2006

TumultuousYear–EndofOccupationofLebanon–HaririEnquiry–Problemswith the US –InternalPressuresonAssad

In 2005, Syria experienced its most tumultuous year since the death in 2000 of its long-serving president, Hafez al-Assad. Protracted and widespread interna- tional pressure on Syria forced it to abandon one of its key policies – the de- cades-old military, political and economic domination of neighbouring Leba- non. This major policy defeat seemed to expose Syria anew to a myriad of allegations about Syrian involvement in the insurgency in Iraq and terrorism in Israel. In short, Syria was on the receiving end of some rough treatment in 2005, with the government effectively running from political crisis to political crisis.

Lebanon(1):EndoftheOccupation In April 2005, a fundamental Syrian policy objective devised by the late Hafez al-Assad and maintained by his son and presidential successor Bashar al-Assad, came to an abrupt end. Syria withdrew its 14,000 troops and military intelli- gence personnel stationed in Lebanon. Syrian troops had been garrisoned in Lebanon since 1976 and their presence had been formalised as part of the 1989 Taif Accord, which brought to an end 14: years of civil war in Lebanon. Through the presence of its army and intelligence units, Syria had been able to act as the arbiter of Lebanese domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, many members of the Syrian elite profited personally from privileged access to the Lebanese economy. Syria had also effectively used Lebanon to alleviate some of its own considerable economic problems. Up to 500,000 Syrians were working in Leba- non prior to April 2005, with their remittances boosting Syria’s own ailing economy. Although the UN Security Council had passed a resolution (Resolution 1559) in September 2004, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops, the trigger for change originated from within the region. Initially, it had seemed that Syria had been able to shrug off pressure from the Security Council to change its ap- proach to Lebanon – a day after the resolution was passed, Syria engineered a three-year extension in the term of its key ally, the pro-Syrian Lebanese presi- dent Emile Lahoud. The true catalyst for end of the occupation was the assassi- nation of former Lebanese’ prime minister, Rafik Hariri, on 14 February 2005. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets of the capital Beirut, blaming Syria

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_0�9 264 2006 for the murder and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country. Some observers dubbed this the ‘Cedar Revolution’, in a reference to similar people power revolutions in republics of the former Soviet Union. Be- tween February and April, Syria came under intense pressure from both long-standing critics and allies alike. The US, the EU and Russia, at odds over a number of issues relating to the Middle East, were united in their call for the endofSyria’spresenceinLebanon. Syria was also rebuffed by its key Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. After announcing and executing what it called a partial ‘redeployment’ in March, Syria gave way in April and carried out a full-scale withdrawal. A UN team con- firmedthewithdrawalinMay.

Lebanon(2):NewRealities The collapse of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon brought home some uncomfort- able new realities to Syria. One of these was the establishment of a UN commis- sion of inquiry in April, under German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, charged with investigating the assassination of Mr Hariri. This commission issued an interim report in October and a full report in December 2005. The commission found that Mr Hariri’s assassination was linked to his opposition to Syria’s successful attempt to extend President Lahoud’s term in office and his threat to continue this opposition in parliamentary elections due in 2005. It also accused mem- bers of the Lebanese and Syrian military intelligence of being complicit in the crime. Moreover, Mr Mehlis expressed a desire to question a number of high-ranking Syrian officials, including, according to Lebanese media sources, President Assad’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, who heads Syria’s Military In- telligence. The commission later requested permission to question Assad him- self, as well as Farouq al-Shara, Syria’s foreign minister until February 2006. On 16 December, the UN Security Council agreed to extend the commission’s man- datebyafurthersixmonths. Potentially more problematic for Syria in the long-term was the question of how it dealt with a Lebanon not directly under its tutelage. In May and June, the second phase of the Cedar Revolution – parliamentary elections in Lebanon – resulted in a landslide majority for anti-Syrian parties. In July, Syria was faced with the first Lebanese government in more than 15 years not vetted by Damas- cus. Despite pledges of co-operation, relations have been strained, particularly over the issue of cross-border trade. Syria has also been accused by Lebanon of sponsoring cross-border terrorism, following a string of bombings targeting high profile anti-Syrian political figures and in areas populated by communi- ties traditionally opposed to Syrian rule. In December 2005, Syria’s diplomatic