Loving Hate. Report Anti-Muslim Extremism, Radical Islamism and the Spiral of Polarization
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RESEARCH LOVING HATE. REPORT ANTI-MUSLIM EXTREMISM, RADICAL ISLAMISM AND THE SPIRAL OF POLARIZATION RESENTMENT PREJUDICE EXCLUSION DISCRIMINATION POLARIZATION STIGMATIZATION ESCALATION VICTIMIZATION DEMONIZATION CONSPIRACY RADICALIZATION VIOLENCE In cooperation with: by: Maik Fielitz, Julia Ebner, Jakob Guhl and Matthias Quent Jena/London/Berlin 2018 LOVING HATE. ANTI-MUSLIM EXTREMISM, RADICAL ISLAMISM AND THE SPIRAL OF POLARIZATION 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Summary This report focuses on the interactional dynamics between anti-Muslim extremists and radical Islamists in Germany and beyond. It reveals ideological underpinnings, approaches to mobiliza- tion and communication patterns, which all prove to be analogous on both sides, and it places emphasis on the reciprocity of hate that may serve to intensify processes of individual and group radicalization. Our study presents the first systematic analysis of the interplay between both forms of extremism that plays out on different places on the Internet. It provides direct evidence showing that Islamist and far-right movements converge at different levels and mutually amplify one another. The analy- sis focuses on measuring the online interaction between extremist content, individuals and events. Overall, over 10,000 Islamist and far-right Facebook posts and over one million German anti-Muslim tweets between 1 January 2013 and 30 November 2017 were analyzed for this study. Additionally, we conducted three months of ethnographic research into encrypted pro-IS and pro-Al-Qaeda groups on Telegram as well as into far-right chat groups. Key Findings Radical Islamism and anti-Muslim racism, which manifest themselves in the form of far-right ex- tremism and right-wing populism exhibit a symbiotic relationship. In the context of glocal interac- tion patterns, the far right operates as a national sphere of resonance for international jihadism. Both negate and dismantle basic democratic values such as the inviolability of human dignity and religious freedom. What’s more, racism against Muslims paves the way for radicalization through Islamic fundamentalists. We identified three key patterns that reveal common worldviews and argumentative resemblance: First, the demonization of enemies based on a clear distinction between friend and foe. Second, the victimization of one’s own group as both sides take advantage of the alleged discrimination of their own group and the constructed dominance of the other. Third, conspiracy, which is the basic explanation provided for why the respective milieus do not share their exclusionary claim to truth. The alleged systematic blindness caused by the Jews or fake news are needed to balance the dissonance between claims and reality as well as to contribute to demonizing other groups. 2 When considering the interaction between the two groups, three developments stand out: ■ Mutual Learning: Both movements learn from one another in terms of their communication strategies, tactical innovation and security needs. Far-right extremists and Islamists familiarize themselves with successful models of intervening into larger circles and strive to create safe (digital) spaces. ■ Strategic references: The provocative act of adopting symbols is especially prevalent among far right groups. Paradoxically, within these circles, a certain degree of recognition is articulated in regard to the strategic and operative approaches taken by Islamist groups. ■ Reciprocal radicalization: Interactions between Islamist and far-right extremists tend to take place when a common discursive framework is generated among the public through events with a high level of media exposure. In some cases, an increase in hate crimes can be observed directly following high-profile events involving the the opposing side. As such, certain events can be deemed as triggers of an escalation spiral that amplifies a transition from prejudiced attitudes to hate crimes. Strong Interplay of content: Our discourse analysis of more than 10,000 Islamist and far-right posts revealed a strong interaction between the narratives of both extremes. By frequently employing victimhood and demonization narratives and normalizing the idea of an imminent civil war, Isla- mists and far-right extremists rhetorically validate each other. Shared vocabulary: Linguistic analysis of the posts of Islamist and far-right accounts also show major overlaps in their vocabulary: However, Islamist terms are used more frequently by far-right users than by Islamist ones. Common narratives: Our observations revealed shared narratives between Islamists and far-right extremists, which mainly focus on three elements: the victimization of the “in-group“, the demoni- zation of the “out-group“, and conspiracy theories about political elites and the media. Asymmetry in online hate speech: Recently introduced measures by Facebook and Twitter had a significant effect on the online extremism landscape. Our analysis shows that communication by Is- lamist extremists has been greatly constrained, forcing them to soften their rhetoric when compared to early 2017. This applies much less to the propaganda and networks of far-right extremists. The extent of openly far-right and anti-Muslim contents easily surpasses the extent of Islamist contents. 3 Limited direct interactions: The majority of all registered interactions between far-right extremists and Islamists were indirect: they often spoke of one another, but rarely with one another. References to the other side of the extremist spectrum were especially common in reaction to political events, demonstrations and acts of violence. Far-right posts about Islamists and Islamist posts about the far-right primarily served as a means to present oneself as the victim and construct a bogeyman. Strong far-right reactions to Islamist events: The analysis of more than one million anti-Muslim posts between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2017 revealed significant spikes in the volume of anti-Muslim contributions on social media in the aftermath of Islamist terror attacks. Additionally, the basic level of anti-Muslim posts rose with almost every attack. Strong islamist reactions to far-right events: Our observation of pro-IS and pro-Al Qaida groups also showed clear Islamist reactions to far-right events and activities. Both far-right demonstrations as well as political events such as the electoral success of the AfD were used to reinforce the image of the anti-Muslim West and use it as a recruitment tool. Mutual dependency: The results illustrate the interdependent relationship between far-right ex- tremists and Islamists. Since the respective enemy is necessary for the propagandist purposes of lending credibility to their narratives and legitimacy to their activities, the two extremes need each other. Recommendations Based on our analysis, we conclude that both forms of group-focused enmity must be considered together if the processes of mutual radicalization and social polarization are to be stopped. We therefore urgently recommend that an approach is taken which considers both forms as being part of the same phenomenon. More work on research and education: In-depth studies and analyses about the online dynamics and the phenomenon of reciprocal radicalization are urgently needed to create a more sophisticat- ed understanding and awareness of the topic among policy-makers, media-stakeholders and civil society. We especially recommend the development of a holistic framework and methods toolkit to measure reciprocal radicalization and its influence on the political discourse. Additionally, we advise building better technological capacities for the analysis of online dynamics, such as the closer cooperation with social media companies. 4 Equal efforts to fight both types of extremism online: Measures to remove dangerous and hateful speech should be applied in equal measure to both types of extremism online. Our analysis shows that more restrictive regulations for online hate speech have led to a significant diminution of Islamist content, but have not led to the same results on the far-right side. Sensitivity to the effects of co-radicalization: The position assumed by the police, media and civil society is a decisive factor for how interactions between both groups are configured. Governmental interventions should therefore be based on in-depth analyses of the situation at hand and attempt to ensure precise differentiation so as to not push individuals from the grey areas into the arms of the radicalized groups. Building resilience among civil society: Consistently removing contents that clearly threat- en violence or violate existing hate speech laws is an urgent necessity. While we observed the moderating effect achieved by recent measures aimed at online Islamist discourse that have been taken by social media companies, not all extremist content can or should be re- moved. For the remaining contents that do not clearly incite violence or violate existing hate speech laws, civil society needs to step up to challenge the extremist narratives spread through such contents. Hence, we recommend developing and promoting counter-narra- tives and campaigns to strengthen civil society‘s resilience towards extremist propaganda. This mainly concerns building up resources and networks, which enable quick responses to far-right and Islamist activities. This will ensure that extremists are prevented from framing the prevailing discourse in the aftermath of terror attacks, demonstrations, election results and other events that