Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.7, April 2004

TOP NEWS INSIDE, p.3: Top Russian analysts debate vote’s • Putin wins with 71%, claims reform mandate implications for democracy, “liberal” parties • Experts debate future of democracy, liberalism • Kharitonov beats expectations with 14% DATES TO REMEMBER: • Khakamada leaves SPS, forms “Free Russia” December 2007: Next Duma election March 2008: Next presidential election party after “satisfactory” 4% in presidential race • OSCE cites violations of democratic principles FOR MORE IN ENGLISH: • Yabloko claims surge in membership, calls Carnegie Center: www.carnegie.ru reports of its demise premature RFE/RL: www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection

RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE:

80 71.3 70 Percentage casting ballots for each presi- 60 dential candidate on 50 March 14, 2004. Turnout: 64.3% 40

30 13.7 20 4.1 3.8 3.5 10 2 0.8

0 Putin Kharitonov Glaziev Khakamada Malyshkin Mironov Against All

Final official results as reported by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

RUSSIA’S ELECTIONS: ed candidate debates, forewent television campaign adver- tisements, and relied heavily on free positive coverage on THE POLITICAL FALLOUT state-owned mass media. While the 2003-04 campaign trail took a number of unex- pected turns, it ultimately brought Russians right back to Unlike 2000, however, this time Putin did not even put an where they had been and expected to emphasis on legions of official campaign representatives ral- be all along: firmly under the lying voters intensively at factories and public meeting places. leadership of President Vladimir V. Instead, the pressure was on Russia’s regional governors, Putin, who won 71% of the vote. many of whose budgets are heavily dependent on transfers Since they had no hope of beating from the federal government, to guarantee that turnout surpass Putin, his rivals focused on beating the 50% necessary for the elections to count and to ensure that expectations. As the final weeks of most of those who turned out (like the man at left) cast ballots the campaign brought few surprises, pundits spent most of for Putin. While challengers Irina Khakamada and Sergei election night debating how many Kharitonovs, Glazievs, Glaziev charged that many irregularities took place, few and Khakamadas could fit on the head of Russia’s political doubt that Putin is supported by a clear majority of the popu- pin. A bigger question, though, remains: What do the lation. Indeed, a few observers remarked that his 71% was elections mean for the fate of democracy in Russia? actually below the support levels he had been registering in the most reliable opinion polls. Naturally, Putin then claimed The “uncampaign” strategy that helped bring Putin to office a major mandate to continue radical market reforms, to re- in 2000 worked again in 2004 although this time around there structure state administration, and to continue the restoration was even more “un” than before. As in 2000, Putin eschew- of order across Russia’s vast territory.

Meanwhile, many of the election’s losers spent a lot of the Pensioners Party, the People’s Party, Dmitry Rogozin’s time arguing that they were in fact winners. Khakamada Motherland Party, and even Viktor Anpilov’s ultra-leftist claimed that her 3.8% was a democratic protest vote that Working Russia. Semigin intoned that the KPRF’s summer justified her creation of a new party, which she named party congress is likely to oust Zyuganov and that the new Free Russia in order to emphasize its opposition to what leadership would bring the party into the “patriotic” coalition she said were autocratic trends in Russia under Putin. reflected by Semigin’s Congress of Russian Patriots. As for Breaking with her former party, SPS, she effected a ma- Glaziev, almost all observers regarded his 4.1% of the vote as jor split in that party along pro- and anti-Putin lines. The a decisive defeat. Having alienated the Communists by form- rump of SPS is now largely controlled by the pro-Putin ing the Motherland bloc for the 2003 Duma elections, and Anatoly Chubais, head of the electricity monopoly Uni- then having lost the helm of Motherland after undertaking an fied Energy Systems. Khakamada and her supporters independent bid for Russia’s presidency, Glaziev found him- talked of cooperation with Yabloko, an initiative that the self politically isolated. He announced that while he would latter’s leader Grigory Yavlinsky supported. While a retain his Duma seat, he would devote much of his time to few top Yabloko figures accepted state posts after the academia, where he began his professional life. As for Rus- Duma election, including Vladimir Lukin as Russia’s sia’s most famous nationalist, Liberal Democratic Party of human rights ombudsman, Yavlinsky called Yabloko the Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky claimed a victory of only large party in the pro-democracy, pro-market side sorts for his chief bodyguard, Oleg Malyshkin, who in March of the political spectrum, stoutly opposing authoritarian 2004 managed to garner about the same percentage of the trends. Yavlinsky even claimed that Yabloko’s member- presidential vote as did his charismatic boss in the 2000 presi- ship had surged since its December 2003 defeat in the dential race (about 2%). Putin “double” and Federation Coun- Duma race. (What should “liberals” do to revive their for- cil Speaker Sergei Mironov attracted less than 1% of the vote tunes? See Kara-Murza’s view on p.3.) and was barely visible at all after the election.

On the political left, most analysts regarded Nikolai As the results rolled in, observers both inside and outside Rus- Kharitonov’s 14% showing as a relative success, con- sia began to debate the implications for the fate of democracy firming that the Communists could net a large share of (for an optimistic Russian view, see Nikonov on p.5; for a more criti- the vote even with a very weak candidate, thereby reaf- cal interpretation, read Kolmakov on p.4). Most official represen- firming the KPRF as Russia’s number-two political tatives of the international community expressed concern. In a force. Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was March 15 press release, the OSCE echoed its assessment of thus quick to proclaim victory for his wing of the party the December 2003 Duma election, calling the presidential over his leftist rivals, notably the ambitious Communist race “generally well administered but lacking elements of a millionaire Gennady Semigin as well as former KPRF genuine democratic contest.” Topping the list of problems Duma fraction member and presidential candidate Sergei cited in the OSCE’s preliminary report was a stark television Glaziev. According to Zyuganov, Kharitonov showed news bias in favor of Putin on the major networks, all of that the party and its “popular patriotic” message is in which are state-controlled. But the Commonwealth of Inde- fine shape; had the playing field been fair, he opined, pendent States delegation, representing Russia’s neighbors in Kharitonov would have gotten even more of the vote. its “near abroad,” were more upbeat, declaring the vote “free, This was clearly a dig at Semigin, who soon convened a democratic, and fair,” reported RFE/RL Newsline. “Congress of Russian Patriots” that included representa- tives of Gennady Seleznev’s Party of Russian Revival, — Henry E. Hale, Indiana University

Russian Election Watch can be found online at http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/publications/rew.html

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected] Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation, editing, and layout and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support. The editor is also grateful to the Carnegie Moscow Center for moral and logistical support.

SOURCE FOR PHOTOS IN Vol.3, No.7: www.1tv.ru, accessed April 4, 2004.

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INSIDER INFORMATION: CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS BY LEADING RUSSIAN PRACTITIONERS

WE WILL REALIZE THE LIBERAL PROJECT IF… Alexei Kara-Murza Member of the Political Council of the ______

SOME KEY POINTS: ting tighter, inaction or a gesture at evidence that the liberal project in * Khakamada campaign was impor- action by liberals and democrats only Russia is possible. In the current situa- tant stand against Kremlin’s politi- aggravates this. tion it was extremely important to cal monopoly Therefore Irina Khakamada’s posi- ascertain this. I am sure that the par- * Her good results buoy democrats tion, her personal project, put into ticulars of the voting in various re- * Liberals must not bide time until action in the presidential elections, gions will reveal the areas that are the next elections but get to work now was more appropriate to the situation. most promising in terms of a liberal * Legal reform, monitoring of me- I think that this is something many electorate and will draw a new politi- dia, and nurturing provinces at top of those who tried in other ways to cal map of Russia. of liberal agenda take a stand against the monopoly of When I tallied the results of the the current government will start to elections together with Irina understand although they will proba- Khakamada’s campaign staff, at first won the presidential bly not admit it openly. Moreover, I it seemed that she might get over 4% elections before they happened. In believe that some of the democrats’ of the votes. Although that did not end light of that, it doesn’t make sense to old leaders are annoyed by up happening, the final result made a dwell on the strategies and administra- Khakamada’s rather good results. very favorable impression on all those tive resources used in the campaign Irina Khakamada performed quite present. itself. The problem is much broader well in the presidential elections, re- It showed that in Russia there are — in Russia there is a monopoly on ceiving 2,600,000 votes. This is a people who think strategically, politi- power and the interpretation of policy half-million more votes than the Un- cally sophisticated experts, who have that operates during campaign seasons ion of Right Forces (SPS) got in the joined up with this project, which has as well as between them. parliamentary elections. While received the moral and intellectual In this political model, elections do Khakamada’s percentage was the support of political, artistic, and liter- not define political periods but are same (she got 3.9% of votes), voter ary figures. instead a continuation of the same turnout in the presidential elections I have the sense that our holiday was political monopoly, just by slightly was higher. the happiest. Strange as it may seem, different means. She achieved these results even the result, formally the same as that of For precisely this reason the liberals though neither SPS nor Yabloko offi- SPS in the parliamentary elections, and democrats should not concentrate cially supported her. SPS started to has a completely opposite psychologi- exclusively on electoral campaigns. push for a boycott, and Yavlinsky cal feel. If the SPS result was depress- For us it is important to change the generally took an odd tack, calling on ing, Irina Khakamada’s result inspires atmosphere and the very political his supporters to come to the polls and cautious optimism. situation in the country. After all, ad- take their ballots home. Some actually In the end, to interpret these elec- ministrative resources are at work did that. But the point of this approach tions is itself to continue the work of even in between elections and have is totally unclear: after all, these peo- the administrative resource, which is already started to look ahead to the ple didn’t lower turnout, which is the only thing we really have in Rus- next four years. based on the number of ballots dis- sia. The power monopoly is obvious. tributed to registered voters. In this Indeed, bureaucracy does not shift The question is what to do about it. It way, Yabloko overtly took votes away gears during an election. It is like a seems to me that the idea of an elec- from Khakamada. bulldozer that tramples the political tion boycott and the attempt to un- However, the electorate turned out field on a daily basis. Therefore the dermine voter turnout were com- to be smarter than its leaders. People goal of liberals and democrats is obvi- pletely inappropriate. came and voted even though a portion ous — they must change the lay of the One can learn democracy only when of voters was disoriented, of course. political land. To do this it is essential one participates directly in democratic Khakamada’s showing was achieved to move in several directions. processes. At a moment when the mo- as a result of a very brief but con- We must work to continue legal nopolistic grip on political life is get- certed effort. We gained indisputable reform. Since there is no independent

3 judiciary in Russia, all legal suits in- the same lines as the BBC in Great governors are handily reelected, in- volving parliamentary and presidential Britain. cluding some to a third term, is an elections simply drown in bureau- We must consistently work to culti- ongoing problem though it is happen- cratic delays and usually yield no re- vate the political landscape in the ing less and less. sult. provinces. Elections in Russia are The areas to work on are obvious. We must change the state of infor- continually taking place. We have to understand clearly that we mation in Russia. It is a question of Currently there are some politicians will be able to count on relative suc- placing the electronic media under who want to take a break and come cess three or four years from now only public control. On this score, there is a back in three or four years. This is if we work today to establish a foun- lot of talk but little action. In the completely misguided because politi- dation for participation in future elec- meantime, it is extremely important to cal life in Russia doesn’t happen just tions. █ create some sort of organ of public in the center; it is continuously regen- control over electronic media along erated in the regions. The way many

POST-ELECTION REFLECTIONS Sergei Kolmakov Vice-President of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia ______

SOME KEY POINTS: opposition electorate who showed up an unwillingness to accept just any * Low turnout tempers Putin vic- at the polls. initiatives from the popular president. tory, points to discontent among Similarly, the Russian media’s geo- Data from the big cities attest to seri- liberals and conservatives graphic numbers paint a very trou- ous dissatisfaction among the liberal * Opposition voters pushed turn- bling picture. Of the ten regions of electorate, disturbed by the escalation out above necessary 50% Russia with the highest voter turnout, of authoritarian tendencies in the * Kremlin strategy to bulldoze nine are national-minority-designated country and the havoc the Kremlin has political parties leads to extrem- republics with a strong tradition of so- wreaked in the right of the electoral ism, low voter turnout in future called “managed electorates.” Only spectrum. * Kremlin’s task of rebuilding one is an ethnically Russian province, Conservatives are unhappy with the party system now very difficult Orel, where the popularity of the cur- policies Putin has pursued, consider-

By any standards, the very predict- rent governor, Yegor Stroev, always ing them too liberal and pro-Western. able results of the presidential elec- drives the vote. Every time he has run The Kremlin’s cynical use of the tions confirm the legitimacy of Presi- for governor, he has gotten between Motherland bloc to achieve its elec- dent Putin’s reelection. The President 80% and 95% of the ballots. toral goals in the December Duma received two-thirds (71.3%) of votes At the same time, in Russia’s largest elections, followed by the bloc’s or- cast with 64% voter turnout. cities — Moscow, St. Petersburg, No- ganizational collapse and the persecu- However, looking at the numbers vosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Yekaterin- tion of one of its leaders, Glaziev, and putting aside the spin, Putin’s burg, and Nizhny Novgorod — voter testifies to power holders’ own fear of triumphal picture does not look so turnout was relatively low and support the demand for radical authoritarian- rosy and perfect. Without any real for President Putin was below the ism, which they themselves aroused in challengers, the 2004 presidential national average. the public. elections largely resembled a plebi- The electoral “experiment” con- The policy of destroying the politi- scite, in which the main indicator is ducted by the leadership of Kras- cal organizations that have developed not the percentage of votes for the noyarsk Krai in using virtually none on both the right and the left is fraught current president (this number was of the so-called administrative re- with the risk of a rise in voter absen- entirely predictable) but voter turnout. sources is quite interesting. Reflecting teeism in future elections and in radi- In absolute numbers, of the 108 mil- Russian elections on the whole, Kras- calization of the political extremes. It lion voters registered for these elec- noyarsk has long been viewed as a is telling that Communist Party tions, only 49 million cast ballots for Russian New Hampshire. For the (KPRF) candidate Nikolai Khari- Putin. Thirty-eight million did not 2004 presidential elections, voter tonov’s comparatively good showing participate in the elections (that is, turnout in Krasnoyarsk barely topped (14%) was accompanied by a drop in they voted “with their feet” against the 50% (the worst turnout in the coun- the Communist electorate’s willing- process itself), and just over 20 mil- try). President Putin won 60% of ness to come out in subsequent elec- lion voted for other candidates or votes, and his main challenger in this tions. According to some polls, the “against all.” region was Sergei Glaziev, who got number of these voters who said they Thus, turnout reached the 50% nec- over 17% of votes (while in Russia at would support future Communist can- essary for the election to count thanks large he took only 4.1%). didates has dipped to 8-9%. only to the approximately 20% of the What do all these numbers mean? The use of its amassed administra- They indicate a lack of total trust and tive resources notwithstanding, the

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President and his election team did not Consequently, United Russia has The task of rebuilding the political- really rely on United Russia’s organi- effectively wound up outside the sys- party system, a task that will doubt- zation for the whole campaign period. tem of political-party checks and bal- lessly loom before the new presiden- The results of the 2003-2004 elec- ances; now there are no limitations on tial administration, is becoming ex- toral cycle provide grounds to confirm it at all. Under such circumstances, traordinarily complicated. █ a major weakening of the KPRF, United Russia itself ceases to fulfill

Yabloko, and SPS as well as a slow- the most important function of a party ing of Motherland’s plan to become a — to channel the public’s demands full-fledged opposition party. and get them considered in policy.

THE ELECTIONS AND THE “DEATH OF RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY” Vyacheslav Nikonov President of the POLITY Foundation

SOME KEY POINTS: moved not from Yeltsin-style democ- three years ago, and since then not one * Russian democracy is alive and well racy to a kind of new autocracy but poll has shown a decline. * Yeltsin’s Russia was less democratic rather from total anarchy to moderate Putin’s problem in the March elec- than Putin’s anarchy. Some entrepreneurs and citi- tions was not getting as many votes as * Democratic progress is not only zens have even started to pay taxes. possible but getting too many with the occurring but relatively quickly Second, this trajectory does not dis- inevitable risk of accusations of dicta- * Public likes Putin for good reasons turb me so much as it inspires my torship (although in the recent Geor- * The elections were fair: people like optimism. As a rule, the government gian elections, which the West recog- Putin so they reelected him takeover of Boris Berezovsky’s TV nized as the height of democracy, the station, Gazprom’s acquisition of winner received 97% of votes). It seems that the results of the presi- Vladimir Gusinsky’s TV station, and Putin is popular not because of any dential elections on March 14 are of the arrest of democratic deficit. In the last four interest to no one. Cynics are telling a are cited as proof of “the end of de- years the Russian economy grew at an joke: Putin liked the inauguration so mocracy.” Acknowledging that these average rate of 6.8% per year, and the much he bought himself an automatic events are not exactly immaculate, population’s earnings increased even inaugurator. In the West and liberal people’s views of them depend on faster. circles in Russia, scores lament the their feelings for individual oligarchs, Next to his predecessor, Putin wins untimely end of Russian democracy. which is fair. Only a person who by contrast in the eyes of voters: he is Are things really that bad? Is democ- knows nothing about these men could young, sober, energetic, and Russians racy really dead? I’m not so sure. I consider Berezovsky a democrat or don’t have to be ashamed of him. think it is a case of the glass being Khodorkovsky a model taxpayer. Moreover, Putin had no serious either half-full or half-empty. In light of all this, it hardly makes challengers. Those who could have First, you can’t bury that which has sense to ignore the many signs of pro- given him any competition — Zhiri- not yet truly been born. Only the ex- gress towards greater democracy. It is novsky, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, tremely naïve can consider the politi- impossible to imagine another scene Nemtsov — cravenly withdrew to the cal regime of Yeltsin’s Russia to be of tanks shooting at a democratically shadows, from which the majority of democratic. Yes, it saw the first insti- elected parliament as we saw in 1993. them have yet to emerge. They, not tutions of democracy sprout in Russia It is impossible to imagine the Com- Putin, chose their fate. — there were competitive elections, a munists’ return to power as in 1996 Fourth, democracy in its clean and parliament convened. But anarchy and when such a scenario was more than ideal forms doesn’t just appear. The lack of any sort of leadership were the realistic. development of democracy takes time. dominant traits of the regime. This There is even progress in the elec- In the United States’ first hundred was combined with the oligarchy — toral process. As an insider to all the years of democracy, slavery existed; through corruption, businessmen close Russian elections of the post-Soviet in the first 150 years, women couldn’t to Yeltsin acquired multi-billion- period, I can say with complete confi- vote; and in the first 190 years, blacks dollar properties and opened any door dence that the 2003-2004 campaigns couldn’t either. in the Kremlin with their left foot. were cleaner and more transparent In Russia, democratic institutions Add to this an eastern despotism, than, say, those of 1996 or 1999. are developing 12 years after a mil- since it is only in sultanates or emir- Third, elections can be considered lennium of totalitarianism or, at best, ates that the family of the head of state fair if they adequately reflect the cur- of strict authoritarianism. By average really governs. rent preferences of the public. It is world standards, democracy in Russia Today the same institutions — elec- laughable to see Putin’s victory as the is developing at breakneck pace. tions, parliament — are in place. The result of some sort of campaign ma- The latest issue of Foreign Affairs oligarchs are kept at a distance from nipulation. The current level of sup- opens with the article “A Normal the levers of power, and Putin’s rela- port for the President was established Country.” Its authors, Andrei Shleifer tives do not lead the country. We have and Daniel Treisman, argue that, for a

5 state at its level of development, Rus- in the world from Latin America to mature democracy. But it is far from sia is normal to the point of being East Asia, Russia doesn’t look bad. hopeless. It simply needs time. And its boring. Its democratic institutions are In the jargon of transitional politics, demos are conscientious citizens who not that advanced compared with Russia’s current regime is not authori- are striving to remake their lives on countries where democracy goes back tarian at all but an undeveloped or their own.█ a few centuries. But in comparison unconsolidated democracy. Such a with the majority of democratic states regime does not necessarily become a

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