Ii. Analysis of the Cns's Constitution Through

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Ii. Analysis of the Cns's Constitution Through 32 II. ANALYSIS OF THE CNS’S CONSTITUTION THROUGH LEFORT’S THEORY 2.1. Historical context of the CNS The CNS is not an isolated event of the history of the D.R.Congo. For better appreciation, it is important to situate it in the logic of resistance for democracy, which punctuates the political history of Congo since its independence in 1960. In their declaration at the CNS on 30 May 1992, the Catholic Bishops of Zaire, underlining the origin of Zairian crisis, go over the history in these words: “Our crisis was neither an unforeseeable occurrence nor a momentary effect of a temporary error. It is part of our history. From the origins of our country, (...) the integral happiness of Zairians has in fact never been the motivation nor the principal objective of the creation of the Etat Indépendant du Congo, of its transformation into Belgian colony, nor even of the hasty setting up of its independence. The search of selfish interests by nationals as well as by foreigners was the principal cause of the rebellions and the secessions that followed immediately the independence.. In the same way, it would be too simple to believe that the military coup of 1965 was only justified by the altruism and the spiritual and material wellbeing of our people”18. Indeed, it was on 30 June 1960 that Congo reached independence under the name of the “Republic of Congo”, after the Round Table of Brussels, in February 1960. Within the first hours of independence, rebellions and secessions were organized as a sign of reaction against “the politicians who had betrayed the people” (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997). An unstable leadership characterized these first five years of the Republic until the seizure of power by a military coup on 24 November 1965, by the Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, then Commander in chief of the army. In order to restore order and stability, the new regime set up as its priority the task of reconstruction and political consolidation. To create new bases of legitimacy, in particular under a one party regime, 18 Declaration of the Zairian Bishop Conference at the CNS, 30 May 1992. 33 became the priority of President Mobutu. Thus, between 1965 and 1967, Mobutu’s State endeavored to reinforce its legitimacy by gradually dismantling the institutions of the First Republic, and, at the same time, by increasing the centralization of the control of power around the president. In October 1966, the function of Prime Minister was removed. Although the Parliament continued to meet occasionally, its prerogatives were appreciably reduced, with the executory decisions being generally henceforth taken by presidential ‘ordinances-laws’. All the political parties were dissolved and political activities were prohibited. Mobutu held from now on the quasi-monopoly of the executive power, and controlled both legislative and judiciary powers. This period is basically marked by the liquidation of the political opposition, either by incorporating it into the new regime, or by repressing it with a fatal violence. Thus on 30 May 1966, four former ministers of the First Republic were accused of plotting against the State, judged in a parody of a trial, and publicly hanged in Kinshasa. 2.1.1. Towards a quest of legitimacy To consolidate his power on a constitutional basis, Mobutu secured the voting in of new constitution on 24 June 1967. This constitution gave increased authority to the central government and to the president, who became head of the State, of the Police Force, the Army, and in charge of Foreign Affairs. The president was empowered to dismiss ministers and members of cabinet, and fixed their attributions. The ministers were in charge of the execution of president’s decrees and programs. The president approved (or dismissed) the governors of provinces, and all the judges, including those of the Supreme Court. A single Assembly, the National Assembly, replaced the bicameral Parliament. The president had the authority to legislate on provisions not envisaged by the laws, but within the constitution. Under certain conditions, the president could control by presidential ordinances, which then prevailed over the laws. But the most significant change of the Mobutu regime was the creation of the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Popular Movement of the Revolution), MPR, on 17 April 1967, marking the emergence of a “politically organized nation” around a leader. The State became from now the emanation, the expression, of the party. In October 1967, responsibilities for party and State administration were 34 shared in a single structure, ensuring the influence of the party at all the levels of power, including in the provinces, the trade unions, youth movements and students organizations. The party was thus the exclusive and the legitimate instrument of the life of the country. Consequently, any difference between political and social organization was eliminated (Claude LEFORT)19. To translate the concept of a “politically organized nation” into reality implied an expansion of the control of the State over civil society. That started with the incorporation of the youth and workers into organizations controlled by the party-State. In July 1967, the political Office of the MPR announced the creation of the Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution), JMPR; in August 1967, this launched the formation of the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois (National Union of the Zairian Workers), UNTZA, which gathered three preexistent trade unions in one organization. The goal was to transform the role of the trade unions from a “force of confrontation” into a “body of support to governmental policy”, becoming, thus, a “place of communication between the popular classes and the State” (KADIMA, 1996). In reality, the regime tried through these operations to put under its control all the sectors likely to see emerging an opposition to the regime. In addition to the trade-union forces and the students, the regime continued to control other key social sectors. Associations of women and the press were put under party control. Under the pretext of the threat of tribalism, Mobutu prohibited a number of cultural associations, such as the Association de Lulua Frères (Association of Lulua Brothers), founded in 1953 in Kasai in reaction to the influence in the area of the rival ethnic group of Lubas; and the Liboke lya Bangala (Package of Bangalas), an association that was formed in the 1950s to represent the interests of the Lingala speakers in the large cities. With the aim of neutralizing any source of uncontrolled power, significant administrative reforms took place between 1967 and 1973. As a result, the influence of the central power on the provinces was increased. The reform of 1967 brought about the abolition of provincial governments, replacing them 19 Moreover, the slogan in Lingala (the Capital city’s language), “olinga olinga te, ozali membre ya MPR”, means “whether you want it or not, you are member of the MPR”. Indeed, “the MPR is the politically organized Zairian nation. Its doctrine is Mobutism. Every Zairian is a member of the MPR” (quoted by Olivier LANOTTE, 2003: 175). “The MPR was considered, according to a declaration of an official of the regime, like a church, and its founder, the Messiah”. 35 with public servants controlled by Kinshasa. The principle of centralization was then extended to the districts and the territories, with public servants totally reliant on Kinshasa. The sole administrative entities, which did not fall under the central government, were the traditional authorities (chefferies), and the villages. Table 0.1.: administrative structure under the Second Republic Central government Provincial/regional governments Districts/Sub-Regions Territories/Zones Communities/Sectors Chefferies Villages With the reform of June 1973, an additional stage was reached in the increase of centralization. The objective was to carry out a complete fusion between the administrative and political structures by making each administrative leader the head of the corresponding section of the party. As a consequence, the reform seriously blocked the power of the traditional authorities at the local level. This authority was allocated only to persons put in charge by Kinshasa and controlled by official channels. Consequently, the process of centralization had formally eradicated any form of preexistent local autonomy. Basically, the Mobutu regime was built on the doctrinal foundation of its party, the MPR, which was contained in the “Manifesto of N’sele”, from the name of the countryside residence of Mobutu at N’sele, (six kilometers from Kinshasa) published in May 1967. Nationalism, Revolution and Authenticity were identified there as the major themes of Mobutism. Nationalism implied the installation of an economic policy of independence. The Revolution, understood primarily as a national revolution, 36 was at the same time a rejection of Capitalism and Communism. “Neither of the right, nor of the left” was how the regime characterized itself. Authenticity had an important place in the doctrine of the party. The concept was derived from the doctrine of the MPR, and entailed “an authentic Zairian nationalism and a condemnation of regionalism and tribalism". Mobutu himself advanced this definition when speaking about authenticity: “To be conscious of one’s personality and one’s cultural values". To show the way, the name of the country was changed to the Republic of Zaire in October 1971 (the name Zaire seems to come from a Portuguese deformation of ‘Nzadi’ in ‘Nzere’, a Kikongo expression to indicate the Congo River); the armed forces became Forces Armées Zairoises (Zairian Armed Forces), FAZ. General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko and obliged all citizens to adopt African names to replace Christian names (received from Catholic and Protestant Missionaries). Many places were renamed too. Table 0.2.: Change of cities names Leopoldville Kinshasa Stanleyville Kisangani Elisabethville Lubumbashi Jadotville Likasi Albertville Kalemi The principle of authenticity gave to Mobutism its principal philosophical originality.
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