AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

ELUSIVE PEACE IN : A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR JUAN CARLOS PINZÓN

DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS:

ROGER F. NORIEGA, AEI

JUAN CARLOS PINZÓN, COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

2:00 PM – 3:00 PM MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2016

EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/elusive-peace-in-colombia/

TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION – WWW.DCTMR.COM

ROGER NORIEGA: I’m Roger Noriega, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. You’re very welcome. I told the ambassador (Spanish) and it’s the truth really. They’re neighbors, the Colombian Embassy just being across the street. We welcome you all. Let me just say at the outset, if you will silence your cell phones, that will make it agreeable for all of us and less embarrassing for you in case a babysitter calls or something.

I’m going to ask our distinguished guest to make some initial comments after I introduce him, and then we’ll throw it open to questions for the balance of our hour together. Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzon has been Colombia’s ambassador to the United States for 14 months. Previously he served for nearly four years as Colombia’s minister of defense, where he led the nation’s armed forces in dealing severe blows to the operations and infrastructure of the FARC, the ELN, and the BACRIM, the criminal bands operating in that country. This resulted in improved security conditions throughout the country and the lowest homicide rate in 35 years.

During his tenure, the armed forces equipment and training were modernized. No less important, the welfare of the men and women in uniform and of their families has improved, and he put in place a transformation plan that will lead the Armed Forces forward for the next decades. What most people do not know is that Colombia is an exporter of expertise in the security area, having lent its expertise to 60 different countries in how to deal with criminal organizations and drug trafficking.

Before serving as a defense minister, Ambassador Pinzon was the chief of staff to President and vice minister of defense. He’s a native of Bogota, Colombia. He holds an M.S. degree in economics from Javeriana in Bogota. He received a master’s in public policy from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. He has also completed advanced studies in international relations at Johns Hopkins and in science and technology at Harvard.

So, clearly, you’re prepared, well prepared for many tasks. And we welcome you here today.

Ambassador, as I’ve said to you in the past, some of my most skeptical Colombian friends were rejoicing on the night of the plebiscite. Others, quite frankly, were devastated by the results, harshly criticizing the “no” campaign and the popular vote. I felt somewhere in the middle because I had reconciled myself to the fact that the plebiscite would probably approve the accords and, although I’m deeply skeptical about the FARC’s intentions, I saw the accords as an opportunity, with strong support from the United States, to hold the FARC to some concrete commitments and to demobilize thousands of guerillas in that framework, many thousands of whom were really kidnapped into the guerilla movement.

In the weeks since the plebiscite, you’ve seen President Santos meet with his predecessor, President Alvaro Uribe. I’ve heard that was for the first time in six years that they’ve met. Perhaps it’s true, maybe not. He’s also met with President Andres Pastrana, one of his other predecessors, both of whom were part of the “no” campaign. Last Thursday, President Uribe, on behalf of that camp, offered a 26-page critique that raised many concerns that also presented some sort of red lines that have been regarded as rather reasonable and practical. Indeed, he adopted more practical positions on a number of critical issues.

I think this may be a function of the fact that regardless of the results of the plebiscite, student marches and other mobilizations, a letter from business leaders, have made it very clear that the Colombian people are essentially committed to some sort of negotiated permanent end to the hostilities. But as a result of the voting, President Santos has had to sit down with these skeptics to hear them out, to take their concerns back to the negotiating table with the objective of improving that accord in a way that would broaden its support among the Colombian people.

So maybe that narrow victory on behalf of the “no,” in the end will actually improve the process for a durable peace reflecting a national consensus. In other words, in the words of the legendary political theorists Keith Richards and Mick Jagger, you can’t always get what you want, but if you try sometime, you just might find that you get what you need. (Laughs.)

So, ambassador, where is Colombia’s peace process today? What condition is it in? Do you feel more or less optimistic today than the night of the plebiscite, and why?

AMBASSADOR JUAN CARLOS PINZON: Well, first of all, Roger, thank you very much. You know, it’s a great honor to be here, at the American Enterprise Institute, especially having this beautiful new venue that you have here. I’m very impressed. I’m very happy to be — I’m sure I’m not the first but one of the first commentators in this new venue.

Second, you have been inviting me to Enterprise discussions for a year already, you know, since I arrived. And I say “yes,” and suddenly there was a big coincidence between my yes and the current juncture. So I’m happy to be here, and it’s good to have this opportunity to discuss.

You always have been interested about Colombia. And one of the things I learned to appreciate the most about Washington is that we have even more friends than I knew, you know. Washington is full of friends of Colombia, and there are many reasons for that. The success from US policy perspective that has happened in Colombia is quite interesting.

It has been bipartisan. It has been a long-term, sustained effort. It has resulted in the most violent country in the hemisphere — not to tell that we had at a point the two most violent cities in the world — to become now exporter of security, a country that somehow is finding a final way to peace — is in transition to peace, if I can call it. And all that no doubt with determination and commitment of the Colombian people, of our leaders, but at the same time with very important US support.

US support came to Colombia to enable Colombia — to allow Colombia to be effective in its institutions, from security — that part is new and I saw with a lot of interest — with justice and with development. And that package is what we know as Plan Colombia. So I know here in Washington there’s a lot of people that feel that in one way or another, as it happened in Colombia, there’s a lot of contributors to this effort. And I see it as a positive element.

To your comments and to your question, I think we are in the middle of a very interesting time in Colombia. The first thing I would say and underline is it’s interesting to see the strength of Colombian democracy. There are very few democracies in this part of the world, the world itself, that can handle such an event, such a political debate with the intensity and the commitment from all the sides and somehow be able to have that as a result.

Second, I believe it’s important to see the strength of Colombian institutions. Every process that we have lived in the past years in Colombia is absolutely related to our constitutional framework, to the separation of powers. The president has expressed and proposed ideas, but those have been discussed in Congress and later on judged by our judiciary system. So I think that’s another important event.

And when you think about the results, the first word President Santos used was not only he’s the president of every Colombian, but that his main objective was to keep precisely the institutional stability of the country. And immediately he opened the room for a political dialogue and a political discussion with every sector opposing to the government proposal in the plebiscite. So I think that’s another interesting feature.

And the third element that I believe is now part of our political discussion is somehow opportunity, and this word has been expressed by President Santos, but by several bright experts from different sides — you know, right, left, center, international leaders, Colombian leaders. It has already come to that word, Colombia is in front of an opportunity. And this is why — because we have been moving from let’s say peacemaking with the use of legitimate force. That’s what we need for a while.

You know, people can talk about long or several decades of war but I can tell you that when Colombian state and Colombian people decide that we’re going to confront the threats of crime, violence, and violation of human rights, it started really 15, 16 years ago. And since then we became very effective. We degraded, to mention the FARC, probably to 30, to 35 percent of what they were in manpower, resources, or financial capabilities. But the same happened to ELN. But the same happened to the criminal bands that inherited somehow the existence after the AUC, the so-called paramilitary.

So I think that effort to degrade them put Colombia in a position of precisely moving towards an effort for a peace from strength, and I think that’s another important argument. The country has been building its discussions and its political process from the strength. And that is why, as of today, this has been the only time in which FARC has agreed with the Colombian state. The Colombian state was able to sign an agreement — political agreement, a very complex discussion. I think nobody can hesitate to call it a different way. There was very complex political discussion. But, at the end, for the first time ever, there was an agreement signed about this.

I think on the other side, it’s important to see that that opportunity as described is seen from the perspective that if we were doing peacemaking by the use of force and if starting four, five years ago we start to transition to peace through a political process, through a peace dialogue, what happened probably as consequence of the plebiscite was that that transition to peace is going to take some more time. And what I can tell you is nobody knows what that time is, but it’s part of the process. And that’s the way I would see it. And, of course, the next phase will be peace in Colombia and the execution of — the implementation of the consequences of the agreement.

So with those words, I will describe where we are today. We have strong institutions. We’ve proved that. We have a strong democracy. We’ve proved that. And now we are in the middle of a political process towards an opportunity and to see how that translates and how the Colombian people will result into something specific. The important thing about democracy here in America or in Colombia or in places where democracy is mature and strong is that things are not solved by one single will or by the desire. They are discussed. They are part of a process. They’re a debate. And then they result into something specific.

I also believe that there are all features that happened after the plebiscite. The fact that President Santos was recognized as a Nobel Prize winner for peace I think is an important issue, an important international signal to Colombian efforts to peace. Of course, a recognition to the president. I keep saying that any Colombian should feel proud about this just because it was a Colombian, but in this case the president of who granted that recognition.

And that has been the consequence, as I insist, of, you know, being effective with the use of force — with legitimate use of force, defeating threats, but in consequence moving to political tools, moving to diplomacy, and making use of those tools to produce a result, an agreement. That’s what I think has been recognized. Of course, we’ve got to let the experts from Oslo to, you know, describe how they got to that conclusion but somehow that’s what you can summarize. I think that’s an important element in the current discussion.

The other element that has been interesting is the public political activity from different points of view and different perspectives is not only granted to the natural leaders and the leadership of Colombia and different political views but it’s almost any Colombian these days giving a point of view, giving an opinion.

Another interesting element that came out of these weeks has been the clear conclusion, if anyone had doubt — I never doubted, but if anyone doubted — that Colombians were hoping and are waiting for peace. But, of course, what is in discussion is different approaches to that result. But I think that’s another interesting element.

And finally, I think that the fact that the government was able to announce very recently and as a conclusion to recent events that the ELN, the other guerilla, is starting a formal public peace negotiation with the Colombian government. So it proves somehow that all the elements that are required for a peace long term in Colombia are now on the table. Not to forget that ceasefire was immediately requested and recommended not only by President Santos, with his authority as commander in chief of Colombian Armed Forces, but immediately it was suggested and requested by different opposition leaders and immediately was somehow accepted and discussed even by the FARC.

So for those who were expecting some kind of turbulence beyond the political debate, nothing as such has happened in the country. And what we have right now is a ceasefire that actually has formal elements coming out not only from a government to FARC, a FARC agreement, but also by UN presence and UN mandate to contribute to maintain that stability in the country.

So I believe, sure, we’re in an interesting time. No doubt we are extending our transition to peace. No doubt there is an interesting challenging political process as part of all of this. Through democracy, with strong institutions, but in addition to that, the country continues to move forward. You know, when you see what happened to the markets, to the US dollar, what happened? Didn’t climb up. It went up 15 pesos, moved down 15, 20 pesos, and, frankly speaking, nothing substantial has been altered in the Colombian economy and markets.

And by the way, we’re in the middle of an interesting discussion on how to strengthen our competitiveness in our economy through a tax reform that is now under discussion, and we’re in a process of finding how to keep moving forward, to attract investors, to attract jobs, to keep moving to the future. That’s the way I would describe it. Not to underestimate the challenges, not to underestimate the debate, but to value somehow the importance of what we have right now and the political realities that are hand right now in Colombia.

MR. NORIEGA: Thank you very much for that initial scene-setter. By the way —

AMB. PINZON: So can I leave now? (Laughter.)

MR. NORIEGA: Thank you very much, ambassador. Let’s talk a little bit about what’s transpired recently.

Last Thursday, President Uribe put together this plan, this vision for a national peace accord. And what’s been remarked upon is that he sort of pulled back on a couple of essential issues. I know there’s a limit to what you — how you want to characterize things particularly from your diplomatic post, but, for example, he had insisted during the campaign and many others in the no campaign had made it an important part of their opposition that there would be potentially some of these FARC commanders literally getting away with murder — no incarceration — and that this was something that needed to be addressed. He’s introduced or adopted a concept of reclusion that Marta Lucia Ramirez had put forward that could mean some sort of confinement in general spaces and some have commented, well, the accords sort of accommodate that.

The other issue that he’s talked about is transitional justice. In that case, he’s said, you know, I think this — you know, commenting that we’ve demobilized tens of thousands of people. We’ve even held people accountable in the past decade within the context of our judicial system. And we don’t need to have this transitional ad-hoc commission created with participation of foreigners. And Andres Pastrana, the former president, has also commented, and he went at length with me about this a number of months ago that we should be doing this in the context of our judicial system and not create this other entity.

Those are a couple of things that he’s brought up. And then, on political participation, can the commanders of the FARC who are guilty of — or found guilty, responsible for serious human rights abuses enter the political realm? Pull back from opposition to, you know, having representation in the Congress, but setting some limits about who among the FARC might be able to participate.

How do you see this conversation shaping up between the Santos government and the negotiators and these opponents of the process who are reflecting the will of the majority of the people that voted them?

AMB. PINZON: Well, first, the issues that are under discussion are very delicate, very complex, and very relevant. Any opinion to those these days does not contribute on any way. I can tell you that almost — I can sure that here I see a lot of Colombian faces, and I can promise every Colombian today has a personal opinion or a group opinion or an institutional opinion or government opinion onto each of these elements.

But the truth is that President Santos, once the plebiscite happened, opened a round of discussions — you described those very well — set of meetings with different leaders. And, by the way, somehow a negotiating table looking for an agreement. Under that framework, government has been taking every proposal, every idea, every recommendation and is now up to his process to bring some kind of conclusions on what is most convenient and what is more visible. And I think those are, you know, the ways things are being discussed right now.

In that regard, I think President Santos has expressed both on his will and the opportunity and, at the same time, mentioned several times the word “realistic” and “as fast as possible.” Those are a bit of the messaging that has been coming out.

From the opposition side, I would recognize in general terms everybody’s will to contribute and to move into some kind of agreement. Being very honest and very transparent, I believe that we are in a time in Colombia in which the best contribution someone can do, and especially here from Washington, is allow that discussion to move on, is allow that discussion to, you know, produce a result rather than putting more personal opinions onto such a delicate set of issues.

And that will be my preference in, you know, current times. That will be the best possible contribution from any Colombian. Allow these to be discussed in a way that there is some kind of compromise and agreement so that can be later on discussed with the FARC and other groups and then move on to the next phase.

MR. NORIEGA: Well, if you’re asking people to withhold their opinions, you’re going to put a lot of people out of work here in Washington. (Laughter.) But at least because they’re here and because they’ll be hearing you in a couple of other places this week, there’ll be more better informed decisions and opinions.

What’s the FARC’s attitude about this opportunity? President Santos spent a good deal of time saying that the guerillas aren’t going to negotiate their way into prison. That’s just one issue. Do you think they will be back at the table? I mean, what’s your sense and what they’re saying and what — if President Santos is aggregating some of these comments and ideas about how to move forward, it seems to suggest that he’ll ask the FARC to join them again at the negotiating table to open some of these issues up.

AMB. PINZON: Well, the only thing we can judge right is what has been said publicly, and what has been said publicly is from their perspective that they are willing to keep the ceasefire. That’s one point. And second, that they are willing to open discussion for a new round and to find additional steps. Of course, there are some words maybe a little out of tone, that, you know, I would insist we should not even hear at this time and focus very much on how to keep moving on the current opportunity.

MR. NORIEGA: Well, I’m going to ask one more question, and then I’m going to throw it open. And this is on the question of Plan Colombia and where we go from here with Paz Colombia.

You know that I was one of the architects from the staff level of Plan Colombian, and it was very fortuitous because I moved from the House to the Senate in the middle of that process so I was one of the few people that a lot of people trusted because, as people don’t necessarily understand, in the House the enemy is not the Republicans or the Democrats. It’s the Senate is the enemy.

And so I got to see that come together in this bipartisan and commitment. And it was a commitment to help an ally, South America’s oldest democracy, defend its institutions and impose the rule of law. But in large measure because of the drug phenomenon and the fact that the FARC, which has now been identified as the biggest cocaine trafficking organization in the world, was shoveling cocaine into the United States and affecting the health and well-being of the American people.

So we made that commitment. Ten billion dollars later, in the last several years we’ve seen coca cultivation increasing by at least 50 percent and some pulling back in the context of these negotiations from the offensives against the FARC, pulling back on extradition, where for the first time in a decade or so Colombia has refused to extradite someone to the United States because he also happens to be a FARC commander. And you’ve reversed yourself on aerial fumigation, which I guess is one of the reasons that the coca cultivation has increased.

If you’re sitting in Congress representing the American taxpayer, what case do you make for an additional half a billion dollars in assistance and even longer-term commitment to Colombia going forward?

AMB. PINZON: Thank you for that question. I believe that’s a very important and very relevant for the time.

First, I think what we have done with Plan Colombia that worked effectively for several years and this was doing peace building, you know, and that’s what we did for a lot of time. You can criticize some elements. You can, you know, have different opinions on parts of the agenda strategy, but, as you said, those who crafted and those of us who have been working on this for a long time, we have found this as a tool to produce a concrete result. And the result was the complete turnaround of Colombia from a failing nation to a vibrant democracy, active economy, and a country that is setting a democratic agenda to the future. That’s a little bit of what happened to Colombia.

And you but many others here in Washington need to feel proud of it from a US policy perspective, but somehow from Colombian perspective the reality is that we have cut poverty by half. We have reduced unemployment. We have increased investment. The economy has grown, and all this with a strong base of strengthening in security indicators.

We discussed from the end of last year, around this time when we arrived, the importance of understanding that we were going to enter into a new phase, that peace building with the use of legitimate force was not now the only thing that we were going to do, but, on the contrary, that we were going to focus on a transition to peace on a real, effective, active peace-building effort.

And that’s how the agenda of Peace Colombia came in. The State Department, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, President Obama himself in the presence of President Santos, and now Congress have concluded that Colombia needed a new package to make peace sustainable in the long term and to guarantee that these gains of transformation of Colombia become permanent.

Those are important for Colombia, but those are important for the United States. The fact that Colombia can be a country that can promote democracy, freedom, markets in the Western Hemisphere is not only important for Colombia, but somehow is important for our set of values. The possibility of Colombia continuing to export training, security standards to other countries in Latin America is not only important for Colombia. It’s strategically important for the United States as a whole.

And I think that is what explains why actually in the House we have an approval of $550 million and the Senate, $450 million. I wish we get the House, you know, and now you mention those words, but, well, it’s up to the US Congress. It’s up to the political process and budget. And we have to understand even that this is an election year that has implications that I’m not the one to discuss.

So, in that perspective, I believe it is very important in the months and the year to come to get those resources, to get the resources precisely to make this peace sustainable on issues like taking development to the marginal areas of the countries, on issues like offering programs related to the humanitarian efforts, on demining, on taking care of victims, on moving onto all these processes that are related to a stabilization and a transition to peace.

And, of course, there are other elements that are important, like strengthening the justice system. Justice is going to be extremely important in the years to come to precisely make that peace sustainable and credible. And keeping the capabilities to confront organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, or other sources of crime and violence that are not going to disappear, are going to be there and are things that we will need to confront.

This, as I said before, is not only important for Colombia. As much as we contain is not only good for Colombia, but it’s good for Central America, it’s good for the Caribbean, it’s good for Mexico, it’s good for the United States. You know, there’s a whole set of nations that benefit out of this.

Moving to the drug trafficking and your question and concern. During my tenure as minister of defense, I had the fortune to see and to testify the wonderful successes of our armed forces. And by the year 2012 and 2013, we got the lowest number of hectares of coca in the , in the history of this relationship and efforts. So that was great — you know, very good news.

Starting then, we have seen an increase by different reasons. What we have learned in this process is that the threats are not static. They’re dynamic. And they learn out of your tools. So they learn how to somehow take advantage or deny powerful capabilities on our efforts. And suddenly they start to use communities and present them in front of some of the coca eradication. They start to create different pressures to limit that success. The truth is tthat, as you described, last year, numbers are there, are public, those coca crops went up.

What has been the Colombian reaction? First, we’re not happy with it. We want to confront that. President Santos himself has said, I want to produce results onto this. I am committed to it. Of course, he’s trying to find new tools. Out of the peace agreement, he thought, and his vision is, that having FARC out of drug dealing and with the commitment — not expecting they honor, but with the commitment of not being part of that business that that will have long-term consequences to reduce that effect.

Second, a more aggressive effort on alternative development because we know it works. There are regions in Colombia in which alternative development has worked very well. In the central part of the country where have roads, where you have technical assistance, we have been able to reduce coca even to zero. In the areas that are marginal, that are distant, in which state presence is not very effective or very stable, the truth is that there, you know, drug comes back and you reduce it and suddenly it can grow again, it has the potential. So that’s what we learned. And this is why under the Ministry of Post Conflict, there has been — we’re in a process of developing and executing an integrated strategy toward that end.

And, on the (hard ?) side, there are very important efforts to do two things. One, for instance, there are new strategies that are I would say under trial, you know, like a manual fumigation or spraying. We don’t know if that’s going to work effectively or not, but we are always evolving, looking for new tools or new challenges or new ways to confront this.

And finally, interdiction. Colombia in the past two years, year ’15 and actually year ’16, is seizing more cocaine than ever. Now, anyone can say, well, it’s because there’s more pressure. No doubt. But at the same time, a lot of that cocaine that is being produced additionally is not getting to the markets, and that’s a way precisely to contain these efforts.

Under my watch, probably last May operation we launched, there was an active action against the criminal bands, especially the so-called Urabenos, and they have like three or four names. You know, these are very large cartel, and they have been very heavily hit in the past year and a half, two years. So the consequence of that is that also that is limiting the potential or constraining the potential of that additional drug to really have a major impact into the market, which, again, does not satisfy anyone in the sense that we need to see how we can produce more results and keep moving forward into this.

But I will underline the will of Colombian government to continue to confront this challenge is as and probably no more than us that know the consequences of moving into this and not continue to be dynamic into these efforts.

And, finally, I would say that the worst mistake any can take after the experience we have had in Colombia is not to support the efforts to confront the challenges. Of course, I think we’re open to the dialogue of how to do better, how to improve one technique or to have a new one. I think that’s part of our discussion.

But this is why you told me, make a case to Congress. You know, keep pushing for this because we need to make peace sustainable — that’s the most important objective. You know, even if transition takes longer, we need to make peace sustainable. And, second, we need to keep the edge on confronting organized crime, whatever face it presents.

MR. NORIEGA: Excellent. Excellent. So we’re going to take some questions from the audience. Raise your hand. The young ladies will bring you — in the back there, two hands up. The ladies will bring you microphones. Please introduce yourself, your affiliation, and ask a question.

Q: Hi. Good morning — (inaudible). Alejandro Sanchez from Jane’s Defense Weekly. My question is that on Saturday, President Santos went to Narino and Orchira (ph). He promised that in four years, the army’s demining — (inaudible) — will have cleared 21 million square meters of common territory from mines, explosives, ammunition that hasn’t exploded yet. My question is, what do you think about this statement, and what would the role be of international organizations like the United Nations, the United States, the SOUTHCOM, the HALO trust? And, finally, where do you think these 21 million square meters will be found? Will it be in the areas that the FARC operates, like in Choco, in Antioquia, in Tutumaio (ph)? What’s the next step for the clearing process of these mines? Thank you.

AMB. PINZON: Well, I’ll start with the final part of your question. You have the question, and you have good answers at the same time for the question. Yes, and those areas I believe are the most important — Cacesa (ph) and areas that have — that contain those kinds of devices.

As you might know, there is a very important effort that has been led by Secretary Kerry actually and the minister of foreign affairs from Norway. That effort was launched in — well, formally, (in hands?), into a ministerial meeting in the past UN General Assembly with the presence of President Santos. And there, different countries — something like 24 countries presented commitments for more than $100 million to contribute precisely to those efforts on demining.

Demining is an important issue, and I keep saying sometimes in Colombia not necessarily mines as we know them, but explosive devices — you know, improvised IEDs actually is what we have there. And, of course, there require a lot of effort, a lot of commitment, and I think those more than $100 million will be very important for the purpose of that objective. That, of course, has humanitarian consequences and are a very good step for a country that is really seeking for a stable peace.

Now, on the other hand, on the Peace Colombia efforts, part of the money or most of the money that the US committed is included into the Peace Colombia package. So that’s another important and concrete step. In addition to that, Colombian government has decided to enlarge first from a battalion to brigade level unit dedicated to demining. So in addition to the humanitarian demining done with the international standards, with UN, OES, and these private sector NGOs that are working onto this, Colombia has decided that part of its capabilities that was used for let’s say military operational demining is going to be transformed into capabilities for humanitarian demining, but using this expertise. So we move from a battalion level to a brigade level. The actual estimate is to move from original 500 to 1,000 men to reach the level of up to 10,000 men dedicated to this purpose.

So of course life is about setting goals, and President Santos is trying to set an ambitious goal for the country. He has this international support, international resources, and at the same time a national will and a national capability being put altogether towards that end. And we should try, and if we don’t make it, we should keep trying until we make it for the importance of the issue, for the good of Colombian people and especially in the rural areas of the country.

MR. NORIEGA: There was a gentleman there, Mr. Alonso (sp) with the AP.

Q: Hi. Thank you.

AMB. PINZON: You always have good questions. I’m worried now. (Laughter.)

Q: No, no. I’m Luis Alonso with the AP. Thank you very much.

AMB. PINZON: Thank you.

Q: Ambassador, I would like to ask you without addressing specifically the funds that Congress could be approving for Colombia, if you could share with us a comment on the US election. Do you foresee a major change in the strategy or emphasis if either candidate wins? And what would be the impact for the relationship with Colombia and specifically the impact on the implementation of this process that you see with the election? Thank you.

AMB. PINZON: Well, you can imagine. We really do not intervene into a political debate, and especially right now, you know. The level of the debate is out there. I mean, we really will not have any opinion. It’s up to the American people. Americans will make their choice, and they will decide. And whatever they decide, we will work with, you know, and do our effort.

The relationship between Colombia and the United States has an interesting element — bipartisanship. It was President Clinton that started Plan Colombia with a Republican majority in Congress. That’s why you were there, Roger. Later on, President Bush came, and at some point there was a major majority of the Democratic Party in Congress. And during the President Obama administration, there has been a good time as well of Republican majority.

In all cases, we have been able to grant US support, and we have been able to work with the administrations and US Congress. And that’s, I think, the way we should continue to plan. I think we have a very special relationship and a strategic one now really on facts and issues between Colombia and the United States just to, you know, put it in terms of political cycle.

MR. NORIEGA: Well, I would just say that certainly Secretary Clinton has a significant history and background and awareness of these issues, but Senator Sessions, who is a principal adviser to the Republican candidate, was one of the pillars of Plan Colombia’s planning, and he even said at a hearing, I support President Uribe’s vision, win the war — three words, win the war.

Another question up front here.

Q: Thank you, ambassador, for your time and your great insight on the situation now. My question — well, first of all, my name is Emanuel and I’m with the AU School of International Service. Sorry about that. But my question is about the involvement of the UN and what does it look like moving forward.

We know that the (tribute ?) monitoring and modification mechanism will still be in place and that the UN has pledged that they will continue their activities on the ground. Would the Colombian government consider it wise to seek to expand their role and make sure that the presence does not waver, especially through these troubled times? Thank you.

AMB. PINZON: Well, that’s a very important question. Right now, there’s a high appreciation for the UN role in Colombia no doubt from President Santos himself and the Colombian government as a whole. But recently we have heard different points of view in the country expressing the importance of having UN playing a role in the country. As you know, the real timeline for the ceasefire was October 31. During the weekend or last week, President Santos opened that space up to December 31. And not to forget that President Santos, the president of Colombia, commander in chief of Colombian Armed Forces, has the authority to move that time or schedule as he considers, you know, frankly speaking.

Second, I think that the UN mandate in Colombia already is formal. It’s not anymore under analysis process, but it’s already formal. There is a UN Security Council mandate in which the moratorium on verification was stated on the way this process should happen so that is on right now in Colombia. And, of course, part of the debate is that how much can you extend, you know, relating to the current political process in Colombia.

But I guess we have seen so much commitment from world leaders and from UN itself that we should without adding expectations have some comfort on the way this mandate can contribute to maintain the ceasefire and towards a future process of the DER (ph).

MR. NORIEGA: Let’s take one more question. The young lady up front here.

Q: Ambassador, my name is Paula Renhi (ph) from the Department of State. And you mentioned that the peace in Colombia needs to be sustainable, and sustainability includes social inclusion. I’ve seen that the opposition is feeding off some concerns about gay rights. And I would like to know how you think the government and the opposition and the most conservative sectors of Colombian society can reconcile to find joint agreement on these issues.

AMB. PINZON: Well, I think social inclusion and minorities inclusion in Colombia is very well developed in our constitution. I’m not a constitutional lawyer. Certainly I’m not even a lawyer. But I can tell you that from different rulings from our constitutional court, those are issues that are, frankly speaking, beyond the reach of the executive or even the political discussion. Those are rights in Colombia that in different levels and different situations have to be implemented and (full on ?) considered. So I think on that regard, Colombia is somehow very well advanced in its constitutional development towards rights, especially for different minorities in the country.

MR. NORIEGA: So let me ask one last question. And it’s not really, not an easy one, but I wanted to bring it up because it’s important. A lot of people who voted “no” are deeply skeptical about the FARC’s intentions to honor the agreement and, for that matter, even use the agreement to advance its continued insurrection. And that’s the word they use in their private conversations with their supporters. And use the electoral process, gaining a foothold and substantial resources that they’ve accrued from involvement in drug trafficking.

How many — how much do you think they’ve got squirreled away in their rainy day fund from this cocaine trafficking and other criminality? And how do we go about sort of ruining their plans by getting that money and freezing that money and putting it at the disposal of the Colombian state?

AMB. PINZON: Your question is very good. You know that and we can bring the intelligence analysts and they will give you their insights and their perspective. But I think in such a delicate issue we have to be careful not to speculate on the issue. There’s no doubt that a Colombian government will and has all this time not only announced but effectively fight the drug trade. And as I said, you know, for the year 2015, was record year in cocaine seizure. The year ’16 is even looking better. And I can assure you that that cocaine is not being selected who do you get from or who you don’t. That cocaine is coming out of the production system. And every time we seize that cocaine certainly we’re harming criminal finances.

So I think, you know, out this increase, probably there were some expectations, calculations coming out of the criminal organizations, including the purposes of the FARC in that regard, but at the same time is Colombian government will in decision to continue to go after.

And I will also underline the importance of the public statements coming out of the attorney general office saying that his will, his determination, and his obligation is to go after any kind of funds obtained through illegal or criminal activities. And I think that’s another important signal of the way Colombia will continue to perceive and approach this effort beyond our commitment and our national will to peace that we expect really to materialize — sooner the better.

MR. NORIEGA: Good question, good answer. Thank you very much. Now, let me just say in closing that I a few months ago saw a video of a father who was saying, you know, the FARC killed my son. And he said, but I’m going to support this agreement because I have two other sons that are still alive. And he doesn’t just want an accord. He doesn’t want just politicians to sort of split the difference or whatever. He wants peace, a definitive peace and a lasting and permanent one.

And that’s something I think that should be in the interest of the American people too. Because of the drugs, yes, but because I think you’re right — that as Colombia is able to end this 52-year-old armed uprising by these folks and demobilize them as it has tens of thousands of others in its history, it will prove a lot. And I think Colombia remains a very key partner for us and to the extent we can make it more stable, more prosperous, more unified, and more democratic, I think it serves all of our interests.

And with that secular prayer, I will thank everyone for coming, and thank you, ambassador. Please join me for — (inaudible). (Applause.)

AMB. PINZON: Thank you.

(END)