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Out of Bounds : Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare / by Thomas A

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Out of Bounds : Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare / by Thomas A Out of Bounds OP 17 Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 17 Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Out of Bounds OOPP 1177 Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare by Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr. Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bruscino, Thomas A. Out of bounds : transnational sanctuary in irregular warfare / by Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr. p. cm. -- (Global War on Terrorism occasional paper 17) 1. Transnational sanctuaries (Military science)--Case studies. 2. Transnational sanctuaries (Mili- tary science)--History--20th century. 3. Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns. 4. Afghanistan--History--Soviet occupation, 1979-1989--Campaigns. I. Title. II. Series. U240.B78 2006 958.104’5--dc22 2006027469 CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 0-16-076846-2 Foreword In this timely Occasional Paper, Dr. Tom Bruscino analyzes a critical issue in the GWOT, and one which has bedeviled counterinsurgents past and present. He examines the role played by sanctuaries as they relate to irregular warfare in two conflicts. An active sanctuary refers to the prac- tice of using territory outside the geographical limits of an irregular war to provide various forms of support to one side, usually the insurgent or guerrilla force. In the first case study, he looks at the United States’ efforts to defeat the advantages gained by the Viet Cong (and later the North Vietnamese Army) by the use of sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War. In doing so, he points out the diplomatic, military, and economic challenges which develop when trying to prevent the use of transnational sanctuaries by irregular forces. In the second case study, he examines the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the 1980s, but this time he does so from the perspective of the insurgency, the Mujahideen. Bruscino illus- trates the advantages accrued by the Afghan resistance in the use of Paki- stan as a sanctuary; the Soviet efforts to neutralize those advantages; and the Mujahideen’s responses to overcome the Soviet actions. In both cases the author finds that the use of an active sanctuary by the insurgents was a major component of their eventual victory. Without a sanctuary it is hard to see how the Viet Cong/NVA or the Mujahideen could have succeeded. In regards to a sanctuary, it is hard to see how the U.S./South Vietnamese or the Soviet Union could have defeated the in- surgencies. Active sanctuaries present the counterinsurgent with a host of military problems, but denying an insurgent the use of an active sanctuary is far more than a military task. All the elements of national power must be employed if one hopes to defeat the challenge posed by active sanctuar- ies. We at the Combat Studies Institute hope that the insights presented in this monograph will be of great value to military planners in the current war against terrorism. CSI – The Past is Prologue! Timothy R. Reese COL, AR Director, Combat Studies Institute iii Acknowledgements An author incurs many debts in the course of writing any project of this sort, and I am no different. The entire staff of the Combat Studies Institute and the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth have been nothing but supportive throughout the process, but a few indi- viduals deserve special mention. I am indebted to Bob Ramsey for kindly passing on a wealth of material that got me started; John McGrath and Matt Matthews for their thoughtful commentary; and Dr. William G. Rob- ertson for sharing an unpublished paper on the topic of sanctuaries that helped provide focus to this study. The supervisory team and editorial board of Colonel Timothy R. Re- ese, Director Combat Studies Institute; Dr. Robertson, Deputy Director, CSI and CAC Command Historian; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Steven E. Clay, Chief, Research and Publications Team; and Major (Retired) Ken- dall D. Gott, Supervisory Historian, Research and Publications Team, all helped usher this paper along with sage advice and needed corrections. On the production side, it was my great good luck to have Robin Kern to make the maps; she did a wonderful job. Likewise, two Combat Studies Institute editors, Angela Bowman and Mike Brooks, did remarkable work in clarifying my muddled thoughts, tightening my writing, preparing the manuscript for publication, and generally saving me from countless mis- takes. I cannot thank them, and everyone else who helped on this project, enough. Of course, any mistakes herein are mine and mine alone. Lastly, my wife Terrie and my sons Dominic and Anthony endured a cross-country move so that I could come to the Combat Studies Institute to work on this project. Their sacrifices made all of this possible, and I could not do it without them. v Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................iii Acknowledgements .........................................................................................v List of Maps ...................................................................................................ix Introduction .....................................................................................................1 Borders in the War ........................................................................1 Sanctuaries and Modern History ..................................................6 American Traditions .....................................................................8 Two Case Studies ..........................................................................9 Chapter 1. Vietnam .......................................................................................15 Indications ..................................................................................15 The Dimensions of the Problem .................................................18 First Options ...............................................................................21 Airpower .....................................................................................25 Pacifi cation and Ground Incursions ............................................30 Ending the War ...........................................................................36 Chapter 2. Soviet–Afghan War .....................................................................49 Shock ..........................................................................................49 Background .................................................................................50 The Resistances and Their Friends .............................................52 The Borders ................................................................................55 Early Fighting, Early Adjustments .............................................58 Those Missiles ............................................................................64 Soviet Wtihdrawal, Afghanistan’s Half Victory .........................67 Conclusion ....................................................................................................79 Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared ..........................................79 Sanctuary Doctrine .....................................................................80 The Contemporary Picture ..........................................................82 What Can Be Done? ...................................................................85 Bibliography .................................................................................................91 About the Author .........................................................................................109 vii List of Maps 1. Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail Network ......................................... 17 2. The 1970 Cambodia Incursions ............................................................... 33 3. Santuaries on the Afghanistan / Pakistan Border .....................................51 4. Parrot’s Beak Region on Afghanistan / Pakistan Border ......................... 63 ix Introduction Borders in the War The very name the United States has given to its struggle against fundamentalist Muslim terrorists indicates that international borders do not confine the enemy. “The Global War on Terrorism” is just that, a war waged around the globe on a foe bound not by the strands of state or na- tion, but by a perverted and perverse ideology. Nevertheless, because the United States and its allies share a respect for the international system, they have chosen to fight this enemy primarily within the boundaries of two states: Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite their adherence to ideology, the terrorists understand and use the international system; despite their dismissal of nations and states for their version of one united pure religion, they gladly hide behind the veil of state boundaries. Some states oppose the terrorists but are incapable of completely stopping
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