CSS Studie Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Zurich, November 2013 Lorenzo Vidino Center for Security Studies (CSS), etH Zürich CSS Studie Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Lorenzo Vidino © 2013 Lorenzo Vidino and the Center for Security Studies (CSS), etH Zurich Center for Security Studies (CSS) etH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, iFW CH – 8092 Zürich Switzerland tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 Fax: +41-44-632 19 41 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Author: Lorenzo Vidino Language editing: Sascha Langenbach Layout and front cover: Miriam dahinden Availability: this report can be accessed online at www.css.ethz.ch disclaimer: Any opinions expressed in this article present the views of the author alone and not necessarily those of the Center for Security Studies (CSS). CSS Studie Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Table of contents Executive summary 4 1 Introduction 5 1.1 Scope of the study 6 1.2 Terminology 6 1.3 Methodology 8 2 Historical evolution of Islamism and jihadism in Switzerland 9 2.1 The pioneers: the Brothers find refuge in Switzerland 10 2.2 First jihadist presences 12 2.3 The current phase 16 2.4 Swiss traveling for jihad 17 3 Radicalization and linkage 20 3.1 Potential radicalizing agents 21 3.2 The internet 22 3.3 The role of mosques 25 3.4 Gateway organizations 26 3.5 The controversial role of the iZRS 27 3.6 Links abroad 30 3.7 Hypotheses on linkage dynamics 34 4 Assessing the phenomenon 36 4.1 Explaining Switzerland’s low levels of radicalization 37 4.2 Potential counter-trends 38 4.3 Conclusion 42 CSS Studie Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Executive summary europe and train or fight with them. • Militants are not born in a vacuum. Rather, radicalization even though over the last twenty years some of its citi- takes place “at the intersection of an enabling environ- zens have been killed or kidnapped by various jihadist ment and a personal trajectory.” this report identifies mil- groups abroad, internally Switzerland has not witnessed itant Salafism as the ideological milieu from which jihad- jihadist activities on a significant scale.u nlike most West- ists, in Switzerland as elsewhere, can come from. An ern european countries, in fact, no successful terrorist at- automatic identification of Salafism with terrorism is a tack of jihadist inspiration has ever been perpetrated on gross analytical mistake. Moreover, even among those its territory and there is no publicly available information who interact with the most radical fringes of the Salafist indicating that concrete plans for an attack in Switzer- movement, only a marginal fraction will make the leap land were ever made. Less than a dozen individuals have into violent radicalism. But militant Salafism is the larger been tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of them involv- sea in which the fish swim. ing non-violent activities of material support and propa- • the report analyzes various factors that, often operating ganda. the number of Swiss residents who have traveled concurrently, contribute to radicalization: abroad to join jihadist groups is also estimated to be low- 1. the internet: the report finds evidence of a small, er than in most other european countries. loose-knit community of Swiss-based jihad enthusi- Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and ar- asts who interact among themselves and with like- gue that “Switzerland is not an island.” Counterterrorism minded individuals abroad on jihadist forums and on- officials have consistently claimed that there is ample line social networks. evidence suggesting that some of the same radicaliza- 2. Mosques: the overwhelming majority of Swiss tion trends that have long characterized other Western mosques reject extremism, but small groups of jihad european countries also exist in Switzerland, albeit on a enthusiasts congregate at the margins of some of smaller scale. Switzerland’s most conservative mosques or in private this report seeks to assess the size and dynamics prayer rooms. of jihadist radicalization in the country. its main findings 3. Gateway organizations: there are a handful of organi- are as follows: zations in Switzerland which do not advocate violence • While it is impossible to provide anything even close to themselves, but spread ideas that may lead others to an exact number, it can be argued that radicalization of do so. jihadist inspiration involves a negligible cross-section of 4. Links abroad: Swiss militants regularly interact with the Swiss Muslim community. there are probably only a like-minded individuals from countries where the couple of dozens of individuals in Switzerland who are ac- Salafist scene is more developed. it is common for tively involved in jihadist activities. Similarly, it can be ar- Swiss residents to travel abroad to participate in semi- gued that the number of those fully embracing jihadist nars and for foreign speakers to come to Switzerland. ideology is somewhere in the hundreds, and of those this interaction is particularly strong with the Salafist with varying degrees sympathizing with it is somewhere scenes in Germany and in the Balkans. in the lower thousands. • Patterns of linkage are very difficult to assess, but there • Basing the analysis on the admittedly limited number of are indications pointing to the presence of “gatekeepers” Swiss-based individuals who are known to have em- operating on Swiss territory that channel aspiring jihad- braced jihadist ideology, it is evident that jihadist enthu- ists in the direction of established groups operating in Af- siasts, as elsewhere in europe, do not have a common pro- rica, the Middle east or South Asia. file.i n the 1990s and early 2000s most of them were first • As in any other european country, radicalization of jihad- generation immigrants who had arrived in Switzerland ist inspiration seems to affect only a statistically marginal already radicalized. An example is the case of Moez Gar- segment of the Swiss Muslim population. But radicaliza- sallaoui and Malika el Aroud, the Fribourg-based adminis- tion in Switzerland appears to be a limited phenomenon trators of prominent jihadist forums who had contacts also when compared to other european countries. Four with the upper echelons of al Qaeda, or members of vari- factors can explain this difference: ous cells providing support to North African-based al Qa- 1. Lack of an “infecting cluster”: Switzerland never host- eda affiliates. Following a pattern common throughout ed an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihadists, europe, over the last few years an increasing number of elements that in other countries have been crucial in jihadist sympathizers have had homegrown characteris- spreading jihadist ideology. tics: born (or at least raised) in Switzerland, they radical- 2. Good degree of social, economic and cultural integra- ized independently in the country and operated largely tion of most Muslims living in Switzerland, rendering outside of the framework of established groups. Occa- them more resilient to extremist narratives. sionally some Swiss-based radicalized individuals man- 3. demographic characteristics of the Swiss Muslim pop- age to link up with al Qaeda-affiliated groups outside of ulation: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims trace 4 CSS Studie Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland their origins to the Balkans or turkey, where the vast Pakistan (2002), indonesia and Saudi Arabia (2003), and majority of Muslims traditionally espouses forms of is- Morocco (2011). Swiss citizens have also been the victims lam that are tolerant and apolitical. of kidnappings at the hand of jihadist militants in Algeria 4. Switzerland’s foreign policy, whose largely neutral (2003), Pakistan (2011), Mali (2009 and 2012), the Philip- stance does not provide a source of grievances. pines and Yemen (2012). Nevertheless, internally, Switzer- • While these concurrently operating factors can potential- land has decidedly not witnessed jihadist activities on a ly explain the low levels of jihadist radicalization in Swit- large scale. No successful terrorist attack of jihadist inspi- zerland, none of them is a guarantee. each, in fact, pres- ration has ever been perpetrated on its territory and there ents weaknesses and exceptions. Many of the dynamics is no publicly available information indicating that con- present throughout europe are visible also in Switzerland, crete plans for an attack in Switzerland were ever made.1 albeit on a much smaller scale. there are loosely knit mi- Less than a dozen individuals have been tried for terror- lieus in Switzerland, both in the virtual and physical ism-related crimes, all of them involving non-directly vio- world, that sympathize with jihadist ideology. And occa- lent activities of material support and propaganda. sionally individuals who belong to these milieus do make Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and ar- the leap from words to action. gue that “Switzerland is not an island.”2 Counterterrorism officials have consistently claimed that there is ample evidence suggesting that some of the same dynamics of radicalization that have long taken place in other West- ern european countries do exist also in Switzerland, albeit 1 Introduction on a smaller scale.3 in 2010, for example, director of Fed- eral Police Jean-Luc Vez stated that in Switzerland there Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 virtually all West- were a “few dozen” people that need to be “closely moni- ern european countries have considered terrorism of ji- tored” as potential violent jihadists.4 in 2011 Minister of hadist inspiration the most significant threat to their do- defense ueli Maurer warned about the small yet growing mestic security. even though the last large successful number of Swiss residents who visit training camps run attack (the July 7, 2005 London bombings) took place by jihadist organizations throughout the world and the eight years ago, dozens of plots have been thwarted possibility they could launch attacks upon their return to throughout europe ever since.