The United States and the Macrosecuritisation of the “China Threat”

Home , Chen Guangcheng, Goh Keng Swee, Operation Trikora, Red Scare, USS Lassen (AE-3)

Jun Yan Chang BSSc (Hons), MSc

0000-0002-6183-2199

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Queensland in 2020 School of Political Science and International Studies

Abstract

The so-called “China Threat” theory suggests that a rising China is a threatening one, especially challenging US international leadership. However, despite significant literature examining the extent to which a rising China constitutes a security threat, very few analyses examine whether China has been represented or “constructed” as a threat. Has China been constructed as a threat by the US government itself? If it has done so, how has the rest of the international community responded to such US depictions? In order to determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, this dissertation adopts a discursive approach novel to the extant literature. It does this through the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, which sees security as constructed when the label of “security” is applied. More specifically, through integrating the positive contributions to the study by the three key debates of securitisation theory since its introduction, as well as accounting for the macro-scale of China’s rise, this dissertation develops a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory that is more appropriate to the research questions. In examining US representations and practices using this post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory, this thesis finds that from 2006-2016, the time period of this study, the US has overall consistently represented China’s rise as a security risk to the Asia-Pacific across the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, but not as a threat. Moreover, within the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore, such US representations have only been partially accepted. In clarifying these arguments, this thesis both contributes to the conceptual literature on securitisation and addresses a relative absence of the application of discursive frameworks to the question of the “China threat”.

(86,931 words)

Declaration by Author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, financial support and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my higher degree by research candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the thesis be made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968 unless a period of embargo has been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School.

I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis and have sought permission from co- authors for any jointly authored works included in the thesis.

Publications included in this thesis

No publications included.

Submitted manuscripts included in this thesis

No manuscripts submitted for publication.

Other publications during candidature

Peer-reviewed Journal Articles: Chang, Jun Yan and Nicole Jenne. "Velvet Fists: The Paradox of Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia." European Journal of International Security, 5:3 (2020), pp. 332-349.

Jenne, Nicole and Jun Yan Chang. "Hegemonic Distortions: The Securitisation of the Insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South." TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 7:2 (2019), pp. 209-232.

Chong, Alan and Jun Yan Chang. "The International Politics of Air Disasters: Lessons for Aviation Disaster Governance from Asia, 2014-2015." Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31:3-4 (2018), pp. 249-271.

Book Chapters:

Chang, Jun Yan. "Conscripting the Audience: Singapore’s Successful Securitisation of Vulnerability." In National Service in Singapore, edited by Shu Huang Ho and Graham Ong-Webb, pp. 83-103. Singapore: World Scientific, 2019.

Contributions by others to the thesis

No contributions by others.

Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree

No works submitted towards another degree have been included in this thesis.

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Research involving human or animal subjects

No animal or human subjects were involved in this research.

Acknowledgements

The poet, John Greenleaf Whittier, wrote in “Maud Muller” that: “For of all sad words of tongue or pen,/The saddest are these: ‘It might have been!’” My fondest dream when young has always been earning a PhD. I am most grateful for having the chance to fulfil my dream. It would never have been possible without the support of many throughout this journey.

My supervisors, Matt McDonald and Andrew Phillips, have been invaluable. Andrew’s perspicacious feedback has prodded me to do better. Matt has been exemplary and inspirational. He is who I want to be when I grow up (and take my own students). My deepest gratitude to Andrew and Matt.

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies has been integral to my PhD. Not only did it fund my PhD, my mentors and colleagues there have also given me the opportunities, tools and space to do my research and writing, as well as support other aspects of my work. Special thanks go to Ang Cheng Guan, Alicia Cheung, Alan Chong, Ralf Emmers, Joseph Liow, Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Sng Seow Lian, Adrian Tan, Jenny Tan and Tan See Seng. I am also indebted to many friends and colleagues (past and present) in the Military Studies Programme, the library and other departments. In particular, Caroline Chin, Ho Shu Huang, Collin Swee Lean Koh and Angela Poh kept me sane.

Being a remote student has been challenging, but it would have been a lot tougher without the awesome administrative support from Muriwai Vanessa Salam, Marja Knuutilla, Tom Court and Kirstin Woodward. I would also like to thank everyone who has been to my milestones – especially my readers, Jessica Kirk (twice) and Raditya Kusumaningprang – for their feedback on earlier drafts of this thesis.

It is only thanks to my family’s support that I could be writing this. I wish I can meet my mother in the hereafter to tell her about this journey.

Chang Jun Yan Bellewoods, Singapore 31 August 2020

Financial support

This research was supported by a scholarship from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Keywords

Securitisation, United States, China Threat, international security.

Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classifications (ANZSRC)

ANZSRC code: 160606, Government and Politics of Asia and the Pacific, 20% ANZSRC code: 160607, International Relations, 80%

Fields of Research (FoR) Classification

FoR code: 1606, Political Science, 100%

To my parents and favourite wife

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... I DECLARATION BY AUTHOR ...... II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... V TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... VIII LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ...... X LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... XI 1. INTRODUCTION: “PEACEFUL RISE” OR “CHINA THREAT”? ...... 1

THE QUESTION ...... 1 THE THEORY ...... 3 THE STRUCTURE ...... 9 THE CONTRIBUTION ...... 13 2. THE “BLUE DREAD” CHINA THREAT THEORY ...... 16

INTRODUCTION: YELLOW PERIL TO RED MENACE TO BLUE DREAD ...... 16 CONTAINMENT TO ENGAGEMENT: US-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS SINCE THE COLD WAR ...... 18 ILLUSION TO REALITY: THE DECLINE OF THE US ...... 21 ORIGIN TO EXPANSION: THE CHINA THREAT THEORY AND CHINA’S ASSERTIVE TURN ...... 24 MATERIALIST TO IDEATIONAL: TRADITIONS OF THE CHINA THREAT THEORY ...... 29 THESIS TO ANTI-THESIS: CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE ...... 35 CONCLUSION: OBJECTIVE TO SUBJECTIVE TO DISCURSIVE ...... 38 3. A POST-COPENHAGEN MACROSECURITISATION THEORY AND DESIGN .. 41

INTRODUCTION: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL ...... 41 SECTORS, COMPLEXES, SECURITISATION ...... 42 CONTEXTUAL, PRACTICAL, CRITICAL ...... 49 First Key Debate ...... 50 Second Key Debate ...... 54 Third Key Debate ...... 57 Neo-Securitisation Theory ...... 60 SUCCESS, MOVES, SCALE ...... 62 METHODS, DESIGN, METRICS ...... 66 CONCLUSION: POST-COPENHAGEN MACROSECURITISATION ...... 73 4. THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE US ...... 75

INTRODUCTION: THE PACIFIC US ...... 75 ASSEMBLING THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ...... 76 ARRANGING CHINA IN AN “OTHERED” TIER ...... 79 ACCLAIMING AND DENOUNCING CHINA ...... 85 CONCLUSION: THE DREADED CHINA ...... 89

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5. THE US SECURITY REPRESENTATIONS OF CHINA’S RISE ...... 90

INTRODUCTION: DRAGON OR PANDA?...... 90 MILITARY SECTOR ...... 91 POLITICAL SECTOR ...... 99 ECONOMIC SECTOR ...... 106 ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR ...... 111 SOCIETAL SECTOR ...... 114 CONCLUSION: THE CHINA’S RISE RISK THESIS ...... 117 6. INDONESIA: RISING “BLUE DREAD” AND ABIDING “YELLOW PERIL” ..... 121

INTRODUCTION: “DEMOCRATIC” DELINEATIONS OF REFORMATION ...... 121 PROTEAN PROFILES OF AN “INDEPENDENT AND ACTIVE” FOREIGN POLICY ...... 123 STUBBORN SHADOWS OF “RED MENACE” AND “YELLOW PERIL” TO “BLUE DREAD” ...... 127 COOPERATIVE CONTOURS OF “NONALIGNMENT” ...... 132 SURFACE SILHOUETTES OF “PARTIAL SUCCESS” ...... 135 Military ...... 135 Political ...... 141 Economic ...... 147 Environmental ...... 151 CONCLUSION: AMBIVALENT AUGURIES OF “YELLOW PERIL” AND “BLUE DREAD” ...... 152 7. SINGAPORE: “BLUE DREAD” ENGAGEMENT ...... 154

INTRODUCTION: DOMINANCE OF A “ONE-PARTY STATE” ...... 154 ENDURING FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FACE OF PERPETUAL VULNERABILITIES ...... 156 CONTINUAL ENGAGEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING “RED MENACE” AND “BLUE DREAD” ...... 159 PERMANENT FRIEND DESPITE TEMPORARY IRRITATIONS ...... 164 UNDEVIATING PRAGMATISM REGARDLESS OF “SUCCESS” AND “FAILURE” ...... 167 Military ...... 167 Political ...... 173 Economic ...... 179 Environmental ...... 183 CONCLUSION: CONSTANT HEDGING AND THE “BLUE DREAD” ...... 184 8. CONCLUSION: THE “BLUE DREAD” CHINA’S RISE RISK THESIS ...... 186 THE FINDINGS ...... 186 THE LIMITATIONS ...... 191 THE IMPLICATIONS ...... 193 THE FUTURE ...... 197 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 200 ANNEX A: LIST OF US SECURITY DOCUMENTS ...... A-1 ANNEX B: LIST OF SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE SPEECHES...... B-1 ANNEX C: LIST OF US DOCUMENTS/SPEECHES ON ASEAN ...... C-1 ANNEX D: LIST OF US-INDONESIA DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES ...... D-1 ANNEX E: LIST OF INDONESIA DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES...... E-1 ANNEX F: LIST OF US-SINGAPORE DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES ...... F-1 ANNEX G: LIST OF SINGAPORE DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES ...... G-1

List of Figures and Tables

Figures:

Figure 2.1: Assertive China Trends in the Media, Policy and Academia (2000-2016) ……. 28

Figure 3.1: A Post-Copenhagen Neo-securitising Move …………………………………... 52

Figure 3.2: Scenarios Depicting Audience Acceptance and Securitisation ………………... 52

Figure 3.3: A Post-Copenhagen Macrosecuritisation Theory ……………………………… 64

Tables:

Table 3.1: Key Debates in Securitisation Theory ………………………………………….. 61

Table 3.2: Comparing Securitisation and Macrosecuritisation …………………………….. 65

Table 5.1: Summary of the US Macrosecuritising of China’s Rise in All Sectors ……….. 120

Table 8.1: Comparing Success of Macrosecuritisation in Indonesia and Singapore ……... 190

List of Abbreviations

9/11 September 11, 2001 Terror Attack A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone ADMM ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus AFC Asian Financial Crisis AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASB Air-Sea Battle ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ATA Annual Threat Assessment (US) BMD Ballistic Missile Defence BRI Belt Road Initiative (China) CCP Chinese Communist Party CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States CNB Changi Naval Base (Singapore) COC Code of Conduct in the South China Sea CPR China’s Peaceful Rise CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP CTT China Threat Theory DCA Defence Cooperation Agreement DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea DOD Department of Defense (US) DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DWP Defence White Paper EAS East Asia Summit EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EU European Union FONOPS Freedom of Navigation Operations FTA Free Trade Agreement GFC Global Financial Crisis (2008) GWoT Global War on Terror HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief ICWA Indonesian Council on World Affairs IMF International Monetary Fund IUU Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (fishing) JCM Joint Commission Meeting (US-Indonesia) JI Jemaah Islamiyah LCS Littoral Combat Ship (US) MCP Malayan Communist Party MFN Most Favored Nation MOU Memorandum of Understanding MSI Maritime Security Initiative (US to Southeast Asia) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDR National Day Rally (Singapore)

NSS National Security Strategy (US) P4 Agreement Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership PAP People’s Action Party (Singapore) PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration PKI Indonesian Communist Party PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China QDR Quadrennial Defense Review QUAD Quadrilateral Grouping (US, Japan, Australia, India) RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ROK Republic of Korea RSC Regional Security Complex SARS-CoV-2 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 SCS South China Sea SFA Strategic Framework Agreement SLD Shangri-La Dialogue SQUAD Quadrilateral Grouping including Singapore (see QUAD) TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN) TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership WHO World Health Organization WWI First World War WWII Second World War UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USA United States of America USD US Dollars USN United States Navy USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1. Introduction: “Peaceful Rise” or “China Threat”?

The Question

This dissertation provides an unfamiliar answer to the familiar question of whether the rise of the People’s Republic of China is a threat. This doubt over China’s rise is one of the most debated questions in the field of International Relations over the past few decades. The Global Language Monitor, tracking the world’s “top 50,000 media sources”, highlighted that the “most read-about news story” of the first decade of this century was China’s rise, beating out other conceivable contenders such as watersheds of the September 11 attacks or the election of Barack Obama as the US’s first African-American president.1 Broadly, the debate over China’s rise and its consequences can be grouped into two polar schools of thought that generically follow the two major International Relations traditions of liberalism and realism: whether China is a “status quo” power or a “revisionist” challenger.2 In the former, China simply wants more “authority and leadership” within the current US-led “liberal international order”.3 This “China’s Peaceful Rise” (CPR) paradigm does not change the rules of the game and is within the boundaries of the current international order. The latter view instead perceives China as seeking to displace the current US hegemon, especially in the Asia-Pacific, for a variety of reasons. These include returning to a glorious past as Asia’s dominant power – the eponymous “Middle Kingdom” of China’s name in Chinese; or reshaping the international order in its own image, akin to the erstwhile Chinese “tributary system”.4 As this “China Threat” theory (CTT) logic continues, the US and China would increasingly come into conflict as their vital interests diverge, and war would occur between the two.

1 Cited in Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," International Security, 36:3 (Winter 2011/12), p. 41. 2 Following A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 23; cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 21. However, Alastair Iain Johnston, "China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challange in Beijing's International Relations," International Security, 44:2 (Fall 2019), pp. 9-60, highlights the problem of applying such a binary distinction to China. 3 G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America," Foreign Affairs, 90:3 (May/June 2011), p. 57. 4 See Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" International Security, 30:2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-45; Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5:1 (2012), pp. 3-36.

For all the differences between these two opposing perspectives even as some tread a more cautious middle ground or challenge the idea that the China is catching up to the US,5 there is one common assumption underpinning the plethora of studies on China’s rise: that the very rise of China is a security issue. However, whilst some studies have highlighted the epistemological distinction between the objective and subjective elements of China’s rise as a security concern,6 what is puzzling is the scarcity of analyses investigating the extent to which such security concerns hold true for US leaders and policymakers. After all, over the years, the US has said many contradictory things about China; from the Clinton Administration’s “strategic partner”, to the “strategic competitor” of the Bush Administration, and to the Obama Administration’s “friendly competitor”.7 Has China been constructed as a threat by the US government itself rather than by the media, academics and pundits? How has the US government portrayed a rising China? Who or what is threatened? What are the associated security practices? How has the rest of the international community within the liberal hegemonic order responded to US depictions of a China threat? Are these audiences convinced? This thesis therefore asks two research questions: (1) “To what extent has the US represented a rising China as a threat to international security?” and if the US has done so; (2) “To what extent have these representations been accepted by the relevant audiences?” I answer these discursive questions using macrosecuritisation theory. In so doing, this dissertation speaks to two audiences; securitisation scholars, as well as a wider epistemic community interested in China’s rise and security in the Asia-Pacific. I argue that, overall, the US has consistently represented China’s rise as a risk to the Asia-Pacific across the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, but not as a threat. Moreover, within the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore, such US depictions have only found partial success. The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into three sections. The next section charts the research design to address my research questions. The second section provides an overview of the dissertation, briefly sketching the objectives and main arguments of each chapter. The third section concludes by highlighting this thesis’s various contributions.

5 Shaun Breslin, "China and the Global Order: Signalling Threat or Friendship?" International Affairs, 89:3 (2013), pp. 615-634; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty- first Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position," International Security, 40:3 (Winter 2015/2016), pp. 7-53. 6 For instance, the optimist versus pessimist positions in Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," pp. 7- 45. 7 Shelley Wick, "Capabilities, Cooperation, and Culture: Mapping American Ambivalence Toward China," Foreign Policy Analysis, 10:3 (2014), p. 290.

The Theory

Since the overarching assumption in the literature on the consequences of China’s rise is that it is a security issue, we need to first examine how security is understood. The traditional approaches to security are that it may be objective or subjective. The former understands security threats to be ontologically real and measurable, with an independent existence. The latter comprehends issues as filtered through psychological fears and other perceptions that then conceives them to be threatening. 8 Conversely, the discursive approach to security challenges this objective-subjective distinction. Instead of an ontological reality or a subjectively determined threat, security is constructed through language when the label of “security” is applied.9 In this manner, this third discursive approach to security is crucial to this thesis since my aim is to determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. This dissertation addresses the puzzling absence of a systematic analysis of whether the US has portrayed China’s rise as a security issue through securitisation theory. Securitisation is an analytical and discursive approach to the construction of security as part of the broader critical security studies tradition. It involves turning an issue into a matter of security, seen as an extreme kind of politics, via the process of a “speech act”, in which “speaking security” discursively constructs security. 10 Securitisation theory is a framework proposed by the “Copenhagen School”, a term coined to refer to a loose grouping of scholars associated with the old Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. 11 As arguably the most prominent framework for examining the construction of security, the utility of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory for answering the research questions posed in this thesis is self- evident. However, there are three challenges to do with the scale involved in my research questions in such a proposed usage of securitisation theory.

8 Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," Political Science Quarterly, 67:4 (1952), pp. 481-502; see also David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies, 23:1 (1997), pp. 5-26. 9 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 33-34. Although Rita Floyd, The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 19-21, attempts to conjoin the notion of an objective threat to the discursive construction of security. 10 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86. 11 Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," Review of International Studies, 22:1 (1996), pp. 81-93.

First, most studies employing securitisation theory concern non-traditional security,12 dealing with topics coterminous with four of the five sectors outlined by the Copenhagen School: the environmental, economic, societal and political sectors; but seldom the traditional security of the military sector.13 This perhaps reflects the widening of the concept of “security” post-Cold War.14 However, in determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant international audiences, this thesis examines all five sectors, especially the military, since China’s rise is usually seen as a traditional security issue. Second, how official US statements have explicated the threat engendered from China’s rise is different from most securitisation accounts in two ways. Typical studies on securitisation tend to focus on the domestic arena and emphasise a present existential threat, for example, in Joseph Liow’s study of the securitisation of illegal migrant labour in Malaysia.15 In contrast, security concerns over a rising China are not only within the domestic arena, but also frequently in the international realm. Moreover, the security focus on China’s rise is often towards the continued growth of China as its material resources approach those of the US in the future, rather than clear and present danger. Third, Copenhagen School securitisation theory is unclear as to the success of securitisation, wavering between the function of the speech act itself, and upon the acceptance of the audience targeted by said speech act.16 However, if the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, the targeted audience is necessarily sovereign states under the condition of international anarchy. Moreover, unilateral action by the US against a China threatening international security is inconceivable. Rather, multilateral support of some form is vital. In applying securitisation theory to my research questions, it is essential to consider audience acceptance as evidence of successful securitisation.

12 For instance, Matt McDonald, "The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia," Australian Journal of Political Science, 47:4 (2012), pp. 579-592; Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, "Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School," International Studies Quarterly, 53:4 (2009), pp. 1155-1175; Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Rita Abramhamsen, "Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 30:1 (2005), pp. 55-80. 13 For an explanation of these sectors, see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security. Notable examples of securitisation applied to the military sector are Holger Stritzel and Sean C Chang, "Securitization and Counter- Securitization," Security Dialogue, 46:6 (2015), pp. 548-567; Juha A. Vuori, "Deterring Things with Words: Deterrence as a Speech Act," New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations, 24:2 (2016), pp. 32-50. 14 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies. 15 Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Malaysia’s Approach to Indonesian Migrant Labor: Securitization, Politics, or Catharsis?" in Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, ed. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 95-114. 16 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 25-26.

Furthermore, I also want to consider how contestation over the core elements of securitisation would affect the theoretical framework I apply to my research questions. This contestation is evident in three key debates (see Table 3.1). The first key debate – between what might be termed classical Copenhagen School scholars and second-generation securitisation scholars – highlights the question of whether security is self-referential or intersubjective. Second-generation securitisation tends towards the latter, as it views the success of securitisation as dependent upon the audience. Classical securitisation theory, by contrast, is more ambivalent on the role and significance of the audience itself, as noted above.17 The second key debate focuses on other means of securitisation besides the speech act, such as images or practices.18 This second debate was largely influenced by the so-called Paris School, whose theorists drew on the work of “[Pierre] Bourdieu and other sociologists, with a dose of [Michel] Foucault and a thorough commitment to detailed, empirical investigations of actual practices by various agencies”.19 Thus, even routine practices can construct security.20 Whereas classical securitisation theory was linguistic, the Paris School-inspired securitisation scholars adopted a practice-oriented approach to securitisation. Last but not least, the third key debate tackles the security problematique from a more reflexive angle, further calling into question the nature and meaning of security. As contemporary issues like climate change or terrorism demonstrate, security threats are more gradated than traditional security allows, with responses including prevention and not just sheer resolutions. These critical approaches to security and securitisation in this third key debate incorporate the concept of “risk”, which is “future-oriented”,21 as opposed to the existential threat of classical securitisation theory. I adapt my theoretical framework to account for the elements useful in addressing my research questions highlighted by the three contextual, practical and critical debates.

17 For works by second-generation securitisation scholars, see for instance, Holger Stritzel, "Security as Translation: Threats, Discourse, and the Politics of Localisation," Review of International Studies, 37:5 (2011), pp. 2491-2517. 18 Lene Hansen, "Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis," European Journal of International Relations, 17:1 (2011), pp. 51-74; Jef Huysmans, "What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings," Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), pp. 371-383. 19 Ole Wæver, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: The Europeanness of New 'Schools' of Security Theory in an American Field," in Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 54. 20 See Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27:1 Supplement (2002), pp. 63-92; Huysmans, "What's In an Act?" pp. 371-383. 21 Jessica Kirk, "From Threat to Risk? Exceptionalism and Logics of Health Security," International Studies Quarterly, 64:2 (2020), pp. 268-269.

Specifically, the first key debate emphasising the role of the audience and context is vital to understanding whether the US security depiction of China’s rise has been accepted by sovereign states within the international system. The second key debate on practices further informs my study of the purpose and character of the US measures invoked as a response to China’s rise, as opposed to mere rhetoric. Moreover, the third key debate’s reflexive approach is particularly relevant when I consider the rise of China as a potential and future security concern involving multiple referent objects as China continues to catch up relative to the US. Consequently, I first formulate a neo-securitisation theory. This posits that constructing security involves both speech acts and security practices, with the actor thus saying and doing security. Such a neo-securitisation theory also adopts a reflexive notion of security that countenances gradated security threats, including risk. An issue then becomes one of security when the audience accepts these speech acts and practices, which is to say that the securitising move is successful upon audience acceptance. I then turn to macrosecuritisation, introduced in 2009 by two of the founders of the Copenhagen School, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, to further account for the scale challenges. Macrosecuritisation is a “larger” securitisation that forms “on a scale above that of both the middle level and regions”, speaking “to referent objects higher than those at the middle level” and which aims “to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations”. 22 Macrosecuritisation is thus appropriate in examining the scale challenges of China’s rise, especially within the Asia-Pacific. Not only is the area a supra-region consisting of East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australia, but there is also US involvement from across the Pacific as a superpower, on top of the primary issue of Sino-US hegemonic rivalry.23 Before proceeding, an notable disclaimer to emphasise here is that the Asia-Pacific is conventionally referred colloquially as a “region” despite its supra-regional character. When this thesis likewise refers to the Asia-Pacific “region”, it is necessary to keep in mind the Asia-Pacific’s international character. I theorise a modified, post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation (see Figure 3.3), based on neo-securitisation theory, to address my research questions. 24 It conceives of a

22 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory," Review of International Studies, 35:2 (2009), p. 257. The term “macrosecuritisation” has been used before this however, in Barry Buzan, "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?" International Affairs, 82:6 (2006), pp. 1101-1118. 23 See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 24 To the best of my knowledge, “post-Copenhagen” to denote a “new” securitisation theory was first used separately by Stuart Croft and Holger Stritzel in 2012; see Croft, Securitizing Islam, chapter 2; Holger Stritzel, "Securitization, Power, Intertextuality: Discourse Theory and the Translations of Organized Crime," Security

macrosecuritising move as a speech act coupled to a security practice, which may be exceptional, routine or preventive. This verifies that the speech act is not just rhetoric, but intended as an attempt to macrosecuritise, with concrete responses. Furthermore, the threats to be countered are not just clear and present existential dangers, but can range across the security continuum. Multiple and differentiated referent objects from different sectors at the higher supra-regional or international level can also be invoked simultaneously. For this post- Copenhagen macrosecuritisation to be successful, the audience state’s elites need to both identify with the threat arising from the speech act, as well as mobilise in support for the security practices. This post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory is a more useful framework to address my research questions due to its macro-scale. Compared to “normal” classical securitisation, it is better able to concurrently encompass: (1) more than one referent object from different sectors at the international level, including any changes to these; (2) different- scaled dangers ranging from present existential threats to those of future risk; and (3) the effects on statist elite audiences at the international level, including an account of their lower level securitisations or countersecuritisations domestically within the state (see Table 3.2). My research project is hence broadly divided into two phases. The first phase analyses the macrosecuritising speech acts and security practices of the US with regard to China. I apply discourse analysis, particularly linguistic textual analysis, to assess official US texts to determine whether the US has discursively represented China’s rise as a security threat, and if so, how these have been constructed. These texts are selected based on their reflections of official government thinking on matters of national security.25 Examples of such selected texts include US security documents, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), as well as speeches by the US President or other key officials to an Asia-Pacific audience (see Annexes for a list of these). In this manner, they also influence the practices that follow. I subsequently investigate ensuing US security practices in light of these speech acts to determine if a full attempt to macrosecuritise, containing both speech acts and practices, has taken place. Other than probing these practices themselves, I also explore the roles of agents and practitioners through other texts, such as their memoirs or autobiographies.

Dialogue, 43:6 (2012), pp. 549-567. “Post-Copenhagen” had been used earlier chronologically, but that instance meant “after” Copenhagen School securitisation, rather than “new”; see Olav F. Knudsen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," Security Dialogue, 32:3 (2001), pp. 355-368. 25 Following Juha A Vuori, "Speech Act Theory," in Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 133-137; Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 17.

The second phase considers the audience to examine whether US macrosecuritisation has succeeded. I analyse audience support in terms of identification and mobilisation through the state’s elite representations (what they say) and policies enacted (what they do). The former consists of discourse analysis of official texts such as speeches as well as other policy documents to determine the extent of audience buy-in. Similarly, these texts are selected based on their reflections of official elite thinking, on matters of security affecting said audience state. The latter includes examining the audience state’s security practices, particularly those following from the texts analysed, to establish if there is acceptance in the form of concrete support for the US security practices. In supporting or rejecting the macrosecuritisation, the audience states’ elites also need to consider the lower level securitisations or countersecuritisations within the state itself, with regard to the state’s own domestic audiences. I subsequently deem the audience state to have strongly identified with the threat if there is repetition of US representations or speech acts by its elites. Also, a mirroring of US security practices by the audience state would be a strong indicator for successful macrosecuritisation in said state. Conversely, if the US speech acts and security practices are not accepted, through rejection, ambivalence or inaction for instance, I consider US macrosecuritisation as unsuccessful. For the purposes of this thesis, I assess case studies of two Southeast Asian audience states, Indonesia and Singapore. The support of these states is vital for any US security representation of a rising China within the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia is acknowledged as the natural Southeast Asian hegemon, the primus inter pares.26 Singapore’s geostrategic position at the Straits of Malacca, coupled to its significant military strength,27 makes Singapore an ideal foil for any US policy aimed at China’s rise. These non-aligned states are the key audiences to convince, unlike the already aligned, traditional allies of the US in East Asia – Japan and the Republic of Korea, both of which have a bilateral collective defence treaty with the US. Furthermore, Southeast Asian cases can be considered “hard” cases in evaluating audience acceptance for three reasons. First, the region is very cautious about external interference, as many point out.28 Second, maritime Southeast Asia is geographically further from China, which conceivably makes China less of a direct threat, but at the same time, Asia-

26 Ralf Emmers, "Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia: A Study of Indonesia and Vietnam," Asian Survey, 45:4 (2005), pp. 645-665. 27 See Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey, 37:4 (1997), pp. 308-311. 28 Following Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 7.

Pacific supra-regional political and economic dynamics mean that any Chinese security development would affect it. This explains Southeast Asia’s interest in China. Third, since global power rivalry between the US and China is largely centred upon the Asia-Pacific, many analysts see Southeast Asia as a contested “chess piece” between them.29 Following these logics, Indonesia and Singapore are even “harder” cases in Southeast Asia as they are not directly involved in territorial disputes with China (unlike Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the Spratlys); they do not share land borders with China (unlike Laos and Myanmar); nor are they strong allies of China (Cambodia) or the US (Thailand). At this stage, there are two important caveats to note regarding my research design outlined above. First, unlike the general extant literature, it discriminates against the wider “China Threat” theory discourse present within the media, academia and punditry in favour of official US discourse. These US governmental texts and practices in effect embody the conclusion of the wider CTT. Similarly, whilst the generic CTT also affects elite audiences in Indonesia and Singapore, my focus is on the official governmental exchanges between these audience states and the US. Second, and therefore, my research design is not meant to develop a causal theory using a neopositivist method, nor to interrogate US, Indonesian or Singaporean policymakers themselves on the power exercised between said states. Rather, as I elaborate in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 3 and 8), my post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory enables me to account for the official representations and practices of these states, and the government-to-government interactions between the audience states and the US, with reference to the rise of China as a security issue.

The Structure

In addressing my research questions of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, this dissertation is organised into eight chapters. This introductory chapter is the first. Chapter 2 reviews the “China Threat” theory literature. It begins by recalling previous discourses of a threatening China, ranging from the racist “Yellow Peril” in the early days of Eastern-Western interaction to the communist “Red Menace” during the ideological Cold War.

29 Alice D. Ba, "Between China amd America: ASEAN's Great Power Dilemmas," in China, the United States, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics, ed. Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 107-127.

Today’s version of a dangerous China is, in my view, best described as a “Blue Dread”.30 The current fear of a rising China is perhaps most symptomatic in China’s pursuit of a blue-water navy to project power in the East and South China Seas, rivaling the US navy, with “dread” further evocative of the dreadnoughts that used to rule the seas. Chapter 2 then briefly analyses a history of US-China relations to set up the context for the rest of this dissertation, highlighting a seemingly new period of Chinese assertiveness in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This chapter groups the existing literature on the “Blue Dread” CTT into four traditions: (1) rationalist, largely informed by realism and neorealism; (2) structuralist, drawing upon hegemonic war theory and power-transition theory; (3) culturalist, influenced by cultures and norms; and (4) poststructural, inspired by discourse and identity. The former two are material-centric whereas the latter two are mostly ideational, with some declaring to be objectivist whilst others claim subjectivity. None of them are adequate in addressing my research questions, highlighting the discursive gap that exists in the current literature. Chapter 2 also discusses the CTT’s anti-thesis, the “China’s Peaceful Rise” narrative. Chapter 3 details the theoretical framework and research design for my thesis, identifying the various primary texts examined. In designing a methodology for the application of my post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory to my research questions, I use the assertive turn in China’s foreign policy after the GFC as a milestone to examine change and continuity in terms of US security representations of China. The timeframe I consider is therefore from 2006 to 2016. This further allows for a comparison of two different US presidential administrations, those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. They were seen as having different approaches to China, providing a clear contrast for the purposes of this dissertation. The objective of Chapter 4 is to empirically investigate US depictions of China and the Asia-Pacific to lay the contextual groundwork for the later chapters focusing on determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. It begins with an analysis of the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, including the role of the US within Southeast Asia. It identifies three tiers of the US’s bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific from US representations. The first and closest tier of US “allies” comprises the US bilateral alliances: Japan and South Korea in East Asia, Australia in the wider Asia-Pacific, and the Philippines

30 Jun Yan Chang, "Great Expectations for ASEAN Will Meet Internal Contradictions in 2018," CNA, 10 December 2017, accessed 10 December 2019, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/commentary- great-expectations-for-asean-will-meet-internal-9476566. Shaun Breslin, China and the Global Political Economy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 1, combines the colours into an "orange peril", but in my opinion, "Blue Dread" is more evocative and appropriate.

and Thailand in Southeast Asia. The US commonly describes these treaty allies as fundamental to Asia-Pacific security. The next tier is a broad “partners” tier, with a multifaceted bilateral relationship incorporating many issues. States in this tier include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India – a rising great power like China – and, surprisingly, Vietnam. China belongs to another third tier by itself. Whereas the first and second tiers mark out states “friendly” to the US, this third tier is “othered” rather than “aligned”. Hence, even as the US acclaims China, it also denounces China frequently too. Furthermore, I identify a distinct, more severe, change of tone in US representations of China from 2014, with the US censuring China in more explicit terms. Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security. I further use the change in tone from 2014 as a gauge to determine if there were changes in US representations of China afterwards, on top of China’s assertive turn post-GFC. Through the systematic analysis of US speech acts and practices in this chapter, I find that the US has macrosecuritised China’s rise as a collective security risk across the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, though not the societal (see Table 5.1). In the military sector, the US representation of the risk from China’s secretive military buildup was with regard to the referent object of Asia-Pacific peace and stability. This warning came with a demand of increased transparency. US preventive measures included building up the capacities of its allies and partners (the first two tiers), as well as military rebalancing under the US Pivot’s ambit. Within the political sector, the US communication of the risk to the rules- based order, especially with reference to the freedom of navigation, was due to China’s behaviour, which the US saw as incompatible with that of a responsible stakeholder of the international community. This led to US demands for China to uphold international rules and norms, including the peaceful resolution of conflict. US routine security practices consequently consisted of multilateralism and institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific, as well as freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea (SCS). In the economic sector, the risk to the market-based economic order was due to China’s economic practices, which the US deemed unfair, as well as China’s expansive claims in the SCS, which might impede economic development and trade. Correspondingly, the US demand was adherence to free market principles, principally in the security practice of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which pre-emptively blocked China. Lastly, the US also presented China’s growth as risking the global climate in the environmental sector. There, China was as much the source of the problem as its solution. The US therefore worked cooperatively with China on the preventive practice

of the 2016 Paris Agreement. Crucially, these US representations across the four sectors had occurred through the Bush and Obama administrations, and not just after the start of China’s assertive turn. Even as such perceived assertiveness was reified in US representations from 2014, the essence and substance of US macrosecuritising speech acts and practices towards China remained the same. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the case studies of the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore, respectively. Each chapter begins with a discussion of the state’s foreign policy, followed by a brief assessment of its past bilateral relationships with China and the US. These set up the context and propositional content in considering the acceptance or rejection of the US representations of China’s rise in these audience states. Of the various US representations of China’s rise as a collective security risk, only the environmental sector was relatively unproblematic since all states were as much to blame for the risk to the global climate, including the US itself. Overall, across the different sectors, the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise has only been partially successful in Indonesia and Singapore (see Table 8.1). Of these, Chapter 6 demonstrates that the greatest success in the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise in Indonesia was in the political sector. Indonesia repeated US representations of the risk to the rules-based order from China’s rise, as well as mirrored US security practices of multilateralism and institutionalism. However, within the military and economic sectors, Indonesia only concurred with the US representations of the risks posed by China’s rise to peace and the economic order in the Asia-Pacific, but neither supported US military rebalancing nor the TPP. Indonesia even countersecuritised the risk posed by a rising China away from the military sector to the political order by positing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as central to Asia-Pacific peace and security. This was ironic as Indonesia itself securitised the military risk from China’s encroachment upon its Natuna Islands against its own national sovereignty. Moreover, in the economic sector, Indonesia portrayed a risk to maritime resources due to increasing demand as China rises. Nevertheless, rising fears of the “Blue Dread China Threat Theory” have been tempered by Indonesia’s national interest in engaging China, especially for economic reasons, such that Indonesia could remain ambivalent and not appear to have to choose sides between the US and China.31 The pattern of success in the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise was different in Singapore, as Chapter 7 shows. Singapore supported the US representation of a rising China in the military sector. It repeated US claims of the risk to peace and stability due to China’s

31 See Daniel Novotny, Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), pp. 349-352.

military buildup. It also mobilised in support of the US Rebalance, whilst building up its own military as its ultimate insurance policy. However, Singapore additionally inserted defence cooperation into military transparency for the purpose of building trust and confidence with China. Simultaneously, Singapore did not endorse the US’s SCS FONOPS as doing so would undermine said trust between Singapore and China. Despite the lack of support for this particular practice, the city-state mirrored US practices in multilateralism and institutionalism in the political sector, and repeated US speech acts on the risk China’s rise posed to the rules- based order. The US macrosecuritisation in the political sector has thus succeeded in Singapore. On the other hand, rather than China’s rise risking the economic order, Singapore saw China’s rise as a constituent part of it. Singapore wanted to continue its economic engagement of China, along with constant military and political engagement. Singapore even countersecuritised a US rejection of the TPP as risking said economic order since free trade was Singapore’s lifeblood. Singapore hence completely rejected the US representation of China’s rise as a risk in the economic sector. Overall, Singapore is quite the quintessential hedger against the risks from the “Blue Dread”. Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation. It first reiterates my main findings to the research questions. The chapter then identifies the potential criticisms and drawbacks of this thesis. Subsequently, it outlines further implications of the research findings, to both securitisation theory and the literature on hedging in international politics,32 before setting out possible future research agendas.

The Contribution

In examining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audience states of Indonesia and Singapore in the manner outlined above, the contribution of my thesis is fourfold. First, it contributes theoretically to securitisation theory. I integrate and synthesise the elements useful in addressing my research questions from the three key securitisation debates into a neo- securitisation theory. This formulation incorporates audience acceptance into the success of securitisation, includes practices as part of a securitising move (not only the speech act), and adopts a reflexive notion of security that countenances non-existential and non-imminent

32 See Van Jackson, "Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14:3 (2014), pp. 331-356.

threats in the form of risk. Such a neo-securitisation theory enables me to consider international acceptance of the construction of China’s rise as a security threat, and how routine or preventive practices help in such construction, especially as China’s rise is future-oriented. I further overcome the scale challenges of China’s rise by developing a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory, to concurrently encompass (changing) referent objects from different sectors at the international level, different-scaled threats (including risks), and acceptance from the audience of state’s elites, including their lower securitisations or countersecuritisations at the level of the state. Since the introduction of macrosecuritisation, very few studies have utilised or developed the framework further. Some works make slight, sideways references to it, whilst others employ it in limited ways revolving round macrosecuritisations during the Cold War or the Global War on Terror (GWoT).33 Few have truly engaged with macrosecuritisation as a framework for research.34 My work here further develops macrosecuritisation theory, answering Juha Vuori’s call for more macrosecuritisation studies.35 Second, my dissertation contributes to highlighting the empirical record of official US representations and policy regarding a rising China. This determines the extent to which the US has actually articulated and acted upon the broader “Blue Dread China Threat Theory”. The thesis also notes the overall trends over a substantial period of time within the larger context of US-China relations. In contrast, a wide range of media reports, academic studies and comments by pundits tend to focus narrowly on trendy “Blue Dread” memes such as China’s “new assertiveness” or its “revisionist” challenge to the rules-based order.36 Generally, the essence of US representations and policy with regard to a rising China had not changed from 2006 to 2016, both in terms of the international risk presented in the military, political,

33 For example, Scott Watson, "Macrosecuritization and the Securitization Dilemma in the Canadian Arctic," Critical Studies on Security, 1:3 (2013), pp. 265-279. 34 Some exceptions are Juha A Vuori, "A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object," Security Dialogue, 41:3 (2010), pp. 255-277; Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, "Security Communities, Alliances, and Macrosecuritization: The Practices of Counter-Piracy Governance," in Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance, ed. Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson, and Mark T. Nance, (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 99-124. 35 Juha A Vuori, "How to Do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People's Republic of China" (PhD Academic Dissertation, University of Turku, 2011), p. 372. 36 For instance, Natasha Fernando, "The Indo-Pacific: A Survival Guide for 'Hobbits'," The Diplomat, 15 November 2019, accessed 12 December 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-indo-pacific-a-survival- guide-for-hobbits/. These memes have even been studied, see Adam Breuer and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Memes, Narratives and the Emergent US–China Security Dilemma," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:4 (2019), pp. 429-455; Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" International Security, 37:4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48.

economic and environmental sectors, as well as the cyberspace and trade threats to the US domestic military and economic sectors (see Table 5.1). Third, this thesis further contributes to policymaking in several areas. It suggests that for macrosecuritising actors, speech acts and practices more attuned to the audience state’s own foreign policy interests are more likely to be accepted and supported. This also makes it easier for the audience state’s elites to convince their own domestic audiences. In terms of the US- China relationship, clarifying the empirical record and the terms of the CTT debate has policy implications as well. For relevant audience states, this clarification helps them decide if they are being “forced” to take sides amidst US-China competition. For the US and China, such clarification aids in future policy considerations and decisions. After all, as Joseph Nye warned, Sino-American enmity would become a “self-fulfilling prophecy”. 37 This project helps to determine the extent to which such a “doomsday prophecy” exists. Finally, this dissertation plugs gaps in the academic literature on China’s rise, as well as the application of securitisation to understanding China’s rise as a security concern. Despite its obvious utility, securitisation theory has seldom been directly employed to analyse China’s rise. 38 This is puzzling given securitisation’s proliferation in the two decades since the Copenhagen School introduced it,39 as well as the prominence of the debate over China’s rise in the International Relations and Security Studies fields. Most such studies have familiarly taken China’s rise to be another typical traditional security challenge. Securitisation theory, in contrast, is a critical security studies framework. Although it has mostly been applied to non- traditional security challenges, it is arguably even more applicable to issues of traditional security, providing greater analytical dividends. Through evaluating the US discursive representation of China’s rise using the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory in the manner described above, this thesis showcases this yield. In moving beyond the rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural traditions of the CTT that focus mostly on its objective and subjective aspects, my dissertation provides an unfamiliar, novel analysis on whether the rise of China is a security threat.

37 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, 74:4 (July/August 1995), p. 94. 38 Some exceptions are Weiqing Song, "Securitization of the 'China Threat' Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account," The China Review, 15:1 (2015), pp. 145-169; Juha A. Vuori, "Let's Just Say We'd Like to Avoid Any Great Power Entanglements: Desecuritization in Post-Mao Chinese Foreign Policy towards Major Powers," Global Discourse, 8:1 (2018), pp. 118-136. 39 Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Peterson, "Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies," Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), p. 316.

2. The “Blue Dread” China Threat Theory

Introduction: Yellow Peril to Red Menace to Blue Dread

Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, wrote in 2011 that the “Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics”, calling this “America’s Pacific Century”.1 Accordingly, the US would shift its strategic attention to this part of the world. Part of the reason why the Asia- Pacific was crucial was due to the emergence of rising powers. This included India, Indonesia, and most importantly, China. The literature on China’s rise has equally skyrocketed. A simple search on Google Scholar for “China’s rise” returned about 406 results from 1990-1999, approximately 2,900 results from 2000-2009, and about 8,100 results from 2010-2019.2 As noted, the underlying assumption beneath China’s rise was that its very rise was a security issue. In this, it may be the greatest irony that the “Pacific Century” could very well be anything but, with a search on Google Scholar for “China threat” for 2010-2019 returning about 8,290 results, more than that for “China’s rise” in the corresponding period.3 Throughout history, various global discourses of a threatening China have appeared. The racial “Yellow Peril” emerged in the early days of Eastern-Western interaction. Some saw this as “[r]ooted in medieval fears of Genghis Khan and the Mongolian invasions of Europe”, combining “racist terror of alien cultures, sexual anxieties, and the belief that the West will be overpowered and enveloped by the irresistible, dark, occult forces of the East”.4 In the US, this “Yellow Peril” eventually resulted in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which banned the immigration of Chinese labourers as they were seen to have brought with them an alien culture, and of course, cheap contract labour.5 After the Second World War (WWII), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized control of mainland China from the US-backed Kuomintang in 1949.6 The new People’s Republic of China aligned itself with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in a communist bloc with the onset of the ideological-political Cold War against the democratic-capitalist bloc led by the US. The democratic bloc represented this

1 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign Policy, No. 189 (November 2011), pp. 56-63. 2 Google Scholar, http://scholar.google.com.sg/, accessed 1 June 2020. 3 Ibid. 4 Gina Marchetti, Romance and the 'Yellow Peril': Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 2. 5 Ruth Mayer, Serial Fu Manchu: The Chinese Supervillain and the Spread of Yellow Peril Ideology, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), pp. 21-26. 6 See Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

communist threat as a “Red Menace”. This discourse was further entrenched when the Chinese sent troops across the Yalu River in 1950 during the Korean War. The Chinese pushed the US- led United Nations (UN) troops back to the thirty-eighth parallel, causing a stalemate before an armistice was finally signed in 1953.7 What concerns this thesis specifically are the renewed fears of a rising China post-Cold War. Napoleon Bonaparte was “purported to have warned: ‘Let China sleep, for when China wakes, she will shake the world’”.8 As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (改革开放, gaige kaifang) from 1978, China has awakened from its long slumber indeed. Particularly in the early 1990s in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, US fears of a rising China became starker. The US economy was stuttering compared to China’s meteoric economic growth. In addition, the US military was being trimmed, whereas China’s military expenditure was rising appreciably.9 The primal fear was that the US, having seen off the Soviets in the Cold War, would instead be displaced itself by a rising China. This would put other states in further jeopardy with the advent of yet another superpower conflict. These have generally come to be known as the “China Threat” theory: that a rising China is a threatening one. Its most evident and symbolic manifestation today is arguably China’s ambition for a blue-water navy to not only rival the US navy in the East and South China Seas, but one that is also capable of projecting China’s military power worldwide.10 In this sense, the global fear of a rising China post-Cold War can therefore be figuratively seen as a “Blue Dread” (with “dread” being further evocative of the dreadnoughts that used to rule the seas). The aim of this chapter is to review the literature associated with this “Blue Dread China Threat Theory”, and especially to highlight the inadequacies of this extant literature in addressing my research questions. Towards this, the rest of Chapter 2 is divided into five sections. The first section provides the background by briefly considering the history of US- China relations from the perspective of the US, during and after the Cold War, till the turn of the millennium. The second section investigates the basis of the CTT, examining whether

7 Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 18. 8 Quoted in Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015), p. 1. 9 Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, 25:4 (Spring 2001), p. 6. In this dissertation, the names of ethnic Chinese elites follow the typical Chinese convention with the surname first, save in the references. Other Chinese names stick to the usual convention. 10 See Robert S. Ross, "The Rise of the Chinese Navy: From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?" in China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, ed. Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), pp. 207-234.

China is catching up to the US. It finds that the decline of the US relative to China is more subjective than objective, though this still concretely affects policy. The third section scrutinises the interpretations and developments of the “Blue Dread” CTT, which includes an assertive turn in China’s foreign policy post-2008 Global Financial Crisis. The fourth section categorises the “Blue Dread” CTT literature into four different, though connected, traditions: rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural. It explicates how they then account for China’s assertive turn. This provides the context for a subsequent assessment of the prevalence and specifics of the global “Blue Dread” discourse potentially within the US official security texts selected, as well as the consequent US security practices. Crucially, the section highlights the discursive gap, in these familiar academic traditions, of how the US actually represented China, from 2006 to 2016. Finally, the last section contrasts the CTT with an appraisal of the “China’s Peaceful Rise” narrative. In comparing these opposing narratives, where exactly does the US lie? This chapter thus concludes with emphasising the importance of using a novel discursive approach to make sense of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences.

Containment to Engagement: US-China Security Relations since the Cold War

Before the “Blue Dread”, with the rise of the “Red Menace”, the US approach was mainly one of exceptionally containing the threat from a communist China, especially via military means. This was an aspect of its Cold War grand strategy of containment in the age of US-Soviet bipolarity.11 Consequently, the US fought the Vietnam War as a proxy war from 1955 to 1975, as part of its bid to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia under the portent of its “domino theory”. The fear was that if South Vietnam was lost, the other Southeast Asian states would succumb and fall to communism like a row of dominoes. 12 David Shambaugh emphasises that the containment of China was “a policy with a profoundly flawed premise that cost the United States nearly 100,000 dead in two wars on the Asian mainland, incalculable losses of commercial and cultural interchange with China, and the polarization of America’s relations with Asia”, as it erroneously assumed that China was expansionist.13

11 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, Revised and Expanded ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 12 Jerry Mark Silverman, "The Domino Theory: Alternatives to a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," Asian Survey, 15:11 (1975), p. 916. 13 David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, 21:2 (1996), p. 182.

Containment against China did not last throughout the Cold War, however. President Richard Nixon pursued rapprochement with China, culminating in his groundbreaking visit to China in 1972. Scholars posit various reasons ranging from the strategic to the operational for this shift.14 Regarding grand strategy, some explain that the US-China rapprochement was part of a longstanding ideological drive to attract China to the western bloc by focusing on shared interests and economic development. The commonly accepted strategic explanation introduces the USSR as a mutual enemy of China and the US amidst greater Sino-Soviet divergence and widening US-Soviet military disparity in favour of the USSR in the 1960s. Such “triangular diplomacy” between the US, the USSR and China brought about closer US-China alignment. Furthermore, China’s support would enable the US to cover its retreat from the ongoing Vietnam War operationally, with the war becoming increasingly unpopular on the US domestic front. However, further progress in the Sino-US relationship was delayed by US domestic events, in particular, the 1974 Watergate scandal. President Gerald Ford served out the remainder of Nixon’s term postponing the “normalisation” of relations with China, though Chinese domestic issues had as much a role to play too.15 The US and China only established official relations in 1979 during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Following that, the US-China relationship expanded from a military-security relationship premised upon “tripolarity” and a common enemy, to the economic and social arenas as well. Carter granted “provisional ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) status” to China, and also “increased China’s access to technology and preferential loans”.16 After succeeding Carter in 1981, President Ronald Reagan was originally predisposed towards supporting Taiwan. Nevertheless, the 1982 US-China communique reaffirmed the gradual lessening of US arms sales to Taiwan, whilst also taking the US-China relationship to the next level with arms sales to, and military exchanges with, China. This third US-China communique followed two other communiques. The first Shanghai Communique of 1972 started “normalisation”. In the second 1979 communique, the US formally recognised Beijing and articulated the “One China” policy of the indivisibility of mainland China and Taiwan. Together, these three joint communiques were emblematic of improving US relations with

14 Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement, chapter 3; Robert S. Ross, ed. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Michael Cox, "The USA, China, and Rising Asia," in US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 264. 15 Michael Schaller, The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century, Third ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 186-187. 16 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "A Primer on China-US Relations, 1949-2008: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed," in Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cure, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Simon Shen, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), p. 29.

China in multiple sectors in the latter half of the Cold War, converse to the existential “Red Menace” ideological threat of the first half. However, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War hijacked the “tripolar” security alignment that had enabled the US and China to become “tacit allies”,17 creating more friction between them in other sectors. The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, in which China forcibly cleared the area of domestic pro-democracy protestors, resulting in heavy casualties, particularly underscored US-China differences. Whereas previous Cold War administrations could turn a blind eye to China’s domestic system due to pragmatic strategic alignment, once the Soviets were taken out of the equation, then President George H. W. Bush had little choice but to act against China. The US sanctioned China economically and politically for Tiananmen, and these eventually “came to be perceived by Chinese leaders and citizens alike as attempts to weaken the PRC”.18 Despite these sanctions, Bush himself remained largely conciliatory. He believed that continuing to engage China diplomatically, politically and economically – rather than ostracising, isolating and criticising it – would be more effective in getting China to offer up more liberties.19 However, domestic constituents disliked Bush’s pacifying stance. They continued to constrain his engagement with China. Bill Clinton further criticised Bush’s China view during the 1992 US presidential elections.20 Consequently, the Clinton Administration began with a harsher approach towards China, though this did not last. In the economic sector, it linked renewal of China’s MFN status to its human rights standards in 1993. This policy proved futile and the Administration did away with such linkage a mere year later. Instead, the Clinton Administration pursued “comprehensive engagement” of China – the idea of increasing trade, cooperation and dialogue to condition China and draw it closer to western norms.21 This was similar to Bush’s own inclination of political and economic engagement post-Tiananmen. However, despite “comprehensive engagement”, Clinton responded to the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis – which witnessed Chinese military demonstrations during Taiwan’s presidential election – with a classic tactic of containment. He sent two aircraft carrier groups to the region in a show of

17 Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement. 18 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2001), p. 20-21; see also Robert G. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 96-98. 19 Drake Skidmore and William Gates, "After Tiananmen: The Struggle over U.S. Policy toward China in the Bush Administration," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 27:3 (1997), p. 519. 20 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, pp. 17-33. For a study on anti-China rhetoric in US presidential elections, see Xiaodong Fang, "Anti-China Rhetoric, Presidential Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy towards China" (Doctor of Philosophy in Government Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2016). 21 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, pp. 39-45; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), pp. 90-92.

force. This drove US-China security relations on a downward spiral yet again. Bilateral summits in 1997 and 1998 restored calm, capped off with agreement in late 1999 for Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization.22 US normalisation with China expanded Sino-US interactions from its military-centric character during the Cold War to the economic, political and social arenas. This caused the US to further shift between the containment and engagement of a rising China as it sought equipoise between these two poles in these various realms. Scholars have coined awkward terms such as “congagement”, “constrainment” or “coopetition” to describe such a difficult US-China relationship post-Cold War.23 This thesis aims to clarify official US policy and the supposed “dilemma” between engagement and containment by determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security. In particular, with perceptions that China is catching up to the US, greater “Blue Dread” security fears are generated, as the following section explicates.

Illusion to Reality: The Decline of the US

The end of the Cold War was a new era for the US. Observers declared the US as the sole superpower/hyperpower/empire/hegemon, the exact formulation depending on the degrees of consent and domination through which one viewed the US’s preponderance.24 The question of US grand strategy became more complicated and complex. Proposals ranged from “neo- isolationism” to “offshore balancing” or maintaining US “primacy”.25 The 2001 September 11 attacks (henceforth 9/11) on the US during the presidency of George W. Bush further turned such strategising upon its head. Despite US predominance, or perhaps because of its

22 Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations, p. 98. 23 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, chapter 4; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the “Constrainment” of China," International Security, 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Tangled Titans: Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship," in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, ed. David Shambaugh, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), pp. 3-26. 24 See Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapters 1-3; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 1-29; Mark Beeson, "American Ascendancy: Conceptualizing Contemporary Hegemony," in Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 3-23. “Hyperpower” was coined by then French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine in 1998, quoted in Joseph S. Jr. Nye, "Limits of American Power," Political Science Quarterly, 117:4 (Winter 2002/2003), fn 2. 25 Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, 22:1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124; Richard K. Betts, "The Political Support System for American Primacy," International Affairs, 81:1 (2005), pp. 1-14.

overwhelming power,26 9/11 shook the US. The US’s strategic focus turned to such asymmetric, non-traditional security threats, particularly terrorism. The Bush Doctrine further promoted democracy and preventive war, based on military primacy and unilateralism as necessary. These culminated in the Global War on Terror, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.27 The 9/11 attacks also transformed US foreign policy towards China. Condoleezza Rice, subsequently George W. Bush’s National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State, had called China a “strategic competitor”, especially in the military, economic and political sectors, during the 2000 presidential campaign as opposed to the “strategic partner” it was under the Clinton Administration.28 This shifted post-9/11 as China’s support was required for the GWoT. The Bush Administration consequently contended that “comprehensive engagement” had worked, with China “successfully drawn into the international system”. It was therefore time for China “to move to the next level of engagement” by becoming “a responsible stakeholder”.29 China mostly collaborated with the US over the GWoT, although it objected to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.30 The Bush Administration’s approach to China paralleled that of the prior Clinton Administration, or even that of George H. W. Bush’s; caught on the horns of a “dilemma” between competing against, or cooperating with, China in the various sectors. This “dilemma” has become even more challenging in the face of China’s rise. In an evaluation of the “rise of China” literature published within The Pacific Review, Shaun Breslin highlights that whilst there was still debate a decade after Deng’s reforms on whether China would rise, by the new millennium, “the dominant position” had become that China’s rise “was inevitable”.31 Now, scholars have written enough books from multiple perspectives about China’s rise to fill libraries, such as how China is rising economically, militarily or in other areas.32

26 Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly, 117:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 19-36. 27 Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, 118:3 (Fall 2003), pp. 365-388. 28 Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, 79:1 (January/February 2000), p. 56. 29 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, p. 92. 30 Peter Van Ness, "China's Response to the Bush Doctrine," World Policy Journal, 21:4 (Winter 2004/2005), pp. 38-47. 31 Shaun Breslin, "Still Rising or Risen (or Both)? Why and How China Matters," The Pacific Review, 30:6 (2017), p. 876, emphasis added. 32 For instance, David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

At the same time, conventional wisdom suggests that a further effect of 9/11 was the start of the decline of US primacy.33 The US’s GWoT quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq arguably epitomised this decline. In addition, the largely unilateral invasion of Iraq put off many states in the international system and made them wary of the US.34 Some further contend that GWoT failures were just the tip of the iceberg in the US’s imperial overstretch or hegemonic overreach post-Cold War.35 The question pertinent therefore, is whether the US is in decline relative to China, in the various sectors. There are three schools of thought on this debate. The first emphasises the enormous gaps that still remain between the US and China. This is particularly in relation to more intangible elements, such as the US military command of the global commons or human capital. Some contend that even the oft-cited narrowing relative gross domestic product underestimates the gap between the Chinese manufacturing-based economy and the US’s knowledge-based one.36 Studies from this school of thought further underscore the scale of the challenges within the Chinese domestic system and its international dealings. These comprise: the slowing economy on top of income disparity, popular unrest from disgruntled groups including political separatism of minorities, or accusations of “free riding” in the international system.37 Despite the enormous gaps that still remain between the US and China, Thomas Christensen also warns that China – with the right equipment and the correct strategies and tactics militarily, such as stealthier sea mines for an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy – may still “pose problems without catching up” to the US.38 The second school of thought underlines that China is catching up to the US, particularly when projecting ahead to the future. For instance, some projections see China’s economy outdoing the US’s by 2026.39 Mark Beeson even suggests that “American military might is less valuable than it once was, and this has given added significance to China’s

33 Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, "US Grand Strategy and National Security: The Dilemmas of Primacy, Decline and Denial," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71:5 (2017), p. 489. 34 Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, "Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective," Third World Quarterly, 26:7 (2005), pp. 1173-1188. 35 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security, 31:2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7-41. 36 Brooks and Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," pp. 7-53. 37 Yasheng Huang, "Rethinking the Beijing Consensus," Asia Policy, No. 11 (2011), pp. 1-26; Michael Clarke, "The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on China’s Foreign Policy: The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur," China Report, 53:1 (2017), pp. 1-25; David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 4. 38 Christensen, "Posing Problems," pp. 5-40. 39 For example, Domic Wilson et al., "The BRICs 10 Years on: Halfway Through the Great Transformation," Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, No. 208 (2011), p. 8.

growing economic power”.40 Recalling the “Blue Dread”, others highlight the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier in 2012 and its plans for more aircraft carriers as signalling the “arrival of a new, increasingly capable, and active blue-water navy in the region”.41 The third school of thought on the decline of the US relative to China asserts the opposite; the Sino-US gap is increasing instead. For example, Michael Beckley points out that a lot of the studies in the second category above had been deficient in failing to examine a thorough group of variables across time, simply presenting single frames of comparison. He instead concludes that vis-à-vis power resources in multiple sectors, the US lead relative to China since 1991 was actually expanding, particularly with reference to per capita income, patent applications, and even its defence spending.42 Ultimately, the issue is not whether US decline relative to China is an illusion not based on objective measures, because the reality is that the subjective perception of US relative decline is common and taken for granted as China rises. As scholars like Beckley have warned, such “unjustified fears” that exist may lead to incorrect policy outcomes.43 For example, if it is believed that there is a power-transition taking place, war may result from either the declining hegemon initiating a preventive war to defeat the challenger, or the rising challenger starting one to usurp the position of the fading hegemon.44 The aim of this dissertation is to determine the extent to which the US has discursively represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. This is particularly important as objective and subjective approaches to the security implications over China’s rise and consequent US relative decline have already informed what has come to be known as the “China Threat” theory.

Origin to Expansion: The China Threat Theory and China’s Assertive Turn

This “Blue Dread” CTT is typically traced to the early 1990s. According to Yong Deng, there are three accounts of its origins.45 These are: (1) a 1990 article from Japan’s National Defense

40 Mark Beeson, "Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power," Review of International Studies, 35:1 (2009), p. 96. 41 Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. III Cooper, "China's Aircraft Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications," Naval War College Review, 68:4 (2015), p. 77. 42 Michael Beckley, Beckley, "China's Century?" pp. 42-43. 43 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 44 Rosemary Foot, "Power Transitions and Great Power Management: Three Decades of China–Japan–US Relations," The Pacific Review, 30:6 (2017), p. 830. 45 Yong Deng, China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 104.

Academy; (2) a US assistant secretary of defence accusing China of initiating a regional arms race at a symposium in August 1992; and (3) James Lilley, a former US ambassador to China, criticising China’s military expansion in an event in Hong Kong in September 1992. Regardless of the exact process, Chinese analysts commonly accept the “official version” tracing the CTT to 1992 due to a “confluence of factors”. This official Chinese version is that:

Deng Xiaoping’s [1992] “Southern Tour” resuscitated China’s market reform, leading to the economic rise of a unified China that lent credence to the fear of China’s strength in lieu of the commonplace prognosis of imminent “China collapse” in the aftermath of the cataclysmic events in 1989–91. In February of that year, China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, passed a law that reaffirmed in particular China’s territorial claims over the South China Sea Islands, which were fiercely disputed by several Southeast Asian countries. Meanwhile, the United States was contemplating the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. The Japanese Diet was on the verge of passing a bill that would allow its Self-Defense Forces to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Both the United States and Japan used China’s military threat to achieve their ulterior motives.46

A study of five major US newspapers corroborates this 1992 advent of the CTT empirically, with less than one article about it per year before 1992, but rising to twenty-five per year on average from 1992.47 Various academic and policy publications from around that time also refer to the CTT.48 For instance, in his 1992 book, Ross Munro warns that China was the “real” source of danger to the US in Asia. In contrast, observers previously focused on Japan’s rise in the 1970s to early 1990s, reminiscent of China’s rise in the early 1990s to today.49

46 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 47 Yi Edward Yang and Xinsheng Liu, "The ‘China Threat’ through the Lens of US Print Media: 1992–2006," Journal of Contemporary China, 21:76 (2012), p. 703. 48 Chengqiu Wu, "Barking Up the Wrong Tree? The Master Narrative of "China Threat Theory" Examined," in Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development, ed. Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007). 49 Ross H. Munro, "Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia Is from China," Policy Review, No. 62 (1992), pp. 10-16. For the similarities between the rising of Japan and China, see Foot, "Power Transitions and Great Power Management," pp. 829-842.

In addition, Yong Deng categorises different variants of the CTT and those responsible for their proliferation.50 Military-oriented versions focus on China’s threat of using force against Taiwan, sales of arms, expansive territorial claims and its non-transparent military buildup. Economic accounts emphasise China’s mercantilism undermining the global free market. Cultural variants highlight aggressive nationalism, whilst others even include possible scenarios like food and energy shortages in China triggering global crises. Deng ascribes these different variations of the CTT to different geopolitical entities or even individuals. They range from the US accusing China of revisionism, to India exploiting China as a diversion to explain its 1998 nuclear tests, to Japan using China as an excuse to justify its own remilitarisation; or from Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” thesis to John Mearsheimer’s offensive neorealism.51 Nevertheless, despite this categorisation, a systematic and longitudinal analysis of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security remains lacking. It is possible to add a seemingly “new” period of Chinese assertiveness to this list. Analysts differ as to when exactly this “new assertiveness” happened, with the timeframe ranging from 2008 to 2010. 52 Nonetheless, the common thread is that China’s growing assertiveness came in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, caused in large part by the US. Observers proffer three main explanations for this.53 The first is that the GFC highlighted US decline in the aftermath of 9/11, particularly its model of free market capitalism, liberalisation and free trade. China then took advantage to narrow the gap between itself and the US further, whilst promoting its own economic model over that of the US.54 Alternatively, the second explanation posits China’s growing assertiveness as simply a reaction to mounting US antagonisms. These included the 2009 “spying” incident involving the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea, and in 2010, the Obama Administration violating “China’s core

50 Deng, China's Struggle for Status, pp. 105-107; see also Emma V. Broomfield, "Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory," Journal of Contemporary China, 12:35 (2003), pp. 265-284; Denny Roy, "The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, 36:8 (1996), pp. 758-771. 51 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, First Trade Paperback ed., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 52 For 2008, see Michael D. Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," China Leadership Monitor:32 (2010), p. 3; for 2009, see Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," Journal of Contemporary China, 22:81 (2013), p. 459; for 2010, see Johnston, "How New and Assertive," pp. 7-48. Evan S. Medeiros, China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), pp. 187-188, also identifies increasing assertiveness prior to 2008 in specific areas of China’s foreign policy. 53 Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, "An 'Assertive' China? Insights from Interviews," Asian Security, 9:2 (2013), pp. 112-113. 54 For instance, Joseph S. Jr. Nye, "U.S.-China Relationship: A Shift in Perceptions of Power," Los Angeles Times, 6 April 2011.

interests by notifying Congress of an impending sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan, criticizing China’s poor record on Internet freedom, and allowing for a private visit between Obama and the Dalai Lama”.55 The third explanation for increased Chinese assertiveness cites domestic pressures in China, particularly arising from growing nationalism, as resulting in a more forceful foreign policy.56 Some scholars deem such increased assertiveness to have gone against Deng Xiaoping’s earlier “hide and bide” admonishment of restraint and to “keep a low profile” ( 韬光养晦, taoguang yanghui). Instead, China’s new assertiveness follows Xi Jinping’s new “show and tell”, or “striving for achievement” (奋发有为, fenfa youwei) strategy.57 Xi introduced this in 2013 after he became China’s president a year earlier. Other scholars emphasise that such Chinese assertiveness is not new, and China was as assertive in the past. 58 Past incidents demonstrating China’s assertiveness included, for example, its detaining of the crew of an US EP-3 aircraft that made an emergency landing in Hainan following a collision with a Chinese J-8 fighter in 2001, or the 2002 adoption of a surveying and mapping law which restricted foreign military activities in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The latter was contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China has ratified. Yet ultimately, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there was an upsurge in Chinese statements and actions that could be interpreted as belligerent or aggressive following the GFC. There were many examples. China promulgated its now infamous nine-dash line map through the SCS in 2009. Yang Jiechi, then China’s foreign minister, stated at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that the “basic difference” between China and ASEAN was that “China is a big country and you are smaller countries”. 59 China also declared an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea over the Senkakus that overlapped that of Japan’s in 2013, on top of increasing reclamation and militarisation in the contested Spratlys in the SCS over the last few years. Belief in China’s new assertiveness is also more than a passing fad in the media, policy and academic spheres. Figure 2.1 below shows that the number of articles in US newspapers

55 Thomas J. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, 90:2 (April 2011), p. 62. 56 For example, Jisi Wang, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds its Ways," Foreign Affairs, 90:2 (April 2011), pp. 68-79. 57 Although some see this as a false dialectic, for instance, Yaqing Qin, "Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7:3 (2014), pp. 285-314. 58 Johnston, "How New and Assertive," pp. 7-48. 59 Quoted in Tiang Boon Hoo, "Hardening the Hard, Softening the Soft: Assertiveness and China’s Regional Strategy," Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:5 (2017), p. 639.

referring to an assertive China has vividly increased since 2010, to a high of 106 in 2016. Similarly, a search of the “government publications and documents” category in LexisNexis returned a lot more results for an assertive China since 2010, whereas there was only a total of three before then from 2000. An exponential rise of “assertive China” within academic discourse since 2010 is perhaps the most dramatic:

Figure 2.1: Assertive China Trends in the Media, Policy and Academia (2000-2016)

300

Number of Academic Books and 250 Articles Referring to "Assertive China" (Google Scholar)

200

Articles in US Newspapers 150 Referring to "Assertive" within Three Words of "China" (LexisNexis) 100

Number of Hits in "Government 50 Publications & Documents" Referring to "Assertive" within Three Words of "China"

0 (LexisNexis)

2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2001 Source: Compiled by author from LexisNexis and Google Scholar.60

Björn Jerdén even suggests that academics were to blame for the proliferation of the “new assertiveness meme”, despite an acknowledged lack of proof.61 An opinion poll further shows that favourable impressions in the US towards China declined from 2005 to 2017.62 Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, also recalled in her memoirs that she thought “China had overplayed its hand”, and instead of “using the period of our [the US’s] perceived absence and

60 Last accessed: 27 October 2017. This follows Johnston, "How New and Assertive," pp. 7-48, although Johnston used blogs instead of policy documents. 61 Björn Jerdén, "The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7:1 (2014), pp. 76-85. 62 Committee of 100, US-China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2017, First Reprint of Initial Survey Report ed., (New York: Committee of 100, 2017), p. 8.

the economic crisis to cement good relations with its neighbors, it had become more aggressive towards them, and that shift had unnerved the rest of the region”.63 This dissertation utilises this assertive turn in China’s foreign policy after the 2008 GFC as a gauge in examining if there were changes in the US security representations of a rising China, comparing the periods before and after this new assertiveness (see Chapter 3). The next section weighs the various theoretical traditions of the “China Threat” theory, particularly in relation to China’s assertive turn post-GFC, and demonstrates how these are inadequate to address my research questions.

Materialist to Ideational: Traditions of the China Threat Theory

From a survey of the CTT literature since its 1992 origin, I have identified different theoretical traditions accounting for the “Blue Dread”. These range from the material-centric to the ideational, with some declaring to be objectivist whilst others claim subjectivity. For clarity, I have classified these into four distinct traditions – rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural – since these are oftentimes conflated even in a single source. For instance, Charles Kupchan writes that China is “potentially a major ideological and geopolitical adversary”.64 First of all, the rationalist tradition is largely informed by realism and neorealism. Under the condition of anarchy – the absence of a global government – states can only rely on themselves. They seek to increase their own power for security. Thus, as China rises in material terms, both economically and militarily, it seeks greater power. Defensive neorealism, which stresses the intractability of the security dilemma, the importance of the offence-defence balance and geographic proximity, predicts that the US can remain an “extremely secure international actor” even as China rises. This is due to the US’s “‘defensive advantage’ created by geography and military technology”.65 The likelihood of war between the US and China as the latter rises is hence reduced, though still present and subject to the security dilemma, escalation or miscalculation. Whereas defensive neorealism can be more sanguine, the outlook from the offensive variant of neorealism is bleaker. For offensive neorealists, states do not simply seek power. Rather, they want to have more power than other states. States further

63 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014), p. 76, emphasis added. 64 For instance, Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 158. 65 For instance, Charles L. Glaser, "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accomodation," International Security, 39:4 (Spring 2015), p. 53.

recognise that “the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival”; and the “best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon” to ensure that no other state is able to threaten it.66 According to offensive neorealism, as China rises, it would seek to expand and gain greater power, especially relative to the state currently at the apex of international relations, the US. These two global powers are on an inevitable collision course as their strategic interests necessarily diverge, both wanting greater power over the other.67 The structuralist account of the CTT is driven by international structures. It commonly draws upon hegemonic war theory and power-transition theory.68 The former considers a changing distribution of power in the international order resulting in a disequilibrium in the system as the foremost cause of a hegemonic war involving most states in the system. It is almost unavoidable as events “escape human control”, with the system re-seeking equilibrium and “a reordering of the basic components of the system”.69 Although the theory does not specify which party would start the hegemonic war, Robert Gilpin suggests that the current hegemon would strike pre-emptively whilst it still holds the advantage.70 In this regard, China’s rise causes a redistribution of power. Consequently, a hegemonic war with the US, drawing in the entire international system, becomes certain as the system needs to be fundamentally transformed in order for it to achieve stability again.71 The latter power-transition theory views the international system as more hierarchical. The hegemon orders the international system to its own advantage until a rising power challenges it in order to revise the status quo, which naturally works to the challenger’s disadvantage. This challenge worsens the stability of the order which had already been imperiled by the rising power catching up to the hegemon. A war is therefore most likely when the balance of power between the challenger and the hegemon is almost equal.72 According to power-transition theory, as China rises, the odds of it becoming more disenchanted with the status quo increases. When the time is right, it would challenge the US for the top position in order to redraw a new international system in its own image with

66 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 3. 67 See Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America, (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3:4 (2010), pp. 381-396. 68 Many studies conflate the two due to their similarities; however, there are important differences between them, see Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition," International Relations, 23:3 (2009), pp. 390-392. 69 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 197- 202. 70 Ibid., p. 201. 71 For instance, Munro, "Awakening Dragon"; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), pp. 10-16. 72 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, Second ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 479-483.

itself at the head of the new hierarchy managing its new order.73 The new international order resulting from a hegemonic total war or a war of hegemonic transition could include a return to the erstwhile Chinese “tributary system”, a “civilisational-state” transcending state boundaries, or what Xi calls the “Chinese Dream” of rejuvenating the Chinese nation and developing “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.74 Both the rationalist and structuralist traditions are material-centric, focusing on objective material measures of power, be these China’s military buildup or economic growth. They also typically utilise historical analogies to make the argument for war between the US and China. For instance, as a rising Germany challenged the United Kingdom in the First World War (WWI) as well as WWII. The rationalist proponents of the CTT see such a challenge as perfectly logical behaviour. Structuralists cite the mechanism of what Graham Allison calls the Thucydides’s Trap: “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one”.75 Rationalists also see China’s growing assertiveness after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as part of a natural progression as China rises. According to the rationalists, in its SCS nine-dash line claims, for example, China is simply seeking greater power in the form of more resources, whether fisheries or oil. Meanwhile, structuralists view China as growing increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of a US dominated order under which China’s historical claims are ignored in favour of the western-imposed mare liberum of the freedoms of the sea and navigation. These objective materialist approaches are generally deficient in addressing my research questions for a variety of reasons. First, they adopt assumptions such as the balance of power for the rationalists, or inevitable power-transitions for the structuralists. In so doing, they disregard how the US has discursively represented China’s rise, especially over a sustained period of time. For instance, the US has frequently said that it “welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China”,76 as opposed to emphasising that it wants to balance or prevent its rise, as the materialist traditions assume. Moreover, it is also not clear empirically that the US and other states within the international system are balancing against the threat

73 See David Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011). 74 Su-Yan Pan and Joe Tin-Yau Lo, "Re-conceptualizing China's Rise as a Global Power: A Neo-tributary Perspective," The Pacific Review, 30:1 (2017), pp. 1-25; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), pp. 373-374; Zheng Wang, "The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context," Journal of Chinese Political Science, 19:1 (2014), pp. 1-13. 75 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), p. 29; cf. Jonathan Kirshner, "Handle Him with Care: The Importance of Getting Thucydides Right," Security Studies, 28:1 (2019), pp. 12-15. 76 For instance, U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (2010), p. 60.

from China as it rises.77 Second, these materialist approaches are largely unable to deal with the scale challenges of China’s rise. As shown earlier in this chapter, China’s rise proliferates not just in the traditional military sector, but also with regard to non-traditional security, such as within the environmental sector; whilst security concerns persist towards the future as China continues to catch up to the US, rather than as a clear and present threat. Conversely, rationalist and structuralist traditions of the CTT focus on material capabilities, especially military power, and do not differentiate between a current or future threat. I further distinguish such materialist approaches from the ideational perspectives of the CTT. Of these, the culturalist tradition is a constructivist one focusing on values and norms. For Alistair Iain Johnston, China’s strategic culture is expansionist, no different from Western realpolitik, converse to the common portrayal of Confucian philosophy.. 78 To others, Chinese/Asian societal values centring upon development, good governance and community, are contrary to, and come into conflict with, Western individualist ones focusing on liberalism, human rights and democracy, with Asians preferring good governance to individual freedoms.79 Culturalists often mesh these norms and values with the different political and economic regimes as well. They juxtapose the Western/American “Washington Consensus” of market privatisation, liberalisation, and democratisation, against the Asian/Chinese “Beijing Consensus” of equitable economic growth in a somewhat liberal economy with strong authoritarian governance.80 Due to the differing and incompatible cultures and norms between the US and China, dividing lines are drawn and antagonisms staged. Huntington took this a step further by positing cultural “civilisations” as the source of “cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world”, with the rising Sinic civilisation as the biggest threat to the US in East Asia in his “clash of civilisations” thesis.81 Last but not least, although the poststructural tradition is about difference too, the sources of this disparity are discourse and identity rather than cultures and norms. The poststructural account depicts the CTT as socially constructed, for example, as an “imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a

77 David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, 27:4 (Spring 2003). 78 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 27, emphasis removed. 79 For instance, the 1990s “Asian Values” debate, see Garry Rodan, "The Internationalization of Ideological Conflict: Asia's New Significance," The Pacific Review, 9:3 (1996), pp. 328-351. 80 Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004). 81 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 20 and 229-238.

significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security”.82 Simultaneously, US “conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked” to how the US sees itself. The social construction of the “China Threat” is hence a value-laden normative proposition about the US’s own identity. 83 China has been constructed as the metaphorical “Other” in opposition to the Western “Self”, even as in the past “Yellow Peril” or “Red Menace” discourses, and not just during the contemporary “Blue Dread”. Rather than an epistemological truth therefore, poststructuralists view China as a subjective threat, regardless of the objective threat indicators. As William Overholt also states, US perceptions of the CTT driving foreign policy is based on “obsolete and inaccurate caricatures” due to less contact with China. 84 The critical point in the poststructural tradition is not so much the objective matter of China rising, or even a China that is growing significantly more assertive. Rather, what matters most is the divergence between what people has constituted as “China” versus what they have constructed as “the US”, and that China is not the United States. The culturalist and poststructural traditions of the “China Threat” theory are both ideational, based upon the subjective perception of threat centred on differences in culture, norms and identity. They frequently employ the image of a rising China as the “successor state” of the former Soviet Union – the “Great Other” – taking over the reins of the leadership of communism in “a sort of hangover” from the ideological Cold War.85 The culturalists see this as culture having taken over political ideology as the source of conflict between the West and China. Poststructural advocates perceive even the Cold War as part of the struggle against the metaphorical other. CTT proponents of the ideational bent also point to the 1989 Tiananmen incident as an example of the fundamental incompatibility between China and the West.86 They further highlight rising Chinese nationalism and anti-US sentiments causing contentions and

82 Oliver Turner, "‘Threatening’ China and US Security: The International Politics of Identity," Review of International Studies, 39:4 (2013), p. 923. 83 Chengxin Pan, "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29:3 (2004), p. 306; see also Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012). This parallels David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), on the role of descriptions of the USSR and communism in constituting US identity during the Cold War. 84 William H. Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and The RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 7. 85 Renée Jeffery, "Evaluating the ‘China Threat’: Power Transition Theory, the Successor-state Image and the Dangers of Historical Analogies," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63:2 (2009), p. 311. 86 For instance, Edward Timperlake and William II Triplett, Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America, (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), which is even dedicated to those who perished at Tiananmen.

conflicts with the US.87 Culturalists account for China’s increasing assertiveness post-GFC through a rise in nationalism, whilst those in the poststructural camp posit stronger anti-USA feelings of identifying against “othered” outsiders.88 For example, one opinion poll has shown that unfavourable impressions of the US in China increased from 2007 to 2017; for business leaders from six percent to twenty percent, and from twenty-six percent to thirty-nine percent for the general public.89 Like the materialist perspectives, these ideational approaches are overall unsatisfactory in accounting for my research questions. Though discourse is more important for the latter than the former, ideational approaches characteristically treat the threat representations of China as a given due to inherent differences based on cultures, norms or identities, whereas examining whether the US has actually constructed these threat representations, and how if so, are the purposes of my research questions. Similarly, the ideational approaches are also mostly unable to deal with the scale challenges of China’s rise. To begin with, they tend to focus on the threat of China itself, rather than its rise threatening different referent objects in different sectors. In so doing, they are indifferent to the character of the threat, particularly its temporality, since changes in cultures, norms or identities typically only happen after a substantial period of time. Moreover, these ideational approaches usually also assume similarities and convergences in subjective cultures, norms and identities, whilst exaggerating the differences. For example, culturalists underscore “Asian” versus Western values, whilst poststructuralists refer to “Asia” as opposed to the “West”.90 Yet, it is not certain that such cultures, norms and identities cohere in states whose securities are affected by the rise of China, nor have these “similar” states bandwagoned with China.91 In determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, I therefore need to resort to another approach beyond these rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural traditions. China has also taken these “China threat” allegations seriously and

87 Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 3-7. 88 Cf. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is Chinese Nationalism Rising?: Evidence from Beijing," International Security, 41:3 (Winter 2016/2017), pp. 7-43. This shows that popular nationalism in China has decreased since 2009, although Johnston acknowledges it was based only on respondents from the Beijing municipality and did not consider elite nationalism. 89 Committee of 100, US-China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2017, p. 16. 90 Xi referred to “Asia for Asians” in 2014, see Linda Jakobson, "Reflections from China on Xi Jinping's 'Asia for Asians'," Asian Politics & Policy, 8:1 (2016), p. 220. 91 Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27:2 (2005), pp. 305-322.

has defended itself with the “China’s Peaceful Rise” narrative to counter the CTT, detailed in the following section.

Thesis to Anti-Thesis: China’s Peaceful Rise

The anti-thesis to the “China Threat” theory is “China’s Peaceful Rise”, what I collectively term the CPR paradigm, used to express that China’s rise is not a security concern. Supporters of the CPR begin by critiquing the various traditions of the CTT. First, they contend that the rationalist CTT tradition wrongly assumes that the Chinese military would be used to garner greater power. They argue that the rationalists: overestimate the capabilities and capacities of the Chinese military, deny assertions from China that its military modernisation is defensive in nature and simply a process of renewal, and thus overdraw Chinese strategic intentions.92 Even with reference to the security dilemma on which defensive neorealism focuses, Robert Ross instead maintains that geography is enough of a barrier between China and the US.93 China is a continental power traditionally fixated upon the Asian landmass whilst the US is a maritime power focused upon the Americas, albeit with interests in Europe and East Asia. Though their strategic interests coincide in East Asia, the physical attributes of the maritime region make it quite unnecessary for the US to maintain a presence on the Asian continent. This minimises strategic conflict between China and the US and mitigates the security dilemma. Second, as for the CTT’s structuralist tradition, various academics have pointed out fundamental problems within hegemonic war theory and power-transition theory. These include the assumption that there is only one single international system at any one single point in time, when there could be several overlapping international or regional orders that exist concurrently.94 Some CPR proponents also doubt the extent to which China is catching up to the US, as aforementioned, to catalyse a power shift, in addition to the question of whether or not China is satisfied with the status quo.95 Furthermore, others have pointed out that war is not inevitable, and power-transitions have occurred peacefully in the past, such as between the

92 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with China," The National Interest, No. 59 (Spring 2000), pp. 5-21; Jonathan D. Pollack, "American Perceptions of Chinese Military Power," in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 43-64. 93 Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," International Security, 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-118. This relates to the US “offshore balancing” grand strategy. 94 Steve Chan, China, the U.S. and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008). 95 For instance, Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 107- 139.

US and the UK post-WWII, even as they recognise the dissimilarities between the China-US relationship and the US-UK one.96 Third, regarding the culturalist tradition, CTT critics maintain that despite differences, China has been socialised by its participation in international institutions.97 Moreover, China is further constrained by economic interdependence within the US-led liberal international order it has bought into, even if not embraced wholesale. After all, it had facilitated China’s rise.98 Fourth, even the poststructuralist claims of “othering” discourse and identity can be modified and transcended in true Wendtian fashion depending on “what states make of it”.99 Naturally, these criticisms of the CTT traditions are not unique to each strand of the CTT, but cross the rationalist-structuralist-culturalist-poststructural divide, as the four traditions themselves frequently do. Chinese leaders and scholars have also publicly repudiated the “Blue Dread China Threat Theory”. Although Chinese analysts widely believed that this CTT originated in 1992, there were few official rebuttals until 1995. This perhaps reflected the Chinese “policy elites’ uncertainties about both the security implications and China’s proper response”.100 Since then however, Chinese elites have often refuted the CTT.101 Chinese presidents from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping have also often affirmed in various fora that China would develop and rise peacefully. Jiang said that: “Even when China becomes strong and powerful it will not threaten other countries”; Hu’s tenure saw the “peaceful rise” concept (和平崛起, heping jueqi) coined in 2003; and Xi, in a 2015 speech commemorating seventy years since the end of WWII, stated that: “All countries should jointly uphold the international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” and that “China will never seek hegemony or expansion”.102

96 See Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, "China and the US: Comparable Cases of ‘Peaceful Rise’?" The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 6:2 (2013), pp. 109-132; Allison, Destined for War. 97 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008). 98 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 161. 99 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391-425. 100 Yong Deng, "Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory," in New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 199. 101 Herbert Yee and Feng Zhu, "Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat: Myth or Reality?" in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 23. 102 Jiang, quoted in ibid.; for Hu Jintao’s “peaceful rise”, see Robert L Suettinger, "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'," China Leadership Monitor:12 (2004), pp. 1-10; Xi, quoted in Andrea Chen, "Xi Jinping Says China Will be Guarantor of World Peace as He Downplays Parade's Military Muscle," South China Morning Post,

In addition, of the various academic defences of China’s peaceful rise, four mainstream arguments stand out. These are: (1) China is inherently peaceful, a claim backed up by history as well as the Chinese socialist system which is only defensive and not offensive; (2) a peaceful international environment is required for China to continue its development; (3) China’s economy may be growing rapidly but it is still a relatively “backward” country compared to the US and the West, whether in terms of living standards or other measures; and (4) China’s military is expanding but its might is still nowhere near that of the US, and moreover is purely for defence.103 Consequently, some scholars even identify “peaceful rise” to be China’s grand strategy, although the means to the end of “peace” differ. These policy options range from those geared towards a security community based on trust and goodwill, to those targeted at just a functional security regime, or a rise “conducted in raw power political terms using threat and intimidation, but avoiding hot war”.104 Indeed, China has taken great pains to reassure the US and the world that its rise would be a peaceful one. This was to the extent that shortly after it was introduced, Chinese leaders stopped using the “peaceful rise” phrase. They started using “peace and development” (和平与发展, heping yu fazhan) instead. They deemed “rise” as too connotative of an ongoing power-transition to China, which might invoke a hostile reaction towards China’s growth, regardless of the preceding adjective. Conversely, Chinese leaders considered “peace and development” to be less threatening and confrontational, countering any possible negative reactions, even though for all intents and purposes, there was no difference between the two.105 Furthermore, as some Chinese policymakers and scholars state as part of the CPR paradigm, insofar as Chinese foreign policy post-GFC is concerned, China had not been growing more assertive. Rather this was simply a continuation of China’s “national rejuvenation” (振兴中华, zhenxing zhonghua) – albeit with greater confidence – hence only a more proactive approach for China to regain its rightful and traditional place in the international system.106 Unsurprisingly, advocates of the CTT counter all these claims as in the preceding

3 September 2015, accessed 26 December 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies- politics/article/1855023/xi-jinping-says-china-will-be-guarantor-world-peace-he. 103 Yee and Zhu, "Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat," pp. 21-42. 104 Barry Buzan, "The Logic and Contradictions of 'Peaceful Rise/Development' as China's Grand Strategy," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7:4 (2014), p. 403. 105 Shaun Breslin, "Understanding China's Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and Implications," International Affairs, 85:4 (2009), pp. 822-823. 106 For example, Xuetong Yan, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7:2 (2014), pp. 153-184.

section, leaving us with two very disparate views. The objective of this dissertation is to specifically determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences.

Conclusion: Objective to Subjective to Discursive

In summary, over time, there have been various threat discourses of China, from the “Yellow Peril” to the “Red Menace”, and then to the “Blue Dread” stemming from perceptions of a rising China today. During the “Red Menace”, the US-China security relationship transformed from the containment of communism to a “tacit alliance” due to the greater threat from the USSR to both the US and China. However, with the end of the Cold War, US-China security alignment ended and other issues such as human rights increasingly came to affect their relationship. Various US administrations have sought to find the correct balance between the “containment” and “engagement” of China, especially as it rises. The objective rise of China has consequently caused a subjective belief of US relative decline. This has worsened the “Blue Dread” CTT, which has proliferated across the media, academic and policy circles, particularly in light of China’s increased assertiveness following the 2008 GFC. Moreover, this “Blue Dread” has been expressed via different rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural theoretical traditions. From the review of the literature above, two points are crucial. First, the “Blue Dread” discourse of a rising China is often formed theoretically in assorted epistemic communities such as academia or professed “China watchers”, or through the media. However, in which directions have US official representations moved? Obama had said: “I’ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China”; Bush Jr., on the return of the detained crewmembers of the 2001 EP-3 incident, stated that: “Both the United States and China must make a determined choice to have a productive relationship that will contribute to a more secure, more prosperous, and more peaceful world”; and Bill Clinton affirmed that: “All the questions and problems between China and the United States . . . are no more than an episode in the longer history of the friendly relations and the cooperation between China and the United States”.107 Were these then simply the mendacious

107 Obama, quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine," The Atlantic, 317:3 (April 2016), pp. 88-89; George W. Bush, "Remarks on the Return of United States Navy Aircraft Crewmembers from China," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 12 April 2001, accessed 26 December 2019, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/213514; Clinton, quoted in CNN, "Clinton Warns against Isolating

rhetoric of goodwill and cooperation masking nefarious true purposes of struggle and competition? Second, the “Blue Dread” CTT encompasses a whole host of variables along the objective-subjective divide, including economic power, military might, political system, history, culture, norms, values, or even identity. This demonstrates the broad scope of issues in multiple sectors that may be threatened by China’s rise. Likewise, the CPR refers to a variety of reasons as to why China is not a threat. However, as demonstrated above, the current traditions explaining the CTT are largely inadequate. They either dismiss questions of representations, especially official depictions and over time, or treat them as a given; whilst failing to deal with the scale challenges of China’s rise in terms of its comprehensiveness across both the traditional and non-traditional security arenas, its future-oriented aspect, or its empirical impact upon Asia-Pacific states. What is noticeably lacking, if not missing altogether, is a systematic examination of official security representations from the US government concerning China’s rise. The extent to which the US has discursively represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, are the questions this dissertation addresses. Compared to the traditional approaches to security – whereby security can either be objective in the sense that there is a measurable, ontologically real threat; or subjective, filtered through psychological fears and other perceptions – the discursive approach moves beyond the objective-subjective distinction. Such an approach sees security as constructed through language when the label of “security” or “threat” is applied,108 thus contributing to the CTT literature in terms of how the US has constructed China’s rise as a security threat. Most glaringly, Copenhagen School securitisation theory has seldom been directly employed to analyse China’s rise as a security concern in a comprehensive manner, despite its evident utility in examining how issues become a matter of security, which is even more puzzling given securitisation’s proliferation since it was introduced. Existing studies conjoining securitisation and China’s rise typically employ the theory in a limited or indirect manner,109 or focus on narrower issue areas such as fishing or energy.110 More direct and

China," CNN, 7 April 1999, accessed 26 December 2019, http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/07/clinton.china/. 108 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, pp. 33-34. 109 For instance, Breslin, "Understanding China's Regional Rise," pp. 817-835; Bibek Chand and Zenel Garcia, "Power Politics and Securitization: The Emerging Indo–Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia," Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 4:2 (2017), pp. 310-324. 110 See Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman, "Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the South China Sea Dispute," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 39:2 (2017), pp. 288-314; Sebastian Biba, "Desecuritization in China's Behavior towards Its Transboundary Rivers: the Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh

comprehensive securitisation studies on the CTT, such as by Weiqing Song and Vuori, are much rarer compared to the large number of works utilising securitisation theory. With reference to these two exceptions, whilst Song’s article adopting a poststructural approach is a seminal study on the securitisation of the CTT, the analysis leaves some questions unanswered, and there are some gaps. For instance, Song did not directly consider whether such securitisation had actually succeeded, especially since he used a poststructural approach, treating security as self-referential. He also did so without recourse to official government documents of security practices, relying instead on representations from assorted epistemic communities. However, to be sure, his goal was not to look at government representations but the overall discourse.111 His work is thus similar to the other studies within the poststructural tradition outlined above in mostly treating the CTT as an ontological prior in a postpositivist manner focusing on China as antithetical to Western self-identity. Likewise, the other materialist explanations above treat the CTT as a given, albeit via a neopositivist approach instead. Vuori’s study also focused on desecuritisation of the CTT, rather than its securitisation per se.112 In contrast, my research project does not take a self-other dialectic as its starting point. Rather, it starts with asking whether China’s rise has been represented as a security threat by the US as a state actor in the first place; and if it has, how and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. I do this through the application of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, specifically using macrosecuritisation to deal with the scale challenges of China’s rise, explaining these in greater detail in the next chapter.

and Ili Rivers," Journal of Contemporary China, 23:85 (2014), pp. 21-43; Andrew Stephen Campion, "From CNOOC to Huawei: Securitization, the China Threat, and Critical Infrastructure," Asian Journal of Political Science, 28:1 (2020), pp. 47-66; Jonna Nyman, "‘Red Storm Ahead’: Securitisation of Energy in US–China Relations," Millennium, 43:1 (2014), pp. 43-65. Maria Julia Trombetta, "Fueling Threats: Securitization and the Challenges of Chinese Energy Policy," Asian Perspective, 42:2 (2018), pp. 183-206; 111 Song, "Securitization of the 'China Threat' Discourse," pp. 145-169. 112 Vuori, "Let’s Just Say," pp. 118-136.

3. A Post-Copenhagen Macrosecuritisation Theory and Design

Introduction: The Copenhagen School

In order to address my research questions and determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, I turn to the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, part of the critical security studies tradition. It exemplifies what has come to be known as the “linguistic turn” in the social sciences, which concentrates on how language constructs social reality.1 Specifically, securitisation is a discursive approach to the construction of security, and it has also become the dominant framework in this regard today.2 Securitisation is evidently the most appropriate tool for tackling my research questions, although there are some challenges in applying it to them. These challenges include the controversies and debates in classical securitisation theory, as well as the scale involved in my research questions about China’s rise, especially since security is an essentially contested concept.3 The objective of this chapter is to develop and explicate a theoretical framework that is best able to address my research questions. To this effect, the remainder of Chapter 3 is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the Copenhagen School. It examines securitisation, its linguistic and political roots, and its main normative, sociological and methodological critiques. The second section considers the three key debates within securitisation theory that these discontents have generated. These are: (1) the contextual debate founded by the second-generation securitisation scholars, (2) the Paris School-inspired debate focusing on practices, and (3) a more critical and reflexive debate over the contemporary meaning of security. The third section develops a post- Copenhagen macrosecuritisation as a framework to address my research questions. I integrate the positive contributions from the critiques and debates of classical securitisation useful to my research into a neo-securitisation theory. I subsequently merge this neo-securitisation with the Copenhagen School’s macrosecuritisation theory to account for the macro-scale of China’s rise and the “Blue Dread” fears this generates. The fourth section sets out a methodology to apply this post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory to determine the extent to which the US has

1 Vuori, "How to Do Security," p. 3; see also Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 7-8. 2 Croft, Securitizing Islam, p. 77. 3 Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. Ken Booth, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005), pp. 27-62.

represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. Before proceeding, it is important to note that “theory” in this thesis does not refer to the scientific meaning of a theory as “a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct”.4 Rather, I use “theory” to refer to “a model that does not in itself explain, but it forms a coherent system in relation to which it is possible to both compare instances and formulate specific hypotheses”.5 (Macro)securitisation theory is an analytical device rather than a predictive, falsifiable explanation. I start with examining the intricate details of this tool in the following section.

Sectors, Complexes, Securitisation

The Copenhagen School posits three main ideas regarding security, which Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde formalise in their 1998 book, Security: A New Framework for Analysis.6 The first of these is the broadening and deepening of the security agenda beyond the traditional military sector geared towards external threats, in line with the critical security studies approach. Under the Copenhagen School, this includes four other common, empirical and analytical sectors: the environmental, economic, societal and political sectors.7 Second, the Copenhagen School further amalgamates these sectors into a more encompassing regional security complex (RSC) theory, which emphasises the interconnectedness of security within regions, even beyond Westphalian state boundaries. RSCs are linked to the international distribution of power when global extra-regional powers “penetrate” and “make security alignments with states within an RSC”. When such penetration happens, interregional or international “supercomplexes” form. 8 In the context of my

4 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 19. 5 Ole Wæver, "The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from Securitization," International Relations, 29:1 (2015), p. 125; see also Ole Wæver, "Waltz’s Theory of Theory," International Relations, 23:2 (2009), pp. 201-222. 6 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security. For a review of the Copenhagen School’s earlier works, see Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe," European Journal of International Relations, 4:4 (1998), pp. 479-505. 7 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 2-5, and 7-8; see also Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983), pp. 75-83; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 73. 8 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, pp. 44-61.

dissertation, post-Cold War, the Asia-Pacific is such a supercomplex involving competition between the global powers of the US and China concentrated upon the regions of East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Compared to the more global supercomplex and bipolar distribution of power between the US and Soviet superpowers during the Cold War era, the Asia-Pacific is a smaller supercomplex, but still a supra-regional one. To be sure, this is also not to say that Sino-US rivalry does not exist outside of the Asia-Pacific, such as in Europe or Africa. It is simply that contemporary Sino-US security dynamics are more intense within the Asia-Pacific. Again, despite the Asia-Pacific’s supra-regional character under the Copenhagen School’s RSC theory, the Asia-Pacific is conventionally referred to as a “region”. Throughout this thesis, it is important to keep in mind the “region’s” international character. The third and most important idea of the Copenhagen School is securitisation theory. Securitisation is also key to the other two ideas. It enables the construction of non-traditional issues in the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors as security. It is also a major aspect of why security is interlinked in an RSC, or how a global power penetrates a region to form a supercomplex. As the theoretical mainstay of the research project, it is worth quoting extensively from the 1998 book to explicate classical securitisation theory:

“Security” is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat . . . when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is “normal politics,” we have a case of securitization. Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects . . . A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such . . . A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threat, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules . . . The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act . . . it is the utterance itself that is the act.9

9 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 23-26, emphasis original.

Securitisation involves turning an issue into a matter of security, which is seen as an extreme kind of politics. Classical securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School mould sees security as constructed when an issue is presented as a danger threatening the very existence of the referent object to which the threat applies. Consequentially, exceptional or emergency security practices in order to combat or counter the threat are required as a response. This construction of security is a process of a securitising move by a securitising actor via the “speech act”, whereby “speaking security” discursively constructs security. As Holger Stritzel points out, the speech act further possesses a “grammatical structure” of a “claim” of an issue as a threat, a “warning” of the danger that would materialise if the threat is not dealt with, and therefore a “demand” that something is done. In addition, “propositional content” substantiates and backs up the claim, warning and demand.10 There are six crucial components of classical securitisation theory hence: (1) the existential threat; (2) the referent object to which the threat applies; (3) the securitising move in the speech act; (4) the securitising actor performing the speech act; (5) the audience of the securitising move; and (6) the exceptional security practices. Stuart Croft also notes that since its proliferation, the term “securitisation” has also been used in a “lenient” way to “indicate simply that an issue has become the subject of debate in security terms”, as opposed to its “stricter” use in securitisation theory.11 To be sure, this thesis focuses on determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security using securitisation theory, and not in the lenient manner of security rhetoric. If security is constructed as the Copenhagen School suggests, it is immediately apparent that there is a problem of an ever-widening security sphere in which anything can potentially become an issue of security. The Copenhagen School addresses this by “fixing form”: drawing upon the language theory of J. L. Austin through the introduction of a speech act as the process of securitisation, and tying it to the thresholds of an existential threat to respond to, and emergency action to respond with.12 Jef Huysmans observes that such transcendence of the “normal” by securitisation parallels Carl Schmitt’s “state of exception”.13 Nonetheless, though

10 Holger Stritzel, Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat, (London: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 48-51; see also Juha A Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-democratic Political Orders," European Journal of International Relations, 14:1 (2008), pp. 65-99. 11 Croft, Securitizing Islam, pp. 77-78. An example of a lenient use is Andrew Phillips, "A Dangerous Synergy: Energy Securitization, Great Power Rivalry and Strategic Stability in the Asian Century," The Pacific Review, 26:1 (2013), pp. 17-38. 12 Ole Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory," Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), p. 469, emphasis original; see also John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 13 Jef Huysmans, "The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism " Millennium, 27:3 (1998), pp. 569-589; see also Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept

outside the bounds of normalcy, the basis of securitisation is still political, relying upon the interaction of human agency vis-à-vis Hannah Arendt, only given form via speech act theory.14 Even as securitisation moves an issue beyond the bounds of normal politics, this does not mean that the issue is beyond the political. Securitisation theory accordingly exposes the state of exception as a fictitious one, as Giorgio Agamben does. However, whereas Agamben emphasises the “politico-philosophical implications of sovereign exceptionalism” in a more abstract manner, classical securitisation does so from an “institutional, sociological and discursive tradition”.15 The implication is that a security issue can still be contested with countersecuritisations or can (preferably) be desecuritised.16 Since securitising an issue remains a political move, a natural question is at which point does it successfully become a matter of security? The Copenhagen School vacillates between the role of the securitising actor and the audience in this regard. It sometimes claims that securitisation is successful simply upon the securitising actor speaking and branding an issue as security with the speech act, yet suggesting at other times that audience acceptance is a prerequisite for successful securitisation. For instance, in the Security book, the authors state that “the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”, but almost immediately go on to also say that “it is the utterance itself that is the act” such that by “saying the words, something is done”.17 Any “discursive legitimation” between the securitising actor and the audience would suggest a “commitment” to Jürgen Habermas’s communicative and strategic action.18 However, the audience is underdeveloped in classical Copenhagen School securitisation theory.19 The Copenhagen School further advances three conditions facilitating securitisation: (1) whether the speech act follows the “grammar of security”, (2) the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience which affects audience acceptance, and (3) the characteristics of the threat itself.20 Of these, the latter two are seen as heavily

of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab, Foreword by Tracy B. Strong, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 14 See Wæver, "The Theory Act," pp. 121-127; Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Second ed., Introduction by Margaret Canovan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 15 Andrew W. Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 103, emphasis removed; see also Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 16 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, p. 29. 17 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 18 Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003), pp. 521-524; see also Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 19 Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," European Journal of International Relations, 13:3 (2007), p. 363. 20 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 31-33.

influenced by Jacques Derrida’s “deconstruction” as they are highly contextual.21 Even with these, on the whole, there remains a “problematic vagueness around the process through which these key concepts of securitising actors and audiences interact to create securitisations” successfully.22 The “unconventional mix of theorists”, as Rita Floyd puts it,23 forming the bedrock of securitisation theory has brought forth various shortfalls and ambiguities in the theory. In developing a theoretical framework to investigate my research questions and determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, it is important to be cognisant of these criticisms, with the aim of overcoming or avoiding the relevant pitfalls where possible and applicable. I categorise these criticisms of classical Copenhagen School securitisation theory into three main groups: normative, sociological and methodological. The normative critiques start with what Wæver calls the “Huysmans dilemma”.24 If security is constructed, (in)security is produced simply by talking or writing security, creating a predicament. Classical securitisation worsens the dilemma by explicitly establishing a state of exception outside of normal politics. Claudia Aradau even highlights that desecuritisation, the preferred mode of classical securitisation, is still normatively deficient since it also relies upon the language of security as opposed to being “tackled politically”,25 putting paid to the linear logic portrayed by the politicisation-securitisation spectrum. In addition, Copenhagen School securitisation is also frequently “elitist” and state-centric since the state often determines the agenda and dominates discourse, “saying” and shaping security.26 The state further entrenches its monopoly on the use of violence if the military or other security forces are mobilised to deal with the existential threat, particularly with emergency measures prescribed.

21 Rita Floyd, Security and the Environment: Securitization Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 14-17; see also Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982). 22 Jonathan Bright, "Securitisation, Terror, and Control: Towards a Theory of the Breaking Point," Review of International Studies, 38:4 (2012), pp. 863-864. 23 Floyd, Security and the Environment, p. 9. 24 Since Huysmans was perhaps most eloquent about it; see Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory," p. 469. See also Jef Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27:1 Supplement (2002), p. 41-62; Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory be Used in Normative Analysis: Towards a Just Securitization Theory," Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), pp. 427-439. 25 Claudia Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation," Journal of International Relations and Development, 7:4 (2004), p. 389. 26 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 166.

I acknowledge that there is no way to escape the normative problem of writing security in my research project, even if my aim in this dissertation is precisely to shine a spotlight on whether the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. Other scholars emphasise the exaggeration of the state of exception both in its processes and outcomes in liberal democracies though, arguing that securitisation theory enables an analysis closer to Arendtian politics instead.27 Functionally, securitising an issue is also positive if exceptional resources are brought to bear to solve the problem. 28 Even failed securitising moves can serve to (re)politicise an issue, triggering positive outcomes.29 I hence examine in-depth the measures undertaken by the US and the audience states to mitigate the insecurity from China’s rise, if any. This dissertation is necessarily state-centric since the research questions focus upon state actors: the US and its audience states. Sociological critiques suggest that classical securitisation theory is derived from a unique European experience and hence faces challenges when it is applied to non-European or non-democratic cases. Claire Wilkinson, for instance, contends that this “Eurocentrism” and consequent “democratic bias” erects a “Westphalian straitjacket” which prevents “explicit interrogation of the normative concepts underlying the framework”, and which does not take “into account the local socio-political context”.30 I thus note the importance of the context when applying the securitisation framework to my research questions. After all, whilst the basic units of my analysis are equal Westphalian sovereign states in an anarchic international system, the sociological interactions between the US and its audience states matter as well. Similarly, other scholars have employed securitisation theory in studies across the non-Western world, in Southeast Asia and Africa, for example.31 These studies have ranged from issue areas like transnational crime to terrorism,

27 For example, Paul Roe, "Is Securitization a 'Negative Concept'? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics," Security Dialogue, 43:3 (2012), pp. 249-266. 28 Rita Floyd, "Towards a Consequentalist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies," Review of International Studies, 33:2 (2007), pp. 342-343. 29 Sebastian Biba, "From Securitization Moves to Positive Outcomes: The Case of the Spring 2010 Mekong Crisis," Security Dialogue, 47:5 (2016), pp. 420-439. 30 Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Usable outside Europe?" Security Dialogue, 38:1 (2007), p. 5; see also Hazel Smith, "Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea," International Affairs, 76:1 (2000), pp. 111-132. 31 Melissa G. Curley and Jonathan Herington, "The Securitisation of Avian Influenza: International Discourses and Domestic Politics in Asia," Review of International Studies, 37:1 (2011), pp. 141-166; Megan MacKenzie, "Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-conflict Sierra Leone," Security Studies, 18:2 (2009), pp. 241-261.

amongst many others.32 Others have also expanded securitisation theory beyond the state to non-state securitising actors as well, such as civil society or international organisations, like the European Union (EU).33 This flexibility in the application of securitisation theory across such different contexts highly suggests the possibility of applying macrosecuritisation theory to the US construction of its “Blue Dread” within the Asia-Pacific. The third category of methodological criticisms stresses that classical securitisation does not fully account for the possibility of numerous securitising speech acts in multiple settings by different actors throughout the securitising process.34 Nor does it clearly state “whether the implementation of emergency measures is the endpoint of the process, the pinnacle of securitizing success, or simply the beginning of a contestation over the legitimacy of such measures”. 35 Amir Lupovici even calls attention to a selection bias in applying securitisation theory to non-traditional security threats rather than traditional, military threats.36 I agree that securitisation theory is still overwhelmingly applied to the non-traditional security sectors and hardly to the traditional military sector,37 which represents a significant fissure in the field. I seek to bridge this gap in this research project as the military sector is an important part of China’s rise. As Vuori also notes, employing the critical security studies framework of securitisation to an important traditional security issue like China’s rise further illustrates its utility.38 Furthermore, different securitisation scholars have applied assorted methods, contributing to a richer diversity in analysing securitisation. For instance, Georgios Karyotis and Stratos Patrikios explore the different representations between political and religious elites with reference to migration in Greece.39 Stefano Guzzini also advocates using “the idea of ‘securitization’ as a causal mechanism in a type of interpretivist process-tracing to

32 Ralf Emmers, "ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia," The Pacific Review, 16:3 (2003), 419-438; Senia Febrica, "Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia," Asian Survey, 50:3 (2010), pp. 569-590. 33 Jocelyn Vaughn, "The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness," Security Dialogue, 40:3 (2009); Sarah Léonard, "EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices," European Security, 19:2 (2010), pp. 231-254. 34 Mark B. Salter, "When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-terrorism Programs," in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 116- 131. 35 Scott D. Watson, The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats, (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 29-30. 36 Amir Lupovici, "The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the Curious Absence of Israel," International Studies Review, 16:3 (2014), pp. 390-410. 37 Another exception is James Sperling and Mark Webber, "NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitisation," European Journal of International Security, 2:1 (2017), pp. 19-46. 38 Vuori, "Let’s Just Say," p. 119. 39 Georgios Karyotis and Stratos Patrikios, "Religion, Securitization and Anti-immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece," Journal of Peace Research, 47:1 (2010), pp. 43-57.

allow for more coherence in the use of securitization in empirical explanations”. 40 This suggests that clearly spelling out how securitisation is applied and when it succeeds is crucial to studies employing the framework. I elaborate on an appropriate and relevant methodology to use my post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation in determining the extent which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, later on in this chapter.

Contextual, Practical, Critical

The contestation over the core elements of classical Copenhagen School securitisation theory does not stop at the critiques of it. It has also initiated various debates revolving round the six components of securitisation theory. I examine these to determine which elements brought up are useful for incorporation into a theoretical framework that would become more appropriate to addressing my research questions. I broadly group these contentions into three key debates, based thematically rather than chronologically (see Table 3.1 below): contextual, practical and critical. Other scholars structure these contentions differently,41 and there are some overlaps in my classification. However, my categories generally allow for a more useful investigation of the effects these contestations of classical securitisation theory have on my theoretical framework. In this regard, I have identified several useful elements from these three contextual, practical and critical debates of securitisation. Specifically, the role of the audience in judging the success of securitisation, especially at the international level of China’s rise as a security concern, emphasised in the first contextual debate relates to the second of my research questions. The second practical debate informs my study of the purpose and character of actual measures invoked to counter the security issue of China’s rise, the first of my research questions. The rise of China as a potential and future security concern involving multiple referent objects as China continues to catch up relative to the US is underscored by the third critical debate. The rest of this section explains these in detail.

40 Stefano Guzzini, "Securitization as a Causal Mechanism," Security Dialogue, 39:4-5 (2011), p. 338. 41 For excellent general reviews of securitisation theory, see Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," European Journal of International Relations, 14:4 (2008), pp. 563-587; Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," International Relations, 30:4 (2016), pp. 494-531.

First Key Debate

The first key debate concerns whether it is the speech act itself that constructs security, or a speech act in addition to audience acceptance, and possibly even the security measures articulated in the securitising move. Unlike the classical first-generation Copenhagen School securitisation scholars, what has generally come to be known as the second-generation securitisation scholars in the literature contend that audience acceptance is key to successful securitisation. This dovetails with the second half of my research in determining the extent which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. The first key debate begins with the speech act. According to Thierry Balzacq, rather than the Copenhagen School’s formulation in which security is constructed upon an articulation of the speech act by the securitising actor – an illocutionary logic whereby the performance happens in the linguistic representation itself – securitisation should instead be understood as “a strategic (pragmatic) practice” dependent upon the context and circumstances. These include the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience, such that constructing security involves gaining audience buy-in. The speech act is thus not illocutionary, but displays a perlocutionary logic – the performance affects said audience, effecting its support – instead.42 This second-generation take on securitisation as perlocutionary is more sociological, constructivist or externalist, whereas the illocutionary speech act skews towards the poststructural, philosophical or internalist. As noted, the Copenhagen School is ambiguous about the roles of the audience and the securitising actor, as well as the resulting question of how the success of a securitising move is determined. The illocutionary speech act logic of classical securitisation suggests a self- referential concept of security, whilst insisting upon proof of success only upon audience acceptance conversely implies an intersubjective take on security.43 As Adam Côté highlights: “This contradiction is heavily rooted in the concept of the securitization audience” within classical Copenhagen School securitisation theory, or rather the lack thereof.44 In comparison, the contextual second-generation securitisation scholars give greater emphasis to the audience,

42 Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," European Journal of International Relations, 11:2 (2005), p. 172; cf. Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic," p. 74, which emphasises that Wæver had always considered the perlocutionary effects of the speech act. 43 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, p. 25. 44 Adam Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory," Security Dialogue, 47:6 (2016), p. 542.

with the success of a securitising move consequent upon audience acceptance with the perlocutionary speech act. Such a slant further ameliorates some of the sociological criticisms of classical securitisation theory. At the heart of the first key debate is therefore the question of whether security is self- referential or intersubjective. Considering this question, Floyd points out that the targeted audience of the speech act may either be the aggressor or the referent object. In the case of the former, the speech act is a warning, whereas when geared towards the latter, it is a promise. Within the interactions between the securitising actor and the referent, securitisation may fail regardless of audience acceptance. In perhaps her strongest test scenario, Floyd argues that if the aggressor accepts the warning, the threat is negated before the need for any action, and counterintuitively, securitisation fails even though there is audience acceptance. She consequently asserts that “there simply is no conclusive relationship between audience acceptance and the ‘success’ of securitization”, and instead proposes that securitisation be judged upon the actions of security practitioners and actors rather than a “sanctioning audience”.45 In the self-referential mould, to Floyd, securitisation is successful if it follows the logic of an identification of a threat, a securitising move (the illocutionary speech act), and a consequent security practice (exceptional or otherwise) in response, regardless of audience acceptance.46 In contrast, towards the intersubjective, Paul Roe emphasises the role of the audience. He further conceives successful securitisation as involving two distinct parts. The first “stage of identification” uses the rhetoric of security to frame the issue in order to get audience buy-in to the narrative of the existential threat. A second “stage of mobilisation” then additionally seeks the audience’s support and acceptance of the measures enacted in response to the threat, although these measures must be exceptional as opposed to Floyd’s. Without the mobilisation of the audience in the latter stage, securitisation is solely rhetorical without achieving an active practical result.47 However, these two approaches are not contradictory. The logical inference is that an attempt at turning an issue into one of security needs to involve both speech acts as well as security practices in response, rather than mobilising resources for security practices only after the speech act and audience acceptance.48 In this regard, a neo-securitising move inspired by

45 Rita Floyd, "Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures: What, and Who, Defines the 'Success' of Securitization?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29:2 (2016), pp. 688-691. 46 Ibid., pp. 677-694; see also Floyd, Security and the Environment. 47 Paul Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq," Security Dialogue, 39:6 (2008), pp. 615-635. 48 As suggested in Alan Collins, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education," The Pacific Review, 18:4 (2005), p. 570.

this first key debate comprises not just the speech act with its specific security grammar of claim, warning, and demand, but also a security practice, or at least the concrete threat of one, to counter the danger. In this manner, the propositional content also affects the securitising practice itself, and not just the securitising speech act. Figure 3.1 below illustrates this process:

Figure 3.1: A Post-Copenhagen Neo-securitising Move

Securitising Move = [Speech Act (Claim + Warning/Promise + Demand) + Practice] x Propositional Content

Without a security practice, the warning or promise remains an empty one rather than a securitising attempt. The success of a neo-securitising move in turn depends on audience acceptance with regard to identification with the speech act and mobilisation in support of the practice. Figure 3.2 below depicts how the securitising move and audience acceptance plays out:

Figure 3.2: Scenarios Depicting Audience Acceptance and Securitisation

1. Warning + Practice → Aggressor → Accept → Problem Solved = Securitisation Succeeds, (Securitising Move) (Audience) then Desecuritisation → Reject → Contest = Securitisation Fails (Countersecuritisation)

2. Promise + Practice → Referent Object → Accept = Securitisation Succeeds (Securitising Move) (Audience) → Reject = Securitisation Fails

In the first scenario in Figure 3.2, when the aggressor is warned through a speech act and practice, should the aggressor, as the audience, accept these, securitisation has clearly succeeded. Following this, after the aggressor acts to resolve the threat that led to the securitising move in the first place, the problem is dealt with and the initial purpose of securitising the issue is fulfilled. The issue can then become desecuritised afterwards. Conversely, if the aggressor rejects the securitising move, securitisation fails, with the

aggressor disputing it with its own countersecuritisation. The second scenario is more straightforward. Securitisation succeeds or fails through audience acceptance or rejection of the securitising move. Without acting upon the threat, a securitising attempt is incomplete and solely exists at the rhetorical level. In judging audience acceptance for successful securitisation in my theoretical framework with reference to addressing the second of my research questions hence, said audiences need to accept both speech acts and security practices by the US portraying China’s rise as a security threat. Additionally, Floyd’s scenario of a non-human referent object “incapable of accepting or rejecting the promise of protection” is invalid here.49 The root of securitisation is Arendtian politics and the speech act therefore necessarily promises an audience that is able to receive said performance of the protection of a referent object. At times, the audience is concurrently the referent object. For example, oftentimes in the securitisation of the environment, the threat from climate change is against the referent object of the humans living on the planet, and not the Earth itself. The planet will survive in geologic terms regardless of drastic changes in climate. The audience in this example are the selfsame people in danger, and they are encouraged to take steps to help protect the environment, amongst other measures, in response.50 At other times, the audience is different from the referent object, such as when telling the citizens of a state (the audience) about the need to sacrifice themselves against an external enemy threatening the state’s sovereignty (the referent object). Overall, what the first key debate shows is that a post-Copenhagen neo-securitisation theory is a two-stage process. It first invokes a securitising move, comprising a speech act and a security practice, which is self-referential – it becomes a matter of security for the securitising actor. Second, the success of this securitising move is intersubjective, dependent on whether the targeted audience also accepts the issue as a matter of security. Indeed, various securitisation scholars such as Vuori, Jürgen Haacke and Paul Williams see the correct interpretation of classical Copenhagen School securitisation as such a two-stage model.51 Vuori even contends that illocutionary speech acts can have perlocutionary effects on top of their conventional performative effects.52 He further differentiates between the “satisfaction” of a

49 Floyd, "Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures," p. 690, acknowledges that this scenario is a “largely hypothetical” one. 50 See Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, p. 76. 51 Vuori, "How to Do Security," chapter 6; Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, "Regional Arrangements, Securitization, and Transnational Security Challenges: The African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Compared," Security Studies, 17:4 (2008), p. 779. 52 Vuori, "Deterring Things with Words," pp. 28-31; see also Marina Sbisà, "Illocutionary Force and Degrees of Strength in Language Use," Journal of Pragmatics, 33:12 (2001), pp. 1791-1814.

self-referential and illocutionary securitising speech act from the “success” of the speech act’s perlocutionary and political effects.53 Whilst I agree with Vuori’s approach to the illocutionary securitising speech act, under my theoretical framework, the first-stage securitising process goes beyond the speech act alone, to also include security practices. At this point thus, it is vital to clarify the terminology since the various terms can get confusing and become conflated once the question of securitisation’s success is brought in explicitly. For instance, Corey Robinson uses “securitisation” to refer to successful securitising moves, its processes, as well as its outcomes.54 As used in this dissertation, the verb “to securitise” denotes an attempt to turn an issue into one of security. In contrast, the noun “securitisation” refers to: (1) its collective group of studies or theories, for instance, in “securitisation theory”; or (2) the securitising attempt having been successful. The verb conveys the meaning of securitisation as a process whilst the latter use of the noun expresses securitisation as an outcome. When an issue is “securitised”, an attempt to turn this issue into a matter of security has been made, but this does not mean that there is “securitisation” since a failed outcome of the securitising move is possible. Similarly, these differentiating nuances hold for the various derivatives of “securitise” and “securitisation”, such as “macrosecuritise” and “macrosecuritisation”. Due to the international scale of China’s rise, I take onboard the expanded understandings of the roles of the audience and context the first key debate of securitisation theory highlights. Specifically, the latter part of my research questions focuses on whether US representations of China’s rise as a security concern have succeeded in the relevant audiences, which are necessarily sovereign states within the anarchic international system. Importantly, for such US representations to succeed, these audiences not only have to identify with the speech act, but also need to mobilise in support of the security practices. Such security practices are the subject of the second key debate.

Second Key Debate

The second key debate involves how security practices themselves construct security, even non-exceptional measures, further implying that the threat itself need not be existential in

53 Juha A. Vuori, "Constructivism and Securitization Studies," in Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge), p. 68. 54 Corey Robinson, "Tracing and Explaning Securitization: Social Mechanisms, Process Tracing and the Securitization of Irregular Migration," Security Dialogue, 48:6 (2017), pp. 505-523.

character. Practice-oriented securitisation scholars argue that the routine and quotidian can also construct security, rather than a state of exception. This insight is especially valuable as I consider the measures implemented as part of US security representations of a rising China for the first of my research questions, as opposed to mere rhetoric or perhaps wishful thinking. The first conundrum in this debate is whether speech is the only mode of a securitising move as the classical Copenhagen School scholars propose, or if other means, such as images, emotions, other non-verbal mechanisms, or the security practices themselves, work as well.55 This second key debate is heavily influenced by the Paris School – the group of scholars inspired by the writings of Bourdieu and Foucault to focus on practices – to a larger extent than its impact upon the first key debate.56 Whereas classical securitisation theory is linguistic and second-generation securitisation theory contextual, the Paris School adopts a practice-oriented approach to securitisation theory. The second key debate shifts “the focus of securitization theory towards the techniques of government”, with security neither self-referential nor intersubjective, but “designed through different technical or physical modalities”.57 In other words, the success of securitisation depends upon the how of security through policy tools and instruments, rather than on audience acceptance or the illocutionary speech act.58 Security practitioners are the securitising actors when security is constructed through practices. Moreover, rather than the exceptional or emergency measures required of classical securitisation in responding to an existential threat, the contention of some interlocutors in the second key debate is that security practices can be mundane and repetitive instead.59 Huysmans further distinguishes between what he calls the “exceptionalising securitising” by the state under the classical Copenhagen School rubric from the “diffuse securitising through assembling suspicion” in contemporary times, especially with reference to “its modality of surveillance and governing uncertainty and risks”, even by non-state actors.60 For instance, post-9/11 in the securitisation of the terrorist threat, commuters on Singapore’s public rail

55 Lene Hansen, "The Politics of Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis: A Post-Structuralist Perspective," Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), pp. 357-369; Eric Van Rythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear? Emotions, Imaginaries, and Limits in the Politics of Securitization," Security Dialogue, 46:5 (2015), pp. 458-475; Vuori, "A Timely Prophet?" pp. 255-277. 56 Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, "Securitisation and Diego Garcia," Review of International Studies, 39:4 (2013), pp. 815-834; Philippe Bourbeau, "Moving Foward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process," Millennium, 43:1 (2014), pp. 187-206. 57 Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited," p. 504. 58 Thierry Balzacq, "The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies," Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1 (2008), pp. 75-100. 59 Salter, "When Securitization Fails," pp. 116-131; Floyd, "Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures," pp. 677-694. 60 Jef Huysmans, Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), p. 9.

transportation network were routinely inundated with announcements reminding them to look out for suspicious individuals and bags left unattended. Successful securitisation can thus happen even without exceptional measures to counter a threat, but simply through mundane security practices, putting paid to the Schmittian exceptionalism of classical securitisation. As the Paris School’s Didier Bigo puts it: “Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional”.61 In addition, the exceptional practices of classical Copenhagen School securitisation and the routine practices of the Paris School interact in two ways. First, and in an extreme scenario, exceptional practices can become so institutionalised that it turns routine and embedded into the everyday. The exceptional becomes the norm. In his study on Israel, Uriel Abulof terms this as “deep securitisation”, in which “threats are explicitly framed as probable and protracted”, with such discourse “incessantly and widely employed” to the extent that “one can hardly make issues part of public policy without framing them as posing ‘existential threats’”.62 Second, the “logic of exception” and the “logic of routine” can work hand in hand to explain securitisation, particularly at different stages of the securitising process, as Philippe Bourbeau shows in his study on the securitisation of migration in France.63 Furthermore, once routine practices are brought into the picture when constructing security, the logical conclusion is that the threat itself no longer has to be an existential one threatening the very survival of the referent object. For example, in his study of migration in the EU, Huysmans demonstrates how institutionalised routines such as border controls generate insecurity. This enabled the successful securitisation of migration and asylum in Europe even though there was no direct existential threat involved.64 As in the first debate, this second key debate reinforces the importance of securitising practices in a post-Copenhagen neo-securitisation theory. These include routine, everyday practices and not just exceptional measures. In terms of the first of my research questions of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security therefore, I examine the character of the US practices invoked, such as whether US routine measures are also targeted at China’s rise. This is especially considering the future-oriented characteristics of China’s growth in strength, as opposed to the grand strategy of containment

61 Bigo, "Security and Immigration," p. 73. 62 Uriel Abulof, "Deep Securitization and Israel's 'Demographic Demon'," International Political Sociology, 8:4 (2014), p. 397 and 400, emphasis removed. 63 Bourbeau, "Moving Foward Together," pp. 187-206. 64 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity.

against the former USSR during the Cold War, for instance. This future-orientation of China’s rise is further illuminated by the third key debate.

Third Key Debate

I identify a third debate evolving from the first two. This third key debate entails contestations over the concept of security, including differentiated types of referent objects, what form security practices take to arrest the issue, and the temporality of the threat. Some scholars of this tradition focus on security risks rather than threats. These are useful in addressing my research questions in relation to the specifics of how the US has represented China’s continued rise and future growth as a concern, and given the complexity and multiple dimensions of the “Blue Dread China Threat Theory” as discussed in Chapter 2. The third key debate tackles the security problematique from a more critical and reflexive angle, further calling into question the nature and meaning of security. After all, normative critiques censure classical securitisation theory for “its lack of a critical edge” despite it being part of the critical security studies tradition.65 For instance, Maria Trombetta argues that the application of securitisation theory to non-traditional security threats like the environment had in turn transformed the concept of security. Whereas classical securitisation is premised upon the “confrontational logic” of traditional security, new emerging threats such as the environment demonstrate that “reactive measures and an antagonist understanding of security” are not ideal solutions.66 Rather than military responses via the use of force, these new threats are simply “politicized through an appeal to security”, and “preventive measures appear to be more effective and new means are required” instead.67 Felix Ciută, utilising a more contextual approach akin to the first key debate, similarly highlights “three distinct logics of energy security currently in circulation”, with different “vocabularies, policy vehicles and normative consequences” attached to each of these logics.68 With regard to climate security, Matt McDonald also differentiates and classifies different representations of climate security according to the type of referent object specified, requiring different responses in addressing

65 Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene," p. 393. 66 Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21:4 (2008), p. 589. 67 Ibid. 68 Felix Ciută, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" Security Dialogue, 41:2 (2010), p. 125.

climate change under the different categories as a result.69 This array of different energy or climate “securities” queries the traditional logic of security and securitisation theory. Other than these critical analyses of the referent object, a more reflexive slant has also been taken towards the threat itself, as well as the security practices to counter the threat, in a mutually constitutive manner. Partially in line with the second key debate, Olaf Corry, critically examining the literature on the securitisation of climate change, introduces “riskification”. As an approach separate from securitisation, “riskification” elucidates the normality of politics (rather than security) when dealing with “risk-security” which handles possible and future harmful effects of the sort posed by climate change.70 Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra Williams and Thomas Diez take this a step further in conjoining risk to securitisation by loosening the theory’s existential threat and emergency measures criteria. They posit a typology of various climate security discourses categorised by differentiated referent objects and the threat posed, existential or risk based, consequentially emphasising different security practices in response. For instance, they highlight that dykes are built to protect a population facing a threat from rising sea levels due to climate change whereas the risk of rising sea levels affecting a population is mitigated by strengthening resilience in the population at risk.71 In terms of terrorism, Aradau and Rens van Munster underscore that war against terrorism post- 9/11 was “a new form of governmentality” that hinges upon “the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new configurations of risk that require that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs”.72 Prevention then deals practically with, and minimises, the risks involved from the threat of terrorism. Rita Abrahamsen hence describes security as a spectrum ranging from “normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and to existential threat”.73 The common thread running through these studies is that they adopt a more critical and reflexive approach to security and its construction. This third key debate incorporates “risk” into the concept of security, opening up classical securitisation’s constituent elements of existential threat and referent object in a more nuanced and reflexive manner to allow for the consequent matching of appropriate security practices to the context. Risk is especially relevant

69 Matt McDonald, "Discourses of Climate Security," Political Geography, 33 (2013), pp. 42-51. 70 Olaf Corry, "Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change," Millennium, 40:2 (2012), pp. 235-258. 71 Franziskus von Lucke, Zehra Wellmann, and Thomas Diez, "What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach," Geopolitics, 19:4 (2014), pp. 857-884. 72 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future," European Journal of International Relations, 13:1 (2007), p. 91. 73 Abramhamsen, "Blair's Africa," p. 59.

for my research questions, considering the future-oriented dimension of the “Blue Dread”, with its emphasis on China’s trajectory. Though risk is novel to securitisation theory, it is not a new concept in and of itself, or as applied to the study of security.74 A notable earlier example of risk in the Security Studies field is deterrence theory.75 Another is the celebrated “Risk Theory” of Germany’s Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz prior to WWI. This proposed a German fleet powerful enough to force the United Kingdom into concessions to Germany as the superior British navy would then not want to risk confronting the German navy for fear of being taken advantage thereafter by Britain’s other enemies.76 Whilst there is no consensus on the definition of risk in the literature,77 risk is the “leitmotif of contemporary society”.78 As Mikkel Rasmussen underscores, unlike a threat, which is (somewhat) specific, identifiable and measurable, risk is a potential threat which is “much less computable”; the former can be defeated, but the latter can only be managed or prevented. It is necessary to recognise how the world today measures danger and security, which has shifted further away from a traditionally state-centric and military focus.79 Risk challenges the ideas of “controllability, certainty or security”, 80 enabling a differentiated concept of security along a spectrum that enables security dynamics to deal with the increasing “complexity and uncertainty of contemporary threats”,81 such as the “Blue Dread”. Likewise, Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero and van Munster highlight that: “Ontologically, risk shifts the security inquiry towards more heterogeneous and diffuse practices that cannot be represented through simple binary dichotomies of normality/exception and politics/security”.82 The danger is that opening securitisation up to risk could conceivably create the ever- widening problem again, as Wæver warns.83 However, risk deserves treatment as a security issue, especially as two of the most contemporaneous security issues today, climate change and

74 Although Oliver Kessler, "Risk," in The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, ed. J. Peter Burgess, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 17-26, identifies different nuances between contemporary and traditional risk, such distinction is unnecessary for this study. 75 For instance, Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics, 11:2 (1959), pp. 173-191. 76 Stephen R. Rock, "Risk Theory Reconsidered: American Success and German Failure in the Coercion of Britain, 1890–1914," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11:3 (1988), pp. 342-364. 77 Deborah Lupton, Risk, Second ed., (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), chapter 2; see also Stefan Elbe, "Risking Lives: AIDS, Security and Three Concepts of Risk," Security Dialogue, 39:2-3 (2008), pp. 177-198. 78 Philip Jan Schäfer, Human and Water Security in Israel and Jordan, (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), p. 13. 79 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-2. 80 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 2. 81 Trombetta, "Environmental Security and Climate Change," pp. 589-590. 82 Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero, and Rens van Munster, "Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction," Security Dialogue, 39:2-3 (2008), p. 149. 83 Wæver, "Politics, Security, Theory," pp. 473-475.

terrorism, demonstrate. Climate change and terrorism exemplify this reflexive shift of security practices and representations following how these threats are conceptualised epistemologically. Securitising actors are furthermore already incorporating such “risk-security” approaches into policy. For instance, in his study of aviation security against terrorism, Mark Salter shows how security practices have proliferated – through the use of metal detectors, screening or emergency preparedness – as a result of the management of risk.84 The widening of security studies, with security as an essentially contested concept, is arguably an inevitable consequence of reflexive modernity. For these reasons, rather than divorcing risk from security, for instance, as Corry did,85 conjoining risk and threat in a scaled continuum enables a non-static, critical and reflexive conceptualisation of security. This third key debate highlights potential risks, on top of existential threats, as security issues, akin to the manner in which the second key debate emphasises routine security practices in addition to exceptional measures. Moreover, it demonstrates that the security continuum ranging from risk to threat is applicable to differentiated objects and issues, rather than a sole overarching referent. These points the third key debate raise are particularly relevant in addressing my research questions. The rise of China is especially a potential and future security concern involving multiple referent objects as China continues to catch up relative to the US, as opposed to China as an evident antithetical ideological enemy, for example. Nevertheless, this incorporation of potential threats to a neo-securitisation theory should not be mistaken for a “lenient” use of securitisation. The former is still performative, turning an issue into a matter of security, whilst the latter is merely descriptive.86 The next part of this section captures the useful insights into my research questions provided by these three key debates of securitisation into a neo-securitisation framework that is more suitable for my purposes.

Neo-Securitisation Theory

The three key debates of classical securitisation detailed above are generically summarised in Table 3.1 below:

84 Mark B. Salter, "Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security," Security Dialogue, 39:2-3 (2008), pp. 243-266. 85 Corry, "Securitisation and ‘Riskification," pp. 235-258. 86 Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," European Journal of International Relations, 4:2 (1998), p. 232; Croft, Securitizing Islam, p. 78.

Table 3.1: Key Debates in Securitisation Theory Classical First Second Third Number (Zero/Null) 1. Copenhagen 1. Contextual 1. Paris School 1. Critical School 2. Second- 2. Practice- 2. Riskification Themes 2. First- Generation Oriented Generation 3. Externalist 3. Internalist Designed Nature of Self-referential/ Intersubjective Technically or Reflexive Security Intersubjective Physically Barry Buzan, Thierry Balzacq, Didier Bigo, Mikkel Examples of Ole Wæver, Holger Stritzel, Jef Huysmans, Rasmussen, Scholars Jaap de Wilde Mark Salter Tugba Basaran Olaf Corry, Rita Abrahamsen Components Existential Constructed; Incorporation of Not required Threat Present Risk (Future) Referent Sectors Differentiated Object Not necessary; Speech Act Illocutionary Perlocutionary Practice Securitising State-centric Power Relations Practitioners Actor Audience Undefined Power Relations Routine; Security Exceptional; Part of the Everyday Prevention Practices Emergency context practice Source: Compiled by author.

Through integrating the positive contributions to a study of my research questions by these key debates, I can outline a post-Copenhagen neo-securitisation theory. This neo-securitisation theory: (1) includes practices as part of a securitising move, even non-exceptional security practices; (2) incorporates audience acceptance into the success of securitisation; and (3) adopts a reflexive notion of security that countenances non-existential and non-imminent threats in the form of risk. However, such a neo-securitisation theory is still, by itself, insufficient for the purposes of addressing my research questions of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. It fails to appropriately consider the challenge of scale. I then use this neo- securitisation theory as a theoretical foundation for developing a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory in the next section.

Success, Moves, Scale

There are three scale challenges in the “Blue Dread” from a rising China. First, most studies employing securitisation theory focus on non-traditional security, rather than traditional military security. However, the security issues related to China’s rise in the literature are from multiple dimensions, encompassing all five of the sectors posited by the Copenhagen School: the military, political, economic, environmental and societal (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, these security concerns over a rising China are frequently in the international arena, presenting two further scale challenges. The second scale challenge is inconceivable unilateral action by the US against China, with the targeted audience necessarily sovereign states under the condition of international anarchy. Third, since the emphasis is towards the continued growth of China as it catches up in power to the US in the future, the challenge of scale in such an orientation is the differentiated types of threat as China rises. This ranges across the entire security continuum from normalcy to risk to existential threat, rather than uncomplicated one- off snapshots of the spectrum. 87 I therefore use macrosecuritisation to overcome these challenges of scale. Macrosecuritisation is “defined by the same rules that apply to other securitisations”; the “key difference is that they are on a larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle levels (states, nations) and seek to package together securitisations from that level into a ‘higher’ and larger order”.88 Macrosecuritisation “imposes a hierarchy on the lower levels of securitization incorporated within it, and/or bundles other securitizations together”. 89 This makes the structure of macrosecuritisation more complicated than the lower level “ordinary” ones. It embodies “permanent tensions across the levels, and are vulnerable to breakdowns not just by desecuritisation of the macro-level threat . . . but also by the middle level securitisations becoming disaffected with, or pulling away from, subordination to the higher level one”. Successfully managing a macrosecuritisation “requires permanent sensitivity to the fact that the local securitisations contained within it have the option to defect if contradictions seem to undermine their linkage to the higher level”.90 Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation theory applies in the securitisation of higher level referent objects that structure lower level

87 For instance, Kai Schulze, "Japan’s New Assertiveness: Institutional Change and Japan’s Securitization of China," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 18:2 (2018), pp. 221-247, grappled with the range of threats in securitisation theory. 88 Buzan and Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation," p. 257, emphasis added. 89 Lise Storm, "The Persistence of Authoritarianism as a Source of Radicalization in North Africa," International Affairs, 85:5 (2009), fn 1. 90 Buzan and Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation," pp. 257-258.

securitisations around and within it. It also consists of the six elements of “normal” securitisation, albeit at a larger, macro-scale. Buzan and Wæver highlight the macrosecuritisations during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror post-9/11, such as that of the communists by the West and that of the capitalist West by the communists, as prime examples of macrosecuritisation.91 Since Buzan and Wæver introduced macrosecuritisation, there have been very few works utilising or developing the concept further. To begin with, Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation is suitable for analysing the scale of the security dynamics contained within the Asia-Pacific supercomplex, particularly the security penetration by the global powers of China and the US. I expand and further develop macrosecuritisation theory in order to overcome these scale challenges to address my research questions, determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. Macrosecuritisation theory in the Copenhagen School tradition also naturally suffers from the same criticisms and debates as classical securitisation such that a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory would need to take these into account. Thus, I start by modifying the neo-securitisation framework identified above for scale. In my post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation, a macrosecuritising actor makes a macrosecuritising move that is conceived as comprising a speech act – with its grammatical structure of a claim, warning and demand – coupled to a security practice. Both elements of the move, the speech act and the security practice, are also grounded by the propositional content. In line with the third critical key debate, speech acts can highlight dangers across the security continuum, including risk, rather than only clear and present existential threats. Multiple and differentiated referent objects from all five of the Copenhagen School’s sectors at the higher international level can also be invoked simultaneously in the various speech acts.92 In addition, the security practices can be exceptional, routine or preventive, in line with the second practical key debate. This verifies that the speech act is not just rhetoric, but intended as part of a macrosecuritising move, with concrete responses to follow. If there is only a speech act but no security practice, or vice versa, the issue would not be macrosecuritised. Moreover, due to the scale of macrosecuritisation and the anarchic nature of international politics, a macro-scaled referent object involves audiences that are independent and sovereign states. Therefore, for macrosecuritisation to be successful, the targeted audience state needs to accept

91 Ibid., pp. 269-274. Not to be confused with the Cold War and GWoT themselves as “security constellations”, which are macro-macrosecuritisations in a network extending across an RSC. 92 For the securitisation of multiple referents, see Vaughn, "The Unlikely Securitizer," pp. 263-285.

the macrosecuritising move, in keeping with the first contextual key debate. Such acceptance includes both identifying with the speech act, as well as mobilising in support of the security practices. Subsequently, the difficulty is in ascertaining the specific audience of macrosecuritisation. For a domestic audience, Salter, using a “dramaturgical analysis”, underscores four distinct settings: popular, elite, technocratic and scientific.93 However, at the macro-scaled referent object of the international to which macrosecuritisation applies, the audience is solely the policymaking elites of the audience state for two reasons. First, the macrosecuritising actor cannot directly control the policies of other sovereign states. It requires the audience states’ elites to identify with the security narrative present in its speech act and mobilise that state’s resources in response to support its security practices introduced. Second, before the elites of the audience states can do so, these elites need to consider the lower level securitisations or countersecuritisations with regard to their own domestic audiences to determine if they can structure and subsume these lower securitisations under the higher macrosecuritisation. At the level of macrosecuritisation, the aim is to convince the elite audience of the targeted state, whom would subsequently organise their own domestic audiences through their own lower level, “normal” securitisations. Figure 3.3 below depicts a successful macrosecuritisation:

Figure 3.3: A Post-Copenhagen Macrosecuritisation Theory

Macrosecuritising Move (Speech Act + Security Practice) Successful + Macrosecuritisation = Elite (Audience State) Support (Identification and Mobilisation)

If the elites of the audience state only identify with the speech act, but do not mobilise for the security practices, then macrosecuritisation is only partially successful. This also applies vice versa, if there is only mobilisation but not identification, though mobilisation alone is more difficult to establish without accompanying speech acts. Such a post-Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation theory addresses my research questions more appropriately due to its macro-scale. It is better able to concurrently encompass:

93 Mark B. Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Safety Authority," Journal of International Relations and Development, 11:4 (2008), pp. 321-349.

(1) more than one referent object from different sectors at the international level, including any changes to these; (2) different-scaled dangers ranging from present existential threats to those of risk – of anticipating threats developing in the future – and the consequent responses required; and (3) the effects on statist elite audiences at the international level, including an account of their lower level securitisations or countersecuritisations domestically within the state. In summary, Table 3.2 below compares classical securitisation, Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation, and the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory developed in this section:

Table 3.2: Comparing Securitisation and Macrosecuritisation Post-Copenhagen Components Securitisation Macrosecuritisation Macrosecuritisation Constructed; Constructed; Present; Reflexive; Existential Threat Present International Existential/Risk All Sectors; All Sectors and Change; Referent Object Sectors International International Speech Act Illocutionary Illocutionary Perlocutionary States; International States; International Securitising Actor State-centric Organisations Organisations Audience Undefined Undefined State elites Exceptional; Emergency; Exceptional; Exceptional; Security Practices Routine; Everyday Emergency Emergency practice; Prevention Source: Compiled by author.

In such scaling, macrosecuritisation theory may, in parts, be similar to the “politics of scale” approach by Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones.94 However, they are mainly concerned with the contestation of scales, especially in how the governance of non-traditional threats are (re)scaled, at the domestic, regional or global levels. My focus is on the macro-scale, in relation to determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. The next section designs a methodology to operationalise and employ my post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory to my research questions.

94 Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, "The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security," International Studies Quarterly, 57:3 (2013), pp. 462-473; Governing Borderless Threats.

Methods, Design, Metrics

As noted in this chapter’s introduction, the goal of macrosecuritisation theorising here is not developing or testing predictive, falsifiable theory via the scientific method. Rather, it is to build a macrosecuritisation theory that models the world, serving as an analytical tool for explaining social phenomena. In this sense, the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory developed in this chapter can be seen as a Weberian “ideal-type”, a mental construct that emphasises common traits in discrete phenomena. 95 I consequently apply this macrosecuritisation theory as a tool to investigate my research questions. In designing a methodology for this application, I use the assertive turn in China’s foreign policy post-2008 Global Financial Crisis as a turning point to see if there were changes in the US representations of China’s rise as a security concern upon such assertiveness rather than genealogically trace how the US government had specified the “Blue Dread” from the beginning of China’s rise. I hence choose 2006 to 2016 as the time frame for my research. Such a use of China’s assertive turn within this time period further allows for a comparison of two completed US presidencies: those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The former is generally seen as more critical of China than the latter, under which the bulk of China’s purported assertiveness took place, providing for a clear contrast.96 This research project is broadly divided into two parts. First, rather than treat the “Blue Dread China Threat Theory” as a given like the rationalist, structuralist, culturalist and poststructural traditions identified in Chapter 2, I instead disregard this general CTT within the media, academia and punditry. In contrast, my research considers specifically US governmental discourse with regard to China’s rise. I therefore analyse official US texts to determine if there have been empirical speech acts on China’s rise and how these have been discursively constructed. I then examine US security practices in light of such representations to determine if a full macrosecuritising move has taken place. Second, I study the effects of these upon the audience to determine if macrosecuritisation has succeeded.

95 For “ideal-types”, see Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Translated and Edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, With a Foreword by Edward A. Shils, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949). For securitisation as an ideal-type, see Thierry Balzacq, "The ‘Essence’ of Securitization: Theory, Ideal Type, and a Sociological Science of Security," International Relations, 29:1 (2015), pp. 103-113. 96 See the fluctuations in Sino-US relations in Xuetong Yan, "The Instability of China-US Relations," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3:3 (2010), p. 270.

The method of discourse analysis, examining how meanings are framed and produced,97 is naturally applied in the first phase. As the Copenhagen School puts it: “The way to study securitization is to study discourse”.98 However, “‘discourse analysis’ has come to be used with a wide range of meanings” in various disciplines.99 Kevin Dunn and Iver Neumann distinguish two main variants of it within the social sciences, differentiated by their ontological and epistemological assumptions. 100 The first is critical discourse analysis, which “sets up a dialectical relationship between discourse and society, contending that both are conditioned by each other”.101 The other is associated with poststructuralism, which assumes the primacy of discourse over ontological reality since it is only through discourse that meaning is produced, and epistemological knowledge therefore understood. 102 On the other hand, the discourse analysis of securitisation studies does not quite fall into either of these two moulds. Stritzel rightly identifies securitisation scholars as “rather distinct among discourse scholars” as “they study discourse in relation to and on the basis of a particular assumed grammar of security marked by ‘a specific rhetorical structure’” (claim, warning, demand, and propositional content).103 My focus is on the construction of security within US official discourse per se. In examining US speech acts using discourse analysis, I first select US official national security texts by the government. These include the 2006, 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS); the 2006, 2010, and 2014 “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR); the (unclassified) “Annual Threat Assessment” (ATA) by the US Director of National Intelligence; the annual reports by the US Department of Defense (DOD) on China’s military and security developments, as well as the annual reports by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency team chaired by the US Secretary of the Treasury (see Annex A for a full list).104 These are the primary documents that reflect official US government thinking on matters of national security. In choosing these texts, I fully recognise that written communications may not be the only means of a speech act. Nevertheless, I focus upon these

97 Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," European Journal of International Relations, 5:2 (1999), pp. 225-254. 98 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, p. 25. 99 Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. viii. 100 Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), pp. 34-41. 101 Benjamin Banta, "Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism," European Journal of International Relations, 19:2 (2012), p. 392. 102 See for instance, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Second ed., (London: Verso, 2001). 103 Stritzel, Security in Translation, p. 48. 104 Unlike, for instance, the annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which is a legislative congressional commission and not by the executive administration.

for functional reasons of measurement, as opposed to images, or indeed, silence. Furthermore, such documents are related and reinforced through intertextuality – transposing ideas and meaning from one text to another,105 for instance, between the NSS and the QDR – giving more weight to the empirical data. I then study these texts to determine what they made of China and its rise. I identify both dominant and alternative US discourses of China, especially in relation to China’s rise as a security concern (see Chapters 4 and 5).106 I subsequently focus on the multiple speech acts present within the selected texts, and use linguistic textual analysis to determine their claims, warnings, demands and propositional content. In doing so, I further differentiate between: (1) the character of the macro-scaled referent object – military, political, environmental, economic, or social; and (2) the scale of the threat over the security continuum, and categorise these speech acts accordingly. For instance, I make distinctions between the rules-based order and the economic order – the former belongs to the political sector whereas the latter to the economic sector – as well as how the US has characterised its security concerns, whether phrased as a potential risk or current threat (see Chapter 5). This enables me to isolate and deconstruct the different elements of the overarching “Blue Dread” discourse in the literature (see Chapter 2) present in the US security depictions of China’s rise in these official texts (see Table 5.1). In investigating US security practices, preventive, routine or exceptional, as part of the macrosecuritising move with reference to the speech act, I first make certain distinctions. In this regard, practices are distinguished from actions, which are purposeful; and behaviour, which is a meaningless action. Practices are understood as “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training”.107 For example, running in a field is meaningless behaviour whereas running in a field to kill someone else is an action. Running in a field as part of an infantry squad to kill the enemy in a battle, however, is a practice. Practices can be seen as meta-actions. Furthermore, I do not suggest that practices are completely divorced from discourse. As Vincent Pouliot underscores, “the Copenhagen School asserts that security is practice; but

105 Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez, edited by Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), chapter 4. 106 Following Amir Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence: Emotions, Identity, and American and Israeli Wars of Resolve, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 14-15. 107 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices: Introduction and Framework," in International Practices, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6.

in restricting its focus to traditional discourse analysis, it evacuates the practical logics that make the securitizing discourse possible”.108 Rather, I reiterate that practices go hand in hand with the speech act in the (macro)securitising process. The importance of practices in this dissertation echoes Neumann’s clarion call to return practice to the “linguistic turn” since the “analysis of discourse understood as the study of the preconditions for social action must include the analysis of practice understood as the study of social action itself”.109 Some scholars identify a “practice turn” in social theory too, following the aforementioned “linguistic turn”.110 Salter and Can Mutlu, informed by the second key debate of securitisation theory, even see “a methodological reconciliation” between the practice-oriented Paris School and the speech act- focused Copenhagen School variants of securitisation theory.111 Consequently, I examine how US security practices also reflect its security concerns with China’s rise on top of its textual representations (see Chapter 5). To begin with, I map and group these practices to the appropriate US speech acts to determine whether or not the US made an actual and complete macrosecuritising move against China’s rise as a security concern in the first place. I similarly differentiate between the different security practices targeted at different aspects of US security concerns with China’s rise. Moreover, studying practices enables approaches other than the discourse analysis of official texts.112 I also analyse the roles of agents and practitioners involved in the security practices through other texts such as their speeches, memoirs or autobiographies. A necessary caveat to emphasise here is that the goal of this study is not to theorise practices in social theory.113 Rather, the purpose of exploring security practices in this way is twofold: to understand how these practices relate to macrosecuritisation via the signifiers of meaning such practices illustrate; as well as how these practices relate to the security practitioners themselves as subjects of said practices.114 After the first phase of probing US speech acts and practices to determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, the second phase of this research project determines whether such macrosecuritisation has succeeded in

108 Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities," International Organization, 62:2 (2008), p. 265. 109 Iver B. Neumann, "Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy," Millennium, 31:3 (2002), pp. 627-628. 110 For instance, Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, eds., The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, (London: Routledge, 2001). 111 Salter and Mutlu, "Securitisation and Diego Garcia," pp. 819 and 833. 112 Following Floyd, Security and the Environment, p. 60. 113 As did Michael C Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007). 114 Following Raymond D. Duvall and Arjun Chowdhury, "Practices of Theory," in International Practices, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 351-353.

the relevant audiences. Towards this goal, rather than the entire Asia-Pacific set of cases, which would be impractical, I limit the research to case studies of two Southeast Asian states, Indonesia and Singapore.115 The support of these two states is essential for any US security portrayal of a rising China in the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia is widely acknowledged as the natural leader in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Southeast Asia. 116 Singapore’s valuable geostrategic position at the bottleneck of the Straits of Malacca, combined with its considerable military might, arguably the strongest of Southeast Asian states,117 makes it an ideal foil for any US policy aimed against a rising China. These non-aligned states are thus the key audiences to persuade, unlike the already aligned, traditional allies of the US in East Asia; the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Japan (see Chapter 4). Additionally, Southeast Asian cases can be considered “hard” cases for three reasons (see also Chapter 1). First, the region is very sensitive about matters relating to external interference. This anxiety is encapsulated in ASEAN’s driving norm of “non-interference” and enshrined in its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).118 Second, Southeast Asia comprises an RSC separate from that of East Asia, which conceivably makes China less of a direct threat due to distance. Simultaneously, Southeast Asia remains within a China-centric Asian supercomplex, such that any Chinese security developments would affect Southeast Asia.119 Third, global power rivalry between China and the US is centred largely upon the Asia-Pacific, with Southeast Asia contested between them. Following these logics, Indonesia and Singapore are even “harder” cases as they are not in direct contention with China over sovereign territory (unlike Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the Spratlys); they do not border China (unlike Laos and Myanmar); nor are they traditional allies of either China (Cambodia) or the US (Thailand), sporadic fluctuations notwithstanding. Accordingly, I supplement the first layer of official US national security texts with a second layer of texts selected based on their official US security representations towards Southeast Asian audiences. The texts of this second layer reproduce the representations within the first layer, including the speech acts, targeting them at the relevant audiences. 120 I

115 See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005). 116 See Seng Tan, "Herding Cats: The Role of Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13:2 (2013), pp. 233-265. 117 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, (St Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 249. 118 On “non-intervention”, see Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, (London: Routledge, 2001), chapter 2. 119 Barry Buzan, "Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels," The Pacific Review, 16:2 (2003), pp. 143-173. 120 Following Vuori, "Speech Act Theory," pp. 133-137; Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 17.

systematically searched US archives such as those stored by the American Presidency Project, the US DOD and the US Department of State to select these texts. They include relevant White House documents and speeches by the US President and other key officials delivered to Southeast Asia (see Annex C), in particular, Indonesia and Singapore, relating to China and security. Such speeches were typically made at Asia-Pacific security fora under the ambit of ASEAN and involving the US, including: (1) the annual East Asia Summit (EAS), to which the US sent then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010 before joining formally in 2011; (2) the annual ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting from 2009, and its successor since 2013, the ASEAN-US Summit; and (3) the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting (ADMM)-Plus inaugurated in 2010, originally triennial and then biennial, with meetings in 2013 and 2015. These are also the more important Track 1 meetings between ASEAN states and the US,121 and conveniently were initiated around the time of China’s assertive turn. These second layer texts also include bilateral summits between Indonesia or Singapore and the US (see Annexes D and F). Finally, another golden opportunity for any US communication is the annual Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) held in Singapore. The SLD is a Track 1.5 security forum organised by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, dubbed “Asia’s premier defence summit”,122 and well attended by defence ministers from the Asia-Pacific. Analysing speeches from the SLD from 2006 (see Annex B) enables me to identify changes or continuity throughout this dissertation’s timeframe. Likewise, for US security practices, I focus on those targeted towards the Southeast Asian region, such as the US “Pivot to Asia”. I subsequently investigate audience support in terms of identification with the threat underscored in the US speech acts, and mobilisation in the backing of US security practices. The former is based on the elite representations of the audience state (what they say), and the latter upon the policies of the audience state enacted by the state elites (what they do). Naturally, what they say and what they do is influenced by the context; with reference to their own interests and their relationships with both the US and with China. As to what the elites of the audience state say, I similarly select texts based on their reflections of official elite thinking on matters of national security affecting said state. These include: (1) official speeches as well as other policy documents from bilateral summits between

121 In contrast to the ASEAN Regional Forum, set up in 1994, which is increasingly unwieldy and irrelevant; see See Seng Tan, "A Tale of Two Institutions: The ARF, ADMM-Plus and Security Regionalism in the Asia Pacific," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 39:2 (2017), pp. 259-264. 122 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "About the Shangri-La Dialogue," accessed 21 December 2017, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/about-s-shangri-la-s-dialogue; see also David Capie and Brendan Taylor, "The Shangri-La Dialogue and the Institutionalization of Defence Diplomacy in Asia," The Pacific Review, 23:3 (2010), pp. 359-376.

the Indonesia or Singapore head of government and the US President; (2) key foreign policy and security speeches made at important Asia-Pacific fora by the Indonesia and Singapore leaders; and (3) relevant speeches and documents directed towards the respective domestic audiences of Indonesia and Singapore, including the equivalent of their national security strategy (see Annexes D, E F and G; also Chapters 6 and 7). I also apply the method of discourse analysis as outlined above with regard to US texts to these; identifying the broad contours of meaning concerning China’s rise as a security issue, especially in relation to the US’s portrayal of such, as well as how they specifically identified with the US speech acts. In determining the extent to which audience identification has taken place, short of direct causal evidence which would be very difficult to obtain, repetition of US speech acts by audience state elites is strongly indicative of the audience state having identified with the threat.123 With regard to audience mobilisation, I assess what the audience state does in terms of its security practices, particularly those resulting from the selected audience state’s texts, to establish if there is acceptance and concrete support for the US security practices, or if there is pushback. A mirroring of US security practices by the audience state is a strong indicator of mobilisation in said state, albeit somewhat indirectly. Likewise, these practices will additionally be explored by other means, such as a close reading of practitioners’ memoirs. In so doing, a note of caution to again highlight here is that I am not evaluating audience support using a neopositivist causation approach. Given the acute sensitivities entangled in questions of foreign interference in domestic politics in Southeast Asia, I expect that it would be extremely challenging to use elite interviews to get direct and first-hand confirmation of audience state elite support of US security representations of China’s rise. This is especially so over the extremely delicate issue of Sino-American rivalry in the region. However, though I cannot categorically establish that such US representations caused particular effects in the relevant audience states in such a manner, this is not to say that I cannot demonstrate that such US representations of China’s rise affected how these audience states treat China’s rise. Hence, I have designed my method to investigate what the audience state elites say and do at the public level, to draw together the connections between the US representations of China’s rise and the audience states’ responses to these representations. I then assess audience support based on “a sequence of events, conditions and processes leading from the explanans to the explanandum”

123 See Ido Oren and Ty Solomon, "WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through Ritualised Incantation of Ambiguous Phrases," Review of International Studies, 41:2 (2015), pp. 313-336.

instead.124 In this manner, I can still develop a plausible and ultimately compelling account of US influence in the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore by assessing whether these states reaffirmed or repeated US representations in their own depictions of China, and supported or mirrored US practices in a manner consistent with such pronouncements. Ultimately, successful macrosecuritisation can be regarded as the formation, between the macrosecuritising state and the audience state, of what Etienne Wenger calls a “community of practice”. This features: “a domain of knowledge, which defines a set of issues; a community of people who care about this domain; and the shared practice that they are developing to be effective in their domain”.125 This dissertation determines if such a “community of practice” exists between the US, and Indonesia and Singapore, in relation to a rising China.

Conclusion: Post-Copenhagen Macrosecuritisation

In determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, the dominant approach of Copenhagen School securitisation theory focusing on how security is discursively constructed is inadequate by itself. This classical securitisation theory has been subjected to normative, sociological and methodological critiques. Furthermore, these criticisms have triggered wider debates: (1) the second-generation securitisation scholars and their contextual securitisation; (2) the Paris School-inspired practice-oriented securitisation, and (3) a more reflexive and critical securitisation theory. These debates have highlighted useful elements that would help to address my research questions. I integrate these into a revised form of neo- securitisation. This neo-securitisation includes practices as part of any securitising move, explicitly incorporates audience acceptance in evaluating the success of securitisation, and adopts a reflexive notion of security that encompasses risk. However, such neo-securitisation is still insufficient in accounting for the scale of my research questions. The scale of the “Blue Dread” of a rising China comprises the military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors within the international arena made up of sovereign states, and involves differentiated types of threat ranging across the entire security continuum.

124 Daniel Little, cited in Olivier Schmitt, "More Allies, Weaker Missions? How Junior Partners Contribute to Multinational Military Operations," Contemporary Security Policy, 40:1 (2019), p. 75. 125 Etienne Wenger, Richard McDermott, and William M. Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Making Knowledge, (Boston, Masachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), p. 27, emphasis removed; cf. “epistemic communities” as knowledge-based networks, see Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, 46:1 (WInter 1992), p. 3.

I therefore theorise a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation that is a more appropriate framework to examine my research questions. This post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory consists of macrosecuritising speech acts and practices, whilst its success is judged upon acceptance by the state’s elites of the targeted international audience. Its advantage is in its scale; concurrently incorporating different higher level referent objects and any changes in these, both threats and risks, as well as the reactions of the elites of the targeted international states. There are thus two phases for my study. The first is in scrutinising security representations of China by the US. I apply discourse analysis upon selected US official texts and examine its security practices linked to its speech acts to determine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security. The second is through investigating what the elites of the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore say and do, in context, in terms of whether they have accepted such US representations. This establishes the extent to which the US representation has succeeded in the relevant audiences. In undertaking this study, it is not my intention for my research to be situated within the confines of a tradition of International Relations scholarship, with all its implied baggage, nor to participate in debates over neopositivist or postpositivist methodologies. Rather, my work in this thesis is meant to be placed squarely within securitisation theory, whilst also adding to studies of China’s rise and Asia-Pacific security. My dissertation contributes theoretically to securitisation by developing a framework of post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation, based on neo-securitisation, for use when dealing with referent objects above that of the nation-state and its constituents, thus also plugging the current academic gap in the underutilisation of macrosecuritisation theory. Finally, in analysing how the US has macrosecuritised a rising China, the aim of this dissertation is not to sensationalise the “Blue Dread”. On the contrary, my objective is to empirically examine the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security. This clarifies the “Blue Dread China Threat Theory” from the US government perspective such that its implications can be praxeologically considered pursuant to the US-China relationship, with a view towards the desecuritising of any macrosecuritisation, despite the normative “Huysmans dilemma” of writing security.126 This is especially crucial for the relevant international audiences which might be forced into taking sides in the event of Sino-American conflict. I begin the empirical examination of my research questions in the next chapter by first setting out the context of the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific in relation to the role of the US.

126 See also Philippe Bourbeau and Juha A. Vuori, "Security, Resilience and Desecuritization: Multidirectional Moves and Dynamics," Critical Studies on Security, 3:3 (2015), pp. 253-268.

4. The Asia-Pacific Security Architecture of the US

Introduction: The Pacific US

Barack Obama’s first trip to the Asia-Pacific as the President of the United States was to Japan. In Tokyo, he emphasised that the US begun “along the Atlantic Ocean”, but it has “also been a nation of the Pacific”. The US and Asia were “bound” by the Pacific Ocean rather than “separated” by it.1 There were five broad periods in the enduring US security agenda and engagement within the Asia-Pacific. The first was the colonial era administering the Philippines, ending with the US’s instrumental role in the Pacific front of World War II. The second period was the US containment of communism during the Cold War. Third, post-Cold War, the US promoted human rights, democracy and the “Washington Consensus” more actively. This stressed the US relationship with regional states in which these were sensitive issues, though cooperation increased in some areas.2 Fourth, after 9/11, the US sought the cooperation of regional states – its allies, and also China – in the Global War on Terror. Although the US declared Southeast Asia as the “Second Front” of the GWoT,3 its focus was predominantly on the “First Front” of the Middle East. Fifth, during the Obama Administration, the US consequently started a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific.4 This chapter explicates the security role of the US within the Asia-Pacific. It clarifies how the US fits into the wider security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, as well as how the US has then empirically represented China in this architecture in its official national security texts selected (see Chapter 3). Doing so provides the necessary context for determining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security in the next chapter. The rest of this chapter proceeds in three sections. The first illustrates the Asia-Pacific security architecture and the place of the US within it since the Cold War. Two models are commonly identified. One is the US-centric series of bilateral alliances, whilst the other is a

1 Barack Obama, "Remarks in Tokyo," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 14 November 2009, accessed 17 June 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86889. 2 Ann Marie Murphy, "United States Relations with Southeast Asia: The Legacy of Policy Changes," in Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia, ed. Ann Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 263-269; Robert G. Sutter, The United States in Asia, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), pp. 23-28. 3 Andrew T. H. Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: The United States' 'Second Front' in Southeast Asia, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 4 I use “Pivot” and “Rebalance” interchangeably.

multilateral network of institutions of which the US is simply a party, albeit an important one. The second section discusses how the US positioned China with regard to the security architecture relative to other Asia-Pacific states in its official representations from 2006-2016. Whereas the US located other rising powers like India and Vietnam in a “partners” tier just shy of the “allies” tier to which traditional affiliates such as Japan belong, China was instead placed in an “othered” tier. The third section further demonstrates the differences between China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region emphasised in official US representations, paying particular attention to China’s assertive turn. I identify a distinct change of tone from 2014, with the US explicitly criticising China in multilateral security fora like the Shangri-La Dialogue, whilst past criticism had been more implicit. This chapter concludes with a reiteration of the context required to investigate my research questions of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences.

Assembling the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture

In order to determine where China fits in US representations of the Asia-Pacific region in terms of security to set the context for the following chapters of this dissertation, I begin with an examination of the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture. In this regard, William Tow and Brendan Taylor underscore the looseness of the “security architecture” term. Following them, this thesis refers to “security architecture” as “an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region’s policy concerns and achieve its security objectives”. 5 Today, analysts typically identify two models of the Asia-Pacific security architecture: a US-centric nexus of bilateral alliances, and a network of multilateral security institutions. The former consists of the series of (mostly) bilateral alliances the US has with various Asia-Pacific states. These include Japan and the ROK in East Asia, the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. This model has come to be known as the “San Francisco System”, after the post-WWII peace treaty with Japan in that eponymous city.6 This realist “hub-and-spokes” collective defence system was essentially a product of the

5 William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, "What is Asian Security Architecture?" Review of International Studies, 36:1 (2010), p. 96, emphasis removed. 6 See Kent E. Calder, "Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective," The Pacific Review, 17:1 (2004), pp. 135-157.

US containment of the communist powers during the Cold War. Even today, the foreign policy elites of non-allied states characteristically believe that the US is a mostly “benign and stabilizing power”. This motivates “Southeast Asian support for a regional order in which the United States has exercised predominant power and is thus instrumental in sustaining American power in the region”.7 The difference between the collective defence arrangements to contain communism in Europe and the Asia-Pacific is noteworthy. In the West, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 and still persists. The US preference for a similar multilateral setup in the East failed to take off however, demonstrated by the short-lived Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation from 1954-1977. As John Duffield convincingly shows, despite the parallels between the two areas, such as post-war rebuilding and the need for containment, there were also many differences, like capabilities, development levels, geography and enduring historical animosities. Whereas West Germany had pushed for resolutions with its European neighbours, Japan did not, concentrating only on its bilateral relationship with the US.8 Hence, whilst a multilateral security architecture prevailed in the West, this did not take root in the Asia-Pacific post-WWII. The latter Asia-Pacific security architecture model of a network of multilateral institutions only slowly emerged towards the end of the Cold War. 9 These multilateral institutions are primarily fora related to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum inaugurated in 1994, the 1997 ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, ROK) forum, the East Asia Summit starting from 2005, and the 2010 ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus. Some observers hence think of this Asia-Pacific multilateral network as premised upon “ASEAN centrality” – ASEAN leadership or connectivity, though there is no agreed definition of this amorphous concept.10 There are also other non-ASEAN multilateral organisations within the Asia-Pacific contributing to the multilateral network, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation formed in 2001 or the South Asian Association for

7 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), p. 2. 8 John S. Duffield, "Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 243-270; see also Mark Beeson, "Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of European Public Policy, 12:6 (2005), pp. 969-985. 9 See Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, eds., Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation, (Cambridge, Massahusetts: The MIT Press, 2007). 10 Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Understanding ASEAN's Centrality: Bases and Prospects in an Evolving Regional Architecture," The Pacific Review, 27:4 (2014), pp. 563-584.

Regional Cooperation started in 1985. None of these multilateral institutions are based on functionalism however, unlike the European Union, for example. Regardless, some scholars, and even the smaller states, see the multilateral network security architecture as crucial in engaging global powers like the US or China, whilst maintaining autonomy for the smaller states. Evelyn Goh calls this the “omni-enmeshment” of the great powers, such that they are deeply engaged and enveloped “in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships”, which “possibly” alters their identification and commitment towards the Asia-Pacific.11 These multilateral institutions therefore “reflect primarily realist approaches to regional security supplemented by liberal and constructivist features”. 12 Analysts typically regard the multilateral network model as more acceptant of China’s rise, with its liberal and constructivist aspects assuming that China can be socialised into becoming an invested stakeholder. The caveat is that such socialisation can be a two-way exchange, and the converse that China also wants to push its own views and goals upon these institutions and the wider region may also be true.13 In contrast, realists often see the San Francisco System, with the US at its core, as serving “a residual balancing rationale” to contain China, like during the Cold War.14 Whilst the US is involved in many of the multilateral institutions today, such as the ARF or the EAS, some have raised questions over whether the US actually treats these multilateral institutions seriously.15 Such questions became more commonplace amidst a stronger unilateral turn by the Bush Administration post-9/11. Obama had similarly emphasised the US bilateral relationships with Asia-Pacific allies, even if he participated more actively in multilateralism. 16 Some scholars also see the US bilateral alliances to be serving as a hedge against a potential multipolar order detrimental to the interests of the US and its allies.17 The San Francisco System hence remains “an integral component of Asia’s emerging regional architecture”, one

11 Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security, 32:3 (Winter 2007/08), p. 121. 12 Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, "Introduction," in Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, ed. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. x. 13 Alice D. Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," The Pacific Review, 19:2 (2006), pp. 157-179. 14 Victor D. Cha, "Informal Hierarchy in Asia: The Origins of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 17:1 (2017), p. 2. 15 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, "U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Limited Re-engagement after Years of Benign Neglect," Asian Survey, 47:4 (2007), p. 631. 16 Chris Good, "The Obama Doctrine: Multilateralism With Teeth," The Atlantic, 10 December 2009, accessed 14 September 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/12/the-obama-doctrine-multilateralism- with-teeth/31655/. 17 For instance, Jae Jeok Park, "The US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?" The Pacific Review, 24:2 (2011), p. 138.

which is like a “‘complex patchwork’ of bilaterals, trilaterals, and other plurilateral configurations”.18 The next section determines how the US has conceived of China in relation to the San Francisco System and the larger Asia-Pacific security architecture, pursuant to examining the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences in the rest of the dissertation.

Arranging China in an “Othered” Tier

From empirical US representations within the selected texts, I have found that that the US’s bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific could broadly be set on a three-tiered scale: allies, partners and China. Before proceeding, an important proviso is that I chose the “tier” noun specifically in place of “hierarchy”. This avoids the latter’s connotation of “international hierarchy” between dominant and subordinate states in the international system, which includes an element of the use of coercion and punishment to ensure that any “rules” set by the dominant state are followed.19 “Hierarchy” would not characterise the relationship between the US and China, nor does it describe the US’s relationships with the states in the other tiers. The first and closest tier of US bilateral ties in the Asia-Pacific comprised the states of the San Francisco System, the treaty allies of the US. These allied states, based on the premise of collective defence, were commonly described as fundamental to Asia-Pacific security in the official US texts. For instance, Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy referred to a “foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in the region” to build an “institutional framework”, including Japan, Australia, and the ROK.20 Obama’s 2010 NSS stated that: “Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region”.21 Likewise in the 2015 NSS: “Our alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific”.22 Any kind of “hierarchy” between these treaty allies and the US has been informal at best, since the US’s “creation of a discrete set of deep and intimate partnerships with each of its allies” has made the relationship legitimate and not based on coercion.23 For

18 Victor D. Cha, "Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia's Regional Architecture," Asia Policy, No. 11 (2011), pp. 28-29. 19 See David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 8-16. 20 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2006), p. 40. 21 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010), p. 42. 22 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2015), p. 7. 23 Cha, "Informal Hierarchy in Asia," p. 3.

example, with the 2016 reinterpretation of the “pacifist” Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to include “collective self-defence”, allowing Japan to aid the US as necessary, Japan’s then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated that the US-Japan alliance has become “stronger than ever”.24 The next tier featured the “partners” of the US, with a multifaceted bilateral relationship incorporating trade and security, amidst other issues. This was a broad and somewhat undefined tier, but the states often named included Malaysia and Singapore, stated by the US to be “vital partners in our efforts in the region – including through their membership” in the now-defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership.25 Indonesia was also frequently incorporated within this tier. For instance, in his 2013 SLD speech, then Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel highlighted that the US and Indonesia “are building new habits of cooperation that reflect a shared vision for a peaceful and prosperous region”.26 The 2006 NSS also stated that: “In promoting greater economic and political liberty, we will work closely with our allies and key friends, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand”.27 Given the history of the bilateral relationships between the US and these “key friends” states, it was unsurprising that the US counted them as partners. This dissertation is clearly not the place to expound on this history, though the successive case study chapters will briefly sketch the ties between the US and the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore. It suffices to note here that there are converging interests between these Southeast Asian states and the US.28 This does not imply that the relationship between such partners and the US is a hierarchical one. Rather, the US and these partners have often disagreed. For instance, observers highlight that the subdued regional responses to the GWoT was partly due to the US overemphasis on the military aspect of counterterrorism.29 There is no expectation that partner states are automatically aligned to US interests and policy.

24 Quoted in The Japan Times, "Suga Says Japan-US Alliance Stronger under Divisive 2016 Security Laws," The Japan Times, 29 March 2018, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/suga-says-japan-u-s-alliance- stronger-divisive-2016-security-laws/#.WsY0G2wd5dc. 25 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 16 November 2015, accessed 24 March 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=122908. 26 Chuck Hagel, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2013 First Plenary Session: The US Approach to Regional Security," International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2013, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri- la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d. 27 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 41. 28 See Hamilton-Hart, Hard Interests, Soft Illusions. 29 See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, "Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia's War on Terror," SAIS Review of International Affairs, 24:1 (2004), p. 91, emphasis removed.

Whilst it was unsurprising that the US included Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore in the “partners” tier, the US incorporation of India and Vietnam into this tier was unexpected owing to the adverse history between them and the US. For example, then Defence Secretary Ashton Carter emphasised during the 2015 SLD that: “Beyond alliances, the United States is also deepening its partnerships with friends across the region, including India and Vietnam”.30 The Indo-US bilateral relationship “was historically characterized more by suspicion and resentment than by cooperation”, especially during the Cold War, though this had changed dramatically by the Bush (Jr) Administration.31 In a study of the 1971 Bangladesh War, Jarrod Hayes even demonstrates how Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted the securitisation of India by linking it to the communist USSR, although India was a democracy like the US. The reason for this was because they perceived India as detrimental to US interests and the overall containment policy.32 Conversely, by 2006, there had been a drastic about-turn, and Bush’s NSS stated unequivocally:

India is a great democracy, and our shared values are the foundations of our good relations . . . We have made great strides in transforming America’s relationship with India, a major power that shares our commitment to freedom, democracy, and rule of law . . . India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.33

By the same token, the 2015 NSS also emphasised of India: “As the world’s largest democracies, we share inherent values and mutual interests that form the cornerstone of our cooperation, particularly in the areas of security, energy, and the environment”.34 The US inclusion of Vietnam in this “partners” tier was arguably even more remarkable due to the historical acrimony between the two former enemies of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, by 2015, the twentieth year of US-Vietnam normalisation of ties, the White

30 Ashton Carter, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 First Plenary Session: The United States and Challenges of Asia- Pacific Security," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary1-976e/carter- 7fa0. 31 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapproachment and Prospects for the Future," Asian Survey, 47:4 (2007), p. 643. 32 Jarrod Hayes, "Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind," International Organization, 66:1 (2012), pp. 63-93. 33 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 39. 34 Obama, NSS 2015, pp. 24-25.

House noted that the “long-term comprehensive relationship with Vietnam” was reinforced “through deeper trade and investment links, including membership in the TPP, and expanding cooperation in areas such as education, health, the environment, and defense engagement, including maritime security”. 35 In the same vein, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted that beyond the “centerpiece” of the first tier of allied treaty states, the US was “also deepening” its “defense relationships with key partners in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam” in order to “address growing regional challenges”.36 The US explicitly linked its newer partners, Vietnam and India, to the more traditional partners of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, within this second tier. Within US representations, China sat alone in a third tier. The US reflected these three tiers most succinctly in the 2015 “Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” factsheet by the Obama Administration:

Since launching the Rebalance, we have made significant progress in advancing this vision. Among a number of accomplishments, we have: • Strengthened our treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines, while maintaining our long-standing alliance with Thailand. We have enhanced our defense posture in the region and prioritized Asia for our most advanced military capabilities . . . • Deepened partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and India, and strengthened our unofficial relationship with the people of Taiwan; • Fostered a more durable and productive relationship with China, defined by expanded areas of practical cooperation on global challenges, and constructive management of differences.37

As the above demonstrates, the US has positioned China in a separate tier. Though China’s sheer size played a part in this positioning, what was evident within US representations was that the US stressed differences in this tier. Conversely, the US romanticised its relationships

35 Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance". For US-Vietnam relations since normalisation, see for instance, Frederick Z. Brown, "Rapprochement between Vietnam and the United States," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32:3 (2010), pp. 317-342. 36 U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (2014), pp. 16-17. 37 Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance"; emphasis added.

and smoothed over differences with states in the other tiers, even as such challenges must surely exist since the relationships were not hierarchical. In the 2006 NSS, for example, whilst close bilateral relationships with US allies and partners were crucial in “promoting greater economic and political liberty”, the dissimilarities between China and these other bilateral relationships were clearly spelt out.38 Thus, the three tiers were not a series of concentric circles centred upon the US. Whilst the “allies” and “partners” tiers suggested overall friendly alignment with the US, albeit with different degrees of “closeness”, the China tier was an independent sphere in opposition to the states the US held as allies and partners, giving weight to the idea that the San Francisco System served to balance against China. Furthermore, this US positioning of China did not just underscore the differences between it and the US. The US additionally juxtaposed China against other states in the first two tiers, especially India, since India was also touted as a rising great power.39 Even though some analysts warn that Chinese and Indian practices are not all that different,40 the US often cast India in a positive light, as opposed to China. For instance, in his 2009 SLD speech, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said of India: “In coming years, we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond” since there is a “genuine convergence of national interests”. He then went on to contrast this against China: “It is essential for the United States and China to find opportunities to cooperate wherever possible”, especially in “maintaining a defense relationship marked by consistent and open channels of communication and contact”, and the US “for its part, will remain committed to this goal”.41 The 2015 NSS similarly stated that the US was “primed to unlock the potential of our relationship with India”, right before emphasising that the “scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China’s military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes”.42 Rather than contributing to security like India, the US implied that China added to insecurity. As democracies, it was only logical that the US and India identified more closely with each other. Yet, the US has explicitly linked even Vietnam, with its authoritarian regime scoring the maximum “least free” political rights

38 Bush, NSS 2006, pp. 40-42. 39 For example, Rajesh Basrur, "Global Quest and Regional Reversal: Rising India and South Asia," International Studies, 47:2-4 (2010), pp. 267-284. 40 George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 2-17. 41 Robert Gates, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2009 First Plenary Session: America's Security Role in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2009, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri- la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2009-99ea/first-plenary-session-5080/dr-robert-gates-6609, emphasis added. 42 Obama, NSS 2015.

rating in Freedom House’s 2018 review, to India, with both in alignment with the US. Instead, the US has generally “othered” China, which has the same Freedom House rating as Vietnam.43 Nicholas Burns, then the Bush Administration’s Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, even suggests in a Foreign Affairs article that India, as “both a rising power and a democracy”, can help to ensure that China rises peacefully.44 If anything, the US mapped China more closely to Russia, the great “Other” of the Cold War, in its representations, although evidence for this was admittedly relatively sparser since Russia was not frequently mentioned in US discussions of the Asia-Pacific. Notably, then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gates linked Russia and China in their 2006 and 2007 SLDs speeches respectively, highlighting that the US had reservations about both states,45 before a barren few years in which mention of Russia was mostly absent. Such US concerns regarding Russia and China were also present in the “Annual Threat Assessment” and NSS documents. For example, the 2007 “Annual Threat Assessment” emphasised that “China and Russia’s foreign intelligence services are among the most aggressive” towards “sensitive and protected US targets”.46 The 2015 NSS, after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014, drew parallels between “Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity” endangering “international norms that have largely been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War”, to “tensions in the East and South China Seas”, which were “reminders of the risks of escalation”. This linked Russia to China, albeit in an indirect manner since the US did not explicitly name China as responsible for the escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas. The NSS even further linked the maritime tensions to “North Korean provocation”.47 The US has therefore “othered” China in a third tier distinct from the first two “allies” and “partners” tiers. Having placed China within the three tiers of Asia-Pacific states in US representations, the next section focuses on what exactly the US has said of China in the

43 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis," Freedom House, 2018, accessed 9 April 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 44 R. Nicholas Burns, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership," Foreign Affairs, 86:6 (November/December 2007), pp. 139-140. 45 Donald Rumsfeld, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2006 First Plenary Session: The United States and Asia's Emerging Security Architecture," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, accessed 6 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2006-f1a5/first-plenary-session- a3c0/donald-rumsfeld-300d; Robert Gates, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2007 First Plenary Session: The United States and Asia-Pacific Security," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, accessed 6 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-diaogue-2007-d1ee/first-plenary-session- d692/the-hon-robert-gates-75ee. 46 John D. Negroponte, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence," (2007), p. 2. 47 Obama, NSS 2015, p. 10.

selected texts to situate the subsequent US security representations of China’s rise in the next chapter.

Acclaiming and Denouncing China

Although the US has positioned China in a third, “othered” rather than “aligned” tier, it has also praised China often too (see Chapter 2). For instance, the 2006 NSS commended China for agreeing to work with the US in the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearisation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a point reiterated by Gates in his 2008 SLD speech as denuclearisation was “a policy not possible without China’s valued cooperation”.48 The 2010 NSS further pointed out that “China and India – the world’s two most populous nations – are becoming more engaged globally”; whilst the 2015 NSS lauded the “landmark agreement” between the US and China “to take significant action to reduce carbon pollution”.49 The US has also fairly consistently said that it “welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China”, even in the 2010 QDR.50 Such praise, however, has regularly been followed by caveats, making US praise for China tangential to the hegemonic US representation of criticising China rather. For example, though then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said at the 2012 SLD that the US “welcomes” China, he went on to emphasise that the US was “obviously paying close attention to the situation in Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea”. He further stressed that: “we call for restraint and for diplomatic resolution; we oppose provocation; we oppose coercion; and we oppose the use of force”, and these views have been made clear “to China and to other countries in the region”.51 In comparison, in the 2014 SLD, Hagel simply stated of India: “We welcome India’s increasingly active role in Asia’s regional institutions, which strengthens regional order. We also welcome India’s growing defense capabilities and its commitment to freedom of

48 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 21; Robert Gates, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2008 First Plenary Session: Challenges to Stability in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2008, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2008-2906/first-plenary-session- 1921/dr-robert-m-gates-bce8. 49 Obama, NSS 2010, p. 8; Obama, NSS 2015, p. 12. 50 U.S. Department of Defense, "QDR 2010," p. 60. 51 Leon Panetta, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2012 First Plenary Session: The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/first-plenary-session-2749/leon-panetta- d67b.

navigation in the Indian Ocean”.52 Likewise, in the US’s 2015 “Advancing the Rebalance” factsheet:

We welcome India's positive role in ensuring a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region . . . the United States welcomes the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in international affairs. Building a constructive relationship with Beijing that simultaneously supports expanding practical cooperation on global issues while candidly addressing differences between us is an important component of the Rebalance . . . At the same time, we are managing the real and complex differences between us – in areas such as cyber, market access, maritime security, and human rights – with candor and resolve. China cannot effectively wield influence while selectively opting out of international norms. These are issues of concern not only to the United States, but also to much of the region . . .53

Given these caveats about the unacceptable parts of China’s actions, many observers have often understood the US mantra of welcoming the rise of China with a liberal pinch of salt. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell call these “sugarcoated threats”, with the Chinese perceiving that “Washington wants cooperation on its own terms, seeks to deter Beijing from developing a military capability adequate to defend its interests, and intends to promote change in the character of the Chinese regime”.54 Although US criticisms of China were frequent, such censures were often more implied rather than made explicit in the selected US texts, perhaps reflecting the purported US “dilemma” towards China (see Chapter 2). The 2006 QDR, for instance, simply noted that “China continues to invest heavily in its military, particularly in its strategic arsenal and capabilities designed to improve its ability to project power beyond its borders”. The US hence “encourages China to take actions to make its intentions clear and clarify its military plans”.55 This suggested that China’s military buildup was worrisome instead of assigning nefarious intentions to it. Similarly, whilst Rumsfeld stated in his 2006 SLD speech that “there are aspects

52 Chuck Hagel, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 First Plenary Session: The United States' Contribution to Regional Stability," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb. 53 Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance". 54 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, "How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears," Foreign Affairs, 91:5 (2012), pp. 43-45, emphasis added. 55 U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," (2006), p. 29.

of China’s actions that can complicate their relationships with other nations”, such as “a lack of transparency with respect to their military investments” that “understandably causes concerns for some of their neighbours”, these concerns were not made explicit.56 Even as US perceptions of a more assertive China grew, especially with reference to its actions in the SCS post-Global Financial Crisis, there was no discernable shift in the implicit character of US criticisms of China. For instance, though observing that the SCS is “an area of growing concern” in his 2010 SLD speech, Gates still made no mention of China’s role in the dispute.57 Neither did he do so in his remarks at the 2010 ADMM-Plus meeting.58 Outside of these US official documents and speeches however, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, in her memoirs, a tense ARF meeting with China in July 2010, and in another EAS meeting in November 2012.59 However, there was a distinct change of tone in the 2014 SLD. Hagel manifestly criticised China: “China has called the South China Sea ‘a sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation’”, but “in recent months, China has undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims” in the SCS.60 Likewise, during the 2015 SLD, whilst acknowledging that other claimant states had “developed outposts over the years of differing scope and degree” in their disputed parts of the SCS, Carter called China out for having done so “much further and much faster than any other”. According to Carter, in the “last 18 months” China had reclaimed “over 2,000 acres, more than all other claimants combined, and more than in the entire history of the region”, increasing the tension in the SCS.61 Carter did so again in the 2015 ADMM- Plus, as well as the 2016 SLD, for example, warning China that “if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation”.62 This harsher tone was echoed in the 2015 NSS. Whereas the “Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations

56 Rumsfeld, "The United States and Asia's". 57 Robert Gates, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2010 First Plenary Session: Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2010-0a26/first-plenary-session- 722b/dr-robert-m-gates-5086. 58 Robert Gates, "Remarks by Secretary Gates at ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus," US Department of Defense, 2010, accessed 17 March 2018, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4700. 59 Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 78-80 and 113-115. 60 Hagel, "The United States' Contribution". 61 Carter, "The United States and Challenges". 62 Ashton Cater, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2016 First Plenary Session: Meeting Asia's Complex Security Challenges," International Institute for Strateigic Studies, 2016, accessed 9 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2016-4a4b/plenary1-ab09/carter- 1610; see also Ashton Carter, "Remarks at the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting - Plus (ADMM-Plus)," US Department of Defense, 2015, accessed 17 March 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech- View/Article/628351/remarks-at-the-asean-defense-ministers-meeting-plus-admm-plus/.

highlighted U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and other issues” in their NSS, “by 2015, the Obama cover letter to the report warned China against using its military might to intimidate others”.63 The rise in the number of hits in “government publications and documents” referring to “assertive” within three words of “China” in 2014, as shown in Figure 2.1, supplement my identification of this more severe tone in official US texts through discourse analysis. Compared to Alistair Iain Johnston’s study, which demonstrates an increase in the “new assertiveness meme” from “late 2009 and into 2010” in the “media, pundit, and academic communities”,64 US policy seems to have only substantively registered this assertiveness from 2014. Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013, further claims that Xi Jinping “amplified” China’s assertiveness after becoming president in 2013.65 China’s assertive turn was indicated by its actions and practices in the East and South China Seas, as Hagel pointed out in his 2014 SLD speech. These included: actions towards the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the Second Thomas Shoal in 2014, land reclamations at various locations in the Spratlys, moving “an oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands” in 2014, and “China’s unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone” in the East China Sea in 2013.66 The 2014 ATA also starkly noted that: “Within East Asia, Beijing seeks to fuel doubts about the sustainability of the US ‘rebalance’ and Washington’s willingness to support its allies and partners in the region”.67 Curiously however, the use of “assertive” in the annual reports to the US Congress on China’s military and security developments peaked in the 2011 report (nine times).68 In other years, “assertive” was only used a maximum of two times. The US added a new section on Chinese use of low- intensity coercion in maritime and territorial disputes to the 2015 report though,69 where it has remained in subsequent iterations. Does this indicate a shift in the US’s ostensive China “dilemma”? Given this harsher tone from 2014, in examining US security representations of

63 US-China Institute, "China in U.S. National Security Strategy Reports, 1987-2017," University of Southern California, 18 December 2017, accessed 12 April 2018, https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/china-in-us-national-security-strategy-reports-1987- 2017.pdf; see also Obama, NSS 2015. 64 Johnston, "How New and Assertive," p. 9. 65 Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, (New York: Twelve, 2016), p. 233. 66 Hagel, "The United States' Contribution". 67 James R. Clapper, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," (2014), pp. 21-22. 68 See U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011," (2011). 69 U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015," (2015), p. 3.

China’s rise in the selected texts from 2006 to 2016, I also compare such representations before and after 2014, on top of China’s assertive turn post-GFC (see Chapter 3).

Conclusion: The Dreaded China

Although the US has participated in Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions, it has continued to value its bilateral relationships in fortifying the region’s security. Moreover, within the US conceptualisation of the Asia-Pacific security architecture, China has been differentiated in an “othered” third tier, unlike its allies and partners. The US has also linked China to other states which it deemed to be contributing to insecurity. Hence, even as the US has welcomed China’s rise, it has not accepted China. The US has often criticised China, with Sino-US differences accentuated; rather than praised it with similarities extolled, like in the case of India’s rise. Such US criticism even grew more explicit from 2014. Before she became the second US Ambassador to ASEAN in 2014, Nina Hachigian used an analogy of a “dinner party” in a 2010 co-authored article in Survival. She made the point that although the US has invited China to the dinner party, it could not count on China to be a good host. Her co-author, Yuan Peng, rebutted that China has not been offered a proper seat at the table.70 In fact, China is not even seated at the same table. Though the US has invited China to the dinner party, it has placed China at the head of another table, seemingly in China’s honour, even as China is close enough to hear the snide remarks those at the actual head table were making of it. China is like the dreaded weird guest at the dinner party, invited not because the host wants to, but because it must. Having provided the context of the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture, and how the US has positioned China within its conceptualisation of it, the next chapter determines the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security using the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory developed earlier in Chapter 3.

70 See Nina Hachigian and Yuan Peng, "The US-China Expectations Gap: An Exchange," Survival, 52:4 (2010), pp. 67-86.

5. The US Security Representations of China’s Rise

Introduction: Dragon or Panda?

Two creatures are often associated with China. One is the giant panda, native only to the country. Some even refer to China’s political loan of pandas as “panda diplomacy”, a demonstration of Chinese soft power since pandas are taken to be cute and cuddly.1 The other creature is the dragon of Chinese mythology. This dragon is associated with the Chinese emperors, and is more snake-like and sinuous, with a mane but without wings, unlike Western dragons, though both types are typically portrayed as fearsome but majestic. Based on the propositional content of the US placing China in an “othered” tier within the Asia-Pacific region as shown previously in Chapter 4, this chapter examines the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security; whether the US has represented a rising China as a fearsome dragon or a meek panda. To this effect, I harness the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory developed in Chapter 3. To recap, this macrosecuritisation theory consists of macrosecuritising moves, in the form of speech acts backed up by security practices, that construct an issue as a security concern at the higher-scaled international level. This concern may also range across the security continuum, including risk, and over the five sectors identified by the Copenhagen School. The success of macrosecuritisation is thereafter judged at the level of the audience state; whether its elites support the move in terms of both identification with the speech act and mobilisation to back the security practices. This chapter focuses on the first part of this process, examining how the US has represented China’s rise in security terms, examining the first of my research questions. Whether these representations have succeeded in the relevant audiences, the second part of my questions, is the focus of the following two chapters. Through a close reading of both layers of the selected US official texts and a systematic examination of the grammar of the speech acts present within them, as well as an investigation of the security practices themselves (see Chapter 3), I have determined that the US has constructed China’s rise as a collective security risk across four sectors. These were the military, political, economic and environmental sectors; with the risk presented as affecting the higher- scaled referent objects of Asia-Pacific peace and stability, a rules-based order, a market-based

1 Jamil Anderlini, "How the Panda Became China’s Diplomatic Weapon of Choice," Financial Times, 3 November 2017. Even in the popular Kung Fu Panda film series, the titular character – a giant panda that is the warrior of legend – is portrayed as cute and lovable rather than as a fearsome fighter.

economic order, and the global climate respectively (see Table 5.1 at the end of this chapter for a simplified summary). However, within the societal sector, the US has only rhetorically presented China’s rise as a risk to the liberal order. Such rhetoric has failed to be backed up by actual, substantive practices. I also illustrate in this chapter that in contrast to a “dilemma”, the essence of US representations of China as a security concern has not changed functionally through the timeframe of this thesis, from 2006-2016, despite China’s assertive turn (see Chapter 2), or the more explicit US criticism of China from 2014 (see Chapter 4). In demonstrating these findings, this chapter is divided into six main sections. The first five sections deal with each of the Copenhagen School’s military, political, economic, environmental and societal sectors, in this order. Each section starts by underscoring how the US has generally presented China’s rise as a security issue in that sector. To clarify the terms of this US security construct, each section then provides examples of US speech acts of China’s rise as a security concern from the selected official US texts, outlining their claims, warnings, demands and propositional content. These texts include the National Security Strategy, the “Quadrennial Defense Review”, the “Annual Threat Assessment”, the annual reports regarding China’s military and security developments and those by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US to the US Congress, as well as other relevant official documents, such as speeches by the US President and other key officials, especially in key security fora such as the Shangri- La Dialogue (refer to Annexes A, B and C). These examples were typically picked from three periods: before China’s assertive turn, after said increased aggressiveness, and after 2014, when the US had criticised China more severely and explicitly. After examining these US linguistic representations, each section then further investigates how US practices have also constructed the rise of China as a security concern, similarly largely following the three periods identified. The sixth concluding section then summarises and discusses these findings.

Military Sector

Beginning with “traditional security”, the military sector, the US represented China’s growing military strength from its secretive military buildup as risking peace and stability in the Asia- Pacific region. This potential danger took three forms: (1) affecting military balances and creating greater insecurity, (2) a risk of a war in China’s quest for hegemony, and (3) the threat of the use of force against the US and the states within its ally and partner tiers. In boosting the

military capacities of its allies, US security practices aimed to counter and balance China’s increased military might, safeguarding stability. An early example of US speech acts from the selected texts examined in this regard was from the 2006 QDR, which put it in this manner:

Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States . . . U.S. policy seeks to encourage China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat and intimidation . . . China continues to invest heavily in its military . . . to improve its ability to project power beyond its borders . . . Secrecy, moreover, envelops most aspects of Chinese security affairs. The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization. The United States encourages China to take actions to make its intentions clear and clarify its military plans . . . The pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk . . . [the US] will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security . . . To dissuade major and emerging powers from developing capabilities that could threaten regional stability, to deter conflict, and to defeat aggression should deterrence fail . . . Based on the Department’s Global Defense Posture Review, the United States will continue to adapt its global posture to . . . mitigate anti-access threats and offset potential political coercion designed to limit U.S. access to any region.2

The US first implied that China was a “military competitor”. It further claimed that China’s extensive and rapid expansion of its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was being undertaken in a secretive manner. Moreover, even though all states were naturally reluctant to be fully transparent about their military capabilities, the US claim was that China was typically much more opaque about its military buildup and capabilities. The US was thus warning that there was a risk, rather than threat, to the referent object of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region stemming from China’s growing military strength, and demanded that China be more transparent about its military plans and buildup to minimise tensions and reduce

2 U.S. Department of Defense, "QDR 2006," pp. 29-30.

misperceptions. In the US speech act above, the propositional content was China’s military development and its traditional lack of transparency, such as in its reporting of military expenditures, which was notorious for not following international standards and suspected of being underreported.3 Moreover, the embedded background of China’s “othered” tier status (see Chapter 4), with the US seeing China as unacceptable in contrast to other rising powers like India, also meant that the fear of China’s rising military might was increased, worsening the classic security dilemma.4 Such US linguistic representations of a rising China in the military sector appeared frequently in the selected texts. For instance, the 2010 QDR indicated that the “lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond”.5 The 2015 NSS also stated that the US “will closely monitor China’s military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation”.6 As before, the claims implied were that China’s military buildup increased misunderstanding, with the warning that Asia-Pacific peace was at risk. This was also the case with the later SLD speeches that more explicitly censured China. In those texts, it was evident that the US was holding China responsible for rising tensions in the East and South China Seas. US claims of increasing Chinese militarisation in the dispute areas were followed by warnings of the risks to stability due to greater chances of miscalculation brought about by China’s increased militarisation. US demands subsequently varied from “an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants” in the SCS disputes, to the US encouraging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China to “conclude a Code of Conduct”.7 These would prevent miscalculations from spiraling into an inadvertent war.8 Nevertheless, even with the harsher rhetoric in blaming China, the substance of the US representations did not change. Warnings were of the risk of endangering future peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific with an intensifying military buildup, rather than something more pressing on the level of an imminent threat, existential or otherwise.

3 Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005). 4 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, "Racing towards Tragedy?: China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma," International Security, 39:2 (Fall 2014), p. 52. 5 U.S. Department of Defense, "QDR 2010," p. 60. 6 Obama, NSS 2015, p. 24. 7 Carter, "The United States and Challenges"; see also Hagel, "The United States' Contribution"; Carter, "Meeting Asia's Complex Security". 8 For instance, Robert D. Kaplan, Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, (New York: Random House, 2014), pp. 164-183.

US concerns with China as a potential military risk globally also manifested in the form of the annual reports to the US Congress on Chinese military and security developments, pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000. Even as the later reports emphasised increasing bilateral military-to-military ties and security cooperation with China, they also stressed China’s improving power projection and increased military capabilities to prepare for future “contingencies” in the East and South China Seas, warning of the risk to stability in the maritime regions.9 In addition, the reports, for instance, 2013’s, cautioned that “China’s increased reference in official government materials to the [SCS] nine- dash line is a source of concern to its neighbors and other nations because, at a minimum, it creates an impression that China . . . may also be claiming a special sovereign status of all the water and the sea-bed contained therein”.10 Such claims further warned of potential military conflict over the disputed SCS, jeopardising peace. These claims in reference to China’s role in the SCS were also linked to other claims in the political and economic sectors relating to order and prosperity, to be discussed in the following sections. Other experts likewise highlight the ambiguity of China’s nine-dash line.11 Another clear focus of these annual reports was Asia-Pacific security in relation to the Taiwan issue, assessing Chinese strategy and possible actions towards the island. In these, the US clarified that it was contributing “to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”, consistent with its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.12 Overall, Taiwan appeared as a security issue less frequently in the other texts examined. Besides the security risk, my analysis of US official texts to determine what they made of China and its rise in terms of security also yielded another interesting aspect of the US concern with China in the military sector. The US has portrayed China as a definite military cyber threat from as early as 2008. The attribution of cyberattacks is typically difficult and uncertain.13 Nonetheless, the cyberattacks listed in the 2008 annual report on Chinese military and security developments were alleged to “appear to have originated within the PRC”, for example. The report went on to state that even if “it is unclear if these intrusions were conducted

9 For instance, U.S. Department of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2015," p. i. 10 U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013," (2013), p. 4. 11 See Robert C. Beckman, "South China Sea: How China Could Clarify its Claims," RSIS Commentary, No. 116, (16 September 2010). 12 U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016," (2016), p. 91. 13 Lucas Kello, "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft," International Security, 38:2 (Fall 2013), p. 33.

by, or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC government, developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent with authoritative PLA writings on this subject”.14 Similarly, the 2011 “Annual Threat Assessment” determined a “Chinese Internet Service Provider” to have redirected routing paths of US government and military sites “through networks in China”, which “would have given the operators of the servers on those networks the ability to read, delete, or edit e-mail and other information sent along those paths”.15 The 2015 NSS also emphasised that the US “will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government”.16 However, the US mostly deliberated this military cyber threat from China in terms of the referent object of US national security. It did not depict this as an international threat in spite of such cyberattacks around the world, which were also noted in the annual reports to the US Congress.17 Hence, amongst other practices, the US set up its Cyber Command in 2009 to strengthen US cyber capabilities and defend against these cyber intrusions from China. On top of the US linguistic representations in its official texts referring to China’s rise in the military sector as a security risk to the Asia-Pacific, preventive US military practices also constructed and reflected this potential risk. Under Bush Jr.’s presidency, the US focused upon building bilateral capacities to safeguard against the risk of collective insecurity due to China’s unknown intentions in its continued military buildup. As the 2004 “Global Defense Posture Review” of the US Department of Defense highlighted, US strategy was to “expand allied roles, build new partnerships, and encourage transformation – both in allied military forces’ capabilities and in allies’ ability to assume broader global roles and responsibilities”.18 According to Evan Medeiros, these expanded allies and new partnerships were principally Japan and India, respectively.19 Of the former, the US-Japan alliance was strengthened with greater military and diplomatic cooperation. In a 2005 meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee

14 U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008," (2008), p. 4. 15 James R. Clapper, "Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Asessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," (2011), p. 26. 16 Obama, NSS 2015, p. 24. 17 For instance, U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the PRC 2008," p. 4; see also Jon R. Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction," International Security, 39:3 (Winter 2014/2015), pp. 7-47. 18 U.S. Department of Defense, "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture: Report to Congress," (2004), p. 9, emphasis removed. 19 Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia‐Pacific Stability," The Washington Quarterly, 29:1 (2005), pp. 150-152.

between then US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice and then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with their Japanese counterparts, the US-Japan alliance was “publicly linked to a set of common strategic objectives and operationally configured to advance these ends” for “the first time”. Subsequent meetings of the committee detailed these operational changes to improve the competencies of the alliance, regarding missile defence for example.20 The 2007 meeting of the committee also encouraged “China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions”.21 Similarly, the 2005 “New Framework for the India-U.S. Defense Relationship” took Indo-US military cooperation to unprecedented levels. This framework allowed the US and India to “collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest” and to “strengthen the capabilities” of the US and Indian militaries “to promote security and defeat terrorism”.22 As pointed out in Chapter 4, although India and China were both rising powers, the US juxtaposed India against China. Regarding international security, the US deemed India’s rise as beneficial, whereas China’s rise contributed to insecurity. Defence and security relations between the US and India grew to resemble an alliance. The two states conducted various joint military exercises. There was also a new willingness on the part of the US to discuss “sales of ‘transformative’ capabilities in such areas as command and control, early warning and missile defense” with India.23 The US bilateral relationships with Japan and India in this regard culminated in a 2007 Japanese suggestion for a “quadrilateral grouping” (QUAD) comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia. Observers commonly see the 2007 version of Exercise Malabar – meant to be an annual bilateral Indo-US naval exercise – as a sign of the QUAD coming into effect. Malabar’s 07-01 iteration in April was not held in the Indian Ocean, but off the coast of Japan, with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force taking part, presumably as a signal to China. The subsequent 07-02 iteration in September in the Bay of Bengal involved navies from all

20 Nick Bisley, "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'? The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:1 (2008), pp. 76-77; see also Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2006, accessed 1 June 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/security/scc/pdfs/doc0605.pdf. 21 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation," Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2007, accessed 1 June 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint0705.pdf. 22 Donald Rumsfeld, "New Framework for the India-U.S. Defense Relationship," The Rumsfeld Papers, 2005, accessed 1 June 2018, http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3211/2005-06- 28%20New%20Framework%20for%20the%20US-India%20Defense%20Relationship.pdf. 23 Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging," pp. 150-151.

four QUAD states. China viewed the QUAD as a means to surround it and contain its rise, sending diplomatic démarches to these four states.24 Whilst Malabar had many objectives, one officer emphasised after the 07-02 exercise that “the demonstration provides a message to other militaries, and our own, that we are capable of operating together and that we work together with our regional partners to ensure stability in the region.”25 Various analysts thought that the QUAD initiative subsided after Shinzo Abe, the then Japanese prime minister and QUAD’s main proponent, resigned in September 2007. However, it seemed to have revived with Abe’s second term as prime minister.26 After Obama became president, the military aspects of his “Rebalance to Asia” epitomised US preventive security practices within the military sector in relation to China’ rise. Regardless of whether “pivoting” or “rebalancing” were misnomers because the US had always been in the Asia-Pacific, the substance of the Pivot was clearly an emphasis on the region “built on sensible policies of previous administrations”.27 Even though the Pivot was not targeted directly or solely at China, the US DOD’s 2012 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” report – one of the first Pivot documents – stated that: “China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security”, and the US “will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law”.28 The Rebalance had two main interlinked military prongs: a redeployment of military assets and resources to the Asia-Pacific, and capabilities to counter anti-access/area denial, especially China’s. 29 Consequently, redeployment practices encompassed moving sixty percent of the US Navy (USN) to the Pacific Ocean, but by 2020, highlighting the future- orientation of this practice. This included the deployment of two extra Aegis ballistic missile defence (BMD) ships to Japan, the USS Benfold (in 2015) and the USS Milius (originally meant for 2017, it eventually arrived in 2018).30 The forward deployment of such military assets

24 Siddharth Varadarajan, "Chinese Demarches to 4 Nations," The Hindu, 14 June 2007. 25 Quoted in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaugh, "Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India," in Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 7 January 2008. 26 For more on the QUAD, see William T. Tow, "Minilateral Security's Relevance to US Strategy in the Indo- Pacific: Challenges and Prospects," The Pacific Review, 32:2 (2018), pp. 232-244. 27 Campbell, The Pivot, p. 19. 28 U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," (2012), p. 2. 29 Nina Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia," International Security, 40:4 (Spring 2016), pp. 69-71. 30 Sam LaGrone, "Navy Moving Two Additional BMD Destroyers to Japan," United States Naval Institute News, 17 October 2014, accessed 6 June 2018, https://news.usni.org/2014/10/17/navy-moving-two-additional-bmd- destroyers-japan.

served to preserve stability. In addition, the currently named Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, more commonly known as the “Air-Sea Battle” (ASB) concept, was meant to utilise joint warfare capabilities, especially air, sea, cyber and space forces, to project military power and counteract A2/AD to secure command of the sea and air in the event of a conventional war against China.31 Forward-deployed BMD ships like the Benfold added to ASB as well. Moreover, like the Bush Administration, Obama deepened ties with Japan and India. The US agreed upon the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” with Japan in 2015, boosting the interoperability of their militaries; whilst it also expanded and renewed the 2005 “Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship” for another ten years in 2015.32 The Obama Administration differed from the Bush Administration in its increased attention towards Southeast Asia as part of its Pivot. For example, the “Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement” was agreed with the Philippines in 2014, allowing for expanded rotational US deployments to the Philippines.33 More military resources were also diverted to Southeast Asia. The US intensified “a range of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and defense interactions, such as Cobra Gold [with Thailand], Balikatan [with the Philippines]” and instituted a new Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) for Southeast Asia, which then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced during the 2015 SLD.34 The US DOD’s 2015 “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” had further underscored Chinese actions as well as China’s modernisation of “every aspect of its maritime-related military and law enforcement capabilities, including its naval surface fleet, submarines, aircraft, missiles, radar capabilities, and coast guard”.35 The MSI thus committed more than US$250 million over 2015 and 2016 to “develop Southeast Asian maritime capabilities”. This included increasing US military cooperation with Vietnam and lifting “the ban on sales of maritime-related lethal capabilities to allow development of Vietnam’s maritime capacity and encourage interoperability with

31 U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Operational Access Concept," (2012); Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia," International Security, 41:1 (Summer 2016), pp. 7-48. 32 Japan Ministry of Defense, "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," (2015); U.S. Department of Defense, "Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," (2015). 33 U.S. Department of Defense, "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on Enhanced Defense Cooperation," (2014). 34 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Ambivalent Engagement: The United States and Regional Security in Southeast Asia after the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), p. 144; see also Carter, "The United States and Challenges". 35 U.S. Department of Defense, "Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy," (2015), p. 10.

other regional forces”. 36 Overall, these US security practices focused on preventing miscalculations by countering China’s military growth, as opposed to overwhelming China’s increased military capabilities. These preventive US security practices have reinforced such US linguistic representations in the military sector, and taken together, the US has macrosecuritised China’s rise, in terms of its military buildup, as posing a risk against the referent object of Asia-Pacific peace and stability. Such US representations in the military sector were also paralleled in the political sector.

Political Sector

The main constituent of the political sector is the “organizational stability of social order(s)”, as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde write.37 The selected official US texts frequently referred to “order” in the Asia-Pacific, but the word denoted different aspects of “order”, depending on the context of its use. The US’s 2015 “Advancing the Rebalance” factsheet arguably captured these myriad dimensions of how the US used “order” best:

The United States seeks to preserve and enhance a stable and diversified security order in which countries pursue their national objectives peacefully and in accordance with international law and shared norms and principles, including: the peaceful resolution of disputes; an open economic order that promotes strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth through a level, competitive playing field; and a liberal political order that promotes peace and human dignity, based on human rights and the rule of law. Our priority is to strengthen cooperation among our partners in the region, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a rules-based regional order and addresses regional and global challenges.38

36 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 17 November 2015, accessed 2 June 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=122946. 37 Although they also note that in “some sense, all security is political”, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 141-142. 38 Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance".

In US representations, the referent object of “order” included political, economic and social aspects. These were: the adherence to international law as well as norms and principles leading to the peaceful resolution of disputes, an open market economy, and universal values and rights, respectively. In this dissertation, I follow how the US used “order” in its official documents, unlike some others writing about the US-China problematique, or more broadly about Asia-Pacific security. They sometimes use “order” in various generic ways that may be different from that specified in US representations, although the fundamental allusion to stability or organisation remains. For instance, Shambaugh uses “order” to mean “system”, whilst David Martin Jones and Michael Smith employ it to mean the “security architecture”.39 Leaving aside the US economic and social dimensions of order for now since they more appropriately belong to the economic and (broad) societal sectors respectively, I follow the US in specifically using the phrase “rules-based order” to indicate the political feature of the international order. Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, popularised this “rules-based order” term in 2010, although she in-turn had borrowed it from then Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd.40 For instance, this term was used in the 2016 “Unprecedented U.S.-ASEAN Relations” factsheet, which affirmed that: “The United States and ASEAN share a strong interest in building and sustaining a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific, one in which countries can pursue their objectives peacefully and in accordance with international law and norms”.41 Within the political sector, the US has represented China’s actions, as it rises, as constituting a risk to the rules-based order. This was particularly with reference to the freedom of navigation. The US demanded that China uphold international rules and norms, including the peaceful resolution of conflict. The rules-based order was a mainly neoliberal institutional construct which was therefore best defended by an institutional approach. In emphasising routine multilateralism, institutionalism and freedom of navigation operations, US security practices communicated China’s non-adherence to the “rules”, and sought to pressure China into following international norms and principles.

39 David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, 29:3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99; David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order," International Security, 32:1 (Summer 2007), pp. 148-184; cf. Christian Reus-Smit, "Cultural Diversity and International Order," International Organization, 71:4 (2017), p. 854. 40 Johnston, "China in a World of Orders," p. 11. 41 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: Unprecedented U.S.-ASEAN Relations," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 12 Feburary 2016, accessed 27 March 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=118116.

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There were many examples of such US representations in the selected texts. The 2006 NSS, for instance, claimed that China was not acting as a “responsible stakeholder” in “the international system that has enabled its success” in terms of implementing international rules, “political standards”, or “contributing to international stability and security”.42 The US was warning here that China’s non-responsible practices risked the referent object of the rules- based order. Attached to this warning was the US demand that China become a “responsible stakeholder” instead of disrupting the order that had facilitated its rise. Then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made the “responsible stakeholder” term famous in a 2005 speech he gave to the US National Committee on US-China Relations.43 The propositional content in the speech act above was hence China’s disregard for international order, particularly owing to its lack of transparency as well as “involvement” with “troublesome states”, to the extent that many “worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather”.44 However, some observers identify China’s strategy as one of being “a responsible great power”, in tandem with its “peaceful rise” strategy. 45 The US’s different perspective in this regard demonstrated once again that the “othering” of China was an important propositional keystone. Similarly, during the 2012 SLD, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta highlighted that whilst “China is a key to being able to develop a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Asia-Pacific in the 21st century”, the US remained “clear-eyed about the challenges” in this regard.46 Crucially in the political sector, the US linked the East and South China Sea disputes to the rules-based order. An example after the severe turn in US criticism of China illustrated this clearly. According to then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in his 2014 SLD speech:

China has undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South China Sea . . . we firmly oppose any nation’s use of intimidation, coercion, or the threat of force to assert those claims . . . We also oppose any effort – by any nation – to restrict overflight or freedom of navigation . . . The United States will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged . . . stakes are not just about the sovereignty of rocky shoals and island reefs, or even the natural resources that surround them and lie

42 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 41. 43 Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" U.S. Department of State, 21 September 2005, accessed 18 April 2018, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. 44 Ibid. 45 See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," International Security, 34:4 (Spring 2010), pp. 82-87. 46 Panetta, "The US Rebalance".

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beneath them. They are about sustaining the Asia-Pacific’s rules-based order, which has enabled the people of this region to strengthen their security, allowing for progress and prosperity. That is the order the United States – working with our partners and allies – that is the order that has helped underwrite since the end of World War II . . . This rules-based order requires a strong, cooperative regional security architecture.47

In this passage, the US claimed that China was threatening force in the disputes, further risking the principles of the freedoms of the air and international waters. Such risks to both international law and the freedom of navigation therefore compromised the rules-based order twofold.48 The demand was for China to “uphold international rules and norms”, including the peaceful resolution of disputes instead of the threat or use of force, and not infringe upon the freedoms of the air or sea lines of communication. Despite mapping the possible flashpoints of the East and South China Sea disputes to the rules-based order, the threat to the latter political referent remained a potential one rather than an imminent emergency in US texts. Chinese actions and practices in the disputes were risking the rule of law and the freedom of navigation principles rather than directly and imminently threatening these, such as by an actual Chinese use of force or closure of the SCS. For example, when the media asked about proof that China was an actual “threat to the freedom of navigation” at a press briefing in 2011 after Obama first attended the EAS, Tom Donilon, then US National Security Advisor, emphasised that: “It really isn't about, from our perspective, about specific instances, although, there have been tensions that have risen . . . We have an interest in these principles around the world”.49 This clarified that the US was simply securing these principles whilst they were being risked by China’s rise. Even with rising tensions in the SCS from 2014, the US did not elevate its security concern over Chinese practices from a collective risk to a threat. For example, the 2016 US freedom of navigation report cited China’s excessive maritime claims, such as “restriction on foreign aircraft flying through an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without the intent to

47 Hagel, "The United States' Contribution". 48 For more on the South China Sea disputes and maritime and air freedoms, see Robert C. Beckman, "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea," American Journal of International Law, 107:1 (2013), pp. 142-163; Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response," International Security, 34:2 (Fall 2009), pp. 46-81. 49 Jay Carney, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 19 November 2011, accessed 22 March 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97084.

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enter national airspace”, as the reason for the conduct of the FONOPS patrols in East Asia,50 rather than actual Chinese enforcement. Indeed, such actions have been mostly absent.51 The 2016 annual report to the US Congress on Chinese military and security developments even noted that China’s coercive tactics were designed to “advance their interests in ways that are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict”, such as using coastguard vessels rather than warships, a different signal altogether.52 Furthermore, though China had publicly rejected the 2016 ruling against it by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) over the case of the South China Sea undertaken by the Philippines, Chinese responses were rather restrained on the whole as opposed to tearing down the rules-based order in a wholesale manner.53 Consequently, in addition to the US linguistic representations in the selected texts, US routine and preventive security practices in the political sector likewise reinforced the idea that China’s practices were not acceptable and did not conform to the rules-based order. They aimed to emphasise the freedom of navigation, whilst pressuring China with the weight of a multilateral security architecture, rather than coercing it if it were a threat instead. A crucial US security practice of routinely underscoring the freedom of navigation was its overt Freedom of Navigation Program started in 1997. This involved conducting military operations to politically challenge excessive maritime claims throughout the world, and not just the East and South China Seas.54 Within my study’s time frame, these FONOPS against China started in 2007, challenging China’s “jurisdiction of superadjacent airspace over the exclusive economic zone” and its domestic legislation criminalising “survey activity by foreign entities in any waters under the jurisdiction of the coastal state”. As these FONOPS continued, in 2011, they also contested further Chinese claims – “prior permission required for innocent passage of foreign military ships through territorial sea”; and in 2013 – “[e]xcessive straight baselines” and “security jurisdiction in contiguous zone”. The US also resisted China’s 2013 unilateral declaration of its East China Sea ADIZ, which incorporated the Senkakus, dispatching unarmed B-52 strategic bombers on unannounced flights through the areas covered by China’s ADIZ.55 The Obama Administration had previously suspended routine FONOPS in

50 U.S. Department of Defense, "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016," 28 February 2017, p. 1. 51 Harry J. Kazianis, "The Strategy behind China's ADIZ in the East China Sea," Asia Times, 17 March 2016. 52 U.S. Department of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2016," p. i. 53 Bill Hayton, "Denounce but Comply: China's Response to the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18:2 (2017), p. 104. 54 U.S. Department of Defense, "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program," 28 February 2017. 55 All FONOPS information from U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports," US Department of Defense, n.d., accessed 6 June 2018, https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/.

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relation to China in the SCS in 2012 in the hope of building better ties. The US resumed this in 2015, with the USS Lassen conducting one in October in the waters close to Subi Reef in the Spratlys. As the first FONOPS the US had directed against China in the SCS in a few years, this Lassen operation drew great attention, as well as a great deal of criticism as some observers thought it had bungled its execution.56 Regardless of whether it was performed successfully, the 2015 Lassen patrol highlighted the commitment of the US in upholding the principle of the freedom of navigation. In general, US FONOPS against China have not proved fruitful in tempering Chinese practices in the East and South China Seas, nor should they be expected to do so, since they are more about politically emphasising the freedom of navigation rather than physically confronting China over such risks. Otherwise, the Bush Administration’s security practices had focused on getting China to work multilaterally with major powers, especially US allies like Japan, in maintaining the rules-based order. For example, when the DPRK withdrew from the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, the Bush Administration agreed to the six-party talks from 2003 to 2007 in order to find a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. The six-party talks, which China hosted, also comprised Japan, the ROK and Russia. The US saw the six-party talks as a test of China as a “responsible stakeholder” of the rules-based order. Zoellick underscored that the talks were China’s “most pressing opportunity” to prove itself.57 Some analysts even suggest the six-party talks to be an embryonic “concert of Asia”.58 In comparison, the Obama Administration concentrated on institutionalism. Jeffrey Bader, special assistant to Obama for Asia in the US National Security Council from 2009 to 2011, emphasised that the Administration adopted an institutional approach to manage the risk from China’s rise, ensuring that China’s rise “served to stabilize, not destabilize, the Asia- Pacific”. 59 The US concurrently politically strengthened existing alliances and built new partnerships. With regard to the former, in a warning to China following its 2013 unilateral declaration of its ADIZ in the East China Sea, the Obama Administration promised Japan that the 1960 US-Japan security treaty covered the Senkakus. Obama also urged a peaceful

56 See Bonnie S. Glaser and Peter A. Dutton, "The U.S. Navy’s Freedom of Navigation Operation around Subi Reef: Deciphering U.S. Signaling," The National Interest, 6 November 2015, accessed 6 June 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-navy%E2%80%99s-freedom-navigation-operation-around-subi-reef- 14272?page=show. 57 Zoellick, "Whither China". 58 For example, Robert Ayson, "The Six-Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?" in The Architecure of Security in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ron Huisken, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2009), pp. 62-63. 59 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 70.

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resolution to the Senkakus territorial dispute between China and Japan, rather than through coercion or changing the rules of the game and the facts on the ground.60 As to the latter, under Obama, the US acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. The US then became part of the inaugural ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus in 2010, followed by membership in the East Asia Summit in 2011. According to Obama, “full and active U.S. engagement in the region's multilateral architecture helps to reinforce the system of rules, responsibilities, and norms that underlies regional peace, stability, and prosperity.”61 Obama made it a point to routinely attend the annual EAS, though he missed the 2013 iteration in order to tackle the domestic government shutdown then. Various analysts and media outlets made much of this absence, pointing out that it questioned US commitment to the Asia-Pacific whilst further allowing China free rein.62 Obama himself commented that: “I’m sure the Chinese don’t mind that I’m not there right now” as “[t]here are areas where we have differences and they can present their point of view and not get as much push back as if I were there”.63 The US also supported ASEAN’s role in working towards the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) with China. In this regard, a COC would highlight “the importance of maintaining peace, stability, safety, security, unimpeded lawful maritime commerce, freedom of navigation in and over-flight” in the SCS, along with “non- militarization” and the peaceful resolution of disputes “in accordance with international law”.64 Furthermore, signalling the importance of institutions, the US appointed its first resident ambassador to ASEAN in 2011, whilst the US-ASEAN Summit in Sunnylands in 2016 marked the first time the US hosted ASEAN inside the United States itself.65 The US engagement of the various Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions was also part of the preventive diplomatic pillar of the Obama Administration’s Pivot, further adding to the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the rules-based order. Such routine “complex patchworks” of US bilateral alliances and other minilateral or multilateral groupings, ad hoc or

60 Mizuho Aoki, "Obama Assures Abe on Senkakus," The Japan Times, 24 April 2014. 61 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 19 November 2011, accessed 22 March 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123012. 62 Liow, Ambivalent Engagement, p. 146. 63 Quoted in Jeff Mason, "Obama: China Benefits from Missed Trip, U.S. Credibility Suffers," Reuters, 9 October 2013, accessed 8 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fiscal-obama-asia- idUSBRE99715Q20131008. 64 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Chairman's Statement of the 4th ASEAN-United States Summit," ASEAN Secretariat, 8 September 2016, accessed 9 June 2018, http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Chairmans- Statement-of-the-4th-ASEAN-US-Summit1.pdf. 65 Barack Obama, "Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz and National Security Advisor Susan Rice," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 15 February 2016, accessed 8 June 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111541.

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institutional, built up a security architecture, sometimes including China, enabling “positive- sum gains” to be achieved.66 The next section then analyses how the US has also constructed China’s rise as a security risk with respect to the market-based economic order.

Economic Sector

US security representations in this sector took two main forms. The first was that China’s growth was based on its unfair economic practices, and the second was that China’s expansive claims to the SCS might adversely affect the sea lines of communication through it, harming global trade. To the US, these posed a risk to the market-based economic order. The main US security practice of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the economic sector was meant to prevent China from further abusing the system by preemptively constructing a trading regime of a tougher standard that China would be unable to meet, to stabilise the economic order. To begin with, US representations of China as an economic competitor and threat to its own economy were the most pronounced, amplified by the enormous trade imbalance between the two states. Peter Navarro succinctly attributes its cause to the “China Price”, which he deems the “result of slave-labor conditions coupled with a potent array of unfair trade practices” by China “that violate virtually every tenet and norm of international trade”. These include export subsidies, currency manipulation, negligent environmental regulations, piracy and stealing to reduce research costs.67 In this regard, although the 2006 NSS demanded that China “move to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime – a step that would help both China and the global economy”,68 for instance, this US speech act was directed more towards the referent object of the US economy than the global market economy. The implied claim and warning contained in the NSS example above might be that China was using a fixed exchange rate to bolster its own economic growth, unfairly disadvantaging the rest of the global economy. However, the propositional content of the US current account imbalance due to the “China Price”, which included its fixed exchange rate regime, 69 affirmed that the US claim and warning were of China as an economic threat rather.

66 Cha, "Complex Patchworks," pp. 27-50. 67 Peter Navarro, The Coming China Wars: Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won, Revised and Expanded ed., (New Jersey: FT Press, 2008), pp. 1-14.; see also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "2007 Report to Congress," (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2007), pp. 26-27. 68 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 26. 69 See C. Fred Bergsten, "Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate," in Congressional Testimony(15 September 2010).

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There are multiple examples of the US representing China as an economic threat to its own national security within the selected official texts. In 2011, the CFIUS annual report even highlighted that the US intelligence community “judges with moderate confidence that there is likely a coordinated strategy among one or more foreign governments or companies to acquire U.S. companies involved in research, development, or production of critical technologies for which the United States is a leading producer”. It further noted that “foreign governments are extremely likely to continue to use a range of collection methods to obtain critical U.S. technologies”, including espionage, in addition to emphasising increased Chinese investment in the US.70 As another example. the 2012 strategic guidance for the US DOD highlighted “the potential” of “China’s emergence as a regional power” harming the US economy in “the long term”.71 Likewise, the 2015 NSS accordingly emphasised US domestic economic concerns, with the US wanting cooperation with China for economic growth even as it also recognised that there would be competition.72 The US started the biannual Strategic Economic Dialogue with China to manage economic relations from 2006 during the Bush Administration, when it was likely that the US “might act to punish China for its ballooning trade surplus” by exceptionally “enacting high tariffs on Chinese imports”. This led to the Chinese currency appreciating “by an impressive 20 percent against the U.S. dollar” by 2009, avoiding a “trade war” between the two states.73 Obama subsequently upgraded this to a Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009, with an added focus on strategic matters on top of economic relations. So as to safeguard US national security interests and economic advantage, as well as to prevent cybertheft, the Obama Administration further blocked sensitive Chinese investments in the US. These include the acquisition of “wind farm sites” that were “within or in the vicinity of restricted air space at Naval Weapons Systems Training Facility Boardman in Oregon” by a company owned by Chinese nationals in 2012, as well as the purchase of “the U.S. businesses of Aixtron SE, a German company”, by another German company “whose ultimate parent” is “a privately held

70 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, "Annual Report to Congress 2011," (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011), pp. 23-27. 71 U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership," p. 2. For more on the US-China economic relationship, see Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015), chapter 4. 72 Obama, NSS 2015, p. 24. 73 Dennis Wilder, "The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: Continuity and Change in Obama’s China Policy," Brookings, 15 May 2009, accessed 12 June 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-china- strategic-and-economic-dialogue-continuity-and-change-in-obamas-china-policy/.

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Chinese company” in 2016.74 Although strictly outside the timeframe of my research, it is also important to note that these blocks and concern over foreign investment from China led to the US Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018. Amongst other things, the Act specifically requires the U.S. Secretary of Commerce “to submit to Congress and CFIUS a report on foreign direct investment transactions” in the US made by Chinese entities every two years.75 Similarly, China is a much more direct bilateral economic threat to other Asia- Pacific states as well. For instance, Vietnam has lost out on lucrative oil and gas development projects within its exclusive economic zone due to intimidation from China.76 The US representation of the national-level threat to its own economy from China’s rise might be starker, but it has still portrayed China’s disregard for economic norms, such as a floating exchange rate, as a risk to the economic order too. This was albeit to a lesser extent than in the military or political sectors. The referent object of a market-based economic order in this regard was one “that promotes strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth through a level, competitive playing field”.77 The US further tied this economic order to the political rules-based order, especially the freedom of navigation principle, and hence the SCS disputes. For instance, as then Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in the 2010 SLD:

. . . the South China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directly bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. Our policy is clear: it is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do not take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate US corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent with customary international law. The

74 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, "Annual Report to Congress 2012," (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2012), p. 2; Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, "Annual Report to Congress 2016 and 2017," (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2017), p. 2. 75 James K. Jackson, " The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)," in Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 14 February 2020. 76 Bill Hayton, "Chinese Intimidation in the South China Sea Leaves Vietnam with Limited Options," 26 April 2018, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/chinese-intimidation-south-china- sea-leaves-vietnam-limited-options. 77 Obama, "Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance".

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2002 Declaration of Conduct was an important step in this direction and we hope that concrete implementation of this agreement will continue.78

The context of this quote was the ambiguity of China’s nine-dash line countenancing Chinese claims to the entire SCS. The US warning here was that economic development could be affected if China unfairly impeded the flow of trade through the SCS (though this has yet to happen), affecting communications and economic lifelines in the Asia-Pacific, at risk the “$5.3 trillion in trade that passes through” the SCS annually.79 Hagel had similarly called the SCS “the beating heart of the Asia-Pacific and a crossroads for the global economy” in his 2014 SLD speech.80 Even if China did not control and impede the flow of ships through the area, simply militarising the disputed islands and surrounding waters might put the economic order at risk too, as demonstrated by the infamous China-Vietnam oil-rig standoff in 2014.81 In addition, the US demand of handling the dispute in a manner consistent with international law encouraged a role for ASEAN, in the form of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) between the regional organisation and China, as well as the COC that is still being negotiated.82 However, I must emphasise with regard to the economic sector that the US was not presenting the market economy itself as being ideologically threatened by Chinese communism, or China’s variant of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, like in the days of the Cold War. Rather, the stakes were the fair working principles of the market economy, and the issue was whether China adhered properly to these principles. Along with these US linguistic communications of China unfairly boosting its prosperity through its unreasonable practices as risking the economic order, US security practices further bolstered an order that would conceivably nudge China to play by fair economic rules. What, then, were the US practices in mitigating the risk to the economic order? As part of the US portrayal of China’s SCS claims as posing a risk to the economic order through the potential barring of access and global trade, its 2012 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership” report, for instance, highlighted that: “To enable economic growth and commerce, America,

78 Gates, "Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific". 79 Allison, Destined for War, p. 128. 80 Hagel, "The United States' Contribution". 81 See Ian Storey, "The Sino-Vietnamese Oil Rig Crisis: Implications for the South China Sea Dispute," ISEAS Perspective, No. 52 (2014). 82 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," ASEAN Secretariat, 4 November 2002, accessed 27 April 2018, http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct- of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2.

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working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons”. 83 Thus, US FONOPS routinely challenging China’s excessive maritime claims contributed to emphasising the economic order as well, and not just the political rules-based order. The mainstay US security practice of communicating and maintaining the Asia-Pacific economic order was the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement (FTA). After all, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission had long recognised that China’s adherence to its World Trade Organization’s commitments was inconsistent.84 The US meant the TPP as a “region-wide economic agreement among a dozen countries”, including Australia, Japan, Mexico, Canada and Peru, that would “level the economic playing field for all parties and set the standard for all future trade agreements”, ensuring “that modern, fair, and pro- growth rules are adopted in Asia”.85 In 2008, Bush had indicated US intention to join the TPP trade agreement, which was based on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (also known as the P4 agreement) between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. The US had even scrutinised the agreement and had “told the P4 that if the US was to join in” there was a need to “upgrade” some portions of the P4 agreement, to which the P4 agreed.86 However, the Global Financial Crisis derailed this US endeavour until the Obama Administration “committed to participate in the TPP” in 2010, making it the central economic prong of its Rebalance.87 As Kurt Campbell emphasised in his memoirs, the TPP was not a mechanism to contain China’s rise and its “standards have not been written to deliberately exclude China’s participation”.88 The US would even welcome China’s participation, should it meet the TPP’s criteria. The US has simply preventively put the TPP at a very high standard, which China was unlikely to meet in the short-term. In a 2015 statement released upon the conclusion of the TPP negotiations, which had dragged on for many years, Obama stated that: “When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to

83 U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership," p. 3. 84 For instance, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "2006 Report to Congress," (U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006), p. 2. 85 Campbell, The Pivot, pp. 266-267. 86 Rubrick Biegon, "US Hegemony and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Consensus, Crisis, and Common Sense," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13:1 (2020), p. 90. 87 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, "Multilateralising Regionalism: What Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?" The Pacific Review, 24:5 (2011), p. 558. 88 Campbell, The Pivot, pp. 267-268.

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American products”. 89 Furthermore, Campbell also highlights that the TPP would enable “Asian trade partners more opportunities for growth and reduce their vulnerability to economic coercion by China or other large economies”.90 In other words, the TPP was not meant to sanction China, but to mitigate the collective economic risk from China’s rise, though it also would naturally further US interests. The parties to the TPP signed the agreement in 2016, but Obama’s successor, Donald J. Trump, withdrew from it in 2017 in one of his first acts upon taking office. Of course, whether the US Congress would have ratified the TPP in any case was also a matter of some doubt.91 Nonetheless, the impact of the TPP in upholding the economic order is still felt today in its evolved form, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP was signed in 2018 by the remaining eleven TPP states, including Australia, Japan, Singapore and Vietnam, which “has helped tighten an embrace of ‘high-standard’, ‘balanced’ [sic] ‘free’, and ‘fair’ game of trade for concerned stakeholders”.92 The US security practice of the TPP and its textual representations in the economic sector have macrosecuritised China’s rise as a risk to the market-based economic order. So far, this chapter has determined the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security in the military, political and economic sectors, through its texts on security and its practices. Though these depictions of China’s rise were to varying degrees of risk in these sectors – with the US also presenting China’s rise as a threat to its own national security in the military and economic sectors – the commonality in these representations was that they “othered” China, mostly excluding it from the US practices. Conversely, US security practices in the environmental sector would include China, as the following section explicates.

Environmental Sector

The Copenhagen School notes that “three relationships of threat define the possible universe of environmental security”, from: (1) the natural environment to human civilisation, such as earthquakes; (2) “human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet” posing

89 Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership," The White House, 5 October 2015, accessed 8 November 2019, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement- president-trans-pacific-partnership. 90 Campbell, The Pivot, pp. 267-268. 91 Mike DeBonis, Ed O'Keefe, and Ana Swanson, "The Trans-Pacific Partnership is Dead, Schumer Tells Labor Leaders," The Washington Post, 10 November 2016. 92 Dinh Tinh Le, "The 2017 APEC Summit: A Game Changer for the Asia-Pacific?" Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 405 (15 November 2017).

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“existential threats to (parts of) civilization”, such as global warming; and (3) the same as (2) except that these are not existential threats, such as the exhaustion of rare-earth minerals.93 The environmental sector is thus a somewhat peculiar one. Specific instances of fallout from a localised, particular cause, such as the 1986 Chernobyl accident, or the recrudescing regional haze afflicting Singapore and Malaysia from Indonesia using the slash-and-burn method for clearing forests for agriculture are rarer. Typically, it is difficult to target states for causing international environmental concerns when all states partake of the human activity that causes environmental degradation. It was therefore not surprising that in the selected texts, instances of the US targeting China alone as risking the referent object of the global climate were rare. One of the few examples of the US doing so was from the 2008 annual report on Chinese military and security developments to Congress:

Pollution and deforestation in China have worldwide implications. China may have overtaken the United States as the world’s largest emitter of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Japan and South Korea both suffer from acid rain produced by China’s coal-fired power plants and yellow dust storms that originate in the Gobi desert. The PRC’s public actions, such as arrests of public officials and new environmental controls, indicate a greater awareness, but China’s leaders’ ability to manage environmental degradation as a long-term political, if not strategic problem, remains uncertain.94

In the speech act above, the US claim that China, in rising, might be contributing more to global warming than the US itself, was matched to US warnings of consequent detrimental effects to Japan, South Korea, and the global climate. The US demand was that China demonstrate an ability to manage its risks to the global environment. These were predicated on the propositional content of China’s rapid industrialisation leading to its growth. Instead, the US has generally portrayed environmental security concerns with regard to China’s rise in two other ways.95 First, the US has highlighted environmental security concerns

93 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 79-80, emphasis removed. 94 U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the PRC 2008," p. 15. However, this is not to say that China’s neighbours do not recognise the environmental externalities they face from China’s rise, see Shaun Breslin, "The China Challenge? Development, Environment and National Security," Security Dialogue, 28:4 (1997), pp. 497- 508. 95 The US has securitised China as an “energy security” threat in reference to US national security, see for instance, Nyman, "‘Red Storm Ahead," pp. 43-65. However, “energy” is not an issue in the environmental sector.

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as vulnerabilities to China’s own domestic political system since “environmental degradation could undermine regime legitimacy by threatening economic development, public health, social stability, and China’s international image”.96 The Chinese government is also aware of this national security threat and has securitised such issues itself.97 Second, and more relevant to the purposes of this thesis, the US has constructed a broader understanding of the risk to the global climate from greenhouse gas emissions by all states, coupled to an acknowledgement of the need for transnational cooperation, with China as well as other states, to be able to deal preventively with the scale of environmental risks such as climate change. This applied less to the Bush Administration, which analysts generally identify to be less concerned with environmental security than the preceding Clinton Administration or the succeeding Obama Administration.98 Thus, even before he became president, Obama had advocated for “[s]trengthened institutions and invigorated alliances and partnerships” to combat climate change, whilst at the same time acknowledging that “the United States, China, India, the European Union, and Russia” were the worst culprits in environmental pollution.99 When the US was first invited to participate in the 2010 EAS, then Secretary of State Clinton, the US representative to the summit, specified climate change as an issue “where it would be especially helpful to coordinate our efforts”.100 This has remained one of the priority areas for the EAS across this dissertation’s timeframe.101 The 2015 NSS similarly acknowledged that “America is leading efforts at home and with the international community to confront” the climate change challenge, including with China.102 The US has thus included China within its preventive security practices in the environmental sector. Bilateral cooperation between the two led to the 2014 “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation”. Thereafter, the two states spearheaded the multilateral Paris Agreement in 2015, which then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon hailed as “a monumental triumph for people and our planet”.103

96 For instance, U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2014," (2014), p. 18. 97 Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee, and Lai-Ha Chan, "China's Environmental Governance: The Domestic–International Nexus," Third World Quarterly, 29:2 (2008), pp. 296-304. 98 Floyd, Security and the Environment, chapters 4 and 5; James M. Lindsay, "George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership," International Affairs, 87:4 (2011), pp. 771-773. 99 Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, 86:4 (July/August 2007), p. 13. 100 Hillary Clinton, "Intervention at the East Asia Summit," US Department of State, 30 October 2010, accessed 20 March 2018, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150196.htm. 101 See ASEAN Secretariat, East Asia Summit (EAS) Documents Series 2005-2016, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016). 102 Obama, NSS 2015, p. 12. 103 Quoted in Robert Falkner, "The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics," International Affairs, 92:5 (2016), p. 1107; see also Obama, NSS 2015, p. 12.

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The environmental sector is hence different from the other sectors examined earlier. In the previous military, political or economic sectors, the US had specifically constructed China’s rise as a collective security risk with the aim of safeguarding against such risk. However, even as the US has similarly depicted China’s rise as an environmental security risk, it has also recognised that China must form part of the solution in mitigating the wider risk to the global climate, including China in its security practices. Conversely, the US has not macrosecuritised China’s rise in the societal sector, as the section below demonstrates.

Societal Sector

The societal sector, in the original conceptualisation of the Copenhagen School, refers to “identity” as its central principle. That identity can be threatened by depopulation, migration, or assimilation into another social group, whether narrower (from national to tribal, for example) or wider (from national to regional).104 The logic of macrosecuritisation in the societal sector is therefore likely to involve referent objects such as a shared Asia-Pacific regional identity, or perhaps, civilisations. However, in the texts I have selected and examined for the purposes of this dissertation, such mentions were absent altogether. This might be due to the lack of a shared identity within the Asia-Pacific, especially with the late advent of multilateral networks in the region (see Chapter 4). The US placement of China into an “othered” tier is also not purely identity-driven, otherwise one would reasonably not expect Vietnam to belong in the partners tier, for instance. Therefore, although the poststructural tradition of the “China Threat” theory emphasises the difference between the “American Self” and the “Chinese Other” (see Chapter 2), there is no “Asia-Pacific Self” to speak of in the societal sector to serve as a referent object. The issue that then most closely resembles a collective security issue in the societal sector is that of the “Chinese overseas”, which includes “all Chinese outside China regardless of their citizenship and culture”.105 In Southeast Asia especially, there is a large number of Chinese overseas. In the past, China’s policy was to protect this diaspora. However, from 1955, China shifted to a more neutral policy. China changed its policy in order to pacify regional states suspicious of China’s (communist) influence on their ethnic Chinese citizens. The newly decolonised Southeast Asian states were particularly cautious as they were attempting to build their own nations out of the diverse populations they had inherited from their old colonial

104 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security, pp. 119-123. 105 Leo Suryadinata, The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017), p. 5.

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masters, on top of facing domestic communist insurrections.106 Elements of both the “Yellow Peril” and “Red Menace” discourse were present hence. With China’s rise, some scholars highlight growing assertiveness on China’s part towards the Chinese overseas once more.107 For example, China’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – also referred to as “One Belt, One Road” – replicating the ancient Silk Road to boost economic development across Eurasia invoked China’s old “tributary system”. China consequently linked the Chinese overseas to the BRI project in 2014 as their participation would help ensure its success and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” of rejuvenation. 108 In 2016, Josephine Teo, then Singapore’s senior minister for foreign affairs, specifically “noted in the Singapore parliament that Chinese Singaporeans have a separate identity from that of Chinese nationals and that they are loyal to Singapore”.109 Singapore is arguably most at risk as it is the only majority ethnic Chinese state in Southeast Asia. The US has not made any attempt to portray China’s stance on the Chinese overseas as a threat to international security within the societal sector. An explanation for the dearth of US activities in this regard lies outside the remit of my study, though arguments might be made that the lack of securitising is an important component of securitisation theory.110 Possible reasons might be the lack of sustained Chinese practices towards the Chinese overseas, or that the US does not want to play this ethnic card overtly due to its own identity as a liberal democracy. US inattention cannot be ruled out either. Indeed, analysts even emphasise that the US has paid relatively little thought to the BRI, arguably because the US has not fully understood its strategic implications, even assuming these were not overstated.111 The US was not supportive of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a key pillar of the BRI. However, its stated concerns were economic, “over whether the AIIB will achieve sufficiently high standards of corporate governance, and questioning the structure of the organization, lending procedure, and environmental and social safeguards”, 112 rather than strategic or geopolitical. Within the selected first layer of US national security texts, the US only noted the

106 Leo Suryadinata, The Making of Southeast Asian Nations: State, Ethnicity, Indigenism and Citizenship, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), pp. 85-99. 107 David Shambaugh, "U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence," International Security, 42:4 (Spring 2018), p. 115. 108 Suryadinata, The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas, chapter 11. 109 Quoted in ibid., p. 234. 110 For instance, Vuori, "How to Do Security," pp. 145-148, refers to the non-securitisation of the global anti- nuclear discourse within China. 111 For example, Nadège Rolland, "China's 'Belt and Road Initiative': Underwhelming or Game-Changer?" The Washington Quarterly, 40:1 (2017), p. 127. 112 Hong Yu, "Motivation Behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Journal of Contemporary China, 26:105 (2017), p. 361.

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BRI very briefly in the annual China report to the US Congress and the “Annual Threat Assessment” in 2016.113 Even if this dissertation were to adopt a broader definition of the societal sector incorporating social values and norms, the US still fell short of constructing China’s rise as a security issue. As China rises, it has retained its illiberal mode of governance. The US might have presented China as a risk towards the referent object of “a liberal political order that promotes peace and human dignity, based on human rights and the rule of law” in its texts.114 For instance, the 2006 NSS stated that “China’s leaders must see that they cannot let their population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship”, even as China supported “resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes”.115 Likewise, the 2010 NSS insisted that the US “will be candid on our human rights concerns” with China, whilst the 2015 NSS averred “that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade to human rights”.116 The US claims in such speech acts were thus that China has violated human rights, warning of a risk to a “universal” set of human rights and norms. The US further tied these to a demand for China to follow the rule of law and norms with reference to universal human rights. After all, China had “expressed its intent to follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and had “acceded to many of the core international human rights treaties”, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.117 The propositional content was China’s status as an autocratic regime, supporting similar rogue regimes. Even if human rights in China was a largely domestic issue, there were still allusions to a universal international standard. However, whilst the US had linguistically depicted a rising illiberal China as risking the liberal order of universal rights, there was little evidence of substantive and sustained US practices that communicated such a vision of China. In terms of human rights issues, the US State Department does have an annual report on China’s human rights violations. It has also acted in specific instances, such as when Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng escaped from house arrest and sought refuge in the US embassy in Beijing in 2012, after which he was moved

113 U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017," (2017), pp. 17 and 42; James R. Clapper, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," (2016), p. 16. 114 As phrased in U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership." 115 Bush, NSS 2006, p. 42. 116 Obama, NSS 2010, p. 43; Obama, NSS 2015, p. 24. 117 Zhou Qi and Andrew J. Nathan, "Political Systems, Rights, and Values," in Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 53.

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to the US. However, in general, the US has seldom moved beyond dialogue, not fronting any preventive international coalitions or exceptional multilateral sanctions against China for human rights abuses for instance. Sophie Richardson, China Director of the Human Rights Watch, even notes that “expressions of concern” about China’s human rights abuses, whether by the US or the EU or other governments, “read more as statements of the painfully obvious”. They do not specify what they “will actually do in response to China’s sharply escalating repression”.118 For example, as Hagel put it during the 2013 SLD: “While the U.S. and China will have our differences – on human rights, Syria, and regional security issues in Asia – the key is for these differences to be addressed on the basis of a continuous and respectful dialogue”.119 Within the broad societal sector, US rhetoric has proven much more extensive than actual action or practices.

Conclusion: The China’s Rise Risk Thesis

Utilising the post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory developed earlier in Chapter 3, and via a systematic analysis of US security texts and practices, I have examined the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security in this chapter. Though the US has not done so in the broad societal sector since practices have failed to match the rhetoric, the US has macrosecuritised China’s rise in the other four sectors. Accordingly, the US has represented China’s rise as a military risk towards peace and stability in the Asia- Pacific due to its (secretive) military buildup. It has also presented China’s practices as it rises as a political risk to the rules-based order, especially because of China’s transgressions in its East and South China Seas claims. The US has further portrayed China as an economic risk to the market-based economic order due to its unfair trade practices that has helped it grow to become the second largest economy in the world, as well as an environmental risk to the global climate because of the rapid industrialisation it embarked upon to rise (refer to Table 5.1). These have happened across the Bush and Obama administrations, and not just after the start of China’s assertive turn. Furthermore, even as such perceived assertiveness was reified in US discourse from 2014 (see Chapter 4), the US representations of China as a collective security risk in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors have not changed in substance.

118 Sophie Richardson, "How to Deal with China's Human Rights Abuses," ChinaFile, 1 September 2016, accessed 17 June 2018, http://www.chinafile.com/viewpoint/how-deal-chinas-human-rights-abuses. 119 Hagel, "The US Approach", emphasis added.

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This chapter’s clarification of the US representations of China’s rise as possible, future- oriented risks to multiple international referent objects in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, highlights the importance of investigating actual US representations. As opposed to the typical rationalist, structuralist, culturalist or poststructural traditions of the “China Threat” theory in portraying inevitable differences and exceptional measures such as a Sino-American war, the US is routinely managing and preventing these collective security risks from China’s rise instead. Moreover, the scale of these risks across different sectors is beyond the narrower focus of the typical CTT traditions, such as the material-centric emphasis of the rationalists and structuralists, whether in terms of the military or economic sectors. The ideational accounts of the culturalists and poststructuralists likewise underestimate the US’s cooperative inclusion of China in the environmental sector, whilst overestimating differences in the broad societal sector, in which the US has not constructed China’s rise as a security threat or risk, whether in terms of “universal” or Western norms and rights, nor against “othered” identities. In distinguishing between the character of the security concern and the referent object, macrosecuritisation theory has additionally drawn out nuances between the higher-scaled international and lower level domestic referent objects. For example, whereas the US had portrayed China’s rise as a threat to the US economy in the timeframe this dissertation covers, to the extent that the Trump Administration even started a Sino-US trade war,120 in terms of the market-based economic order, the danger was in the form of risk rather than as an existential threat. Significantly, the US representation of China’s rise as a collective security risk as demonstrated in this chapter has further highlighted that the US was not caught on the horns of a supposed “dilemma” between the containment and engagement of China. The situation was not one of “congagement”, “constrainment” or “coopetition”. Nor was it hedging, a form of insurance to “on one hand, stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization programs”,121 such that any uncertainty and risk were mitigated. Instead, the US recognised the security risks from China’s rise to various higher- scaled, international referent objects, and was managing these in a comprehensive manner, with

120 See Neil Irwin, Alexandra Stevenson, and Claire Ballentine, "What a Trade War with China Looks Like on the Front Lines," The New York Times, 23 June 2018. 121 Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging," p. 145.

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differentiated strategies in different sectors.122 These included the US security practices of routinely engaging China through institutions or other forms of multilateralism, or with environmental cooperation, whilst at the same time preventively building partnerships with other allies and partners via military interoperability and cooperation or trade agreements. All these existed as part of the US security architecture to address the risks from China’s rise such that it would be a peaceful one rather than one of inevitable war. Moreover, the US has not placed other states different from it, such as Vietnam, into an “othered” tier like China. Neither has it done so to other rising powers, like India. Thus, even when Thucydides highlights: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”, it was perhaps also because it was Athens and not just its rise that made Sparta fearful. Allison notes this as well, observing that unlike the US taking over Britain, it is different to be “surpassed by an adversary whose values are so strikingly different”.123 The logical conclusion is that the US security portrayals of China’s rise as a risk are not due to China itself nor its assertive practices. Rather, the US is concerned with China’s rise. Unlike the “Yellow Peril” or the “Red Menace”, the US take on the “Blue Dread” is not a “China Threat” theory, but more appropriately a “China’s Rise Risk Thesis”. The following two chapters deal with the second of my research questions. They determine if the target audience states of Indonesia and Singapore have accepted this US security management strategy, identifying with, and mobilising in support of, the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to collective security, through what the elites of these audience states have said and done.

122 Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot," pp. 81-82, makes a similar argument about how engagement and balancing “were integral elements of the one reorientation [Pivot] strategy”. 123 Quoted in Allison, Destined for War, pp. vii and 139, emphasis removed.

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Table 5.1: Summary of the US Macrosecuritising of China’s Rise in All Sectors Sector Referent Object Threat Claim Warning Demand Propositional Content Practice - China’s rapid - Insecurity - Transparency - China’s secrecy - Building allies’ Asia-Pacific military buildup - Strategic - “Othered” China capacity peace and Risk - China’s clarity - Military stability militarisation of - Stop Spratlys’ rebalancing Military Spratlys militarisation - Cyberattacks - US information - Stop - China’s - US Cyber (Domestic) Threat originating from theft cyberattacks cyberwarfare Command US Cyberspace China strategy - China not acting - Disrupts order - Uphold - China’s expansive - Multilateralism Rules-based order as responsible - Challenges international South China Sea - Institutionalism - International stakeholder freedom of rules and claims - Freedom of law and Political Risk navigation and norms - Involvement with navigation norms overflight - Peaceful rogue states operations - Freedom of resolution of - “Othered” China navigation conflicts - China writing its - Impedes - Follow free - China’s unfair - Trans-Pacific own economic economic market economic practices Partnership Market-based rules development principles - China’s ambiguous Risk economic order - China claiming - Disrupts trade - Resolve South China Sea the South China disputes claims Economic Sea peacefully - China’s fixed - Handicaps US - Move to a - China as economic - Threat of (Domestic) exchange rate domestic market-based competitor imposing high Threat US Economy regime economy exchange rate - Sino-US trade tariffs on regime imbalance Chinese imports - States, especially - Environmental - Manage - China’s rapid - Transnational China, as degradation environmental industrialisation cooperation Environmental Global climate Risk emitters of and climate degradation - Paris Agreement atmospheric change carbon dioxide Liberal order - China violating - Challenges - Uphold human - China as autocratic - NIL Societal - Universal human rights universal rights Risk (broad) human rights human rights and norms and rule of law Source: Compiled by author

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6. Indonesia: Rising “Blue Dread” and Abiding “Yellow Peril”

Introduction: “Democratic” Delineations of Reformation

Having analysed the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security in the previous chapter, I turn to investigating whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences; whether these US macrosecuritising moves have been accepted by the audience. For macrosecuritisation to be successful in an audience state, there must be elite support from the audience state such that the audience state: (1) accepts the threat identified by the speech act, and (2) mobilises in support of the security practices (refer to Chapter 3). If there is only identification but not mobilisation, or vice versa – though mobilisation may be more difficult to ascertain without supporting speech acts – macrosecuritisation can only be said to be partially successful. This latter part of this dissertation, considering the second of my research questions, starts with a case study of Indonesia. The archipelagic state of Indonesia is a natural hegemon within Southeast Asia owing to its geostrategic location, geographical mass, natural resources and population size. It is also recognised by other Southeast Asian states as primus inter pares.1 This makes Indonesia’s support crucial for the US in its representations of a rising China as a Asia-Pacific security risk in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors. Domestically, Indonesia’s democratisation during Reformasi, or Reformation, since the fall of strongman President Suharto in 1998 was accompanied by a “democratisation of foreign policymaking” – both an opening up of Indonesia’s foreign policymaking process as well as embracing democratic values in its foreign policy.2 Thus, Indonesian elites are by no means a coherent whole. “Bureaucratic infighting” has been known to occur, such as then Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti’s strict policy of destroying foreign vessels captured due to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing leading to disagreements with the Indonesian navy. 3 Nevertheless, despite foreign policymaking becoming “more

1 Emmers, "Regional Hegemonies," pp. 647-648. 2 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2010, ed. Daljit Singh, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 126- 141. 3 Evan A. Laksmana, "The Domestic Politics of Indonesia’s Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and the South China Sea," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38:3 (2016), p. 385.

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consultative” under Reformation, foreign policy has remained an elite “top-down” process and the “salience of leaders as the state’s major foreign policy-makers” has been largely preserved.4 To determine elite audience support, this chapter first examines, via discourse analysis (see Chapter 3), five sets of primary texts (refer to Annexes B, D and E). These are: (1) bilateral US-Indonesia documents, including joint statements between the US and Indonesian presidents; (2) Indonesia’s security documents, namely the 2008 and 2015 “Defence White Paper” (DWP); (3) speeches by the Indonesian president, especially key foreign policy speeches such as those delivered to crucial Asia-Pacific fora like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as the domestic annual “State Address” to the Indonesia parliament; (4) speeches by the Indonesian foreign minister, particularly the annual press statements meant for a domestic rather than international audience, 5 along with important foreign policy addresses to multilateral organisations such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific; and (5) remarks by other elites at the Shangri-La Dialogue, regarded as the top defence meeting in the Asia-Pacific. I have selected these Indonesian texts based on their focus on Indonesia’s foreign policy and national security, as well as what these foreign policy leaders say to their domestic constituents. I identify the broad contours of meaning within these texts regarding how Indonesia perceives China’s rise as a security issue. Specifically, I also ascertain whether Indonesia has supported the US speech acts of China’s rise as a collective security risk. Following which, I investigate whether Indonesia has mobilised in support of US security practices. I do this via Indonesia’s own security practices, particularly those resulting from the selected texts, as well as other documents, such as memoirs of Indonesia’s leaders like Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s foreign minister from 2009 to 2014. In particular, I determine how these Indonesian security practices relate to said US practices. The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section appraises Indonesia’s “independent and active” foreign policy principle since this is fundamental to any discussion of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Though the concept has remained a guiding maxim for Indonesia’s foreign policymaking elites, there were varying vicissitudes in its exercise since Indonesia’s independence. The second and third sections briefly outline Indonesia’s bilateral ties with China and the United States, respectively, to set up the context for assessing if Indonesia has supported the US representation of China’s rise as a collective security risk.

4 Muhammad Hadianto Wirajuda, "The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management" (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014), p. 67-91. 5 Jürgen Rüland, "Democratizing Foreign-Policy Making in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN: A Role Theory Analysis," TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 5:1 (2017), p. 62.

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Overall, Indonesia has had a more collaborative relationship with the US than with China. Significantly, fears of the “Yellow Peril” and “Blue Dread” continue to shadow Indonesia- China relations. The fourth section examines what Indonesia has said and done within the military, political, economic, and environmental sectors in which the US has portrayed China’s rise as a security risk to the Asia-Pacific. Ultimately, the evidence discussed in this chapter presents a qualified picture of a “partial success” of US macrosecuritisation in Indonesia. Whilst Indonesia has identified with the US characterisation of the risk from China’s military buildup, it has resisted US preventive security practices of rebalancing militarily to the Asia-Pacific. Rather, Indonesia has countersecuritised by moving such a risk away from the military sector to the political by positioning ASEAN as central to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Consequently, as this also serves Indonesia’s own foreign policy, Indonesia has fully supported the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the rules-based order within the political sector. With reference to the environmental sector, Indonesia has also supported the US portrayal of the risk of global climate change, in which the US has included China in mitigating such risk. In the economic sector, although Indonesia has identified with the US depiction of the risk posed to the economic order from China’s rise, it did not join the main US security practice of the Trans- Pacific Partnership. Yet, Indonesia has itself additionally macrosecuritised the risk to maritime resources due to China’s rise, from Chinese activities such as IUU fishing or the exploitation of gas and oil fields within China’s expansive nine-dash line claims. The chapter concludes with further insights about the “Blue Dread” and “Yellow Peril” in Indonesia.

Protean Profiles of an “Independent and Active” Foreign Policy

Any examination of Indonesia’s foreign policy needs to begin with its guiding principle, the bebas-aktif ideal of an independent and active (also free and active) foreign policy serving Indonesian national interests. Some trace this doctrine to the preamble of Indonesia’s 1945 constitution, “which committed the new Indonesian republic to work for the abolition of colonialism and the creation of a new world order based on independence, peace and social justice”.6 Others pin it to a speech by then Vice-President and Prime Minister Mohammad

6 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto, (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007; repr. 1976, Cornell University Press), p. 161.

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Hatta in 1948.7 Hatta had cautioned against taking sides as the Cold War developed post-WWII, advocating a middle course between the two blocs or “rowing between two reefs” instead.8 Hatta’s position was that “Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal – the goal of a fully independent Indonesia”.9 As Vibhansu Shekhar puts it: “It is not an exaggeration to state that nearly every Indonesian foreign policy maker, member of its strategic community and Indonesia watchers from outside know that the ‘bebas dan aktif’ (free and active) approach has formed the central tenet of Indonesian foreign policy since independence”. 10 Indonesian elites commonly espouse it in foreign policy or security speeches. Nevertheless, the principle’s use has changed over time. It is possible to identify four different interpretations over Sukarno’s tenure as Indonesia’s first president.11 First, during the Liberal Democracy period in the early 1950s, an independent and active foreign policy prohibited international agreements aligning Indonesia to either Cold War bloc. Second, Indonesian elites reinterpreted this more widely as balancing relations with both blocs. Third, when Sukarno become more authoritarian in the latter Guided Democracy part of his reign from 1959, such balancing encompassed even economic relations with both blocs. Fourth, Sukarno subsequently evolved a distinct third path of supporting decolonialism and opposing neo-imperialism from the independent and active principle. This manifested in the 1963 Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly independent Malaysia, which Suharto deemed a neocolonial construct. Following the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto in 1965, Suharto increased Indonesia’s reliance on Western economic aid and ended Confrontation in 1966. Suharto kept the original tenet of official nonalignment, whilst more radical interpretations were discontinued. Rizal Sukma points out that: “In practice, the bebas-aktif principle was replete with nuances and subject to criticisms”, such as against the close Western

7 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12:3 (1990), p. 227. 8 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Speech by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA)," Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2005, accessed 7 February 2019, https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/presiden/Pages/Speech-by- H.E.-Dr.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-President-of-the-Republic-of-Indonesia-before-the-Indone.aspx. 9 Quoted in Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, (London: George Allen & Unwin, for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 20. 10 Vibhanshu Shekhar, Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific Power, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), p. 2, emphasis original. 11 Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 162-270.

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economic cooperation during Suharto’s New Order.12 Dewi Fortuna Anwar even highlights that a truly independent and active foreign policy was only possible post-Cold War.13 The short-lived Indonesian administrations that followed Suharto’s downfall and Reformation continued to utilise the free and active guideline. These were: B. J. Habibie, Suharto’s vice-president who took over briefly from Suharto; Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur and elected president in 1999 by the Indonesian parliament due to political infighting despite his party’s small numbers in parliament; and Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s daughter who took over after Gus Dur was impeached in 2001. Democratisation was consolidated more firmly after Indonesia moved towards direct presidential elections from 2004, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected twice, the constitutional limit. Yudhoyono was president for the majority of the 2006 to 2016 timeframe covered by this thesis, until Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, was elected in 2014. According to Yudhoyono in his first foreign policy speech, Hatta’s Cold War reefs had instead become a veritable turbulent ocean in the post-Cold War international environment. Yudhoyono thus reinterpreted the independent and active principle:

as always, it entails “independence of judgment” and “freedom of action”. But I would also add the necessity of a constructive approach in the conduct of foreign policy . . . But there is no use having an independent mind and freedom of action if we end-up making the wrong turns or become marginalized. And there is no sense for us to be different just for the sake of being different, or to be active just for its own sake. Our independence and activism must therefore be combined with a constructive mindset so that we can attain our national objectives . . . independent and active means that we will NOT enter into any military alliances . . . continue our policy of not allowing any foreign military bases on Indonesian territory. Indonesia does not have a country which we consider a threat or an enemy.14

Despite wanting to be independent and active, there was also a degree of flexibility. Crucially, independence did not necessarily mean rejecting or opposing other perspectives, such as US

12 Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia's Bebas‐Aktif Foreign Policy and the ‘Security Agreement’ with Australia," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 51:2 (1997), p. 233, emphasis original. 13 Anwar, "The Impact," p. 127. 14 Yudhoyono, "Speech (ICWA)".

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representations. Indonesia could accept other perspectives within reason and if aligned to the Indonesian national interest. Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia agreed strategic partnerships with other states, such as India in 2005. Similarly, Jokowi upgraded Indonesian-India ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2018. Shekhar points out that the independent and active principle “has come to represent Sukarno’s non-alignment, Suharto’s limited alignment and democratic Indonesia’s multiple alignments”, 15 highlighting the fungibility of some aspects of Indonesia’s core foreign policy principle. Indonesia’s independent and active principle also manifested as a commitment to ASEAN, another vital prong of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Some observers contend that Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN’s formation was a way for Indonesia to implement its independent and active principle towards regional autonomy.16 However, Indonesia’s struggles during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that led to Suharto’s abdication shifted Indonesia’s priority. Following the recession, Indonesia concentrated on urgent domestic matters such as economic recovery and democratisation, only refocusing on foreign policy and ASEAN during the Yudhoyono era.17 Yudhoyono reaffirmed ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy, pushing also for Indonesia to have “a million friends and zero enemies”. 18 When Indonesia assumed ASEAN’s yearly rotating chairmanship in 2011, Natalegawa, Yudhoyono’s foreign minister, further proposed a “dynamic equilibrium” principle – differing from a “balance of power” – to always maintain equipoise even as regional power politics were being altered, to ensure stability.19 “Dynamic equilibrium” and “ASEAN centrality” (see Chapter 4) are “complementary”.20 In contrast, some have identified an Indonesian-ASEAN divergence under Jokowi.21 In adhering to the independent and active principle, Jokowi wanted Indonesia to forge its own

15 Shekhar, Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy, p. 4. 16 See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 174. 17 Ralf Emmers, "Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectorial Leadership," The Pacific Review, 27:4 (2014), p. 544. 18 For instance, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occasion of the 64th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia," Indonesia Ministry of the State Secretariat, 14 August 2009, accessed 5 October 2016, http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3880&Itemid=26. 19 Marty Natalegawa, "Annual Press Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs," Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 2011, accessed 9 February 2019, https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/lembar- informasi/Pages/Annual-Press-Statement-of-the-Minister-of-Foreign-Affairs.aspx. 20 Leonard C. Sebastian, "Indonesia's Dynamic Equilibrium and ASEAN Centrality," in Prospects of Multilateral Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: To Overcome the Gap of Security Outlooks, ed. NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs, (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), p. 22. 21 For instance, Vibhanshu Shekhar, "Realist Indonesia's Drift Away from ASEAN," Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 323 (2015).

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“axis” – a World Maritime Axis or Global Maritime Fulcrum – underscoring Indonesia’s position at the geostrategic junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indonesia preferred these oceans to “remain peaceful and safe for world trade instead of being a battlefield for natural resources, territorial conflicts and maritime supremacy”. 22 Jokowi’s approach emphasised bilateralism, even as he focused more on domestic matters, deviating from ASEAN’s multilateralism.23 Sukma, also Jokowi’s foreign policy advisor, therefore stated in 2014 that: “We used to say ASEAN is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Now we change it to a cornerstone of our foreign policy”.24 Though ASEAN remained important to Indonesia, its importance had diminished from Yudhoyono’s presidency. The next two sections analyses Indonesia’s bilateral relations with China and the US in light of its foreign policy approaches before investigating whether Indonesia has accepted US representations of China’s rise as a collective security risk, with this context.

Stubborn Shadows of “Red Menace” and “Yellow Peril” to “Blue Dread”

Indonesia-China ties have been complicated since Indonesia established relations with China in 1950. China was also the first communist state with which Indonesia established official ties as Indonesia sought to demonstrate its independent and active foreign policy. However, there was opposition to this. To begin with, a 1948 armed conflict involving the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) caused Indonesian leaders to become “highly suspicious of internal communist intent”. 25 Objections, “especially from Muslim groups” were thus twofold: considering the large ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia, “the presence of a Chinese embassy in Jakarta could intensify ethnic Chinese sympathies for mainland Chinese nationalism, whatever form such nationalism might take”; on top of a resurgence of the PKI with Chinese help.26 Indonesia was concerned not just with the communist “Red Menace” discourse, but the racist “Yellow Peril” too. Wang Jen-shu, China’s first ambassador to Indonesia, tried to win the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia over to Beijing’s cause, away from Taiwan’s. Wang even protected a PKI leader within the Chinese embassy during a 1951

22 See Rendi A. Witular, "Presenting Maritime Doctrine," The Jakarta Post, 14 November 2014. 23 Avery Poole, "Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?" The Diplomat, 2015, accessed 9 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean/. 24 Quoted in Prashanth Parameswaran, "Is Indonesia Turning Away from ASEAN under Jokowi?" The Diplomat, 18 December 2014, accessed 9 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/is-indonesia-turning-away-from- asean-under-jokowi/, emphasis original. 25 Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship, (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 21. 26 "Indonesia's Perceptions of China: The Domestic Bases of Persistent Ambiguity," in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 183.

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Indonesian crackdown on the PKI, seeming to confirm Indonesian suspicions.27 Beijing then began a campaign in 1959 to entice overseas Chinese back to mainland China. Indonesia eventually had to confiscate the property and belongings of those ethnic Chinese who left Indonesia for China for fear of an economic meltdown.28 The spectres of the “Yellow Peril” and “Red Menace” in the political, economic and societal sectors made the early Indonesia- China relationship a very uneasy one. However, a “Jakarta-Beijing Axis” started forming during the period of Guided Democracy. Sukarno had growing international ambitions of supporting decolonialism and opposing neo-imperialism. For instance, he commenced Operation Trikora in 1962, a military operation led by then Major-General Suharto, to “liberate” West Irian (now Papua) from the Dutch. Indonesia also withdrew from the UN in 1965 during Confrontation. China supported Indonesia’s anti-establishment stance and this greater political convergence shored up their previously fragile relationship. During Guided Democracy, the Indonesian domestic political arrangement was also predominantly “tripartite”, comprising a balance between the three power poles of Sukarno, the PKI and the military.29 The resurgent PKI naturally welcomed greater alignment with China, 30 but popular support for China remained low, 31 even as Indonesian stayed officially nonaligned. The incipient “Jakarta-Beijing Axis” was reversed after Suharto took over Sukarno. Tensions between the PKI and the Indonesian military came to a head in 1965 with an attempted coup against Sukarno, thwarted by Suharto. Indonesia’s official explanation was that the PKI masterminded the coup. The military consequently purged the PKI and its supporters.32 Crucially, along “with the destruction of the PKI in the domestic arena, the army also moved to eliminate the Party’s external ally, China, by charging it with supporting the abortive coup”.33 Ethnic Chinese were also swept up in this PKI purge as anti-communist and anti- China protests erupted, and the Chinese embassy in Jakarta was attacked. Indonesia froze diplomatic relations with China in 1967, with China reciprocating, completing an about-turn in Indonesia-China ties. Suharto’s New Order depicted China “as the main threat to Indonesia’s

27 Ibid. 28 David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949-1967, (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007; repr. 1976, 2004, Cornell University Press), pp. 95 and 171-175. 29 Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, 36:4 (Winter, 1963-1964), pp. 353-354. 30 Sukma, Indonesia and China, p. 32. 31 Sukma, "Indonesia's Perceptions of China," p. 184, emphasis original. 32 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007; repr. 1978, 1988, Cornell University Press), p. 155. 33 Sukma, Indonesia and China, p. 33.

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national security”, though not in terms of military incursions by China. Rather, this was “a widely held belief that the so-called ‘China threat’ to Indonesia would come mainly in the form of subversion” via a “triangular threat” logic arising from the nexus of China, the PKI and the ethnic Chinese.34 Indonesia’s elites believed that: (1) remnants of the PKI constituted an internal threat to Indonesia; (2) the loyalty of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese remained questionable; and (3) China’s antagonistic regional communist policy might involve the ethnic Chinese minority or the PKI. Hence, the New Order also practised discriminatory assimilation policies towards solving the “Chinese minority problem”.35 Both the “Yellow Peril” and the “Red Menace” continued to inform the “triangular threat” from China in the political and societal sectors during Suharto’s New Order. Indonesia only resumed direct trading with China in 1985, with diplomatic normalisation in 1990. The reasons for rapprochement were varied. These ranged from Suharto’s international ambitions as Indonesia became more stable and prosperous, for example wanting to lead the Non-Aligned Movement, to economic opportunities as China opens up and rises. The post-Cold War environment mattered too.36 Importantly, the political and societal sources of the “triangular threat” were ameliorated. Chinese reforms under Deng Xiaoping (see Chapter 2) included cutting Chinese support for foreign communist parties, and in 1989, then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen also personally reassured Suharto that China would neither “interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia” nor back the PKI. 37 Regarding the “Chinese minority problem”, assimilation and other naturalisation measures had some success such that by 1986, the number of China citizens or stateless ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had reduced fourfold from about a million in the 1970s.38 China also promulgated a law in 1980 which confirmed the citizenship of Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese population.39 Yet, various quarters expressed reservations about resuming ties with China. In particular, the Indonesian military warned that renewed Indonesia-China ties would kickstart communism in Indonesia once again, harming stability and hampering Indonesia’s economic development. It perceived China to be a security threat since it believed that China’s “ultimate ambition was to dominate Southeast Asia by supporting communist insurgency movements

34 Sukma, "Indonesia's Perceptions of China," pp. 184-185; Rizal Sukma, "Recent Developments in Sino- Indonesian Relations: An Indonesian View," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16:1 (1994), p. 37. 35 See Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order," Asian Survey, 16:8 (1976), pp. 770-787. 36 Sukma, Indonesia and China, chapters 6 and 7. 37 Ian Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22:1 (2000), p. 149. 38 Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough," Asian Survey, 30:7 (1990), p. 690. 39 Suryadinata, The Making of Southeast Asian Nations, p. 90.

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and direct military action”.40 Even though the foreign ministry was more welcoming of China overall, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesia’s foreign minister from 1978 to 1988, had cautioned as late as 1982 that “ultimately the biggest threat is China”.41 After all, the New Order’s account for legitimacy post-coup was essentially anti-communist, despite official non- alignment according to the independent and active principle. The “Chinese minority problem” also persisted in the manner of “the economic position of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society and its political consequences”.42 In 1994, China’s harsh statement against Indonesia with reference to an anti-Chinese riot in Medan caused Indonesia to warn China against interfering in its domestic affairs.43 In addition, by 1992, the Indonesian government was deliberating protectionist measures to repel cheap Chinese imports.44 Indonesia-China relations in the political, economic and societal sectors continued to lie within the shadows of the “Red Menace” and “Yellow Peril”. An early outline of the “Blue Dread” in the military, political and economic sectors joined these two discourses as China grew increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea in the 1990s (see Chapter 2) over its nine-dash line claims. Indonesia had asked China to clarify the status of the Natuna Islands, with its large gas reserves, during the 1995 Mischief Reef incident. Whilst China’s reply acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty over the islands, it also noted that the two states should resolve the “existing issue of delimiting the sea border through bilateral negotiations and consultations”, implying overlapping Indonesian and Chinese claims in the waters near the Natunas.45 Subsequently, Qian told then Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would determine any resolution, which Alatas deemed “quite satisfactory”, as it paralleled Indonesia’s own stance.46 UNCLOS would only grant an exclusive economic zone up to two hundred nautical miles from baselines, and China was too far away, even accounting for its Spratlys claims, to have an EEZ claim without any corresponding Natunas claims. Indonesia’s official position was thus that there was no territorial dispute between it and China. Nevertheless, the Indonesian military conducted its biggest ever military exercises near the Natunas in 1996 in an ostensible show of

40 Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy," pp. 147-148. 41 Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Normalizing' Relations with China: Indonesia's Policies and Perceptions," Asian Survey, 26:8 (1986), p. 919. 42 Sukma, Indonesia and China, p. 137. 43 Sukma, "Recent Developments," p. 36. 44 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 14:4 (1993), p. 362. 45 Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy," p. 159. 46 Quoted in Leo Suryadinata and Mustafa Izzudin, "The Natunas: Territorial Integrity in the Forefront of Indonesia–China Relations," Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 5 (2017), p. 15.

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force.47 Despite normalisation, Indonesia remained suspicious and vigilant in its dealings with China.48 Ties improved after Suharto. Indonesia appreciated China’s financial support for its crashed economy, as well as China downplaying the anti-Chinese riots during the Asian Financial Crisis.49 Indonesia then sought closer ties with China during the Reformation period and reduced Chinese discrimination in Indonesia. For instance, Gus Dur ended Suharto’s ban on practising Chinese culture.50 According to Sukma, the Indonesian perception of China was further enhanced by China’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) aid to Indonesia after the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami.51 Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia and China agreed to a strategic partnership in 2005. The two upgraded this to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013. Jokowi has similarly been very keen on economic ties with China, awarding a contract to China to build a high-speed rail connecting Jakarta to Bandung in 2015. Despite the growing Indonesia-China relationship, it remains fraught with challenges. Progress in military and security cooperation is dilatory, notwithstanding the strategic partnership. This is due in part to “lingering distrust” within the Indonesian military over “China’s long-term intentions in Southeast Asia”, particularly over the Natunas.52 Though Indonesia persists in its stance of not being a party to the SCS disputes officially, concerns remain over Chinese claims. There are also economic trepidations over cheap Chinese imports flooding the Indonesian market.53 Furthermore, anti-Chinese sentiments appear to be rising in Indonesia. Various groups have also criticised Jokowi for being too pro-China, for instance, by allowing a growing number of Chinese workers into Indonesia.54 Overall, Indonesian fears and suspicions of the “Yellow Peril” linger today, though the “Blue Dread” has largely replaced the shadow of the “Red Menace”. These mainly take the form of risks in the military, political, economic and societal sectors, as the following sections demonstrate. Of the Indonesian texts examined for the purpose of this dissertation, the

47 Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy," p. 161. 48 Sukma, "Indonesia's Perceptions of China," p. 185. 49 Daojiong Zha, "China and the May 1998 Riots of Indonesia: Exploring the Issues," The Pacific Review, 13:4 (2000), pp. 563-569. 50 Christine Susanna Tjhin, "Indonesia's Perceptions of the 'China Threat': From 'Yellow Threat from the North' to 'Strategic Partner'," in China's Rise - Threat or Opportunity? ed. Herbert Yee, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 197-198. 51 Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia–China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement," Asian Survey, 49:4 (2009), pp. 601-602. 52 Ian Storey, "China and Indonesia: Military-Security Ties Fail to Gain Momentum," China Brief, 9:4 (2009), p. 8. 53 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia-China Relations: Handle with Care," ISEAS Perspective, No. 19 (2019), p. 4. 54 See Leo Suryadinata, "The Growing 'Strategic Partnership' between Indonesia and China Faces Difficult Challenges," Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 15 (2017), pp. 17-21 and 23-25.

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“communist” topic only appeared twice. The first was the 2008 Indonesia DWP highlighting that an “ideological communist threat is still latent”, though this disappeared in the 2015 iteration. 55 The second was by then Indonesian Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu in response to a question posed during the 2016 SLD about the communist threat. Ryacudu replied simply that: “We respect communist ideology and have no feelings of hostility towards it. However, the Indonesian Communist Party staged revolts twice, in 1948 and 1965. That is a matter of record and must be kept an eye on”. 56 He did not link this to China. Before investigating the interactions between the US security representations of China’s rise amidst Indonesia’s perception of the “Yellow Peril” and the “Blue Dread”, the next section first provides a brief overview of Indonesia-US relations.

Cooperative Contours of “Nonalignment”

Compared to the complicated Indonesia-China relationship, Indonesia-US ties have been a lot smoother overall, notwithstanding a rocky start. The US was initially unwilling to back Indonesia’s war of independence, causing Indonesian leaders to lose faith with the US. 57 Relations worsened in the 1950s. The US attempted to coopt Indonesia during the Cold War with its 1951 Mutual Security Act, despite Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy. This caused the ousting of the Indonesian government then. The US also supported the 1957 Sulawesi and Sumatra rebellions when Sukarno grew closer to the PKI and China during the Guided Democracy era. Sukarno further came to believe that the 1957 Cikini assassination attempt on him was a US plot.58 Indonesia grew increasingly anti-US during the Sukarno years. However, there was a dramatic shift during the New Order era. The thwarted coup supposedly orchestrated by the PKI meant that Suharto drew Indonesia closer to the Western bloc. In practice, Indonesia was anti-communist, as were the other members of ASEAN, with the regional organisation meant to serve as a bulwark against communism. The “West became Indonesia’s chief source of economic assistance and the US became the key patron of the Indonesian military, providing aid, equipment and training”. Even the 1975 Indonesian

55 Indonesia Ministry of Defence, "Defence White Paper," (2008), p. 29. 56 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2016 Third Plenary Session: Making Defence Policy in Uncertain Times: Q & A," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2016-4a4b/plenary3-b139/qa- aeeb. 57 Murphy, "United States Relations with Southeast Asia," p. 251. 58 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, (New York: The New Press, 1995), pp. 3-19 and 115.

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invasion of East Timor was carried out with tacit US approval.59 Close cooperation between Indonesia and the US did not mean that Indonesia was only paying lip service to its independent and active principle though. Rather, the New Order stuck pragmatically to the principle’s core tenet of not having alliances that would chain Indonesia to either superpower as Indonesia pursued greater autonomy free from external influence under the ASEAN ambit. Strong Indonesia-US bonds lasted till the end of the Cold War, after which the US promoted human rights, democracy and free markets (see Chapter 4). This undermined ties with Indonesia. A 1991 US arms restriction placed upon Indonesia due to human rights violations in Papua and East Timor forced the Indonesian military to buy Russian hardware instead.60 The AFC additionally led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose the privatising and restructuring of the Indonesian economy as part of its bailout in accordance to the “Washington Consensus”. Though Indonesia then started on the path of reform and democratisation with US support, it remained a “problem state” for the US.61 Under Habibie, problems arose over economic reforms and corruption, with the IMF suspending aid in 1999. Such scandals similarly plagued Gus Dur, and he also failed to account for the atrocities committed by the Indonesian military in the wake of the 1999 East Timor independence referendum, which had resulted in a US arms embargo. The ambivalent state of Indonesia-US affairs persisted until the 9/11 attacks, though ties remained delicate. Post-9/11, the US renewed its interest, wanting to make Indonesia a partner in its “Second Front” of the Global War on Terror (see Chapter 4). Indonesia was critical as both a “‘model of moderation’ in the Muslim world, and as a source of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked terrorism with presumed connections to Al-Qaeda”.62 Indonesia was itself attacked by the JI in the October 2002 Bali bombings, but its criticisms of the Bush Doctrine’s military emphasis in the GWoT (see Chapter 2) grew,63 especially after the 2003 US preventive war on Iraq. Throughout her presidency, “Megawati equivocated over Indonesia’s political commitment to fighting international terrorism, in order to appease domestic political constituencies”.64 Military-to-military ties between Indonesia and the US

59 Ann Marie Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32:3 (2010), p. 365. 60 Damien Kingsbury, "Indonesia in 2007: Unmet Expectations, Despite Improvement," Asian Survey, 48:1 (2008), p. 44. 61 Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia," pp. 367-370. 62 Anthony L. Smith, "A Glass Half-Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25:3 (2003), p. 449. 63 David Capie, "Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The 'War on Terror' and Southeast Asian-US Relations," The Pacific Review, 17:2 (2004), pp. 227-230. 64 Andrew Chau, "Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S. and ASEAN's Counter-Terror Strategy," Asian Survey, 48:4 (2008), p. 637.

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were restricted due to US congressional objections over the slowness of Indonesian military and political reforms. Similarly, the arms embargo continued despite the need to boost Indonesian security forces for the “Second Front”, to the chagrin of the Indonesian military. Indonesian-US ties were only comprehensively strengthened after Yudhoyono succeeded Megawati. Yudhoyono’s status as Indonesia’s first directly elected president in free and fair elections demonstrated Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. Furthermore, Yudhoyono was himself very involved in counterterrorism as a former general and Megawati’s coordinating minister for political and security affairs, hence aligning Indonesia to US interests more fully “than at any time since the Cold War”.65 US HADR efforts expended on Indonesia’s behalf during the 2004 tsunami disaster also caused a drastic improvement in bilateral ties. A 2005 Indonesian poll highlighted that post-tsunami, sixty-five percent of Indonesians were in favour of the US whilst opposition to the GWoT dropped to thirty-six from seventy-two percent in 2003, even as the Bush Administration lifted the arms embargo in 2005.66 The scope of Indonesia-US cooperation expanded, and by 2006, “the two countries had declared a broad based democratic partnership based on equality, mutual respect, common interests and shared values of freedom, pluralism and tolerance”.67 Subsequently, during the Obama Administration, the US and Indonesia upgraded their bilateral relationship – between the world’s second and third largest democracies – to a comprehensive partnership in 2010, and to a strategic partnership in 2015, following Jokowi’s trip to the US. Generally, in spite of the various peaks and troughs, and amidst phases of ambivalence, Indonesia has maintained a good relationship with the US, and most of the Indonesian elite perceives the US as “a fundamentally benign and trustworthy power”.68 Yet, the independent and active principle is still present as Indonesia pursues its own national interest, as opposed to slaving its foreign policy to the US, such as in disputing the military high-handedness of the Bush Doctrine.

65 Murphy, "US Rapprochement with Indonesia," p. 373. 66 Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia and the Tsunami: Responses and Foreign Policy Implications," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60:2 (2006), p. 225; Murray Hiebert, Ted Osius, and Gregory B. Poling, A U.S.-Indonesia Partnership for 2020: Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship, (Washington D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield for Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), p. 7. 67 Shekhar, Indonesia's Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy, p. 212; see also George W. Bush, "Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 20 November 2006, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24310. 68 Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Dave McRae, "Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence," (United States Studies Centre at the University of Sdyney, 2015), p. 12.

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Surface Silhouettes of “Partial Success”

To recap, Chapter 5 has demonstrated that the US has represented China’s rise as a collective security risk in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors. This section, and the bulk of the chapter, analyses whether these US representations have been accepted in Indonesia against the context of Indonesia’s relationships with China and the US as outlined above, starting with the military sector.

Military

In the military sector, the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to collective peace and stability stemmed from China’s secretive military buildup. This came with a US demand of increased transparency from China, as well as the US preventive practices of increasing military capacities in the Asia-Pacific to deter China. However, whilst this US representation had taken place right from the start of this study’s timeframe, Indonesia’s support of it was not as straightforward, with some countersecuritisation thrown in for good measure. To begin with, some convergence can be identified from Indonesia repeating the US military warnings and demands. However, of the primary texts studied, this only started in 2011, the year of Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship. For instance, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesian’s defence minister from 2009 to 2014, said in his 2011 SLD speech on military reforms that he supported “the call for enhanced transparency in military capabilities as a means to ensure regional stability”.69 Yusgiantoro was also asked during the session: “whose enhanced transparency on military capabilities are we talking about?” This question was left unanswered however. 70 Though Yusgiantoro did not specify offenders, the propositional content behind it was likely China’s secretive military buildup. Similarly, in a question and answer following the second US-Indonesia Joint Commission Meeting (JCM) with then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 – the JCM being part of the Indonesia-US comprehensive partnership framework – in which South China Sea developments were

69 Purnomo Yusgiantoro, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2011 Second Plenary Session: New Military Doctrines and Capabilities in Asia," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/second-plenary- session-f172/purnomo-yusgiantoro-8b76. 70 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2011 Second Plenary Session: New Military Doctrines and Capabilities in Asia: Q&A," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/second-plenary- session-f172/qa-662e.

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discussed, then Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa emphasised the importance of “transparency” in relation to “the potentials for miscalculation”, like the US, although he stressed the need to deal with these issues “within the diplomatic process”.71 At first glance, Indonesia’s 2015 DWP also seemed to have highlighted and agreed with the US representation of the risk from China’s rise in the military sector, linking it to the SCS disputes:

A very dynamic development of the Asia-Pacific region will impact on economic and security issues . . . Chinese economic growth enables the country to modernize its military . . . creates worry about the military balance, thus, it can be a security dilemma for countries in the region . . . South China Sea disputes involving several countries may affect the stability of security in the Asia Pacific region . . . have the potential to become an (open) armed conflict . . . use the military instrument to strengthen their claim, the involvement of countries outside the region in the conflict, and there being no institution or credible international organization in resolving this dispute. Instead, armed conflict will not happen because ASEAN member states have made commitments amongst of themselves in the settlement of the conflict without using armed violence. This decision was reached through dialogue and brotherhood based on mutual understanding, respects, and trust.72

However, there was no mention of the need for greater military transparency within the passage above, nor elsewhere in the DWP, even as the US took a harsher stance towards China from 2014 (refer to Chapter 4). Rather, although the 2015 DWP recognised the potential for miscalculations due to a security dilemma caused by China’s military buildup, it downplayed the likelihood of armed military conflict in the SCS disputes. It instead underscored the role of the ASEAN and the concomitant pledges by its member states to not resort to the use of force in resolving disputes. Indonesia was thus proposing another account that resisted the military-

71 Hillary Clinton, "Remarks with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa after Their Meeting," U.S. Department of State, 24 July 2011, accessed 7 January 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168997.htm. 72 Indonesia Ministry of Defence, "Defence White Paper," (2015), pp. 7-9.

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centric claims of the US instead, setting up ASEAN as the key player in handling the SCS disputes.73 Although Indonesia identified with the US representation over China’s secretive military buildup as risking stability in the Asia-Pacific, rather than demanding outright accountability and transparency from China, Indonesia was more interested in doing so indirectly by stressing the importance of building trust, through diplomacy and institutionalisation via ASEAN. For example, Yudhoyono, in his keynote speech at the 2012 SLD, also highlighted the risks from “conditions of mistrust, miscalculation and miscommunication, which give rise to occasional eruptions of incidents”. Though the “overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims” were “still a long way from being resolved”, ways could be sought to “transform the potential conflicts in the South China Sea into potential cooperation”. He therefore promoted the “dynamic equilibrium” principle to accommodate the rise of China. According to Yudhoyono, the “pursuit of security” by emerging powers “need not be done at the expense of the insecurity of others”, and there was “always room for new stakeholders, so long as they invest in common peace and progress”. In his speech, Yudhoyono further proposed joint military exercises to build military-to-military trust, and crucially positioned ASEAN as the lodestone of regional stability. 74 Yudhoyono also echoed the “dynamic equilibrium” theme in his 2014 “State Address” to the Indonesian parliament.75 Hence, though the claim and warning repeated those of the US, Indonesia’s demand for greater multilateral political cooperation was different from the US demand of transparency. There were many other examples in the selected texts of Indonesia countering US representations of China’s rise as a risk to peace and stability in terms of the Indonesian political measures required to respond to this risk. During the 2014 SLD, for instance, Yusgiantoro reiterated that military modernisation does not equate to an arms race, although the former “does need a positive regional security framework marked by confidence-building measures, trust and transparency”. He also stressed that conflict was not “inevitable” as the

73 For countersecuritisations, see Stritzel and Chang, "Securitization and Counter-Securitization," pp. 548-567; Catherine Charrett, "A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," in ICIP Working Paper, No. 7, (Barcelona: International Catalan Institute for Peace, December 2009). 74 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2012 Keynote Address: An Architecture for Durable Peace in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address- 9e17/keynote-address-7244. 75 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occasion of the 69th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia," Indonesia Ministry of the State Secretariat, 15 August 2014, accessed 10 May 2016, http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=8102.

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Asia-Pacific adjusted to the “evolving dynamic equilibrium”, such that “when they [the Great Powers] compete for peace, when they compete for progress”, there would be growth and stability for everyone.76 Earlier, when Yusgiantoro was asked whether China was “a threat to your country and to the region” during the 2012 SLD, he explicitly answered that “We do not see that China is a threat for Indonesia or for the region”. In contrast, his fellow panellists, Indian Minister of Defence A. K. Antony and Japanese Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defence Shu Watanabe, both highlighted their states’ concerns with China’s rapid and opaque military expansion.77 In addition, though Jokowi dropped the “dynamic equilibrium” phrase, as he did Yudhoyono’s “million friends and zero enemies”, Jokowi did not differ substantively from Yudhoyono, focusing on the core of a political solution.78 Likewise, Jokowi’s defence minister, Ryacudu, stressed during the 2016 SLD: “the commitment of the conflicting parties to reach agreement with mutual respect and in good faith to solve this problem will ameliorate or even eliminate conflict in the South China Sea”. He further highlighted that “communication” and “prioritising dialogue, openness and transparency, as well as cooperating with the media, to resolve issues peacefully, equitably and with mutual respect in keeping with the spirit of ASEAN, and the spirit of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” was the way forward for Asia- Pacific stability.79 Hence, even as Indonesia largely identified with the US representation of China’s rise as a risk in the military sector and repeated US warnings and demands in relation to transparency, Indonesia’s focus was subtly different. Indonesia was actually countersecuritising and pushing the US portrayal of the risk from China’s rise away from the military sector and into the political sector. This was in line with its independent and active principle. As Sukma also points out, Indonesia does not conceive of China’s rise “in terms of ‘military threat,’ but more in terms of China’s future role and place in the region, and how it

76 Purnomo Yusgiantoro, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Third Plenary Session: Managing Strategic Tensions," International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri- la-dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-3-bce0/yusgiantoro-9bca. 77 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2012 Second Plenary Sesssion: Q&A," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri- la-dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/second-plenary-session-25b4/qa-762d. 78 See for instance, Joko Widodo, "State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occcasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia," Indonesia Ministry of the State Secretariat, 18 August 2015, accessed 10 May 2016, http://setkab.go.id/en/state-address-of-the- president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-on-the-occasion-of-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-proclamation-of- independence-of-the-republic-of-indonesia/. 79 Ryamizard Ryacudu, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2016 Third Plenary Session: Making Defence Policy in Uncertain Times " International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2016-4a4b/plenary3- b139/ryacudu-c735.

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will affect the regional security architecture” as “the uncertainty surrounding China’s rise remains a strategic challenge”.80 With regard to practices in the military sector, on the surface, Indonesia has been keen on building up its military capacity with the aid of the US. For instance, it established its Integrated Maritime Surveillance System covering strategic parts of its maritime straits with US funding.81 In 2011, the US also agreed to transfer twenty-four F-16s to Indonesia to enable it to defend its airspace under the US Excess Defense Articles Program. This was the “largest transfer of defense articles in the history of the U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relationship”, and “a signal of the growing commitment to regional security under the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership”.82 However, even if more than a quarter of the almost two hundred Indonesian Army officers sent overseas had “enrolled in 34 courses and programs” in the US by 2015, the Indonesian military’s “doctrinal documents and education materials in recent decades barely align with US conceptions of war-fighting, professionalism or civil–military relations”.83 This was unlike the growing interoperability between the Japanese and US militaries, for example. Indonesia’s goal was simply to strengthen and modernise its own armed forces, rather than support the US security practice of building up a partner’s military capacity to prevent the military risk from China’s rise, like in the case of Japan and India (see Chapter 5). Indonesia’s reception of the US Pivot’s military prong more starkly illustrated its rejection of US preventive practices with respect to China’s rise as a potential military risk. Naturally, Indonesia’s independent and active principle prohibits foreign bases or troops stationed within the archipelago. In addition to this, Indonesia criticised the deployment of up to 2,500 US Marines to Australia in 2011 under the Pivot’s military rebalancing. Foreign Minister Natalegawa cautioned that doing so might trigger a “vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust”, whilst Indonesians also “reacted negatively to the presence of US troops”. 84 Furthermore, during the 2014 SLD, a member of the audience posed a question: whether there

80 Quoted in Hamilton-Hart and McRae, "Indonesia," p. 16, emphasis removed. 81 Office of the Spokesperson, "DOD-Funded Integrated Maritime Surveillance System," U.S. Department of State, 18 November 2011, accessed 22 February 2019, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177382.htm. 82 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: Excess Defense Article (EDA) F-16 Refurbishment," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 18 November 2011, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=123005&st=indonesia&st1=; see also Barack Obama, "Joint Statement by President Obama and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 18 November 2011, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=97082&st=indonesia&st1=. 83 Evan A. Laksmana, "Are Military Assistance Programs Important for US-Indonesia Ties?" East Asia Forum, 18 April 2018. 84 Cited in Euan Graham, "Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35:3 (2013), p. 322.

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were “any possible circumstances where your country might consider accepting the rotation presence of US forces?” Yusgiantoro diplomatically avoided the question, saying only that Indonesia had “no problems” with US forces in the Asia-Pacific because “we don’t see that as a threat to us, to Indonesia”.85 Ultimately, Indonesia’s stance towards the overall US Rebalance was “ambivalent” at best; preferring the Pivot’s diplomatic approach over its military slant.86 The US representation of China’s rise as a risk to Asia-Pacific peace and stability has therefore not been fully successful in Indonesia. Even as Indonesia has repeated US speech acts, identifying with the risk from China’s rise in the military sector, Indonesia’s purpose was shifting the military risk from China’s rise to the political realm instead. In particular, Indonesia has rejected US security practices aimed at preventing the military risk from China’s rise. Although Indonesia countersecuritised the US representation of China’s rise as a risk in the military sector in the Asia-Pacific, Indonesia itself represented China’s rise as a military risk towards its own sovereignty. For instance, Indonesia’s 2008 DWP claimed and warned that although “invasion or military aggression from outside is estimated to be less likely”, there was still the likelihood of a “military threat” that challenges Indonesia in the form of “territorial violations carried out by other countries”. This was in reference to border violations like IUU fishing or the “sabotage, hijacking or piracy of important installations and vital objects at sea”.87 Likewise, the 2015 DWP assessed the threat of “open conflict” or “conventional war” as unlikely, referring to these as “non-factual threats”; compared to “factual threats” like terrorism or border violations.88 Although neither DWP specified China with reference to border violations, the 2015 DWP further demanded “the development of defence force” in the Natunas in anticipation of “the development of the maritime situation of Indonesia’s territory”.89 The propositional content in these two DWP was Chinese behaviour in the waters near the Natunas. For example, in 2013, a Chinese maritime law enforcement ship threatened an Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries vessel into releasing the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel arrested for IUU fishing in the area.90

85 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Third Plenary Sesssion: Managing Strategic Tensions: Q&A," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-3-bce0/qa-3d38. 86 Evelyn Goh, "Indonesia's New Strategic Outlook under Jokowi: Change, Continuity, and Challenges," in A Strategy Towards Indonesia, ed. Evelyn Goh, Greg Fealy, and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, (Canberra: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2015), p. 7. 87 Indonesia Ministry of Defence, "DWP 2008," pp. 7, 26-28 and 47. 88 Indonesia Ministry of Defence, "DWP 2015," pp. 24-25. 89 Ibid., p. 42. 90 See Scott Bentley, "Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the South China Sea," The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 29 October 2013, accessed 25 February 2019,

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In terms of its own security practices, Indonesia has also taken steps to deter China’s encroachment into the waters near the Natunas. Although Indonesia commonly downplayed such incidents with China, in 2014, the Indonesia military “announced plans to deploy fighter jets and attack helicopters” to the Natunas “in response to Chinese claims”.91 Following similar incidents in 2016, Jokowi even held a cabinet meeting onboard an Indonesian warship near the Natunas to signal Indonesia’s determination to safeguard the Natuna Islands’ EEZ.92 Jokowi also declared in his 2016 “State Address” that: “We develop the regions such as Entikong, Natuna, and Atambua for the world to see and recognise Indonesia as a great country whose every square inch of her land is constantly treasured, defended and well taken care of”.93 Even as Indonesia has portrayed China’s rise as a security risk in reference to the territorial integrity of the Natunas and its waters,94 its perspective has ironically remained that China was neither a direct military threat nor a major military risk to the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia has only partially agreed with the US representation of China’s military buildup as a collective risk, instead preferring to transfer such a security concern from the military to the political sector at the supra-regional level.

Political

Within the political sector, Indonesia has more readily repeated and mirrored the US representation of China’s rise as constituting a risk to the rules-based order. The US representation was especially with reference to the freedom of navigation, which led to demands for China to uphold international rules and norms, including the peaceful resolution of conflict. This US representation particularly adhered to Indonesia’s own countersecuritising of China’s rise to the political from the military.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-the-south- china-sea/. 91 Aaron L. Connelly, "Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 37:1 (2015), p. 20. 92 Suryadinata and Izzudin, "The Natunas," p. 3. 93 Joko Widodo, "State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occcasion of the 71st Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia," Indonesia Cabinet Secretariat, 16 August 2016, accessed 26 February 2019, http://setkab.go.id/en/state-address-of-the-president-of-the-republic- of-indonesia-on-the-occasion-of-the-71st-anniversary-of-the-proclamation-of-independence-of-the-republic-of- indonesia/. 94 See Patrik Kristhope Meyer, Achmad Nurmandi, and Agustiyara Agustiyara, "Indonesia’s Swift Securitization of the Natuna Islands How Jakarta Countered China’s Claims in the South China Sea," Asian Journal of Political Science, 27:1 (2019), pp. 70-87.

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However, there were some caveats to Indonesia’s support. Terminology-wise, whereas the Obama Administration had focused on the “rules-based order” phrase, this term was completely absent from the selected Indonesian texts examined, and non-existent in the US- Indonesian documents even, unlike its repetition by India or Australia.95 Indonesian elites preferred to use and repeat other related terms such as “international law”, signifying concepts similar to “rules-based order”. For example, Yusgiantoro emphasised “the importance of regional peace and stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea based on recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS”, during the 2012 SLD.96 As Richard Rigby highlights, ASEAN does not “talk much about the rules-based international order”, and “Indonesia, certainly, on those rare moments when the term is used, views it negatively, regarding it as a hollow concept put forward by those who don’t necessarily follow the rules themselves”, like the US failing to ratify UNCLOS.97 ASEAN prefers “norms” rather than “rules” given its precepts of consensus and non-interference.98 Hence, that a “rules- based approach in the management as well as settlement of disputes in the South China Sea” was mentioned for the first time in the 2011 “Chair’s Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit”, hosted by Indonesia as ASEAN Chair, was arguably noteworthy, suggesting some US “rules- based order” influence.99 Whilst “rules” may be contentious, Indonesia has freely repeated the importance of the freedom of navigation in support of the international order, even if this was also due in large part to Indonesia’s status as an archipelagic state. For example, Yusgiantoro, in his 2012 SLD speech, argued:

Being ourselves a maritime and archipelagic nation, we are fully aware of the great significance of maritime safety and freedom of navigation, which are at the core of maritime freedoms, for the global common good . . . importance of

95 See for instance, Narendra Modi, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2018 Keynote Address," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 June 2018, accessed 1 March 2019, https://www.iiss.org/-/media/images/dialogues/sld/sld- 2018/documents/narendra-modi-sld18.ashx?la=en&hash=66F993469C4220817C4926310711FEE4A2C9E017; Australia Department of Defence, "Defence White Paper," (2016). 96 Purnomo Yusgiantoro, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2012 Second Plenary Session: Protecting Maritime Freedoms," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri- la-dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/second-plenary-session-25b4/purnomo-yusgiantoro-1b4f. 97 Richard Rigby, "An Inclusive Rules-Based International Order," Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 8 June 2018, accessed 28 February 2019, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/an-inclusive-rules-based-international-order/. 98 See Acharya, Constructing a Security Community. 99 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Chair's Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit: ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations,", ASEAN Secretariat, 17 November 2011, p. 41, emphasis added.

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regional peace and stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea based on recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS . . . while waiting for the solution of territorial disputes, the next best option is to focus on confidence building to ensure that there is enough predictability among the claimants, including rules of conduct, which would help minimise the prospect of conflict escalation.100

In general, Indonesia viewed observance of UNCLOS and “confidence building” amongst states to ensure the freedom of navigation and the international order, particularly relating the SCS disputes, as the best way forward. The 2015 joint statement Obama and Jokowi issued when the latter visited the former, for example, also correspondingly “affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and upholding internationally recognized freedoms of navigation and overflight” in the SCS, whilst supporting “the peaceful resolution of disputes in conformity with international law”, including UNCLOS.101 Within the selected texts, Indonesia did not specify China outright, unlike the US which did so from 2014 (see Chapter 4), perhaps signalling its “non-alignment” under its independent and active principle. Even as Jokowi’s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, emphasised that international law “must be respected” and that “Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands is indisputable” due to various legal mechanisms in her 2016 “Annual Press Statement”, China was still not named.102 However, some analysts criticise such reticence on Indonesia’s part. Evan Laksmana, for instance, disparages Indonesia’s response to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against China that called for “respect” for “international law, including 1982 UNCLOS”, as “a bland, lacklustre five-sentence statement”, and a sign of Indonesia’s “under-balance against China”.103 Another caveat regarding Indonesia’s support of the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the rules-based order, particularly to the freedom of navigation, was that this support did not extend to US freedom of navigation operations. When the US resumed its routine SCS FONOPS in 2015, Jokowi, who happened to be in the US on an official visit, “urged all parties

100 Yusgiantoro, "Protecting Maritime Freedoms". 101 Barack Obama, "Joint Statement by President Obama and President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo of Indonesia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 26 October 2015, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=110993&st=indonesia&st1=. 102 Retno Marsudi, "Minister Retno Speech at the Annual Press Statement PPTM 2016," Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 2016, accessed 1 March 2019, https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/pidato-menlu- RI-pptm-2016-english-version.aspx. 103 Laksmana, "The Domestic Politics," pp. 382 and 387.

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– including Washington – ‘to exercise restraint’” during an address at the Brookings Institution, whilst Luhut Pandjaitan, Jokowi’s coordinating minister of political, legal and security affairs, went even further to say that “Indonesia disagreed with U.S. ‘power projection’”.104 FONOPS aside, Indonesia has much more fully mobilised in support of, and mirrored, the US preventive security practices of multilateralism and institutionalism (see Chapter 5). These tied in with Indonesia’s “dynamic equilibrium” and its efforts in maintaining ASEAN centrality. The expansion of the multilateral East Asia Summit aptly demonstrated this support. The East Asia proposal was first revived by Malaysia in 2004. Malaysia and China advocated membership to be the states making up the ASEAN Plus Three: the ten ASEAN member states as well as the East Asian states of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, as the term “East Asia” would imply. However, Indonesia, wanting an “equilibrium”, and in concurrence with its independent and active foreign policy, proposed, together with Singapore (see Chapter 7), the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand. Most of the other ASEAN states supported this position since they did not want China to dominate the new organisation.105 The EAS, formed in 2005, finally included the ASEAN states as well as all six states named. Subsequently, “initial statements from the Obama Administration suggested a renewed U.S. interest in East Asian regionalism and an American willingness to move beyond the issues of terrorism and maritime security”, eventually leading to the US acceding to the TAC and the first annual ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in 2009. 106 Then Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa tellingly recalled in his memoirs:

The possibility of U.S. participation in the EAS was discussed during my first bilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the sidelines of the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] Summit . . . I recall at the time a general U.S. disposition to enhance its engagement with Southeast Asia, and thus deep interest on the strategic rationale behind the EAS. From my conversation I detected that Secretary Clinton recognized the importance of the EAS to the region’s evolving geostrategic architecture . . . I have consistently

104 Quoted in Prashanth Parameswaran, "The New U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership after Jokowi's Visit: Problems and Prospects," Brookings Op-Ed, 8 December 2015, accessed 1 March 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-new-u-s-indonesia-strategic-partnership-after-jokowis-visit-problems- and-prospects/, emphasis removed. 105 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's Vision of Regional Order in East Asia amid U.S.-China Rivalry: Continuity and Change," Asia Policy, 13:2 (2018), pp. 61-62. 106 Ralf Emmers, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and See Seng Tan, The East Asia Summit and the Regional Security Architecture, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 3, (Baltimore: University of Maryland, 2010), pp. 29-30.

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made the argument that the EAS would provide an invaluable forum for the United States and China to work closely with one another . . . I felt that by 2009 the need to include membership of the United States and Russia in the EAS was a foregone conclusion.107

The US and Russia joined the EAS formally in 2011 with Indonesian support when Indonesia was the ASEAN Chair. Consistent with Indonesia’s shifting of the risk from China’s rise from the military to the political sector, Natalegawa further explained that his development of the “dynamic equilibrium” concept was to forestall concerns that US admission to the EAS was simply “part of its ‘containment’ of the rising influence of China in the region”. Natalegawa’s aim was likely to emphasise the contrast between the political multilateralism of the EAS and the traditional US system of bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific (see Chapter 4) instead.108 Furthermore, Indonesia concurred with the US position on the importance of an institutionalised South China Sea Code of Conduct in maintaining the Asia-Pacific rules-based order. Indonesia had started the annual “Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea” in 1990 to mediate amongst the claimant states. Additionally, under Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011, momentum was injected into the COC process. Natalegawa was personally “determined to ensure” that there was “some positive movement on the issue”, and this led to the 2011 “Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC”.109 This was almost a decade after ASEAN and China had agreed upon the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. Although Indonesian initiative in this regard was evidently not solely due to the US, as Clinton stressed after the 2011 US-Indonesia Joint Commission Meeting with Natalegawa in Bali, what the US wanted was “a resolution process that will be aided by the code of conduct that ASEAN is working toward”. This process was to be “based on the Declaration of Conduct, and that the principles of international law will govern, so that there can be peaceful resolution of all the claims”. At the same time, she commended “Indonesia’s leadership” in achieving the “Guidelines” whilst further pressing ASEAN to move “urgently” towards a legally-binding COC “that will avoid any problems in the vital sea lanes

107 Marty Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? A View from Within, (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), pp. 96-97. 108 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 109 Ibid., p. 122; see also Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC," ASEAN Secretariat, 2011, accessed 6 March 2019, https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/documents/20185-DOC.pdf.

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and territorial waters of the South China Sea”.110 Natalegawa also noted that when Indonesia was Chair in 2011, “representations were made by China, though not always overt and explicit, for the EAS not to discuss the South China Sea, and by the United States for its inclusion on the agenda” though he “did not at any time sense pressure on the chair to pursue a particular course of action”.111 The 2011 EAS did discuss the SCS issue, indicating that US pressure likely played its part, with Indonesia further supporting Japan’s proposal for an Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum that would include the non-ASEAN members of the EAS so that “the contentious views” of the SCS between the various states could be “proactively and constructively” channelled.112 This mirrored the US approach. Indonesian commitment to putting the SCS disputes on the ASEAN agenda has been impressive. After the infamous 2012 debacle in which the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting had failed to issue a joint communique due to differences over the South China Sea, the first time such an ignominy had occurred in the history of ASEAN, Natalegawa was the one who smoothed things over. He “initiated consultations with his ASEAN counterparts in an effort to restore unity and commit ASEAN to a common position” regarding the SCS, conducting “an intense round of shuttle diplomacy flying to five capitols”.113 As a result of his efforts, the foreign ministers agreed on “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea”. Clinton once again praised Natalegawa “for his personal leadership under the President’s guidance”, since the US “has a national interest, as every country does, in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom on navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce” in the SCS.114 Under Jokowi, Indonesia was less active in the SCS disputes, focusing on “protecting its own interests around the Natuna Islands while not antagonising

110 Clinton, "Remarks With Indonesian Foreign Minister". 111 Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? p. 129. 112 Ibid.; see also Obama, "Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit"; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Fifth Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum," 8 December 2017, accessed 6 March 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001833.html. 113 Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea," SAIS Review of International Affairs, 33:2 (2013), pp. 78-79; see also Natalegawa, Does ASEAN Matter? pp. 130-134; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers: "ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea"," ASEAN Secretariat, 20 July 2012, accessed 6 March 2019, https://www.asean.org/storage/images/AFMs%20Statement%20on%206%20Principles%20on%20SCS.pdf. 114 Hillary Clinton, "Remarks with Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa," U.S. Department of State, 3 September 2012, accessed 27 March 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197279.htm.

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China” instead.115 However, Jokowi still adhered to the idea that Indonesia can be an “honest broker” since it is a non-claimant in the SCS disputes, supporting the COC negotiations.116 Overall, the US representation of China’s rise as a security risk in the political sector can be seen to have succeeded in Indonesia. Indonesia repeated US speech acts and mirrored its practices for the most part. Though such repetition did not include the “rules-based order” phrase itself, Indonesia clearly identified with the risk to the rules-based order from China’s rise, repeating its tenets and other comparable phrases. Similarly, Indonesia also mirrored the routine US practices of multilateralism and institutionalism, save FONOPS, although the COC is still being negotiated.

Economic

With reference to the economic sector, like many other states, Indonesia generally represents China to be both an economic opportunity and challenge. Unlike the US (see Chapter 5), this was not to the extent that Indonesia saw China as a threat to its national economy. Since the normalisation of ties between Indonesia and China, bilateral trade relations grew exponentially from about two million US dollars (USD) in 1993 to more than fifty-three million USD in 2016. Problems have arisen too due to “Indonesia’s widening trade deficit, negative sentiments towards Chinese products in Indonesia’s market, and the low level of Chinese investment in Indonesia”.117 In his study of the perceptions of Indonesia’s elites towards the US and China, Daniel Novotny highlights that eighty percent of the respondents “who explicitly stated that they regarded China as a security threat to Indonesia believed that this danger stems mainly from the country’s ‘economic threat’”. They worry that China was “a dangerous economic competitor” and that “bilateral engagement with Beijing would allow the latter to expand its economic dominance and political influence” in Indonesia. Yet, they concurrently want “Indonesia to tap into China’s economic development”.118 Speech acts to the effect of constructing China as an economic threat were thus absent from the official Indonesian texts examined. Evi Fitriani further underscores that a “‘systematic examination’ of articles in the three biggest newspapers in Indonesia during the Yudhoyono

115 Aaron L. Connelly, "Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going It Alone," Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2016, p. 1. 116 See Ian Storey, "ASEAN's Failing Grade in the South China Sea," in International Relations and Asia's Southern Tier, ed. Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow, (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 120. 117 Evi Fitriani, "Indonesian Perceptions of the Rise of China: Dare You, Dare You Not," The Pacific Review, 31:3 (2018), p. 395. 118 Novotny, Torn Between America and China, p. 214.

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presidency” showed that the general Indonesian perception of China was positive, and China’s economic development “an inspiration”.119 In his 2014 “State Address”, Yudhoyono similarly boasted that Indonesia ranked “highest in growth after China” amongst the G20 states, and that the Makassar region posed “a higher economic growth than China”. 120 Compared to Yudhoyono, as mentioned earlier, Jokowi was seen as more pro-China, especially in economic matters. Indonesia under Jokowi intensified its “economic diplomacy” with China such that China overtook the US in Indonesian investments in 2016.121 Although Indonesia has not securitised China as a threat to its national economy like the US, Indonesia has identified with the US representation of the collective economic risk from China’s claims in the SCS to a large extent. The 2010 plan of action for the Indonesia- US Comprehensive Partnership, for instance, espoused Indonesia-US partnership “in support of an open, fair, and transparent rules-based international trade and financial system”.122 Like the US, Indonesia has mapped freedom of navigation to maritime security and economic prosperity, especially since it is an archipelagic state. As an example, then Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono stated in his 2007 SLD speech that Indonesia agreed that the US “‘secures the waters’ that underpins intra-regional trade, investment and economic growth”.123 Moreover, as Ryacudu identified during the 2016 SLD, since the SCS is “a major route for world trade”, if “this route is not safe, it will harm the global economy”, and all the parties to the SCS disputes “must exercise restraint”.124 However, Indonesia has fallen short of repeating US demands for China to follow the rules of the market-based order. Moreover, despite Indonesia’s identification with the US representation of the risk posed to the economic order from China’s rise, Indonesia has not supported US security practices, either in the form of routine FONOPS or the Obama Administration’s flagship international trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. As pointed out above, Indonesia deemed US FONOPS as destabilising. Yudhoyono’s government was originally reluctant to join the TPP, although its position shifted in 2013, highlighting that it would participate in TPP

119 See Fitriani, "Indonesian Perceptions of the Rise of China," p. 399. 120 Yudhoyono, "State Address 2014". 121 Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia in 2016: Jokowi’s Presidency between Elite Consolidation and Extra- Parliamentary Opposition," Asian Survey, 57:1 (2017), p. 171. 122 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Plan of Action to Implement the Indonesia-U.S. Comprehensive Partnership," U.S. Department of State, 7 September 2010, accessed 7 March 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/2010/147287.htm. 123 Juwono Sudarsono, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2007 Fourth Plenary Session: Securing Regional Waters: How Much Progress?" International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-diaogue-2007-d1ee/fourth-plenary-session- 82ac/juwono-sudarsono-2546. 124 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Making Defence Policy in Uncertain Times: Q & A".

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negotiations under the condition of progress in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.125 However, there were substantial domestic hurdles to TPP membership coupled to Indonesia’s foreign policy considerations. Various groups in Indonesia opposed the TPP on the grounds of protectionism as they regarded Indonesia as uncompetitive. State-owned enterprises also resisted their privatisation that would happen under the TPP. Simultaneously, Indonesia likely feared the TPP as a US-centric trade pact which might challenge ASEAN centrality as well as undercut Indonesia’s independent and active principle.126 In contrast, the RCEP was initiated in 2011 by Indonesia as ASEAN Chairman. The RCEP was more flexible than the TPP, particularly in accounting for the varying economic development of different states.127 On balance, Indonesia preferred the RCEP to the TPP. Jokowi also proclaimed that Indonesia would join the TPP within two years when he visited the US in 2015, but domestic impediments, principally, would not have changed.128 Eventually, the collapse of the TPP made Jokowi’s stance moot. Importantly, on top of identifying with the US representation of China’s rise as a collective economic risk in terms of China potentially adversely affecting the flow of global trade, Indonesia has further represented China’s rise as a risk to an additional aspect of the economic order in the Asia-Pacific: the illegal pillage of maritime resources like oil and gas or fisheries. For example, during the 2012 SLD, Yusgiantoro highlighted: “to really establish a comprehensive maritime security”, not only must the sea “be free from the threats of violence” and “navigation hazards”, it must also be “free of natural resources tribulation, and free from threats of transgression of the law” with reference to “smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing, illegal logging, etc.” 129 These latter examples were also the “factual threats” of Indonesia’s 2015 DWP. Ryacudu, in his 2015 SLD speech, likewise emphasised:

In term [sic] of tackling the security situation on the sea, including issues such as piracy and robbery that can impede the sea lanes of global trade a commerce [sic] . . . A new concept, new culture and understanding based on international

125 The Jakarta Post, "US-ASEAN Businessmen Lobby Indonesia on TPP," The Jakarta Post, 25 June 2013. 126 Mei Ping Michelle Ong, "Comparing Diverse Southeast Asian Reactions to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)" (Master of Arts in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, the Pacific) Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), p. 54-68. 127 Ibid., p. 58. 128 See David Price, "Indonesia and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA): The Luxury of Time," Indonesia Law Review, 7:1 (2017), pp. 1-22. 129 Yusgiantoro, "Protecting Maritime Freedoms", emphasis added.

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common values and capabilities are more needed by all the stakeholders . . . in order to find effective solutions to address such aforementioned common factual threats . . . This mechanism can also be used as an effective tool to find a compelling solution in the development of South China Sea issues. I believe a joint coordinated patrol for peaceful purposes among stakeholders in the South China Sea is important and indispensable to promote peace and stability in the region.130

As is typical, Indonesia did not name China explicitly in the speech acts above. However, the propositional content of China’s moves towards Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natunas clarified the claim and warning to which Indonesia alluded in its textual representations; that China’s ambiguous and expansive nine-dash line risked the economic order based on the delimitation of EEZs by UNCLOS, at stake China’s potential “poaching” of maritime natural resources. A demand of a new innovative solution followed, such as joint patrols to ensure comprehensive maritime security. Sudarsono and Sukma concur that “energy and natural resources from Indonesia and Southeast Asia are desperately sought by China due to its economic development, which in turn threatens Indonesia and other regional countries”,131 with such risks getting more acute as China continues to develop and rise. Consequently, Indonesia’s preventive security practices reinforced and reflected its linguistic representations in this regard. Indonesia opened a military base in the Natunas in 2018. Before this, to deter “factual threats”, Indonesia had also deployed “new patrol boats and special forces equipped with its latest air defence system” to the Natunas in 2016. Then fisheries minister, Pudjiastuti, stated that these would “contribute more on securing the seas, our exclusive economic zone, and for poachers to see the government’s presence in guarding our waters”.132 Ryacudu also proposed joint patrols with China during the 2016 SLD, as well as reportedly raising such possibilities with Australia in 2016, and with other Southeast Asian states in 2018. 133 It therefore appeared that Indonesia actually supported the practice of

130 Ryamizard Ryacudu, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 Second Plenary Session: New Forms of Security Collaboration in Asia," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary2- a5ab/ryacudu-048e. 131 Cited in Fitriani, "Indonesian Perceptions of the Rise of China," p. 399. 132 Today, "Indonesia to Step Up Patrol of Natuna Islands," Today, 8 April 2016, accessed 1 March 2019, https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/indonesia-deploy-patrol-boats-air-defence-system-natunas-following- clashes-chinese; Kyodo, "Indonesia Opens Military Base on Edge of South China Sea to 'Deter Military Threats'," South China Morning Post, 19 December 2018. 133 See Ryacudu, "Making Defence Policy"; Jamie Smyth, "Australia and Indonesia Explore Joint Naval Patrols; Southeast Asia," Financial Times, 2 November 2016; Fergus Jensen, "Indonesia Pushes for Southeast Asian

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freedom of navigation patrols, just not US ones, but instead in partnership with local stakeholders like ASEAN or Australia to prevent “factual threats”. However, no such joint patrols have materialised yet. Holger Stritzel, in his study on how the (normal) securitisation of organised crime and rogue states travel to different states, highlights the translation and localisation of security discourse.134 Along these lines, even as Indonesia has accepted the US linguistic representation of China’s rise as a risk to the market-based economic order, it has also adapted this identification to its own local context. In particular, its focus was on the maritime resource risks arising from China’s expansive and ambiguous nine-dash line claims as compared to the US emphasis on the disruption of global trade, with Indonesia naturally paying specific attention to Chinese IUU fishing as well as potential contentious claims of the oil and gas resources around the Natunas. The US representation of China’s rise as a collective security risk in the economic sector could therefore only be said to have partially succeeded in Indonesia. Although Indonesia had largely identified with the risk to the economic order from China’s rise, this was not so much in terms of China flouting market rules, but due to the link between the global economic order and China’s SCS claims and aggressive stance as risking trade. Indonesia’s portrayal of China’s rise as risking maritime resources further clarified such identification. Thus, Indonesia did not support the US pre-emptive practice of the TPP. Rather, it even wanted to economically engage China via the RCEP.

Environmental

In the environmental sector, Indonesia has accepted and repeated the US generic risk representation of rising greenhouse gases causing climate change. It has also mobilised in support of and mirrored US preventive security practices, which included China. The US noted that Indonesia was “the third-largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, behind China and the U.S”.135 Like China, Indonesia was as much the source of the problem as its solution. In 2009, leading-up to the Indonesia-US comprehensive partnership, for example, Clinton and then Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda underscored that Indonesia and the US had “common interests on a range of regional and global issues, from environmental protection and

Patrols of Disputed Waters," Reuters, 2018, accessed 1 March 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-australia- indonesia-politics/indonesia-pushes-for-southeast-asian-patrols-of-disputed-waters-idUKKCN1GS0CR. 134 Stritzel, Security in Translation. 135 U.S. Department of State, "Indonesia," U.S. Department of State, 3 June 2011, accessed 7 January 2019, https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/indonesia/182308.htm.

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climate change to trade and investment”; whilst the 2015 joint statement between Obama and Jokowi similarly emphasised: “Climate change remains a priority area of cooperation between the United States and Indonesia, and both countries committed to working closely together to implement strong domestic policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions and increase climate resilience”.136 With regard to practices, the US gave help to Indonesia to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. It did so through “improving local forest and land management, advancing public-private partnerships, promoting clean energy technologies, and providing technical assistance to improve scientific capacity” to respond to climate change. This included “approximately $60 million under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act's debt-for-nature swaps, and $50 million under the Millennium Challenge Corporation”.137 Further mirroring US practices, Indonesia joined the Paris Agreement in 2016. It also successfully hosted the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2007 in Bali, whilst passing Presidential Decree 61/2011, the National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas. Analysts thus note that the Indonesian government was inclined to combat climate change “at the highest level”.138

Conclusion: Ambivalent Auguries of “Yellow Peril” and “Blue Dread”

In summary, the context of Indonesia’s bilateral relations with the US and China amidst its independent and active foreign policy has naturally influenced the extent to which Indonesia has conceivably supported the US representation of China’s rise as a collective security risk. The greatest success in this regard was in the political sector. Indonesia was seen to have repeated the risk to the rules-based order from China’s rise as well as mirrored the security practices of multilateralism and institutionalism by the US, although it seldom used the “rules- based order” phrase per se and did not agree with US FONOPS. Indonesia also wholly accepted the US representation of the risk to the global climate from rising greenhouse gases, with Indonesia, like China, as much cause as solution. However, within the military and economic sectors, Indonesia only identified with the US representations of the risks posed by China’s rise

136 Hillary Clinton, "Developing a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia," U.S. Department of State, 18 February 2009, accessed 10 March 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/02/119424.htm; Obama, "Joint Statement by Obama and Jokowi". 137 Barack Obama, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Climate Cooperation," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 26 October 2015, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=122928&st=indonesia&st1=. 138 Michal Nachmany et al., The Globe Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 66 Countries, Fourth ed., (London: GLOBE International and the Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics, 2014), p. 264.

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to peace and the economic order in the Asia-Pacific, but neither supported US military rebalancing nor the TPP. Indeed, Indonesia even countersecuritised the risk from China’s rise away from the military sector to the political order, though it had ironically constructed a military risk from China’s encroachment upon the Natunas, as well as a risk to maritime resources in the SCS due to increasing demand as China rises. The success of these ultimately falls outside the remit of this dissertation. Overall, the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise was only partially successful in Indonesia. US representations of the “Blue Dread” were probably tempered by Indonesia’s national interest in engaging China, for economic reasons and for establishing a “dynamic equilibrium” such that Indonesia could remain ambivalent and not have to choose sides between the US and China.139 Finally, whilst the US has not macrosecuritised China’s rise within the societal sector, the elite audience in Indonesia was likely to be receptive if the US had done so, in part because of its own lingering “Yellow Peril” fears of the “Chinese minority problem”. However, a potential US representation of China’s rise as a security risk due to China’s violations of human rights backed by appropriate US security measures in the broader societal sector would only likely be partially accepted by Indonesia. Even if Indonesia sees itself as the regional “cheerleader in democracy”, it is not “the shining democratic knight in Southeast Asia it claims to be”, with problems of “endemic corruption, impunity of security agencies, and harassment of minorities” still plaguing it. 140 Indonesia would probably not mobilise to support any potential US security practices against the risk to the liberal order from China’s rise, similar to the economic and military sectors, a case of rhetoric as opposed to actual practices. Having examined the extent of the success of the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise in Indonesia, the next chapter turns to the case of Singapore.

139 See Novotny, Torn Between America and China, pp. 349-352. 140 Jürgen Rüland, "Constructing Regionalism Domestically: Local Actors and Foreign Policymaking in Newly Democratized Indonesia," Foreign Policy Analysis, 10:2 (2014), pp. 195-196.

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7. Singapore: “Blue Dread” Engagement

Introduction: Dominance of a “One-Party State”

Continuing with the latter of my research questions, this chapter examines if the US macrosecuritisation of a rising China has succeeded in the relevant audience state of Singapore. It investigates if there was elite support in Singapore in identifying with the threat and mobilising against it, especially in repeating US representations and mirroring US practices (see Chapter 3). Though Singapore is only a small island, its geographical location at the choke point of the Malacca Straits, “through which one quarter of the world’s trade, half the world’s oil and two-thirds of its natural gas trade passes”, added to its significant military strength and facilities, economic prosperity, and political stability, enable Singapore to “punch above its weight” in international affairs.1 These advantages make Singapore a critical partner for the US in managing China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific region. In examining this case study, it is important to first understand how Singapore is governed. The People’s Action Party (PAP) is the only political party to have ruled Singapore since self-government from British rule in 1959. Though Singapore’s government is somewhat authoritarian for a democracy, it is not illegitimate.2 Every election has seen the PAP being returned to power. The PAP’s idea of democracy is that a “responsible and responsive government rules with the consent of the public and in the public interest – but without being slaves to public opinion”.3 The consequences of the PAP’s governing mode and longevity are twofold: the elite is unusually cohesive, and policymaking is very elite-driven, especially towards foreign policy and national security. National security issues are typically conducted under a veil of secrecy.4 Singapore’s only defence white paper equivalent was thus a dated one from 2000.5 Foreign policy was also originally dominated by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding prime minister; Goh Keng Swee, the first defence minister; and S. Rajaratnam, the first foreign minister.6 Lee

1 Andrew T. H. Tan, "Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore's Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy," Defence Studies, 11:4 (2012), pp. 674 and 684. 2 Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 25. 3 Cherian George, Freedom from the Press: Journalism and State Power in Singapore, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Pres, 2012), p. 86. 4 Norman Vasu and Bernard Loo, "National Security and Singapore: An Assessment," in Perspectives on the Security of Singapore, ed. Barry Desker and Cheng Guan Ang, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), pp. 28-31. 5 Singapore Ministry of Defence, "Defending Singapore in the 21st Century," (2000). 6 Michael Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 6.

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served as prime minister for more than three decades, from Singapore’s self-government through the 1963-1965 merger with Malaysia, before relinquishing the position to Goh Chok Tong in 1990. Even then, he remained in the cabinet till 2011, and in parliament till his passing in 2015. Foreign policymaking continues to remain an elite matter, with Lee Hsien Loong – who also happens to be Lee Kuan Yew’s son – succeeding Goh Chok Tong in 2004. The younger Lee was the only prime minister of Singapore throughout this dissertation’s timeframe. Lee Hsien Loong himself put it thus in 2015: “It [external relations] is not the top issue on the minds of many Singaporeans because we enjoy peace and stability . . . People are much more concerned with the salient things that affect their daily lives”.7 The elite, unified and secretive nature of Singapore’s security and foreign policymaking has three implications for this case study. First, there are few public security documents. Second, leaders’ memoirs are rare since most of them are still currently serving in the government. Third, I devote less weight to examining what the elites have said to domestic audiences. Thus, in analysing Singapore’s perspective of the US representation of China’s rise as a collective security risk, this chapter relies on security and foreign affairs speeches by Singapore’s top leaders, often delivered to a non-domestic audience. I select four primary sets of official texts (refer to Annexes B, F and G). These are: (1) bilateral US-Singapore documents, including joint statements; (2) elite speeches on security and foreign policy delivered at international fora, via the Singapore Prime Minister’s Office; (3) speeches by Singapore’s prime minister or defence minister at the Shangri-La Dialogue; and (4) the annual National Day Rally (NDR) speech, arguably the year’s most widely anticipated address by the Singapore prime minister. The NDR typically concentrates on domestic concerns, with Lee Hsien Loong admitting in the 2015 iteration that: “I have not spoken much about the external affairs in recent rallies because we have been focused on domestic issues”.8 I examine these selected texts using discourse analysis, including linguistic textual analysis, to identify the broad contours of meaning within them with regard to how Singapore views China’s rise as a security issue. Specifically, I also identify whether Singapore has supported the US characterisation of China’s rise as a security risk in the Asia-Pacific. Subsequently, I investigate whether Singapore has mobilised in support of US security practices through what Singapore has done with reference to its own security practices.

7 Hsien Loong Lee, "PM Lee Hsien Loong at the 8th S Rajaratnam Lecture," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 27 November 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loong-8th- s-rajaratnam-lecture-27-november-2015. 8 Hsien Loong, Lee, "National Day Rally 2015," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 2015, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/national-day-rally-2015.

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The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first reviews Singapore’s foreign policy, sometimes called “pragmatic”, though this term does not sufficiently capture its nuances. The second and third sections outline Singapore’s bilateral relationships with China and the US respectively, to establish the context for this chapter’s evaluation of whether Singapore has supported the US representation of a rising China as a collective security risk. On the whole, Singapore has had a longstanding and comprehensive relationship with the US, relative to “newer” official ties with China characterised by economic exchanges despite the cultural “kinship” between the two ethnic Chinese-majority states. The fourth section, and the bulk of this chapter, delves into what Singapore elites have said and done within the military, political, economic, and environmental sectors in which the US has constructed China’s rise as a security risk in the Asia-Pacific. This chapter finds that in the “success” and “failure” in these different sectors, Singapore’s own national interests were stark. I deem that US macrosecuritisation in Singapore has mostly succeeded in the military, environmental and political sectors. However, in the latter, Singapore was less supportive of provocative US South China Sea freedom of navigation operations, as it is still a vulnerable small city-state, despite its ability to punch above its weight. Moreover, in the former, Singapore has added defence cooperation activities with China as a security practice. This included multilateral defence cooperation including both China and the US, to build confidence to allay the risks from China’s military buildup, rather than be over- reliant on a US military partnership. The failure of US macrosecuritisation in the economic sector was likewise due to the city’s continued engagement with China to ensure its own prosperity. Overall, Singapore has unfailingly followed its own interests. This chapter concludes by discussing the “Blue Dread” and the “Yellow Peril” in Singapore.

Enduring Foreign Policy in the Face of Perpetual Vulnerabilities

In the first major study of Singapore’s foreign policy since its independence upon an acrimonious separation from Malaysia, Michael Leifer points out that “the pronouncements of government spokesmen, at times punctuated with references to Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes”, align with realism.9 For instance, Rajaratnam referred to the balance of power in a famous speech in 1976: “like the sun, all great powers exert gravitational pulls on

9 Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 5. For earlier, shorter works on Singapore’s foreign policy, see for instance, Boon Hiok Lee, "Constraints on Singapore's Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, 22:6 (1982), pp. 524-535.

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weaker nations . . . When there are many suns the gravitational pull of each is not only weakened but also, by a judicious use of the pulls and counterpulls of gravitational forces, the minor planets acquire a greater freedom of navigation”. 10 Leifer also highlights that Singapore’s realism is due to a perpetual sense of Singapore’s inherent vulnerabilities, which are many and varied.11 Politically, the small size of Singapore coupled to its bitter history with its larger immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia – separation and Confrontation respectively – meant that Singapore has always felt uncomfortable with them, despite an overall friendly relationship with each. Economically, lacking any natural resource or a sizeable domestic market, Singapore is very dependent on trade and keeping required communication channels open. This is a challenging task for Singapore as a “little red dot”, a derogatory term attributed to then Indonesian President B. J. Habibie.12 In socio-cultural terms, though it has a sizable Malay minority, Singapore is the only Chinese-majority state within Southeast Asia – the whole world other than China, if Taiwan is discounted – whereas both Indonesia and Malaysia are Malay-majority states, with the consequent fear that Singapore is like a Chinese nut in a Malay nutcracker. Conversely, persistent vulnerabilities also mean that Singapore’s survival could not simply depend on maintaining territorial integrity. Rather, on top of sovereignty, national security is also underpinned by growth and prosperity to mitigate these innate vulnerabilities. Narayanan Ganesan identifies a “liberal philosophical undergirding” to Singapore’s foreign policy since its economy is largely dependent on open borders, trade and interdependence instead of realism’s self-help.13 Singapore has been an active promoter of trade liberalisation. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership grew out of Singapore’s P4 agreement. Moreover, liberalism does not only influence trade policies. Singapore also strongly supports institutions and international law. Nonetheless, there are elements of realpolitik within this. According to Tommy Koh, one of Singapore’s top diplomats who served as the president of the 1982 Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was agreed: “no state, no matter how powerful, can entirely ignore the interests of other states, the rules of international law and international relations, the decisions and

10 Quoted in Heng Chee Chan and Obaid ul Haq, eds., The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches & Writings of S. Rajaratnam, (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1987), pp. 291-296. 11 Michael Leifer, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy," in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, ed. Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 965; Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, pp. 10-42. 12 The Straits Times, "Former Indonesian President Habibie, Who Described Singapore as a 'Little Red Dot', Dies Aged 83," The Straits Times, 11 September 2019. 13 Narayanan Ganesan, Realism and Interdependence in Singapore's Foreign Policy, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 16.

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recommendations of international, regional and binational institutions and the opinion of mankind”.14 It is in Singapore’s vested interests as a small state to back these aspects of liberal institutionalism. Scholars have also analysed Singapore’s foreign policy using constructivism too. Amitav Acharya emphasises that the traditional perspective of treating Singapore’s foreign policy as realpolitik underestimates the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ regionalism in helping to secure Singapore’s national interests and security, with Singapore also playing a crucial role in developing said regionalism as well as a collective regional identity.15 Not only that, such regionalism has also expanded beyond Southeast Asia, to the slew of other Asia- Pacific organisations premised upon “ASEAN centrality” (refer to Chapter 4) such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asia Summit. Nevertheless, “realist undercurrents” are yet present, with the collective weight of ASEAN also serving to bolster the lone voice of Singapore as a small state, assuaging its inherent vulnerabilities.16 Singapore’s foreign policy is altogether more complex and nuanced than a shallow explanation of realpolitik allows. If a single word or phrase must be used to describe Singapore’s foreign policy, that is arguably “pragmatic”, 17 although this is still overly simplistic. Singapore’s foreign policy is pragmatic in serving its national interests against its innate and ceaseless vulnerabilities. In this regard, understanding Singapore’s pragmatic foreign policy is vital to analysing whether it has accepted the US portrayal of China’s rise as a collective security risk. Despite Singapore’s successes today, these vulnerabilities continue to persist in the consciousness of its political elites, helped along by the prevailing presence of the PAP in government. Observers use various phrases to describe this pervasive sense of vulnerability, such as the “securitisation of vulnerability”, a “siege mentality”, a strategic “discourse of vulnerability”, the “militarised civilian”, or even a “garrison state”.18 Singapore’s foreign policy principles have therefore remained almost constant since independence. In mitigating Singapore’s political, economic and socio-cultural vulnerabilities,

14 Tommy Koh, The Quest for World Order: Perspectives of a Pragmatic Idealist, Edited with an Introduction by Amitav Acharya, (Singapore: Times Academic Press for Institute of Policy Studies, 1998), p. 7. 15 Amitav Acharya, Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2008), pp. 3-8. 16 See Seng Tan, "Faced with the Dragon: Perils and Prospects in Singapore’s Ambivalent Relationship with China," The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5:3 (2012), p. 252. 17 Alan Chong, "Singapore's Foreign Policy Beliefs as ‘Abridged Realism’: Pragmatic and Liberal Prefixes in the Foreign Policy Thought of Rajaratnam, Lee, Koh, and Mahbubani," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6:2 (2006), pp. 269-306. 18 See Jun Yan Chang, "Conscripting the Audience: Singapore’s Successful Securitisation of Vulnerability," in National Service in Singapore, ed. Shu Huang Ho and Graham Ong-Webb, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2019), pp. 83-103.

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Bilahari Kausikan, another of Singapore’s top diplomats who rose to become the foreign ministry’s top civil servant from 2010 to 2013, emphasises three major principles of Singapore’s foreign policy: (1) Singapore belongs to Southeast Asia “inescapably and forever”, alluding to Singapore’s “siege mentality”, although this too means that Singapore must “never be limited to or be trapped” by the region; (2) the necessity thus for Singapore “to create political, diplomatic and economic space”, such as leveraging upon ASEAN; and (3) to also maintain a balance of power that enables international law and institutions to thrive.19 These principles may sometimes be articulated in different ways, but their essence of pragmatism in serving Singapore’s national interests in light of its vulnerabilities has seldom wavered, across a relatively homogenous political elite. Having established Singapore’s pragmatic foreign policy, the next two sections turn to how these have applied to Singapore’s relations with China and the US to set up the context to assess whether Singapore has accepted US representations of China’s rise as a security risk in the Asia-Pacific.

Continual Engagement Notwithstanding “Red Menace” and “Blue Dread”

Despite the establishment of official diplomatic relations only in 1990, one of Lee Kuan Yew’s last acts as prime minister, China has constantly mattered to Singapore’s governing elites due to the city-state’s majority-Chinese demography. 20 During the colonial era, Singapore’s economic prospects attracted migrant Chinese workers, which became a majority. They maintained their culture and ties with China. Post-WWII, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), dominated by ethnic Chinese, began an insurrection in the Malayan jungles, known as the Malayan Emergency. In Singapore, there were covert communist organisations existing “within its trade unions with ancillary support from Chinese high school students”.21 They instigated violent activities in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the 1955 Hock Lee bus riots. These culminated in the Singapore self-government’s Operation Coldstore in early-1963, which the government held as a critical blow against the communist threat in Singapore.22 Coldstore also netted Lim Chin Siong, one of the PAP’s founders who had become leader of the opposition Barisan Socialis political party, which comprised leftist elements split from the PAP. Hence,

19 Bilahari Kausikan, "Some Fundamentals of Singapore's Foreign Policy," in The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore's Diplomats, ed. Tommy Koh and Li Lin Chang, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005), pp. 105-106. 20 Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 108. 21 Ibid., pp. 108-109. 22 Kumar Ramakrishna, 'Original Sin'?: Revising the Revisionist Critique of the 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015), pp. 2-3.

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Singapore’s (Chinese) PAP leaders were already extremely wary of the “Red Menace” even before independence, all the more so since Singapore had a majority-Chinese population which might be strongly influenced by “motherland” China. Merger in 1963 with Malaysia was partly to protect Singapore from the “Red Menace” in the military, political and societal sectors. Ironically, Singapore was tainted with the “Red Menace” and the “Yellow Peril” itself. If the overseas Chinese communities in the Asia-Pacific, sometimes called a “Third China” after Beijing and Taipei, were a “fifth column” for Beijing, then Singapore was the prime capital for this “Third China” due to its majority-Chinese population.23 This fear of Singapore afflicted regional states with sizeable Chinese minorities, particularly neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. From Malaysia’s point of view, merger with Singapore was thus partly to guard against the “Yellow Peril” from Singapore’s suspect Chinese community too, on top of the “Red Menace” from China and the MCP.24 Meanwhile, Singapore, under the political control of ethnic Chinese different from those in mainland China, was also very cautious of Beijing’s influence over its Chinese population. However, this was more from a societal security point of view regarding Singapore’s national identity than a racist “Yellow Peril” fear per se, since Singapore’s Chinese was the majority. Singapore worked hard to dispel a “Third China” image, including undertaking to be the last ASEAN state to formalise ties with China.25 Singapore’s non-alignment policy upon independence so that it would “not become, or even appear to become, the pawn of any outside power”,26 in line with its pragmatic foreign policy principles, further affected the Singapore-China relationship. China was initially ambivalent about Singapore’s independence, particularly since it had supported Indonesia’s Confrontation (see Chapter 6). Though officially non-aligned, Singapore was in practice anti- communist, and continued to clamp down on communist activities and reduce China’s influence. For example, Singapore insisted that “no one from Peking [Beijing] was allowed to direct” its branch of the Bank of China, though it also voted in favour of Beijing replacing Taipei in the UN Security Council in 1965, demonstrating its pragmatism.27 When its Cultural Revolution started, China quickly grew critical of Singapore. Amongst other things, China

23 C. P. FitzGerald, The Third China: Chinese Communities in South-East Asia, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 86; see also David S. G. Goodman, "Are Asia's ‘Ethnic Chinese’ a Regional‐Security Threat?" Survival, 39:4 (1997), pp. 140-155. 24 Tai Yong Tan, Creating 'Greater Malaysia': Decolonization and the Politics of Merger, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 29-65. 25 Kuan Yew Lee, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000, (Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2000), p. 640. 26 Chan and Haq, The Prophetic, p. 283. 27 Lai To Lee, "China's Changing Attitudes Towards Singapore, 1965-1975," in Political and Social Change in Singapore, ed. Teh-yao Wu, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in co-operation with the Department of Political Science, University of Singapore, 1975), pp. 174-175.

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called Lee Kuan Yew a Western “puppet”, such that political relations between the two states reached their nadir by 1970.28 In spite of these political tensions, Singapore continued to create economic space in its China ties and trade persisted.29 Their relationship improved from the early 1970s with a Sino- Singapore détente.30 “Ping-pong diplomacy” between the two states begun, each team visiting the other for exhibition matches, before Rajaratnam’s 1975 visit to China to expand trade ties. Lee Kuan Yew himself went to China in 1976, though he was adamant that “no one doubted we were not going in as kinsmen Chinese” by involving non-Chinese in his delegation, including Rajaratnam.31 During this trip, then Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng told Lee that “China, being a socialist country, would support revolutionary struggles of all countries”, although he also assured Lee that “China does not interfere in the internal matters of other countries”.32 This ameliorated the “Red Menace” threat in the military and political sectors, though Singapore continued to be wary of China and the “Yellow Peril” in the societal sector. Singapore’s “Red Menace” fears were only laid to rest in the 1980s. Relations had improved considerably after the Cultural Revolution ended with Mao Zedong’s death and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping. Deng visited Singapore in 1978 and was impressed with the city- state. After Deng’s visit, the Chinese media lauded Singapore, and Singapore’s leaders “were no longer ‘running dogs of the American imperialists’”.33 Although the Chinese Communist Party continued to profess its support for other communist parties, it was evident by the 1980s that China under Deng had opened up and was focused more on its own economic development than on exporting communism. Backing for the MCP also continued to ebb, diminishing the local communist threat. Singapore further appreciated China’s support for ASEAN in preventing the puppet regime in Cambodia – installed by the Soviet-backed Vietnam after it invaded Cambodia in 1978 – from taking over the ousted regime’s UN seat.34 Economic ties continued to improve and Goh Keng Swee even became an advisor to China for the special economic zones in China’s Shenzhen and Zhuhai in 1985.

28 Ibid., pp. 180-189. 29 John Wong and Liang Fook Lye, "China–Singapore Relations: Looking Back and Looking Forward," in Singapore-China Relations: 50 Years, ed. Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), p. 2. 30 Lai To Lee, "Sino-Singaporean Relations in the 1970s," in China: Development and Challenges, ed. Ngok Lee and Chi-Keung Leung Proceedings of the Fifth Leverhulme Conference, (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1979), pp. 269-274. 31 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 641. 32 Cited in Lee, "Sino-Singaporean Relations," p. 274. 33 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 668. 34 See Cheng Guan Ang, Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict, 1978-1991, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013).

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Additionally, as a Singaporean national identity started to take root, Singapore’s worry in the societal sector subsided. It grew “less concerned with the political orientations of its ethnic Chinese citizens in dealing with China”, and the differences between Singapore-Chinese and Chinese-Chinese were recognised especially by Malaysia and Indonesia.35 This dissipated their “Yellow Peril” fear of Singapore as a “Third China”. Singapore began using “its Chinese heritage to reap” economic benefits from China’s rise instead, inviting more Chinese students and migrants, and promoting itself as a bridge between Chinese and Western cultures.36 This linking role further demonstrated Singapore’s foreign policy pragmatism. By the establishment of official ties in 1990, a few months after Indonesia, and the last ASEAN state to do so, Singapore-China ties were robust, particularly in the political and economic sectors. China even gave in to Singapore on its two original preconditions for official ties, denouncing Taiwan and stopping all visits there, although Singapore agreed to keep Taiwan visits low-key and affirmed Beijing’s one-China policy.37 Singapore maintained its Taiwan links, including Taiwan’s provision of training space for the Singapore military, in line with its foreign policy of the consistency of international law and creating political space. During his 1992 Southern Tour, Deng further singled out Singapore as a model from which China could learn.38 Following this, China sent officials to study Singapore, and Singapore created joint projects with China to transfer and improve economic knowledge and ties, such as the 1994 Suzhou Industrial Park. Stephan Ortmann even underscores that the “Beijing Consensus” (see Chapter 2) is simply a larger rendering of the “Singapore model”: a “successful developmental state . . . with a majority Chinese population that is efficiently organized, tightly regulated, and most importantly a (soft-)authoritarian one-party state”.39 Nevertheless, despite the good relationship with China upon the decline of the “Red Menace”, Singapore was cautious of a growing “Blue Dread” in multiple sectors. As Ian Storey points out, Lee Kuan Yew “had long been of the opinion that an economically and militarily strong China might pose other security concerns for the region in the mid to long-term – in

35 Lai To Lee, "The Lion and the Dragon: A View on Singapore‐China Relations," Journal of Contemporary China, 10:28 (2001), p. 416. 36 Andrew T. H. Tan, "Singapore's Survival and its China Challenge," Security Challenges, 13:2 (2017), pp. 18- 19. 37 Lee, "The Lion and the Dragon," p. 418. 38 Stephan Ortmann and Mark R. Thompson, "China's Obsession with Singapore: Learning Authoritarian Modernity," The Pacific Review, 27:3 (2014), p. 436. 39 Stephan Ortmann, "The ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the ‘Singapore Model’: Unmasking the Myth of an Alternative Authoritarian State-Capitalist Model," Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10:4 (2012), pp. 342- 343.

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other words, it was a potential threat to regional stability”.40 This was particularly concerning the interrelated issues of Chinese dominance and military modernisation, Taiwan, and the SCS disputes. Following the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong raised concerns about “regional stability and freedom of navigation” in the SCS with then Chinese Premier Li Peng.41 Instability is against Singapore’s national interests as it constricted its political, economic and diplomatic space. Singapore’s engagement of China was hence “three-pronged” within the economic, political and military sectors. The first was economic engagement, providing China with vested interests in warding off instability. This eventually led to the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in 2009, the first FTA China signed with an Asian state. Second was diplomatic engagement. China joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 1991, the ARF in 1994, and the ASEAN Plus Three forum in 1999. Conversely, Singapore’s third prong was an insurance policy, in the form of reinforcing its own, already considerable, military strength, to the extent of moving closer towards the US if necessary, to maintain a balance of power.42 These once again illustrated Singapore’s pragmatic foreign policy. After all, despite warm ties, there have still been conflicts between the two, such as the fallout from Lee Hsien Loong’s 2004 “personal” visit to Taiwan just before he succeeded Goh as prime minister.43 Overall, Singapore has promoted engagement with China, believing that China’s growth would create economic opportunities for the ASEAN states, whilst further stabilising and integrating it into the international system.44 Lee Kuan Yew himself encouraged “the West to continue to invest heavily in China, lest it become ‘a xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West because it tried to slow down or abort its development’”. 45 The following section turns to Singapore’s relationship with the US before the results of the US macrosecuritisation in Singapore are assessed.

40 Ian Storey, "Singapore and the Rise of China: Perceptions and Policy," in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 208. 41 Ibid., pp. 214-215. 42 Yuen Foong Khong, "Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1999), pp. 111-131. 43 Kah Beng Teo, "Singapore in 2004: Vigilance Amid Growing Uncertainty," in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ed. Daljit Singh and Kin Wah Chin, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 344-345. 44 Storey, "Singapore and the Rise of China," p. 206. 45 Denny Roy, "Singapore, China, and the 'Soft Authoritarian' Challenge," Asian Survey, 34:3 (1994), p. 238.

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Permanent Friend Despite Temporary Irritations

In contrast to the long history of Sino-Singapore ties, the Singapore-US relationship mainly started only after Singapore’s independence, and moreover, on the wrong foot. In one of his first acts as prime minister of a newly independent Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew disclosed in late- August 1965 that Singapore had caught three Americans during a 1961 attempt at corrupting a Singapore official. Lee divulged this partly “to signal to the West that if the British pulled out”, then Singapore would “go along with Australia and New Zealand” rather than allow “American bases in Singapore”, especially since his “gut feeling” was that he “would find it difficult to work with the Americans whom” he “did not know as well”.46 Singapore took on “an extreme anti-Western posture in general and an anti-American one in particular” to “offset the ‘pro- colonialist’ taint” from retaining the British military base – crucial to Singapore’s defence and economy in light of its many vulnerabilities – and support its non-alignment policy.47 Despite official non-alignment and the poor start, there was general strategic concurrence that would see the Singapore-US relationship grow from strength to strength. To begin with, Lee Kuan Yew supported US intervention in Vietnam. To him, the US was “buying time” for the new governments across Southeast Asia “to solve the problems of poverty, unemployment and inequity” in order to mitigate the attraction of communist ideals.48 Thus, after Singapore’s independence was relatively assured and its British military base accepted, Singapore embraced a more tractable stance towards the US, particularly in security terms.49 When the UK revealed its intention to withdraw its troops from the east of the Suez Canal in 1967, Lee invited the US to take over the British naval dockyards in the hope that “an American presence in Singapore would deter likely aggressors and boost investors’ confidence”.50 The US only agreed to repair its warships in Singapore however. In 1968, Lee further requested that the US remain in Southeast Asia to ensure “a friendly naval presence” that would keep the sea lanes of communication open for trade.51 The US presence was not only valued in security terms, but also due to its contribution to Singapore’s economy. This was both indirectly in terms of enabling trade, as well as directly

46 Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 500-502. 47 Heng Chee Chan, Singapore: The Politics of Survival 1965-1967, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 43. 48 Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 503-504. 49 Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 102. 50 Daniel Wei Boon Chua, US-Singapore Relations, 1965-1975: Strategic Non-alignment in the Cold War, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), p. 2. 51 Jean-Louis Margolin, "Singapore: New Regional Influence, New World Outlook?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20:3 (1998), p. 323.

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in the form of US investment. Notwithstanding the troubled start, Singapore had pragmatically done business with the US. In 1966, Singapore agreed that the US could use the island as a recreational stopover for its Vietnam troops. The Vietnam War also provided Singapore with a large amount of “export orders from South Vietnam”.52 By 1972, the US “had become the largest foreign investor in Singapore”, reducing unemployment and boosting the economy.53 These US opportunities were crucial to Singapore’s early economic development. Singapore has therefore consistently wanted the US to maintain its presence in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Even after the 1975 fall of Saigon and the end of the Cold War, from Singapore’s perspective, the US presence preserved the balance of power. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the US imposed economic sanctions on Vietnam, provided arms and aid to the Cambodian resistance and supported ASEAN’s UN endeavours opposing the invasion to “Singapore’s satisfaction”.54 Post-Cold War, Singapore was still keen on the US presence. It agreed upon the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Regarding United States’ Use of Facilities in Singapore in 1990, which increased US access to Singapore’s military facilities. This included the eventual relocation of the Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, from the Philippines in 1992. A 1998 addendum granted the US access to Singapore’s newly built Changi Naval Base (CNB), with berths large enough for aircraft carriers. Singapore underscored that such privileged access did not indicate a permanent US presence though, and CNB may still host other navies upon request, to avoid others seeing Singapore as a US ally.55 As the younger Lee (Hsien Loong), then deputy prime minister, emphasised in 1999: “Generous American policies and the history of U.S. engagement since the Second World War have earned America a deep reservoir of goodwill and respect throughout Asia. Neither China nor Japan can replace the U.S. in this pivotal role”.56 There is “a firm belief within the Singapore leadership in America’s indispensability” in the Asia- Pacific to create the necessary conditions for Singapore’s survival.57

52 Chan, Singapore: The Politics of Survival, pp. 45-46. 53 Daniel Wei Boon Chua, "Becoming a 'Good Nixon Doctrine Country': Political Relations between the United States and Singapore during the Nixon Presidency," Australian Journal of Politics and History, 60:4 (2014), pp. 544-546. 54 Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 104. 55 Kah Beng Teo, "Singapore," in Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China, ed. Evelyn Goh, IDSS Monograph, No. 7, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005), pp. 41-42. 56 Quoted in Shannon Tow, "Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26:3 (2004), p. 441. 57 See Seng Tan, "America the Indispensable: Singapore's View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia- Pacific," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 38:3 (2011), p. 157, emphasis added.

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The Global War on Terror saw increased Singapore-US strategic alignment. Singapore worried that an Islamist terror attack on the island-state would further implode its many vulnerabilities, disrupting its economy, multicultural society, politics and neighbourly ties. Unlike the official non-alignment with a Western bias of the Cold War, Singapore was transparent about its US ties in the GWoT.58 It supported US proposals such as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, contrary to neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia, which deemed it to be external interference in their own littorals.59 In 2003, Singapore and the US agreed on a US-Singapore FTA. The two states also signed the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security, which included a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), in 2005. The SFA built upon the 1990 MOU, extending cooperation to counterterrorism. Singapore was also recognised as a “major security cooperation partner” of the US, although it had declined an offer in 2003 to become “a major non-NATO ally”, in accordance with Singapore’s pragmatism. Singapore deemed the latter to be a “strategic disadvantage” due to its relationship with other major powers, such as China, as well as the sentiments of its Muslim-majority neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia.60 Singapore-US ties have been very robust despite an unfavourable start, and Singapore generally welcomes the US presence in the Asia-Pacific. However, as Singapore’s then Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar reminded parliament in 2003, this did not mean Singapore was “subservient” to the US, and without regard for Singapore’s “own national interests”.61 There have also been various disagreements between the two despite their compatible strategic outlook. For instance, Singapore’s authoritarian tendencies clashed with the US’s liberal democracy during the so-called “Asian values” debate of good governance, conservatism and community ideals, against Western values of liberty, human rights, and the individual.62 Even during the GWoT, Singapore and the US had differed on tactical and strategic issues. 63 Nevertheless, as Rajaratnam stated: “countries whose foreign policy principles and deeds coincide with our national interests . . . We should not allow temporary irritations and minor disagreements between us and them to cause us to abandon them as our permanent and reliable

58 Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, "The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the ‘War on Terror’ in Southeast Asia," The Washington Quarterly, 30:4 (2007), pp. 80-81. 59 See Ian Storey, "Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress," Asia Policy, No. 6 (2008), pp. 113-114. 60 See Seng Tan, "America the Indispensible Power: Singapore's Perspective of America as a Security Partner," Asian Politics & Policy, 8:1 (2016), p. 126-127. 61 Quoted in Tow, "Southeast Asia," p. 443. 62 Michael D. Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Asian Values' Debate," Asian Studies Review, 24:3 (2000), pp. 309- 334. 63 See Kuan Yew Lee, "The United States, Iraq, and the War on Terror: A Singapore Perspective," Foreign Affairs, 86:1 (2007), pp. 2-7.

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friends”.64 It may be true that there are no permanent friends in international relations, but Singapore’s view of the US comes close to that holy grail.

Undeviating Pragmatism Regardless of “Success” and “Failure”

Chapter 5 demonstrated that the US has represented China’s rise as a collective security risk in four of the five sectors of the Copenhagen School; the military, political, economic and environmental sectors. This section considers whether these US representations were accepted by Singapore’s elites, such that they identified with the threat and mobilised in support of the security practices, in view of the context of Singapore’s bilateral ties with China and the US. We begin by turning to the military sector.

Military

The US representation of China’s rise as a risk to Asia-Pacific peace and stability in the military sector stemmed from China’s secretive military buildup, with a consequent demand of increased transparency. US preventive practices of increasing military capacities in the Asia- Pacific served to restore the balance of power. However, whilst this US representation had taken place right from the start of this thesis’s timeframe, Singapore only agreed with it at a later stage. For instance, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in his keynote to the 2007 SLD, stressed that though “America and Japan have expressed concerns over China’s military buildup, and seek more information on China’s defence spending and intentions”, “most Asian countries assess the challenge from China to be more economic than military” and China’s military buildup was only “a specific response to the cross straits situation” with Taiwan and “not a threat to regional security”.65 However, by 2009, Singapore appeared to have changed tack and identified with the US portrayal of China’s rise as a risk to peace and stability. Although this change might not be due to US influence alone, Singapore’s then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean, for example, repeated the US speech acts in the military sector during his SLD

64 Quoted in Chan and Haq, The Prophetic, p. 280. This quote is used in the title of this section. 65 Hsien Loong Lee, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2007 Keynote Address," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-diaogue-2007- d1ee/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-0f34/he-lee-hsien-loong-pm-e9ed.

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speech that year, calling for greater transparency. Additionally, a closer examination of his speech revealed a demand for more than simply transparency:

I am glad that the title of this plenary session is “Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation”, and not just “Military Transparency” . . . We are in a state of flux, which brings with it a degree of strategic uncertainty . . . New points of friction can arise as more states seek to secure access to sea-lanes and resources, or to protect new claims to maritime zones . . . As the powers realise that their spectrum of strategic interests has grown, they may increase their military capability to safeguard these interests . . . Of particular concern for the region are the overlapping and disputed claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The potential for incidents to occur between the claimants is high . . . This is where transparency plays a crucial role to avoid misunderstandings and to increase trust and confidence. 66

In order to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations risking peace and stability, Singapore wanted more than just “bean-counting”, but transparency transcending into defence cooperation. According to Teo, transparency included: (1) “statements of strategic intent” for reassurance, including “commitments to peace”, such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; (2) pledges towards “international norms and legal frameworks”; and (3) practical defence cooperation activities to build trust and confidence.67 In identifying with the US representation of the risk from China’s rise in the military sector, Singapore further added to it in proposing defence cooperation as part of the security practices in the military sector. This was on top of US practices of building the military capacities of its allies and partners, and military rebalancing. Attaching defence cooperation, with China, in this manner also matched Singapore’s pragmatic foreign policy principles of creating space. For example, Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s current defence minister from 2011, also stressed during that year’s SLD with reference to the SCS disputes that: “Strategic confidence is also built up through practical defence cooperation, through military exercises and exchanges which facilitate information sharing and enhanced transparency. Crucially, they

66 Chee Hean Teo, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2009 Fourth Plenary Session: Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Affairs, 2009, accessed 31 July 207, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2009-99ea/fourth-plenary- session-8062/military-transparency-and-defence-cooperation-in-the-asia-pacific-qa-53bb, emphasis original. 67 Ibid.

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build up personal ties among regional militaries and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation”.68 In 2014, after the US had sharpened their criticisms of China (see Chapter 4), Ng once again emphasised in the SLD that: “Recent incidents in the East and South China seas do not give the reassurance that Asia’s trajectory is on” a “virtuous path” of “peace and stability”. Therefore, there was a need “to step up practical cooperation and interaction between militaries to forge understanding and trust”, including under the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus framework.69 Defence cooperation, or defence diplomacy, is “the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy”.70 In this regard, the US was also part of Singapore’s solution in building confidence and trust, as much as China. For example, Lee Hsien Loong had underscored in a 2013 foreign affairs speech that: “America and China need to institutionalise exchanges to build strategic trust, promote transparency to prevent misunderstandings, and develop clear rules of engagement to avoid incidents”.71 In practice, Singapore increased its defence cooperation activities with China, following their 2008 bilateral Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation. These included the inaugural Singapore-China Exercise Maritime Cooperation in 2015. The inaugural ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise in 2018, proposed in 2016, helped to build multilateral defence cooperation ties as well. 72 The ADMM-Plus, including both China and the US, also increased practical cooperation, such as the 2015 Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Field Training Exercise, co-hosted by Singapore and Brunei, and involving “3,000 personnel, 18 ships, 17 helicopters, two maritime patrol aircraft along with Special Forces” from the eighteen member states.73

68 Eng Heng Ng, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2011 Sixth Plenary Session: Building Strategic Confidence; Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, accessed 31 July 2017, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/sixth-plenary-session- 087a/dr-ng-eng-hen-e2ed. 69 Eng Heng Ng, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Fifth Plenary Session: Ensuring Agile Conflict Management in the Asia-Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-5-8d14/ng-eng-hen-9a28. 70 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, The Adelphi Papers, No. 365, (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 6. “Defence cooperation” is used in this dissertation as it is preferred by the primary texts analysed. 71 Hsien Loong Lee, "Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 19th Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 23 May 2013, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-19th-nikkei-international- conference-future-asia. 72 See Swee Lean Collin Koh, "ASEAN–China Maritime Exercise CUES Greater SCS Stability," East Asia Forum, 18 August 2018. 73 Prashanth Parameswaran, "Singapore, Brunei to Host Multilateral Military Exercise in May," The Diplomat, 2016, accessed 26 September 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/singapore-brunei-to-host-multilateral- military-exercise-in-may/.

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In addition to identifying with and repeating the US linguistic representations of China’s rise as a military risk to the Asia-Pacific, Singapore has also mobilised in support of US security practices, albeit with an additional military practice of defence cooperation. In terms of building up military capacity, as noted earlier, Singapore-US defence ties dated to the 1960s, including the 1990 MOU and the 2005 SFA. By the late 1990s, more than one hundred US warships visit Singapore annually. The two militaries also exercise together very frequently. Such exercises include: Commando Sling, an annual bilateral air force exercise starting from 1990; the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise, an annual bilateral naval exercise begun in 1995; Exercise Valiant Mark, an annual exercise between the Singapore army and the US marines initiated in 1991; and Exercise Cobra Gold, an annual joint exercise, originally only between the US and its Thai ally, which Singapore joined from 2000. Moreover, as Tim Huxley stresses, the largest impact on the Singapore military’s capabilities from the Singapore-US defence relationship – which he calls a “quasi-alliance” – was the “extensive range of long-term training opportunities provided for Singapore’s air force in the USA”.74 These included the Peace Carvin, Peace Prairie, Peace Vanguard and the Peace Triton programmes. Singapore even took part in Exercise Malabar 07-02 in September 2007, the only state to do so besides the other “quadrilateral grouping” navies (see Chapter 5). Some observers call this formulation of like-minded states increasing their capabilities with each other and in the process likely sending a signal to China, “SQUAD”, adding Singapore to the mix.75 The US also sold military equipment to Singapore, including the F-15SG, a Singapore-purposed variant of the US F-15s, delivered in 2009, and achieving full operational capability status in 2013.76 Since 2014, the US has “authorized the permanent export of over $37.6 billion in defense articles to Singapore via Direct Commercial Sales”.77 Not only have these military training, exercises and equipment increased the capacity of the Singapore military, they have also enhanced the interoperability between the Singapore and US militaries. For instance, Singapore lauded the importance of the inaugural bilateral Exercise Pacific Griffin 2017, a “high-end” biennial naval exercise “of substantial scope and

74 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, pp. 208-212. 75 See Tanvi Madan, "The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the 'Quad'," War on the Rocks, 16 November 2017, accessed 1 October 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/; see also Singapore Ministry of Defence, "Reply to Media Queries on Ex Malabar 07-2," National Archives of Singapore, 2007, accessed 25 October 2019, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=20070729999.htm. 76 Singapore Ministry of Defence, "RSAF's F-15SG Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft is Fully Operational," Singapore Ministry of Defence, 2013, accessed 27 October 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and- events/latest-releases/article-detail/2013/september/2013Sep18-News-Releases-02501. 77 U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore," U.S. Department of State, 15 July 2019, accessed 28 September 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/.

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complexity”, in “enhancing professionalism and interoperability among the two navies”, with planning for the exercise having already started in 2016.78 Yuen Foong Khong also notes that military cooperation between Singapore and the US has grown significantly in the 2000s.79 Singapore was evidently leveraging on US capacity and alignment, in part, to further develop its third insurance prong in engaging China. Singapore has moreover supported the military dimension of the US Rebalance. As this US policy started taking shape, during the 2011 SLD, then US Defence Secretary Robert Gates highlighted that: “In Singapore, we are strengthening our bilateral defence relationship” and “pursuing more operational engagement, most notably by deploying US Littoral Combat Ships [LCS] to Singapore”. Gates further emphasised that Singapore and the US were also “examining other ways to increase opportunities” for the “two militaries to train and operate together” in order to “help prepare” them “for the challenges both militaries face operating in the Pacific”.80 Many analysts regard this rotational deployment of up to four LCS under the aegis of the 1990 MOU and the 2005 SFA as evidence of Singapore’s vigorous support for the Pivot.81 Since the first LCS, the USS Freedom, arrived in Singapore in April 2013, two other ships have completed their rotations, the USS Fort Worth and the USS Coronado. The USS Montgomery and the USS Gabrielle Giffords were deployed in Singapore in 2020, the first dual placement of the LCS there.82 To avoid implications that it has become a US base, Singapore emphasised that the LCS deployment did not mean it was “based or homeported in Singapore, and the LCS crew will live on board the LCS for the duration of their deployment”. Lockheed Martin, one of the companies designing the LCS, claimed that “Singapore officials specifically asked the Navy [USN] to deploy the LCS” in Singapore though. 83 Further demonstrating its support for the US Pivot, Singapore followed up this LCS arrangement with the maiden deployment of the US P-8 “spy plane” in Singapore in 2015 – announced along

78 Singapore Ministry of Defence, "Singapore and US Navies Strengthen Interoperability in Inaugural Bilateral Exercise Pacific Griffin," Singapore Ministry of Defence, 2017, accessed 27 October 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article- detail/2017/september/04sep17_nr/. 79 Yuen Foong Khong, "Singapore and the Great Powers," in Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years, ed. Barry Desker and Cheng Guan Ang, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016), p. 214. 80 Robert Gates, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2011 First Plenary Session: Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia- Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Affairs, 2011, accessed 7 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2011-4eac/first-plenary-session- 1fea/robert-gates-e986. 81 Tan, "America the Indispensible Power," p. 130. 82 Bhavan Jaipragas, "U.S. to Boost Naval Presence in Asia," South China Morning Post, 12 September 2019. 83 Cited in Chris Rahman, "Singapore: Forward Operating Site," in Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 121.

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with an enhanced DCA between Singapore and the US – which drew attention due to high profile P-8 brushes against Chinese forces in the SCS.84 It would appear Singapore has perceived that China had grown worryingly assertive in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (see Chapter 2). Then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew himself warned of the “Blue Dread” in 2009 in a foreign policy speech in the US:

So it was a surprise that on the 60th Anniversary of China’s National Day on 1st October 2009, Beijing paraded high-tech China-made weapons . . . The US, Japan, India and all of China’s neighbours must have taken notice of this display. Of course, a country the size of China must have its armed forces keep abreast with its economic growth . . . A blue-water fleet with aircraft carriers cannot just be to deter foreign intervention in a conflict between Taiwan and the Mainland . . . Chinese maps show these islets and most of the South China Sea as under Chinese ownership. There have also been disputes over fishing grounds between China and various ASEAN countries. The Chinese have built on several islets fishing outposts, and coastguard vessels patrol them. Later, behind these small patrol craft will be a blue-water fleet . . . The consensus in ASEAN is that the US remains irreplaceable in East Asia. But it can no longer be alone and manage the new complexities to maintain stability. Hence, the search for some new architecture, such as the concept of a community in East Asia . . . US core interest requires that it remains the superior power on the Pacific. To give up this position would diminish America’s role throughout the world.85

With such congruence, it was therefore unsurprising that Singapore has accepted the US representation of China’s rise as a potential collective security risk in the military sector to a large extent. Singapore repeated the US speech acts and identified with the risk to peace and stability, even as it included defence cooperation as an additional measure to mitigate the collective military risk from China’s rise. It also mobilised in support of the military aspect of the US Rebalance whilst building up its own military capacity with the aid of the US, though

84 Lynn Kuok, "The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia- Pacific," in Asian Alliances Working Paper Series, Paper 6, Brookings Institution, 2016, p. 6. 85 Kuan Yew Lee, "Speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the US-Asean Business Council's 25th Anniversary Gala Dinner in Washington DC," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 27 October 2009, accessed 11 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-minister-mentor-lee-kuan-yew-us-asean-business- councils-25th-anniversary-gala.

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it was unable to mirror these in terms of helping other states too, given its limited resources. Singapore’s acceptance of the US representation of a rising China in this regard was in concert with its own foreign policy principles of maintaining a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Whilst recognising that it cannot be seen as a “lackey” of the US due to political sensitivities, Singapore simultaneously wanted to keep the US in the region.

Political

Singapore has also accepted the US representation of China’s rise in the political sector, to an extent even greater than in the military sector. This US representation positioned Chinese practices as a risk to the rules-based order, particularly with regard to the freedom of navigation, which led to demands for China to uphold international rules and norms, including the peaceful resolution of conflict. Singapore repeated and mirrored this US representation. As in the military sector, before 2009, Singapore was still relatively sanguine about the potential political risks. For example, as Lee Hsien Loong underscored in the 2006 SLD: “China has been diligently and thoroughly engaging all ASEAN countries, allaying fears of a future dominant China” through active participation in multilateral fora and handling the SCS disputes “in a restrained manner”, including adopting “a joint declaration [DOC] with ASEAN to reduce the risk of a clash”, and agreeing with several other claimants bilateral arrangements on joint development.86 In contrast, by the 2009 SLD, this tone had shifted. As Teo Chee Hean highlighted then: “the overlapping and disputed claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands” in the SCS were of “particular concern”, and the “potential for incidents to occur between the claimants is high, especially as the value of these territories is elevated by their strategic location adjacent to key sea-lanes, and reports of valuable deposits in their seabed”. 87 Singapore has given greater support to the political aspect of the US representation of China’s rise since. At the outset, Singapore is more comfortable in repeating the “rules-based order” phrase than most of ASEAN, given its foreign policy principles. For example, Lee Hsien Loong remarked in a 2014 speech in the US commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Singapore- US FTA that: “The US has always promoted an open and inclusive rules-based framework for

86 Hsien Loong Lee, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2006 Keynote Address," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue- 2006-f1a5/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-c8ca/lee-hsien-loong-749e. 87 Teo, "Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation".

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international cooperation. And that is what has made the US a great world power and one which is welcomed and accepted as a benevolent and constructive force in many parts of the world”.88 Even more tellingly, in 2016, in one of the few usually domestic-oriented NDRs which touched upon foreign policy, Lee highlighted that:

Big powers can insist on their own interests and often do. They do not submit to adjudication by international tribunals, they may not comply with their rulings and China is not the only country to do this and nor is this the first time something like this has happened. Nevertheless, Singapore must support and strive for a rules-based international order . . . If rules do not matter, then small countries like Singapore have no chance of survival . . . Our second interest in the South China Sea is freedom of navigation . . . We have two vital sea lanes of communication, two arteries. One through the South China Sea, the other, through the Straits of Malacca . . . You block one, you die . . . Singapore needs a united and effective ASEAN . . . if ASEAN cannot deal with a major issue at its doorstep affecting its members, in the long run, nobody will take ASEAN seriously . . . So, on the South China Sea, we have got our own stand, principled, consistent; different from China’s, different from the Philippines or America. Other countries will persuade us to side with them, one side or the other, and we have to choose our own place to stand, what is in our interest, calculate it, choose the spot, stand firm, we cannot succumb to pressure.89

Singapore, like the US, has mapped the SCS disputes and the concomitant risk to the freedom of navigation to the rules-based order. It similarly stressed the role of multilateralism and institutionalism to deal with such risks, especially via ASEAN. Although Lee emphasised that Singapore’s position was its own, there was no substantive difference between Singapore and the US in this matter. As then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also remarked in 2012 when meeting K. Shanmugam, Singapore’s foreign minister from 2011 to 2015: “We are partnering to increase maritime security cooperation by upholding the rule of law, fighting the scourge of

88 Hsien Loong Lee, "Transcript of PM's Speech at the USSFTA 10th Anniversary Reception at the US Chamber of Commerce," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 24 June 2014, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/transcript-pms-speech-ussfta-10th-anniversary-reception-us-chamber- commerce-washington. 89 Hsien Loong, Lee, "National Day Rally 2016," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 2016, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/national-day-rally-2016, emphasis added.

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piracy, and ensuring freedom of navigation”.90 In comparison, Singapore’s position was vastly different from China’s. Not only did Lee refer to China’s rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against it during his 2016 NDR – though he was cautious in not rebuking China harshly, unlike the sharper US tone from 2014 – he also went on to say that “if you read the foreign media, including the PRC media, you will find articles criticizing Singapore for not siding more with them”.91 Singapore viewed the freedom of navigation as a crucial issue due to its vulnerabilities resulting in dependence “on imports for all essential commodities”, as well as reliance on trade and other communications as a “major air and sea port”.92 Examples of the importance of the freedom of navigation to Singapore were common throughout the texts examined. For instance, Lee underlined during the 2015 SLD keynote that though non-claimant states “cannot take sides on the merits of the rival claims”, “they do have a stake in the maritime disputes and in particular a stake in how they are handled”. This was because every state “whose trade passes through the South China Sea, or whose ships and aircraft use the South China Sea, has an interest in freedom of navigation and overflight”, including Singapore, “for whom the South China Sea is a vital lifeline”. 93 Lee repeated this in another 2015 foreign policy speech, commenting that Singapore is “a small island state that has depended on maritime trade” as its “economic lifeline”. Thus, Singapore must “defend the rights of freedom of navigation and overflight”, especially with regard to the SCS as provided for by UNCLOS, which “strikes a careful balance between the rights and interests of littoral states and those of other countries”, providing “a way of arbitrating and resolving disputes peacefully.”94 Singapore therefore mirrored the US routine security practices of multilateralism and institutionalism to mitigate the risk to the rules-based order and the freedom of navigation from China’s rise. Such practices followed Singapore’s own approaches to foreign policy. When Singapore was ASEAN Chair in 2007, it promulgated a concept paper to create an ADMM- Plus that would “engage ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue partners” such that measures “to enhance regional security should be respectful of each country’s sovereignty, conform to

90 Hillary Clinton, "Remarks with Singaporean Foreign Minister and Minister for Law K. Shanmugam," U.S. Department of State, 1 February 2012, accessed 11 September 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/02/183032.htm. 91 Lee, "NDR 2016", emphasis added. 92 Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy, (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999), p. 145. 93 Hsien Loong Lee, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 Keynote Address," International Institute for Strategic Affairs, 2015, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue- 2015-862b/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-6729/keynote-address-a51f. 94 Lee, "8th S Rajaratnam Lecture".

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international norms of behaviour, and sustain the international institutions and laws that underpin a stable international order”. 95 The US joined the ADMM-Plus when it started meeting in 2010. Another case in point was the initial formation of the EAS. Formed in December 2005, the US was not originally part of the EAS as it had not then acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. According to George Yeo, Singapore’s foreign minister from 2004 to 2011, following a February 2005 bilateral meeting with then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the US had expressed “concerns” that the EAS “will be inward looking and exclusive”.96 Singapore, together with Indonesia, recommended to include Australia, India, and New Zealand, in addition to the states within the ASEAN Plus Three forum, to prevent China from dominating the proposed East Asia forum (see Chapter 6).97 Subsequently, during the first EAS, China wanted to keep the ASEAN Plus Three as the “core group” of the EAS. Japan, on the other hand, with support from Singapore and Indonesia, and “also endorsed by Washington”, opposed discriminating against India, Australia and New Zealand in this manner.98 In the end, the ASEAN Plus Three was kept parallel to the EAS. Tellingly, Lee Hsien Loong reassured the US about the EAS in a 2007 foreign affairs speech, stating that amongst “the Asian countries, there are different views on what is the right configuration”. According to Lee, some thought that the ASEAN Plus Three was “a more natural grouping, where things can be more easily worked out”, though “others like Singapore are convinced that it is wiser to form a broader grouping that would help to make the grouping an open and balanced structure, and enable the United States to play an important and constructive role in the region”.99 The US eventually joined the EAS in 2011 after signing the TAC (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, Singapore welcomed the greater diplomatic support from the US in multilateral institutions as part of US security practices to avert the risk from China’s rise to the rules-based order. One prominent instance of this occurred during the 2010 ARF meeting held in Vietnam, after the US had already decided to join the EAS. Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recalled:

95 ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Concept Paper," ASEAN Secretariat, 2007, accessed 5 October 2019, https://admm.asean.org/dmdocuments/4.%20Annex%20G_ADMM- Plus%20Concept%20Paper.pdf, emphasis removed. 96 Quoted in Bruce Vaugh, "East Asia Summit: Issues for Congress," in Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 9 December 2005. 97 Anwar, "Indonesia's Vision of Regional Order," pp. 61-62. 98 Mohan Malik, "The East Asia Summit," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60:2 (2006), p. 210. 99 Hsien Loong Lee, "America And Asia: Our Shared Future," Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 May 2007, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and- Photos/2007/05/Speech-By-Mr-Lee-Hsien-Loong-Prime-Minister-And-Minister-For-Finance-Of-Singapore-At- The-Asia-Societ.

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. . . there was one topic on everyone’s mind: the South China Sea . . . Yet China kept insisting this wasn’t an appropriate topic . . . Vietnam raised the contentious issue. Then, one by one, other Ministers expressed their concerns and called for a collaborative, multilateral approach to resolving territorial disputes . . . After two years of China flexing its muscles and asserting its dominance, the region was pushing back . . . The United States would not take any sides on any particular dispute, I said, but we supported the multilateral approach being proposed, in accordance with international law and without coercion or the threat of force. I urged the nations of the region to protect unfettered access to the South China Sea and to work towards developing a code of conduct that would prevent conflict. The United States was prepared to facilitate this process because we saw freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as “a national interest”. This was a carefully chosen phrase, answering the earlier Chinese assertion that its expansive territorial claims in the area constituted a “core interest” . . . When I was finished, I could see that Chinese Foreign Minister Yang [Jiechi] was livid.100

In his response, Yang defended China whilst berating its critics, presumably Singapore in particular, which had ostensibly supported Clinton’s move. During his comments, Yang had “stared straight at Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo and said, ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact’”.101 Singapore was the smallest state in the ARF by size by far, but Yeo “reportedly stared right back”.102 The US has since regularly raised the SCS issue in such meetings.103 Consequently, in September 2010, then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew emphasised in a forum that he supported “the use of international conventions to solve border disputes, especially when the countries involved are not of equal standing”, referring to Clinton’s earlier 2010 ARF stance.104 Likewise, in a joint statement in 2016, then President Obama and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong “reaffirmed the importance of maintaining regional peace and stability and upholding freedom of navigation in and overflight above” the SCS. They also highlighted “the importance of resolving disputes

100 Clinton, Hard Choices, pp. 78-79. 101 Quoted in Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and Goliath?" Journal of Democracy, 29:2 (2018), p. 76. 102 Bilahari Kausikan, "Singapore Cannot be Cowed by Size," The Straits Times, 3 July 2017. 103 Sheldon W. Simon, "The US Rebalance and Southeast Asia: A Work in Progress," Asian Survey, 55:3 (2015), p. 582. 104 Jeremy Au Yong, "The Way to Solve Border Disputes: MM," The Straits Times, 29 September 2010.

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peacefully, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with international law, including as reflected” in UNCLOS, whilst backing “the full and effective implementation” of the DOC and “the expeditious conclusion” of a COC.105 Singapore also supported the PCA ruling against China.106 However, Singapore’s persistent consciousness of its vulnerabilities as a small state also constrains it, explaining its less enthusiastic stance towards US FONOPS. Whereas Britain and France, US allies, have mirrored the US and conducted their own SCS FONOPS, 107 Singapore has not made such a move. Rather, Singapore’s attitude towards FONOPS has been lukewarm at best. For example, in 2015, when asked if Singapore endorsed US FONOPS, such as the one by the USS Lassen earlier in October (see Chapter 5), Lee Hsien Loong avoided the question, simply remarking that FONOPS was “completely understandable”, whilst also noting that it was “also understandable that the Chinese look at this and say well, you are raising the temperature and why are you coming in from outside of the region”. 108 Similarly, when Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen was asked if Singapore would join FONOPS in a 2016 joint press conference with then US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, Ng gave a non-answer, only saying that “Singapore always believes in the the [sic] global commons and critical waterways that Singapore can do its part to keep safe”.109 As See Seng Tan points out, despite the importance of the freedom of navigation to Singapore, it has been very cautious with regard to US FONOPS to avoid riling the Chinese.110 In all fairness, no other Asia-Pacific state has practiced FONOPS in the SCS, not even a staunch US ally like Japan. Overall, Singapore has repeated the US speech acts in the political sector, including the “rules-based order” phrase, and mirrored the US security practices of multilateralism and institutionalism. These strongly indicate that Singapore has accepted the US representation of China’s rise as a risk in the political sector, though once again, this is not to say that US

105 Barack Obama, "Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 2 August 2016, accessed 14 August 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=118954. 106 Today, "Singapore Urges Respect for Court Ruling on South China Sea," Today, 12 July 2016, accessed 2 October 2019, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapore-south-china-sea-ruling-reaction. 107 Tuan Anh Luc, "Are France and the UK Here to Stay in the South China Sea?" The Diplomat, 14 September 2018, accessed 2 October 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/are-france-and-the-uk-here-to-stay-in-the- south-china-sea/. 108 Hsien Loong Lee, "Interview of PM Lee Hsien Loong by Greg Sheridan of The Australian on 13 November 2015," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/interview-pm-lee-hsien-loong-greg-sheridan-australian-13-november-2015. 109 Jermyn Chow, "US Has 'No Better Friend than Singapore' in the Region, Says Defence Secretary Carter," The Straits Times, 3 June 2016. 110 See Seng Tan, "Facilitating the US Rebalance: Challenges and Prospects for Singapore as America’s Security Partner," Security Challenges, 12:3 (2016), p. 31.

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influence is the sole reason for such acceptance. As a vulnerable small state, the rule of law, including the freedom of navigation, multilateralism and institutionalism had already been part of Singapore’s own pragmatic foreign policy principles. This vulnerability also meant that Singapore was simultaneously wary of joining in practices that were too provocative against China, such as US FONOPS, since as Yang Jiechi pointedly reminded George Yeo, Singapore remained a vulnerable small state.

Economic

In the economic sector, Singapore has by and large rejected the US representation of China’s rise regarding the risk posed to the economic order. Singapore did agree that the risk to the freedom of navigation would affect trade. For instance, as then Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean emphasised in a 2015 foreign affairs address: “Threats to freedom of navigation along key sea lanes have a significant impact on international trade . . . For Singapore, this is critical”. Trade is three times Singapore’s Gross Domestic Product and most of this trade is seaborne.111 However, this link between the freedom of navigation and trade was more a political issue to Singapore, as the subsection above detailed. Unlike the US, which has securitised China’s trading and commercial practices as a threat to its national economy, Singapore has seen China as more economic opportunity than challenge especially since Deng’s 1978 visit to Singapore. 112 During the 2006 NDR, for example, Lee Hsien Loong further likened ASEAN as “being the body with two wings, China, India taking off and carrying us along”.113 Contrary to the US then, Singapore has not perceived China to be disrupting the global economic order but was instead adamant that trade with China was a main part of it. For instance, in a 2007 foreign affairs speech in the US, Lee Hsien Loong had highlighted that, “Economic frictions and obstacles to trade and investment weaken countries' stakes in one another, and their incentive to uphold the international order”. Whilst Lee could “understand why the rising trade deficit with China has aroused strong reactions” in the US, he hoped that the US “will continue to take a rational approach to current trade issues with China, and keep

111 Chee Hean Teo, "Keynote Address by DPM Teo Chee Hean at the RSIS-Brookings Institution Conference 'Southeast Asia and the United States: A Stable Foundation in an Uncertain Environment?'" Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 19 October 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/keynote- address-dpm-teo-chee-hean-rsis-brookings-institution-conference-southeast-asia. 112 Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy, p. 114. 113 Hsien Loong Lee, "National Day Rally 2006," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 2006, accessed 26 August 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2006-english.

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US markets open” in order to “maintain the benign conditions that have benefited both the US economy and the world”.114 Lee echoed this during the 2007 SLD as well:

The trade imbalance between America and China is the consequence of different savings and consumption rates in the two countries, and not just a misaligned exchange rate . . . As former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick noted, “[it] has become a symbol today of whether the relationship is fair or not”. This sense of unfairness is fuelling protectionist pressures . . . If the US takes punitive measures against China on trade, and China retaliates, it will lead not just to more protectionism, but also friction and recrimination that will sour the broader relationship between the two countries, and increase the risks of a cold war. Protectionism will not be confined to US-China trade, but will surely spill over into the global trading system. This will constrict the main arteries of trade and investment flows . . . We will all be worse off.115

In a protectionist system closed to free trade, Singapore would be unable to survive its many vulnerabilities. Even Singapore’s defence minister, Ng Eng Hen, emphasised during the 2015 SLD that, “Asia plays an increasingly important role in global trade, international finance and military security”. With China “now the leading trading partner of all ASEAN states and Australasia”, there was “pressure for the rules that have heretofore governed the international order to adjust, to accommodate the nationalistic aspirations of new entrants and rising powers in the Asia-Pacific”.116 China was clearly part of the global economic order in Singapore’s point of view. Hence, though Singapore was extremely supportive of the TPP, especially in keeping the US within the agreement, this did not indicate that Singapore was mobilising in support of the TPP as a US security practice in the economic sector against China’s rise. In 2016, then US Secretary of State John Kerry had praised Singapore, emphasising that “it was Singapore that actually invited the United States to join the landmark” TPP.117 However, from “the very

114 Lee, "America And Asia: Our Shared Future". 115 Lee, "SLD 2007 Keynote". 116 Ng, Eng Heng Ng, "Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 Fifth Plenary Session: Global Security Challenges and the Asia- Pacific," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary-5-8995/ng- 4ab4. 117 John Kerry, "Remarks at a State Lunch for Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong," U.S. Department of State, 2 August 2016, accessed 14 September 2019, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/08/260769.htm.

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beginning, the P4 Agreement was conceived as a catalyst” for a wide Asia-Pacific FTA, and it explicitly allowed any APEC economy to join, subject to them meeting the conditions.118 For instance, Lee Hsien Loong argued in a 2009 APEC speech that the TPP was “a high quality agreement that maximizes the benefits for businesses” and “designed so that other economies can join in and accede to the TPP” such that “this little seed can bloom” and “grow into a significant tree and pillar for free trade and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific”.119 Furthermore, the TPP was not Singapore’s sole focus. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which included China, was also part of the economic order to Singapore. Both the TPP and RCEP could “pave the way for an eventual Asia-Pacific” FTA, as Lee emphasised in a 2013 speech at a dinner hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce and the US-ASEAN Business Council.120 Singapore’s interest in the TPP was simply to promote trade, and that was its original impetus in extending an invitation to the US in 2008. Singapore’s view of the TPP was different from that of the US. For the US, on top of boosting trade, the TPP was seen as the economic prong of the Obama Administration’s US Rebalance, and “was increasingly cast in strategic terms and in terms of competing with China”, to the extent that then Defense Secretary Ashton Carter even deemed the TPP as important as an aircraft carrier. 121 A 2016 press conference then President Obama and Lee held demonstrated the difference in the US and Singapore positions on the TPP. Lee stressed the economic advantages the TPP would bring to the US, whilst saying that a US rejection of the deal was like a wedding ceremony in which the bride failed to arrive. He also encouraged trade between China and the US. Obama, in contrast, highlighted that: “As Prime Minister Lee mentioned, China is not a part of TPP”, but if the US did not pre-emptively “establish strong rules, norms for how trade and commerce are conducted in the Asia-Pacific region, then China will”. Obama further emphasised that China was “not worried about labor standards or environmental standards or human trafficking or anticorruption measures”, meaning that if the

118 Henry Gao, "From the P4 to the TPP: Transplantation or Transformation?" in The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement, ed. C. L. Lim, Deborah Kay Elms, and Patrick Low, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 64. 119 Hsien Loong Lee, "Keynote Address by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the APEC CEO Summit 2009," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 13 November 2009, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/keynote-address-mr-lee-hsien-loong-prime-minister-singapore-apec-ceo- summit-2009-13. 120 Hsien Loong, Lee, "Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at Gala Dinner Hosted by US Chamber of Commerce and US-ASEAN Business Council," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 2 April 2013, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-gala-dinner- hosted-us-chamber-commerce-and-us. 121 Bates Gill, "The United States and Asia in 2015: Across the Region, US-China Competition Intensifies," Asian Survey, 56:1 (2016), p. 9.

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US were not “creating high standards”, then “China’s rules”, “a low-standard, lowest common denominator trade deal” would instead “govern in the fastest growing part of the world”.122 Therefore, Singapore was countersecuritising against the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the global economic order, rather than supporting the TPP as part of the US preventive security practices in that regard. Singapore instead positioned US ratification of the TPP as a major gauge of US willingness to remain within the Asia-Pacific in place of isolationism and protectionism. The claim and warning in the above example were that economic development and the US’s own reputation would be adversely affected if the US failed to liberalise trade, set against the propositional content of the US Rebalance. Singapore demanded that the US ratify the TPP. Likewise, during the 2015 SLD, Lee had cautioned that: “I hope American legislators and the American public realise how big the stakes are in the TPP, not just for Asia, but for the US itself too”. Lee stated that this was “because whatever the merits or demerits of individual line items of trade covered in the TPP, the agreement has a wider strategic significance” in that not getting “the TPP done would hurt the credibility and standing of the US, not just in Asia but worldwide”.123 Singapore’s countering representation conversely put the US in the frame as risking the global economic order, and not China. During the 2015 SLD, Lee even emphasised that: “It is an open secret that the US had reservations” about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank under China’s Belt and Road Initiative and “discouraged its friends from participating”; whilst “on the TPP, some observers believe that the rules are being crafted to raise the hurdle for China to join”. Though he was “quite sure that is not the thinking of all the TPP members”, Lee hoped that “eventually China will join the TPP and the US and Japan will join the AIIB”.124 Singapore had worked hard in the TPP negotiations, especially in gaining US buy-in to the TPP. The US representation of China’s rise as risking the market-based economic order mostly failed in Singapore. Although Singapore identified with the risk to the economic order due to the risk to freedom of navigation closing off trade, this was to be managed politically. Singapore was more inclined to see China as part of the global economic order. Furthermore, in portraying the US’s TPP agreement and ratification as crucial for the Asia-Pacific, Singapore was instead positing the US as part of the risk against the trading arrangements of the international economic order instead of China.

122 Barack Obama, "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley The American Presidency Project, 2 August 2016, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=118786. 123 Lee, "SLD 2015 Keynote". 124 Ibid.

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Environmental

Finally, within the environmental sector, the issues were less complicated, and the US representation of China’s rise as part of a wider environmental risk in terms of rising greenhouse gases causing climate change has succeeded in Singapore. Singapore was cognisant that every state had a stake in the risk to the global climate, since as “a low-lying island nation, Singapore is very vulnerable to the effects of climate change”, as then Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean emphasised in a 2015 speech, for instance.125 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had also underscored the severity of climate change as early as the 2007 SLD:

. . . longer term concern is global climate change. This is traditionally viewed as an environmental or economic issue, but it has serious security implications . . . The emerging economies of Asia will be among the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Any viable solution on climate change must have their support. They must be convinced that their own interests are at stake, and be full participants and stakeholders in setting the global direction forward. But they are understandably reluctant to constrain their growth and energy usage, when the current greenhouse gas problem is the result of past emissions by the developed countries, and their per capita emissions remain much lower than the developed countries . . . serious long term threat to the security of the region, and the world.126

China was a part of the problem of climate change as much as it was the solution, just like the US and even Singapore. Lee therefore praised China for its “early ratification” of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which came into force in 2016.127 In a Singapore-US joint statement, Lee and Obama further “affirmed the importance of addressing climate change and transitioning towards a low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathway”, whilst committing “to pursue a range of initiatives to advance these goals”. These included the US

125 Chee Hean Teo, "DPM Teo Chee Hean at the Opening Session of the Arctic Circle Singapore Forum," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 12 November 2015, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/dpm-teo-chee-hean-opening-session-arctic-circle-singapore-forum-12- november-2015. 126 Lee, "SLD 2007 Keynote". 127 Hsien Loong, Lee, "PM Lee Hsien Loong at the Special Session of the Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia," Singapore Prime Minister's Office, 29 September 2016, accessed 10 September 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loong-special-session-nikkei-international-conference-future- asia-0.

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reiterating “its commitment to join” the Paris Agreement in 2016, and Singapore committing “to taking the domestic steps necessary to join as soon as possible, with a view of joining in 2016”. 128 Despite only contributing “0.11% of global emissions”, Singapore’s domestic practices consisted of adopting “green development strategies” and stabilising “emissions with the aim of peaking around 2030”, even though such was “not easy for a small country with limited alternative energy options”.129 Ultimately, Singapore ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016, as did the US. However, after President Donald Trump succeeded Obama in 2017, he announced that the US will withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Chinese President Xi Jinping subsequently told the World Economic Forum that: “All signatories should stick to it [the Paris Agreement] instead of walking away from it, as this is a responsibility we must assume for future generations”.130 This was ironically perceived by observers as the US handing over leadership on climate security to China within the environmental sector.

Conclusion: Constant Hedging and the “Blue Dread”

Overall, Singapore’s pragmatism in its foreign policy has shaped its bilateral relations with China and the US, whilst also moulding the successes and failures of the US representations of China’s rise in the city-state. Of these, success in the least contentious environmental sector was straightforward, since every state, including the US and China, and even a small state like Singapore, was as much cause as solution. Singapore can also be seen to have fully supported the US representation of China’s rise in the military sector, identifying with the risk to Asia- Pacific peace and stability due to China’s military buildup, and mobilising in support of the US Rebalance, whilst building up the ultimate insurance policy of the Singapore military. Singapore further inserted defence cooperation into military transparency to build trust and confidence with China. At the same time, Singapore did not endorse US FONOPS in the SCS as doing so would undermine trust between Singapore and China. Even though Singapore also conceivably accepted the US representation of China’s rise in the political sector, with the island-state repeating US speech acts on the risk to the rules-based order from China’s assertiveness and mirroring US routine security practices in multilateralism and

128 Obama, "Joint Statement by Obama and Lee". 129 Teo, "Opening Session of the Arctic Circle Singapore Forum". 130 Quoted in Edward Wong, "China Poised to Take Lead on Climate after Trump's Move to Undo Policies," The New York Times, 29 March 2017.

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institutionalism, Singapore wanted to continue to engage China politically, in line with its pragmatic foreign policy. Likewise, in the economic sector, Singapore’s engagement of China continued unabated, resulting in the rejection of the US representation of China’s rise as risking the market-based economic order. Rather, to Singapore, economic engagement of China was a constituent part of the global economic order, and Singapore even countersecuritised a US rejection of the TPP as risking said order since trade was Singapore’s lifeblood. These nuanced measures demonstrated Singapore’s pragmatic foreign policy, especially its hedging against the risks from the US representations of the “Blue Dread”. A last issue of note is that Singapore remains very sensitive about its social harmony, one of Singapore’s core national interests.131 Whilst the US has not macrosecuritised China’s rise within the societal sector, Singapore’s leaders are likely to be sympathetic, within reason. Singapore’s worry of being identified as a “Third China” still smoulders even today, since such a view would heighten fears of a “Yellow Peril” from Singapore. Already, there have been warnings against covert “influence operations” by China in Singapore. Bilahari Kausikan candidly cautioned in 2018, after he had left the government, that: “When the Chinese try to impose a Chinese identity on Singapore, we must resist, because modern Singapore is based on the idea of being a multiracial country”.132 Conversely, any portrayal of China’s rise and its “Beijing Consensus” as a security issue against the liberal order of the broader societal sector would likely not take root in Singapore, given the “Singapore model” of merging authoritarianism with economic prosperity. Societal sector aside, the next (concluding) chapter compares the success of the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise in the cases of Indonesia and Singapore, reflecting on what this tells us about macrosecuritisation theory and its application to the question of the “China threat”.

131 See Lee, "8th S Rajaratnam Lecture"; The Straits Times, "Reaffirming Primacy of National Interest," The Straits Times, 20 August 2019. 132 Quoted in Charissa Yong, "S'poreans Should Be Aware of China's Influence Ops: Bilahari," The Straits Times, 28 June 2018; see also Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore," China Brief, 19:13 (2019), pp. 12-17.

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8. Conclusion: The “Blue Dread” China’s Rise Risk Thesis

The Findings

To what extent has the United States represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and have these representations been accepted by the relevant audiences? In contrast to the extant literature of the “China Threat” theory (see Chapter 2), I have found that the US has discursively represented China’s rise only as a risk to collective security rather than as an imminent and existential international threat. This future-oriented risk has persisted in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, though not the societal. Additionally, these US representations have only been partially successful in the (neutral) audience states of Indonesia and Singapore, signifying that it is unlikely that the majority of states within the interregional Asia-Pacific security “supercomplex” view China as a source of threat. I derived these findings using a post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory, based on a neo-securitisation formulation which incorporated the positive contributions of the three key contextual, practice and reflexive securitisation debates to a study of my research questions as its foundation, and in step with the scale involved in my research questions (see Chapter 3). My post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory, utilised to examine securitisation at a higher supra-regional or international level, posited an attempt to construct an issue as security at that level as a macrosecuritising move comprising of a speech act with a corresponding security practice. Such a move would succeed, resulting in macrosecuritisation, if there were elite support within the audience state consequently, in the form of these elites identifying with the issue underscored by the speech act, and mobilising in support of the security practice (see Figure 3.3). I subsequently applied this post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory systematically to US security texts and practices with regard to China’s rise using discourse analysis and investigating the practices themselves, including examining the signifiers of meaning illustrated by said practices (see Chapter 3). I started with empirically examining US representations of China within the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific to set out the context of my research (see Chapter 4). The US has placed China in an “othered” tier within its representations, different from its allies and partners. With reference to this “othered” tier, the US often denounced China, even as it also stated that it welcomed China’s rise. In addition, I identified a more severe change of tone in such denunciations of China in US representations

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from 2014. Hence, I also used this period to compare and contrast the US representations of China’s rise over time, on top of China’s assertive turn following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Consequently, this thesis has determined the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security (see Chapter 5). The US representations of China’s rise as a security risk to the Asia-Pacific have remained fairly constant throughout this dissertation’s timeframe, from 2006 to 2016, persisting across the military, political, economic and environmental sectors (refer to Table 5.1). Within the military sector, the US claimed that China’s rapid and secretive military buildup was a recipe for insecurity, risking peace and stability, and demanded greater transparency from China whilst focusing on the practice of building the military capacities of its allies and partners. During the Bush Administration, such preventive US security practices were mainly directed towards East Asia, whilst Obama extended this to Southeast Asia under the military prong of the US Rebalance. With regard to the political sector, the US representation of the risk to the rules-based order was due to China’s own practices, particularly in relation to the East and South China Seas, with implications to the freedom of navigation. The US demanded that China follow international rules and norms, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the peaceful resolution of conflict. The routine security practices of multilateralism, institutionalism, and freedom of navigation operations followed, with the US consorting with its allies and partners in fora like the six-party talks and the East Asia Summit to prevent the risk from China’s rise to the rules- based order. With reference to the economic sector, the US claimed that China’s rise was a risk to the global economic order from China’s unfair economic practices as well as from the potential disruption of trade through the SCS due to China’s excessive claims there. The US demanded that the principles of the free market be adhered to, whilst negotiating for the Trans- Pacific Partnership free trade agreement, pre-emptively excluding China. In contrast, within the environmental sector, the US’s more generic representation of the risk to the environment included China as part of its preventive security practices to mitigate climate change, such as the Paris Agreement, since China was as much cause as solution, like the US itself. However, US security representations in the environmental sector were more frequent during the Obama Administration than the preceding Bush Administration.1 The latter part of this dissertation focused on whether these US representations of a rising China as a security risk in the Asia-Pacific succeeded in the relevant audiences of

1 For instance, cf. Bush, NSS 2006, p. 41; Obama, NSS 2015, p. 12.

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Indonesia (see Chapter 6) and Singapore (see Chapter 7). Across the four sectors, both Indonesia and Singapore have accepted some US representations of China’s rise whilst rejecting others, though they have not done so in the exact same manner. Comparing Indonesia and Singapore (refer to Table 8.1 below), within the military sector, the US demand for transparency was repeated by both Indonesia and Singapore in the texts examined, but with differing purposes. Although Indonesia did so, it had mostly countersecuritised the military-centric claims of the US, preferring to shift them to the political sector instead. This fitted better with Indonesia’s foreign policy of “dynamic equilibrium” in accordance with its independent and active principle. Indonesia did not support the US security practice of capacity-building to guard against China’s rise therefore, only wanting US military aid for the sole purpose of modernising its own armed forces, whilst also starkly rejecting the military prong of the US Pivot, in particular. Ironically, despite its countering stance at the higher international level in the military sector, Indonesia had itself securitised the military risk to its own sovereignty and territorial integrity from China’s rise due to Chinese violations of the Indonesian exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands. Unlike Indonesia, Singapore further demanded for defence cooperation as part of transparency to allay the risk from China’s military buildup, in line with its pragmatic foreign policy of creating greater space. Singapore thus mobilised in support of the US security practices of capacity-building, training with the US, even to the extent of joining Exercise Malabar in 2007 with the rest of the “quadrilateral grouping”, and incorporating the US Pivot. In contrast, Indonesia’s call for joint patrols was more political and economic rather than military in character with regard to peace and stability. There was greater convergence between the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore in the political sector. My analysis demonstrated that both states can be perceived to be widely supporting the US representation of China’s rise in this regard. Adhering to its own portrayal of China’s rise as a political rather than military risk, Indonesia repeated and mirrored US speech acts and practices. It wanted China to respect international rules and the peaceful resolution of conflict, as well as to take part in multilateral and institutional security practices, which also included the US. Similarly, Singapore repeated the US demand for a rules-based order, being even more comfortable than Indonesia in doing so, and mirrored US security practices. Both Indonesia and Singapore were instrumental in shaping an EAS with US membership, and are continuing to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, which the US also backs. As Malcolm Cook argues, “US allies in the Asia Pacific, along with Singapore and Indonesia, have been the strongest supporters of Asia-Pacific regionalism and the inclusion of the United States in its regional

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bodies”.2 Furthermore, both Indonesia and Singapore were supportive of the US insistence on the sanctity of the freedom of navigation and UNCLOS. Indonesia recognised that the freedom of navigation and UNCLOS were crucial for its rights as an archipelagic state, especially its EEZ off the Natunas. Similarly, the freedom of navigation was a vital lifeline for Singapore given its geostrategic position. However, in spite of both repeating the importance of the freedom of navigation and UNCLOS, neither has supported US FONOPS. Indonesia deemed US FONOPS as too militarily provocative even though these were meant to register political objections to China’s abuse of the international rules and norms encapsulated in UNCLOS. Likewise, Singapore stayed cautious in weighing endorsement for the US against China due to its vulnerabilities as a small state, despite otherwise seemingly full political support for the US. Notwithstanding the overall Indonesian and Singaporean acceptance of the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the rules-based order in the political sector, the situation in the economic sector turned out differently. Although Indonesia identified with the risk posed to the economic order from China’s rise, it did not support the security practice of the TPP due to stronger domestic concerns. Instead, Indonesia further portrayed China’s rise as a risk to another aspect of the economic order in the Asia-Pacific, in terms of the potential illegal pillage of maritime resources like oil or fisheries, of which China would need more as it continued to grow. Indonesia thus stepped up security practices such as increased patrols in the waters near its Natunas. In so doing, Indonesia had localised the US representation of the economic sector to be more in tune with its own economic concerns about China’s rise. In comparison, Singapore’s perspective was the opposite of Indonesia’s. The city-state did not identify with the US macrosecuritisation in the economic sector. Even though Singapore participated in the negotiations to establish the TPP, it did not do so in support of the US’s perspective of the TPP as a means to keep the global economic order safe and prevent the risk from China’s rise. Singapore simply wanted to engage the US with an Asia-Pacific trade agreement in light of its own economic interests. Singapore therefore countersecuritised by positioning US ratification of the TPP as a major gauge of US willingness to remain within the region in place of isolationism and protectionism, working hard in the TPP negotiations in order to make the agreement stick. Simultaneously, Singapore also engaged China in the other Asia-Pacific FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Singapore continued to view China’s rise as part of the global economic order, against and despite the US representation otherwise.

2 Malcolm Cook, "The United States and the East Asia Summit: Finding the Proper Home," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2 (2008), pp. 297-298.

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Lastly, regarding the environmental sector, both Indonesia and Singapore have repeated the US warning of the generic risk to the environment from climate change caused by the rising emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as mirrored US preventive security practices to counter this risk, just as China did. Though the US had since planned to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, both audience states have remained committed to it. 3 Singapore has even announced an ambitious plan of peaking emissions by 2030, halving this peak by 2050, and targeting zero net emissions for “the second half of the century”.4 In summary, Table 8.1 below depicts the success of macrosecuritisation within the two case studies, albeit in simplistic terms:

Table 8.1: Comparing Success of Macrosecuritisation in Indonesia and Singapore Audience State Indonesia Singapore Support Identification Mobilisation Identification Mobilisation Military Sector ✓✓  ✓✓ ✓ Political Sector ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ Economic Sector ✓    Environmental Sector ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ Legend: ✓ - Identification/Mobilisation ✓✓ - Repetition/Mirroring  - Failed Source: Compiled by author.

My post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory has clarified that the US has represented China’s rise as possible, future-oriented risks to multiple referent objects in the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, as well as whether Indonesia and Singapore have accepted such US representations. This unfamiliar broad US discursive representation of China’s rise as a risk is furthermore starkly different from the familiar depictions of China by the typical rationalist, structuralist, culturalist or poststructural traditions of the “Blue Dread CTT”. The remainder of this concluding chapter is split into three sections. The following section considers the limits of my analysis. The second section examines the implications of the aforementioned research findings. The third section then concludes the chapter and dissertation by exploring various avenues for future research.

3 For instance, A. Muh. Ibnu Aqil, "Indonesia Finalizing New NDC, Likely to Keep Old Emissions Cut Target," The Jakarta Post, 24 Feburary 2020. 4 Audrey Tan, "S'pore to Take Steps against Shock Waves of Climate Change," The Straits Times, 5 March 2020.

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The Limitations

The manner in which my research has been designed, applied and carried out may generate at least three potential criticisms, which I shall do my best to address in this section. First, arguably the greatest potential criticism of my thesis stems from the established idea of neopositivist causation. It may be pointed out that my research has not conclusively drawn a direct line from the explanans to the explanandum, failing to prove beyond doubt that the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore have accepted some of the risks of China’s rise due to US representations of these. Crucially, over the course of my research, no “smoking guns” were discovered to strongly demonstrate such causation. 5 For example, no Indonesian or Singaporean leader has outright claimed that the US was responsible for the state’s national response to China’s rise. Nonetheless, “smoking guns” by themselves are “sufficient but not necessary for the acceptance” of an explanation. 6 What this dissertation has done is to draw together the connections between the US portrayal of China’s rise and the responses to such US representations in the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore in terms of what their elites have said and done. Doing so validated how the explanandum was reached from these various connected events, conditions and processes. In particular, whether the audience states’ elites have repeated and mirrored US speech acts and security practices was posited as strong indicators of successful macrosecuritisation. Significantly, successful macrosecuritisation in this thesis has also been illustrated via the “community of practice” (see Chapter 3) between these audience states and the US with regard to a rising China.7 For instance, such existed between Indonesia, Singapore and the US in the political sector, with the two audience states adamant in bringing the US into the EAS to counter China’s otherwise unchallenged weight. It was also present in the military sector between Singapore and the US as well, demonstrated in military exercises like Exercise Malabar 07-02, the SQUAD iteration, or the forward deployment of the Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore’s Changi Naval Base. The signifiers of meaning within these “communities of practice” were the US representations of the risks from a rising China and how to mitigate these.

5 For the “smoking gun” test, see Stephen van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 31-32. 6 David Waldner, "Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Inference," Security Studies, 24:2 (2015), p. 244. 7 See Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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Furthermore, I do not suggest that the US representation of China’s rise was the sole cause of the audience states’ acceptance of the collective security risks from a rising China. Rather, as highlighted in the case study chapters, both Indonesia and Singapore have their own national interests at stake and in mind too, shaped by their own threat perceptions of the “Blue Dread”. US representations naturally have to interact with these national interests in affecting whether macrosecuritisation has succeeded or failed. Crucially moreover, as a counterfactual, without US leadership in the Asia-Pacific, it is far more unlikely that smaller states like Indonesia and Singapore would have reached the same conclusions in thoughts and deeds about the risks from China’s rise as noticeably. Second, some may argue that the speech acts and practices highlighted in the thesis, as well as what the elites in the audience states have said and done, have not always been explicitly targeted at China. Whilst this is true, it does not equate to meaning that such have not been directed against China. These have simply been more implicit rather than always overt, as traditionally expected of international diplomacy,8 especially since relations were not outright hostile. Importantly, my dissertation has emphasised the propositional content; of an “othered” China, events such as Chinese practices in the SCS, as well as the historical relationships between the audience states and China. In this context, it was clear that speech acts and practices by US policymakers as well as what the audience states’ elites have said and done were influenced by China’s rise and the fears this rise have generated, even if they have remained tacit more often than not out of an abundance of caution. Third, another potential criticism lies within the normative group of critiques with reference to securitisation, the “Huysmans dilemma” (see Chapter 3). In underscoring the discursive manner in which the US has macrosecuritised China’s rise, critics may deem this to be a worsening and realisation of the Sino-American “self-fulfilling prophecy”, against which Joseph Nye warns.9 This criticism is perhaps aggravated by my coining of the “Blue Dread” term, sensationalising the CTT from China’s contemporary rise. However, to reiterate (see Chapter 1), my goal for this dissertation was precisely the opposite. Purposely characterising the current CTT as a “Blue Dread” linked this to the previous images of China as a “Yellow Peril” and “Red Menace”. In so doing, my intention was to highlight that these previous racist

8 For example, Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds., Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices, Second ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 9 Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," p. 94.

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and communist fears were founded on exaggerations of the “Other” and were but caricatures,10 exactly like the “Blue Dread”. Furthermore, in clarifying how the US has represented China’s rise as a collective security risk, I have demonstrated the lack of a serious, imminent danger in the US threat perception of China’s rise. Rather, the danger is future-oriented. Moreover, understanding the specifics of the US representations also means that these could be conversely deconstructed and reversed through desecuritisation instead, as opposed to instituting a vicious cycle that would spiral out of control. These turned the so-called “self-fulfilling prophecy” on its head. The next section discusses the implications arising from my research.

The Implications

To begin with, the post-Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation theory I have developed for this dissertation has contributed to debates about classical securitisation theory and its applications. I first accounted for the normative, sociological and methodological deficiencies that were highlighted of classical securitisation theory. Subsequently, I took on board the positives engendered by the three key debates of securitisation useful in addressing my research questions: the importance of the context and the audience, the emphasis on practices on top of speech acts, and the difference between risk and threat, to formulate a refined neo-securitisation theory. To apply these to the macro-scale of my research questions of the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences, in the Asia-Pacific, I consequently theorised a higher- level post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory. This post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory was more suitable for the purposes of my research in being able to concurrently encompass: (1) more than one referent object from different sectors at the international level, including any changes to these; (2) different-scaled dangers ranging from present existential threats to those of risk – of anticipating threats developing in the future – and the consequent responses required; and (3) the effects on statist elite audiences at the international level, including an account of their lower level securitisations or countersecuritisations domestically within the state. Furthermore, the empirical application of this post-Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory to my research questions has affirmed Vuori’s contention that macrosecuritisations “do

10 Stephen Del Visco, "Yellow Peril, Red Scare: Race and Communism in National Review," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42:4 (2019), pp. 626-644; see also Overholt, Asia, America, p. 7.

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not always triumph over lower level securitisations”. 11 Rather than macrosecuritisation structuring all lower level “normal” securitisations within it, it may still be possible for these lower level “normal” securitisations to differ from the macrosecuritisation. For instance, for Indonesia, whereas US macrosecuritisation has only partially succeeded in the military sector, Indonesia itself securitised a domestic military risk from China’s rise. Macrosecuritisation is useful in analysing the different nuances between the lower and higher level securitisations. Moreover, macrosecuritisation is not just a unidirectional download by the audience states. Instead, audience states may also further macrosecuritise or countersecuritise as they engage with it. For example, whereas the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific excluded China with its security practices of building the military capacities of its allies and partners and military rebalancing, Singapore added defence cooperation that included both the US and China. The US and Chinese militaries exercised together in multilateral military exercises such as the 2015 Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Field Training Exercise held under the ambit of the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting-Plus framework. In addition, as Buzan and Wæver emphasise: “Size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in determining what is or what is not a successful object of security”.12 As shown in my thesis, with reference to the success of macrosecuritisation, the challenge of scale means that the closer the higher level representation is to the audience state’s own interests, the more likely it is that these representations are accepted. It would thus be useful to have an appropriate representation that resonates with different audience states in line with their own interests, including shaping gradated speech acts and practices for different audience states. Nevertheless, targeted macrosecuritising moves cannot differ overly from the overarching representation for fear of affecting its coherence. Likewise, when it comes to desecuritisation, doing so at the higher level of the international arguably also means that the lower level domestic securitisations must be considered to aid the success of desecuritisation. My thesis has also empirically clarified the US position on China’s rise in lieu of the general “Blue Dread” discourse. As stressed above, the US did not see China’s rise as an international threat, but as a risk, though it did perceive China as a threat to its domestic economy as well as in relation to China’s use of cyber threats against the US in terms of stealing military secrets (see Table 5.1). It should not, therefore, be surprising that during President Donald Trump’s tenure, a Sino-American trade war has ensued, and Trump also banned

11 Vuori, "How to Do Security," p. 142. 12 Buzan and Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation," p. 255.

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Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, from the US’s 5G networks due to concerns over US national security. Trump has simply stepped up the US’s security practices against the economic and military threats to US national security from China. Importantly, the US’s China policy was not caught on the horns of a “dilemma” between competing against, or cooperating with, a rising China, described by unwieldy terms such as “congagement”, “constrainment” or “coopetition”; or dealing with the “China Threat” as the media, academics and pundits often assume. Instead, the US’s China policy for the Asia-Pacific was a comprehensive strategy to manage the security risks from China’s rise to various higher-scaled, referent objects. Given this broad US representation of China’s rise as a collective risk across the military, political, economic and environmental sectors, it is perhaps remarkable that the US did not attempt to construct China’s rise as a security issue with respect to the societal sector in terms of the overseas Chinese identification with Southeast Asian states. This is especially since the elites in both Indonesia and Singapore remain very sensitive about the “Yellow Peril” with regard to their own nation-building (see Chapters 6 and 7), of which the US must be aware. Whilst a study of this curious absence in the societal sector is outside the scope of this dissertation, I posit two hypotheses here to explain this. It could possibly be that the US recognises that any potential dividends from such a social representation might be outweighed by the potential harm caused if Indonesia and Singapore were to perceive the US as interfering in their domestic affairs. Alternatively, the US does not want to play this ethnic card overtly due to its identity as a liberal democracy. Regardless, examining this puzzle would make an interesting future study, especially in relation to where such a lack of securitising fits into Copenhagen School securitisation theory. Crucially, this broad US representation of China’s rise as a collective risk across various sectors further emphasises the challenges of macrosecuritisation in practice. It is much more challenging to gather audience support uniformly across all these different variables to support the overall US policy regarding a rising China. As it stands, the US representation of China’s rise as a risk to the global economic order has antagonised key constituencies in Singapore in this regard, to the extent that Singapore has even countersecuritised a US rejection of the TPP as risking the economic order. Likewise, Indonesia has countersecuritised the military risk from a rising China represented by the US to the political sector instead. Furthermore, this scale challenge of the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise is arguably amplified when the security concern is one of future-oriented “risk”, as compared to “threat”, which is more urgent and

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demands an emergency response. States balance against “threat” after all, rather than “risk”.13 There is simply more room to manoeuvre when it comes to the uncertainty of risk versus the exceptionalism of threat. With reference to praxeological implications for the Asia-Pacific states, this thesis has clarified that managing the risks from China’s rise with the US is different from choosing to side with the US in a Sino-American war. Most states, especially Indonesia and Singapore,14 do not want to have to choose a side, nor have they. Even as the US macrosecuritisation has succeeded in some sectors in Indonesia and Singapore, these were about managing risks together with the US as opposed to siding with the US to face the threat from China’s rise. In the environmental sector, managing the risks to the global climate even involved the US, the audience states of Indonesia and Singapore, together with China. Practices by the US, Indonesia and Singapore, amidst US macrosecuritisation should not be mistaken as spirals of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” of inevitable war. The caveat here is that the broad US representation of China’s rise as a collective risk over the 2006-2016 time period of this thesis also signals a conflictual Sino-US relationship for the future. As audience states in the Asia- Pacific further interact with the US and China, they then need to be clear eyed about the distinction between risk and threat, as well as the practices involved in terms of balancing, internal or external, for the latter; or prevention or hedging, for the former.15 In this manner, the results of my thesis have also provided insights to the academic literature on hedging. As Haacke argues upon an extensive review of the extant hedging literature, rather than looking at hedging as a steadying act between various matters; such as balancing or bandwagoning, or different political alignments versus economic arrangements, it is more appropriate to “understand hedging as a risk management strategy”.16 However, whereas Haacke assesses that Singapore had sided with the US to balance the threat from China’s rise, as opposed to hedging, by considering his proposed indicators of the state’s: (1) threat assessment, (2) military alignment, and (3) use of “ambiguous signals to competing powers” in the military sector,17 my thesis has shown otherwise. First, Singapore’s

13 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 1990 paperback ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 14 See Novotny, Torn Between America and China, pp. 349-352; Joseph Chinyong Liow, "What If Singapore Has to Choose between China and the United States," in Singapore Perspectives 2017: What If? ed. Gillian Koh and Debbie Soon, (Singapore: World Scientific, 2018), pp. 37-47. 15 For balancing, see Walt, The Origins of Alliances; T. V. Paul, Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). 16 Jürgen Haacke, "The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19:3 (2019), p. 392, emphasis added. 17 Ibid., pp. 402-409. Haacke’s third indicator of ambiguous signalling is based on: Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, "Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia," Security Studies, 24:4 (2015), pp. 696-727. Cf.

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identification with the US was over the military, political and environmental risks from China’s rise, and not collective threats to the referent objects of stability, the rules-based order or global climate respectively, nor any domestic level threat. This fully realised hedging’s risk management. Second, though Singapore also supported US security practices in the military sector, it did not exactly mirror these, such as by building partnerships with other Asia-Pacific states to increase capacities to manage China’s rise. Nor was such military alignment one-sided in favour of the US. Instead, Singapore also included defence cooperation, with China, as part of transparency to mitigate military risks, such as the Singapore-China Exercise Maritime Cooperation in 2015. Third, as defence cooperation with China on top of its support of the US Rebalance indicated, Singapore sent ambiguous signals to both the US and China in the military sector. Such ambiguous signalling also happened within each of the political and economic sectors. In the former, Singapore held back on outright support of US FONOPS despite its core interest in the freedom of navigation. Regarding the latter, even as Singapore wanted the US in the TPP, even to the extent of positing a US rejection of the TPP as isolationism and withdrawal, Singapore concurrently negotiated the RCEP with China. Therefore, building upon Haacke’s definition, as well as Darren Lim and Zack Cooper’s work on hedging as ambiguous military signals,18 the results from this thesis reinforce hedging as a risk management strategy signalling ambiguity in multiple security sectors, not just the military; and these ambiguous signals are within each sector, rather than across sectors. Singapore is quite the quintessential hedger against the risks from China’s rise, and such hedging further demonstrates that US macrosecuritisation has not fully succeeded in the relevant audiences. In conclusion, in utilising a novel discursive approach to the familiar question of whether the rise of China is a security threat, I have academically engaged with, and expounded on, macrosecuritisation theory as a framework for research. The next section discusses some future research agendas for macrosecuritisation theory.

The Future

I offer three additional prongs for future research. The first two add to macrosecuritisation theory whilst the third deals further with the question of the extent to which the US has

Singapore as hedging in Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, (Washington D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2005); Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:2 (2008), pp. 159-185. 18 Haacke, "The Concept of Hedging," pp. 375-417; Lim and Cooper, "Reassessing Hedging," pp. 696-727.

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represented a rising China as a threat to international security. As a start, my post-Copenhagen School macrosecuritisation theory, which builds upon and reinforces classical macrosecuritisation, may be applied to the prime examples of macrosecuritisation listed by the Copenhagen School, the Cold War and the Global War on Terror.19 Doing so may provide additional insights on these cases, akin to how Ronald Krebs has reexamined the so-called “Cold War consensus”.20 Another fruitful issue to apply my macrosecuritisation theory is the Covid-19 pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus – also known as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or 2019-nCoV – that arose towards the end of 2019. Macrosecuritisation theory is potentially valuable in analysing the discursive construction of the Covid-19 disease as a security issue. Such a project would first involve examining how the macrosecuritising actor, the World Health Organization (WHO), had presented the novel coronavirus when it first emerged in Wuhan, China in 2019. Subsequently, whether different states accepted or rejected the WHO’s representations and what such signified would make for engaging case studies. There are several points of interest. The Covid-19 disease was upgraded to a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 31 January 2020, but was declared a “pandemic” by the WHO on 11 March 2020, even though doing so did not “change WHO’s assessment of the threat posed by this virus”, nor did it change “what WHO is doing” and “what countries should do”.21 Another focus area would be how and why states like the US, for instance, seemed not to have heeded the WHO’s call early in January 2020 to “be prepared for containment, including active surveillance, early detection, isolation and case management, contract tracing and prevention of onward spread” of Covid-19. 22 There were already indications that there were gaps and problems with China’s extraordinary measures in combating the global spread of Covid-19, especially between the discovery of the novel coronavirus and Wuhan’s lockdown. 23 Despite these, the US had tested fewer than three

19 Buzan and Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation," pp. 269-274. 20 Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 21 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, "WHO Director-General's Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID- 19 - 11 March 2020," World Health Organization, 11 March 2020, accessed 25 March 2020. 22 World Health Organization, "Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)," World Health Organization, 23 January 2020, accessed 25 March 2020, https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/23-01-2020-statement-on-the- meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel- coronavirus-(2019-ncov). 23 See Josephine Ma and Pinghui Zhuang, "5M Left before Wuhan Lockdown," South China Morning Post, 26 January 2020; Thomas J. Bollyky and Yanzhong Huang, "The Multilateral Health System Failed to Stop the

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thousand people in the ten days after the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention affirmed that there was “community spread” in the US on 26 February 2020.24 This would appear to be a failure of the WHO’s macrosecuritising moves. A study of the Covid-19 pandemic would further provide more insights to macrosecuritisation. The final avenue for further study would be to extend the time period of the US macrosecuritisation of China’s rise to the Trump Administration. This would assess the Trump Administration’s impact on the extent to which the US has represented a rising China as a threat to international security, and whether this has succeeded in the relevant audiences. Indeed, the prima facie memes in this regard – the trade war, banning Huawei, TikTok and WeChat, or the Covid fallout, just to give a few examples – would have us believe the case to be closer to the former rather than the latter, the familiar “China Threat” theory. A post- Copenhagen macrosecuritisation theory might unfamiliarly demonstrate otherwise.

Coronavirus," Foreign Policy, 10 March 2020, accessed 25 March 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/10/the-multilateral-health-system-failed-to-stop-the-coronavirus/. 24 The Atlantic, "Here's How Many People Have the Coronavirus in Your State," The Atlantic, 20 March 2020, accessed 25 March 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-many-people-tested-sick- coronavirus-covid-each-state-america/608413/.

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Annex A: List of US Security Documents

• National Security Strategy: o 2006 o 2010 o 2015

• Quadrennial Defense Review: o 2006 o 2010 o 2014

• National Defense Strategy o 2008

• National Military Strategy: o 2011 o 2015

• Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (2012)

• Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (2015)

• Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence (to 2010) /Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (from 2011): o 2006 o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012

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o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016

• Annual Report to Congress – Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (to 2009)/Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (from 2010): o 2006 o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016 o 2017 (noting the events of the preceding year)

• Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Annual Report to Congress o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016 and 2017 (this report comprised the events of two years)

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• Freedom of Navigation Report (by Fiscal Year) o 2006 o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016 o 2017

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Annex B: List of Shangri-La Dialogue Speeches

• 2006: o Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Keynote Address. o Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, “The United States and Asia’s Emerging Security Architecture”. o Teo Chee Hean, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Setting National Security Priorities”. o Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Constructing a Regional Security Community”.

• 2007: o Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Keynote Address. o Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, “The United States and Asia-Pacific Security”. o Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Securing Regional Waters: How Much Progress?” o Teo Chee Hean, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Security Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliances and Partnerships”.

• 2008: o Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister, Keynote Address. o Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, “Challenges to Stability in the Asia- Pacific”. o Widhyawan Prawiraatmadja, Indonesia Pertamina Senior Vice President, “Securing Energy in the Asia-Pacific”. o Teo Chee Hean, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Modes of Security Cooperation: Confidence-Building, Partnerships, Alliances”.

• 2009: o Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, “America’s Role in the Asia-Pacific”.

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o Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Building a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific”. o Teo Chee Hean, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, “Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific”.

• 2010: o Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific”. o Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Renewing the Regional Security Architecture”. o Teo Chee Hean, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, “Renewing the Regional Security Architecture”.

• 2011: o Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence, “Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia- Pacific”. o Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “New Military Doctrines and Capabilities in Asia”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Building Strategic Confidence; Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes”.

• 2012: o Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia President, Keynote Address. o Leon Panetta, US Secretary of Defence, “The US Rebalance towards the Asia- Pacific”. o Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Protecting Maritime Freedoms”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Emerging Risks to Global and Asia- Pacific Security”.

• 2013: o Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defence, “The US Approach to Regional Security”.

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o Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Military Modernisation and Strategic Transparency”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Advancing Defence Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific”.

• 2014: o Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defence, “The United States’ Contribution to Regional Security”. o Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Managing Strategic Tensions”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Ensuring Agile Conflict Management in the Asia-Pacific”.

• 2015: o Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister, Keynote Address. o Ashton Carter, US Secretary of Defence, “The United States and Challenges of Asia-Pacific Security”. o Ryamizard Ryacudu, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “New Forms of Security Collaboration in Asia”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Global Security Challenges and the Asia-Pacific”.

• 2016: o Ashton Carter, US Secretary of Defence, “Meeting Asia’s Complex Security Challenges”. o Ryamizard Ryacudu, Indonesia Minister of Defence, “Making Defence Policy in Uncertain Times”. o Ng Eng Hen, Singapore Minister for Defence, “Pursuing Common Security Objectives”.

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Annex C: List of US Documents/Speeches on ASEAN

• 2006: o Steve Hadley, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, 9 November. o Steve Hadley, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, 18 November.

• 2007: o George W. Bush, Interview With Foreign Print Media, 30 August. o Dennis Wilder, Dan Price, Press Briefing on the President's Trip to Australia and the APEC Summit by Senior Administration Officials, 30 August. o The White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Forces of Freedom and Prosperity in the Asia Pacific, 6 September. o The White House, Fact Sheet: United States Cooperation with Southeast Asia, 7 September. o George W. Bush, Remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Summit in Sydney, 7 September. o George W. Bush, Remarks at a Luncheon With Southeast Asian Leaders in Sydney, 7 September. o James Connaughton, Paula Dobriansky, Press Briefing by Chairman of Environmental Quality James Connaughton and Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky on U.N. Convention on Climate Change, 5 December.

• 2008: o Tony Fratto, Press Briefing by Tony Fratto, 17 June. o George W. Bush, Interview With Foreign Print Journalists, 30 July. o Dennis Wilder, Press Briefing by Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Dennis Wilder, on President's Trip to Asia, 30 July. o The White House, Fact Sheet: The United States and Asia: Enduring Freedom and Prosperity, 7 August.

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• 2009: o Ben Rhodes, Jeffrey Bader, Michael Froman, Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes; National Security Council Senior Director for East Asian Affairs, Jeffrey Bader; and Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs Michael Froman on the President's Trip to Asia, 9 November. o Robert Gibbs, Michael Froman, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs Michael Froman, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on the President's Trip to Singapore and the APEC Summit, 14 November. o Joint Statement — 1st ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, Singapore, 15 November. o Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Singapore, 15 November.

• 2010: o Hillary Clinton, Remarks at Press Availability, 23 July. o Robert Gibbs, Jeff Bader, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeff Bader, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, 23 September. o Joint Statement of the 2nd ASEAN-US Leaders' Meeting, New York, 24 September. o Barack Obama, Remarks at a United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Leaders Meeting in New York City, 24 September. o The White House, Press Release - Readout of President Obama's Working Luncheon with ASEAN Leaders, 24 September. o Robert Gates, Remarks by Secretary Gates at ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, 12 October. o Hillary Clinton, Intervention at the East Asia Summit, 30 October. o Chairman’s Statement of the Fifth East Asia Summit, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 30 October 2010.

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• 2011: o The White House, Press Briefing Previewing the President's Trip to Hawaii, Australia and Indonesia, 9 November. o Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 18 November. o Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth East Asia Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 19 November 2011. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit, 19 November. o The White House, Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on the President's Meetings at ASEAN and East Asia Summit, 19 November o Jay Carney, Tom Donilon, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, 19 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: ASEAN-United States Leaders Meeting, 20 November.

• 2012: o Ben Rhodes, Danny Russel, Samantha Power, On-the-Record Conference Call by Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes. NSC Senior Director for Asia Danny Russel, and NSC Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Samantha Power on the President's Upcoming Trip to Asia, 15 November. o Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, 20 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, 19 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: The U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative, 19 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet On The U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Partnership For A Sustainable Energy Future, 20 November. o Jay Carney, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney and Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, 20 November. o Chairman’s Statement of the Seventh East Asia Summit, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 20 November 2012. o The White House, Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit Outcomes, 20 November.

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• 2013: o John Kerry, Opening Remarks at U.S.-ASEAN Summit, 9 October. o Chairman’s Statement of the 1st ASEAN-U.S. Summit, Brunei, 9 October. o Chairman’s Statement of the Eight East Asia Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 10 October 2013. o US Department of State, Background Briefing on Secretary Kerry's Meetings in Brunei, 10 October.

• 2014: o Chuck Hagel, Rajiv Shah, Opening Remarks by Secretary Hagel and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 2 April. o Chuck Hagel, Media Availability with Secretary Hagel Onboard the USS Anchorage, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2 April. o Chuck Hagel, Remarks at ASEAN Conference, 3 April. o Josh Earnest, Ben Rhodes, Michael Froman, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, 11 November. o Josh Earnest, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, 13 November. o Chairman’s Statement of the Ninth East Asia Summit, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014. o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma, 13 November. o Chairman's Statement of the 2nd ASEAN-United States Summit, 13 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: 2nd ASEAN-U.S. Summit, 13 November.

• 2015: o Ash Carter, Remarks at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting - Plus (ADMM- Plus), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 4 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, 16 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia

C-4

o Josh Earnest, Michael Froman, Ben Rhodes, Dan Kritenbrink, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh earnest, USTR Ambassador Michael Froman, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, and NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dan Kritenbrink, 19 November. o Chairman’s Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-United States Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 21 November. o Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 21 November. o Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership (2016-2020). o The White House, Fact Sheet: US-ASEAN Economic Engagement, 21 November. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Relations, 21 November. o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Association of Southeast Asian Nations Leaders in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 21 November. o Chairman’s Statement of the 10th East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November. o Barack Obama, The President's News Conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 22 November. o The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, 30 December.

• 2016: o The White House, Fact Sheet: Unprecedented U.S.-ASEAN Relations, 12 February. o Eric Shultz, Susan Rice, Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Eric Schultz and National Security Advisor Susan Rice, 15 February. o Barack Obama, Remarks at the Opening Session of the United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit Meeting in Rancho Mirage, California, 15 February. o Joint Statement of the United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Special Leaders Summit—Sunnylands Declaration, 16 February. o Barack Obama, The President's News Conference in Rancho Mirage, California, 16 February. o John Earnest, Ben Rhodes, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, 6 September.

C-5

o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Association of Southeast Asian Nations Leaders in Vientiane, Laos, 8 September. o Chairman’s Statement of the 4th ASEAN-United States Summit, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 8 September. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, 8 September. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Connect, 8 September. o Chairman’s Statement of the 11th East Asia Summit, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 8 September. o Barack Obama, The President's News Conference in Vientiane, Laos, 8 September.

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Annex D: List of US-Indonesia Documents and Speeches

• 2006: o George W. Bush, Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia, 20 November. o George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia and an Exchange With Reporters in Bogor, 20 November.

• 2007: o George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Sydney, 8 September.

• 2009: o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's Telephone Call to President Yudhoyono of Indonesia, 13 March. o Barack Obama, Statement on the Reelection of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, 14 July. o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's Telephone Call With Indonesian President Yudhoyono, 18 July. o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's Call With Indonesian President Yudhoyono, 2 October. o Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Singapore, 15 November.

• 2010: o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Toronto, 27 June. o Barack Obama, The U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, 27 June. o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Jakarta, Indonesia, 9 November. o Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia, 9 November.

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o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Economic and Trade Cooperation with Indonesia, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Expanding The U.S.-Indonesia Partnership On Climate Change And Clean Energy, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Higher Education Partnership With Indonesia, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Indonesia and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: U.S. Response to Natural Disasters in Indonesia, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Remarks at a State Dinner Hosted by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Jakarta, 9 November. o Barack Obama, The President's News Conference With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Jakarta, 9 November. o Barack Obama, Press Release: Remarks of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia - As Prepared for Delivery, 10 November.

• 2011: o Joint Statement by President Obama and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, 18 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, 18 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Excess Defense Article (EDA) F-16 Refurbishment, 18 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Expansion of the Peace Corps Indonesia Program, 18 November. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Education Partnership, 18 November. o Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia in Bali, 18 November.

• 2013: o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's call to President Yudhoyono of Indonesia, 3 October.

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• 2014: o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's Call with Indonesian President-Elect Widodo, 23 July o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of Indonesia in Beijing, China, 10 November.

• 2015: o Joint Statement by President Obama and President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of Indonesia, 26 October. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Climate Cooperation, 26 October. o Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Energy Cooperation, 26 October. o Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of Indonesia, 26 October. o The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation, 26 October.

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Annex E: List of Indonesia Documents and Speeches

• Defence White Paper: o 2008 o 2015

• State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occasion of the Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia: o 2006 o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016

• Annual Press Statement, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia (not available 2006-2009): o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016

• Key Foreign Policy Speeches by the President of the Republic of Indonesia: o Speech by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), 20 May 2005.

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o Keynote Speech by H.E. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President Republic of Indonesia At the ASEAN Forum: Rethinking ASEAN Towards the ASEAN Community 2015 Jakarta, 7 August 2007. o Statement by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of Republic of Indonesia at the Ceremony to Mark the Entry Into Force of the ASEAN Charter, 15 December 2008. o Speech by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the Opening of the 18th ASEAN Summit, 7 May 2011. o Lecture by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, on the Occasion of the 44th Anniversary of ASEAN, 8 August 2011. o Speech H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the Opening Ceremony of the 19th ASEAN Summit, 17 November 2011. o Keynote Speech by H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia, at the APEC CEO Summit 2013, Bali International Convention Center, 6 October 2013.

• Key Foreign Policy Speeches by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia: o Remarks By H.E. Dr. Marty Natalegawa, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia On the Occasion of the 7th General Conference of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 16 October 2009. o Welcoming Remarks by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia At the 44th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 19 July 2011. o Marty Natalegawa, “An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-Pacific”, Washington D.C., 20 May 2013.

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Annex F: List of US-Singapore Documents and Speeches

• 2006: o George W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore in Singapore, 16 November. o George W. Bush, Remarks at a Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore in Singapore, 16 November.

• 2007: o George W. Bush, Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 4 May.

• 2008: o George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Meeting With Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore, 9 April. o George Yeo, Opening Remarks by Mr George Yeo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore and Co-Chair of ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations, at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference 10+1 Session with the United States Of America Singapore, 23 July 2008.

• 2009: o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and an Exchange With Reporters, 29 October.

• 2013: o Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 2 April.

• 2015: o Barack Obama, Press Release - Readout of the President's Telephone Call with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 16 September. o Barack Obama, Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 22 November.

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• 2016: o Barack Obama, Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 2 August. o Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 2 August. o Barack Obama, The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 2 August. o Barack Obama, Remarks at a State Dinner Honoring Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, 2 August.

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Annex G: List of Singapore Documents and Speeches

• National Day Rally, Prime Minister of Singapore: o 2006 o 2007 o 2008 o 2009 o 2010 o 2011 o 2012 o 2013 o 2014 o 2015 o 2016

• Key Foreign Policy Speeches: o Speech By Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister And Minister For Finance Of Singapore, At The Asia Society Washington Center / US-Asean Business Council Joint Gala Dinner, at Washington D.C. – America And Asia: Our Shared Future, 3 May 2007. o Opening Plenary Remarks by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the ASEAN Summit Singapore, 20 November 2007. o Opening Plenary Remarks by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 3rd East Asia Summit, 21 November 2007. o Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, at the S. Rajaratnam Lecture, 09 April 2009. o Speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the US-Asean Business Council's 25th Anniversary Gala Dinner in Washington DC, 27 October 2009. o 2009, Excerpts from the Media Conference by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chair of the 17th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting on 3 November 2009. o 2009, Welcome remarks by PM Lee Hsien Loong at the APEC Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Welcome Reception, 10 November 2009.

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o Keynote address by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the APEC CEO Summit 2009, 13 November 2009. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s interview with US television journalist Charlie Rose on 14 April 2010. o Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s address to Chicago Council Of Global Affairs (CCGA), 15 April 2010. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Q&A Session with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on 15 April 2010. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s interview on Chicago tonight on WTTW on 16 April 2010. o Transcript of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Seth Mydans of New York Times & IHT on 1 September 2010. o Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s remarks for CNN 30th anniversary event on 20 October 2010. o Keynote Opening Speech of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Singapore Conference by Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law of Singapore K Shanmugam, 10 February 2012. o Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Singapore Summit, 21 September 2012. o Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the NS45 Commemorative Dinner, 22 October 2012. o Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at Gala Dinner hosted by US Chamber of Commerce and US-ASEAN Business Council, 2 April 2013. o Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 19th Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia, 23 May 2013. o Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 2nd Singapore Summit Welcome Dinner, 20 September 2013. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's remarks at the APEC CEO Summit 2013 Panel Discussion, 6 October 2013. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's doorstop interview at APEC 2013 in Bali, 8 October 2013. o Excerpt of Nikkei Inc's Interview with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 14 May 2014.

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o Dialogue by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loon at Council of Foreign Relations, 24 June 2014. o Transcript of PM's Speech at the USSFTA 10th Anniversary Reception at the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington DC on 24 June 2014. o Politico's interview with PM Lee Hsien Loong, 25 June 2014. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Dialogue at Singapore Summit on 20 September 2014. o “Southeast Asia and the United States”: Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugum, 22 September 2014. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Dialogue at Forbes Global CEO Conference on 28 October 2014. o Excerpted Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 February 2015. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Media Doorstop at the ASEAN Summit in Langkawi on 27 April 2015. o Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's Meeting with ASEAN Journalists at the 7th ASEAN Journalists Visit Programme (JVP) on 4 June 2015. o Keynote Address by DPM Teo Chee Hean at the RSIS-Brookings Institution Conference “Southeast Asia and the United States: A Stable Foundation in an Uncertain Environment?” 19 October 2015. o DPM Teo Chee Hean at the Opening Session of the Arctic Circle Singapore Forum on 12 November 2015. o Interview of PM Lee Hsien Loong by Greg Sheridan of The Australian on 13 November 2015. o PM Lee Hsien Loong at the 8th S Rajaratnam Lecture on 27 November 2015. o PM Lee Hsien Loong's interview with Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on 29 March 2016. o DPM Teo Chee Hean at the launching ceremony of the second Littoral Mission Vessel on 16 April 2016. o PM Lee Hsien Loong at US Chamber of Commerce/US-ASEAN Business Council, 1 August 2016. o PM Lee Hsien Loong's Dialogue at the US Chamber of Commerce/US ASEAN Business Council Reception, 1 August 2016. o 2016, PM Lee Hsien Loong at the Special Session of the Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia, 29 September 2016.

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