Russophobia in the Kremlin's Strategy

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Russophobia in the Kremlin’s strategy A weapon of mass destruction

Jolanta Darczewska, Piotr Żochowski NUMBER 56 WARSAW OCTOBER 2015

Russophobia in the Kremlin’s strategy A weapon of mass destruction

Jolanta Darczewska, Piotr Żochowski © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Editor Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska

Translation Jim Todd

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

Photograph on cover Shutterstock

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-62936-72-4 Contents

INTRODUCTION /5

THESES /6

I. Outline of the concept’s history /9

II. Russophobia in the informational battlefield /13

III. Russophobia in official political language /16

IV. Russophobia under special scrutiny /19

V. (Anti)dialogue with Poland as part of the Russian identity discourse /23

VI. Russophobia as the Kremlin’s problem /28 extremely emotional and stimulating opinions. stimulating and emotional extremely it categorical, possible devise to makes approach enemy; this logical ideo image ‘enemy’of the the of classic suits akind well is of Russia, of identity. discourse Thement aneo-imperial Russophobe, in who itone argu as treat and dimension, give it auniversal they itism; anti-Sem Russophobia equate with Kremlin the day’s in strategists To domestic. foreign Kremlin’s and opponents, both the with war stage of of Russia’s another declaration the sents communications space, today repre media Russian the in often voked increasingly in Russophobia, being is which against of astruggle The postulate West. ‘decaying’ consumerist, opposition in the to structed world’ con ‘Russian of vision it adistinct encompassedother the Empire’s zone Russian on of the while the the domination, scribed it de one hand, on the ambiguous: politically been has discourse this beginning, the From discourse. imperial nineteenth-century in deep along roots has history, has and term This language. cal politi Russian in ‘Russophobia’ reinstated term been the has of Russia’s Western to criticism Ukraine, response in In actions INTRODUCTION ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 6 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 • THESES • • derivative of them: namely, information technologies. These namely, technologies. derivative of them: information are which those and development technologies the of political to importance great authorities of today attach The Russian threats. alleged of face these the in society alien’, were deemed ‘ideologically which it Russian mobilised states and individuals those world; bythe stigmatising and, division of schematic this Russophobia fightjustified against West. of the those The and East of of the those values, systems two between conflict the as well as models, civilisational and of cultural two rivalry the symbolised Russophobia invariably goals: tactical beyond above and these clear always tive was ment of EU, NATO However, the etc. objecand strategic the enlarge the against argument an as also and society; date Empire; combat to ‘global Russian of the Zionism’; consoli to peoples rebellious the discipline to state: beyond Russian the and within objectives policy both implement to used various been Russophobiahas Throughout fight history, the against of isolationism. haughty attitude adopt to an Russia led regime’s which of policy expansion, tsarist of the criticism West’s the neutralise to unable was discourse of This values. hierarchy i.e. adifferent Khan, of legacy Genghis the and tium of Byzan tradition Orthodox-imperial the East’), representing it promoted ofworld avision adifferent the Empire (‘the of (Pan-Slavism), Europe other Southern on and the while tral Empire’s zone Russian of the the ofpassed Cen domination it on encom one hand, discourse: ambiguous apolitically was it world’. of values a‘decaying start the From traditional the to heir the as opposition in and to a ‘degenerate’ Europe being presented as was Empire Russian the Even then, time. of the discourse civilisational and imperial Russian the support ed to intendmid-nineteenth thecentury,was in disseminated first ‘Russophobia’, deep-rooted term The historically was which ------• • niques of manipulating information and elements of elements and information ofniques manipulating employs which operation, long-term tech and special planned aform of ‘state propaganda’ actually is called is That which way of shaping collectiveconsciousness. andperspective effective an as ities’ point ofregarded –is view author the world from desirable it is the which and around sia image of an Rus messages portray these –which Moderating defensive from offensive. to changed, has nature their and grown has importance objectives. their recentpolicy years, In state’s the foreign domesticand realise and legitimise to serve policy. Kremlin’s doubts about the against society Russian munising away of Russophobes as im serves attacking hand, other the On isolate them. and works publicly to and emies, stigmatise en as regime of the considerscritics state the that means This of Russia. liberalisation and democratisation of the porters sup against directed is approach this basis, domestic Russian world’). ‘Russian developed of As on the astrictly part actually but nations, not are considered separate are Belarusians and (Ukrainians question a‘civilisational’ with questions national Ukrainian and Belarusian the equating Belarus, and Ukraine The concept cover to Russophobia’ of ‘domestic expanded has applied. universally be can which instrument nomenon an as phe this against struggle the treats and lent anti-Semitism, to equiva is which state Russian the and group ethnic speaking Russian- the Russians, ethnic a form of towards intolerance Russophobia it as treats of all, it. First with trends dangerous Russophobia fightbrings of the against new strategy This egorical, extremely emotional and stimulating opinions. stimulating and emotional extremely egorical, it cat possible devise to makes approach enemy; this logical ‘enemy’.the ideo image of The the the ‘Russophobe’ suits well image previous of of or the updating recreation constant the Western world, requires the propaganda such with of rivalry context adeterministic public. in Set general the ly controlling’ ‘manual ------

7 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 8 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 • • • isolationism. of haughty attitude of an demonstration Union Soviet –the the and regime tsarist days of the the in –as isolation and of Russia self- further rhetoric, the political of Russian in aggressiveness level the in They increase foreshadow an nature. very by their opponents their to values and intentions, negative traits hostile on attributing Kremlin’s policy, the based towards and stance critical their to adjust forcing them countries, individual and Russia tween away –when of be as seen communication Externally tended. have in opposite can consequences those to country ti-ethnic amul in which chauvinism, for Russian ground abreeding are Russophobic on the based stereotype activities Informational of force. arguments traditional the and past imperial its wards to turned it has aresult, As never by formulated Russia. been has inspiring) ideologically (attractive, a positive programme today, history. Until throughout policy of Russian programme negative of the phenomenon, amanifestation is a universal into growing Russophobia,is today The fightwhich against West. the and Russia between relations in tensions ing ongo for asimple the and explanation argument a crowning of remains Russophobic also countries stereotype thologised for example). (as Ukraine, in Kremlin’s actions Thethe my of failure of face the the in them to comfort psychological ing aform of as restor serves also and threats, or alleged of real face the in Federation, them mobilising Russian of the citizens among the identity political shaping aneo-imperial in mental image instru up of an Russophobic also is Building countries – such actions represent a negation of dialogue represent a negation of actions dialogue – such ------2 1 Tyutchev Fyodor by discourse ‘Russophobia’The term into political introduced was I. Third Department of the Tsar’s of the Office Department Third ascribed to ‘Occidentalists’, who criticise the tsarist regime for its regime tsarist the ‘Occidentalists’, to who criticise ascribed domestic(where the contexts: it into two is of Russophobia falls Tyutchev’s values. saviour,its of astronghold Christian concept Western world, by the to be was (the “Great East”), marginalised Empire Russian the terms, geocultural his In tronage of Russia. concept pa the ofthe i.e.as under Pan-Slavism, Slavic harmony France”; from rot spreading well aremedy “the be to stop to as element”, supposed was which Germanic still-healthy “the with a partnership Empire, including Russian for the programmes foreign policy Tyutchev 1840s, potential the outlined in written revolution’ West’,Germany’, the the and and ‘Russia ‘Russia and and ‘Russia texts his government. In the to support conceptual

this committee as of 1858. as committee this of charge was and Tsar’s Office, of the Branch Third the in for censorship tee commit on the worked he Russia to return his After nlo/1999/40/reitbl.html. http://magazines.russ.ru/ West; the in counter-propaganda of Russian tion crea the initiated he mid1840s the In of Panslavism. a proponent was and of Nations, Springtime the during Europe in situation social and political the Europe, and Russia between relations political the described he journalism his In Genoa). Turin, (Munich, service diplomatic the in years twenty over attaché an as Munich to went he University, State at Moscow studying after 1822, alone’). In mind the with understood « slogan famous of the thor au the and poet, and diplomat aRussian was Tyutchev(1803-1873) Fyodor Fyodor Tyutchev became its leader; he ran it until 1873. it until ran he leader; its Tyutchevbecame Fyodor buturlinovskiy komitet so-called the Department, Third the within formed was pervision Su for Press Committee Special the 1848, In Emigration. Polish Great the supervise to intended mainly was agency, which foreign the supervised and it coordinated 1830 After of Gendarmes. Corps the by aided was Department TheThird individuals. ‘dangerous’ and of suspects of resettlement areas as well as prisons, and centres detention supervised observation, police under people about information gathered Church, Orthodox the within activities sectarian monitored publications, censored ministries, it supervised tences: of compe range a wide It had 1880. to 1826 from period the in active was police) secret tsarist (the Office Majesty’s His of the Department The Third O ut l ine (named after its first head Dmitry Buturlin). Ten years later, years Ten Buturlin). Dmitry head first its after (named f the of 1 , a poet, diplomat, and secret councillor in the the in councillor diplomat, secret , apoet, and Умом Россиию не понять не Россиию Умом conce p 2 t , to provide intellectual and and provide, to intellectual to the Russian legation. He spent He spent legation. Russian the to ’ s histor » (‘Russia cannot be be cannot » (‘Russia y ------

9 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 10 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 es of the Russian language under Stalin. it Iirst appeared in in appeared it Iirst Stalin. under language Russian es of the The word resourc ‘Russophobia’ lexical the only entered of the Poles’of the idea of of rejection the context the foreign context (mostly in it”, the in as wards well as to rush the stop can commits, Europe principles which tional “none or even law, civilisa of violations of the the ethical of the that fact about the complaining opposes Russia, which a Europe to ofrepression, of lawlessness freedom and expression; lack and 4 3 torical justice torical aconsequence of his was Polish state of liquidation the the and enemy, an of a‘victim’ Poland: Poland was as of Russia stereotype the imposed propaganda tsarist supporting ofpretation history inter nationalist the Karamzin, Nikolai from Moreover, starting ‘Polish atrocities’. and Polish ‘Polish betrayal’, ‘the ingratitude’ recall and hostility its manifest to opportunity the propaganda 1830, 1863) (1794, gave tsarist Vistula on the insurrection each Slavs”. of Judas people the “the as views: not his He alonein was Slavs’ Polish ‘The the to poem (1867) his he referred in and sians, Rus towards ‘Russophobic’ cruelty and rape Poland of treason, thepost-partition, Slavs. between He accused aconflict signify to issue he brought regime, this tsarist of policy the the Justifying empire. the Polish people of the against struggle question’ the and ‘Polish Russophobia the between and Tyutchev link aclear made century. nineteenth opment Panslavism of and Slavophilism (Slavophile).phile devel cemented The by the concept then was Russo other, on the the empire; and the strengthening patriot, Orthodox the ‘Russophobe’ one of hand, on the the was, tithesis

[Putin. Sources of imperial aggression], Warsaw 2014. Warsaw aggression], of imperial Sources [Putin. agresji imperialnej Źródła Putin. Nowak, Andrzej see topic For on this more fied; this brought a pan-Slavic agenda to the tsarist regime’s foreign policy. regime’s foreign tsarist the to agenda pan-Slavic a brought this fied; intensi rule Austrian and Turkish under Slavs the in Iinterest of Nicholas era the In Slavs. of the unity the preached and of Russia Europeanisation the cised criti Slavophiles 1840s-1870s. the in developed thought, social Russian in A trend 4 . Slavic brotherhood). The an 3 in the second half of the of the second half the in ------Russia, as their Russophobia would interfere with the process of the Russophobia with would interfere their as Russia, (the Pribaltika countries Baltic for the called NATO, and EU of had the they enlargement the Before tradition. of historical Russia’s the power revival in the to keys the imperial policy, of seeking Russian backbone are intellectual the constitute who today them, to close conservatism Russian and Eurasianism advocates the of and world’. scientists sian geopoliticial Russian idea’ ‘Rus the ‘Russian and the it as constructs thought, porary in contemideology nineteenth-century Wethis of echoes find (Moscowtions’ 2011), others. and Russia’ (Moscow 2002), of civilisa people abattle in Russian ‘The of contemporary perspective the from history Jewish millennia. of puzzle ‘The three books: his in repeated eventually was thesis This of anti-Semitism. cloak the behind criticism any from hide could and played media, ahuge mass culture, global role the in national Russophobia Jews, the from who the to were detached of spread the he attributed ‘Zionists’. because was This against citizens fellow of aggression his the he directed liberalisation, demanding intelligentsia Russian West the the and both against for fight basis the way, a theoretical this In of by creating Russia. independentdevelopment the inhibiting was force that structive Hayek).Pipes, He Friedrich considered Russophobia ade be to USSR (‘Russophobes’) of West the the critics in (Richard as well as et al.), Yanov, Galich (Alexander Alexander Grigory Pomierants, period), Russophobic at with home abroad dealt dissidents and perestroika (i.e. late 1980s the the during in Russia published in Professor Igor Shafarevich’s comprehensive Russophobia, treaty For example, journalism. political and analysis of academic cern con aconstant was question this times, Soviet In valves. safety tested and tried as function to came also chauvinism Russian ‘Anti-Russophobic’ enemies. those Great and against nationalism aggression citizens’ the directed of perfection, astate to enemies of brought creation which (1950-1965). the propaganda, Stalinist of OzhegovSergei Dictionary Academic (1949), so-called the and (1935-1941); dictionary Ushakov’s the in dictionary then Dmitry ) to be separated from from separated be ) to - - - - - 11 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 12 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 provides expert support to the Presidential Administration Presidential the to support provides expert (RISI), for Studies Strategic which Institute Russian ofconcern the as they see it, is the defender of traditional values values defender of traditional seeit,the is they as Russia, West. would of and lead This abuses to interpretation: East between of values come aclash to down would eventually Syria) stage (Kosovo, Ukraine, international Georgia, on the participates Russia in which conflicts and tensions Any integration. Eurasian 6 5 sian-speaking populations (Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia). Ossetia, South (Crimea, populations sian-speaking defence of alleged Rus the in outside itself Russia interventions military Russian and 1612, in Kremlin the from Polish army of the Unity,tional celebrated on 4November, expulsion honour to the holidays Day of of of the national Na repertoire the to troduction in the as such politics, phenomenonby movesreal in justified is this territory). its to The fight Western Ukraine against annex and boundaries state revise to Polandky, aims suggested that has Zhirinovs Oleg Niemiensky, Vladimir like expert RISI ample the Russophobia of alleged by thesis Poland (for the ex supports also RISI the and Russia, Ukraine between conflict context of the the of Russian ultra-nationalists considerations Russophobia‘Domestic’ the present always is in Russian. things law, all rejecting this and order,tional breaking tradi the West, opponent, its law; the destroying while is tional

sophobia’ by Oleg Niemiensky et al. et Niemiensky Oleg sophobia’ by ‘Rus entitled report the included RISI the by inspections Analytical entitled series the 2014 in and on Russophobia, conferences two 2013 it organised in (http://kuraev.ru/smf/index.php?topic=599940.0); textbooks Russian in bia Russopho monitoring acampaign launched of experts group RISI the 2012 In Russia Party. Great of the leader and Duma State fourth the in adeputy was The author 2006-2009 g. doklad Analiticheskiy Savelyev, A. v Rossii. Rusofobiya for example See 5 . Since 2012 it has been the constant constant the been . Since it 2012 has and interna and 6 . In . In ------7 idea of the to involves clinging of which part inseparable code, an cultural Russian the to referring ‘obviousness’, acertain recipients’ alleging emotions; the and ing arous recipient response; them’ ‘us and the pushes into an which information long-term of and simplified repetition the operations; of use afew principles: basic the large-scale successkey to in lies the Cold theorists, the War.ing propaganda Russian to According dur used methods of the reminiscent is and not is en sophisticated, tak of actions The repertoire taking. authorities are the measures the to no be alternative can there that itself Russia within belief the order, intended strengthen to are international the shape to right Russia’s justify present, which they compromise. The arguments or of dialogue possibility any of excluding aggression, language the waged with into battles turning are Russia’s campaigns information Western world. the with rivalry acontext ofin deterministic control, placed of elements social and information of manipulating techniques using operation, long-term of planned, ly special a kind actual is propaganda state called collective What consciousness. is way shaping of andperspective effective an as regarded –is view authorities’ point of the world from desirable it is which around the image and of an Russia messages portray these –which erating defensive from offensive. to Mod nature their have changed they and grown, has thesetechnologies of significance cent the years, state’s the objectives. foreign re policy In domesticand realise and legitimise to They serve derive them. from that tion technologies informa the and development technologies the to oftance political impor great FederationThe attaches governmentRussian of the II.

of the Russian Federation. See for example, T.V. for example, See Federation. V.V. Evgenieva, Russian of the Titov, Obraz Sciences of Military Academy the and of Sciences Academy Russian of the aegis the under Academy, operating Defence Self Informational the by tions publica the is enemy of the image the construct to technologies and mation of infor impact of the issue the to approach of acomprehensive example An ba R p usso tt l ef b ho l ie i d a in a the empire in f 7 . or ma tion al al ------13 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 14 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 any and all critics of the authorities of the critics all and any includes which extremists, or column, –afifth Russia in ernism US’s of EU’,‘the West supporters the horse as in Trojan but also For ‘enemies’ internal). and these example, Poland include –as nal exter image enemy of of (both an the construction the requires logic of ‘usthem’, to the According and technique this liberalism. Western to aresponse is conservatism Russian whereas Russia, West by the of against aconspiracy result revolutions’ the are ‘colour so-called the that neighbours; their and Russians the ing threaten are fascists) with (identified ‘Banderites’ that nation; of spring’, the a‘Russian awakening been i.e. apatriotic has there that at stake; are population Russian-speaking of this rights the world’ beyondthat rights; Russia’s‘Russian specific has borders the conviction that include: the of events. Examples this political as are the methods of disseminating them of disseminating methods the are as supplemented being updated, and constantly is used stereotypes ality of description re amodel essence constitute in which clichés, and labels slogans, of political consistent language Russian into the introduction the by confirmed is technique presence of this stant The con effect. stigmatising have the had campaigns mational infor Russian repeatability, these and durability their to Thanks 10 9 8 the Russian information arsenal has once again brought once again the has arsenal information Russian the of Russia’s Western to criticism Ukraine, response in In actions

proclaimed. Yeltsin’s had which Russia democracy of liberal idea the from a departure marking democracy’, of ‘sovereign slogan propaganda the is example A clear http://www.iwars.su/#!statii/clyp voyny Informacionnye Rossii’, sovremennoy opyt ternet: In vseti identichnosti politicheskoy formirovaniya instrument kak ‘vraga’ russian_information_warfare.pdf 2014 View, of Point OSW warfare, information of Russian The anatomy Darczewska, Jolanta kremlin publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potemkin-conservatism-ideological-tool- View of Point OSW Kremlin, of the tool cal ideologi An conservatism. Potemkin Rodkiewicz, Witold Rogoża, Jadwiga 8 . Their role is to shape the public’s attitudes towards current public’s current role. Their the shape to is towards attitudes ; http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the_anatomy_of_ ; 9 , 2014; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/ 2014; , . The arsenal of slogans and and of slogans . The arsenal 10 . , 2014, No. 4, pp. 22-27; pp. 22-27; No. 4, , 2014, ------(which (which values democratic to Russophobia to contrary adherence is that however, time, same suggestion At the the threat. alleged of this face the in mobilised public being is Russian the states; member theof societies NATOEU and Russophobia aproblem as affecting of expressions alleged by publicising served also is aim internal body This politic. alien’, the from ‘alienate’ to them serves which ‘anti-state ideologically who and are individuals stigmatises type stereo this practice, political In Russia. with conflict in countries government’s the to posed for or sympathy policy who expresses who dis unfavourably is citizen sophobe’ aRussian now means a‘Rus domesticcontext, the In Russian. ofrejection everything motives for psychological the and political the word explaining become a key outside has world; to the term extended been the has concept of The Russophobia geography on board. of Russophobia lin’s policy among Western political and intellectual elites. lin’s intellectual and among Western policy political Krem the of supporters or allies win to goal: external a different de facto means an attack on an alien system of values) system has alien on an attack an means - - - - 15 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 16 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 could leadcould disaster to West’s the that Russophobicsises Ukraine stoking in sentiment world. the in He empha strength Russophobia gathering are and forces of the anti-Semitism that warned has Putin Vladimir policy. of official President language the entered Russophobia has the concept of conflict, Ukrainian-Russian context of the the In that Ukraine is and will remain a part of the ‘Russian world’ ‘Russian of the apart remain will and is Ukraine that notionRussophobia’ i.e. ofthe by ‘domestic insisting Ukraine, to expanding is strategy information element of this important An ‘revolution of dignity’. Ukrainian the demonise and discredit to phobias order in anti-Russian ideologies &Nazi alleged and fascist with associated being is a Russophobic Ukraine state. primarily however, is Todaypropaganda, official Ukraine in nationalism. (sic) radical and of neo-fascism dissemination of the aresult as outside world, the to mainly athreat posed which astate sented as pre initially was of Kiev’s Ukraine scale the to resistance. portion pro direct in risen has of which radicalism the language, litical po tone in Russian harsher to a led has in Ukraine The conflict III. 13 12 11 through dialogue through it “can that cured” be time same added at the has countries, tain of foreign policy ofcer Russophobia the afeature deeming be to

tv/news/politics/11612771 http://mir24. kkatastrofie; Ukrainu privedet rusofobii podderzhka Putin: ing of Ukrainian national consciousness.” national of Ukrainian ing awaken owe the they all, after whom, “to Lenin, to monuments dismantling are Ukrainians “ungrateful” the that He regrets masses”). black celebrates who Antichrist (“the dimension ametaphysical them giving while sophobes, - Rus Western and Ukrainian the demonises and discredits group, analytic intelligence of aRussian head aformer and of RISI adirector interviewer, the Interestingly http://www.kp.ru/daily/26444.7/3314664/. let; 20 mum maksi eshche Ukrainie na proderzhatsya Rusofoby Reshetnikov, Leonid world/20151013/1301271122.html http://ria.ru/ izlechit’’; mozhno Moskvy votnoshenii “rusofobiyu Lavrov:

la R p usso n g uag b ho e 13 . Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Presidential Ivanov,. Sergei Presidential head of the the i a in a 12 . Russia’s Lavrov, Sergei Foreign Minister off ici al p al ol itic al al 11 . ------that a full-scale war was being waged against the concept the of the waged being against was war afull-scale that which will neutralise the anti-Russian message anti-Russian the neutralise will which promotion culture, the of Russian Russophobia,ing particular in of mentioned combat amethod power Hesoft as has dominate. places propaganda even where in Russophobia anti-Russian and allies has Russia that stated he has time same At the countries. seesRussophobic European in State sentiments Duma, of the man 16 15 14 cleansing out ethnic carrying from prevented having ‘Russophobes’ as Donbas of the destabilisation the and Crimea of annexation the justified has Administration, the 8 the during in 2014, November committee; Council’s foreign affairs Federation of the Kosachov, chairman the bypressed Konstantin world’. ex ‘Russian clearly the was and This Russia towards try given thepolicy of a coun assessing criterion for aspecific bia as treat Russophothe they in West, fightallies forother, their in the On Russia. fight the against in instrument ideological an as Federation, and Russian of the security information the to threat aserious Russophobia’. as nal present this they one hand, the On onare focused ‘exter politicians statementsRussian by Official Russophobic. deemed be to also are of fascism destroyer and rope of liberator Eu principal the as Red Army the depicting narrative orous group of Russophobes” group orous work of the but result of clam a“small the as assessed was tory occupied be to terri Crimea declaring ‘aggressor and state’ an as June 2015 of in Europe Russia of Council aresolutionof the naming Assembly community. The Parliamentary tional adoption by the the interna by Russia ofcriticism to response position in official government’s Russian of the part as to appear began bia argument

daily/26294/3172985/0 in Ivanov Sergey with Interview eign affairs committee; http://vz.ru/news/2015/6/26/752984.html for Council’s Federation of the head the Kosachov, Konstantin by Statement www.kp.ru/daily/26392/3269711/ http:// Press; of Russian World at the Congress statement Naryshkin’s Sergei th Congress of the Kremlin’s Russkiy Mir Foundation, he said Mir Kremlin’s Russkiy of Congress the 16 Komsomolskaya Pravda Komsomolskaya . Attempts to relativise the official official the relativise to . Attempts 14 . Sergei Naryshkin, the chair the . Naryshkin, Sergei 15 ; http://www.kp.ru/ . The Russopho . ------17 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 18 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 evil in the world.” the in evil of source all the as present to Russia consciousness, and social the of elements Russophobia embed to of in Russia, guilt the in belief world’s world’. the ‘Russian “an perpetuate to attempt was Its goal 17

ety/3389/#.Vh-NT-HSD1g Russkiy mir - eto russkiy otvet na globalizatsiyu; http://www.vrns.ru/soci 17 - 19 18 operations informational role in Russian cific plays aspe experts and by analysts activity organised practice, In IV. the CIS-EMO International Monitoring Organisation Monitoring International CIS-EMO the sia’, held on 2015 25-26 Moscow. September in by organised It was Rus against war information ‘Russophobia the ence entitled and the confer is future the near in intensified be will bic campaign anti-Russopho the that showing signal One forced to counteract. Russophobia is problem Russia aglobal is that which demonstrate problem intended to the to is approach detailed This American. and German also Polish, and Baltic, Belarusian, Ukrainian, bia: Russopho of national into varieties conduct research personnel Specialised characteristic. is approach The regional increased. has tanks think and centres research in issue of this study the ‘Russophobia’ mentioned As above, 2012 since propaganda. in term the instrumentalising in used also is mechanism This desires). Kremlin the which thesis the propagate online can which time, ashort in network, created information an through or media, –opinion-formers traditional the in pool of experts alimited through (usually media the in popularised is advance up in have drawn which been of arguments acatalogue projects, implementation informational the of and new ideological During taken. be to actions the justify will which of abody of literature in advance the preparation is characteristic Russian A specifically implementation.their in participate also they and for operations, such basis theoretical

by grants from the state. the from grants by funded actually are NGOs so-called the and universities; state at prestigious work information of influence the to related projects involved in researchers its Administration; Presidential the to directly reports (RISI) Studies tegic for Stra Institute Russian the as such think-tank aleading For example, rights outside Russia and organising election observation missions. In 2014 2014 In missions. observation election organising and Russia outside rights democratic with for compliance elections monitoring to dedicated 2003, in established organisation, nongovernmental ostensibly an is CIS-EMO

R p usso b ho i a under a s p eci al scrutin al 18 . They develop the 19 , supported , supported y ------19 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 20 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 – – being promoted and distributed online promoted distributed being and still are statements coverage, participants’ media wide the and given The experts). was conference same the it (they share with associated personally Institutions Development Society of Civil Diplomacy’ ‘Public Foundation the for government, and the by the 20 following terms: following Russophobia the ideas, describing in specific several seminate publications). sponsored dis to is (seminars, Theprojects aim of international organisation for the basis form the also will policy. media’s information Russian They the in current used be to here put forward theses We the expect should gineering. en of social its degree the sophobia were delivered) confirms devoted Rus to lectures day, first thirty (during the meeting the in participants by the made speeches of the analysis An

– – emo.net/en at onhttp://www.cis- CIS-EMO’s website, found be can Information ters. mat other among domination’ informational of ‘American problems the in specialising aresearcher Biedritsky, Aleksandr is of CIS-EMO The head of Ukraine. policies the discrediting campaign informational the in it joined Ukraine and Estonia. and Ukraine Moldova, Belarus, Serbia, Poland, of France, representatives by attended also was Theconference seychas-vyshe-chem-vo-vremya-holodnoy-voyny. http://www.cis-emo.net/ru/news/kochetkov-uroven-rusofobii-na-zapade- Cold War”; the during than greater now West is the in of Russophobia degree “The Kochetkov: Aleksei organisation, of the head the by statement the also See website. CIS-EMO on the found be can participants the by Statements security; of system global the undermine could which Russia, against conducted West by the war information aweaponas the in ‘post-Soviet the in situation the space’, destabilise to used and Russia, towards hatred and enmity aform ofas cultivating (‘ group ethnic Russian the astate, as Russia of against aggression and itism, intolerance, comparable to anti-Sem of atmosphere ethnic an security, by helping shape to national to threat external an as russkikh ’) and the Russian cultural heritage; cultural Russian the ’) and 20 . - - - - - – – – – – propaganda). of followingforms activity: They the included counter- organisational, (legal, sphere informational the in threats to for responding known doesnotposed go already beyond methods pro to how to combat as measures tions Russophobia. of The the list up recommenda The some drew general conference’s participants liberals). (so-called columns’ ‘sixth and foreign agents) (so-called ‘fifth’ the as to referred be to used latter the internal; and enemy,the with external fight tion of the both acontinua weapon. allows a double-headed It also informational as use its concept of the allows interpretation extended This itself. of Russia citizens the but countries, also of other societies the only not concept, stigmatising wide-ranging increasingly an becoming that ‘Russophobia’ is confirm conference this from The materials – – – – – ology and sympathises with the policies of Western the countries. with sympathises and ology ide young people)liberal to (especially succumbs ciety which theso of part that as adomesticproblem as for defined Russia, pean institutions dealing with the protection of individual of protection individual the with dealing institutions pean Euro and organisations rights work human with increased of creation foreign-language portals; the formation through in influence of the intensifying or Russia; promoting Russian either are which on organisations rhetoric based Europe, in of creation anetwork counter to anti-Russian ofthe centres tion; for defama challenges legal spheres, for by initiating example legal and informational it preventing the in and bic activity Russopho monitoring of organisations establishment the feuds; oftions Russophobia ethnic incitementto as manifesta criminalising Code, and Criminal the and tivity ac extremist laws of on fighting the amendment the through Russia’s repression against population, increasing own ------21 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 22 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 Kremlin’s policy. Kremlin’s of the critics against ‘war’ communications the front in another of opening the represents It also Russia. against war undeclared West an the waging is that thesis the to Kremlin’s commitment ‘anti-Russophobic ofThe this opening of evidence is the front’ operation. for aspecial propose employ to planning resemble the rhetoric of continue the tions, they ‘war’, use to actions the and instruc on political operating elite, intellectual Russian of the notedearlier. trends therepresentatives The confirms conference of issue RussophobiaThe the to Moscow approach presented at the ion that Russophobia is a specific variant of racism ( racism of variant Russophobiaion aspecific is that opin the orderdisseminate to in elites, intellectual and rights sic ). - - 21 of Russophobic“consistently list one on number the countries” is said, Poland has Duma, the State of committee foreign affairs head of Pushkov, the of the identity. discourse Aleksei As rial impe of the part integral an Poland is at least, reason, For this plans. geopolitical and cultural Russia’s have with collided more recent and history geo distant choices both in problem: Poland’s civilisational a civilisational also Empire, enemy and of the ‘eternal’ an and Empire Russian former of the problem, part as ahistorical both is country our sia, for reasons: for Rus ‘Polish several case Russophobia’ aspecial is V. Western Belarus, which Poland ‘colonised’ after the war of 1920. war the Poland ‘colonised’ which after Western Belarus, and Western located Ukraine in fate of territory historical on the focuses The Europe. programme Eastern for in tions domination ambi imperial manifested 1918, it in Empire immediately and Russian of the (“the hyena ruins founded of on Europe”) the was Poland that learned viewers Russian-speaking of programmes, one just slot. of In aseries viewing aprime-time in evenings, on Saturday on Tsentr TV broadcast is programme This cian. Pushkov’, above-mentioned hosted by the Aleksei politi with ‘Post-script programme ‘analytical’ is of example this A model Western over world. the superiority moral and uniqueness its world’, ‘Russian of the superiority and of abroad the Russians people convince to own its and serving television, Russian over-represented clearly been idea on has this Most recently science literature. popular in propaganda as serves and literature, propaganda the in well-documented and well-rehearsed is ‘Russophobic’ which asubject also Poland is

cast on 31 January 2015; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=656h-q6e0DQ broad of Europe’, hyena a programme - the ‘Poland Pushkov’s for example See a ( discourse Anti s pa rt o ) di al R f the o g ue with ussi a Po n identit ndla

y 21 ------. 23 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 24 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 sponsibility should be shared by Beck”) shared be should sponsibility re the that know should they Poles the Stalin, (“Seeing as blame Kuniayev, of Poland World outbreak for blamed the also War II for this role. The main message role. programme’s The of authorfor main the was this predestined not is morally Ukraine’ in promoter of democracy advocate ‘the prove to and case, that this needs: in rent political it employs updated meet to cur The are stereotypes eastwards. of expansion conquest and centuries undertaken supposedly has West, opposition in the to which constructed is struggle This tion. of abuses its interpreta and pseudo-facts of use historical heavy of its terms in shocking one particularly is this world’ –although ‘Russian the and of identity Russians political and consciousness historical for the struggle the to dedicated programmes evision tel one is Russian of many Pushkov’ ‘Post-script Aleksei with Nazarov Oleg and Bezpalko Bogdan researchers programme’s guests, Jedwabne. in The crimes the revealing historians Canadian and American by confirmed was Holocaust, as the ticipated in it par war the during and uporder divide to Czechoslovakia, in Hitler with alliance into an entered Poland allegedly 1934 In Podlaska. Biała and Kartuska Bereza in concentrationin camps imprisoned insurgents andbloody conducted,were pacifications suppressed, were allegedly Belarusians and byings Ukrainians ‘occupation’, of this years twenty the of upris During hundreds 23 22

miensky and Stanislav Kuniayev). Stanislav and miensky Nie Oleg Nazarov, Oleg Narochnitska, Natalia as (such facts of historical manipulation the and of lies scale the who expand historians by dominated is space media This imperceptible. is Russia in discourse popular-scientific V. in Anatoly presence Torkunov, and However, 2010. Warsaw their Rotfeld relations in Polish-Russian issues Difficult stains. black of White stains, preparation joint the in resulted which project, Matters cult for Group Diffi the in Russia represented of them Some al. et Petrov Nikita Guryanov, Aleksandr Narinsky, Mikhail Yazhborovska, Inessa Lebedeva, Natalia historians: Russian of many topic the are relations, Polish-Russian in issues controversial including issues, Polish that noting worth It is dia. me the in propaganda Kremlin who support on call’, ‘experts are These Józef Beck, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (1932-1939). of Poland Affairs of Foreign Minister Beck, Józef 22 and the editor-in-chief of Nash the and Sovremennik 23 . , edited by Adam Daniel Daniel Adam by , edited Stanislav Stanislav ------Poland as “the spetsnaz “the Poland as imagethe of is identified be can which innovation ‘original’ only history. The throughout constant remain Russophobe’tant also The ‘mili concepts‘West’s of the the and watchdog’ (or Allies’) the ‘White’‘white movement). anti-Bolshevik Pole’ to the (referring into the Slavs’ metamorphosis of‘Judas the a smooth undergoes 25 24 recent books numerous in ist). again They have catalogued been Stalin and Tsarist (both arsenal propaganda imperial the from deployed being derive of Poland currently stereotypes Most of the propaganda. Stalinist from drawn stereotypes the confirm who all experts, Russian as well as politicians, and Western of historians authority those the to appeal his justify to The aristocracy and us and The aristocracy above-mentionedThese abook include by the Kuniayev entitled sia remains a ‘victim’ of Poland in its own perception. Kuniayev perception. of a‘victim’ own its Poland in remains sia Rus tradition, to according Also Katyń. in massacre the ordered NKVD of the members Jewish the tradition: the to faithful mains of Poland”. re He also partitions eighteenth-century the in Russia of participation “the be to myths”, one he of even claims which today. “liberal The ‘conservative’ disarms Kuniayev consistently function asimilar element’, perform alien they and ‘ideologically white Pole’ ‘the as notions such an indicated parlance, Stalinist In inquisition”. and colonisation bloody of rope

Vneshney Razvedki Rossiyskoj Federacii (Moscow 2010). (Moscow Federacii Rossiyskoj Razvedki Vneshney or 2009), (Moscow Zapada pies Zhukov, -tsepnoj Pol’sha Dmitri for example See books/365246/ Russian”; http://www.labirint.ru/ and Polish both of history, counterfeiters professional of the refutation but convincing “a as harsh advertised is and bookstores, in available constantly is Thebook others. among 2010, in lensk Smo near plane Polish of the crash the and Uprising Warsaw the massacre, Katyn the Pact, Molotov-Ribbentrop the to devoted chapters new with tion edi latest the expanded has author the polonaise]; [The Russian polonez kiy Russ title the under published it was 2006 In 2012. and 2010 2006, 2005, 2003, Sovremennik Nash in 2002 May in published was book imy. of this Aversion Kuniayev, Shliakhta Stanislav Sekrety pol’skoy politiki 1935-1945. Rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby Sluzhby dokumenty Rassekrechennye 1935-1945. politiki pol’skoy Sekrety 25 , first published in 2002. In his study, his theIn in 2002. published , first of Europe”, “a book, the we Eu in read as . The book has been reprinted several times, in in times, several reprinted been has . The book 24 ------. 25 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 26 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 Novaya Polsha Novaya Russian trend in this kind of discourse of identity. of of discourse kind kind This this in trend Russian main Kuniayev today representthe and Pushkov that noting world’. ‘Russian the to belonging It pride in worth is of imperial intended foster to asense is it, which alienate to thus and values, enemy, the and it i.e. negative assign to stigmatise to qualities fact in is aim its of dialogue: adenial fundamentally Kuniayev is and implemented by Pushkov strategy informational the Meanwhile, orpolemics. fierce avoids Pomianowski didacticism dialogue, in participate to vited events. When in on cultural focused and transformation, cratic country’s of the demo Polish experience the discussing gentsia, nation of overtly extremist content” extremist overtly of nation dissemi the and 2010in of activities “Russophobia, anti-Russian it apublic in denunciation accusing Pomianowski, byedited Jerzy Polsha Novaya attacked edly for repeat example he has reviews, critical his In magazine. his pages the opponents in ideological of his combats Heevision. also tel on Russian guest afrequent he is activist’ a‘social As Stalin. defender of ardent Joseph and aeulogist as become famous he has editor of Nash the ready for As Sovremennik action. is literature, and analytics Russian in trend /patriotic servative conKuniayev, oneso-called representatives of of as the many captivity).side (of were sent into Russian 60,280 which on Hitler’s fighting of fascists Polish number vast the by firmed con is of ‘Crusade’ 1941 opinion,the 1941). 1920 and his In 1812, alongside (in 1612, Napoleon lands into ‘Russian’ in expeditions the about four Polish writing stereotype, this sharpens definitely 27 26

cle/1981051.html http://www.svoboda.org/arti sprotivnikom’; oshiblas Pol’sha Novaya See http://www.novpol.ru/ 27 is a periodical addressed to the Russian intelli Russian the to addressed aperiodical is , a monthly published in Russian and and Russian publishedin , amonthly 26 . (since 1989), ------29 28 Year 2013, in the of Kalinouski parallel: in conducted being only onePoland is such of many with ‘dialogue’ was taken with Belarus, and was intensified in 2015 intensified was and Belarus, with taken was

ing (1863-4) on the territories lying in present-day Belarus. present-day in lying territories on the (1863-4) ing - Upris January of the leader the Kalinowski), (Konstanty Kalinoŭski Kastuś http://www.regnum.ru/news/poli/1991411.html Zapad; na uyti mozhet Belorussiya ‘majdanov’ vsiakikh Bez ments.” See: move social and organisations create to masses, the with working been have it should But instead elites. the with on working bet “Russia consciousness: people’s national Belarusian of the state current for the strategists Russian blamed has world.” Bezpalko Russian the from Belarusians the excluding gradually is nationalism Belarusian “moderate because Maidans” out any with go Westwards could “Belarus that for example, regrets, his expressed has University, of Lomonosov Center Belarusian and Ukrainian oftor the direc deputy and matters, on Belarusian expert a Russian Bezpalko, Bogdan 28 , a similar approach approach , a similar 29 . - - - 27 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 28 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015 of the opposite of dialogue – especially as the current Russian Russian current the as – especially oppositeof of the dialogue way, world the this basis in on with the communicating tinues outcome con the Russia if predict to It intended. easy is those to have opposite can consequences country a multi-ethnic in which chauvinism, for amedium Russian constitute they time, same At the nationalism. aconsolidation to of leading political bia are of Russopho stereotype the using campaigns The information of force. argument traditional the and past imperial its towards turning is Russia moment.aresult, As of this as mulated never for been has inspiring) ideologically (attractive, gramme history. Apositive throughout policy pro of Russian programme negative of the world. Itabout amanifestation is atreacherous theories conspiracy in argument crowning West, the the and and Russia between ongoing for relations the in explanation tensions asimple of Russophobic remains countries stereotype thologised my world’. the light, ‘Russian favourin the to of this belonging In identity national give should up their Belarusians and Ukrainians the that it because assumes argument, of identity, irrational an is discourse neo-imperial of this Russophobia, part into question. as of Russia’s guarantor greatness civilisational and anational as idea of very the the have called Poles Ukrainians the and world’, ‘Russian motivated, as ideologically the in are themselves who seeno place for Poles of the or Ukrainians, ingratitude the ‘ its Poland as West of the or treat afraid be to no reason today has reality, Russia (as Ukraine). in Kremlin’sIn actions of the failure face of the the in them to comfort psychological of restoring and threats, or alleged of face ofreal identity the Russia’s in them of mobilising citizens, sophobic political a tool is for neo-imperial countries shaping the image up of an Rus building context, Kremlin’s policy.the this In doubtsabout any having from itself society Russian of protecting ‘Russophobes’ away is at attacking domesticconsumption: aimed Russophobiais primarily fight of the against strategy The current VI. R usso p spetsnaz ho b i a ’. over or regret The humiliation aggression, K s the re ml in ’ s p ro bl e empire empire m ------regime and the Soviet era. Soviet the and regime tsarist days of the the in – as of isolationism haughty attitude self-isolation acontinued and of Russia, further the language, political level Russian of in the aggression increase to promises it enemy. term, Russophobe short into auniversal the the In geography the of turned Russophobia, has expanding discourse, J o la nt a Daa rc z e wsk a, Piotr a, Żocho wski 29 POINT OF VIEW 10/2015