Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Burying Heads in Geneva Sands WP Without Dismantling the Sectarian Crux of Assad’s Rule, Syria Peace Talks Are Unlikely to Usher in Stability S Khaled Yacoub Oweis

A web of corruption involving the Assad family, the security apparatus, and their business cohorts has been a major factor behind the outbreak of the Syrian revolt that started in 2011. UN-facilitated talks between the regime and the opposition are set to convene in Geneva in January 2016, after the refugee crisis in Europe and Russia’s entry into the Syrian war prompted a renewed international push to solve the conflict in Vienna. The proposed “thematic” negotiations ambitiously cover humanitarian issues; the military, terrorism, and security; the constitution and political systems; institutions and reconstruction. Germany set up an international fund for the rebuilding of Syria in 2013. But a deal that does not tackle fundamental imbalances linked to the domination of Assad’s Alawite sect risks repeating the reconstruction debacle of post-Saddam Iraq, inviting the Sunni majority to scuttle any stabilization and recovery efforts.

Attacks by the so-called Islamic State on state institutions, including the adminis- civilian targets have accelerated a de facto tration, army, and security apparatus. Yet, rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad in Europe those organizations are dominated by and the United States. The attacks have also Assad’s minority Alawite sect and have prompted a near abandonment of a 2012 been viciously geared toward internal re- deal between international powers (known pression. The result of a hasty international as the Geneva Communiqué) to seek a polit- compromise with no Syrian input, the ical transition in Syria. A new agreement to Vienna framework ignores the revolt that end the conflict was reached in November preceded the civil war. Therefore, it does 2015 in Vienna, comprising a wider range not provide the space to address the secta- of international and regional powers, most rian security core of the regime, as well as importantly Iran. The Vienna statement, to the pervasive, corrupt economic network which Germany is a party, calls for a cease- that has sustained Alawite domination over fire and the establishment of “inclusive and Syria for five decades. Rather, international non-sectarian governance” as well as a new actors are mainly motivated by the idea constitution followed by elections. It em- that the army and security services could phasizes the objective of a preservation of become a nucleus for fighting the Islamic

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “The fragmentation of Syria” SWP Comments 52 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office December 2015

1 State along with pro-regime militia and ratus dominated by Assad’s Alawite sect vetted rebel groups. The approach toward had deepened. Corruption plagued the judi- Syrian institutions is also partly driven by ciary and bureaucracy. Public procurement the desire not to repeat the experience of contracts and tenders were mostly handed the dismantling of the Iraqi army after the through frontmen to three regime figures. 2003 US invasion, which was later seen as a The three were, and remain, Assad’s brother move that swelled the ranks of an insur- Maher – the most powerful figure in the gency. The legacy of post-Saddam Iraq has military – and two of their cousins: Rami curbed US involvement in Syria and will Makhlouf and Zuhayr Shalish, who heads cast a shadow when the Assad regime and the presidential guard. By 2011, dilapidated opposition representatives are due to meet infrastructure required US$85 billion to be again in Geneva in early 2016. fixed. Corruption had run the bureaucracy into the ground to the extent that it could not respond to a water crisis that destroyed The “Alawization” of Syria the agriculture-based economy of eastern The family succession that brought Bashar Syria. The crisis drove hundreds of thou- al-Assad to power in 2000 ushered a concen- sands of the region’s Arab Sunni and Kurd- tration of Syria’s economy into the hands of ish inhabitants to flee to Damascus and the ruling Alawite elite and business associ- other cities, contributing to a charged ates, stoking the resentment of the Sunni atmosphere by the time of the revolt. majority that culminated in the revolt a decade later. Along with limited economic liberalization, Bashar’s rule was marked by Sectarian Corruption and Control a partial lifting of bans on media and com- The water crisis was as much a result of munications, but the opposition remained drought as of corruption in a state-run agri- banned and the police state changed little culture industry, which helped deplete the from the iron-fisted rule of his father. The water table through the unauthorized dig- economic liberalization brought to the fore ging of wells. The United Nations stepped a new class of mostly younger businessmen in with emergency food aid in 2010. In the who had access to Assad when he was being same year, up to 3 million Syrians – out of a groomed to become president. As “friends population of around 22 million – had sunk of Bashar,” the new class of businessmen into “extreme poverty,” deprived of food, milked the economy and national resources, drinking water, sanitation, health, proper such as oil fields and public land. They shelter, and education. Economic and joined an older class of profiteers and black human development indicators fell sharply marketers nurtured by Hafez al-Assad, who with the start of the civil war. had adopted a mixture of socialism and Yet, the revolt broke out in the relatively state capitalism. prosperous city of Deraa, in the southern By the outbreak of the revolt in March Hauran plain. The pro-democracy demon- 2011, Syria’s per capita income hovered strations in the city were sparked by arrests around US$2,500, on par with Egypt’s. Un- made by the secret police of children who employment was independently estimated had scribbled on walls anti-regime graffiti to be up to 25 percent, as liberalization of inspired by Arab Spring slogans. But finan- the economy had done little to improve com- cial and social resentment had already been petiveness, curb unemployment, or develop building from within the majority Sunni the country. Lifting of bans on imports and population in Deraa and in other regions. free enterprise had expanded the scope of Entrepreneurs, graduates, and professionals unofficial interference in commerce and had expected to benefit from economic business. Extortion of merchants, shopkeep- liberalization but were confronted with ers, and regular citizens by a security appa- expansive levels of Alawite-administered

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2 corruption. In the public sector, hiring also Perceived Property Grab favored Alawites. Typically, young Alawite Sunni frustration was compounded by the recruits would come from coastal regions seizure of private and public lands by the into the interior regions with little experi- military, as well as other expropriations ence and be appointed as principals of seen to be advantageous to the friends of schools or heads of government depart- Bashar, who started investing in real estate ments, whereas local Sunnis languished at as restrictions on the sector were lifted. lower strata. At higher levels, the prime Alawites were granted sweeping priority minister and most ministers in successive in the bureaucracy and military. This cabinets under Bashar (and his father) were prompted greater levels of Alawite migra- – and are – still Sunni. But power rests with tion from the coast to the interior and an mostly Alawite department heads through- encroachment on Sunni properties and out the executive apparatus, with backers public lands. For example, the Fourth in the intelligence apparatus as well. Up to Division – a praetorian guards army unit 75 percent of managerial positions in the headed by Bashar’s brother Maher – has bureaucracy were estimated to have been been blamed for the mass expropriation of held by Alawites before the revolt. Their Sunni-owned land in the western Damascus proportion is thought to have increased districts of Somariya, Daraya, Mouadamiya, since then, as the regime tightened its grip and Mezzeh, where housing was built for on sectors such as state media and Sunnis the mostly Alawite members of the divi- began to be seen as “suspect elements.” A sion. Large tracts of empty land in other similar proportion of Alawites dominated Syrian cities were cordoned off as belong- the officer corps before defections took ing to the military and intelligence units. place due to the revolt. Military intelligence This pushed urban population growth into and air force intelligence provided another more crowded quarters and has contrib- layer of control over Sunni foot soldiers. uted, since the 1980s, to the growth of il- Secret police branches also interfered in legal buildings, known as ashwaiyat (ran- the daily lives of regular Syrians. For ex- dom), which account for more than half ample, intelligence operatives would put of all urban construction across Syria. The pressure on public schools to accept stu- ashwaiyat residents, mostly comprised of dents whose parents had paid bribes to poor Sunnis, often fall prey to extortion by security officers to admit their children. In corrupt officials and bureaucrats. In 2007, higher education, grants favored Alawites, the governor of Homs, Iyad Ghazal, an- who were often awarded scholarships, to nounced the “Homs Dream” project to the disadvantage of more qualified Sunnis remove illegal housing and turn the city or applicants from other minorities, con- into a commercial hub, capitalizing on its tributing to a degradation of the education location near the border with Lebanon. system. State universities often produced, Ghazal was another friend of Bashar, and for example, English literature graduates the project was seen by Sunnis as a guise who could hardly speak or write English. for a land grab by the local Alawite popu- Public healthcare existed mostly in name, lation because it proposed demolishing as patients had to bribe doctors and nurses mostly Sunni property in Old Homs. With for a semblance of care at most government the advent of the revolt, the project was hospitals. Supplies were stolen to the point abandoned. Residents of Old Homs, as well that patients at times had to bring their own as other Sunni districts in the city, marched bandages. Al-Mujtahid, a main hospital in in demonstrations and militarized after the the center of Damascus, was so notoriously regime sent tanks into the city in May 2011. bad that it was known as “the butchery.” By 2012, most Sunni districts of Homs had fallen to rebels. Loyalist troops and militia sacked the city the following year. The city

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3 was ethnically cleansed, thus turning the apparatus itself was above the law, accord- city from majority Sunni to majority Ala- ing to a law decreed during the rule of wite. Complicating any possible restoration Hafez al-Assad. The law was scrapped during of Sunni residents’ rights, a fire destroyed reforms to placate demonstrators in April the city’s land registry while it was under 2011, but in practice, the regime’s security the control of the regime in 2013. underpinnings have not been subject to any domestic persecution.

The Judiciary Compromised Property disputes in Homs and elsewhere Regime’s Smuggling Base tarnished the Alawite community, as the Traditionally, smuggling has been the main sect became seen as benefiting the most source of windfall profits for the ruling hier- from corruption and was identified with archy, dipping during liberalization from the security apparatus, which increasingly 2000 to 2011 and resuming after the revolt. interfered in daily life. Opening a business Smuggling rings – in cahoots with the mili- often required bribes to obtain clearances tary and the intelligence apparatus – filled from a plethora of security branches. Syrians a vacuum that had developed during underwent “security investigations” for broader bans on imports in the 1970s and mundane reasons, such as when making or 1980s. Numbering in the thousands, receiving a power of attorney. smugglers brought in goods, mainly from In the judiciary, which has been marred across the border with Lebanon. They regu- by bribery and kangaroo courts, an esti- larly passed through, or next to, border mated 2,000 judges were employed before crossings staffed by customs officials linked the revolt. Bribes were paid to security to Assad’s brother Maher, who is thought operatives who would order judges to skew to have dominated the cigarette smuggling verdicts. For example, a Western oil services trade into Syria. The smuggled goods cov- company was swindled out of millions of ered everything from cement, bread, medi- dollars before the revolt by a member of the cine, steel for construction, and cosmetics rubberstamp Syrian parliament who did to toilet paper. Smuggling shops, owned business on behalf of the company in Iraq. mostly by Alawites from the coastal moun- The company approached an intermediary tains, sprouted up near the Fourth Division who was a protégé of Assef Shawkat, a secu- headquarters in the district of Somariya on rity chief who was killed in 2012 and also the western edge of Damascus. The illicit Assad’s brother-in-law. In return for a cut shops in Somariya and elsewhere kept oper- of any money recouped, Shawkat offered to ating despite the lifting of restrictions on threaten the businessman that his parlia- imports under liberalization. New supplies mentary immunity would be lifted and that came through Makhlouf, who was awarded he would be prosecuted. a monopoly to build and operate border If a defendant and a plaintiff both re- and airport duty-free shops. The duty-free sorted to bribes, the process turned into a goods were supposed to be taken outside de facto auction for the verdict. In one case, Syria and be subject to tariffs if they were a political dissident “convinced” the judge taken inside the country. Instead, the smug- presiding over the dissident’s trial to hand glers used Makhlouf’s duty-free depots on down a three-year sentence – instead of a the border with Lebanon and Jordan to standard five years – by arranging to pay for smuggle goods into Syria, with the author- construction materials at a summer house ities turning a blind eye to any activity the judge was building. In the criminal jus- sourced to Makhlouf. Smuggling also tice system, Alawites were rarely prosecuted worked from Syria to Lebanon under the because many in the community have family supervision of the Syrian army and intel- in the intelligence apparatus. The security ligence units. Subsidized Syrian diesel –

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4 often shipped in trucks by Syrian soldiers to Assad’s cronies prompted public criticism on a “military lane” across the Jdeideh–Mas- from Aref Dalila, a prominent Syrian econo- naa border crossing – was sold for triple the mist. For speaking out, Dalila ended up price in Lebanon. spending seven years in jail. But Makhlouf But illicit money was also made in ports, and a new class of crony capitalists expand- oil and gas fields, telecommunications, and ed their wealth and connections to the infrastructure. Latakia, Syria’s biggest port, leadership and security apparatus to levels has been the domain of various strands of that raised the stakes and left little to the Assad family since the 1970s, when the others. This contrasted with the economy port became controlled by Jamil al-Assad, a under Hafez al-Assad, which offered fewer brother of Hafez al-Assad. The takeover of opportunities for corruption because it was the ports by the Assads was twinned by the mostly closed. family’s control of the customs department. In the 2006–2007 period, Makhlouf led A job at customs – such as an inspector at an effort to consolidate the regime’s capi- one of the several border crossings with tal, setting up the larger of two holding Lebanon – was so prized that it was prac- companies that comprised the friends of tically auctioned. At Latakia and the port Bashar. The two firms, Cham Holding and of Tartous to the south, extorting cargo Souria Holding, had cross-share ownership, owners has been a lucrative business, on and both embarked on real estate projects top of illicit port activity. Vessels carrying and infrastructure takeovers. Controlled by foodstuffs would be impounded on dubious Makhlouf, Cham Holding was the more claims of violating Syrian standards. The aggressive one, building a large headquar- owners would have to pay bribes for the ters at the southern entrance of Damascus. cargo to be released or face demurrage and But US sanctions imposed on Makhlouf in other costs related to the forced delay of the 2008, specifically for corruption, limited ship. If a cargo owner could not pay, a friend his commercial attraction to investors. The of Bashar would offer to buy the cargo for measures against Makhlouf upped the ante well-below market price, then use his con- from the sanctions first imposed on the nections to end the cargo’s seizure and regime in 2004 for its suspected role behind make a profit. To give but one example, the violence in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as sup- extortion extended to a 150,000-ton wheat port for militant groups. They prohibited purchase from France, agreed on during a the export of US goods to Syria, other than visit by Assad to Paris in 2009. The last food and medicine, and froze assets of Syrian shipment in the deal was stopped at Tar- entities and individuals suspected of involve- tous. It took four months to resolve the ment in “terrorism” and weapons of mass issue, costing the French seller €1 million destructions. in shipping charges. In an attempt to raise his international business stature, Makhlouf tried in the same year to sell Syriatel to Turkish mobile Corruption’s Icon: Makhlouf operator Turkcell for an estimated US$1 bil- In the wider economy, revenue streams lion. The deal was aborted because Turkcell, that developed as a result of liberalization which came under pressure from Washing- were awarded to Makhlouf in the form of ton, apparently chose not to risk American outright or quasi-monopolies. The bonanza wrath. Additional US and European sanc- started in the telecom sector in 2001 with tions were imposed on Makhlouf and other Makhlouf’s company Syriatel being granted Assad cronies two months after the start of one of two mobile phone concessions. The the revolt in 2011 in response to the mili- second license went to the Mikati family, an tary crackdown on the peaceful protest Assad family protégé in Lebanon. The way movement. Whatever damage the new sanc- the mobile phone sector was being handed tions caused, it appeared manageable, as

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5 Makhlouf and others in the ruling hierarchy New Faces in War Economy became players in the war economy, enjoy- The exchange rate plummeted from 48 Syr- ing continued access to the commercial ian pounds to the US dollar on the eve of hubs of Dubai and Beirut. Syriatel has also the revolt to 394 Syrian pounds to the dollar remained a cash cow for the Assad regime. by November 2015. The scope for commerce In line with the younger generation of thus has sharply narrowed, and business- businessmen who befriended Assad, Makh- men with substantial operations outside louf owes his rise to his father, Mohammad Syria, such as Vienna-based Nabil Kuzbari, Makhlouf, who is the main power behind have mostly chosen to distance themselves the scenes in the state and the economy, from Assad. For them, the threat of Western and the brother of Assad’s mother, Anisa. sanctions appear too damaging to their busi- He is thought to have made hundreds of ness interests that depend, among other millions of dollars in the 2006–2008 period factors, on access to Europe. Among the from the sale of a company called Dublin prominent businessmen, a handful have Energy, which comprised little more than actively supported the opposition. Most an oil concession in Syria, to a Chinese firm. notably has been Ayman Asfari, head of the After the deal, the Makhloufs remained oil services firm Petrofac, which operates active in the oil sector through service con- from London. Asfari is also apparently ac- tracts and Gulfsands, a London-listed com- ceptable to Russia – Assad’s most powerful pany with oil exploration and production backer – as a representative of what Moscow rights in the eastern province of Hasakah. By regards as non-terrorist opposition. In the 2014, Hasakah province was mostly captur- Gulf, Ghassan Abboud, who made his for- ed by Kurdish militia and the Islamic State. tune in trading in the United Arab Emir- Mohammad Makhlouf controlled key ates, owns Orient Television, the opposi- appointments in government as well as in tion’s main media outlet. Abboud also set up the justice system and the central bank. For a network of charity hospitals and schools example, the current central bank governor, in rebel areas (for an earlier assessment Adib Mayaleh, is a protégé of the Makh- of the interests and positioning of Syria’s loufs. Similar to Iraq under Saddam Hus- business elite, see SWP Comments 22/2013). sein, the bank has effectively been the per- Others jumped at the opportunities sonal financial house of the ruling clique, provided by the war economy, chief among together with state-owned banks. In 2005, which has been a return to the smuggling the Syrian pound weakened following the heydays of Hafez al-Assad’s rule. Sanctions assassination of Lebanese statesman Rafik and hostilities between Turkey and the Hariri. Zouhair Sahloul, Syria’s main black- Syrian regime have restored Lebanon as the market money changer, was apparently main supply route to Damascus and other brought into the central bank and given loyalist areas. The Lebanese Shi’ite militia access to conduct forex operations with the Hezbollah and its influence on the Leba- country’s dollar reserves to halt the slide of nese police and intelligence units patrol- the local currency. Sahloul was linked to ling the border has facilitated the move- the Makhloufs. He helped the Syrian pound ment of goods. On the other side, Turkey recover, but he is thought to have profited has been the main supplier to rebel-con- handsomely from his power to influence trolled areas. A new warlord-businessmen the exchange rate by deciding when to class active in importing fuel, other daily pump – and how much – hard currency necessities, and consumer items have thus reserves into the market. In 2006, the gov- emerged in both camps, as well as in Islam- ernment lifted bans on private money ex- ic State territory. In Damascus, Ayham al- change companies and Sahloul opened a Assad, once a junior member of the Assad chain of currency exchange bureaus. clan, became a chief smuggler of diesel and other goods to the capital. Ayman Jaber, a

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6 previously small regime operative from made it clear that he could not interfere in Latakia, supplies diesel to the coastal a matter that could put him at odds with region. the security apparatus. Signaling a change of faces since the civil Dardari left the regime after the out- war, new elections and government appoint- break of the revolt and joined the United ments to the board of the Aleppo Chamber Nations Economic and Social Commission of Commerce in 2014 brought in 10 new for Western Asia (ESCWA), where he has members out of 18. At the Damascus Cham- been in charge of the “national agenda for ber of Commerce, 15 out of its 18 top tier the future of Syria.” Germany has contrib- were replaced in the same year. The two uted around US$2 million in financing for organizations have long been the who’s the project. Under Dardari’s supervision, who of the regime’s business associates. bureaucrats in the Assad government and The changes reflect attrition in the regime’s some members of the opposition – mostly longtime partners, as well as the emergence with a research background – have met sev- of new frontmen and previously unheard eral times since 2013. The meetings were of figures now making money in the war billed as a “track two” effort, compared to economy. At the same time, the core regime the international diplomatic efforts to end tier appears to have adapted. Makhlouf in the war. Among the opposition, many view particular has taken a lower profile and is Dardari with unease and consider the UN thought to be operating behind new front- project to be a vehicle for his self-promotion. men. Still, it helped raise Dardari’s profile as a cen- trist and crucial figure in any settlement. More importantly, Dardari has steered Lone Reformer Turned Mediator clear from raising issues linked to the core Before the revolt, economic policy had been of Syria’s economic and political order, the domain of Abdallah al-Dardari, deputy such as sectarianism, monopolies, the role prime minister for economic affairs. Dar- of the security apparatus, and Sunni-Ala- dari believed that reform of the economy wite property disputes. Even if substantive would restore Syria’s middle class and ulti- issues were to be raised, no one in the Assad mately usher in political change. A Sunni, regime – except the very top of the ruling Dardari privately criticized the Makhloufs circle – would dare discuss them. and others he called “mafias.” But he was powerless to stop the liberalization from becoming another tool of Alawite domina- Conclusion and Recommendations tion. Indeed, the economic opening he A common chant by demonstrators in the championed provided those who made early months of the Syrian revolt was “Rami fortunes from smuggling and other illicit Makhlouf and the 40 thieves.” But the activities with the means to channel their friends of Bashar would not have achieved liquidity. As a government official, what control over Syria’s economy without part- Dardari was able to do was within the tech- nering with the security apparatus, which nical sphere, such as writing anti-trust and has been responsible for the killing, torture, other rules and regulations that did not rape, and disappearance of countless Syr- apply to the security apparatus and ruling ians since the revolt – a fact nowadays often elite. Corruption and the inherent sectari- forgotten by the international community anism of the system also remained beyond due to the rise of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups Dardari’s mandate. In one instance in 2010, and the Islamic State. Yet, without struc- a Western investor in a Syrian company tural changes to Alawite domination and asked Dardari for help in fending off gov- an end to the disenfranchisement of the ernment officials with links to intelligence country’s Sunni majority and the system of who were hampering business. Dardari control and corruption, no sustained reso-

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7 lution to the Syrian civil war is likely, even perienced during UN sanctions from 1990 if a deal is struck in Geneva. to 2003. Iraq’s new rulers have done little Indeed the framework for next year’s to establish better governance. In addition, Geneva talks between the regime and the jihadists fed off the failure of the govern- opposition appears to set the stage for a ment to integrate Sunnis in the political deal that would expand participation in the system. Among the lessons of Iraq is the government and parliament but would not damage dealt to the remaining technical address the structural impediments to an talent in the bureaucracy through a de- inclusive and less repressive and corrupt Baathification policy that extracted mem- system. Some Sunnis could sign on to such bers of the Baath Party across the bureau- a compromise, but it would do little to halt cracy, regardless of rank and degree of in- the larger insurgency or rebuild the coun- volvement in the Saddam era. Some tech- try and its institutions, and would instead nical staff eventually attended ideological allow the failed old system to continue. rehabilitation courses offered by post-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und For a solution that could garner significant Saddam governments and re-joined the Politik, 2015 Sunni backing as well as broader Syrian bureaucracy. But many soon left because All rights reserved support, Geneva would need to focus on they could not cope with what they regarded These Comments reflect dismantling the Alawite deep state and the as a suffocating atmosphere. Similar to the author’s views. business-security nexus that has financed Saddam’s Iraq, many Baathists officially SWP it. Otherwise, reconstruction could end up joined Syria’s Baath Party to increase their Stiftung Wissenschaft und involving the same robber barons who rode leverage in government employment. The Politik German Institute for roughshod over reformists such as Dardari. party itself has been ruling in name only, International and But only pressure put on the regime by with the top Alawite tiers taking over real Security Affairs international sponsors of the talks, particu- power. The proposed Syria talks should Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 larly Russia, could result in a peaceful dis- focus on how to redress the imbalances in 10719 Berlin mantling of the plethora of sectarian secu- the bureaucracy without replacing Alawite Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 rity outfits, which have had close links with sectarianism with Sunni sectarianism. www.swp-berlin.org Moscow since the Alawite takeover of power In addition, it is imperative to curb the [email protected] in the 1960s. In this regard, amnesty could existing monopolies. If the fragmentation ISSN 1861-1761 encourage Alawites in the security appa- of Syria is halted and large-scale projects ratus to leave office, especially those in the were to become feasible, reconstruction higher ranks who have amassed the most funds would need to be kept away from loot. A compensation mechanism would an untested post-conflict government and also have to be negotiated to deal with land placed under international administration, disputes, one that allows Alawites to keep which could award contracts to Syrian property they may have acquired illegally firms only if they meet disclosure and anti- before the revolt, since a major reason that corruption criteria. But the start of recon- Alawites stick with the regime is the fear struction is likely to be small-scale in areas of a restoration of property rights to their where ceasefires prove to hold. Already former owners. But no reconciliation can be there exists a possible nucleus to identify achieved without an overhaul of the legal and meet local needs in the form of the system. This would need to include an Syria Recovery Trust Fund. Set up under the agreement to identify the most corrupt auspices of Germany and the United Arab judges and those closely linked with secu- Emirates in 2013, the fund was established rity and to consign them to retirement. as an international reconstruction mecha- In the field of post-conflict reconstruc- nism, but it has been financing only small tion, Iraq is a cautionary tale. Billions of projects in non-regime areas, due to a lack dollars were spent for rebuilding, but cor- of security and an active opposition govern- ruption deepened and infrastructure barely ment on the ground. improved from the catastrophic levels ex-

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