Dengxiaoping-Selectedworks-V1.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Volume I (1938-1965) MOBILIZE NEW RECRUITS AND CONDUCT POLITICAL WORK AMONG THEM January 12, 1938 THE PARTY AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT April 15, 1941 THE PRINCIPLES, TASKS AND ORIENTATION FOR CULTURAL WORK IN THE 129TH DIVISION May 1941 IN CELEBRATION OF THE FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY OF COMRADE LIU BOCHENG December 15, 1942 A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS January 26, 1943 ORGANIZATIONAL WORK AND APPLICATION OF POLICY IN ENEMY- OCCUPIED AREAS January 26, 1943 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AREAS AND THE MASS MOVEMENT February 20, 1943 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TAIHANG AREA July 2, 1943 SPEECH AT THE MOBILIZATION MEETING ON RECTIFICATION IN THE PARTY SCHOOL OF THE NORTHERN BUREAU November 10, 1943 BUILD STABLE BASE AREAS IN THE DABIE MOUNTAINS August 27, 1947 THE SITUATION FOLLOWING OUR TRIUMPHANT ADVANCE TO THE CENTRAL PLAINS AND OUR FUTURE POLICIES AND STRATEGY April 25, 1948 CARRY OUT THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DIRECTIVE ON THE WORK OF LAND REFORM AND OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION June 6, 1948 SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING OUR ENTRY INTO NEW AREAS IN THE FUTURE August 24, 1948 OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE NANJING-SHANGHAI-HANGZHOU CAMPAIGN96 March 31, 1949 BREAK THE BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY THE IMPERIALISTS July 19, 1949 FROM THE CROSSING OF THE YANGTZE TO THE CAPTURE OF SHANGHAI August 4, 1949 TACTICS FOR WORKING IN THE NEW AREA OF GUIZHOU November 12, 1949 REPORT DELIVERED AT A CONFERENCE ON THE PRESS IN SOUTHWEST CHINA May 16, 1950 OVERCOME THE CURRENT UNHEALTHY TENDENCIES IN THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTHWEST CHINA June 6, 1950 THE QUESTION OF MINORITY NATIONALITIES IN THE SOUTHWEST July 21, 1950 OUTLINE FOR THE REPORT AT THE MEETING ON URBAN WORK CONVENED BY THE SOUTHWEST BUREAU OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE December 21, 1950 THE ENTIRE PARTY SHOULD ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO UNITED FRONT WORK March 26, 1951 AGRARIAN REFORM IN SOUTHWEST CHINA AND OUR EXPERIENCE May 9, 1951 SIX PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL WORK January 13, 1954 THE OVERALL SITUATION SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN LOCAL FINANCIAL WORK January 25, 1954 CONCEIT AND COMPLACENCY ARE THE ARCHENEMY OF UNITY February 6, 1954 RUN OUR SHOOLS WELL AND TRAIN CADRES July 9, 1954 REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA September 16, 1956 INTEGRATE MARXISM-LENINISM WITH THE CONCRETE CONDITIONS OF CHINA November 17, 1956 OUR CHIEF TASK AHEAD IS BUILDING UP THE COUNTRY April 8, 1957 THE COMMUNIST PARTY MUST ACCEPT SUPERVISION April 8, 1957 CONGRATULATORY SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE THIRD NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE NEW-DEMOCRATIC YOUTH LEAGUE OF CHINA May 15, 1957 EDUCATION SHOULD BE MADE UNIVERSAL AND EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS RAISED April 7, 1958 CORRECTLY DISSEMINATE MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT March 25, 1960 ENCOURAGE THOROUGH AND METICULOUS WORK October 23, 1961 PROMOTE LARGE NUMBERS OF YOUNG TECHNICIANS November 23, 1961 IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACCOMPLISH OUR DAY-TO-DAY WORK December 27, 1961 SPEECH DELIVERED AT AN ENLARGED WORKING CONFERENCE OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE February 6, 1962 MEASURES FOR OVERCOMING OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES May 11, 1962 RESTORE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION July 7, 1962 QUESTIONS CONCERNING CADRES OF THE PARTY IN POWER November 29, 1962 BE REALISTIC AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE August 20, 1963 BUILD A MATURE AND COMBAT-EFFECTIVE PARTY June and December, 1965 MOBILIZE NEW RECRUITS AND CONDUCT POLITICAL WORK AMONG THEM January 12, 1938 I Currently we are suffering a temporary and partial setback in our defensive war against Japan, but this is not final defeat. The final outcome of the war will be determined by a protracted war of resistance. In order to continue in the present war, we must take full advantage of the valuable experience we have gained from the past six months' fighting. We should not only study strategy and tactics, but also do our utmost in every possible way to build up and expand the national armed forces by mobilizing the people to join the army, replenishing the existing corps and organizing new armed units in order to support an arduous, long- drawn-out war. There is no question that the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation are ready to fight to the death in the forefront against the Japanese aggressors and to win the liberation of their nation at the cost of their own flesh and blood. However, this does not mean that recruitment is completely without problems. First of all, we have not exploded the traditional myth that ``a good man doesn't join the army''. Second, not enough attention has been paid to education in the need to defend the country, and to fight Japan in particular, among the masses. This important work has remained utterly inadequate even since the war of resistance broke out. Third, some people have used coercion in recruitment -- a mistake that has made it most difficult for us to enlist new recruits and has resulted in those forced to join the army lacking a strong will and the courage to fight, and one that could even cause antagonism between the people, on the one hand, and the government and army, on the other; this would only play into the hands of the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators. Finally, the government's policy of giving preferential treatment to families of soldiers who are fighting against the Japanese aggressors in order to reduce their problems to a minimum has not been properly implemented, so that the soldiers are not able to fight without worries about their families and people are lacking the determination and courage to join the army. If we soberly review our experience in recruiting soldiers over the past few months, we can see that, because of the aforesaid mistakes made in some areas, people may fail to realize that the future of the nation hangs in the balance and that they should rush to the front with the deepest hatred for the foreign foe, and they may, therefore, become increasingly reluctant to join the army. They may fail to realize the importance of the government's policy of building up and expanding its defence capability in order to achieve final victory in the war of resistance; moreover, among some people, dissatisfaction with the government may increase. People may fail to realize that the arduous struggle now being conducted by the officers and men at the front is closely related to the fate of the country and their families, they may fail to carry forward the fine tradition of unity between the army and the people during the days of the Great Revolution , and they may fail to warmly support the army and show gratitude in order to encourage it to win the war of resistance in the end; moreover, some people may become disgusted with the army and be loathed to join it. In addition, the Japanese aggressors, Chinese collaborators and Trotskyites may use these mistakes to incite people to revolt, as a way to threaten and harass the rear areas in the fight against the Japanese aggressors. These phenomena are serious enough to demand our close vigilance, even if they are to be found in only one or two villages and among a very small number of people. It is true that our recent recruitment efforts have been quite successful and our troops at the front have generally been kept replenished. This does not, however, mean that we can continue those undesirable methods of recruitment, since they can help supplement the army only for a short period of time and they can never serve the needs of a protracted war of resistance. Only when the inappropriate methods are corrected will successful recruitment be ensured for the future. II Pointing out the inappropriateness of the recruitment methods and the bad results and effects they may lead to is not meant to be passive criticism, but is designed to encourage people to work out ways to correct them and adopt appropriate methods, so as to provide the front with a steady flow of replenishments and organize enough new troops. It should be understood that people all over the country detest Japanese aggression. So long as we adopt the appropriate methods of recruitment and persuade and arouse the people, they will surely rid themselves of unhealthy attitudes and, with great determination and courage, go to the front, or encourage their husbands, sons or brothers to do so, to fight for the glorious cause of national liberation. This has been fully borne out by the notable success achieved in some areas. These areas have gained the following valuable experience from which we can learn. People there have carried out adequate propaganda and agitation activities. They have made use of various means of propaganda -- operas, songs, ``wall newspapers'', mass meetings, brief lectures, private talks, and so forth -- to explain to the masses about the current situation and the way for them to survive, and to expose the cruelty of the enemy. This widespread and thorough publicity promptly aroused the enthusiasm of the masses to fight the Japanese aggressors, and they volunteered to join the army. This method of recruitment has proved far more effective than coercion. People there have united with anti-Japanese activists and persons respected by the masses (not careerists, who are out for power and money) in order to carry out recruitment with their help, which has yielded very good results. People there have worked among families of anti-Japanese soldiers, inviting family members of servicemen of every army unit to meetings or even dinner parties, when possible, at which they explained various questions concerning resistance to Japan, showed them the respect they deserve, presented them with honour plaques, and asked for their opinions.