Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.5, February 2004

TOP NEWS • Putin leads nearest presidential rival by 75% • Seven candidates qualify for presidential ballot

• Khakamada blasts Putin on 2002 hostage deaths • Putin to skip candidate debates • Some liberals call for election boycott • Candidate Rybkin disappears for five days • United takes control of Duma committees • Moderate replaces nationalist Rogozin as Duma foreign affairs committee chair

SEE INSIDE P.2: How strong is Russian trust in Putin? Pp.5-13: Putin’s Second Term: An insider on foreign policy plans (Nikonov, p.5); opposing views on the fate of Russian democracy (Domrin, p.6; Michaleva, p.8); TRACKING THE POLLS: and leading experts on the future of big business How the Presidential Race Now Stands:

(Kolmakov, p.10) and federalism (Petrov, p.11). Nov.-Dec. January Putin 75% 79% On the Campaign Trail Glaziev 2 4 THE PUTIN JUGGERNAUT Kharitonov — 2 With the official start of media campaigning for president Khakamada — 1 set for February 12, tension fills the Russian air. But the Gerashchenko — 1 tension has everything to do with a recent wave of terror- Mironov — 1 ism and virtually nothing to do with electoral battle. Incumbent towers so far above other Malyshkin — < 1 candidates that few even call the election a race. With the Rybkin — < 1 major TV networks firmly under state control and at least Against All — 4 one of the six other candidates campaigning for him, Putin Hard to Say — 6 is unlikely to face an attack strong enough to bring down these numbers significantly. Just to be sure, he recently January figures are from polling agency VTsIOM-A’s survey of 1,601 adult citizens nationwide conducted January 23-27, 2004. Numbers represent announced he will skip the candidate debates. At least two the percentage of respondents who, given the list of candidates, say they opponents appear prepared to mount spirited challenges, would cast their ballots for a given candidate if the presidential election but they are looking less to March 2004 than to March were held the following Sunday, counting only those who intend to vote. 2008. Meanwhile, Putin’s favorite party, United Russia, On the November-December poll, see the January issue of REW. continues to tighten its control over the Duma and to set its sights on the Kasyanov government, which it hopes to replace after Putin wins reelection. (Is Russia on the road to DATES TO REMEMBER autocracy or democracy? See Domrin, p.6, and Michaleva, p.8.) February 12, 2004: Mass media campaigning begins March 14, 2004: Presidential election THE UNCAMPAIGN Putin’s chief strategy is simply to continue to be presiden- dents. Claiming to represent the whole nation rather than tial in public eyes by meeting with foreign dignitaries, any one political party, he spurned United Russia nomina- traveling the country, and, most importantly, staying tion and declared that he would run as an independent, even above the political fray. Standing up for Russian interests though this meant a costly signature-collection drive from in the wake of the Iraq war, he met with Colin Powell in which party nominees are exempt. Casting virtually nothing . (Will Putin’s second term bring a foreign policy as “campaigning,” he nevertheless used his travels to project change? Turn to Nikonov on p. 5.) Signaling his concern certain messages. In the city of Cheboksary, for example, for Russian interests in its “near abroad,” he traveled to he discussed his vision for regional economic development. Ukraine and Kazakhstan and consulted with their presi- (Is Putin ending Russian federalism? See Petrov on p. 11.) More dramatically, in his native city of St. Petersburg, Yet no rival has even come close to such levels of public he met with veterans’ groups and visited the spot known trust, and, with the state largely barring negative stories and as the “Neva Nickel,” where his father fought and was advertisements about Putin on its TV networks, no one thus wounded during the 900-day siege of Leningrad by Nazi far has been able to exploit this wariness effectively. Germany.

While Putin recently tapped first deputy chief of staff THE UNRACE Dmitry Kozak (below) to head his campaign, his main In the 2004 presidential race, Putin faces only two challeng- goal is essentially to keep the campaign invisible and in ers who can be considered half-way serious, and both have fact to cast “campaigning” as a dirty activity pursued by been unable even to secure the full support of their own par- petty men and women who are only out for themselves. ties. The stronger, polling 4% with Thus after a horrific explosion killed some 40 innocents less than two months to go before on a packed subway train in the election, is Motherland bloc early February, he called for leader Sergei Glaziev (left). This a tough response and hinted past fall, the Kremlin helped this that anyone who questioned leftist economist’s bloc go from him was basely using a trag- nonexistence to 9% of the vote in edy for political ends or, the Duma race as a way of defeat- worse, was in cahoots with ing the Communists. Now, how- the terrorists. Not only has ever, Putin’s forces reportedly see him as the closest thing to Putin announced that he will an obstacle to a first-round victory for the President, which skip the debates, but he has requires winning more than 50% of the vote. Glaziev, declined to make any use of known primarily for his calls to radically hike taxes on su- the free television airtime to per-rich natural resource companies, says that he finds Putin which he is entitled by Rus- personally appealing but that his policies are not tough sian law. Of course, as in- enough. (Read Kolmakov, p. 10, on the future of Russian cumbent, he can count on extensive coverage of his own big business.) activities as a newsmaker. This same “uncampaign” strategy produced a landslide victory for him in 2000, All this has severely complicated and he has seen no reason to change it. relations between Glaziev and Motherland co-chair, Kremlin Indeed, his imagemakers have fellow-traveler and nationalist been highly effective in helping . (right). Curi- him sustain a “presidential” ously, the bloc formally nomi- image. Remarkably, his public nated not Glaziev, but former trust ratings have often been Central Bank head Viktor Gerashchenko, who was subse- close to 80% since he took of- quently disqualified by the Central Election Commission on fice. Some of this support is a technicality. Glaziev proceeded to cast himself as an al- iron-clad, with 10-20% of res- ternative candidate getting on the ballot as an independent in (Central Election Commission pondents regularly saying that case Gerashchenko’s candidacy fell through. Rogozin, reviews signatures) they trust him “fully,” as however, disavowed Glaziev’s run, declaring that shown in the graph below. The numbers also indicate, Gerashchenko was the bloc’s only horse in the race and that however, that most of those who support Putin are keep- the party would fight for his reinstatement by the Supreme ing at least some distance from him, reporting that they Court. Shortly thereafter, while Rogozin was out of the “tend to” trust but do not fully trust him as president. country in Strasbourg, Glaziev convened Motherland dele-

RESPONSES (IN %) TO “IN WHAT MEASURE DO YOU TRUST VLADIMIR PUTIN?”

100

80 Total Trust in Putin 60

40

20 "Tend to" Trust "Fully" Trust 0 Jul Jan Nov Feb Nov Feb Jun Nov Mar Sep Sep Mar Sep May Aug May May 2000 2001 2002 2003 Polls taken by VTsIOM-A representative nationwide samples of Russian citizens, http://www.vciom-a.ru/prezident.html, accessed February 5, 2004.

2 gates to reorganize as a “social organization,” getting cians effectively conceded the himself elected sole leader in the process and relegating presidency to Putin. As noted in Rogozin to one of 25 seats on a governing council. the January issue of Russian Elec- Rogozin charged that this move was illegitimate and, tion Watch, the Communist Party once the Supreme Court disqualified Gerashchenko once (KPRF) and the Liberal Democratic and for all, he endorsed Putin for president. Party of Russia (LDPR) both benched their party leaders and The only other active Putin opponent, fielded small-time figures, Nikolai Khari- (left), declared an tonov (left) and Oleg Malyshkin (right, with independent run for the presidency Zhirinovsky), respectively, whose main jobs back in December after her party, the are to keep their party brands in public view (SPS), failed to and to prevent anyone other than Putin from clear the five-percent threshold in the encroaching on their electorates. Duma race and refused to nominate anyone for president. Hoping to energize democratic In fact, other than Putin, the candidate who made the most voters disaffected with Putin, she made political waves headlines in the race did so because he took inactivity to a in mid-January by publicly accusing him of sacrificing new extreme. In a move he later explained as an attempt to the victims of the 2002 hostage crisis in a Moscow thea- get away from it all, former Duma speaker and Security ter by ordering the use of toxic gas and then covering up Council chief (below right) simply hopped a that the gas was in fact toxic, all for political gain (photo train to Ukraine on February 6 with- of rescue at right). “I out telling his campaign manager or come to the inevitable even his wife. The latter two then conclusion that this filed a missing persons report, only terrorist act helped for him to turn up five days later and whip up anti-Chechen apologize. Few expect him to net hysteria, continue the many votes in this contest; he has not war in , and been able even to rise above the one- bolster the high rating percent mark in the polls. In fact, some commentators have of the President. I am predicted that he will withdraw to clear the way for convinced that the attempts to hide the truth in the cur- Khakamada. But experts see him as someone who might rent situation are, in essence, a state crime, and therefore nevertheless go down fighting since he is a member of the I have made the decision to advance my candidacy for “Liberal Russia” party linked with the disgraced anti-Putin the presidential elections,” she railed. “oligarch” Boris Berezovsky, who presumably can be counted on for significant financing. Rybkin has denied While a few newspapers receiving such funding and has shown no signs of spending carried this statement as a it so far. paid ad, RFE/RL Newsline noted that others refused to The only other candidate to qualify for the run it, citing Russian law ballot is one of Putin’s closest associates, barring mass media cam- Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov paign advertising until Feb- (left), running as a “backup” candidate for ruary 12. The same source pro-Kremlin forces. Other declared candi- reported that Russia’s two biggest television networks dates, businessmen Vladimir Bryntsalov and made no mention of the accusations, while the third al- Anzori Aksentev-Kikalishvili, pulled out in January before luded only to “serious” charges against the President. attempting to submit the signatures they needed to get onto Her declaration had a polarizing effect even within SPS. the ballot. The party’s most powerful and Putin-friendly personal- ity, United Energy Systems chief Anatoly Chubais (be- A few political forces, notably the liberal Yabloko party and low), said that he was no longer able to support some human-rights organizations, have called on voters to Khakamada for president. boycott the elections in order to protest what Yabloko leader According to one estimate, Grigory Yavlinsky (right) called “the about half of all delegates to an slide of the country into authoritarian- SPS party congress in late ism.” This has not made much of an January agreed with him, impact in the polls, although the num- declining for a second time to ber of people saying they will likely back her candidacy. Many in vote has been declining over the past SPS are supporting her, how- month. According to polling agency ever, and have organized some 40 regional party com- VTsIOM-A, in late January, 58% of the mittees to help. Nevertheless, at the end of January population still planned to vote, down about 8% from the Khakamada remained at just 2% in the polls. previous poll, although much of this decline in anticipated turnout appeared to be because people see Putin’s victory as After United Russia’s crushing victory in the December assured. Duma elections, virtually all other high-profile politi-

3 UNITED RUSSIA’S DUMA relative unknowns, such as former Piatigorsk Mayor Yuri As the presidential race nears, United Russia continues Vasiliev, who now heads the Committee on the Budget and to consolidate its gains from the December Duma race. Taxes. Not all posts were reserved for United Russia’s inner Absorbing a few more independents, the party’s fraction core of members, however; former SPS legislator Pavel membership has reached 306 legislators. This was more Krasheninnikov was essentially allowed to stay on as a than enough to win any vote, and the party accordingly committee chair, heading the important Committee on Civil, broke with previous Duma tradition and gave the chair- Criminal, Arbitration, and Procedural Legislation. Attempt- ships of all 29 committees to its fraction’s members. ing to forge a unified voice on important issues, the party One notable change from the previous Duma is that the also moved to restrict its legislators from making statements nationalist Rogozin was replaced by career diplomat to the media without party authorization except on matters Konstantin Kosachev as head of the International Af- concerning their districts. fairs Committee. Rogozin has thus essentially been marginalized in the new Duma. The moderate pragma- — Henry Hale, Indiana University tist Andrei Kokoshin was renamed head of the Commit- tee on the Commonwealth of Independent States and . Compatriot Relations. Other key committees went to

Russian Election Watch can be found online at http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/publications/rew.html

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington

The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the editors or any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation and editing and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support.

SOURCES FOR IMAGES USED IN RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.5: Accessed August 18, 2003: www.gzt.ru (Glaziev). Accessed February 6, 2004: www.1tv.ru (Putin); www.president.kremlin.ru (Kozak); (Glaziev). Accessed February 9, 2004: Kharitonov, www.pravda.ru, all others, www.kommersant.ru.

4

PUTIN’S SECOND TERM: LEADING RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON WHAT TO EXPECT

FOREIGN POLICY IN PUTIN’S SECOND TERM Vyacheslav Nikonov President, POLITY Foundation ______

SOME KEY POINTS: his country, concerned with the great- Yet it is important to stress that *Notions of Russia becoming part ness of the nation. Putin is a more pro-Western and de- of the West by next Thursday or Considering Russia’s weakness to mocratic politician than the over- reverting to confrontation with be the main threat to its security, Putin whelming majority of the elite, not to the West are gone forever. views foreign policy first and fore- mention the populace. He is leading * Putin is steadily leading Russia most as a means to effect conditions Russia along a path of integration and to integration with the West. favorable to economic growth. With- will continue to do so, giving the un- * Putin’s second term will be a out a long-term international strategy avoidable rhetoric of a Russian “spe- continuation of the first, a time to for the country, which has still not cial path” its due. And considering the work out a long-term strategy for entirely forged its new identity, policy natural limitations that are the princi- Russia and a preliminary answer will be largely reactive. pal obstacle to Russia’s entry into the to “Where do we belong?” The novelty of the current situation main European and trans-Atlantic * The U.S. presidential campaign lies in the obsoleteness of the old structures—the European Union and could spell trouble for US- 1990s dichotomy—liberalism versus NATO— far from everything depends Russian relations. communism. It appears that this is on us. gone for good, since both the Com- munist Party and the liberals from the When asked to comment on how the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko Putin is more pro- presidential election will impact are now embracing an utterly suicidal Western and democ- Putin’s foreign policy during his sec- tactic that will lead very soon to their ond term as president, I was at a bit of complete disappearance from the Rus- ratic than the over- a loss. International relations are play- sian political arena. But that is another ing no role whatsoever in the cam- story. The bottom line is that notions whelming majority of paign, which, like the Duma races last of Russia becoming part of the West the elite, not to men- fall, is utterly issueless. In general, by next Thursday or reverting to con- only events on the scale of bombings frontation with the West are now tion the populace. of Belgrade or Baghdad can turn Rus- things of the past and forever will be sian public opinion to the outside so. It is probably premature to look world. The president is now surrounded by Nothing like this is going on, and ahead to Russian-American relations two dominant groups, each with its in November 2004, but they promise Putin does not have to show any par- own approach to foreign policy. First, ticular toughness or softness to to be anything but simple. In the the integrationists—the economic part American elections, the Democrats achieve a landslide victory. Popular of the administration, the “Family”, support for the president is running are taking an interest in exactly what oligarchs, etc.—advocate the maxi- it was that George W. Bush saw in very high, and one can hardly say that mum possible Russian participation in his re-election would fundamentally Putin’s eyes, and the American presi- the world’s basic integrationist institu- dent will have to show that he is far augment his legitimacy and that this tions. could serve as the basis for a new po- from completely agreeing with his Second, the neo-isolationists, basi- Russian colleague. litical direction. cally representing the power wing of Continuity will be the hallmark of Putin sees no problem with Russia’s the administration, argue that a Rus- democratic society, and he will not the administration’s foreign policy. I sian path to growth, with emphasis on have said more than once that Putin is take any criticism of human rights. our own strength and a zone of na- The development of Russian democ- a conservative, a Gaullist. Proceeding tional interests without a Western from his ideology, he will continue racy will not correspond to many presence, is preferable. Neither group American conceptions about this the independent, activist, multi- has a decisive advantage, and the bal- faceted policy of a pragmatic father of process. ance of power in the Kremlin will stands a good chance of serving the continue into the future.

5 full prison sentence allowed by law— problems of slowed economic growth, sumer market in Asia, especially since ten years. Russia will get bad press. escalating internal tensions, and ab- the main lobbyist for the Chinese sorption of new countries that are es- route, , has fallen out of favor. I sentially unprepared for membership think that Moscow will make an effort Far from everything and exhibit nationalistic inclinations to find new oil reserves so as to sup- depends on us. (and the majority are anti-Russian). ply both pipelines from the outset and, Europe will be more egoistic, and with that in mind, will take advantage Russia will face long and tedious ne- of Japanese proposals for large-scale Without fail, Putin will view the gotiations over admission to the investment in oil-drilling in Siberia. Commonwealth of Independent States World Trade Organization, anti- Cooperation on energy promises to just like before, as a zone of special dumping procedures, freedom of extricate Russian-Japanese relations Russian interests and will be unhappy movement across borders for Rus- from their current dead end. with any American activity there. For sians, transit to Kaliningrad, etc. Thus, Putin’s second term will be a its part, the US does not see why its Moscow is on the verge of making continuation of the first. It will be a behavior in the post-Soviet space historic decisions that could lead ei- time to work out a long-term strategy should be any different from any- ther to long-term close strategic part- for Russia and at least a preliminary where else on the planet and is thus nership with China or to deep strain answer to the question “Where do we inclined to ignore Russian concerns. on the bilateral relationship. At issue belong?” For now, the only indicator As long as the Russian elite does not are plans to build an oil pipeline from of any change is the appointment of get an answer as to what concretely it northern Siberia; the choice is be- Konstantin Kosachev as chair of the will get from a tighter partnership tween a terminus at Datsin in China or Duma committee on international af- with the United States, or does not at the Russian port of Nakhodka on fairs. He is a career diplomat and a provide an answer for itself, there will the Pacific for ultimate delivery to man more pro-Western and less na- be no particular inclination to pursue Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the tionalistic than his predecessor, Dmitri such a partnership. US. Delay of a final decision has Rogozin. █ Europe is becoming an increasingly greatly irritated the Chinese govern- complex and tangled-up entity, with ment, which will wait only until which it will not be easy to have rela- spring, at the latest. tions. Beyond that. the EU is preoccu- Putin understands the potential pied more and more with its own downside of focusing on a single con-

“FREE, BUT NOT FAIR”: “NOT FAIR” FOR WHOM? Alexander Domrin Senior Associate, Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law (Moscow) Visiting Professor, University of Iowa College of Law ______

SOME KEY POINTS: (as introduced by Rep. Tom Lantos elections either. Not until President * Western assessments of what is on June 12, 2001 and passed by the Yeltsin decided to dissolve that very “free and fair” in Russia have often House of Representatives on De- parliament and had the assurance of been politically motivated. cember 11, 2001) extended the same President Clinton that the U.S. admini- * While the Communists did face definition to Russian “Presidential stration supported Yeltsin “fully” in some unfair practices, the poor result elections in 1996 and 2000”. The his “consolidation of democratic re- of the liberals represents the Russian U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign form.” people’s choice. Relations struck down the second Everything is clear with the 1993 * The U.S. administration and part of the sentence. At long last, elections too. The “red-brown” Su- American programs in Moscow U.S. Senators became embarrassed preme Soviet was burned down. Doz- should respect the outcome of the to call Yeltsin’s shameful reelection ens (if not hundreds, we’ll never know 2003 Russian elections. in 1996 “fair.” the exact number) of its defenders Equally significant was U.S. Con- were killed. The U.S. Senate voted for gress’ omission of two other Russian $2.5 billion in “assistance” to Russia This is not the first time that West- parliamentary elections—those in and other former Soviet republics in ern officials and mass media have 1990 and 1993—among “free and order, as Senator Claiborne Pell (D- questioned whether an election in fair” elections. As a reminder, the RI) bluntly put, to “to show the re- Russia has been “free and fair.” The elections of 1990 were recognized as formers in the NIS that we are in their U.S. “Russian Democracy Act of “the freest ever held in Russia” by corner”. 2002” (P.L. 107-246) named only such organizations as the U.S. Federal Believing that the new Duma would two “substantially free and fair Rus- Election Commission and the Lawyers be “truly representative,” and “far sian parliamentary elections” –those Committee for Human Rights. No- more democratic and friendly to the in 1995 and 1999 (sec. 2(3)(B)). Fas- body doubted the “fairness” of those West than the previous parliament,” cinatingly, early versions of the bill

6 Representative Gerald B. Solomon (R- and best hopes (who said “wishful Kirienko—leader of New Force Party; NY) called on the U.S. President and thinking”?) were invested into at- —leader of Young Congress to “divert from existing pro- tempts to “help” SPS and Yabloko to Russia Party.” Did anybody expect grams whatever resources necessary to “strengthen their organizational struc- something different? achieve the objective of ensuring” tures and their role in elections,” and Analysis of the eight last issues of victory for the “reformers” in Russia. what is the result? the NDI periodical in Russian (Nos. Yet, ungrateful Russian voters turned Even the largest financial contribu- 28-35) shows the same picture. Vest- their backs on the “reformers.” How tions and considerable “administrative nik NDI is dominated by interviews of could this kind of election be “fair”? resource” (from Chubais’ Unified En- federal and regional leaders in SPS (5) ergy Systems and members of and Yabloko (4) (with 2 interviews of Kasyanov’s government) did not save deputies from Unity and Two groups of people SPS from a miserable failure in the Fatherland-All Russia) and coverage have a right to say elections. mainly of events in those two parties. Exploitation of the late Galina Irina Khakamada was certainly right that the last Russian Starovoitova’s legacy did not help when criticizing NDI for a “somewhat Irina Khakamada to win in Starovoi- one-dimensional interpretation of elections were not tova’s district No.209 in St. Peters- events in Russian political life” and for completely “fair.” burg, where former State Duma its “tendency to work with the same Speaker Gennady Seleznev received partners” (Vestnik NDI, No.30, 2001, more than twice as many votes p.1), even though Khakamada herself However, there is a certain truth in (100,326 against Khakamada’s was one such “partner.” criticism that the last Russian elections 45,118). The chairman of St. Peters- were not completely “fair.” Two burg’s branch of SPS, Grigory Tom- groups of people and political forces chin, did something nearly impossible: The U.S. administra- certainly have a right to say so. he won 32,946 votes in his district tion should come to The first of them is the Communist No.207, and managed to be crushed by Party of the Russian Federation another candidate named “Against terms with the inevi- (KPRF). Negative campaigning and All” (who got 46,646 votes). the misrepresentation of the KPRF on The fact that two-thirds of SPS’s table reality and radi- Russian TV are well-documented. Duma campaign budget (as SPS’s in- cally reconsider pri- Analysts of the liberal Novaia Gazeta ternal investigation reportedly and Nezavisimaia Gazeta (who cannot showed) was embezzled is hardly an orities of their work in be accused of being Communist sym- excuse here. pathizers) came to the same conclu- Russian “liberal” parties were able to Russia. sion, that the KPRF was “put on ice” bring only 7 members to the 450- by three out of four national TV chan- deputy Duma. And the first thing five On the positive side, results of the nels (Channel 1, RTR, TV Center). of them did after the elections was to 2003 parliamentary elections in Russia The same channels “ignored or cov- switch sides and join the pro-Putin may have an unexpectedly and inad- ered neutrally” the electoral campaigns Unified Russia. (Did somebody say vertently positive effect for the Ameri- of SPS, Yabloko, and the LDPR “principles”?) can people. Yet another disastrous (Channel 1, RTR) or Yabloko and the Reproduction of my previous article defeat of Russian “liberal” parties can LDPR (TV Center). The remaining from Russia Watch (No. 9, January make it much more difficult for national TV channel—NTV—did not 2003) on Johnson’s Russia List (No. USAID, NDI, IRI, and the like to take sides and covered all parties “neu- 7314, September 6, 2003) caused a spend the money of American taxpay- trally.” The fairness of the KPRF’s fierce reaction from IRI officials in ers on the pretext of working with complaints was recognized in two of- Moscow. Calling themselves “Ameri- “those political parties that…have ficial letters from the Central Election cans who work tirelessly in Russia on significant public support with a po- Commission’s Law Department. the very issue of party-building” and tential for expansion” (as NDI defines Regardless of our attitude to the praising the IRI program for its “inten- one of its goals in Russia) or “working KPRF, it is necessary to admit that sive” and “hard” work in Russia “for with pro-reform factions in the State only once before, during the 1996 over a decade,” they denied working Duma” (as IRI’s “Current Program” in presidential campaign, was the party with just two main “reformist” parties Russia claims), for there are no such and its supporters an object of this in Russia (No.7326, September 16, parties in the Duma anymore, and it is kind of “black PR”—dirty tricks, 2003). clear that SPS and Yabloko are rapidly open lies, and uncivilized pressure Well, the devil is in the details. losing any public support in the coun- from the government. Even though the IRI Moscow web site try. The other group of people who can says that IRI works “intensively” with The Russian people made their wholeheartedly question the “fairness” three other parties, including a non- choice. The U.S. administration and of the 2003 Duma elections are existent “Union of Unity” (what’s American programs in Moscow should USAID-funded International Republi- that?), the web site provides links only respect the outcome of Russian elec- can Institute (IRI), National Democ- to these three parties: Yabloko, SPS, tions, come to terms with the inevita- ratic Institute (NDI), and similar pro- Russia’s Democratic Choice and to ble reality and radically reconsider grams in Russia. Millions of dollars these two individuals: “Sergei priorities of their work in Russia. █

7

AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE POLITICAL REGIME: REGIONAL VARIATIONS Galina Michaleva Head of the Yabloko Party’s Analytical Center

are deciding the direction of the coun- Nemtsov, and Zhirinovsky—not to SOME KEY POINTS: try’s development. An example of this run. * The political regime in Russia can is Stanislav Belkovsky, whose “new It is not out of the question that even be characterized as “soft” authori- state ideology” by his own account those candidates expected to win less tarianism. consists of the formation of a new than 7-10%—Glaziev and * Elections are turning into a means national elite bolstered by the army Khakamada—will be disqualified for of legitimizing bargains made among and the church. This world view, par- one reason or another during the ruling elite groups. ticularly the religious basis for na- presidential registration and campaign * Governors under Putin must supply tional consolidation as well as reliance periods. not only loyalty, but economic and on the power organs goes beyond au- Judging from VTsIOM-A’s latest political results. thoritarianism to evince the classic poll (conducted at the end of January), * United Russia has incorporated features of totalitarianism. Putin’s standing in the presidential most governors, but significant pro- Finally, the central institution of race has already reached 79%. Gla- vincial opposition remains. democracy—competitive, honest, free ziev trails him with 4%, and all the * Regional elections may provide the and fair elections, the presence of other candidates are at 1% or less. If basis for a second wave of Russian which distinguishes incomplete de- Glaziev and Khakamada are taken out democratization. mocracy from “soft” authoritarian- of the race and the elections turn into ism—is largely fading. Elections are a completely grotesque spectacle of Presidential Elections and the Politi- turning into a means of legitimizing Putin running against only his own cal Regime in the Country bargains made among groups within shadow (Mironov), political puppets On the eve of the 2004 presidential the ruling elite. and third-string politicians, this will elections, the political regime in Rus- The upcoming presidential election be an important sign that the present sia by all indications could be charac- clearly illustrates this development. regime has no need to bother even terized as “soft” authoritarianism. The Without serious challengers, it has with a charade of democracy. following basic democratic institu- virtually become a referendum on tions are lacking: confidence in the current president. From Regional Political Regimes to — a division of power with independ- Furthermore, those candidates who Unification ent legislature, judiciary, and mass could potentially win more than 7- The story of establishing a new Rus- media; 10% of the vote have been excluded sian government is one of pitting elite — legal principles as a foundation for from the contest. groups against each other in a struggle cooperation among state institutions for influence and consolidation of or between state institutions and citi- power and resources. At the beginning zens. Such cooperation is realized on Political control is be- of the 1990s, an alliance between Yel- the basis of informal agreements. In ginning to expand into tsin and regional elites neutralized contrast, legal norms are used arbitrar- internal opposition, Communists and ily as a means of political pressure, as spheres other than statists in the Supreme Soviet. This the Yukos affair blatantly shows. process led to a decentralization, at In addition, the following undemo- politics: nonprofit or- first controlled and later not, that was cratic circumstances are evident: ganizations, educa- buttressed by the 1993 Constitution. —the absolute domination by one By 2000, the asymmetry and negoti- political institution—the president, tion, science, and cul- ated character of the federation had who controls virtually all significant ture. resulted in the lack of a unified legal forms of political and social activity; system and an enormous number of —the thorough exclusion from politi- contradictions between the Constitu- cal life (with the help of administra- On the one hand, this was achieved tion and provincial laws. tive resources) of parties representing by creating conditions extraordinarily In the political sphere, “economic citizens’ interests and proposing alter- disadvantageous to candidates who privileges in exchange for loyalty” native political courses. lack administrative and financial re- was the general rule of thumb in in- Political control is beginning to ex- sources. On the other hand, the con- formal negotiations between more or pand into spheres other than politics: duct and result of the Duma campaign less autonomous regional regimes nonprofit organizations, education, forced national-caliber politicians and the central government (the “Cen- science, and culture. with significant reserves of citizens’ ter”). This deal primarily took the What’s more, it is increasingly clear trust—Zyuganov, Yavlinsky, form of regions’ delivering the neces- that ideologues close to the Kremlin

8 sary votes to the Center during presi- who not only controlled them but cut time arch enemy of Governor Eduard dential and parliamentary elections. them off from the direct cash flow Rossel, as mayor of Yekaterinburg. The political systems and regimes in from the Center. In addition, Moscow On the other hand, the spectrum of the regions were varied, ranging from gained the power to remove governors parties in the regions does not look polycentrism with large free zones and mayors from office, albeit only like the virtual picture created by the (for example, the provinces of Kare- with a court ruling. Interbudgetary federal mass media, particularly when lia, Sverdlovsk and Perm) to ethni- relations changed also: a large portion it comes to the importance of Krem- cally nuanced authoritarian regimes of taxes collected in the regions have lin-created pseudo-parties. One of the (as in Kalmykia, Bashkortostan, and now been transferred to the Center. latter, Motherland, lacks infrastruc- Tatarstan). The political diversity of According to the 2004 budget, only ture. The Communist Party’s regional the regions not withstanding, they all 38% of taxes collected in the regions organizations vary greatly in strength had one thing in common: their chief can be used locally. and orientation, ranging from nation- executives successfully took control With the adoption of the law on par- alism to communist radicalism. There of regional business and local self- ties and amendments to electoral leg- are also internal rifts in United Russia. government. islation, the system for electing re- The organizations of Yabloko and the In return for maintaining loyalty to gional parliaments was standardized. Union of Right Forces (SPS) have the Center, regional and local elec- Half of each legislative assembly is varying degrees of influence as well. tions were entirely farmed out to local now elected through party lists, in Those regional elections that have elites, although there were consulta- which regionally based parties are already been held under the new rules tions with the Center, especially for excluded from participation. Previ- have yielded results different from gubernatorial elections. ously, these regional parties had effec- those of the Duma elections. In Vo- tively served as political machines for logda, Agrarian Party representatives incumbent governors. This reform made it into the regional parliament. Unlike the Kremlin, thus further limits the power of re- In Ingushetia, the Party of Life and regional leaders often gional heads while augmenting that of Yabloko were elected. In Volgograd, the Center. the Communist Party garnered nearly have rather strong In the last three years, the overall 26% of the vote. mode of center-periphery relations has Regional politicians used preexist- challengers with fi- also changed: governors are expected ing federal parties as springboards to nancial resources and, not only to be politically loyal but also political activity and their regional effective in making regional economic branches for financial support and most importantly, the and social decisions, forcing them to legitimacy. Along with the presiden- resource of public establish new chains of command and tial election, March 14 will bring elec- to use effective management methods. tions in almost 30 regions if one trust. The situation regarding loyalty has counts races for governors, mayors, also changed. Whereas under Yeltsin and local councils. In light of this,

the maxim “refrain from criticizing parties are an important resource not Under these circumstances, even the head of state and give help in elec- only in the party-list races but in all when open conflicts arose as with tions if necessary” was perfectly fine, others as well. Primorsky Krai governor Yevgeny now regional heads must deliver re- It is also already apparent that the Nazdratenko, the Center was not in a sults. In the last Duma elections, re- alignment of forces is completely dif- position to find coercive levers and gional heads and the entire adminis- ferent in different provinces. For ex- had to resort instead to bargaining trative “vertical” under them worked ample, in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Altai from a position of disadvantage. for United Russia, and most governors Krai, St. Petersburg, and Krasnoyarsk Thus, while Nazdratenko did wind up and mayors had already joined the Krai, Yabloko and SPS are together in leaving his gubernatorial post, he re- party just to be on the safe side. a united bloc. In Karachaevo- ceived a ministerial appointment Cherkessia, Yabloko has formed a while his protégé won the replacement Regional Elections: What Will bloc with the United Industrial Party. election for governor. Change? In Yaroslavl, it is running independ- Beginning in 2000, with the strict From Moscow’s perspective, the ently. implementation of Putin’s reforms of leaders’ obvious task now is to reprise Will the Kremlin be in a position to federation structure, the regional leg- the outcome of the Duma elections at firmly control all this diversity, espe- islation was largely brought into line the provincial level, giving United cially since it is practically impossible with federal law. In the political Russia absolute domination in re- to use its main instrument, federal sphere, regional heads lost institu- gional parliaments. Yet this task is television networks, in regional elec- tional representation at the federal harder than it seems. tions? level—in the Federation Council— Unlike the Kremlin, regional leaders The answer to that question will be along with immunity. Additionally, often have rather strong challengers the most important indicator of they can no longer appoint the heads with financial resources and, most whether Russian authoritarianism will of power organs in the regions. importantly, the resource of public become “tougher” or if there is a On top of that, the creation of seven trust. One example of this is the recent chance for a second wave of democra- new supra-regions (“federal districts”) election of Arkady Chernetsky, long- tization. █ placed governors under new “bosses”

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THE 2003 ELECTION AND THE FINANCIAL-INDUSTRIAL GROUPS Sergei Kolmakov Vice-President, Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia

SOME KEY POINTS: serving as secret spoilers for other In the reality of the new Duma, *The Kremlin demanded a greater parties, primarily the Communists. where United Russia has an absolute business role in the 2003 elections, The crisis in relations between the majority, it is practically impossible to but as agents not independent actors. authorities and business began in late lobby for the interests of large corpo- * Despite funding United Russia and spring with the first salvos of the rations without the express sanction of displaying political loyalty, Yukos Yukos affair. This subsequently be- the Kremlin. From now on, the repre- efforts to form an informal “Yukos came one of the main intrigues of the sentatives of business within United fraction” in the Duma begat the elections, defining the alignment of all Russia will be able to affect nuances Kremlin wrath. the political forces and supplying grist of draft legislation only through in- * The political influence of financial- for the campaign mill during the im- formal channels and from inside the industrial groups has now been cut portant final month before election large United Russia Duma delegation, * Large corporations today cannot day. before these bills are formally intro- impact legislation without Kremlin The Kremlin maintains that one of duced. sanction. the biggest catalysts to the Yukos af- * Plans are afoot to merge business fair was the violation of the secret associations so as to dilute “oli- pact of mutual distance by the com- From now on, repre- garch” influence and to favor smaller pany’s leadership. sentatives of business corporations. By April and May 2003, it had be- came clear to the presidential admini- within United Russia It is no secret that from 2000 up stration that Yukos’ plans for large- will be able to affect until the start of the Yukos affair, the scale financing of the Communist Kremlin maintained a policy of so- Party, the Union of Right Forces, and legislation only called “mutual distance” from oli- Yabloko in conjunction with the com- garch groups. From the very begin- pany’s successful recruitment of through informal ning, all parties to this unwritten Yukos candidates from these parties channels and from in- agreement, from both government and and intentions to run a large number business, were aware that the idea of district candidates in Yukos- side the Duma delega- behind the policy was to exclude fi- dominated areas, would, if successful, tion, before these bills nancial-industrial groups (FIGs) from pose the threat of an independent in- the pinnacle of federal political power. formal entity in the Duma. are formally intro- Mass media (first and foremost the A so-called “Yukos fraction” would nationwide television networks) as entail serious consequences for the duced. well as regional elites and political Kremlin. Yukos’ loyalty and support parties were all implicated in the for United Russia could not change In light of all that has happened, all Kremlin’s effort. The FIGs’ dealings the general negative impression. indications are that big business’ other with such groups were tolerated, but Hence such a qualitatively asymmetri- legal channels of influence on the po- only under the control of the political cal and decisive response from the litical and law-making process may center—in other words, as “transmis- authorities. change. Discussions are already un- sion belts” for the presidential admini- The outcome of the 2003 elections derway on merging the business asso- stration. not only signaled defeat for every as- ciations of large, medium, and small In the prelude to the 2003 election pect of Yukos’ campaign plan, but companies—the Russian Union of cycle, the Kremlin considered the task also significantly compromised and Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, at hand—i.e., scoring victories for the devalued the political activity of all Business Russia (Delovaia Rossia), party of power and fashioning a more the other financial-industrial groups. and Support (Opora) respectively— docile Duma—and demanded greater Despite the facts that they remained into one in order to eliminate the term involvement in all parts of the process loyal Kremlin partners in these elec- “oligarch” from popular conscious- from its partners in the business tions and substantially increased their ness and to dilute the demands and world. number of direct representatives interests of the largest business own- elected by sponsoring district candi- This involvement meant fundrais- ers with all the rest. █ ing, recruiting candidates to represent dates and placing them on United the party of power on party lists and in Russia’s party list, FIGs have experi- the regions, and, to a certain extent, enced a significant change in their political influence.

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CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN PUTIN’S SECOND TERM: AN ATTEMPT AT PREDICTION Nikolai Petrov Co-Director, Program on Domestic Politics and Political Institutions, Carnegie Moscow Center

SOME KEY POINTS: second phase of federal reform. One is Federal financing has also been in- * Putin’s second term will produce a a stricter delineation of central and creased for courts and other judicial more unitary, centralized state. regional powers than is prescribed in organs, helping end their dependence * The supra-districts that Putin cre- the Constitution, including resources on aid from regional administrations. ated are the heart of his new system. for their implementation as well as the They now represent the interests of * Regional leaders themselves will municipal reform overseen by first the Center both in word and deed. lead a big push to make governors deputy presidential administration As a result of this verticalization, the presidentially appointed, not elected. chief Dmitry Kozak. The other is a entire state-political system is becom- * While the Kremlin is attempting to set of pilot projects to merge regions. ing more rigid and less able to adapt combine a few of Russia’s regions, no It would appear that the chief goal to changing conditions. Regional di- wholesale merger policy is expected of Putin’s second term will be the versity is also decreasing, with each barring an economic crisis. continued unitarization and centraliza- province converging to a certain me- tion of the country within an “effec- dium; the worst are pulled up but the Vladimir Putin’s presidency began tive state” framework, building on the best are pulled down. with “federal reforms” of an anti- foundations that have already been federalist nature. They included the laid in these directions. The changes The End of Two-Level Representative introduction of seven federal districts may affect, first and foremost, Democracy (supra-regions) that are headed by whether federal districts will be main- Discussions of whether to return to presidential appointees and that con- tained or given greater power, whether appointing regional leaders instead of tain federal inspectors; a change in the regions will merge, whether regional electing them began even before Putin composition of the Federation Council leaders will continue to be elected or came to power. The notion gained with a sharp increase in Kremlin con- will instead come to be appointed, and momentum as Putin’s popularity trol over the body; and the legal but- what exactly the upper house of par- grew—a popular father of the country tressing of federal interference in re- liament will be. The only question, on a national level makes regional gional politics, making possible the perhaps, is the speed of the Kremlin’s “fathers” redundant. removal of popularly elected regional actions and, consequently, the depth Governors themselves have some- leaders (“governors”). of the changes in each of these areas. times come out in support of the idea, Later on, other reforms were added: frequently wanting to demonstrate strict budgetary centralization and the Federalism in a Cage: Building Verti- their loyalty to the Kremlin but more reallocation of local taxes to the cen- cals and Horizontals often hoping to hold on to power de- tral government (“Center”); the resto- The new federal political elite, spite the law or the desire of voters. In ration and strengthening of vertical emerging from a quasi-military struc- 2000, a two-term limit for governors lines of power, including over force- ture, sees the increased efficiency of a was introduced. In 2004, 50 will be in oriented state organs and a new kind simplified administrative structure. their final term, in 2005 another 67 of party of power; the dissolution of The measure of uncertainty inherent will be, in 2006 — 75, and in 2007 — bilateral agreements between federal in democratic elections does not suit 88. This means that interest in reject- and regional powers that had been this elite, nor do any relationships ing elections and returning to the prac- actively used from 1994 to 1998; the other than subordination. The priority tice of appointment will grow quickly liquidation by January 2004 of Rus- is on a primitive falling into line in- among regional heads in the future, sian regional “offshores,” internal tax stead of a more complex and modern and appointment means that their al- havens that had existed in provinces system of government. Thus all sorts ready increased dependence on the like Kalmykia, Mordovia, and Chu- of “verticals” are being set up: admin- Center will become absolute, making kotka; active Moscow interference in istrative, law-enforcement, military, the independence of the regions they regional elections through the estab- party, election-commission, media. lead ephemeral. lishment of a vertical chain of com- The restoration of the system of mand among electoral commissions; horizontal rotation of leaders of gov- Merging Regions and the use of blackmail and the ernmental and legal organs stands out Another solution to the “third-term courts against those would not volun- among the personnel innovations. The problem” is the merger of regions, for tarily come to the necessary agree- new generation of regional police which pilot projects have been ments with the Kremlin. chiefs, unlike the previous one, have launched in the Urals and Siberia. In The end of Putin’s first term has made their careers outside of their principle, merger might help over- seen the start of two new federalism- own regions and thus do not have come rigid centralization on the re- related projects, sometimes called the close ties with local political clans. gional level, promote the pluralization

11 and intensification of political compe- seats are reserved for these federal trict, regional and lower levels, in- tition within regions, and foster a sort parties, who compete via party lists. cluding regulation, rotation, selection, of local critical mass, without which The most recent Duma elections for preparation, must be sustained so as to democratic development in less popu- all intents and purposes reduced the keep the system in working order. 2. lous regions is difficult. number of viable federal parties to The federal districts have become a However, merger disrupts the politi- two—United Russia and the Commu- universal matrix for spatially organiz- cal, cultural, and other commonalities nist Party. In elections held at the ing multiple federal structures and that have developed in a region and same time for parliaments in seven have acquired enormous inertia. 3. erodes the established social structure. regions, the firmly centralist United The federal district is the key element Some of the less complicated cases, Russia, truly reminiscent of the old of the new, firmly centralized network such as the Komi-Permiak Autono- Communist Party of the organization modeled on the CPSU mous Region’s return to the fold of its (CPSU), scored a decisive victory. As “internal party.” 4. The districts have native Perm Oblast, are already un- a result, if the Center is not getting a grown into the political system to such derway. In the case of Perm, a refer- “controlling share” of seats in the re- an extent that it would be extraordi- endum was held in December 2003, gional parliaments, it is getting a narily difficult or even impossible to draft legislation outlining the new “blocking share,” enough to thwart remove them without risking the de- subject of the federation is expected in unwanted legislation. struction of the entire system. March or April 2004, and “Perm United Russia works like an elec- The districts are by no means rele- Krai” will officially appear in 2005. toral machine, chiefly for federal elec- vant only for Russia’s power agen- As to a whole wave of regional tions. Between elections, the key re- cies; they are the base and infrastruc- mergers, this now appears more of a gime creation is broader than the party ture for the whole new political re- threat than a systematic and viable itself: a new, firmly centralist net- gime. They provide for a homogeniza- idea, at least beyond a few special work organization in the mold of an tion of society, organizing it more cases that are stipulated by the 1993 “internal party.” Its creation is taking strictly on a quasi-military basis that Constitution. The Kremlin could be place at three levels: presidential rep- involves subordination, a clear divi- pushed to make good on such a threat, resentatives, inspectors in the regions, sion of responsibility, power verticals, however, in the case of a drop in and local public reception offices. and strict administrative control over world oil prices which could lead to On the highest level, there is a rela- business and civil society. financial crisis, tensions with regions, tively small number of people—the Although Putin’s first term has seen and hence the need for the Kremlin to presidential representatives personally the steady dismantling of federalism find a way to manage center-region plus tens of other federal structures and although this surely will continue relations more effectively. with district subdivisions (including into the near future, it would seem that United Russia proper). On the middle in the grander scheme of things there The Two Parties of Power level, there are the federal inspectors is no alternative to the federalist pro- The 2003 Duma elections were in all regions. On the lowest level, ject as the only way to preserve Rus- marked by unprecedentedly large par- there are the so-called public recep- sia as a unified state. And the centrali- ticipation by governors in the party of tion offices being set up in three thou- zation that has accompanied both power, United Russia, whose federal sand cities and neighborhoods Putin’s rise and economic growth list was headed by two and regional throughout the country. These offices might even be seen as a healthy lists by 30 regional leaders. not only give the Kremlin direct con- thing—otherwise the country would The elections amounted to the crea- tact with citizens over the heads of face growing interregional inequalities tion of a new party-political system, regional bosses but also serve as a and tensions due to uneven growth. much more centralist and unitary than place to gather and prepare staff re- There are more grounds for pessi- before. United Russia—a new kind of serves on the lowest level. A regional mism than for restrained optimism, party of power—is its basis. It is con- legislator or member of the local ad- however. Unfortunately, there is little solidated, de-ideologized and has ministration usually heads these of- doubt that Russia will meet the second strict party discipline as it turns away fices, assisted by 30 volunteers and decade of the new century as a state from highly recognized politicians in staffers. Local businessmen finance that is substantially more unitary and favor of functionaries. It relies on an the work of these institutions. centralist even than it is today. This administrative apparatus and claims may take different forms. The num- hundreds of thousands of members. Federal Districts ber of regions might remain the same An important feature of this new Federal districts are a serious and as currently, with the exception of a project of the party of power is a re- multidimensional project, the bulk of few reunifications of territories that structuring from top to bottom. First which is hidden from view as with an had earlier been united, or Russia the law on political parties established iceberg. Despite the fact that the fed- might find itself with just 20 to 40 that only federal organizations with eral districts have already fulfilled the provinces. It might continue with branches in no fewer than half the main mission that they were originally elected governors, but could wind up regions of the Federation count offi- assigned, the districts are far from a with appointed ones serving under cially as “parties.” Then, in 2003, the one-time political instrument. For at prefects. One can only hope that the system of electing members to re- least four reasons, the districts will be federalism of the 1990s, in many ways gional parliaments was changed to a preserved for the foreseeable future. 1. wild and chaotic, has nevertheless “mixed” system, in which half of the The work done in the federal district planted a few shoots that will inevita- framework with personnel at the dis- bly bloom in the future. █

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