Álvaro Uribe Vélez

An Interview with Álvaro Uribe Vélez When you assumed the presidency in Both the guerillas and self-defense groups were 2002, what was the overall condition of ultimately co-opted by narcotraffickers. The Colombia? Was it a failing state? vast majority of them converted into narcotrafficking mercenaries. Uribe: I never thought that Colombia was a What we found when we assumed the pres- failing state, but during my first month as presi- idency was a country with almost 30,000 homi- dent, I was surprised by many international ana- cides per year and with more than 3,000 cases of lysts. For example, people from the World Bank kidnappings—a country with 56 percent of the and other multilateral agencies came to see me population living in poverty, with 16 percent saying, “Be careful because Colombia is becom- unemployment, and a very low investment rate. ing a failing state.” Colombia has long been a This is what we found. But we also found excel- democratic state. The failures of the 1980s and lent people in Colombia with whom to work. 1990s were not because of our state but because of the advancement of terrorist groups attempt- When you assumed office, approximately ing to defeat our democratic institutions in many what percentage of Colombia was under the areas of the country. By the mid-20th century, control of the insurgents? Colombia’s traditional political parties—the Colombian Conservative Party and Colombian Uribe: I would not say “under control of Liberal Party—came to terms, putting an end to the insurgents,” but I would say “in anarchy” their historic violent confrontation. because of the advancement of violence: two- During that period, however, [Fidel] thirds. The other third was in danger of falling Castro’s revolutionary movement in Cuba suc- into anarchy. ceeded, and it chose two countries in which to replicate its revolution: Colombia and Bolivia. What were the root causes of the conflict The irreconcilable remnant of partisan guer- of the 1980s and 1990s? rillas in Colombia reinvented themselves as communist guerrillas. Colombia did not have Uribe: During that time, the dominant a long period of peace. No sooner had the cause was narcotrafficking. I remember the violent political confrontation ended then political agitators used to say, “If Colombia the new Marxist guerrillas opened fire. Later, widens its democracy, we are going to cease. communist violence resulted in the birth and We are going to stop our cause.” In 1988, our growth of anticommunist self-defense groups. constitution adopted a popular direct election Álvaro Uribe Vélez was the 58th President of Colombia (2002–2010). PRISM 3, no. 3 INTERVIEW | 139 VÉLEZ of mayors, and later on, the 1991 constitution a decision that there was no point in trying brought the popular direct election to negotiate with the FARC? of governors. In 1994, I was the second governor to be Uribe: No. When I was elected, elected in my province of Antioquia. But the Colombians were already fed up with failing question is this: How well did Colombia suc- negotiations. I said the only way for me to ceed in widening democracy? Instead of drop- renew this process is if they would accept one ping their guns, guerrillas began to threaten condition: to cease any criminal activity. If they mayors, to coerce them, to penetrate mayors’ didn’t accept this condition and cease all crimi- offices and the political system, to rob their nal activity, my government couldn’t undertake wallets. Pablo Escobar even became a member negotiations with them. of Colombia’s congress, though by the time of my election to the Senate, he had been What were the basic principles and chucked out by our armed forces. objectives of the democratic security policy? It’s sometimes said about people like Pablo Escobar and other drug kingpins and warlords Uribe: In Latin America, there was an idea that they provide social services for the peo- that any proposal to bolster security was a way to ple in their community—public safety, soccer support dictatorships. In Colombia, many poli- teams, stadiums, and other things that the gov- ticians were feeble on security. What I proposed ernment doesn’t provide. It is an excuse. It is was security with democratic values—I call it not uncommon that criminals want to legiti- Democratic Security Policy. But not only secu- mize their actions. Many times they do what rity, but security in the company of two other ele- they think they need to do to win community ments: investment promotion and social cohesion. support. But the vast majority of Colombians The first principle was security with democratic have never supported these criminals. values. This is security for all Colombians: security without cracking down on freedoms, security with What was your first priority when you all the respect of a pluralistic society, security for assumed the presidency? those who support the government as well as those against our government. Uribe: Because I was the first president elected with a platform based on establishing Did you have a timeline? security, my pledge to my fellow Colombians was: “If I am elected I will fight day and night, Uribe: No. Many times I was asked about every minute during 24 hours a day, to restore a timeline, and what I answered was: I cannot security, but security with democratic values promise when we are going to solve this prob- and to promote investment as a source of the lem. My pledge was that I would devote all my resources we need to advance social cohesion.” energy day and night to lead this effort. Did you attempt at first to negotiate How did you reconcile the competing with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of and sometimes conflicting imperatives of Colombia [FARC]? Or had you already made human rights and security? 140 | INTERVIEW PRISM 3, no. 3 VÉLEZ Uribe: Security is a democratic value. military. My theoretical conclusion is that we There is a strong link between security, demo- were instilled with the belief that the military cratic institutions, and of course human rights. was created to protect national sovereignty and Security is a prerequisite for the development that the risks are coming from external threats. of resources. This is the link between security, But the only risk for sovereignty was coming investment, and social cohesion. Coming back from terror threats—not from distant lands but to the relationship between security and human a domestic threat in the rise of narcoterrorists. rights, I have always said that we need secu- Narcoterrorism can be so powerful that it has rity as the long-term vision for Colombia. In a the ability to undermine the state and to inflict democratic society such as Colombia, the only huge damage to our democratic institutions. way for people to support security in the long And when someone undermines the state and term is by making security credible. And cred- damages the institutions, it is the beginning of ibility depends on effectiveness and transpar- the destruction of sovereignty. It is important ency. Transparency needs order and respect for that we think of resorting to the military in human rights. And we did our best to protect order to protect sovereignty, not to think exclu- human rights and to not sanction any abuse of sively in terms of external threats. We must human rights. think of the necessity to confront domestic threats against sovereignty such as the threat What was the division of labor between of narcotrafficking, and this led to engaging the the police and the military? military in the war against narcotraffickers. Uribe: This was quite difficult because Is it fair to say you consider the collusion the problems were as serious in rural areas as of narcotics networks with terrorist networks in cities. We couldn’t apply a strict division. and insurgency networks to be not just a law The original division was for the military to enforcement problem, but an international protect our borders and the police to secure our security threat? cities. We couldn’t stick with this. We had to involve the military in the fight against nar- Uribe: Of course, of course! Weakening cotrafficking, and we had to involve the police institutions could gradually eliminate the state. in our fight against terrorist groups such as First, these networks eliminate the supreme guerrillas and self-defense groups. Regarding power of the state. They then reduce the the involvement of the military in the fight state to a formal state without the capacity to against narcotrafficking, there have been dis- impose the law. And when you have the formal cussions in Colombia and in Mexico. I have state without effective powers, the state begins two practical conclusions and one theoreti- to dissolve. cal approach. The practical conclusion is that during the years before Colombia engaged the Did restoring the police presence military, narcotraffickers expanded and finally throughout the country result in problems penetrated some sectors of the military itself. within the judicial system, such as having Secondly, attacking the criminal power of nar- people arrested by the police but not being cotrafficking requires the involvement of the tried quickly and effectively by the judiciary? PRISM 3, no. 3 INTERVIEW | 141 VÉLEZ Uribe: Sometimes there were complaints One of the elements of your on these cases, but the general outcome of tak- Democratic Security Policy was to ing the police to every place in Colombia was reestablish a strong connection between that we began to restore security. And the more the population and government. How did we advanced security, the more autonomy the you balance the requirements of winning judges could reestablish in every city, in every the hearts and minds of the Colombian place.

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