To Singapore Island, Rathe R Than Defence of Mersing , Must Be Considered Vital— Another Indication of the Concern Being Felt About Attack from the Flank and Rear
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CHAPTER 1 3 TO SINGAPORE ISLAN D HE Japanese had bitten deeply into the left flank of Westforce in th e Tbattle of Muar . With two divisions deployed from the trunk road and railway to the coast, General Yamashita was able to apply to a greate r extent the strategy and tactics characteristic of his campaign. Displaying extreme mobility, his forces continued to make swift and unremitting us e of the initiative they had gained . General Percival's forces were now being forced from the northern half of Johore, though that State was their las t foothold on the Malayan mainland. The Japanese were stimulated by victory; their opponents were suffering the physical and psychologica l effects of withdrawal . Already Australian troops—the 27th Brigade—were sharing the loss and exhaustion imposed upon the III Indian Corps sinc e the beginning of the struggle by constant fighting by day and movemen t by night. To the east, Mersing, extensively prepared for defence on the groun d that it offered a tempting back-door approach to Singapore Fortress, ha d been comparatively little affected at this stage ; but, as shown, the likelihoo d that it would be attacked had resulted in the 22nd Brigade Group bein g kept there, and had prevented the Australians from being employed as a division in resisting the enemy's main thrust . Because of the Japanese possession of Kuantan and their progress in that and other sectors, th e brigade had begun early in January to prepare to meet attack from the north and north-west rather than to resist a landing. Particular attention was paid to the Sungei Endau area and north of it . The river, with its tributaries, offered means of enemy approach in shallow draught vessels to the road running across the peninsula from Mersing, through Jemaluang , Kluang and Ayer Hitam to Batu Pahat . An Endau force was formed on 7th January, with Major Robertson,) of the 2/20th Battalion, in com- mand. It comprised one company of the 2/19th Battalion and one o f the 2/20th Battalion, the anti-aircraft platoon of the 2/18th, and a number of small vessels under command. Enemy infiltration of the area was soon evident, for during the mornin g of the 14th a reconnaissance patrol saw thirty Japanese soldiers crossin g the Sungei Pontian, about 15 miles north of Endau, oddly clad in steel helmets, black coats and khaki shorts . Next day Endau was bombed and machine-gunned, and a party of Japanese riding bicycles was engage d eight miles north of the Sungei Endau by a platoon led by Lieutenant Varley, son of the commander of the 2/18th Battalion, which had bee n sent forward for the purpose. 2 Both Endau and Mersing were attacked Lt-Col A . E . Robertson, NX34912 ; 2/20, 2/19 Bns (CO 2/19 Bn Feb 1942) . Accountant; of Willoughby, NSW; b. NE Ham, Essex, 24 Jun 1906 . Died while prisoner 31 Mar 1943 . ', The platoon was in contact with the enemy for two days and inflicted a high proportion o f casualties. In extricating his men Varley swam a flooded river and got a boat for them . 16-21 Jan EASTFORCE 25 1 from the air on the 16th . When, on the 17th, it became apparent that the Japanese were gathering in the Endau area in strength, Brigadie r Taylor decided that the Endau force had fulfilled its role, and ordere d its withdrawal. Before this had been completed the area was again attacked by Japanese aircraft.3 Because these attacks suggested some major move in the area, bridges on the way from Endau to Mersing were demolishe d and the road was cratered . General Heath visited Brigadier Taylor's headquarters at Mersing on 18th January, and it was decided at a conference that the road leadin g south from Jemaluang through Kota Tinggi to Singapore Island, rathe r than defence of Mersing , must be considered vital— another indication of the concern being felt about attack from the flank and rear. It was also decide d that the garrison being maintained at Bukit Lang- kap, west of Mersing on the Sungei Endau, must be re- duced to strengthen Jema- luang. The new formatio n to be known as Eastforce was to be commanded by Taylor under Heath's con- trol as from 6 a .m. on 19th January. It would comprise the 22nd Australian Brigade Group and all troops an d craft in the Mersing- MILE S Kahang-Kota Tinggi areas . 5 0 5 to 15 20 Its Australian components were the 2/18th and 2/20th Battalions, th e 2/10th Field Regiment, the 2/10th Field Company, and the 2/9th Fiel d Ambulance . Also included at this stage were the 2/ 17th Dogras, the Ja t Battalion (amalgamated 2nd Jats-1/8th Punjabs), two companies of th e Johore Military Forces, and the Johore Volunteer Engineers . Patrols reported a gradual enemy approach to Mersing in the next two days, and the 2/20th Battalion area was under frequent air attack . During the morning of the 21st a patrol led by Lieutenant Ramsbotham 4 ambushed a party of Japanese near the north bank of the Sungei Mersing , and killed a number of them . The others attempted a flanking move, an d entered a minefield. Though the mines had become immersed in water from s During the 16th and 17th January HMS Shun an (Lt O. R. T. Henman) and HMS Kelen a (Lt Connor Craig) went up and down the Endau under heavy bombing and rifle fire, firin g broadsides from brass 3-pounders at the enemy on the north bank . The Kelena was sunk, but the Shun an was used to evacuate the garrison at Bukit Langkap, farther south on the Endau. Capt F . Ramsbotham, NX59561 ; 2/20 Bn . Clerk ; of Bondi Junction, NSW; b. Murwillumbah, NSW, 22 Nov 1916 . 252 TO SINGAPORE ISLAND Jan 1942 heavy rains, and failed to explode, the Japanese were disposed of b y machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire . In the afternoon a concentration of Japanese in the same locality was successfully dealt with by the 2/10t h Field Regiment's guns . An attempt was made early on 22nd January by a company o f Japanese to capture the Mersing bridge . This, however, had been well wired, and the attackers wilted under concentrated mortar and machine - gun fire. A section of the 2/20th Battalion crossed the river and machine - gunned enemy posts, and houses in which the Japanese had hidden . Artil- lery which ranged along the road completed the task, and the rest of th e enemy force moved westward. Enemy posts and concentrations elsewher e in the Mersing area were pounded by the Australians' guns, for which good fields of fire had been provided as a result of the evacuation o f civilians on the outbreak of war with Japan . In keeping with the with- drawal policy laid down, Taylor moved his headquarters and the 2/18th Battalion less a company back to the Nithsdale Estate, 10 miles nort h of Jemaluang. The 2/10th Field Regiment maintained effective fir e throughout the day, and the move was completed without interference during the night. The 2/20th Battalion was left covering the approach to Mersing. On the civil front meanwhile the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, ha d responded to complaints that the civil administration was failing to mee t the demands of war . In a circular issued to the Malayan civil service in mid-January he declared : The day of minute papers has gone. There must be no more passing of files fro m one department to another, and from one officer in a department to another . It is the duty of every officer to act, and if he feels the decision is beyond him he must go and get it. Similarly, the day of letters and reports is over . All written matter should be in the form of short notes in which only the most important matters are mentioned. Every officer must accept his responsibility to the full in the taking of decisions. In the great majority of cases a decision can be taken or obtained after a brief conversation, by telephone or direct . The essential thing is speed in action. Officers who show that they cannot take responsibility should be replaced by those who can. Seniority is of no account . On this the Straits Times commented : "The announcement is abou t two and a half years too late," adding "but no matter. We have got i t at last." It would, however, have required a staunch faith in miracles t o entertain the idea that habits engendered by Malaya 's venerable system of government could thus be changed overnight . A further exchange of cables between the British and the Australian Prime Ministers had again indicated their differences in outlook . Replying on 18th January to Mr Churchill's cable of the 14th about the withdrawal in Malaya, Mr Curtin pointed out that Australia had not expected th e whole of Malaya to be defended without superiority of seapower . On the contrary, the Australian Government had conveyed to the United King- 18-22 Jan IMMEDIATE NEEDS 253 dom Government on 1st December 1941 the conclusion reached by the Australian delegation to the first Singapore conference that in the absenc e of a main fleet in the Far East the forces and equipment available in th e area for the defence of Malaya were totally inadequate to meet a majo r attack by Japan .