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Colombia's New Armed Groups

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Colombia's New Armed Groups COLOMBIA’S NEW ARMED GROUPS Latin America Report N°20 – 10 May 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MORE THAN CRIMINAL GANGS?.......................................................................... 2 A. THE AUC AS PREDECESSOR ..................................................................................................3 B. THE NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS ......................................................................................6 III. CASE STUDIES.............................................................................................................. 8 A. NORTE DE SANTANDER .........................................................................................................8 1. AUC history in the region..........................................................................................8 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations ..............................8 3. Conflict dynamics....................................................................................................10 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................11 B. NARIÑO ..............................................................................................................................11 1. AUC history in the region........................................................................................11 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations........................11 3. Conflict dynamics....................................................................................................12 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................14 C. ATLANTIC COAST ...............................................................................................................14 1. AUC history in the region........................................................................................14 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations..........................14 3. Conflict dynamics.....................................................................................................16 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................17 D. MEDELLÍN ..........................................................................................................................17 1. AUC history in the city............................................................................................17 2. Presence of new illegal armed groups and criminal organisations..........................18 3. Conflict dynamics....................................................................................................19 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................19 IV. STATE RESPONSE ..................................................................................................... 20 A. SECURITY POLICY...............................................................................................................20 B. JUSTICE...............................................................................................................................21 C. FROM REINSERTION TO REINTEGRATION..............................................................................22 D. DANGERS AHEAD ...............................................................................................................25 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF COLOMBIA WITH AREAS OF NEW GROUP ACTIVITY...............................................29 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................30 C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA...................31 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................32 Latin America Report N°20 10 May 2007 COLOMBIA’S NEW ARMED GROUPS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The disbanding of the paramilitary United Self-Defence of some 3,000 is disturbing, and civil society groups Forces of Colombia (AUC) between 2003 and 2006 is estimate up to triple that figure. Some of these groups, seen by the administration of President Alvaro Uribe as such as the New Generation Organisation (Organización a vital step toward peace. While taking some 32,000 AUC Nueva Generación, ONG) in Nariño have started to members out of the conflict has certainly altered the operate much like the old AUC bloc in the region, landscape of violence, there is growing evidence that including counter-insurgency operations and efforts to new armed groups are emerging that are more than the control territory and population so as to dominate the simple “criminal gangs” that the government describes. drug trade. Others, such as the Black Eagles in Norte Some of them are increasingly acting as the next de Santander, are less visible and both compete and generation of paramilitaries, and they require a more cooperate with established criminal networks on the urgent and more comprehensive response from the Venezuelan border. government. The government’s response to the threat has been Since early 2006, the Organization of American States insufficient, limited to treating it as a law enforcement (OAS) Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), matter, mainly the responsibility of the police, who have human rights groups and civil society organisations have instituted a special plan and a special “search unit” to insistently warned about the rearming of demobilised deal with what they generically label “criminal gangs” paramilitary units, the continued existence of groups that (bandas criminales). This has not stopped the groups did not disband because they did not participate in the from spreading across the country. In some regions the government-AUC negotiations and the merging of security forces do not cooperate with each other and former paramilitary elements with powerful criminal show low commitment to fight the new groups. Justice organisations, often deeply involved with drug trafficking. institutions, in particular the attorney general’s office, Worse, there is evidence that some of the new groups often cannot carry out investigations because they lack and criminal organisations have established business resources and are not helped by the security forces but relations over drugs with elements of the insurgent also because they are intimidated. The reintegration Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and program for ex-combatants is being restructured to National Liberation Army (ELN). At the same time, overcome serious shortcomings but time is working the government’s plan for reintegrating demobilised against it. paramilitaries has revealed itself to be deeply flawed. A new, comprehensive strategy is essential if the emerging These alerts have to be taken seriously since conditions groups and criminal organisations are to be defeated. It now exist for the continuity or re-emergence either of old- requires combining solid intelligence and more effective style paramilitary groups or a federation of new groups law enforcement with military measures, all with full and criminal organisations based on the drug trade. The respect for human rights and complemented by military struggles with the FARC and the smaller ELN improvements in how demobilised fighters are reintegrated are ongoing, and drug trafficking continues unabated. into society, including a major, national rural infrastructure Massive illegal funds from drug trafficking help fuel and development program. This strategy needs to the decades-long conflict, undermine reintegration of concentrate initially in the regions where paramilitary former combatants into society and foment the formation domination has ended but which are targets of both the and strengthening of new armed groups, as occurred with new groups and the FARC. Sustaining security in those the AUC and the FARC more than a decade ago. areas depends both on permanent, effective police and military presence as well as on providing tangible economic These new groups do not yet have the AUC’s organisation, benefits and services for the local communities. reach and power. Their numbers are disputed but even the lowest count, from the police and the OAS mission, Colombia’s New Armed Groups Crisis Group Latin America Report N°20, 10 May 2007 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS convicted of such crimes cannot be reduced under the JPL. To the Government of Colombia: 4. Implement, within the interior and justice ministry’s plan to prevent irregularities in the October 2007 1. Adopt a comprehensive strategy to combat the departmental and municipal elections, measures emerging armed groups and criminal organisations, aimed at preventing interference by the new armed including: groups and other criminal organisations. (a) improved intelligence work and law enforcement measures, such as additional To the Police and the Armed Forces: special “search units” (bloques de búsqueda) and expanded police presence in all affected
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