Potential Threat: the New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security and the Pentagon Provided Helicopters and Other Equipment to Security Forces for Drug Control Activities

JEREMY BIGWOOD

A publication of WOLA’s security program, which aims to bring reason, moderation, and respect for human rights and civilian institutions into the policy debates about security in the United States, Latin America, and at the Organization of Potential Threat: The New OAS American States. Concept of Hemispheric Security

By Gaston Chillier and Laurie Freeman

Introduction

he Declaration on Security in the Americas, adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in October 2003, created a new concept of hemi- Tspheric security that broadens the traditional deﬁnition of national defense to incorporate new threats, including political, economic, social, health, and environmental concerns, to such an extent that almost any problem can now be considered a security threat.

The implementation of this new concept may lead to greater “securitization” of the region’s problems, deﬁned as the treatment of these problems as if they were security threats. Securitization carries with it the risk of military responses to problems that are not military in nature and in circumstances where military action is ill-suited or could cause more harm than good, a tendency that is already well under way in Latin America. This risk exists due to four main factors:

1) The historic tendency of the region’s armed forces to intervene politically under authoritarian regimes or during periods of armed conﬂict or social instability;

2) The U.S. “war on drugs,” which encourages a greater role for the region’s militaries in domestic law enforcement;

A WOLA Special Report 3) The inability of most of the region’s police forces to respond effectively to growing crime and violence; July 2005 4) The U.S. “war on terror,” particularly on counter-drug responsibilities; and 2) the its expansive and nebulous deﬁnition lack of effective public security policies, of terrorism, which in turn encourages rendering law enforcement institutions the armed forces to combat terrorism in unable to respond to growing crime and whatever form it is expressed. insecurity.

The OAS’s new concept of hemispheric Since the mid 1980s, when the Reagan security will only enhance Latin America’s administration declared illegal drugs a historic tendency and current trajectory national security threat, a central part of towards giving its militaries greater internal the U.S. “war on drugs” has consisted of and non-traditional responsibilities. enhancing the ability of Latin American By encompassing such a broad range of armed forces to carry out counternarcotics The convergence of security threats, the OAS Declaration initiatives.1 The pressure that the United on Security in the Americas justifies, like States exerts within the framework of its the new OAS and U.S. never before, the use of Latin American counternarcotics policy towards Latin visions of security armed forces in new and non-traditional America is one of the main factors that in Latin America will missions. U.S. foreign policy, which now has spurred the region’s armed forces to views a similarly broad range of regional intervene in internal security matters.2 likely obstruct the problems through the lens of terrorism, long and difficult path further enhances that possibility. The In addition, rising crime rates throughout towards consolidating convergence of the new OAS and U.S. the region are generating intense social visions of security in Latin America will demands for effective responses that democracy and likely obstruct the long and difficult path will guarantee citizen security while also strengthening civilian towards consolidating democracy and resolving social conflict caused by poverty institutions in strengthening civilian institutions in and inequality. The failure of police forces the region. Furthermore, these visions to meet these demands has increasingly led the region. of regional security offer ineffective and governments to turn to the armed forces in inappropriate methods to resolve the wide matters of internal policing. range of problems of social, economic, political, and environmental origins facing The effects of U.S. counternarcotics Latin America. policies can be seen clearly in Bolivia, where the U.S. military has been directly involved in counter-drug efforts and The “Wars” on Drugs has encouraged the Bolivian military to take on a greater counter-drug role. In and Crime Increase 1988, the U.S. government funded the Militarization in creation of a Bolivian air force unit and a Latin America naval group to carry out drug interdiction operations. The trend continued with Latin America has a history of the launching of the Andean Initiative, militarization in response to internal under which the U.S. government began conflict, instability and crime. Although “a deliberate incorporation of host country the region is no longer governed by military military forces into the counternarcotics dictatorships and all but one of the region’s effort and an expanded role for the U.S. countries have democratically elected military throughout the region.”3 More leaders, many countries in the region recently, U.S. Special Forces trained the have turned to their militaries to respond Bolivian counternarcotics police force; the to internal problems. This is primarily U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section due to two factors: 1) the threat of drug funded a paramilitary counterdrug unit trafficking, and U.S. counter-drug policies (the Expeditionary Task Force), which was that encourage regional militaries to take commanded by Bolivian military officers;

2 Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security and the Pentagon provided helicopters and other equipment to security forces for drug control activities. The Expeditionary Task Force (ETF), comprised The Bolivian military’s internal role of former Bolivian soldiers and operating outside is not limited to counternarcotics, but the military chain of includes broader law enforcement efforts command, was funded by the United States to as well. The army is occasionally called carry out counternarcotics on to respond to popular protests. For activities in Bolivia. The example, when the La Paz police mutinied ETF committed gross violations of human rights. in February 2003, President Sanchez de ANDEAN INFORMATION NETWORK Lozada deployed soldiers to restore public order. Their subsequent clash led to 32 dead and hundreds wounded.5 According posts. Since 1995 the Defense Ministry to scholar Juan Ramón Quintana, “the has served as a member of the National militarization of public security as well as Public Security Council, giving it a role in the militarized response to social conflicts public security decisions and policymaking. corresponded with a dramatic increase in The army now has a direct role in efforts human rights violations.”6 to track down and detain drug cartel bosses. Military personnel have also been In Mexico, the military’s involvement assigned to police forces and prosecutors’ in domestic law enforcement has grown offices in regions with high levels of drug considerably in the past decades. Sigrid trafficking activity, including the Federal Arzt explains that “the process of Preventive Police and the federal attorney militarization of public security is an ad general’s office; for most of the Fox hoc policy response on the part of the administration, the attorney general was a Mexican political elite to the escalation brigadier general. The Mexican army has of organized crime, particularly in the also assumed other internal roles such as phenomenon of drug trafficking.”7 While social work, environmental protection, and the Mexican army has historically been natural disaster response. In its most recent involved in manual eradication of illicit white book, the Mexican army identifies crops, President Miguel de la Madrid’s extreme poverty and social exclusion as 1987 declaration identifying drug national security threats as well. trafficking as a national security threat led to the expansion of the military’s In Brazil, a country characterized by counterdrug mission to embrace law poverty and social and racial inequality, enforcement and intelligence tasks as well. crime and homicide rates exceed those of U.S. policy has encouraged this trend Colombia, a country in the midst of an through the provision of counter-drug armed conflict.8 The police forces are often training and equipment for the Mexican part of the problem instead of the solution. military, as well as rhetorical support for In response, governments across the party militarization as a temporary solution to spectrum have resorted to the armed forces the problems of police and prosecutorial as an immediate “solution.” 9 corruption and ineptitude. Since the 1990s the fight against drug Militarization in Mexico occurs in two trafficking in Brazil has been the principal ways: the expansion of the military’s role justification for the intervention of the as an institution to include public security armed forces in law enforcement tasks. and law enforcement responsibilities, Frequently, the governing elites appeal to and the appointment of military personal the army to militarily “occupy” the favelas (active, licensed, or retired) to civilian (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro or Sao

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2005 3 Paulo after attacks break out between leading a failed coup in February 1992. drug trafficking groups that are disputing With Chávez’s rise to power, the armed territorial control or confronting police forces have increased their presence in conducting counternarcotics operations.10 national politics. The 1999 Constitution In June 2004, the Brazilian congress created a new security and national defense approved legislation that permits the armed model which includes economic, social, forces to take on police functions in the political and environmental factors, areas war on drugs, and in July of the same year traditionally not seen as related to security. approved a law called the Lei de Abate that authorizes the Brazilian air force to bring Argentina, like many other Latin down any plane they suspect is transporting American countries that have suffered drugs. 11 Brazil’s counternarcotics policies military dictatorships responsible for serious have been influenced by the militarized and widespread human rights violations, The failure of police U.S. counter-drug strategy. According to has a legal framework that prohibits the forces to halt rising the Transnational Institute, “Brazil has intervention of the armed forces in internal crime rates has been pulled along, little by little, towards security issues except for clear exceptions of the U.S. inspired “war on drugs.”12 internal commotion.15 In spite of this legal increasingly led impediment, the possible intervention of governments to The Brazilian armed forces are also used for the armed forces in the public security area turn to the armed other public security matters, such as when is an issue that frequently returns to public they were called in to act against rebelling debate in different contexts. For example, forces in matters of or striking police forces in seven Brazilian confronted with a wave of kidnappings in internal policing. states in 1997. More recently, immediately the city and province of Buenos Aires in after the assassination of U.S. missionary 2004, then-President Eduardo Duhalde Dorothy Stang, an environmental activist proposed to reconsider the possibility of and advocate for rural workers in the allowing the armed forces to carry out state of Pará, the federal government internal security functions.16 Even though deployed 2000 army troops to reestablish this proposal was categorically rejected by order and detain those responsible for the the national government, it received much crime. The commander in charge of the support from business and political sectors troops claimed, “Our mission is to give in Buenos Aires province. These sectors assistance, security, and logistical aid to the also proposed that the armed forces be detachments of police in the operations, used to resolve the intense social conflict but we are prepared for any situation of resulting from failed neoliberal policies confrontation.”13 According to Paulo applied in the 1990s.17 Mezquita, the federal government has limited participation of the armed forces in the public security area to those situations The “War on Terror” in which the police are unable to guarantee Furthers Militarization security. Nevertheless, he concludes that “the federal government still depends on Terrorism has become the number one the armed forces to maintain law and order, foreign policy priority for the U.S. especially when the police are involved in government, and the “war on terror,” illegal actions or disorder.”14 launched as a response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, is now the main mission In Venezuela, military presence in public of the U.S. military. This war is not life has increased significantly during characterized by a clearly defined enemy, the last few years as a consequence of however. According to Jeffery Record, a deep crisis in the system of political “The nature and parameters of [the] war [on representation. Current president Hugo terror]…remain frustratingly unclear. The Chávez began his political career by administration has postulated a multiplicity

4 Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security of enemies, including rogue states; weapons The clearest example is Colombia. The of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; country is grappling with an intractable terrorist organizations of global, regional forty-year-old internal armed conflict and national scope; and terrorism itself. involving several armed groups, but the It also seems to have conflated them into current government’s policy is to reduce a monolithic threat, and in so doing has this situation to a problem of terrorism.21 subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it strives for in foreign policy….”18 Equally troubling is that other conflicts with political or social roots—the kinds Within this framework, and in line with most commonly afflicting the countries the overarching foreign policy and security of the region—may be treated as security priorities of the Bush administration, the threats and, directly or indirectly, as Pentagon and its Southern Command terrorist threats. One example is the case (Southcom) are viewing Latin America of southern Chile, where indigenous Viewing Latin America through the lens of terrorism, even though leaders who have disputed land through the lens of the region is of little strategic importance rights with the Chilean government, terrorism leads to a in the global war on terror. They are businessmen, and landowners, have been superimposing U.S. concerns about convicted of terrorism. Even though the distorted diagnosis of terrorism onto a wide range of problems Chilean government has not called on the region’s problems in the region, as if all these problems were the armed forces to respond to this social and their potential potential terrorist threats. In March 2004 conflict, it has applied an antiterrorist for example, then Commander in Chief law inherited from the dictatorship of solutions. of Southcom, General James Hill, stated General Pinochet against members of that “terrorists throughout the Southern the Mapuche indigenous community, Command area of responsibility bomb, provoking police brutality and other murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, violations of human rights and due launder money, and smuggle humans.”19 He process.22 Even though some members of also grouped a variety of criminal activities the Mapuche tribe have committed illegal under the broad umbrella of terrorism by acts in the context of their claims (in saying, “not surprisingly, Islamic radical general crimes against private property; groups, narcoterrorists in Colombia, and they have never taken a human life), it urban gangs across Latin America all is an implausible stretch for the courts to practice many of the same illicit business treat this conflict as if it involved terrorist methods.”20 These statements, which offenses. Even though it is not possible exaggerated the terrorist threat in the to draw a direct causal relationship hemisphere and recommended a larger role between this tendency and the post- for Southcom and regional militaries in September 11 context, it is clear that responding to law enforcement problems, the region has been influenced by the illustrate how the inappropriate application new security paradigm and the definition of a diffuse concept of terrorism leads to a of terrorism promoted by U.S. policy. distorted diagnosis of the region’s problems Human Rights Watch explains that it and their potential solutions. “fears that the current international climate has provided support for the The “war on terror”—which uses a broad Lagos government’s inappropriate use and nebulous definition of terrorism and of the Chilean anti-terrorism law. The encourages an essentially military response U.S.-led campaign against terrorism to this phenomenon—has had impacts has, unfortunately, become a cover both direct and diffuse in Latin America. for governments who want to deflect The direct impacts can be seen in the attention away from their heavy-handed design and in the application of national treatment of internal dissidents. Today, policies to respond to threats to security. governments in countries around the

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2005 5 world are attempting to use anti-terrorism appropriate responses to these problems or national security measures as a means of by suggesting that the armed forces could avoiding international scrutiny of dubious have a role in solving them.27 human rights practices.”23 Other high-level Defense Department Broad definitions blur the lines officials continue to blur the lines In the context of this broad definition between appropriate police and military of what constitutes a potential terrorist roles and to conflate the region’s problems threat, the U.S. military is labeling as under a broad definition of terrorism. terrorist threats long-standing problems During the Sixth Conference of Defense that would have previously been Ministers in Ecuador in November 2004, determined policing matters or social U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld referred to the threats confronting the High-level Defense issues. This is what we refer to as the “securitization” of social problems. region in the following terms: “Terrorists, Department officials drug traffickers, hostage takers, and continue to blur For example, in his testimony before criminal gangs form an anti-social the U.S. Congress in April 2004, Gen. combination that increasingly seeks to the lines between 28 Hill stated that the principal threats destabilize civil societies.” appropriate police confronting the region are terrorism, and military roles. narco-trafficking, organized crime, gangs, Impact on Colombia and the activities of “radical populists,” During the 1980s and 1990s, the majority pointing out in particular the movement of U.S. counter-drug aid to Colombia led by Evo Morales in Bolivia.24 In went to train and equip the police, the speaking of mechanisms to confront main counternarcotics agency.29 This these new threats, specifically street changed in 2000 when the U.S. Congress gangs, Gen. Hill sustained that for many approved “Plan Colombia,” a $1.3 billion Latin American countries it was difficult counter-drug aid package primarily and complex to respond to these groups destined for the military. (The total aid because they fall “precisely on a seam under Plan Colombia has since exceeded between law enforcement and military $4 billion.) According to Lemus, operations.”25 Instead of advocating clear Stanton and Walsh, up to that point “the lines between police and military roles, he Colombian armed forces had avoided any stated that “Latin American leaders need significant role in drug control efforts.… to resolve this jurisdictional responsibility The armed forces viewed illegal drugs issue to promote cooperation among as a law enforcement issue, to be dealt their police and military forces while with by the police, while their primary simultaneously restructuring their states’ adversaries were the guerrillas.”30 Like its security forces.”26 Andean neighbors, the Colombian armed forces began to play a leading role in In his testimony before Congress in counternarcotics efforts. March 2005, Gen. Hill’s successor and current Southcom commander, Gen. Plan Colombia was originally intended as Bantz Craddock, provided a more nuanced a counter-drug program. However, after and accurate diagnosis of the roots of the 9/11 attacks, Congress expanded the instability in the Americas. He described authority of the State Department and the the social, economic and public security Pentagon to use the counter-drug aid for problems as the main challenges in the counter-terror purposes as well, arguing region, and did not equate them with that there was no way to distinguish terrorism. Nevertheless, his testimony, just between drug traffickers and the terrorist like that of his predecessor, continued to groups in Colombia, all of whom receive generate doubts about what should be the financing from the drug trade.

6 Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security WOLA ARCHIVES That shift coincided with the 2002 election of President Álvaro Uribe, who campaigned on a platform centered on security. Upon taking office he implemented his Democratic Security Policy, which increased the militarization of public security spheres that had begun with the incorporation of the drug control mission under the armed forces. Surely influenced by the global impact of the U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the Uribe administration began to use the word “terrorism” to refer to the Colombian problem, denying the existence of an armed conflict. These measures aligned the Uribe government with the Bush administration’s war on terror, converting Colombia into the strongest U.S. ally in the region. Police in Peru provide security for The New OAS Security a march against the Andean Free The anti-terror rhetoric employed Concept in Context Trade Agreement. by high-level Colombian officials often reveals a logic of war that is not In October 2003, the OAS adopted a new dissimilar from the Bush administration’s concept of hemispheric security through sentiment that “you’re either with us or the passage of the Declaration on Security in against us.” There is also strong pressure the Americas. According to the declaration, on the armed forces and police to “the security threats, concerns, and other obtain results in confronting “terrorist” challenges in the hemispheric context are organizations. The combination of these of diverse nature and multidimensional factors has served to stigmatize sectors scope, and the traditional concept and that are critical of the government, approach must be expanded to encompass particularly civil society and social new and nontraditional threats, which movement leaders, by associating them include political, economic, social, with armed groups.31 According to the health, and environmental aspects.”35 In International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s other words, the new definition broadens willingness to provide the army and the traditional concept of security, police with additional powers and incorporating new and non-traditional fewer constitutional and judicial checks threats. This declaration considers the risks an increase in arbitrary actions following practices as threats, concerns, or by the security forces against the other challenges to security: civilian population, as has occurred in the Rehabilitation and Consolidation [T]errorism, transnational organized Zones (RCZs) and other parts of the crime, the global drug problem, country.”32 Another example is the corruption, asset laundering, illicit massive detention of persons, most trafficking in weapons, and the of whom are later released for lack connections among them; extreme of evidence.33 The Office of the UN poverty and social exclusion of High Commissioner for Human Rights broad sectors of the population, noted, in its latest report, an increase in which also affect[s] stability and allegations of extrajudicial executions democracy…, erodes social cohesion and due process violations.34 and undermines the security of states;

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2005 7 natural and man-made disasters, long list of threats, is not an agreement HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other of consensus, but a reflection of the health risks, and environmental impossibility of creating a common agenda degradation; trafficking in persons; for security in the region.39 Instead of attacks to cyber security; the potential clearly establishing a common agenda to for damage to arise in the event of confront the security challenges of the an accident or incident during the region, the new scheme seems more like a maritime transport of potentially long list of the diverse problems facing each hazardous materials, including county, sub-region, or region. petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and the possibility of The transformation of the security system access, possession, and use of weapons of the Americas responds to a clear of mass destruction and their means necessity to update a system that prevailed The traditional concept of delivery by terrorists.36 under the logic of the Cold War and that of hemispheric security had stopped responding to the reality 40 “must be expanded The declaration recognizes the prerogative of the region. Nevertheless, given the of sovereign States to identify their own current context of the region and the to encompass new priorities with respect to security and concept of terrorism promoted by the and nontraditional flexibility when choosing mechanisms United States, the implementation of this threats, which include to confront threats. It incorporates new multidimensional concept constitutes democracy, the rule of law, human rights a risk of increasing the securitization of political, economic, and international humanitarian law, and the region’s problems and, consequently, social, health, and multilateralism as shared values of the militarization as a response to confront environmental hemisphere’s states. Finally, the declaration them. incorporates the concept of human security aspects…”—OAS to reaffirm that the fundamental reason for By our criteria, the OAS’s new concept being of security for democratic States of of multidimensional security of the OAS the hemisphere is the protection of human suffers from two main problems: life.37 First, it views common problems in the This new security system has been region, such as extreme poverty, social called “multidimensional” and exclusion, HIV and other illnesses, and possessing a “flexible architecture.” natural disasters, through the lens of The multidimensionality resides in the national security, conceiving them as broadening of the traditional concept of threats. In this sense, the declaration regional security, linked to defense and creates conditions for the securitization the security of States, starting from the of problems of a political, economic, incorporation of new threats, concerns, social, or environmental nature that, in and challenges. The flexibility of the principle, should not be part of an agenda architecture is related to the diversity of of hemispheric security. As a result, mechanisms which the States can use to everything is now a security problem. respond to these threats. Second, the declaration dilutes the historic The adoption of a new system of security difference between the concepts of defense for the region generated various reactions. and public (or citizen) security that has Some officials involved in the negotiations existed in the region until now by failing emphasized that the Declaration updated to distinguish traditional security threats the obsolete Cold War-era security scheme from new threats. The armed forces play and reflected the region’s new security- a central role in defense of the country, related needs.38 But others felt that the understood as the protection of the Declaration’s content, as seen by the integrity of the State—both politically

8 Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security and geographically—from external operational implementation, turning a threats and, in exceptional circumstances new multidimensional concept of security clearly defined by law, of grave instances into an empty concept. For that reason, it of internal commotion that threaten the seems unlikely to be an effective tool for integrity of the State. Public security, as protecting the States and citizens of the it is traditionally conceived, is related Americas. to the maintenance of public order, for which it employs police forces to promote The Sixth Conference of Defense Ministers compliance with the law. The concept of is a good example of how the OAS’s new citizen security emerged in Latin America multidimensional concept conforms to as a broader conception of public security the U.S. security agenda for the region. emphasizing the protection of the citizen The conference’s declaration, known as and his or her rights as a central part of the Quito Declaration, refers to the new Some felt that the police function. concept of multidimensional security, but emphasizes the threat of terrorism Declaration’s content, In the context of the Declaration, the above all else. Terrorism occupies a as seen by the long securitization of political, social, or disproportionately large place in the list of threats, reflects economic problems on the one hand, and declaration compared to other threats or militarized responses on the other, are concerns, in a hemisphere where, aside not a consensus, but two sides of the same coin. A meeting of from Colombia, there is not significant the impossibility of experts about the multidimensional aspect terrorist activity. creating a common of security concluded: “The principle risk is that development problems are associated Like the OAS Declaration of Security in agenda for security in with “threats” to security, with which the Americas, the Quito Declaration blurs the region. military strategies can be alternatives.”41 the dividing line between the duties of the police and those of the armed forces. As we mentioned before, it is important Declarations from previous defense to emphasize that securitization and ministerials have focused primarily on militarization are not practices that defense, both in terms of issues and were created by this new concept of mechanisms (such as fostering mutual multidimensional security. On the trust and transparency; defense policy, contrary, these types of practices, above military cooperation; education of civilians all the use of armed forces in internal and military personnel, etc.). On the few affairs, already existed in various countries occasions that both defense and security before the adoption of the Declaration. were mentioned together, it was understood Nevertheless, the implementation of the that they referred to a concept of regional declaration in these circumstances creates or hemispheric security.42 Nevertheless, certain risks that the current tendencies in incorporating the multidimensional towards militarization of domestic affairs, concept of security, the Quito Declaration particularly public security matters, treats the concepts of defense and security will increase in the region, because the as almost the same thing and for the Declaration’s new definition of security—in moment it is difficult to identify the which almost everything can be considered differences and particularities of each a security threat—reinforces and legitimizes one of them in relation to the functions these tendencies. that the police and military should carry out. For example, the Quito Declaration Furthermore, the incorporation of a establishes that “Among the common series of diverse problems—like public concerns for security and defense, whether security, development, environment, traditional or nontraditional, conflict and health—into the concept of security prevention, the peaceful settlement of is an obstacle for the Declaration’s disputes, and mutual confidence building

Washington Ofﬁce on Latin America  July 2005 9 among the States of the region are the State. This could derail the efforts included, on the basis of a cooperative by the governments of the region to concept of security and defense, which subordinate the armed forces to civilian recognizes its multidimensional character, democratic institutions. involves State and non-State actors, and includes political, economic, social, and 43 natural components.” Endnotes

1 Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, Conclusion Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005. 2 Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences”, in The OAS adoption of the new Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne multidimensional security concept Reinner Publishers, 2005. The implementation opportunely replaced an old hemispheric 3 Ibid. of this new security structure that did not respond to 4 Ibid. 5 the region’s needs. Its multidimensional “Para que no se olvide, 12-13 de febrero 2003,” multidimensional Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de character, and above all, its flexible Bolivia (APDHB), Asociación de Familiares de concept constitutes architecture, could become mechanisms for Detenidos Desaparecidos y Mártires por la Liberación a risk of increasing responding to the current threats facing the Nacional (ASOFAMD), Diakonia, Bolivia, 2004. 6 Juan Ramón Quintana, “Bolivia: Militares y Policias. the securitization of countries of the hemisphere. Fuego cruzado en democracia,” draft held by author. 7 Sigrid Arzt, “La militarización de la Procuraduría the region’s problems Nevertheless, in the region’s current General de la República: Riesgos para la democracia mexicana,” Document requested by the Project for the and, consequently, context, we must be wary of the impact Reform of Justice Administration in Mexico, Center militarization as a that the implementation of this new for U.S.-Mexico Studies, San Diego, May 15, 2003, p.4, concept of security might have on the available at www.repositories.cdlib.org/usmex/prajm/ arzt/. response to democracies and the public security systems 8 Between 1985 and 1995, homicides in Brazil increased confront them. of Latin American countries. from 13,910 to 37,129. See Mezquita Neto and Loche, “Police-Community Partnership in brazil,” in Crime and First, the treatment of a variety of issues Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State, Edited by Hugo Fruhling and Joseph under the lens of security opens the door S. Tulchin with Heather A. Golding, Baltimore and to the securitization of political, social, and London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Johns economic agendas. This risk is heightened Hopkins University Press, 2003. 9 It is important to mention that in Brazil, preventive by the broad definition of terrorism and the police (in charge of patrolling the streets) are expansive vision of what signifies a threat denominated military police and are therefore to security used by the United States after militarized security forces in terms of their practices, structures, and control mechanisms. the September 11 attacks. 10 This occurred in 1994 with Operations Rio I and II; in 2003 the military occupation of the Rio de Second, the broad and diffuse formulation Janeiro favelas was preceded by the invocation of terrorism as justification for this measure by then Rio of the OAS concept of security blurs the de Janeiro governor Rosinha Garotinho. See “Una line between the concepts of defense guerra inútil. Drogas y violencia en Brasil,” Editorial, and public security. As we saw in the TNI, November 2004; Paul E. Amar, “Reform in Rio: Reconsidering the Myths of Crime and Violence,” examples described above, the practical NACLA, September/October 2003; “El Ejército consequence of this process is the alteration combatirá a los narcos en Río,” La Nación, Buenos of the traditional functions of the armed Aires, February 28, 2003. 11 forces to involve them in matters of Folha de Sao Paulo, “Lei do Abate só vai permitir ataques a avioes de tráfico,” July, 2004. internal or public security. This situation 12 Transnational Institute, “Una Guerra Inútil: Droga could contribute to the tendency of re- y Violencia en el Brasil”, TNI Briefings No. 2004/8, militarization of internal security produced November 2004. 13 in the last few years beginning with the “Exército chega a regiao onde morreu irma Dorothy e já cercam pistas de pouso,” Amazonia.org, February 18, involvement of the armed forces in roles 2005. that do not correspond to the defense of 14 Mezquita Neto and Loche, op. cit.

10 Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security 15 Constitución Nacional, leyes 23.554 de Defensa Rumsfeld during the plenary session of the VI WOLA Staff Nacional y 24.059 de Seguridad Interior. Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas, 16 La Nación, “Nacionalizar la inseguridad”, 11 septiembre Quito, Ecuador, November 17, 2004. Joy Olson de 2004. 29 According to Ramírez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, Executive Director 17 According to the sectors that made this proposal, the until 1997, approximately 90 percent of U.S. Geoff Thale participation of the armed forces could be direct, that is counternarcotics aid went to the police for drug Program Director and to say, repressing the social protests, or indirect, that is interdiction and fumigation. Ramírez Lemus, Stanton y Senior Associate for Cuba and Central America through the intervention of the armed forces in areas of Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Cycle of Drugs and War,” intelligence of different social sectors. in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, op. cit. Lori Piccolo 30 Development Director 18 Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, Ibid, p.107 Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 31 Human Rights Watch, Annual Report 2005, New York, Jason Schwartz Carlisle, Pennsylvania, December 2003. January 2005. Available at: http://hrw.org/english/ Operations and Financial Manager 19 U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement docs/2005/01/13/colomb9847.htm. Gastón Chillier of Gen. James T. Hill,” U.S. Army, Commander 32 International Crisis Group, “Colombia: President Senior Associate, Human Rights, and in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, before the Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” Latin America Security Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House Report No. 6, Bogotá/Bruselas, November 2003. Jeff Vogt of Representatives, Washington, DC, March 24, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. Senior Associate for Economic Issues 2004. Available at: http://www.house.gov/hasc/ cfm?id=2367&l=1 John Walsh openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04- 33 Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ), “En contravía Senior Associate for the Andes and 03-24hill.html de las recomendaciones internacionales,” Bogotá, CCJ, Drug Policy 20 Ibid. 2004. Adriana Beltrán 21 This does not mean that the two guerrilla groups 34 Report of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner Associate for Guatemala and Media (FARC and ELN) and the paramilitary group (AUC) for Human Rights regarding the human rights situation Coordinator do not commit terrorist acts as part of their strategies. in Colombia, E/CN.4/2005/10, February 28, 2005. Laurie Freeman 22 Indebido Proceso: Los juicios antiterroristas, los tribunales 35 Declaration on Security in the Americas, Section II, Associate for Mexico, Security, and militares y los Mapuche en el Sur de Chile, Human Rights Par. 4, Organization of American States, Special Drug Policy Watch y Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Conference on Security, Mexico, 2003, Available at: Elsa Falkenburger Indígenas, New York, October 2004. http://www.wola.org/security/declaration_security_oas. Program Officer for Cuba, Central 23 Ibid, p. 5. pdf America, Brazil and Economic Issues 24 U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement of Gen. 36 Ibid. Ana Paula Duarte James T. Hill,” op. cit. For more in depth analysis see: 37 Declaration on Security in the Americas, Section II, Par. Development Assistant “Blurring the lines: Trends in U.S military programs 2, inc. E, op cit. Katie Malouf with Latin America,” Latin America Working Group 38 WOLA Interviews with Ambassadors of Missions to Program Assistant for Andes region Education Fund, Center for International Policy and the Organization of American States, between October and Hemispheric Security WOLA, Washington, DC, September, 2004. 2003 and February 2004. Kristel Muciño According to this report, in budget and staffing Program Assistant for Mexico and 39 Ibid. terms, the Southern Command has a greater presence Drug Policy and Intern Coordinator in the region than all of the civilian U.S. agencies 40 Cesar Andrés Restrepo F., “La nueva Seguridad Coletta Youngers together. Hemisférica”, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Senior Fellow 25 Ibid. Colombia, 2004. Rachel Neild 26 41 Ibid. Informe de la Conferencia “Seguridad Hemisférica. Una Senior Fellow 27 U.S. Southern Command, “Posture Statement of Gen. visión mesoamericana y caribeña,” Antigua, Guatemala, Ford Foundation, ITAM y Foreign Affairs en Español, George Withers Bantz Craddock”, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, Senior Fellow U.S. Southern Command, before the Armed Services May 2004. Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, 42 Quito Declaration, VI Conference of Ministers of Washington, DC, March 9, 2005. Available at: Defense of the Americas, November 2004. http:// Edited by Tina Hodges http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/109thcongress/ vicdmaecuador2004.org/espanol/documentos/otros/DE FY06%20Budget%20Misc/Southcom3-9-05.pdf CLARACION%20DE%20QUITO%20INGLES.pdf 28 U.S. Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary 43 Ibid, paragraph 13.

Washington Office on Latin America  July 2005 11 About WOLA The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a nonprofit policy, research and advocacy organization working to advance democracy, human rights and social justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1974, WOLA plays a leading role in Washington policy debates about Latin America. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training and advocacy.

To Order More WOLA has a wide range of publications available on human rights in Latin America WOLA Publications and U.S. policy. WOLA also publishes a quarterly newsletter: “Cross Currents” in English and “Enlace” in Spanish. See our website for a complete list of publications and contact our ofﬁce to order.

To Contact Us Washington Ofﬁce on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20009 Telephone: 202.797.2171 • Facsimile: 202.797.2172 Email: [email protected] • Web: www.wola.org

ISBN: 0929513657 This WOLA publication was funded in part by the Ford Foundation, Chile.

Washington Ofﬁce on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20009

WOLA