s o te at he dcds t ha te interim the head to decades, three last the for as unknown hitherto the of , a businessman who has lived in Tex- choice the widespread of the criticism and Forces, Opposition and ary head of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution- evi- al-Khatib, Moaz of resignation recent the by denced as divided, seriously remains opposition The costs. its calculating first without duration uncertain of war civil a on embarked have turn, in rebels, The ground andisonthedefensive. superiority,military lose to continued has regime the overwhelming its despite However, massacres. tiple ha, death squads thought to be responsible for mul- tion to the regular troops, it has deployed the addi- In air. and ground both from cities and towns not hesitatedtouseitsheavyartillery, shellingentire persons. To halt the rebels’ advance, the regime has displaced internally million three another and tries, 70,000 high: coun- neighbouring to refugees been million one deaths, has crackdown the of two years first the of cost human The winner. one have only could that death the to struggle a was it view, the so-called “military solution.” In President Assad’s 15 March 2011, the Syrian regime bet the house on on mobilisations popular the of start the Following conflict, making it that much harder to find the a solution. in indirectly, or directly involved, become have com- is pounded by the intrigues of the opposition regional powers that the against waging is regime al-Assad’s Bashar that battle relentless The ravel. un- to knot tough a become has crisis Syrian The of Alicante University Professor of Arab andIslamicStudies Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio of theSyrianCrisis Evolution andOutlook The CivilWar inSyria 1 Thistextwasfinalised beforeMay2013(Editor’snote) 1 shabi- of the country. As a result of this weakness, it has it weakness, this of result a As country. the of has been heavily eroded, as it has lost control of part a is rickety and crumbling façade. The regime’s authority today remains that all yore, of state powerful all- all-encompassing, the Of bridges. his all burn to proceeded President Syrian The population. the defend to arms up take to need the of opposition for the “military solution,” which, in turn, convinced the opted Assad reforms, cosmetic by deterred be not would demonstrators the that clear became it Once and Qatar. Arabia Saudi Iran, , countries: neighbouring dium-intensity civil war with the active involvement of distinct sides. Today, it is possible to speak of a me- clearly two between conflict armed an on, 2011 of asan began anti-authoritarian uprising became, from the summer What ago. two years out broke first it since mutate to continued has crisis Syrian The A BadlyWoundedRegime predominance initoftheAlawiteminority. the of because apostate be to consider they which own their wage to seeking due to their infiltration by hundreds of Arab Islamists rebels the of radicalisation dangerous a witnessed has year last the Moreover, prisoners. of execution summary the and torture including rebels, the also but regime, the by only not committed being crimes war the for concern expressed have Watch, Rights Human as such organisations, rights human Some rebel militaryunits,eachonefightingitsownwar. thousand a than more are there all, strategy.In mon com- a have or voice single a with speak not does government. Meanwhile, the Free (FSA) against the regime, the against jihad

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 13 The Civil War in Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 14 The Civil War in Syria Keys Aqrab. of city the in 200 of massacre the lowing fol- conflict the of nature sectarian increasingly the 2012, December 20 on denounced, Republic Arab Syrian the on Inquiry of Commission International should the regime fall. Indeed, the UN’s Independent persecution fears decades, for advantages certain these fears. The Alawite minority, which has enjoyed confirm to seem ) around or in (all mana Jara- of suburb the of district Druse the and Zeinab, Sayyida of shrine Tuma,Shiite Bab the of bourhood neigh- Christian the in blasts bomb car The war. ian footsteps of Iraq and become embroiled in a sectar- the in follow will Syria that fear growing a is there communities, some In heterogeneity. confessional up schisms within the population by manipulating its use a strategy of “divide and conquer,” trying to open to chosen has Assad situation, explosive this Given Ambassador toIraq,NawafFares). the and Guard, Republican the of Tlass Manaf eral key figures (such as Prime Minister Riad Hijab, Gen- of defection the and Turkmani) Hassan office ment manage- crisis forces’ security the of head the and Rajiha, the Deputy Defence Minister Assef Shawkat, ing the crisis (including the Defence Minister Daoud tion of the military leadership responsible for manag- major assassina- the others, among year, last the in blows several suffered has regime the Moreover, are facingshortages. cities most and tripled, or doubled have petrol, and dollar. The prices of basic necessities, such as bread the to 130 to 50 from fallen has and slide to tinues posed by the US and the EU. The Syrian im- pound con- sanctions the of result a as acute more grown has crisis economic the Moreover, looting. and tion extor- in engaging groups crime organised and law own their imposing militias armed with country, the of much through spread has chaos of climate The has acceleratedtheexodusofpopulation. has had a staggering cost in terms of human life and ers) against rebel-controlled neighbourhoods, which fight- MiG-21 and missiles Scud (including war of name just two as examples), has the use of weapons (to Deraya and Hula of cases the by witnessed as widespread, become has populations defenceless emphatic increasingly to of massacre The rebels’advance. the halt to means resort to forced been 2

Á lvarez -O ssori , Ignacio.“LeConseil NationalSyrien: genèse,développement etdéfis.” MaghrebMachrek , vol.213,p.55-67, 2012. regime to crush peaceful demonstrations and rebel rebel and demonstrations peaceful crush to regime the allowed has that conflict, the of stages early the from absent was which community, international the of paralysis the precisely is It al-Qaeda. fighting be to claimed initially regime the as prophecy, fulfilling a self- is It groups. Salafi radical of infiltration the is Western countries for concerns greatest the of One community’s refusaltoarmtheopposition. international the for justification a as served has tion atomisa- This authority.FSA’s the recognise not do sand militias operating on the ground, some of which thou- a than more currently are there Indeed, front. united a into coalesce to inability their by hindered been has advance rebels’ the However, bases. tary some border controls with Turkey control and Iraq and various mili- moreover They country’s city. the second-largest , of neighbourhoods certain and Idlib and of provinces the of much taking as such progress, significant made have FSA, the At the military level, the rebel forces, grouped around and themembersofFriendsSyriagroup. League Arab the Council, Cooperation Gulf the by as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people recognised formation, new the of backbone the as emerged and power of Brotherhood share large a retained (MB) Muslim The Council. the Military head FSA’s to chosen was al-Oqaidi Jabbar Abdel Colonel Mosque. Umayyad the of imam former the al-Khatib, Moaz by led formed, was Forces position Op- and Revolutionary Syrian for Coalition the National , in 2012, November 11 On opposition. the of ranks the unify Syria,”to New a for Covenant “National the through undertook, SNC the group, Syria of Friends the from pressure to response In the fiftyyearsofBaathistrule. during opposition the by suffered persecution atic iiain afcig h Sra Ntoa Council National (SNC). Syrian the affecting limitations the of some are sponsors its on dependence and resources of lack cohesion, internal fragile The take. to strategy what to regard with divided is and plan has which proven opposition, incapable of uniting around a common action the of nature fragmented the is uprising the of start the after years two vival sur- continued regime’s Syrian the for reason One A FragmentedOpposition 2 This weakness is largely due to the system- the crisis. As Moaz al-Khatib stated at the Doha talks so hard to find a lowest common denominator to end it makes that game the in interests respective their and actors of multiplicity this precisely is It accept. to willing is community international the gagement en- of degree in the course, of and, influence Syria post-Assad wield to hope that region the in tries coun- those by adopted strategies the on also but conflict, the in side each of capacities the on solely depends longer no war Syrian the of outcome the Consequently, Assad. oppose or back that powers playing out, albeit beneath the also surface, between the regional is conflict another but obvious, most the certainly is rebels the and forces regime’s the between clash The time. same the at fought being several for rather but war, one just for battleground the not is Syria that suggest to seems Everything Arab fundingandjihadimilitaryknowhow.” Gulf to access as and well as figures; Islamic pragmatic leaders secular West, the with enchantment dis- sectarianism; and violence – terrain hospitable Salafis offers Syria “present-day that noted Group Crisis International the by report A Iraq. in al-Qaeda with ties alleged its for organisations terrorist of list Front, al-Nusra the which the Obama Administration is has included on its far by notorious most The Brigade. Farouq the and al-Sham Ghuraba Islamiya, Jamaa Brigade, Tawhid the al-Sham, Ahrar others, among including, ground, the on a influence growing have groups Salafist of plethora a stands, it As affecting theSyrianNationalCouncil sponsors aresomeofthelimitations resources anddependenceonits The fragileinternalcohesion,lack of sive actionearlyonintheuprising,asitdidLibya. vented if the international community had taken deci- pre- been have could elements jihadist of influx The ons but also aim to have a voice in post-Assad Syria. weap- ship only not which monarchies, oil Gulf sian Per- the on dependence their increased simply has the cause. The Western arms embargo on the rebels forces with impunity, thereby drawing more people to 4 3 Al-Akhbar,17December2012: www.al-akhbar.com/node/173812 I nternational C risis G roup . “Tentative Jihad:Syria’sFundamentalistOpposition.” MiddleEastReport,vol.131,12October2012. 3 n aor f ntoa daou. oz al-Khatib, Moaz dialogue. national a of favour in before.” were things how to back going no is there that and alternative only the is solution political a that day, to- believe to continue and crisis, the of outset the from believed have forces the armed the in and some party (...) dialogue political a in engaging ident still hopes “to achieve a decisive victory before paper tual transition government, told the Lebanese news- even- an of head the as see many whom al-Sharaa, Farouk President vice movements, these of light In talks afewdayslater,likewiseendorsedtheplan. Marrakesh the for meeting group, Syria of Friends end the crisis was necessary and still possible.” The to process political “a that stressing Burns, William Mikhail Bogdanov and US Deputy Secretary of State Minister Foreign Deputy Russian with talks for year dar Brahimi, returned to Geneva on 9 December that UN- envoy, the Algerian diplomat Lakh- The implemented. be to plan the for down step first to had Assad whether specify not did they as ity,” in attendance chose a path of “constructive ambigu- parties The Minister. Prime the to powers executive the drafting of a new constitution that would give full and elections, legislative of holding the government, ures from the opposition and members of the current the formation of a national unity government with for fig- called that approved was plan transition A sia. Rus- and US the both by attended Geneva, in held were talks 2012, June 30 On situation. negotiated a support to continues Administration Obama the ground, the on situation deteriorating the Despite sia andIran. Rus- by supplied generously is which regime, the of that serves only to perpetuate the military superiority embargo arms an maintain they opposition, the port engaging in doublespeak. Though they claim to sup- As Syria slides into the abyss, Western countries are A NegotiatedSolution? aimed atdividingSyria.” be clearly will it as interference external of type any to opposed am “I 2013, March 26 to 25 from held Al-Akhbar that, even though the Syrian Pres- 4 In fact, in early 2013, Assad came out again

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 15 The Civil War in Syria Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 16 The Civil War in Syria Keys com.es/2013/03/comunicado-de-opositores-alauies.html also to convey the message that the Alawite minor- unity,territorial country’s the ensure to butonly not is opposition the for challenge main the Therefore, respective sharesofpowerinpost-AssadSyria. their maintain to seek who , and Iran help from have would they end, this To fall. Damascus create a safe haven for the Alawite population should to order in TartusLatakiq between and strip coastal the along cleansing ethnic in engage to tempted be by different armed factions. The loyalist forces could controlled is and fragmented becomes territory the which in situation a is, that Syria, of Lebanonisation gradual the witness may we dramatically, changes forces different the between relationship the Unless mine theoutcomeofwar. deter - will that battle final the await they while cover taken have forces loyalist Assad’s where mascus, Da- to forces’advances rebel the halted has power air superior regime’s the level, military the at draw technical the Given burned. been have dialogue for bridges potential the all as feasible, seem crisis the to solution negotiated a does Nor survival. very its ensure to fighting is it that belief stubborn regime’s the to due tunnel the of end the at light a of sign no is there and year, third its entered now has broiled em- currently is country the which in war civil The ends. era authoritarian the when and how on tially, essen- depend, will Syria post-Assad of future The well founded. sure territorial unity and safeguard minority rights are ally establishing a multi-party democracy able to en- eventu- of possibility the regarding doubts quently, Conse- 1961. and 1954 of elections the following those democracy,as of such stints brief only known has Syria independence, its Since son. his of ership lead- the under established was republic hereditary a death, his On presidency. the to al-Assad Hafez bringing launched, was Movement” “Corrective the 1970, In 1963. in power to came Party Baath The Post-Assad Syria ited byhisownplatform. discred- subsequently was he although gotiations, ne- for called also Coalition, National the of leader 5 Traducciones de la revolución siria. “Comunicado de opositores alauíes reunidos en El Cairo.”2013: El March en 25 reunidos alauíes opositores de “Comunicado siria. revolución la de gradual Lebanonisation ofSyria gradual Lebanonisation dramatically, we maywitnessthe different forceschanges Unless therelationshipbetween ae y h regime.” the by tage hos- held – being is still and – was sect Alawite contrary,the the Alawites’On the service. in been ever it has nor regime, sectarian Alawite an not is regime Syrian the for mistake, ethical and political deadly a is sect Alawite the with regime ruling the ship, despotism and corruption” and that “equating lution is a revolution for all Syrians against dictator- of the regime meeting in Cairo asserted, “This revo- opponents Alawite of group a 2013, March 23 On onciliation. rec- this towards steps first the taken already have community Alawite the from figures prominent ent differ- and opposition the Both costs. all at vented pre- be must population, the of 12% for accounts which minority, Alawite the of criminalisation the and prosecuted, be should hands their on blood with people those Only confession. or ethnicity of regardless citizens, it all of equality full the ensure must Syria post-Assad noted, often has Coalition ity has nothing to fear if Assad falls. As the National tage of the power vacuum to establish a considera - a establish to vacuum power the of tage advan- taken have and regime the against lisations mobi- to regard with profile low a kept have regions Kurdish-majority the project. uprising, the of nationalist start the Baathist From the to threat a might pose that one only the and country the in munity com- non-Arab cohesive most the is it that fact the political, social and and economic marginalisation, persecution due to of history long a has minority ish Kurd- Syrian The claims. nationalist Kurdish to lated re- is integrity territorial Syrian to threat second The ing totheregime.” accord- extremism, Islamic imminent and potential fear Syrians make to intended lie a is It minority. Alawite the especially – minorities protecting be ment: “The Syrian regime is lying when it claims to govern- the by used logic sectarian the nounced 5 h cmuiu as de- also communiqué The http://traduccionsiria.blogspot. through its control of the religious institutions and, of institutions religious the of control brand its through official an sponsored regime the influence, their Tooffset Europe. in and world Arab the in elsewhere residence up take and country the severely leave to leaders its causing 1982, since persecuted been has organisation The future the government. in play will MB the role what all, above and, fallen has regime Baathist the once shared be will power exactly how seen be to remains Finally,it The RoleoftheIslamists occurred inIraq. as just State, the of collapse immediate the cause ment would have devastating effects, as they would govern- or party sole the dissolving and army the Disbanding regime. the to sympathetic are whom ploys around one and a half million people, some of em- government the Furthermore, population. try’s coun- the of tenth one is, that members, million half a and two has years, forty last the for force in been has that Constitution the to society”according and StateParty, the Baath of Syrian “leader the the that the sectarianism. In this regard, exacerbate it should be recalled to served only which measures ment, govern- the of de-Baathification the and army the of disbanding the them, among Hussein, Saddam of fall the after Iraq in made were as made be will mistakes same the whether precisely is Syria sad post-As- over hovering mark question big Another itself from theuprisings. distancing and own its on out striking istan concern among the , who saw Syrian considerable Kurd- regular caused the move This of troops. withdrawal the following ground the on deployed were which militias, defence and Council Supreme Kurdish a founded Council tional Na- Kurdish the and Party Union Democratic the position. On 26 July 2012, in the Iraqi town of Erbil, op- Syrian the by opposed strongly is that idea an established in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, one the after modelled state, federal a of lishment estab- the for calling are parties Kurdish the fact, In both theiridentity-basedandnationalrights. claim and time lost for up make to come the has time that believes population Kurdish the of Much Hasakah. of province the in autonomy of degree ble of thepopulation. tremist formulas will not be embraced by the majority ex- these that possible thus is It religions. different the between coexistence peaceful of history long a towards Alawites. Nevertheless, Syria is a plural country with hostile openly are moreover, which, and by governed state theocratic a impose to aim which groups, these strengthen could it late, esca- war the Should backing. Saudi their to thanks influence their increased have country, the in ence pres- minimal their despite which, groups, Salafist the by held be will position what seen be to remains it time, same the At brotherhoods. Sufi the of roots tor has a monopoly on political Islam, given the deep ac- single no Moreover, Ismailis). and Druses tians, Chris- Alawites, of consists population the heterogeneity of (25% confessional country’s the to due position hegemonic a achieve will it whether ful play a prominent role in post-Assad Syria, it is doubt- to destined is MB the that clear seems it Although any referencetoshariaasthemainsourceoflaw. make not did Pledge the Syria,” Future the for ject Pro- “Political 2004 their Unlike orientation. political or thought of school ethnicity, sect, religion, of less of power” in which all citizens would be equal regard- transition of] principle the on operates [that State tic supporting the emergence of “a democratic, pluralis- will be chosen in free and fair elections,” as well as of that assembly founding a by drafted (...) and people with a civil constitution rooted in the will of the Syrian state civil “modern, a of creation the of favour in out came group Brotherhood,”the Muslim Syrian the by Charter and “Pledge 2012 its In Syria. post-Assad the Syrian opposition and aspires to play a key role in within position predominant a holds MB the Today, of theState would causetheimmediatecollapse effects,asthey have devastating the solepartyorgovernmentwould Disbanding thearmyanddissolving last decades. brotherhoods, Sufi which have acquired considerable influence over the different promoted all, above law sharia

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 17 The Civil War in Syria Keys