full tide of victory, with every hope of recovering at least a large tract of the conquered territory. For tlie details of the campaign I am indebted to a series of articles in LE Corrcspoizdnnt, by M. Charles Stihon, entitled I’ Lc A1lysli.rc Rozmaiit.” The Ilunianians claim to be tlie descendants of the Romans; that is to say, of the Latin emigrants and Roman citizens who colonized ancient Dacia, after the Emperor Trajan’s conquest of that country- now Iinoivn as TVallachia and AIoldavia (Rumania), Transylvania and Bessarabia-in the year ro; of our era. The Dacians, of whom Horace (sonic 135 years earlier) wrote: “ TE Daczts asPcr,”1 and who for two centuries had been a constant source of trouble and anxiety to Rome, were finally driven across the Danube by ;\Iarcns ,Crassus in two campaigns (ayaS R.c.), and the whole of their territory south of that river conquered and annesed to the Empire. This action was consequent on the attitude of the Dacians during the war with Antony, when a Dacian invasion of Italy was a continual dread, and Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 only internal dissensions appear to have prevented it. After 1Marcu.s Crassus’ victory over the Dacians, under their King Cotiso, the Danube I~ecaniethe Roman frontier and a Roman river practically along its whole course.2 ‘‘ Noit pi profiiiidtm Ilnrizibiiint bibtiiil Edicln rziiiipent Idin . . . .w3 Hut this did not stop the Dacians from making frequent incur- sions into Roman territory on the right hank, which is now Rulgaria, and at last Trajan, \vho in military skill and in imagination was the

1 Odcs J., SXXV. 2Celebrnted-by IIorncc in Odes III., viii. 3 Odes IV., SV. 420 THE RUMANIAN CAJIP.\IGN, 1916-17 most worthy successor of Julius and Augustus that lhad as yet occupied the throne of the Czsars, determined to make an end, once and for all, of Dacian aggression. He conquered and occupied the country, and proceeded to deal with it much as Cromwell did, after him, with the North of Ireland. From Italy, Greece, Illyria, Spain, and probably Gaul, and from other parts of the Empire, colonists were brought to occupy and exploit this new fertile territory. -4s for the Dacians, most of them who were not slaughtered or carried away into slavery, retreated northwards, and if nothing had happened to interfere with the peaceful development of this prosperous colony until the inrush of the Magyars in the year p, there would be no doubt whatever that the modern Rumanian was a descendant of the Roman. But this Roman colony only lasted 167 years. In the reign of the Emperor Aurelian, owing to attacks from the north in the year 274, it was decided to make the Danube again the frontier. The Roman troops and civil functionaries crossed to the right bank, and the country was left without any official administration or protection. hlagyar and German historians argue from this event that there was no Rumanian population in the lands that were once ancient Dacia, when in Sgj or cpo the Hungarians made their appearance from the steppes of Asia. They cite in their favour the Latin historians, Eutropius and Flavius Vopiscus, that Dacia-Trajana was completely abandoned by all the Daco-Roman population, and was desert at the time of the hlagyar invasion in Sgj. ?’lie Magyar argument is that the large Rumanian population now to be found in these lands is due to an emigration from the right bank of the Danube in the Middle Ages. This assertion, if it were true, would not malie the Rumanians less the descendants of Roman cifizens, but it ~vouldseriously affect their claim to be the original owners of Transylvania and Bukovina, where onerous language laws prevent the Rumanian majority from esercising anything like its full share in local administration, AIagFir being the official language in Rumanian-speaking provinces. The authors of two books on Rumania, recently published in Paris, are full of this grievance and its incidence, and h1. Comnene,l in his discussion on the Rumanian origin, is conclusive in his refuta- tion of the hlagyar-German argument. There is no trace of any evidence for an emigration from south of the Danube in the hliddle Ages, whereas for a large residue of the poorer people having remained Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 in Dacia-Trajana after it mas abandoned by the official and (possibly) richer classes in A.D. 274, he quotes, among many other authorities, the monk, Nestor, of the 11th century, and the anonymous chronicler of King Bella IV., of Hungary, who, in his history of the establish- ment of the Magyars in Transylvania, relates, with many details, the struggles of the Hungarians with the Rumanian dukes of that country. hloreover, rivers, mountains, and towns in the lands that were once Dacia-Trajana have preserved their Roman names. How is it possible to explain this marvellous coincidence, if, according to the Magyar theory, ancient Dacia remained completely deserted by the Daco-

f ‘‘ Notes stir In Guerre Rownaine.” THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, lg16-1; 4” 1

Roman population for Goo years before tlie Magyars appeared on the scene? JVe may therefore fairly accept the Rumanian ciain: that their people are the originat owners of the soil of ancient Dacia-Trajann, a considerable part of wliich is stiil under the domination of the: Magyar. EthnoIogy accounts, in great measure, both for the intervention’ of Rumania 011 the side of the Entente and for her invasion of Tran- sylvania in this war. But her French sympathies had also an influence. From the 18th century, wlien Greeks from Constantinople became, in I; I I, Princes of Tlrallachia and hloldavia, French literature was the basis of the intellectual progress of these States, and French customs and civilization were much sought after by the educated classes? Napoleon 111. interested himself iii their welfare, and it was under French auspices that, after the Criniean JVar, the two States became united under the nanie of Rumania. The action of Russia, after the Russo-Turkish JVar of 1877, in \vliich Rumania whole-heartedly supported her powerful northern neighbour, tended greatly to alienate her sympathies and throw her into the arms of the Triple Alliance, or rather, as it was then, the Dual 4lliance, for Italy joined subse- quently. The portion of Bessarabia forming part of Rumania by the Treaty of Paris (1856)was clainied by Russia, who oflered to Rumania the whole of the Dobrudja in exchange for it. But Uessarabia was peopled by the Rumanian race, and Rumania refused all bargaining in the matter, whicli hsd therefore to go before the Congress of Berlin. Unfortunately for Rumania, the Congress not only decided in favour of Russia, but awarded in escliange for Bessarabia only a part of the Dobrudja, instead of the whole of it, which Rumania could have had from Russia, had she consented voluntariIy to the Russian claim. This bitter disappointment, and the pressure which Austria could exercise over the navigation of the Danube, decided Rumania to join the Dual Alliance and tlie treaty was signed at Gastein in 1SS3. But the forced Bessarabian cession accounts for a great deal more than the alliance. ?‘he Sereth was fortified against Russia (under German direction), and the state of feeIing between the two countries remained anything but cordial up to the actual intervention of Rumania by the side of her great northern neighbour in August, 1916. How Russia repaid little Rumania’s petulance at having her Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 kindred torn away from her in IS$, will be apparent in the account of the 1916 operations, u-hich is about to follow.

?’HE PLAXOF CAJIP-IICS. On the outbreali of war, the late 1Gng.Charles assembled a Council‘ of State, at ~vliiclihe gave it as his personal opinion that the terms of the treaty obliged his Government to support the Central Powers. But he could find only one Runianian statesman (Carp) to agree with him. The sympathies of Rumaaia were so strongly in favour of THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-1; 422 France a11d Great 1Jritain that, despite political and diplonintic runiours to the contrary, Rumanian intervention on the side of the Ihtcnte jvas, from the first, only a question of time, preparation, and military expediency. OIiviousIy a sniall State, such as Rumania, almost surrounded Iiy Austria and 13tdglnria, could not be cspected to risk a xsar wit11 these States, supported as they ~vouldbe in all prolnbility by Germany and Turkey, escept in close co-operation with Entente forces, and in full agreement witli the .4llicd Governnicnts and their military advisers. But the entry of 13ulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers had cut off Ruinanin from Entente support from the \vest, and the General Staff of the Czar’s armies had given their opinion that Rumania \vould best scr\‘e Entente interests by remaining neutral. Xe\wtheless, for two years, frtim Xugust, 1914, to August, 1916, the I

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 mihition wit11 regard to Constantinople, and if she 1)ccamc. strong, with the populations of Transylvania and 13ukovina added to her own, she might be too independent, and \vould certainly require the cession of J3cssarahia for an!- lielp she tniglit give in tlie furtiieranc<: of Iiussinn I3allcm policy. ‘I‘liis \sas the jealous, unfriendly spirit characterizing Russian relations with Iiriniania tlirougliout, both Iiclfore and during the campaign : and tlie desire that this little ‘State slioulcl remain neutral, and the sulisequcnt lack of effective support, wvrc, without doulit, due to political rather than to military reasons. 1’roI)alily owing to pressure from her allies, Russirr decided during lirussilof’s cani- paign to bring Rumania at once into the struggle. General Illi~sco,~ THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 423 in liis before-mentioned statement to the Press, declares that a sort of mise el1 deiireicrc reached the Government in June or July, together witti a fully elaborated plan of canipaign, in which the invasion of ,.1ransylvania appeared as the principal operation, the probable danger in the Dobrudja from Ilulgaria being almost entirely ignored. 'I To our objection," said General Illiesco, 'I AI. 13oris Stiirmer, the then Prime AIinister, replied that IZulgaria would never fight against Russia. IVe aslied tlien for mo,m Iiussian troops for the Dobrudja front, to which request the answer was that 30,000 nieii iwuld ajitply szlffice for a demoiistratio?t pzlrely political. Twice our Staff asked the Russian Government to hgin ljy an operation against Bulgaria. . . . l'he capture -of R~~t~li~liwould have been security for our capital. The French General Staff entirely shared our opinion, but from Russia came u)i iibsolzcfe veto." 'I'he plan of campaign, in its essentials, was therefore the \VorIi of the Russian, not the Rumanian Staff. Tile Rumanian Government might, of course, have refused altogether to enter the ivar unless the requirenients considered absolutely necessary by its military advisers (including tlie French) could he complied with ; and why it did not do so is not at present quite clear. Possibly it was an error of judgment. However that may be, to the great joy of lier Western Allies, and amidst great enthusiasm at Uucliarest owing 'to I3russilof's victories, the victories on the IVestern Front (on the Somme and at ITerdun), and the Italian occupation of Goritza, Rumania dcclared war on ilustria on August qth, 1316.

I. 1 IiI.: lsv~srosOF TILIKSYLVAXIA. 'l'lie actual plan for [lie invasion of Transylvania may be sum- marized :is tinder. The First Army, on the River Jiul, in the region of Orsova, to lie the pivot of tlie,operation. The Second Army, issuing from the central passes of the Transylvanian Alps, to invade tlie plateau Ixyond ivitli tlie object of reducing tlie Iiunianian front towards I-lungary by one-half by holding a line roughly from Dorna TTatra (tlie Russian left), on the frontier of Rukovina, to the Vulcan Pass (held by the First Army); that .is to say, on the chord of the arc formed hy the frontier along the watershed of the Transylvanian t-\lps, (\vliich is 500 miles long). I'he I~ourthXrniy, in touch with the Iiussians, to advance through the northern passes and occupy

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 the northern part of the new front, along the course of the River IIaros, connecting its left with the right of the Second Army. *.1 lie Runiani:in Third Army \\'as in the Dobrudja, having detailed a curtain of troops to \vatdl the Danube from Orsova castwards. ,.I lie exact strength of each army is unknown ;but wlien mobilized the R ti ni:i n i a ns li ad at 1 cast fi f t ee n divisions , five detached caval ry 11 r i gades, and a cavalry corps of ttvo divisions, twenty regiments of artillery --mountain and field-and five regiments of Iiowitzers (4.2 inches). " Alas !" said General Illiesco, " the Russian troops from Dorna Vatra never advanced a single metre." The Rumanian Armies were on a war footing at the outbreak of hostilities, and appear to have been partially niohilizcd beforehand, \'OL. 1.XIII. 1) 424 1HE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 for early in September tlie invasion of Transylvania was in full swing, the passes having been seized in August. The Fourth Army (General Presan) passed over tfie. frontier by the passes Tolgyes, Beliaz, Gyfmes, and Oitoz, based on Focsani. The Second Army (General 21verescu) advanced by the centre passes on Brasso and Segesvar, based on Bucharest. The First Army (General Culcer) passed by the Ilother 'I'hurni and Vulcan passes on Hermannstadt and Ilatzeg, based on Craiova. -411 went well for fhe first ten dai-s. 'I'lie .Austrians, owing to the recent Russian and Italian offensives, had only seven divisions (under General ,\rz von Stmussenberg) in Transylvania, wliich weak- ness, combined with the unreliability of some units,'. enabled the Rumanian Xrmies to make an eas? conquest of the centre plateau: But the enemy held on tenaciously to the flanlis; that is to say, to the Iieleman Hills in the north and the district of Hatzeg opposite to and west of tlie I'ulcan Pass. IVitfi these positions solidly entrenched they fell back in the centre, awaiting reinforcements. The First Rumanian Army was. divided into three columns. Number one on the Cerna, which was forced at Orsova; number two on the Jiul, operating north of the I'ulcan Pass on I-Iatzeg; number three, consisting of the 1st Army Corps, under General AIanolescu,. on the Oltu. Column number three passed over the Rother Thurni Pass on August 3otl1, aiming at Hermannstadt. The mountainous country necessitated the advance being mrried out by briga{es in several separate columns, badly connected, as there was no aviation service in the Rumanian Army. Sibiu was evacuated by the enemy on September 10th.; but the Austrians prevented the Rumanians from occupying it by hotding a strong position in rear. Combined opera- tions with the Second Army were necessary in order fo effect a further advance. The Second Army occupying Fogaras, the 1st Corps was able soon after to push on to Hermannstadt, but here again the Austrians held a strong position in rear, which prevented the town from being occupied. 'The Austrian artillery was necessarily much superior and heavier than what General hlanolescu could bring into action, for the latter had had to cross the mountains, whereas the enemy, with a first-rate Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 railway system, had been waiting for him in tlie plain. In the meantime, towards the end of September, the left centre of the Fourth Army and the right of tlie Second Army had advanced to a line on the central plateau marlied by tlie following places. from north to south : Magyros, Seliekel?--I~erecztu-I-Iendorf-Gross- Schenk-Fogaras. These places will be found on the accompanying sketch map, joined I)y a tliicl; black line, :IS niarliing the limit of the Rumanian advance westwards in TransyI\-ania. The reason n.hy the Rumanian Armies irere unable to attain tlie line of the 31aros-I-latzeg

1 :It the Tolgys Pass the Fourth Ammy found a regiment of Tchrques, which alIo\\cd thb . Kuninninris to go through unopposed. TI i E RUJIAXI.\S CAM PAIGS, I9I6- I 7 425 IviH now be shortly explained; but even had they been able to reach this line and to strongly entrench it, the most tliat could be hopd for from their unassisted efforts was a more or less prolonged war of trenches. Everythiiig depended in this theatre on n Russiaii ofieiisiloe front Bukovitin. Rumania could only be useful as an adjunct, or complement to the Russian front in Bukovina and Galicia, and her intervention should have been so timed as to assist the Russian opera- tions on Austrian territory. Left to herself, defeat was a foregone conclusion, whenever the Central Powers were ready to undertake a campaign against her ;and by the creation of a number of new divisions (by reducing the number of infantry regiments from four to three in a certain number of esisting divisions, as well as in the newly-formed units) Hindenburg was read? almost at once, while on the right flank of the Rumanian western front the Russians remained inactive. Brussilof’s five armies had pushed on victoriously during June, July, and August, but the moment Rumania joined the Entente, by an extraordinary coincidence, blunder, or misunderstanding, the Russian offensive ceased altogether. Possibly the appearance of some of Hindenburg’s new German divisions in Galicia ahd Bukovina had something to do with Brussilof’s offensive dying out, for after their first success in East Prussia, which ended disastrously at Tannenberg, the Russians xere never able to gain any ground against the Germans. But it is generally thought that the abandonment of Rumania to her fate was deliberate on the part of the Russian Government, for reasons that will be referred to again later. Served by sereral lines of railway from Buda Pest and German:-. von Falkenhayn’s Xinth Army, of twelve divisions, begin to assemble on the loker AIaros about the middle of September, and by the 22nd \\-as preparing to take the offensive in the direction of the southern passes, while thc -.\ustrians, under von Straussenberg, concentrated towards the northern portion of the Transylvanian plateau against the Rumanian Fourth Army’. Thus the Austrian advance had in view the eventual invasion of AIoldavia: that of the Germans the more immediate attack on Wallachia, which, if successful, would place the invader on a shorter line to Bucharest than the mass of the Rumanian forces in Transylvania. At the Vulcan Pass the Germans from Hatzeg, under General von Staabs, after occupying it were counter-attacked by General Culcer

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 (First Army) and driven some distance to the north, where they remained till the beginning of October. It was towards the Rother Thurm (Red Tou-er) Pass that General von Fallienhayn directed his principal effort. The right column, number three, of the Rumanian First Army, under General hlanolescu, had one division towards Fogaras and the other before Hermannstadt, as already stated. Only one railway line fed these troops (see sketch map), whereas Falkenliayn had three lines of supply, and, observing the isolated position of these divisions, one opposite Hermannstadt and the other twenty miles to the east, towards Fogaras, but too far from that place to obtain any effective support from the garrison, the commander of the German Ninth Army planned to cut them both from the Rother Thurni Pass and their only line of supply. D2 426 THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 A glance. at tlie accompanying sketch niap will be sufficient to enable the reader ro appreciate the dangerous positions of General AIanoIescu's divisions, one between l'ainiech and Fogaras, and the other before Herniannstadt, both drawing their supplies from the Oltu Valley railway, if attacked by superior forces. 'I'he importance of 'I'alniecli, the junction of the lines from Fogaras and Hermannstadt, will also be manifest, as well as the vital necessity (to tlie Rumanians) of keeping open the Rother 'Hiurni Pass. Fallienhayn's plan was to occupy Manolescu with a frontal attack froni Herniannstadt, push a force between his right division and 'I'almccli, and at the saim time occupy the Rother l'hurni Pass. His principal difficulty was tlie mountainous nature of tlie country, render- ing the essential rapid movement far from easy; but to meet this difficulty he liad a corps d'klife, specially withdrawn from the Italian front-the Alpine Division-composed of Bavarians and Prussians, and commanded by the Bavarian General, Kraft von Delmoningen. Its strength was nine battalions, six field, six mountain batteries, and one heavy. ?'lie men's personal equipment included an iron-shod alpenstocli. This division, starting on Septeniber zand, and marching for five days over hills (3,000 feet to 7,oOo feet high, reached the Rother 'I'hurni on the ZGtIi, having liad only one skirmish by way of opposition during the march. The left German column, also very mobile, reached its appointed position on the same day, the 26tI1, and Alanolescu was cut from his communications. The operation was a cleverly planned and executed example of mountain warfare on a big scale. hlandlescu's situation was desperate ; but lie escaped complete destruction by abandoning any attempt to recover his communications Iiy the Rothkr Tliurni and piarching south-eastwards over the Fogaras mountains, re entering Rumanian territory with the loss of only 3,000 unwounded prisoners and thirteen kuns, thus turning the pass. Falkenhayn had judged such a manmuwe impossible with no good roads, and, having moved a force on Fogaras, had counted on the destruction or capture of tlie \\thole of the Rumanian 1st Army Corps. Leaving the Alpine Division on the Rother Tliurni Pass, and General von Staabs' force masking- the Vulcan, Fallienhayn now (September 30tli) directed the mass of his army against the troops of the Rhmanian Second and left wing of the Fourth Armies on the Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 Transylvanian plateau.

THE OPERATIOXS IX THE DOBRUDJA. It is now time to turn our attention to the Dobrudja operations, in which theatre, froni the first, our Allies depended for success either on the practical .non-intervention of Bulgaria, or on the energetic co- operation of the Russian Armies. The Rumanian forces were altogether inadequate for the task of defending the Dobrudja. They were none too strong in numbers on tlie Transylvanian side, while for the whole course of the Danube and the Dobrudja only three divisions were available, under General Aslau, designated the Third Army. THE I1uhItiNI.iX c.\~tp:~I~~,IgIGI7 427 General Aslau had posted the 19th Division from near the Black Sea to Dobritch, on the frontier; the 17th Division at ’I’urtukai, on the Danube, thirty miles from Dpbritcli; and the 9th Division in reserve at Silistria. Communications between divisions was very difficult, for want of railways ; and there was no sign of Russian help. The Pulgarian General, Tosheff, opposite him, besides superior forces-nearly two to onchad the Rustcliuk-Varna railway immedi- ately in rear of his front, by which he could concentrate rapidly at any desired point between the sea and the Danube. Moreover, he had the certainty of being heavily reinforced. Tosheff concentrated first on his right and seized Dobritch on September 4th,l soon after which he was reinforced by a division of Turks, while the Germans, under hlackensen, advanced against Turtukai, aided by the 4th I3ul- garian Division. This place was defended by thirteen forts, but like all the Rumanian fortresses, l’urtukai was quite out of date against modern artillery, and the place was carried by assault on the Gth. Aslau’s 9th Division was prevented from intervening (from Silistria) by ;I covering force of Bulgarians. The capture of this Rumanian bridgehead secured the safety of the Rustchuk-Varna railway. Von Afackensen nest niarched on Silistria, which was occupied on the 9th without an action. His further advance had this of advantage to our Allies-that it shortened their front by one-half (see Map); but on account of the nonarrival of the Russians, nothing could be done by way of counter-oflensive, and the fate of Rumania was already sealed? Only part of the 6rst Russian Division, and a Jugu- Slav division, formed of l’cheques, Poles, Croates, etc. (n.ho had given theniselves up as prisoners to Brussilof), had as yet joined Aslau. ..I his unfortunate General, who, whatever mistakes lie niay have made, was set an inipossible task, was relieved from his command on Sep tember loth, and replaced by General Averescu (Second Army), who with several divisions, withdrawn from the First, Second, and Fourth Armies, was brought over from Transylvania to defend the Dobrudja. I.I his decision may have been necessary to save 13ucharest, or at least to reassure public opinion in the capital ; but. it completely com- promised the Tra nsy Ivan ian operations, and what ever chance there might have been of making head against Falkenhayii and Straussen- berg in that theatre was now at an end. For this the Imperinl Russian Government was entirely to blame, just as much as is the Revolu-

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 tionary Government of Russia for the subsequent and final disaster wliicli robbed Rumania of her hopes of victory. Russia, wlio set the world ablaze for her Serbian Iirotliers, Iias systeniatically failed her Allies throughout the war, and has finally torn up her treaties and repudiated her debts. Yet, now, in some quarters, it is still thought good policy to trust Russia. That 31. Trotsky would. be very glad to have a disciplined army at his

1The Bulgarians displayed white flags on the Danube from August 27th to jist, but declared war on September 1st. 2The bridge of boats at Reni (near Galrttz), necessary for the pnssnge of Kuslan reinforcerncnts in any numbcr over tile Danube, was only finished on Sep teniber I 0th. 428 TIiE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 disposal is quite natural and easy to understand; but how anyone can suppose that an adventurer of this type, who was responsible for the repudiation and publication of treaties, and \vho lias done his best to harm (by calling upon the proletariat to follow Russia's despicable example) the Allied countries who had formerly given him hospitality -that such a man could be trusted to use the army, if 11: got it, in the interests of the Allies, is very astonishing. Trotsky lias already received German money. IIe is ready to take it, and anything else that may be of use to him, from w~homsoeverwill give it, but he has shown no sign up to the present of greater fondness for the demo- cratic Governments of America, France, and Great 13ritain than for the autocratic, or semi-autocratic Government of Germany. In fact, if anything, has he not shown preference for Germany? Yet anything is better, it must be admitted, than that Germany sliould enslave the \vhole of Russia. President IVilson's policy is right. Assistance should be given to a11 who, even at tlie eleventh hour, would resist the Kaiser. At last, on September 16th, a smalf Kussian Army, under General Zalouclikovski (who assumed supreme command), reinforced General Averescu on a line a few miles south of the Cernovada-Constanza railway. The Russian troops-three cavalry divisions, tlie GIst Division and the SLVIItli Army Corps-held the right of this line, the Jugo-Slav division being in tlie centre ,and the Rumanians (five divisions) on the left. This gave nine infantry divisions on a front of thirty-seven miles, but some parts were marshy and practically unapproachable. llackensen's force was about equal in numbers, comprising two Turkish and three and a half Bulgarian divisions (each Bulgarian division having a strength of 30,m men : practically an army corps), and a certain number of German infantry regiments with .-lustrian heavy guns. I-Tu attacked on tlie 19th and was repulsed, upon which he retired about fifteen niiles to the south, where, holding Silistria and Turtul;ai, he awaited the arrival of more heavy artillery before making another attack. There was no pursuit, and the Russian General ic; described as being markedly incompetent. \\%en Alackensen attacked again, on October 2otli, the Jug" Slavs and Rumanians, respectively in the centre and on the left of

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 the line from Rasova (on the Danube) to Tuzla (on the Ulncl; Sea), lield firm and repulsed no less than five assaults; but the Russians on tlie riglit gave way and appear to have been seized with panic, unco\wing the Jugo-Slav right and forcing that division and tlie Runianian Army to retire also. Thus the httle \vas lost by the Russians, and Cernavoda occupied by AIackensen on the 25th. The Rumanians destroyed Constanza before evacuating that port. General Sakharof now replaced Zalouclikorsl;i, and was reinforced. He had gained a great reputation against the Austrians, but against Germans did nothing to add to it, and appeared to take things easy 'in the Dobrudja. On Xoveniber 7th lie drove the weak line of observation troops, left against him by Mackensen, to witliin twelve miles north of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway ; but when the THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, .IS)I6-17 429 'Rumanians attaclred to\vards *Cernayoda, on the 3111, Saldiarof did not support tlieni, and was apparently satistied lvith the little advance already accomplished.. A flotilla of Rumanian and Iiussian gunboats on the Danube c6-operated with him. On October 3rd the Rumanians in JVallacliia carried out a more or less successful raid across the Danube betneen 'I'urtukai and Rustchuk, taking a thousand prisoners and some guns. Probably the stra.tegical idea \\.as to alarni ;\lackensen for his communications and nmkc him detach a force to guard them.

*. I IIE GEl<>i.\s I~\~.\sloS01: \\'.\LLACIllA. l\%ile these eyents \Yere taking place in the lhl)rudja, General von F:iIkenliayp, havinc secured the riglit flank of his advance by the occupation of the Rother 'I'hurm Pass and the niasliing .Of the Vulcan, marched on Fogarris and the 'I'orzburg Pass, thus turning the left flank of the Rumanian linc on tlie plateau. ,.1 1iaI~Iis to tlie self-sacrificing valour of its rearguards, the Second Army liad succeeded in recrossing the frontier by October 10th with the loss of only 1,200 prisoners and twenty-five guns. Brit owing to the frontier heing on the waterslied of the 'I'ransylvanian :lips, it could only be crossed at the passes, necessitating the complete separation of the Second and Fourth .:\rniies, their lines of retreat being divergent. While the Second .Army regained Rumanian territory by tlie l'orzburg and l'redeal Passes in a soutlicxly direction, the Fourth Army recrossed the frontier by the Tolgyes, Bekaz, Gylnies, and Oitm Passes, inore or less due east. 17ie latter army, in fact, retreated on Aloldavia, \vliile tlie Second and First .Armies retired into and had the duty of defending Wallachia. Leaving von Straussenberg to follow thc Fourth Army and protect the communications against any possible offensive return from 3101- davia, von Fallicnliayn made Wallachia the principal theatre of operations, in accordance, no doubt, with I Iindenhurg's orders, the plan being a concentric advance on TZucharest by Falkenliayn and Mackcnsen, acting in conjunction on exterior lines, for which strategical manmuvre the campaign of 1866 provided a successful precedent. The alternative nianmuvre of an advance in force into lloldavia, with

Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 the object of cutting the Rumanians from Russia, \vould ha\-e given the Russians from Rukovina a chance of operating on the communica- tions, twsidcs rvndcring ctroperation with 3Iacliensen niuch niorc difficult. The plan selected was undoubtedly the safest. I3cforc beginning thc advance on Hucharest, however, it was necessary to occupy definitely the Vulcan Pass. and it was to this operation that Fallicnlia!~ nest directed his attention. 139 this route, moreover, marcliing on Craiova by tIie valley of the Jiul. his, troops could best come into touch witti the arm)- of von 11aclxnsen. A force consisting of Count von Sclinietto\v's cavalry corps, the 4rst I'russian and two Bavarian divisions, with onc Austrian Iirigade, the \vhole under the command of General yon TCiiline, Iiegan its advance on this linc on November roth. 430 TIiE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-I 7 ’I‘arg~i-Jiul, the first objectire, was occupied on the 15th after a gallant &fence in which even tlie uld men and Iioys tmli part. Four 1)oy scouts received subsequently the 11icda1 of Faith ad Cournge for their conduct in this fight. Hut the reason why the German advance to ‘I‘argu-Jiul had been delayed till November 10th was that tlie I It11 Jhvarian Division, \vith tu-o cavalry brigades (one Austrian) and the zand I’russinn Infantry Regiment, under General von Kncussel, had been coniplctcly defeated by General Dragaiina (~110had replaced General Cttlcer in coinrnand of the First Rumanian Arniy) at tlie end of October, with a loss of several hundred prisoners, twelve machine-guns, and seventeen firld guns. Unfortunately, the gallant Dragrnlina, lvounded in the arm by two hullets, succumbed under tlie necessary amputation. General Petaia succeeded him. For (lie second time the Germans Iiad heen forced (on November 1st) to recross the frontier at the Vulcan Pass. It was then that von 1:all;enIiayn tool; nieasures to mass a force at tlie Vulcan that should be irresistible. Tlis army was divided into three columns : von Kuhne’s on the riglit, which we have already followed as far as Targu-Jiul, which was occupied on. Soveniber 15th. Kraft von Ilelniesingen comniandcd the centre column, marching by the Kotlier ’I’hurni Pass on Pitesci, and Gcncml \’on llorgan tlic left column. moving by tlir ‘I’orzburg and I’reclcal Passes on I’itesci and I’loesci, where General .4verescii, recalled froni the Ilol)riidja, piit up a fine defence froni the 11th to thc 17th. Keller’s Cossacks, and a Russian Arniy from Volliynia, had at last arrived in AIoldavia, and had taken over that sector, allowing of the withdrawal of tlic divisions of the Fourth Army to ~\Tallacl~ia~ Rut not before a big success had lieen won at the Gylnies Pass, where General I’resan worsted Straussenbcrg, taking a thousand prisoners (Austrians) and twelve guns. The French Ililitary lIission, at the lientl of tvliidi was General Berthclot, and French and 13nglisli aviators arrived at I3iicharest before the end of Octolier, But bepd relieving tlie Runianian Fourth .Army in AIoIdavin and giving inefficient and Iiopclessly inadeqiiate help in ttie l)obrudja, the Russians did nothing to save I3ucliarest, and contented tlicniselves with fortifying the line of the Seretli, which it is more than probable Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 their Government intended, all along, should lie ttie R usso-Ilurnanian principal line of resistance. ,. I IIE I’ASS.IGEOF TIIK D.ISUHE. Von Alackensen, having beaten the Kusso-l

him a I decisive defeat. ’The only difficulty appeared to he the want of unity betwecn the Russian and Rumanian command. I3ut the fates willed that a most unforseen accident should spoil tlie best of plans. 43 2 THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, IC~~G-J~

it general offensive by the Third and Fourth -4rntics was arranged for December 1st. That night (November 30th-December 1st) two Rumanian officers left Bucharest in a niotor-car with despatches. Tlie driver lost his way in the darl;. Nest morning they were captured by a German cavalry patrol! On December Ist, however, everything went \veil. The Turks were routed and cut to pieces. General Presan retook Gradistia and niarched on Comana. Von Kosch was cut from Simnitza. Besides what happened to the Turks, and although the Russians, next to useless, refused to take orders from Rumanian Generals, 3,000 prisoners were captured and thirty guns. On December 2nd von Kosch isas obliged to order a general retreat. On the 3rd his situation was almost desperate, and had it not been for the accident referred to above, the \\-hole course of the canipaign niight have been clianged xsithout the least help from the Russian army corps, n-hicli appear to have taken no part in the battle. But Falkenhayn liad received the despatches intended for a Rumanian General, and \\’as thus able to retrieve the situation by directing ron Scliniettow?s cavalry corps. supported by infantry, on the riglit flank and rear of General Presan’s troops as they \\-ere advancing towards the Danube. Von Schniettov fell first on the transport of the and and 5th Rumanian Divisions, causing a panic among the drivers, which presently spread to the troops, forced to retire for \\-ant of supplies, lien attac1;cd in flank by a Prussian infantry brigade. ?‘he panic being coniniunicated to the 9th and 19th Divisions, niany units disbanded, and December 3rd, which opened with such brilliant prospects, closed at nightfall in complete disaster, showing once again, as ‘at JIarengo, the extraordinary effect of an attack in flank, even on victorious troops, when accompanied by sur- prise. After the 2nd and 5th Rumanian Divisions Iiad dispersed, the 9th and 19th Divisions surrendered. General Socescu, in command of the 2nd and jth, was tried subsequently by court-martial and awarded imprisohment for life for having been in Bucharest when von Schniettow attaclred. Tlie two Russian army corps, it would seem, might have been of soine use in covering the Rumanian flank on the 3rd. But the alniost complete inaction of tlie Russian corps on Rumanian soil throughout tlie campaign seenis to confirm the truth of the statement Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 attributed to a prominent Russian General by 11. Stihon, as having been made before the Rumanians lid suffered any clicclc. I-Ie is said to have pointed out on the map tlie line of the Sereth, accompanying the action with these words: r‘ It is there that me shall make OW 7esisfmce.” Amongst the secret documents published by Trotsky was a report b~ 11. Pdivanoff in \\-liicli an opinion was expressed 4< that disaster was the natural consequence of the totai insufficiency of the Rumanian military prymation, and that the collapse of Rumanian ambitions can be utilized by us with tlie view of consolidat- ing the forced bonds that nou7 unite Russia and Rumania. By the desire of the Allies, Russia had aFrced to cede Bukovina (just taken by Rrussilof) to Rumania, and a victorious campaign would give her THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 433 Transylvania. Slie would become a formidable State of 13,000,000 inhabitants, nearly all of her own race. She would be certain to claim Ressarabia, and friendly relations with her \vould become difficult. On the other hand, her collapse would bind her to Russia and favour the latter’s designs on Constantinople.” This document is proof of Russia’s treason towards Rumania, but only in a very modified sense can it be taken as proof of her treason towards the Entente Powers. Doubtless there were traitors at Petrograd, and the Empress, king ii German, may have favoured them. But with regard to the practical abandonment of Rumania, until she was obliged to fall back to the line of tlie Sereth, this extra- ordinary and fatal attitude was the outcome of a selfish policy which surely points to the intention, not of making a sep?rate peace, but of continuing the war to final victory? For the policy in question was to bind a weak Rumania to Russia, so weak and so indebted to Russia tliat she would consent, not only to a revision of the agree- ment about Bukovina, but to leave the Bessnrahia question alone, and generally become an obsequious ally of tlie Colossus of tlie Xorth. Sir George Buchanan’s, and, indeed, all the latest reliable evidence, goes to show that tlie Czar was loyal to tlie Entente, and his Prime Minister’s (Sturnier’s) seeming lack of energy nray have been due to his short-sighted Rumanian policy. With a German peace, with Germany allied to and dominating Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, what hope would there have been for Russian ambitions in the Balkans? After the Rumanian defeat on tlie Arges, the capital was evacuated. Bucharest had become a fortress of the first class in 1866, from tlie plans and under the direction of the Belgian General, Brialmont, the designer of Antwerp, who also furnished the plans for the defence of the Sereth (against Russia). With the increasing range of siege ordnance a system of advanced works had since been completed, and in 19rG the perimeter of the place was not less than sixty miles, requiring an army to defend it. But the fate of Xntwerp and the Polish fortresses had been an object lesson taken to heart, and, together with tlie actual situation, rendered the defence of Bucliarest out of the question. JIarslial von blackensen entered the city on December mth. ’l‘lie successful invasion of Rumania on a double line had its precedent in IS%, when Alarshal von Jloltke, acting as Chief of the Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 Staff to Icing William I. of Prussia, invaded Bohemia on exterior lines, the armies of tlie Crown Prince (afterwards tlie Emperor Frede- rick) and Prince Frederick Charles (father of the late Duchess of Connauglit), after being widely separated, uniting on the battlefield of I< ii n igg-ratz . IVliile the Rumanian Armies retreated out of IVallacliia towards tlie Seretli, the armies of the Czar replaced them in tlie fighting line. nut Rumanian troops (of the Second Army) defended tlie Prahova River against von Delniesingen and von Morgan, retarding them forty-eight hours. Ploesci fell to them on the 16th. Von RIackensen’s army marched on nrizeu and Braila. In the Dohrudja, Sakharof conformed to tlie genera! movement of retreat and crossed the Danube 434 THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, IgIG-Ij into I3cssarabia, after an action with the Third Bulgarian Army, where lie could not be followed, owing to the broad arms of the river and iiumerous lakes, making its defence (with smalI numbers) impregnable. The flotilla of Russian and Rumanian monitors (the latter under a French naval officer) was of great service during the operation. The cnemy claimed 6,000 prisoners and sixteen guns. IPest of the Danube tlie Russo-Rumanian forces, reinforced by a number of Uritish armoured cars, which were invaluable, held a line from Hraila to the mountains north of Buzeu. Mackensen and Fallienhayn, having greatly superior forces, attacked the flanks. The Alpine division and Austrian detachment on the estreme left turned the Allied right. 'I'his battle is known as the Battle of Rimnicu-Sarat, in which the eneniy claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners. Including the I3attle of the Arges, where two divisions surrendered, the engage- nicnts on the Buzeu river, in the Dobrudja, and at the Battle of liininicu-Sarat, the Rumanians must liave lost in prisoners at least j0,OOo during December. After the last-mentioned battle, tlie British armoured cars did such good service, that the Allied right, wliicIi had been turned, was able to retire in good order. The commander had been wounded on the ZGtli, but he was at his post again the nest day. This stand allowed of the I3raila supply depbt being evacuated and of the destruction of all quays, docks, and elevators. At the end of December the Russians held the lolgyes, Bekaz, Gylmes, and Oitoz Passes, and the Russo-Rumanians were on the line of the 'I'rotus and Sereth rivers. ' The Oitoz Pass would appear to have remained in the possession of the Russians during the winter, but Foscani was evacuated on January 8th. The Trotus-Sereth front proved to be everywhere impregnable.

-rriE RIimxilAx OFFENSIVE OF AUGUST, 1917. During the spring of I 91 7 the Rumanian Arniies were completely reorganized under French supervision, and the artillery re-armed with French ij, IOj, 120, and Ijj-mm. guns. Aviation was instituted as a military service, and the cavalry formed into a corps of two divisions. In June a hundred thousand \vell-armed and well-trained Rumanian soldiers stood ready on the estreme left of the Russian front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. As for the Russians, guns and aniniuni- Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 tion had been poured into their country by England, France, and America. New armies had been organized, and never had the Eastern Front been so strong or more perfectly prepared to take the offensive. Rousslii, Gourko, Brussilof, officially declared that never before had their troops been so abundantly supplied in guns and munitions as in June, 1917. But for the disintegrating fernient at work among the illiterate masses in the interior of Russia, very ably intensified by Gernian-paid propaganda, the prospect before the Rumanians of recovering at least' a large part of their conquered territory vould have bccn particularly favourable. Vnfortunately for Rumania, and for the Entente, the Revolution, which was hailed in democratic countries as certain to strengthen the THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 435

military value of the Alliance, had just tlie opposite effect. “ Never,” wrote 31. A. Xelcludof, a former Russian .4mbassador, in a letter to the G‘nztlois, “ never would the Emperor Nicholas have signed a separate peace. His fidelity to the Alliance was inviolable. The revolutionaries, who have laid hands on all the. Cmr’s official and personal papers, have never been able to prove this pretended treason of tlie supreme power. It was not generally understood abroad that a revolution which overthrew the Imperial fdgirne, would most certainly unchain forces that must precipitate Russia into hopeless misfortune. They understoovl it in Germany, and set to work resolutely to have their fingers in the anarchistic pie.” \\lit11 the fall of AI. Goutchkof, the War Office became niore and more ;I centre of disintegrating propaganda, and Generals, one after another, were relieved from tlieir commands. Sakharof replaced Gourko in the direction of the Rumanian section of the Russian front. Leclietski relieved Saliharof until, on AIay 18th, lc, in turn, had to resign. It was then that General Tcherbatchcf (now a naturalized Rumanian and ;L Rumanian General) took up tlie post and contrived to hold it, even after the advent of and in opposition to the Lenin- Trotsky 7L:gintc, concerning which comment is superfluous and words inadequate to describe its hideous and chaotic ruin. As the former Russian Ambassador, already referred to, declared, tlie Entente made a gross niistalie and the Germans showed their acumen in their respective appreciations of the effects of the Revolu- tion, whicli had not a strengthening hut a disintegrating value on the military situation. In the spring of 1917, Kerensky, with Generals Alesieff and 13russilof, prepared their offensive against Lemberg, \vhicli ivas to be carried out by the Galician Army Group and timed to hegin early in JU~J-. In close co-operation with this enterprise, General Tcherbatchcf arranged wit11 General Presan, now Chief of the Staff to the King of Rumania, and General 13erthelot (Chief of the French Mission), for an offensive in Moldavia from tlie Oitoz Valley. The Iiusso- Rumanian front ran, as me have seen, from the Black Sea to the Carpatliians, along tlie Danube, the Seretli and its tributary, the Trotus river, facing generally south and south-west. The right flank being secured by tlie First Russian Army on the Transylvanian frontier, the order of battle was as follows: The Second Rumanian Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 Army, under General Xverescu, and the 1:ourtli Russian Army, in the order named. stood ready to advance on a front of about fifty miles, from the Oitoz Valley to the Seretli (see Jlap), supported 1)~. the First Rumanian Army under General Grigorcscu. The Sisth Russian Army held the Sereth and Danube, whicli part of the front was practically unattackable by either side. On July zand the artillery preparation began, and on the 24th General Avercscu advanced against hlacliensen’s troops holding the line of the Susita river. The opening of this offensive was attended with every success. The Narastu heights were taken (1,800 to 2,000 feet above sea level) with 3,000 prisoners and thirtytwo guns, One IQj-rnnl. gun, taken with team, was turned against the enemy. The 436 THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 218th and 117th German Divisions were routed, and the road to Hucharest lay open. Aviators reported that the Germans were carting off the half-ripe corn, and everything pointed to an important victory, dien orders arrived for the First and Sixth Russian Armies to stop at once all offensive operations. This telegram n-as opened in the presence of King Ferdinand and Generals Berthclot and Grigorescu. The Russian Fourth Army, moreover, was to be transferred to Buliovina. Rumania was betrayed for the second time. Xrrangenients liad to be made at once to fill tlie places of tlie Russian troops. ‘I’lie 171th Rumanian Corps (First Army) took tlie place of the Russian Fourth Army on Averescu’s left, and the cavalry corps took over tlie Sercth from the Russian Second Army. The Rumanians were everywhere thrown on the defensive, and Averescu’s right had to be stretched back to establish connection with the Russian Ninth -Army on tlie Upper Trotus. This Ninth Army appears to have been already affected with peace- at-any-price virus, for when the new arrived that Riga had been taken by the Germans, many soldiers of this army, and even officers, were reported to have been well pleased. In this unfortunate state of affairs on the Russo-Rumanian front, Llie Ninth German Army proceeded to attack Averescu from the south, while the Austrians, under von Kowess, conquered Bukovina on his right rear. Some of the Russian units on this side behaved well, but others bolted, leaving their officers to work the machine-guns by themselves. The Rumanians fought like heroes, rebuilding in the night the defences destroyed during the day. It took von ;\lackensen a month before lie had made sensible progress; but the hlarastu lieiglits were retalien at last, and Averescu, besides fighting the German Ninth Xrmv, found himself obliged to take over the sector previously held by the Russian Ninth Army on his right. Yet at the end of September tlie Rumanians still held their original positions on tlie line of the Trotus. Counting the Austrian First Army in the Transylvanian mountains, yon hlackensen had now twenty-four divisions and six cavalry divisions operating against the Rumanian front. The defection of Russia had completely isolated Rumania from all contact with her Allies. Sur- Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015 rounded by immensely superior hostile masses, and having eventually tlie Petrograd I30lclievili Government as her enemy also, some form of capitulation leading to an ignominious peace, enforced by the Central Powers, as the alternative to estermination, was clearly inevitable. This peace, however, has not been recognized by tlie Entente Powers. It is the only satisfaction we have, the one ray of hope that the sacrifices and valour of this gallant little nation, in tlie cause of liberty, may not have been given, after all, in vain. The success of tlie short offensive of August, 1917,against German troops, the defence 6f the Vulcan Pass, early in the war, and the Battle of the Arges, while fortune favoured, are all military operations which do honour to the Rumanian Army. With loyal and intelligent THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN, 1916-17 437 co-operation on the part of the Ilussian forces that were within sup- porting distance, the Battle of the Arges might have put another complexion on the campaign. But everything depended on the Russians. If Imuerial Russia had honestly favoured Rumanian aspirations, the intervention of the Danubian Kingdom on the side of the Entente might have been the turning point in the war. Instead of this, the Imperial Government allowed the country to be overrun, and was apparently content to use the Rumanian rlrnij- to prolong the Russian front froni the Carpathians to the Black Sea by the line of the Sereth. Then, in August, 1917, as the final and culminating misfortune of tlfis devoted little State, Revolutionary Russia withdrew her troops in the very moment of yictory, aiid to 1ier own undoing, for a people that will not stand by its friends, and has not the courage to defend its principles and its 01vn liberty with arms, deserves to be enslaved. Nevertheless, this is poor satisfaction. Such an event in such an immense country as Russia would carry wit11 it unfathoniable dangers for the rest of the world. Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 19:51 18 March 2015