A I R reuieinvU M I VE R S I T Y THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAl OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

USAF A ir l if t and the Airmobility Idea in Vie t n a m ...... 2 Col. Rav L. Bowers, USAF T he Hanoi POL S trike...... 19 Col. James H. Kasler, USAF

N ational Sec u r it y as an Intellectual Challenge...... 29 Dr. Adrian Preston

E thics of the Mil it a r y Profession...... 3 9 Maj. Robert C. Carroll, USA

O per a tional T est and Evaluation: A L ook in t o the Fundamentals...... 44 Lt. Col. Clyde R. Robbins, USAF

I nteraction: T he Mil it a r y and the Med ia...... 54 Maj. John Duncan Williams, USAF In My Opinion S im u l a t io n : A T hreat to T actical A ir Power...... 59 Col. Harry A. Goodall, USAF

T he Co mmand er and H is T heology of Man...... 54 Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John G. Truitt, Jr., USAF

P rofessional Mil it a r y Education for the No nco mmissio ned O fficer: I s It Effective? ...... 0 g CMSgt. Donald S. Beshore, ANG Books and Ideas O f Vic t o r ies, D efeat s, and Faillr es: P er c ept io ns of the A mer ican Mil it a r y Experience...... 7 3 Lt. Col. David Maclsaac, USAF

C hurchill in D ist o r t ed Per spec t ive...... 83 Wing Com m ander R. A. Mason, RAF

M il it a r y Hist o r y in Sympo sium...... 89 Dr. Richard I. Lester

T he Contributors...... 9 5

THE COVER A ddrett manusr ripto lo E ditor. Air U niversitv Sevcral articlcs in this issue of the Rrviru»— Revirw Division. Bldg. 1211. Maxwell AFB. AÉ thosc by Colonel Bowers, Colonel Kasler. 36112. Pnnted by CGovernment Printuig OHicr. anrl Licutcnant Colonel Maclsaac— derive Addres» sulxcriptiom to Superintendent of at least in part from our reccnt involve- Documento, CGPO. W ashington DC: 20402: yearlv ment in Southcast Asia In particular, th.OO domettie, $10.00 foreign-, single copv $IJ>0. though. the cover—withJC-1 30 Hercules and GH-47 C.hinook in rhe loregroiind and the aird ro p operaiion alx>ve—reflccts Colo- Vol. XXVI No. 1 NovF.MnrjR-DECE.MBKR 1974 nel Rav L. Bowers’s "CSAF Airlift and the Airm obility Idea in V ietnam ,” which re- views U.S. Army and Air Force experience with airlift and airmobility from Korca to the I970s and emphasizes “pragmatic antl scnsible accommodaiion by botli Services.” USAF AIRLIFT AND THE AIRMOBILITY IDEA IN VIETNAM

COLONEL RAY L. BOWERS " | “HE usefulness of the transport air- excellent short- and rough-field potentiali- I plane in theater operations became ties, combat zone assault work had be- Idear during the Second World War. come secondary.3 An important doctrinal contradiction re- One potentially important development mained. however. Many American air and had been short-lived. Design studies in ground offícers saw in the parachute and 1949 had indicated that rotary-wing craft glider assault a new order of combat zone of vvorthwhile payload were within reach. mobility for ground units. Others realized Although some offícers fell that helicop- that the fixed-wing transport had proven ters were overly vulnerable to ground fire, better suited for less rigorous, though tac organized its first rotary-wing unit in important. tasks. The korean War seemed early 1952. The helicopter fit easily into to support the latter view. Paratroop as- older airlift doctrine: the craft possessed saults were rarities in Korea, but several obvious advantages over the parachute for hundred usaf transports ranged the war the assault and short-haul resupply, along zone dailv—landing with ammunition and with unmatched capacity for pickup of other supplies, hauling units and person- casualties. By the end of 1955, five heli- nel. dropping supplies to isolated units, copter squadrons had been activated in and evacuating casualties to Japan.1 tac, building toward a nine-squadron Post-Korean tactical airlift doctrine vvas force. divided. The quest for batdefield mobility Lhe decision to dismande the helicopter brought into existence the Fairchild C- airlift arm was a reluctant one, made after 123. The twin-engine Provider was called repeatecl and firm refusals by U.S. Army an “assault transport,” having been devel- officials to support a usaf combat zone oped from a glider airframe for the helicopter lift role. Major General Chester purpose of rough-field landings at for- E. McCarty, commanding airlift forces ward landing zones. The craffs assault widiin tac, dissented, warning that future landing capabilities complemented the improvements in rotary-wing craft would parachute-delivery strengths of the older eventually result in “real airlift potential C-119, still in active Service in the mid- that definitely should be integrated with fifties.2 and assigned to the Theater Combat The larger and more powerful C-130 Airlift Force.” Most Air Force leaders joined the active force in 1956. This four- became reconciled to the loss of the engine Lockheed turboprop brought helicopter airlift arm. aware of the very vastly improved speed, range, and pay- limited range and payload capacities of load—qualities useful for high-volume or existing helicopter types. Thus, in 1961, intertheater operations. During the next with the usaf helicopter arm stillborn and decade of Cold War crises, the mission of with the athletic C-123s programmed for moving task forces to overseas trouble retirement from the active force, usaf spots became foremost. Patterns varied, batdefield delivery capabilities were not but often the C-130s of Tactical Air impressive.4 Command deployed men and equipment of tactical air units overseas, while the larger C-124s hauled ground troop ele- the airmobility challenge ments. Although C-130 crews continued Robust ideas w'ere emerging in the U.S. to practice parachute techniques and al- Army—toward greater, not less, use of though for its size the Hercules had airlift for mobility in the combat zone.

3 4 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

The promise of helicopters hacl been the Services over ownership and control of glimpsed in Korea, and in 1954 Army airlift forces grevv firm. In the regularly staff studies vvere reflected in a Harpers held joint field exercises, activities focused article entitled “Cavalry, and I Don t Mean on the parachute assault, avoiding the Horses!” The author was Lieutenant Gen- issue-laden matter of helicopter troop mo- eral James M. Gavin, G-3, Department of bility. Numerous technical questions relat- the Army. Later, from retirement, Gavin ing to airmobility thus remained unan- in War atui Peaee in the Space Age (1958) svvered, among them methods for air called for creation of “sky cavalry” forma- traffic control at forward airheads and tions, capable of dispersai and movement agreed responsibilities for medicai evacua- over the nuclear battlefield. Field Manual tion, cargo handling, and pathfinding. 57-35, Airmobile Operations, described the Army and Air Force aircrews remained movement of combat elements about the etjuipped with incompatible radio equip- battlefield in Army-owned air vehicles; for ment, unable to converse with one an- example, following up nuclear detonations other at future crowded airheads.6 or—conceivably—in counterguerrilla situa- Secretary of Defense Robert Mc- tions. In The Uncertain Trumpet (1959), Namara and members of his civilian staff General Maxwell Tavlor, the retiring moved firmly to unblock airmobile policy. Armv Chief of Staff, wrote that nevv After several months of preliminary dis- equipment for tactical airlift (and for cussions, McNamara by memorandum of tactical air support) shoulcl be organic April 1962 called upon the Army for within the Army, claiming that the Air “fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts Force hacl long neglected these responsi- which will give us a significam increase in bilities to the Army. By 1960, the Army mobility.” Four months later, an Army possessed 5500 helicopter and fíxed-wing board under the chairmanship of Lieuten- aircraft (up from 3200 in 1953) and ant General Hamilton H. Howze reported planned a further expansion to 8800 over (in its ovvn words) “a single general con- the next ten years. Few of the active clusion: adoption by the Army of the helicopters, however, vvere sufficiently airmobile concept.” The group recom- powered to fulfill the kind of large-scale mended formation of “air assault” divi- mobility envisioned by Gavin, Taylor, and sions, equipped with large numbers of the nevver generation of airmobility lead- aircraft for hauling troops into battle and ers.5 providing fire support. Separately orga- The Air Force consistently opposed nizecl air transport brigades, equipped expansion of the Army’s transport heli- with heavier helicopters and Caribou copter arm, convinced that transport air- fixed-wing transports, would distribute craft should be controlled centrally at supplies to forward points. usaf trans- theater commander levei to preserve the ports, the Howze group envisioned, would mobility, flexibilitv, and capacity for con- make “Wholesale movements to bases as centration inherent in air forces, usaf far forward as possible,” linking there with positions rested on the Air Force’s long- the Armys transport craft to form an all- standing legal responsibility for conduct- air line of communication.7 ing airborne operations ancí a 1956 clarifi- Partly in response to the Howze report, cation ruling out “large-scale movements the Air Force pressed ahead projects of sizable Army combat units” by Army designed to improve the abilitv of the C- aviation. Thus, the disagreement between 130 for forward zone delivery. A new AIRUFT AND AIRM0BIU7Y IN VIETNAM 5 familv of formadon low-level tacdcs was ers, although one weakness became clear: designed and tested, along with new Dop- despite the tireless efforts of the Army pler navigadon systems, both in part in- Caribou aircrews, the 272-ton payload of tended to facilitate accurate drops in mar- that craft was far too small for high- ginal weather. Methods of delivering volume air line-of-communication (loc) heavy loads while flying several feet above resupply.9 the ground were tested, using either an The series of tests failed to end disa- extracdon parachute or a hook-and-cable greement between the Services, but techni- arrangement. The extracdon idea prom- cal progress was undeniable. The compe- ised to overcome the dependence of the tence of the C-130 fleet for much forward C-130 on semiprepared 3000-foot air- area work was now clear, while from air strips. Short-field landing tests in 1962 assault II the Army recommended to brought approval for several landing-gear Secretary McNamara that the provisional modifícadons. A new cargo-handling Sys- air assault division be established on the tem, known as 463L, included features for acdve list. Plainly, the capabilities of the C- better forward area offloading. Thus, the 130 and C-123 overlapped with those of Air Force in November 1962 could cor- the Caribou and Chinook, although com- recdv inform Secretary McNamara that it, plementary features were equally obvious. too, was taking “imaginadve approaches.” Basic questions remained—how far for- The efforts were designed to back up the ward the C-130 airhead should be located twofold Air Force position: (1) that the C- and w'hether the Army should exclusively 130s could do much of the work envi- retain the Caribou and médium helicopter sioned by the Howze board for Army roles. The emergence of an agreed, flexi- craft and (2) that all transports should be ble system of airmobility and air resupply centrally controlled at theater levei, availa- awaited the realities of Vietnam. ble for allocation to the most valid re- quirement.8 early years in Vietnam Concepts of both Services were refined in a series of field exercises during 1963 A diverse fleet of American air ele- and 1964. Over 200 usaf transports, cen- ments—Army, Air Force, and Ma- trally controlled, served in swift st r ike rine—served in Vietnam during the early III (1963), hauling 34,000 troops and sixdes; the dominant elements were fixed- 27,000 tons of cargo into an objecdve area wing and helicopter transport units, with during two weeks of simulated assault and missions of providing airlift for the Viet- resupply. Exercise goldfire I in 1964 namese war effort. Arriving with a small again featured mass deliveries by C-130s force of strike aircraft in November 1961 and further use of the low-level extracdon were four usaf C-47s, their foremost task methods. A small provisional unit of usaf the resupply of isolated camps manned by CH-3 helicopters performed over 600 U.S. Special Forces and indigenous irregu- assault and resupply sorties: the unit’s lars. Deliveries were often by parachute. commander foresaw “a vastly expanded I he air commando C-47s were gradually rotary-wing retail air arm working in overshadowed by a larger force of usaf C- concert with a Fixed-wing Wholesale deliv- 123s, expanding to four 16-ship squad- er\.” Army concepts were tested in Exer- rons by late 1964. Besides joining in camp cise AIR assault II in October 1964. The resupply, the 123s lifted Vietnamese in- results gready encouraged airmobile lead- fantry units to regional airfields about the

Continuid on fxtgr 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Aspects of Airlift

A USAF C-130 Hercules m Vietnam takes meu and equipment aboard in lhe move of the Isl Brigade, lOlst Airbome Divisioiis Screaming Eagles,"from Konlum to Phan Rang in January 1966. In the foreground others await their tum. . . . An Air Force CH-3C delivers supplies to an Army specuil forces camp in the central highlands of Vietnam. . . . C-130 and Army CH-47 Chinook at forward airhead near the Cambodian border, 1970. 8 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW country and performed countrywide air tored the progress of missions country- logistics Services. The American transport wide. The other air transport elements crews also worked vvith Vietnamese para- remained outside the central system, ex- troop battalions, making practice drops cept for a few Caribous intermittently and standing alert for “fire brigade" emer- included in deference to heavy usaf pres- gencies. Two Vietnamese Air Force C-47 sure.12 squadrons performed similar roles, aug- To the Americans, the advantages of mented by several dozen usaf ofFicers the mobility and flexibility conferred by assigned as copilots during 1962-63. The the fixed-wing and helicopter package Vietnamese airborne battalions made a were manifest. The fixed-wing fleet made number of combat parachute assaults urgent battalion and larger reinforcement from the C-47s and C-123s, in most cases lifts into airstrips in regions of confronta- failing to bring the elusive enemy to tion, while the helicopters had in essence battle.10 restored to the Vietnamese a capacity for Three U.S. Army helicopter companies the tactical offensive. The usaf fixed-wing arrived in Vietnam in December 1961 and elements, however, had rarely been em- January 1962, along with a company of ployed in direct support of airmobile Otter fixed-wing craft. The Otters proved enterprises. useful for supporting the troop-carrying Employment of the C-130s and C-123s helicopter units and for making deliveries to extend the range, stamina, and weight to tinv strips. Two more light helicopter of allied offensive airmobile operations companies followed later in 1962, along awaited the movement into Vietnam of with a U.S. Marine helicopter squadron U.S. Army brigades in 1965. Many of the and an Army unit equipped with turbine- methods were drawn from the 1963 and powered UH-ls—craft destined to become 1964 field exercises and were worked out the backbone of airmobility through most in Vietnam by practical men of both of the war. The American helicopter force Services, many of them veterans of those performed frequent tactical assaults with same exercises. Successful partnership en- Vietnamese infantry, trying out and refin- sued between the Air Force transports ing many of the tactics that were later and brigades of three distinct configura- commonplace. An Army Caribou com- tions—airmobile, airborne, and conven- pany entered in December 1962, expand- tional infantry. ing briefly with a second company the next year. The Caribous performed di- entry of the cavahry division verse tasks, flying into most Special Forces President Johnson in July 1965 authorized camps and proving their ability for opera- deployment to Vietnam of the newly tions into primitive strips." authorized Ist Cavalry Division (Airmo- By early 1965, usaf C-130s based off- bile). Air Force leaders warned against an shore were rotating into Vietnam for Army proposal to place the division in the periods of temporary duty, augmenting interior highlands about Pleiku, given the the C-123s. Both the 123s and the 130s insecurity of land routes from the coast were centrally controlled, under the usaf- and the small number of C-130 airfields managed Southeast Asia Airlift System. near Pleiku (three). Air officers rebutted Allocations and priorities were by theater suggestions that Caribous could if neces- (i.e., ma cv) agencies, and an airlift control sary handle the highlands loc by deliver- center at Saigon assigned tasks and moni- ing into lesser fields, pointing out that a AIRLirr AND AIRMOB1UTY /N V1ETNAM 9

daily 800-ton lift requirement equated to Khe, including mail and aircraft spare 141 Caribou round trips (or 29 C-130 parts from Saigon. usaf Service was handi- trips). The decision to base the division at capped by the destructive effects of the An Khe, relatively close to the port of Qui An Khe pierced-steel-plank runway on C- Nhon, reflected these considerations.13 130 tires. Although the cavalry division On entering Vietnam, the cavalry divi- requested priority allocation, or “dedica- sion possessed eight infantry battalions, tion,” of C-123 and C-130 sorties, each three of them with parachute capability. mission was scheduled and controlled un- Over 400 aircraft were taken overseas, der the centralized theater system.14 nearly all heücopters, primarily for troop l he long-contemplated entry of the mobility but including a 39-ship rocket cavalry into the interior plateau was trig- battalion. Organized for general support gered by Communist pressure against Piei within the division were several dozen Me, a camp 25 miles south of Pleiku. médium CH-47 Chinooks. Caribou trans- Beginning on 20 October 1965, usaf C- ports were not organic, but an 18-ship 123s and Armv Caribous sustained Piei company flew the Pacific during the sum- Me with drops of munitions and food. mer for direct support of the division out During the first five days of the resupply, of Pleiku. at least 23 C-123s took hits from ground I he cavalry s earlv operations near An fire; seven ships were temporarily put out Khe were supported principally by high- of Service. As a Vietnamese relief column wav loc from Qui Nhon. C-123s and C- moved south from Pleiku, a one-battalion 130s made supplementary deliveries to An task force from the cavalry division moved 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to Pleiku, hauled from An Khe by Cari- Pleiku to sites chosen for artillery positions bous and the division’s helicopters on the supporting the relief force. The Caribou morning of the 23d. A second battalion and Chinook force became badly over- moved in later in the day, along with workecl by the movements and the resup- artillery elements and a brigade headquar- ply into and out of Pleiku. Despite an ters. The deployment continued the next impressive round-the-clock effort, fuel day, while some units helicoptered from supplies at Pleiku on the 26th were down

The C-123 Provider extended airmobility into rough forward landing zones, here Vietnam, 1965. . . . C-130s and C-7s deliver cargo to Ban Me Thuot airstnp, 1968. . . . The fixed-wing/helicopter pack- age demonstrates mohility and flexibility, 1970.

t 4IRI.IFT AXD AIRMOnil.llY IX VII- IXAM 1 I to 7000 gallons, against recent daily con- ions moved out from An Khe, to join in sumption of 70,000. Expansion of the air the three weeks of aggressive airmobile loc into the region became an absolute warfare that followed.15 necessity on the 27th, with the American General Harry W. O. Kinnard, com- decision to unleash the cavalry, to seek out mander of the cavalry division, has indi- and destroy the enemy, now apparently cated that he “at once” started through retiring from Piei Me. Additional battal- "multiple channels” to obtain Air Force 12 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW airlift to Pleiku but that the requested strip ten miles south of the city, known as assistance began slowly. Awareness of “the Catecka Tea Plantation and serving as the criticai status of JP-4 at Pleiku" reached principal helicopter refueling point. This the macv Operations Center at 2120 move vasdy eased the Chinook workload. hours the evening of the 28th. Emer- It was made possible by dry weather and gency air delivery of 50,000 gallons was would have been stopped by any signifi- requested for the next day, to commence cant rainfall. The division’s G-4 afterwards at 0800. A midnight C-130 lift of empty reported that the Air Force transport into 500-gallon containers was laid on and Catecka “was certainly one of the biggest executed, hauling the bladders from godsends of the whole exercise.” Highway Pleiku to Tan Son Nhut for refilling. Communications from An Khe into the Departures of POL-carrying C-130s from batüe area opened on 9 November, after Tan Son Nhut for Pleiku began before road-clearing operations, although the air- dawn. Consumption continued to outpace lift effort continued to operate at heavy supply, however, and by evening of the volume thereafter. The Ia Drang cam- 29th the division reported “zero gallons of paign continued into late November, the fuel on hand to support operations.” enemy retiring into Cambodia from Once fully underway, the C-130 po l lift ground long dominated by his presence; to Pleiku was impressive. Eyewitnesses the cavalry division estimated that enemy found the spectacle impressive—the 130s losses were equivalent to a full regiment.16 arriving at short intervals, each one rolling The air loc had been vital in the off ten or twelve 500-gallon bladders filled tactical success. The Air Force reported with JP-4, then departing without ever that during the 29 days starting 27 Octo- stopping engines. One crew offloaded 14 ber its transports delivered 5400 tons in bladders. The huge capacity of the C-130 direct support of lst Cavalry Division or a was of the essence; in contrast, a C-123 daily average of 186 tons. Of this tonnage, could handle only four bladders, a Cari- 58 percent was po l . N o cavalry request bou or Chinook, two. An anxious cavalry had been rejected, although the quantities G-4 officer became finally reassured, after delivered most days fell slightly short of counting 134 filled bladders on hand. the amount requested. General Kinnard, The C-130stream from Saigon hauled whose data indicated an Air Force contri- considerable ammunition as well as po l . bution of 3188 tons, stated that the divi- The C-123s operated mainly between An sion also received from externai points Khe and the combat area, assisting the 2920 tons by organic air and 1446 tons Caribous in troop and supply movements. overland, during 35 days. Retail distribu- Initially, all C-130 deliveries were into the tion by organic airlift carne to 5048 tons, 6000-foot Pleiku New airfield, just north much of it lifted from Pleiku New'. of the city. Fuel bladders deposited at that The campaign did much to clarify field were picked up by Chinooks and future relationships between Army airmo- taken to the helicopter forward operating bile and Air Force airlift forces, usaf locations south and west of the city; other hostility to the airmobile idea softened: cargo was trucked to the field at Hollo- General Hunter Harris, Commander of way, just east of the city, w'hich was rarely pa c a f , advised the Chief of Staff that the used by the 130s during the battle. An cavalry had done “a highly commendable important step was the decision to bring job” clespite a demonstrated lack of stay- the 130s directly into the 4000-foot dirt ing power when using only organic resup- AIRUFT AND AIRMOBIUTY IN VIETNAM 13

ply. The chief of the usaf tactical air sioned the two airborne brigades as stra- control partv with the division, Lieutenant tegic reserve forces, available for offensive Colonel John R. Stoner. returned to the or reaction operations throughout lhe United States several months later for a country. Both were employed essentially series of debriefings and interviews at in this way: deploying every few weeks to Headquarters usaf. In a television tape fresh operating areas, returning periodi- prepared for internai use, Stoner persua- cally to base camps for rest and retrofit. sively stated that the airmobile division Both became well-practiced in airmobile had been applied dramatically and effec- assault methods, working with nonorganic tivelv in Viemam and that in the Ia Drang helicopter companies attached on mission it had proven its abilitv to find and fight basis or for extended periods. the enemv where no other formation Most tactical operations were staged at could. forward airheads, usually C-130 or C-123 Both Stoner and his airlift coordinator, airstrips that were natural transshipment Captain Charles J. Corev, felt that the points for resupply. A typicai airhead campaign had strengthened the willing- might contain a Forward Support Area ness among officers of the cavalry division unit (stocking several davs of supplies), the to seek Air Force assistance in the future. brigade command center, perimeter de- Kinnard concluded that airmobile units fense forces, helicopter refueling and must plan to rely heavily on us.af support, loading facilities, and artillery firing posi- for both firepower and resupply, and that tions. Field operations could be easilv Air Force airlift should be counted on to staged within a radius of at least 20 miles bring supplies forward to brigade base from the airhead location, featuring multi- areas. Kinnard emphasized that his Chi- ple heliborne troop movements and fire nooks and Caribous were needed for from several outlying artillery fire support tactical moves and essential distribution, bases. leaving the division with a need for Air In planning movements and resupply Force lift probablv greater than any other efforts to these airheads, Army logisticians type of formation. Plainly, doctrinal diver- exploited fixed-wing transports, helicop- gencies of the two Services had nar- ters, ground vehicles, and, occasionally, rowed.17 water craft. Shifts over distances greater than 50 miles were usually perfortned by the airbome in Vietnam the C-123 and C-130 fleets exclusivelv. For shorter moves, considerations in- Among the earliest American brigades cluded the condition and security of road- entering Vietnam were two paratroop ways, desire for speed and surprise, and units, each with a historie tradition of the availability of helicopters and trucks. partnership with the tactical airlift arm. Aíter a move in summer 1965 by C-130 The 173d Airbome Brigade, long sta- and C-123 to the Pleiku region, the 173d tioned in the Pacific, moved from Oki- returned to base camp at Bien Hoa, to nawa in a 142-sortie C-130 stream during begin a series of offensive endeavors, 5-7 May 1965. The lst Brigade/lOIst increasingly in partnership with the usaf Airborne Division arrived by sea at Cam airlift arm. For the penetration into the Ranh Bay on 29 Julv. General William Iron Triangle region north of Saigon in VVestmoreland, Commander of ma cv (in- early October, initial movement was by cluding all U.S. forces in Vietnam), envi- road. Subsequent resupply was by air, to 14 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW a five-ship C-123 airdrop to an isolated unit of the 173d in criticai need of resupply. All five ships received battle damage in repeated passes at 400 feet— tactics made necessary by the small dimen- sions of the available drop zone.18 Transportation patterns varied in subse- quent forays. Operation new life-65, for example, commenced with a helicopter assault into a dirt strip, 40 miles east of Bien Hoa, on 21 November 1965. The first C-130 landed within one hour, fol- lowed by the arrival of 70 more 130s in the next 36 hours, each delivering troops or cargo. Overland loc became estab- lished on the third day, allowing reduction of the C-130 resupply to about ten sorties daily. After several comparable ventures north and west of Saigon, the brigade on 10 April 1966 commenced Operation denver, its first all-air loc effort. The four-day unit move to Song Be, 50 miles north of Bien Hoa, was handled without difficulty. Troops, vehicles, artillery, and supplies were hauled in 129 C-130 sorties. For two weeks the brigade operated about the Song Be airhead, staging numerous lesser movements by helicopter and re- ceiving an average of 60 tons daily by air The odyssey oj the Ist Bngade, 101 st Airhome Division, April-July 1966 resupply into Song Be. In later years the Song Be strip became a focal point for supporting allied forces in the border area.19 Yet more spectacular was the Vietnam avoid ambush by an alerted enemy. Since odyssey o f the 1/101 st. During the spring the forward supply point lacked a satisfac- and summer of 1966, the brigade made tory airstrip, the air loc rested upon C- five successive moves to new operating 123 airdrops, low-level extraction delivery areas, each of them entirely by usaf airlift. by Caribous, and helicopters. The brigade Each shift required some 200 C-130 lifts, had initially planned to receive eight C- and each operation was subsequently sus- 123 (or four C-130) resupply deliveries tained largely by air resupply. The bri- daily by the extraction method but was gade moved from Tuy Hoa to Phan Thiet surprised to learn that the ships and crews in early April, to the highlands strip at in Vietnam lacked this relatively recent Nhon Co late in the month, north to delivery capability. The operation featured Cheo Reo in May, to Dak To soon A1RL1FT AND AIRMOBILITY IN VIETNAM 15

afterwards. and finally to Tuy Hoa in designed for air transportability, so that July. The operations at Nhon Co and these units were ideally suited for the Cheo Reo were complicated by the rongh mobile reserve role in Vietnam. Certain and deteriorating airstrips anel the doubt- technical problems remained: airstrips de- ful adequacv of smudge-pot lighting for teriorated under heavy usage; forward night landings, but no aircraft were lost in airspace became crowded with transports, accidents. Ground fighting was occasion- helicopters, artillery fire, and air strikes; allv sharp—at Nhon Co in May and Dak overworked transports and crews were To in July. Tactical mobility and supplv sometimes drawn away by higher-priority redistribution about each airhead was tasks. Nevertheless, by 1966 the ability of mainlv by helicopter.20 a relatively small number of C-130s to Both brigades retained parachute profi- move brigades to relatively primitive for- ciency. Paratroop assaults were occasion- ward airstrips and sustain them over sev- ally planned (for example, in nevv life-65), eral weeks of operations appeared proven. but none were performed until Operation junction citv. In that 1967 venture, a battalion from 173d jumped almost simul- First Infantry Division and the Saigon plain taneously with multiple helicopter assaults, By spring 1966, five American conven- staged over a wide region. The parachute tional infantry brigades (three of them assault thus served the modest purpose of belonging to lst Infantry Division) oper- enlarging the assault force beyond that ated from base camps about Bien Hoa transportable by available helicopters. and Saigon. Periodically, these units After the jumps, the C-130s made cargo moved out for multibattalion sweeps, us- drops, for several weeks resupplying ele- uallv into the region between Saigon and ments positioned along the Cambodian the Cambodian border, seeking to attrite border. In the final stages of junction the enemy’s forces and force him away city, the 130s sustained an American from the capital city. Helicopters and infantry brigade in “floating” operations fixed-wing transports gave heavy support over the operational area, making daily to these operations, in effect achieving drops into newly designated drop zones. airmobility for units not organized or The airdrop and extraction capabilities equipped for movement by air. thus were confirmed useful assets, with The earliest ventures rested heavily on their greater applications in Vietnam yet roacl transport for movements to forward ahead. The junction city assault re- bases, supplemented by Caribou, Chinook, mained the only significam American par- and usaf lift. The C-123s operated into atroop operation of the war, however.21 the base camp strips and into many of the The early operations of the airborne regional forward strips. C-13()s were sel- brigades in Vietnam reflected the comple- dom used because few improved strips mentary strengths of lhe helicopter and were available. Air Force CH-3 craft of fixed-wing airlift arms. The helicopter was 20th Helicopter Squadron augmented clearly superior to the parachute for scarce Chinooks in displacing artillery and short-distance assault but could not match making deliveries to field units. Troop the ability of the fixed-wing transport foi assaults were performed exclusively by the moving and resupplying substantial forces UH-lDs; use of CH-3s in this role was over médium distances. The unit ecjuip- unauthorized.22 ment of airborne formations had been Operation birmingham, t h e four-week 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tire damage. Ground fire hit one ship, wounding tw'o men. Army logistics officers had forecast an air resupply requirement into Tay Ninh of 465 tons daily. During the first six days, through 30 April, a daily average of 424 tons was actually flown into Tay Ninh. Landings went on around the clock, flare pots and portable lamps providing runwray illumination for recluced operations dur- ing darkness. Although substantial, the air line of communication w'as insufficient to meet the unexpectedly high artillery con- sumption, and a land loc w'as opened to Tay Ninh on 1 May. Tonnages hauled after that date by road convoy approxi- mated the amounts airlifted; the 130s continued hauling most of the po l to Tay Ninh because of bridge limitations for large po l road carriers. Heavy rains neces- sitated closure of the road loc on 8 May, and resupply for the rest of the operation was again entirely by air, despite runway invasion of Tay Ninh province, was deterioration caused by the rain. Upon launched 24 April 1966 and involved all return of the last units to base camps on three brigades of lst Division. Movement 17 May, the Air Force reported that a to the operational area was entirely by air. total of 679 C-130 and 266 C-123 sorties Planning initially called for delivery of five had supported the operation, lifting 9500 infantry battalions, fíve artillery batteries, troops and 9700 tons of cargo. Mean- and two brigade headquarters, all in 75 C- while, Caribou courier craft linked each 130 loads on D-day. Concern for possible base camp with Tay Ninh, averaging 14 saturation at the 4600-foot laterite dirt sorties daily, under operational control of strip just west of Tay Ninh caused the lst Division. As in past ventures, changes: some units were positioned by C- supply distribution to field units, as well as 123 at two dirt strips (Soui Da and Dau tactical movements and assaults out of the Tieng) east of Tay Ninh. On D-day forward airhead, were by Army helicop- morning the initiai four C-130s arrived at ters. l he infantry counted destruction of Tay Ninh in close trail formation, landing numerous Communist supply caches with textbook precision at 30-second inter- along the Cambodian border but had vals and depositing 400 troops. During brought to battle only a single enemv the first day, C-130s made a total of 56 battalion.23 sorties into Tay Ninh, with none of the Land and air transport modes were feared congestion. Flights originated from meshed in further operations of the infan- the base camp strips (Lai Khe, Phu Loi, try brigades. Air Force C-123s were active and Phuoc Vinh). Weather was ideal; the in the summer 1966 el pa so series in the only delays carne from several instances of Loc Ninh and An Loc region north of AIRLIFT AND A1RMOBIUTY IN VIETNAM 17

Saigon. Typically, artillery ammunition tween the fixed-wing and helicopter was airlifted from Bien Hoa to onc of modes. Noteworthy also were the efforts four C-123 airstrips in the border region, of the engineers in upgrading and main- for further distribution by helicopter to taining the necessary airstrips. As a result, firing positions. Despite seasonal vvet the usaf airlift arm became a crucial weather and marginal landing fields in the element, strengthening the ability of the operadng area, over 1000 C-130 and 5000 Army’s airmobile, airborne, and infantry C-123 sorties supported the four-month brigades to seek out and destroy enemy effon. Operation attleboro in November forces. Further, the ability of the allies to featured now-familiar divisions of effort: shift forces by air into (or out of) regions C-130s again delivered into Tay Ninh, C- of enemy buildup permitted wide econ- 123s into Dau Tieng, sustaining forward omy of defensive forces. Thus, the Ameri- support area supply acrivides at the two can offensives battered the enemy in areas airheads. Dau Tieng, exclusively under air once safe, meanwhile threatening those resupply, received a daily average of 37 C- remaining sanctuaries. The Communist 123 and eight Caribou sorties, delivering leadership, seeing the hopelessness in principallv po l from Tan Son Nhut and these developments, decided on a new rations and munirions from Bien Hoa.2J strategv, resulting in the general offensive ofTet 1968.25 The campaigns of 1965—6(5 saw U.S. T he usaf tacucal airlift arm Army and Air Force officers adjust major performed numerous other tasks in Viet- differences in outlook, finding ways of nam, manv of them highly challenging. meshing the capabiliues of the Fixed-wing The airlifters hauled extensively for Spe- airlift force into the new procedures of cial Forces camps in border regions, often offensive airmobile warfare. usaf airlift by airdrop. Air Force transports vvorked managers, for example, concerned after at times massively on behalf of U.S. complaints during el pa so over unsatisfac- Marine forces in the northern provinces tory airlift “responsiveness,” introduced a of South Vietnam, the airlifters attaining series of construcüve reforms, including their Finest hour to date in the battles formadon of an in-country airlift air divi- there of early 1968. The C-130s per- sion in late 1966. The developments in formed administrative unit movements Vietnam helped produce agreement be- across regional boundaries or from off- tween the respective Chiefs of Staff, who shore, reinforcing against enemy buildups. decided in April 1966 to transfer the Routinely and continuously, the airlifters Caribou fleet to usaf ownership. In turn, provided a countrywide airlift Service, the Air Force formally renounced owner- hauling passengers, mail, and cargo in ship of helicopters for air loc: roles, an sustained high-volume traffic. important concession although one effec- The foremost mission, however, re- tively conceded several months earlier. mained an assuredly “tactical’’ one—the Meanwhile, officers of the two Services in airlanded movement and resupply of Vietnam addressed the long-neglected Army units into forward airstrips. Funda- practical problems in the common use of mental in this evolurion was the flexibility airheads by helicopters and usaf trans- of the Army’s logistical system, which ports. Solutions were not immediate, but allowed supply redistribution to take place progress increased after formadon of joint at the natural transshipment point be- working groups in 1968. 18 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW Thus, from the necessities of combat ices to the burst of creativity accompany- operations in Vietnam came pragmatic ing the airmobile doctrines of the early and sensible accommodation by both serv- sixties. Alexandria, Virgínia

Notes C. W. Abbott, D/Plans, Hq USAF. subj: Cotnments on a Concept for Employment of Army Airmobile Div. 4 May 65. 1. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Arr Force in Korea, 1950-53 (New 14. Fact Sheet. D/Army, subj: U.S. Army Air Mobile Division. Jul 65; York. 1961). pp. 12-13. 73-74. 148-327. 521-36; Col Samuel T. Moore. Tolson, Arrmobility, pp. 59-62. 68-73; Edward Hymoff. The First Air "Tactical Employment in lhe U.S. Army oF Transpori Aircraft and Cavalry Dwuion in Vietnam (New York. 1967), pp. 6-12: Ltr. lst Air Cav Gliders in World War 11" (AFF Hist Office. 1946). Div to MACV, subj: Lessons Learned, I Oct-30 Nov 65, 10 Jan 66; 2. Study, 18ih AF. Concepi of Troop Carrier Operations, 1955-58, Interview, Lt Col Charles J. Corey. 17 Aug 72. 1953; draft USAF Hist Studv 134. "Troop Carrier Aviation in USAF. 15. H W. O. Kinnard. "A Victory in the la Drang: The Triumph of a 1945-55." (RSI. AU). pp. 30-32. Concept," in Army, Sep 67, pp. 71-91; Ltr, Maj C. A. Beckwith, Cdr Det 3 Robert F Futrell. Ideas, Coneepts, Doctnne: A History of Basic Thmking B52, 5ih Sp F Gp, to Cdr. 5th Sp F Gp, subj: Sequertce of Events for Piei in the USAF. 1907-64 (ASI. AU. 1971), pp. 583-95; Report. TAC Me Opcration for 20-28 Oct 65, 15 Nov 65: Hist, 315th AC Gp, Jul-Dec Worldwide Troop Carrier Confcrence. 17-19 Jan 56; Study. Dir/ 65. p. 21; Daily staíf journal, MACV COC. 19-26 Oct 65: Memo. 1 /Lt Operations Analysis, TAC, A Rcview of Tactical Combat Airlift, 1956-70. Peter R Teasdale. USA, Air Movemts Off. 5th Sp F Gp, to cdr 5th Sp F Aug 56; Ltr, OPR-G, 18th AF. to Cdr, TAC, subj: A Concept of Gp. subj: Support of Piei Me, Nov 65; Rprt. lst Air Cav Div, Combat Operations for Tactical Air Power and Related Airfield Requirements Opns AAR. Pleiku Campaign. 4 Mar 66. Forccast, 7 Jan 55. 16. Daily staff journal. MACV COC. 26-28 Oct 65; Kinnard. "A 4 Futrell. Ideas, Coneepts. Doctnne, pp. 583-84; Address. Maj Gen Victory in the la Drang," in Army. Sep 67; Msg, lst Air Cav Div to CG I Chester E McCarty. Cdr, I8th AF. TAC Worldwide Troop Carrier FFV, 29/2S40Z Oct 65; Col John R. Stoner. "The Closer the Better." in Confcrence. 17-19 Jan 56; Ltr. Maj Gen Chester E. McCarty, to DCS/ Arr Umvrruty Review, Sep-Oct 67. pp. 40-41; Interviews, John R. Stoner Opns. TAC. 6 Mar 56; Study. I8th AF. Troop Carrier Concept for and Lt Col Charles J. Corey, 17 Aug 72: Rprt, lst Air Cav Div. Comb Employment of Assault Helicopters (n.d., c 1954); Ltr. Cdr. TAC. to Opns AAR. Pleiku Campaign. 4 Mar 66: Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 73-82. CSAF. subj: Provision of Airlift by Rotarv Wing Assault Airlift to Army, 17. Kinnard. "A Victory in lhe la Drang." in Army, Sep 67; Msg, 2d 27 Dec 54. AD to PACAF, 28/1210Z Nov 65; Rprt, lst Air Cav Div. Combat Opns 5. James M. Gavin, IVar and Peace in the Space Age (New York. 1958). AAR. Pleiku Campgn. 4 Mar 66; Video tape. Lt Col John R Stoner. pp. 227, 271-72; FM 57-35. Airmobile Operations, Nov 60; Thcodore H. Briefing from Vietnam. 29 Apr 66; Ltr. lst Cav Div to subord staff and White, "Tomorrows Battlefield: An Interview with General Gavin." The cd officers, subj: Lessons Learned. Nr 2, 9 Dec 65; Ltr. lst Cav Div to Army Combat Forces Journal, Mar 55; Maxwell D. 7'aylor, The Uncrrtain MACV, subj: Lessons Learned. I Oct-30 Nov 65; Intvws, Stoner and Trumpet (New York, 1959). pp. 168-70; Robert A. Olson, "Air Mobilitv Corev, 17 Aug 72. for the Army," Military Affarrs, winter 1964-65; Study, U.S. Army Combat 18. Hist, I9th AC. Sq, Jul-Dec 65, pp. 25-30; Rprt, Brig Gen F.lüs W. Dcvelopments Command, A Short History of Close Air Support Issues. Williamson. Cdr I 73d Abn Bdc, Critique of the Iron Triangle Opn. 25 Jul 68. pp. 44-47; Lt Gen John J. Tolson. Airmobilxty, 1961-1971 Oct 65; Rprts, I73d Abn Bdc. Daily SITREPs for Oct 65; Ltr. 315 AC (Vietnam Studies. Dept Army. 1973), pp. 4-8; John R Calvin, Air Assault: Wg to 7th AF. Recomm for PUC, 30 Jan 66; Ltr, Col T. C. Mataxsis. Sr The Development of Airmobüe Warfare (New York. 1969), pp. 254-64. Advis. II Corps. to Cdr 2d AD. subj: Exceptional Performance by 315th 6. Minutes, 464th TC Wg, Flving Safety Council Mtg, 6 Sep 60; Memo, AD. 19 Aug 65; Lt Col Robert L. Burke. "Corps Logistic Planning in 50th rc Sq to D/Opns. 314th TC Wg. subj: Final Rprt of Exercise Swift Vietnam." in Mihtary Review. Aug 69. pp. 3-11. Strike III. 2-23 Aug. 63; Memo, TPL. Hq TAC. to D/Plans. TAC. subj: 19 Rprt. Lt Col Harold S. Snow. ALO, I73d Abn Bde..AAR (Denver), Joint Exercises. 28 Jul 60; Rprt. 3d Aer Port Sq. Exercise Swift Strike. 25 28 Apr 66; Ltr, Lt Col B R. Cryer, to Cdr Det 5. 315lh AD. subj: Msn Aug 61; Rprt, 464th TC Wg. Exercise Tacair 61-1, 12 Sep 60; Command Cdr Rprt. Opn Denver. Apr 66: Hist Rprt, Maj Robert Carmichacl and Histories. 18th AF. 1952 through 1954, TAC. 1957 through 1962. Lt Richard F Eckert, USA, subj: Opn New Life-65. (n.d.); Rprts. I73d 7. final report. U.S. Army Tactical Mobilitv Requirements Board. 20 Abn Bde, Comb Opns AAR, New Life-65. 26 Jan 66, Silver City. 1966. Aug 62: Alain E. Enthoven and K. Wavne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Maraudcr I. Jan 66; Tolson. Airmobihty, pp. 63-64 , 86-88; Ltrs. Capt Shapmg the Deferue Program, 1961-1969 (New York. 1971). pp. 100-104; William A. Barrv, to author. subj: Tactical Airlift Missions in Vietnam, Futrell. Ideas, Coneepts. Doctnne, pp. 745-48; Calvin, Arr Assault. pp. 274- May 72 and 17 Jun 72. 79; Tolson. Arrmobility, pp. 16-24. 20. Study. 22d Mil Hist Det. USA. subq: Vietnam Odyssey, 28 Jul 65— 8. Report. AF Flt Test Center. 463L Universal Cargo Handling System 31 Det 66: Rprts, USARV G-4. Daily Significam Logistical Activities. 7 for C-130 Acft. Aug 62; Report. Project Close Look. Sewart AFB. TAC Apr—26 May 66; Ltrs. Lt Col O. M. Coats. Maj Peter T. DiCroce, Maj E. Programming Plan 202-62. 1963; Brig Gen H. D. Aynesworth. Cdr. 32d T. Yelton, to Det 5, 315th AD. subj: Msn Cdr Rprts. 6 May. 7 Jun. 26 TC AF (Provis). Troop Carrier Activities, Swift Strike II, 22 Sep 62; May 66; Rprts, PACAF. Monthly Airlift Rprts, Apr 66. May 66: Rprts. 1/ Richard E. Stanley. "Tactical Airlift Support: Army or Air Force?" (AWC lOÍst Abn Bde. Comb Opns AARs. Van Buren. 23 Mar 66, Austin. 5 Jun Thesis, AU. Apr 65). pp. 74-80 66, J. P. |ones, 28 Sep 66. 9. Ltr. Lt Col James L. Blackburn. Cdr 4488th Test Sq (Helic) to 21. Hist. 3l5th AD. Jul-Dec 65. p. xi; Msg 00037. 314th TC Wg to 9th ALT F. Goldfire I. subj: Final Rprt for Helicopters. Goldfire I. 1964; AF. 16 Sep 65; Tolson. Airmohiluy, pp. 126-29: Rprts, lst Log Cd, AARs. Rprt. 5 16th TC Wg, Special Rprt on Airlift. Goldfire I. 1964; History. A irdrop Msns 16-22. 16 Apr 67, 26-40, 21 Apr 67; Sharp and 3l4th TC Wg, Jul-Dec 64. pp. 8-12; Hist. 9th AF. Jul-Dec 64. pp. 126- Westmoreland, Report on the War. p. 137; Rprt. 196th Lt Inf Bde. AAR. 97. Col Frederick A. Sanders. "Exercise Swift Strike III," in Arr Unwersity Review. Jan-Feb 64. pp. 4-16; Ltrs, Brig Gen Wüliam T. Daly, D/Opns. Junction City, 4 May 67. 9th AF. to Gen Waltcr Sweeney. Cdr TAC, 16 and 22 Oct 64; Galvin. Arr 22. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War, pp. 113-17; Rprt. lst Assault, pp. 280-86. Inl Div. Qtrlv Command Report. 31 Dec 65: Rprt. lst Inf Di\. Comb 10. DOD, Annual Report for FV 1965 (Report of Secy of AF). pp. Opns AAR. Opn Mastiff, 1966. 332-35; Hi»t Rprts. 346th TC Sq, Jan, Feb. Mar 62; R L. Bowers. 23. Ltr, Maj F.rnest L. Howell, to Cdr Del 5. 315th AD. subj: Msn Cdr "Americans in the VNAF: The Dirtv Thirtv.” Aerospcwe Historial. Sep 72, Report, Opn Birmingham, Apr 66; Rprt. lst Inf Div. Comb Opns AAR. pp. 125-31; Intervicws, Lt Col Charles R. Blakc, 6 May 70, Lt Col Opn Birmingham. Mas 66; Rprt, USARV G-4. Daily Significam Logistical Benjamin N. Kraljev. 29 Jan 71, Maj Bernard J. Clark, -I Nov 70. Maj Activities. 17 Apr-16 May 66; Rprt, 315th AD. PACAF Airlift System Hugh D. Perry, 3 Nov 70, Lt Col Richard D. Kimball, 4 Nov 70, Maj Accomplishments, CY 66. Charles B West. 5 May 70. 24. Ltr. Maj Robert A. Hutto. to Det 5. 3l5th AD. Msn Cdr Rprt. Opn 11 T o l s o n , Arrmobility. pp. 15-16, 25-50; Adm U. S. G. Sharp and Gen El Paso. 2 Jun 66; Hist, 8th Aer Port Sq, Jul 66-Ocl 67; Hist, 3l5lh AC. W. C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (GPO, 1968), pp. 79- Wg. Jul-Dec 66, pp. 26. 44-45: Imvw, Lt Col Richard H Prater. 9 Nov 81. 72; Rprt, lst Log Cd. Logis Critique. 1-68. (Opn Attleboro), 29 Apr 67: 12. Fact Sheet, MACV J-3, subj: Need for C-130 Airlift. II Mar 65; Rprts. USARV' G-4. Daily Logistical Activities, dates in Jun-Jul 66. Rprt. Capt Charles W. Case, EOT Rprt. 11 Jun 65; Hist, 315th AD, Jan- 25. Lt Col Robert L. Burke. “Corps Logistirs Planning in Vietnam." in Jun 65 and Jul-Dec 65. Mililan Review. Aug 69. pp. 3-11; Sharp and Westmoreland. Report on the 13. Pentagon Papers. GPO ed.. Vol. V. sec IV.c.6.(a). pp. 13-17; Vol. War, pp. 136-37. 157-58; Bríefing text. MACV’ Dir/Construction, subj: IV, sec lV.c.5; Vol. 111. sec IV.c.l, pp. v-vii, a!0-al6, 103; Brief, Lt Col Construction in RVN, 25 Oct 66. THE HANOI POL STRIKE

Colonel J ames H. Kasler NTIL mid-1966, the usaf’s aerial Takhli, Thailand.) He also informed me bombardment of North Vietnam that the Wing Commander, Colonel Wil- was restricted to targets of compar- liam H. Holt, would lead the mission and Uatively litde importance. These restrictionsthat Colonel Holt had asked that I finalize were a direct result of such thinking as the navigation and attack plan and pre- that reflected by the then Secretary of pare the combat mission folders for the Defense Robert S. McNamara, who de- strike. On 21 June, when we had First clared that “the targets that are influenc- been informed of the contemplated strike, ing the operations in the South, I submit, we had been directed to identify to Wing are not the power, the oil, the harbor, or Operations those pilots who were to par- the dams. The targets are the roads and ticipa te. They were to be selected accord- the war material being moved over the ing to their skill and experience. It was roads.” There were also no-strike areas one of the most difficult decisions I ever surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong, thus had to make because there was no pilot in inaking a virtual sanctuary of these areas. the squadron whom I considered to be The North Vietnamese were well aware of unqualified, and I knew how' disappoint- this sanctuary and took the utmost advan- ing it would be for those not selected. tage of it, especially in the positioning of Two of my most experienced flight com- strategic war materiais. manders, Captain Lewis Shattuck and As it became increasingly obvious that Captain Norman Wells, assisted me in the destruction of targets such as vehicles, planning the mission. roads, small bridges, and river traffic was Air-to-ground combat is the most exact- causing hardly a ripple insofar as affecting ing type of flying in the Air Force and the Communists’ ability to carry the war to certainly the most dangerous, as the com- the South, it was decided in Washington bat casualty records of World War II, in June 1966 not only to increase the Korea, and Vietnam bear out. Moreover, tempo of air strikes against the North but low-level navigation at speeds in excess of also to include targets of greater strategic 500 knots requires the utmost in skill in significance. The first of these targets was that a one- or two-degree heading error the great petroleum, oil, and lubricant can throw- one miles wide of the route in (po l ) facility located just outside Hanoi. a few minutes. In addition, timing is The following account is mv recollection essential because each element of the of that 29 June day when I íed Thailand- attack must mesh exacdy or the mission based aircraft of the 355th Tactical will be seriously degraded in effectiveness. Fighter Wing on one of the most spectac- I feel that there are three elements neces- ular and successfully conducted missions sarv to increase the air-to-ground combat of the air war. pilots’ chances of survival: planning, exe- On the afternoon of 28 June, I had just cution of the mission, and luck. Of course, returned from a mission and, after my experience and skill in the planning and intelligence debriefing, had stopped in at execution phases decrease one’s depend- the Wing Command Post. The Deputy for ence on luck. Operations motioned me into his ofFice We spent six hours planning, checking, and told me that my squadron had drawn and double-checking every facet of the the lead for the Hanoi po l storage com- mission. This was our first detailed study plex. (I was Operations Officer of the of the defenses in the Hanoi area, and we 354th Tactical Fighter Squadron at found little in the aerial photographs to 20 give us comfort. The enemy’s air defenses, formidable from the start, were becoming more formidable each day. By every esti- mate, Hanoi had the greatest concentra- tion of antiaircraft weapons ever known in the historv of aerial warfare. In Vietnam itself, there were from 7000 to 10,000 fast-firing antiaircraft weapons of 37-mm caliber or larger. In addition, the Russians had provided the Vietnamese with a so- phisticated radar and communication net- work for detecrion and coordination of their surface-to-air missiles (sam) and mig fighters. Surprise was pretty well ruled out as a possibility in our attack plans. For one thing, the Navy attack fighters were strik- ing the Haiphong po l complex fifteen minutes prior to our time over target (tot). For another, the defenses would certainly be alerted in the Hanoi area because our sixteen aircraft would be preceded in the attack by eight aircraft On the morning of the strike, I walked from the 388th Wing. into the wing intelligence building at The intelligence planning room to an about 0810. General George Simler, the outsider would resemble a madhouse lo- Deputy for Operations of Seventh Air cated in a paper factory. Once the mission Force, was standing by the door with leader has laid out the route and attack Colonel Holt. General Simler looked at plan, every pilot must prepare his own me and said, “Major Kasler, how would charts. The charts are cut, glued, and then you like to lead this mission?” I said, “Yes folded in accordion fashion. Routes are Sir, I certainly would!” General Simler drawn down the center of the page and handed me the combat mission folder that ticked off in time and distance. Each turn I had prepared for Colonel Holt the requires another chart because the route preceding day. I looked at Colonel Holt, line must remain centered for ease of who did not appear too happy, and said, navigation. “Fm sorry about that, Colonel.” He mut- By midnight, we were satisfied with our tered something and stalked into the work and headed for our quarters. Us- briefing room. I had not meant for it to ually, the briefing for the first mission of come out the way it sounded because I the day was scheduled between 0100 and knew how anxious he was to lead the 0900 hours, but this one was special. mission, and I was sincerely sorry. Every Except for a few selected strikes, involving fighter pilot dreams of leading a mission only a few aircraft, the Hanoi raid was the of this importance, but few ever have the only one scheduled for our wing on the opportunity. 29th. Our briefing time was scheduled for As it turned out, all the wing command- 0830, with time over the target at 1210. ers whose units were participating in the

Coniinued on pagr 24 F-105 Thunderchiefs in Vietnam

Planning every facet of the mission is the first essential. . . . Workhorse on 75 percent of USAF strikes against Communist forces in North Vietnam durtng 1966, F- 105s line up on the parking ramp, getting ready for the next one. . . .A ir refueling, to enable completion of the mission plan, imposes exact timing of the rendezvous with the tanhers. . . . After Navy fighters had hit the Hanoi POL complex, the Thunderchiefs unloaded their bombs amid bursting groundfire, leaving a column of smoke and flame nsing above 35,000 feet.

pointed out that the facility at Hanoi contained tw'enty percent of all North Vietnam’s petroleum products. He also made it clear that under no circumstances, even if hit, was any pilot to jettison his bombs into the city of Hanoi. The role of our sister wing, the 388th at Korat, was to initiate the attack on the po l complex with eight aircraft. Their plan was to approach the Communist capital from the south, low- behind the screen of high mountains Southwest of the city. At the mountains, they would pop up over them and then dive in low over Hanoi and strike the target. The 355th struck from the north. The plan was to cross the Red River 100 miles northwest of Hanoi, turn east, and de- scend to low altitude to avoid sam missiles. Our route took us parallel and north of Thud Ridge, the 5000-foot razorback mountain running west to east through the heart of North Vietnam. The eastern tip of the mountain ended about 25 miles due north of Hanoi. We wrould screen Hanoi raid, vvhether in the strike, top ourselves behind the mountain until we cover, or a support role, hacl scheduled reached the eastern tip, then make a 90- themselves to lead their vvings. But they degree turn south toward Hanoi. vvere all removed from the mission by The operadons order had also directed order of General Joseph Moore, Com- that all attacks would be executed on a mander of Seventh Air Force. south-to-north heading to preclude tossing The general briehng preceding a mis- a hung bomb into the city of Hanoi. sion is little more than a refresher of those Approaching from the north, we had to items that the pilots have learned and make a 180-degree pop-up maneuver to memorized about the route, tactics, and strike the target as ordered. target defenses. The things the pilots are YVhat the attack order meant was that most interested in are the weather and every aircraft wrould be rolling into the bombing winds in the target area. The bomb run at approximately the same spot, weather for the Hanoi area that day was heading in the same direcdon. Not too perfect for fighter-bomber operations. It smart from the pilots viewpoint, but, in was forecast as clear with light and varia- the interest of protecung civilian popula- ble winds to 10,000 feet. tions, such orders were commonplace in General Simler concluded the briefing Vietnam. Ideally, attacks should be on with a short talk, in which he emphasized divergent headings to confuse the gunners the importance of the Hanoi po l complex and thus prevent them from zeroing in to the Vietnamese supply lines. He on one spot. 24 THE HANOl POL STRIKE 25

Following General Simlers reinarks, a functioning aircraft leading the biggest short briefing \vith the other three flight mission of the Vietnam war to date. commanders was conducted. Each aircraft As the rest of the flight slid into was carrving eight 750-pound bombs position, I completed a slow turn back to armed with a fraction-of-a-second delayed the north and contacted our radar site. fuse. It was deeided to change the fusing They gave me a bearing to our tankers of the two bombs carried on the outboard 250 nm to the north. wing stations to an instantaneous setting, Approaching the tankers, I could see a to ensure that there would be some flving row- of ominous thunderstorms stretched shrapnel among the fuel storage tanks in across the horizon to the north. It was the event of a near miss. obvious that the tankers were not going to A final briefing was held in the squad- be able to maintain their briefed refueling ron before the pilots headed for their route. Fighters can refuel and even effect |aircraft. The crew chief greeted me as I join-ups in thin cirrus clouds, but the stepped from mv pickup. He vvalked turbulence and lack of visibility associated around the aircraft with me as I made the with heavy cumulus clouds create an im- preflight inspection. I told him that if I possible situation. gave him the abort signal after I had We began taking on fuel, but the started the engine he was to get the tankers were unable to maintain their ladder back up immediately because I was track because of the thunderstorms. Ten heading for the ground spare. He said, minutes prior to our drop-off time, the “Major Kasler, my assistant and I have tanker lead advised that he had to turn spent the last nine hours checking every back because he was unable to circumnavi- system on this airplane, and you aren't gate the storms ahead. We had all re- going to abort.” He was right! I have fueled, but we were not able to recycle never found more dedicated or experi- through again to top off as planned. enced airmen than those who worked on I rejoined my flight in dose formation, our aircraft in Vietnam. In the 91 mis- flicked on my radar, and picked my way .sions I flew there, I never had an abort or betwfeen the thunderstorm cells. We were an armament malfunction—a fantastic 60 miles southeast of our desired point of iachievement. departure when we left the tankers. It was We started engines and taxied to the imperative that our timing be exact, so I marshaling area at the end of the runway, had selected a prominent river junction in where the maintenance crews made a final Laos as my starting checkpoint. As luck inspection of the aircraft. We then lined (the third element mentioned earlier) up on the runway and were cleared for would have it, we broke out in a small jlakeoff. Our takeoff weight was around hole directly over the point. I was three 51,000 pounds, the maximum gross minutes ahead of time, so I made a 360- weight for the F-105. In the hot Thailand degree turn to use up time and set course summer, this meant a long ground roll to the north. and a lift-off speed of 205 knots. We immediately re-entered the clouds, I breathed a sigh of relief when my and when we next broke out, after 20 igear was in the well, not because I was minutes, we were directly over the Red concemed about the takeoff but because River northwest of Yen Bai. My Doppler 95 percent of our aborts occur on the was functioning perfectly, and we were iground. I was airborne with a perfecdy direcüy on course and time. I turned right 26 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

and began a descent through several bv flak guns of every caliber and descrip- layers of clouds. Vietnam north of Thud tion. Ahead, I could see two black smoke Ridge vvas covered with ground fog. I columns rising from a portion of the continued the descent to 300 feet, which Hanoi po l field, just struck by the 388th. was just above the fog bank. At higher The sky was dotted with hundreds of aldtudes, sam missiles have a nasty vvay of white, grey, and black puffs, the remain- popping up through clouds at an unsus- ing traces of shells that had been fired at pecting pilot, and 300 feet was a tairly the departing Korat aircraft. Thus we had safe altitude to prevent this from happen- a good idea of what was awaiting us over inS- the target. We were skimming along the base ot We approached slightly left of target. I Thud Ridge, which towered above us to called for afterburner and began my the right. As we approached its eastern pullup. I climbed through 8000 feet and tip, our externai fuel tanks showed empty, began a slow turn to the right until I and I ordered them dropped. I could reached my roll-in point at about 11,000 hear Lieutenant Colonel James R. Hop- feet. I cut my afterburner, dropped dive kins, leader of the 388th, departing the brakes, and rolled into the bomb run. As Hanoi target area, and I asked him what I was turning in, I could see three ten- the weather was. He said, “It’s clear in the gun 85-mm batteries on Gia Lam airfield target area, but there are mig’s airborne.” franticallv firing. Ignoring these as best I Looking far to the east, I could see could, 1 began my bomb run. I saw that smoke rising from the po l tanks at Hai- two large tanks on the extreme left side of phong, which the Navy fíghters had al- the complex and one on the right side ready struck. were already burning. As I continued my When we passed our initial point at the dive between the rising columns of smoke, end of Thud Ridge, I called the flight to I could hardly believe my eyes—my entire push it up and started a turn south view w'as filled with big, fat fuel tanks! I toward Hanoi. As we turned, the fog pushed my pickle button and made a bank faded away beneath us and we rolling pullout to the right. When I broke into the clear. At that same instant, cleared the smoke, I made a gentle left flak began bursting around us. I glanced turn around the target complex. The to the right toward Phuc Yen airfield and huge fuel tanks were erupting one after could see the flak guns blinking at us. another, sending up immense billowing Despite the fact that we were only 300 fireballs. feet above the ground, the Vietnamese By the time I had circled to the South- had leveled their heavy 85-mm and 100- west corner of the target, each of my mm guns and were firing almost horizon- flight members had also made his bomb tally at us. I called the flight to start run and had rejoined me. The smoke “jinking," a series of irregular evasive now merged into one huge boiling red maneuvers designed to confuse ground and black pillar, an unbelievable sight. As gunners. I climbed back to about 5000 feet, I could We were running parallel to the north- see flames leaping out of the smoke east railroad that leads into the city of thousands of feet above me. Hanoi. This was North VietnanVs most After my number four man had re- important supply link with the Peoples joined the formation, I swung around to Republic of China, and it was protected the north toward Phuc Yen airfield. I had THE HANOl POL STRJKE 27

seen a mig on the end of the runway found us a K.C-135 tanker; we refueled when we began our dash toward Hanoi over the Mekong, and headed for home. and thought we might get a shot at it if it got airborne. I changed my inind when I saw the fantastic intensity of the flak T he Hanoi po l strike was one bursting around us. I then banked my of the most successful missions of the Thunderchief to the south, and as 1 did Vietnam war. The complex was over 90 so I looked at the ground; there were so percent destroyed and was one of the few manv guns firing that the valley reminded targets in North Vietnam that never re- ime of a desert city \iewed from the air at quired a restrike, as the Vietnamese aban- inight. doned the facility altogether. After we crossed south of the Red Amazingly, only one of the strike air- IRiver, the flak diminished as the gunners craft was lost to flak in the raid; the pilot, apparendy switched their attention to the Captain Neil Murphy Jones, was interned fighter-bombers behind my flight. We in North Vietnam until February 1973. headed vvest, searching the roads for Three aircraft suffered battle damage, targets of opportunity. As we approached with one pilot receiving minor wounds. Hoa Binh on the Black River, I noticed On the other hand, the mig’s were that a new road had been cut up the side conspicuously absent; they engaged only of a high plateau that extended east back one flight of the sam suppression aircraft. toward Hanoi. They inflicted minor damage on one of Investigating, I popped over the rim of the plateau and dropped my nose; there, direcdy under my gunsight pipper, was a truck. I squeezed the trigger, and the 20- mm cannon shells tore into the truck, setting it on fire. All told, we found 25 trucks on the plateau. We set twelve afire and damaged at least six others. It ap- peared that the Vietnamese were floating supplies from China down the Black River on rafts to Hoa Binh, transferring them to trucks, and moving them across the plateau to Hanoi. As I pulled out of one of my strafing passes, I looked back at Hanoi 35 miles to the east. It was a windless day, and the black smoke formed a perfect pillar reach- ing above 35,000 feet. Bv now our fuel was running low. We were forced to heacl ífor home. We did not have enough fuel to reach Takhli, so I planned a recovery at Lbon if we could not get fuel from the airborne tankers. Looking back toward Hanoi, I could still see the smoke column over 150 miles away. The gci controller 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW the F-105s, but the pilot was credited with air defense boss.” Just a guess on my part, a probable mig kill in the brief aerial but apparendy a correct one as he became batde. quite agitated and left. A short time later By comparison with the World War II my room was invaded by four very stern- Ploesti oil raid, vvhen German Me-109 looking Vietnamese, w^ho spent the next pilots flew through their own flak to get at two days trying to figure out how I knew the B-24s, the North Vietnamese mig they had a shake-up in their air defense pilots’ efforts were far less courageous. command. One of the puzzles of the raid was why The Hanoi po l strike was a supreme the Vietnamese had not fired any of the feat of courage, fortitude, and airmanship. dozens of sam missiles that rimmed Ha- The pilots who participated in the raid felt noi. The day following the raid, they at the time that it was a major step toward began firing sam’s in volleys at our air- shortening the war. Ironically, howjever, craft, which was a complete change in the despite an almost perfectly conceived and tactics they had used previously. The executed mission, there was no perceptíble answer to this question was learned two slowdown in the North Vietnamese po l months later when I was shot down and supplv system, as Soviet tankers continued captured by the North Vietnamese. to discharge fuel supplies at Haiphong Shordv after my capture on 8 August harbor until 1972. Had the port been 1966, I was questioned by a Vietnamese closed and the fighter-bombers and B-52s interrogator while lying in a hospital room used in conjunction with the strategic in Hanoi. The interrogator tried to get targets struck in 1966 as they subsequendy informadon from me concerning the Ha- were, America might very w'ell have noi po l strike. He asked: “What did you avoided the agonizing years of war that think about our defenses during the Ha- followed. noi raid?” I said, “I figure you got a new Air War College NATIONAL SECURITY AS AN INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE

Dr . A drian

oltowing the lead of American cholar Eduard Mead Earle of a generation go, Canadian historian Adrian Preston hallenges the academic and civil nmmdnities to give serious attention o defente and strategic studies. N his celebrated indictment in December tion for and during war required effective 1940 o f national defence studies as an collaboration between civilians and sol- obligation o f scholarship,1 Edward Mead diers. While soldiers were groping toward I a wider comprehension of the social and Earle callecl for a radically new treatm ent of national defence probleins and posed economic constraints that effectually cir- three m ajor quesrions: first, w hether mili- cumscribed their policies, there seemed no tary affairs were the legitimate and, in- reason why civilians should not turn to the deed, a vital concern o f political and social study of war and defence, matters deeply scientists; seconcl, w hat specific contribu- affecting both the nation at large and tion academic habits and techniques could themselves as individuais. After all, stra- make, in a way that those of professional tegic theory and military history, the social soldiers could not, to our understanding and economic aspects of defence, the o f the essential place o f military pow er in military aspects of international relations the Science o f governm ent and politics; and international law, the structure of and third, what topics of basic research in military establishments and their political the nature of war as a fundamental social and constitutional relationship with civilian phenomenon could profitably be under- society, military education and profession- taken ultimately to form a com prehensive alism—all these were not black arts con- basis for long-term defence policy and signed to the caves of the occult, the strategic planning. supratemporal, or the recondite but were Dr. Earle was struck bv a paradox: clear, hard, and practical problems suscep- tible of analysis and criticism by informed Although military defense has been a per- laymen and upon which factual data as a ennial problem of the American people since the first colonists landed on this scientific basis for scholarship were readily continent, there has been no conscious, accessible. For academics to shirk the integrated and continuous study of military obligations of defence studies might well securitv as a fundamental problem of gov- prove disastrous. There would always be ernment and society. . . . Although we vested interests and captivating theories to live in a war-like world and have ourselves corrupt souncl sense and discretion, while been participants in large-scale wars, there the sheer inertia of large military bureauc- has been almost no systematic considera- racies constituted an obstacle in itself. The tion by American scholars of the role of theory and analysis of war and defence war in human affairs—this despite the would be betrayed by default into the transparent truth, however deplorable, that war is a recurrent phenomenon which hands of a clique of eccentric publicists, from time to time transcends all other would-be reformers, civil servants, or bean human activitv and assumes command of flaneurs who, in the vigorous tradition of our li\es, our fortunes and our destiny.2 Victorian military positivism, dredged with furious industry for facts and figures with Q uite asicle from this intrinsic interest, which to entrench and advance their own the problems of national defence con- special tactical theories or strategic policies: fronting parliamentary democracies had a men of gritty brilliance, with quicksilver special claim upon historians and political tongues and dogmatic candour, who scientists, for they represented a continu- linked events into problems, reduced the ing dialectic between freedom and secu- chãos of experience to predictable order. rity. I he intelligent organisation and di- deduced principies and extrapolated rection of national resources in prepara- trends, struck hard and fast analogies 30 NATIONAL SECURITY AS A CHALLENGE 31

jetween the historical and contem porary serve the purposes of some inexplicable :onditions of war and defence, and in propaganda: neither of which, in the eyes jeneral tossed around the stuff of his- of professional and civilian critics, ory—such recent and appalling history— helped—indeed they unwittingly dam- vith an insouciance which outraged all aged—the otherwise sound case for the iccepted mies of precaution. reason, or rigorous, dispassionate, and documented ;ven strict military logic; men such as study of war as a factor inherent in—and v^ansittart and Liddell Hart who peddled possibly indispensable to—the Science of heir policies of despair, ümited liability, government and politics. Neither the ind the indecisiveness of modem war and American Military Institute nor the *’ho seemed prepared to sacrifice the United States Naval Institute has achieved Indian Empire—and indeed the whole the effectiveness enjoyed by the Royal Asian theatre of war—to a perverse obses- United Services Institute as a forum or ;ion with averting another Continental floating seminar for stimulating profes- zommitment. sional debate about the technical and In the best liberal traditions of Western political aspects of national security. There onstitutionalism, the notion that defence was no tradition of consistent criticai yet tudies might be incorporated into their responsible military journalism of the kind urricula struck most American universi- associated in England with the names of ies as repellent, immoral, and positivelv Russell, Forbes, Wilkinson, and Reping- mthinkable. The study of the history of ton. There was no tradition grounded var itself was regarded as a kind of upon a clear-eyed appreciation of the teditious cloak for official militarism. De- special attributes and needs of the Ameri- pite Earle’s own pioneering efforts, there can profession of arms without being lid not exist in American institutions—as mesmerised by them; none which would here were at Oxford, Cambridge, and place that profession—with all its ciai ms to nore recently at the University of Lon- a distinct corpus of specific technical lon—chairs for the comprehensive and knowledge and doctrine, an exclusive ystematic study of war as a rational group coherence, and a unique complex nedium of social conflict, of the limita- of institutions and codes—firmly within ions and capabilities of organised force in the context of the social and political itatecraft. forces that had shaped—and possessed Even the study of American military the ultimate power to disband—it; none nistory until recendy had been forfeited to which could translate the alarming shifts òreigners: Englishmen such as Hender- and changes in international politics and on (Stonewall Jackson) and Liddell Hart the bewildering jargon of the military Sherman) had written the best biographi- bureaucrat into layman’s table talk. :al studies of the American Civil War; and Moreover, within the pre-World War II 10 attempt had been made to salvage an government itself, at no levei—Executive, >fficial account of the American Expedi- Congressional, or Service—was there ionary Force in Europe from the crates either the will or the machinery to formu- )f documents disintegrating in Boston late and execute grand strategic policy. varehouses. Those civilian societies that The House and Senate committees on kirted obscurely on the fringes of military military and naval affairs and appropria- icholarship and research did so out of a tions were riven with parochialism, parti- ugitive and sterile antiquarianism or to sanship, and patronage; and national de- 32 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW fence had degenerated into the grubbv War College had been closed because dispensation of local contracts for army there were not then enough crises or posts and naval stations. An occasional colonels to make it worthwhile. There was chairman of extraordinary abilities, ambi- no higher defence college (similar to the tion, or eloquence might drive or drag bis Imperial Defence College) to compose the comniittee above its stagev mediocrity; interservice and civil-military disputes but, in the main, Congressional reaction to which had been so disfiguring a feature of the issues of national defence was inter- the military politics of World War I and mittent, short-term, and uncritical. Al- which the Service war colleges themselves though technically and constitntionally had clone much to perpetuate and embit- Commander in Chief, the President— ter. nnlike his fascist contemporaries in Italy Writing in 1940, Dr. Earle observed: and Germany and Japan and indeed unlike Balchvin or Chamberlain in Brit- . . . t h e A r m y W a r C o lle g e h a s b e e n closed because of the shortage of commis- ain—rarely founcl the time to keep di- sioned personnel in the higher ranks. rectlv and personallv informed about the There is now no group of trained person- national military condition. Presidential nel engaged in theoretical studies—a defi- messages and quadrennial platform ciency which expert scholars might over- speeches were confessedly collections of come were they available in any number. unworkable platitudes. The secretaryships In general, however, what is involved is not of War and Navy, like the War Ministries temporary measures to meet an emergency of Victorian England, were distincdy infe- but a long-term program of research and, rior Cabinet posts, attracting with rare ultimately, o f teaching which will enable exceptions only the theatrical or incompe- the United States in times of peace as well tent and otherwise providing a spring- as in times of crisis and war to build up a board for coming politicians of ambition body of knowledge and a corps of schol- arly experts who can help in the formula- and weight. It seemed an axiom of Amer- tion of public policy and who can contrib- ican politics that the administration of ute to an understanding of the military defence contained an inherent capacity for problems and the military power of the unwelcome controversy that was in inverse nation. proportion to the buclget allocated and its . . . O n l y t h e s c h o l a r is c a p a b l e o f direct relationship with the broader social maintaining a continuous, objective and docu- and economic interests of the State. There mented study of the problem. Experience was no National Defense Council, similar shows that comparable results cannot be to the Comniittee of Imperial Defence, expected from the public, the politidan, charged with the continuous, systematic, the government, or even the armed Serv- and professional study of contemporarv ices. Furthermore, only the scholar can developments in international politics and create a vast reservoir of competence in the military technology as they bore upon the field. The people whom he teaches and for conditions and needs of American secu- whom he writes today will be the voters, teachers, reserve officers and statesmen of rity; with the formulation of integrated tomorrow. No such reservoir of compe- contingency plans; with the coordination tence now exists. . . . Studies now under- of domestic resources and strategic inter- ta k e n will h a v e . . . t h e i r gr e a te s t im p o r - ests; and with the provision of a reservoir tance . . . in laying sound and broad of expert up-to-date technical military ad- foundations for a national military policy vice, skills, and knowledge. The Ármv in the longer future which will not tnerelv NATIONAL SECURITY AS A CHALLENGE 33

be concerned with a passing crisis—how- influence upon defence policy; but pessi- ever menacing and prolonged—but will be mists can still be found who believe that intimately related to our political ideais, unless they turn away from the study of geographical position, industrial resources, past military operations to the nature of governmental institutions, standard of liv- war itself, making greater use of the ing, and long-run national objectives.3 resources o f political philosophy, econom- All this, uniniaginably distant and inno- ics, and sociology and somehow Corning to :ent as it seems today, could be expiai ned b etter term s with applied Science, the n terms of the geostrategic position of the traditional processes of professional educa- United States, its absorption with frontier tion are doom ed to antiquarianism . Yet it Dacifícation and economic self-sufficiency, is clear that the development of weapons ts rooted and abiding aversion to the and new States, which has effected so jnbridled presence or use of military drastic a change in the nature of war and x>wer, the absence of extrahemispheric international relatíons since 1945, has also wars and colonial military commitments, caused us radically to re-exam ine the ind the protection incidentallv afforded concepts and presuppositions on which [>y the incessant balancing of povver in the fabric and philosophy of the profes- Europe. It was transformed dramatically sion of arm s are based. Indeed, Earle tnd irrevocably between Pearl Harbor and himself, in his discussion of the conditions rliroshima. The defeat or dismemberment that circumscribed the role of the soldier )f France, Italy, Germany, and Japan; the in the public discussion of strategy and ímergence of organised national resist- defence policy, as m uch as aclmitted that mce and liberation movements in Europe, he was treating less than half of a twofold África, and Asia; the disintegraüon of the problem . A nd today intelligent com m enta- British, French, and Dutch colonial em- tors frequendy express concern that strat- 3Íres; and the advent of nuclear deter- egy has become too much of an esoteric ence for those powers vvhich could afford plaything in the hands of irresponsible t—all thrust upon the United States the “experts” and often all too unrelated to neluctabilitv of a policy of containment professional, technological, and humani- tnd retaliation and an unprecedented tarian considerations. •ange of military problems and commit- If the civilian has become “the compleat nents both in Europe and in Asia with stratygyst” of our time, there may be vhich it was historically, intellectually, and danger in encouraging the soldier to go jsychologically ill-equipped to deal. too far the other way. Since Plato, philoso- American national security policy rap- phers have wrestled with the purposes of Idly assumed the grotesque features of a education; but it is in the military profes- massive ideological crusade. In these cir- sion that men’s lives and national security rumstances the growth of defence studies at once clepend as much upon contempla- |n the United States and to a lesser extern tion as upon action, upon diplomacy as n Great Britain and Europe, for which upon force; that the conflict between Earle had pleaded a quarter centurv or so “general” and “technical,” “cultural” and >efore, was at once explosive, ency- “vocational,” “humanistic” and “technologi- lopedic, even Promethean.4 cal” has been most acute and long-stand- Nluch of this work has been unfortu- ing, However this relationship may be íately and undeniably oversophisticated resolved—and it is largely a matter of tnd at times counterproductive in its cultural heritage and social values—in 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

most nations that have pretensions of ditions, which seem to have been wrenched military power the complexion and objec- out of all historical context. The responsible tives o f professional military education are defence specialists upon whom was first manifestly constrained by the State of thrust the task of devising strategic policy military technology and international rela- with weapons capable of unleashing unpre- tions and the nature of future war that cedented destruction were readily might predictably emerge between them. vulnerable—and indeed sometimes par- At the sam e time, military education, like donably susceptible—to those theoreticians the profession which it sustains, clearly who, much like those interwar theorists who m irrors the society in which it must passionately ascribed to their chosen inno- flourish and so is shaped in its ravv vations the qualities of ultimate weapons, materiais by the standards and structure saw no alternative to subverting the estab- of secondary and higher education gener- lished Clausewitzian thesis concerning the ally and by the exigencies and pressures relationship between war, strategy, and dip- o f dom estic politics and economics. Only lomacy to that of Ludendorff and Lenin. when all these elements are working in These specialists concluded that since war harmonious dialectic can there be a fruit- was essentially a conflict of societies—a ful policy of education for defence. permanent State of social conflict varying If for Americans today Earle’s article only in its methods and intensity—all inter- possesses no more significance than that national relations were but a mere exten- of a remarkably prescient document of a sion of warfare. previous era, for Canadians it contains an The entry into common usage of such intrinsic lesson of great relevance, em- terms as “national strategy,” “cold war,” barked as we are on a subtle but impatient and “garrison State” is clothed with a revolution in social, constitutional, and subtle and sinister significance and may or military affairs. But only by establishing may not, as some critics have argued,5 the context in which it was written, assess- betray a dangerous confusion of categories ing the nature, extent, and significance of and a fundamental misappreciation of the the changes that have since occurred, and nature of international affairs. For, after relating them to Canadian conditions and all, there is much inescapable logic in needs can we take his words as a guide to Marxist military philosophy, and the result our own studies and policies as we move of antithesis between two rival military to fulfill Sir YVilfrid Laurier’s promise of cultures is not necessarily, nor even us- destiny in world affairs in the second half ually, conflict but is mutual conformity. of the twentieth century. Rather it betrays perhaps a constitutional reluctance to reshape the foundations of W e are often tempted today to our beliefs and the armies recruited to overestimate the changes brought about in defend them, to counter more limited and the nature of war and international politics effective forms of violence specifically de- through the introduction of nuclear ployed to exploit the very contradicrions weapons. The present ascendency of politi- in our society that we refuse to resolve. cal scientists, economists, mathematicians, Such instruments of policy, so ablv and sociologists in our universities and de- wielded in the past by Machiavelli, Gan-i fence research institutes has challenged the dhi, and Hitler, today provide nations relevance of military history—indeed most with sufficient and acceptable substitutesi history—to modern social and political con- for nuclear warfare in the acquisition and| NATIONAL SECURJTY AS A CHALLENGE 35

exercise of their political power. Indeed, nuclear, conventional, and guerrilla forms in the generation that has elapsed since of war as it is of the vast collective 1939, there has been an intensification humanitarian interest to prevent, restrain, rather than a cessation of traditional or retard it. means of limited conflict, whose potential- The widespread introduction of hand- ity as vaüd instruments of major strategy gun and arquebus, while in itself a sym- and policy were all too imperfecdy recog- bolic and accessory factor in the overthrow nized and understood by the Western of the old chivalric order centred on democracies before then and whose per- heavy cavalry and castles, did not immedi- fection todav is of paramount concern to ately transform the monarcho-feudalism militarv planners. The complex tangle of of the Middle Ages into the nation-state social, constitutional, and diplomatic conse- system of modern international politics. In quences of the militar) revolution of our the same way, the introduction of nuclear time is still without logic or pattern and weapons was not singular in contributing perhaps may never be completely unrav- to international anarchy and did not, in elled by any future historian or political the opinion of defence theorists on both scientist. His task might be made that sides, at once or drastically alter the much simpler, however, were he to accept conventional pattern of warfare as it had as a starting point the thesis that the been experienced in World War II. revolution in nuclear warfare—with all its In terms of the actual conduct of impücations—is merely an amplification of warfare and the refinement of strategic that inaugurated by Machiavelli and Gus- thought, these potentially revolutionary tavus Adolphus three centuries before and innovations, wrhether of firearm or nuclear that a more approximate comprehension missile, in fact represented a retrograde of the complexity of modern war as an step or at least created such a confusing intellectual challenge might be gained and precarious situation that it seemed from a comparative analysis of the nature impossible or positively dangerous to and enduring features of the original. move forward in it. If Agincourt repre- The effective combination of missile sented the medieval climax in the effective weapons and close action has always been coordination of archer and man-at-arms, one of the central problems of warfare. so the German blitzkrieg, or perhaps That statement is no less true of the more appropriately the overlord inva- attempts of Maurice of Nassau and Gusta- sion, suggests the culmination of a trend vus Adolphus to develop the right form towards the tactical integration of land, of close action dependent upon the im- sea, and air powrer that we are not likely pact and mass, the firepower and shock, to see repeated on so huge a scale. of heavy infantry than it is of military As governments, specialists, and peoples planners today who must seek some effec- carne to recognise if not embrace the íive form of combining the impact and potentialities and implications of the new fmass represented by nuclear and conven- weapons, as the possible nature of a ional or guerrilla forces. Indeed, the most nuclear war threw increasing doubt on ntractable question facing strategic spe- either the time or the need to convert the Íialists today is as much to visualise, then national peacetime economy to a war plan and educate for, some practicable footing, on the old techniques of mobilis- liynthetic pattern of battlefield behaviour ing major conventional forces, and on the jbased on the effective combination of classical strategical principies along which 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

they had been deployed, so it seemed placed atomic fission, and manned bomb- imperative to seek ways and means not so ers were supplemented by ballistic missiles; much for abandoning conventional forces, when national security had become a techniques, and strategic concepts as for matter of survival and international rela- adapting them to the new conditions of tions one gigantic ideological confronta- warfare within a fresh harmonic sym- tion. phony of nuclear and modified conven- It was Iogical and perhaps even neces- tional forces that they hoped to bring sary in these circumstances that attempts about. Thus, by a curious paradox, the should be made to provide in numbers of coming of new weapons was accompanied weapons what they lacked in individual by a sharp and sudden decline in fire- performance. At the same time, there power. seemed good and sufficient reasons for For the tacticians of the sixteenth cen- not abandoning those eclectic forces and tury, like the strategists of the twentieth, techniques—such as blockade, propa- found they had been provided with a ganda, blitzkrieg, and unconventional war- thoroughly expensive and inefficient fare—which had contributed significandy weapon. if indirectly to the defeat of the Axis For almost identical reasons, the earliest powers. Indeed, their combined effective- atom bombs, for all their unexampled ness in certain well-prescribed situations power, vvere not immediately accepted as such as the Berlin and Cuban blockades, being in themselves decisive weapons of the Korean War, and the Arab-Israeli war. Their process of manufacture was so wars, soon emphasised their prescriptive slow and expensive that it was several right to be retained as adjunctive if not years before the United States could com- primary forms of conflict. Yet acute ideo- pile a stock sufficient to devastate its most logical as well as strategic interests in probable rival. Such bombs as the scien- Europe made it urgent to effect somehow tists devised could be transported to their a fruitful combination between massed targets only in subsonic, short-range atomic firepower and massed ground manned bombers, vulnerable to ground forces. As the Spanish tercio represented fire or fighter interception. Moreover, the first clumsy attempt, without achieving blast and radiation presented such seem- optimal firepower or maneuverability, at ingly irresolvable tactical, legal, and moral hastily combining massed musketeers with issues that it was difficult to conceive of massed pikemen, so nato represented a their use in safe combination with other mariage de convenance between nuclear and tactical forces or indeed at any time in conventional forces—a marriage made all circumstances short of national survival or the more hazardous and potentially bar- some great ideological crusade. ren by the “shotgun” character of its When the world began to rearm again inception and the debatable provision of in 1950, the atom bomb was considered tactical nuclear weapons. an ancillary and not a decisive weapon in At the same time, the swift achievement a conflict which would be unlikely to of Russian nuclear parity and the develop- differ much in its basic pattern from ment of early warning and antiballistic World War II. The year 1945, like 1495, missile systems brought profound changes only provided a foretaste of what might to the Science and strategic theory of come when the new technology got into defence. Poised beneath the threat of its stride; when thermonuclear fusion re- inescapable and unacceptable destruction, NATIONAL SECUR1TY AS A CHALLENGE 37

nilitarv security, for those nations that confusion of terms, has all too often been ould afford it, lay only in the capacity to identified with the weapon it is partially deter ones adversary by having the capac- but not principally designed to deploy. At Ílitv to inflict on him inescapable and the saine time, many theorists, rationalis- unacceptable damage in return. ing their own impotence and the intrinsic The short-term effects of these develop- deterrent strength of nuclear power, have iments were not simply to hobble the continued to extol a superior Science of conduct of nuclear vvarfare but to create a psychological maneuver and revolutionary distinct and rooted aversion towards it warfare which others consider woulcl be and, in the absence of operationaJ analysis ultimately destructive of our moral tradi- under real conditions, to stunt the growth tions and social values, would be produc- Df applied strategv involving the inte- tive of deep domestic cleavages, and ^rated deplo^ment of all alternative forms would promote, not alleviate, international 3f conflict. The huge size of the nuclear anarchy. They cannot visualise any politi- stockpile and the maintenance of large cal problem to which the destruction of zonventional forces, strategically and polit- millions of civilians would provide the ícallv fused as they came to be in nato appropriate military answer. They would and subsequent alliance Systems, could not condemn nuclear warfare as the last resort be sufficiendy reconciled as a tactical in- of a singularly inept or ill-advised politi- strument appropriate to the peculiar cut cian. |and thrust of international politics. To- Between those two extrem es in military gether they obscured the need for alterna- postures that are accentuated versions of dve mechanisms to wage more limited but Clausewitz’s concepts of “absolute” and ess regular forms of conflict as they “real” war, and the reluctance to contem- jegan to develop in the 1950s. plate the extensive use o f either, m odem Tactical nuclear weapons made the pos- strategic thought now stands paralysed sibility of a major nuclear war not less and may never be hammered out except bertain but less controllable, dependent as in the blazing forge of a long war. Over it might be upon the untrained judgement the past decade or so, the shifts and bf junior commanders. Correspondingly, trends in internadonal politics and tech- 'he creation of international defence or- nology— not least in public Communica- ijanisations in peacetime not only evoked tions media— have m ade nuclear warfare rfficial countersystems that were tolerable decreasingly likely or tenable as a rational jecause expected but posed fundamental instrument of national policy, though the ssues of command and control which rem ote possibility in exceptional circum- hemselves further compounded the for- stances always rem ains. M oreover, the nulation and adoption of a common Wholesale reconversion of our military ntegrated and realisüc strategv by concen- establishm ent, if not of our social and rating too much upon European, as moral environment, in such a way as to iistinct from Asian or global, conditions combine the techniques of the insurgent and needs. with the discipline of the regular would The steady magnification of nuclear involve the creation of a revolutionary xnver by both sides has paradoxically ethos of professional responsibility and itrengthened that element, or agent, of behaviour which would not only be sus- national power that is least apt to be used ceptible to social disorder and internai affensively; and strategy, by a curious revolt in time of actual or apprehended 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

crisis but would impose inevitable and beyond all precedent, for a deeper under- intolerable strains upon the constitutional standing of the nature of war, of the role prerogatives of the State vvhich could only of force in statecraft, and of the needs, be safeguarded by imposing in return capabilities, and limitations of the armed restraints intolerable to professional spirit forces of which they dispose. The devel- and efficiency. opment of some neo-Clausewitzian philos- To restate our original proposition, one ophy of war comprising a fresh analysis of of the major military problems today is the dialectic between extremist forms of how best to contain and control the new conflict that would provide a basis for insurgent spirit and techniques of armed education for defense is, of course, not forces, contracted by exposure during fully possible in the absence of nuclear prolonged Asiatic warfare, in such a way wars during which the just apportionment as to preserve their enhanced tactical of responsibility and influence as between aptitudes and adapt them to operations of statesmen and soldiers, soldiers and strate- a conventional or nuclear kind without gists, scientists and specialists, w'ould be impairing the moral values or constitu- evolved. tional supremacy of the State. For the In these circumstances military philoso- professional soldier, the answer, at least in phy is dangerously liable to wither into the part, lay, as it did for Gustavus Adolphus recondite preserve of economists or math- and Sir David Dundas, in the introduction ematicians, divorced from practical, of a more enlightened but equally more professional, or humanitarian considera- exacting form of discipline and education, tions. There are signs that the dimensions to give him the technical expertise and of the problem are being probed and that exceptional political wisdom required to such a philosophy of conflict might ulti- cope intelligently with the demands of mately prevail, but there are many who modem conflict. feel that it is still far from attaining its For statesmen and specialists, officials, legitimate and final form.6 and academics, there is a need, greater Kingston, Ontario, Canada

Notes

I Edward Mead Earle, "N ational Defensc and Political Science," 6. In Canada, the strategic speculation that emerges fitfully and more Political Science Quarterly, LV. 4 December 1940, pp. 481-95; see also by or less unofficially from the established thairs of militarv and strategic the same author, "American Military Policy and National Security," ibtd., studies. the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. lhe universitv LIII. March 1938. pp. 1-13. Earle's pioneering efforts to persuade centres of international studies, and the Service academies often convevs a American scholars to take seriouslv the question of national defence and tone of futility, apology. or despan: that no matter what thev sav or do. grand strategv, of which his Makcn of Modern Strategy was but the Canadian analysts will never attain the pre-em inence or influence culmination, have yet to receive the recognition thev deserve. commanded by their European or American colleagues. nor the problems 2. Earle, "National Defense and Political Science," p. 481. of Canadian security be fairly faced by their governments and people. 3 Ibid. pp. 490-91; 494-95. This disillusionment is real and understandable and is no implicit 4. That the cvolution of modern strategic thought is at lasl susceptible reflexion upon the qualit* o f Canadian scholarship and rescarch. The to the techniques and perspectives of the historians craft has been absencc of Canadian strategists of world stature is quite simply explained recently suggcsted by Ravmond Aro.i and Michael Howard. See R. Aron. in terms of Canada s small and thinly scattered population. her traditions 'The Evolution of Modern Stratcgic Thought." and M. Howard, "The of political and military subordination. an officer corps educated in a Classical Strategists." Adelphi Paper no. 54, International Institute for technical rathcr than a literarv cast of mind, and. perhaps most importam Strategic Studies, London, 1969, pp. 1-17, 18-32. See also C. S. Cray, of all. the lack of any sovereign defence problems that require her to "The Rise and Fali of the Academic Strategists,"Journal of the Royal United maintain and deploy powerful armed forces independem of those Services Institute for Defence Studies, May 1970. VVhether war studies or committed to nato and noraíi. Even Canadian militarv historv. rich and strategic history is the most appropriate foundation for professional instruetive as it is. is but a series of footnotes to that of Europe and military education continues to be debated in the Army Quarterly. See also America Nevertheless, the depth and growth of Canadian defence H Bull. "Strategic Studies and Its Critics." World Politics, XX. july 1968; studies had not been well served by the practice of emploving fugitiver J. Carnett, ed., Theortes of Peace and Security: A Readrr in Contemporary foreign defence specialists—however great the temptation and however Strategic Thought. London: Macmillan. 1972 It is often forgotten that good they may be—or by an emphasis upon "applied policy" researth Machiavelli and Clausewitz, Jom ini and Mahan, even Kissinger and into subjects of immc*diate "defence relcvance." For furthcr discussion ol Brodie werc historians before they became strategic analysts and theoreti- this point. see C. S. Grav, "The Need for Independem Canadian cians. Strategic Thought," Catuuiian Defence QjuarU-rly, I. Sumrner 1971. pp. t>- 5. Michael Howard, "MilitaryPower and International O rder," Interna- 12. tional Affatrs. XL, July 1964. pp. 379-408. ETHICS OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION

M ajor Robert C. C arroll, USA

ECENTLY a general officer ad- dressed a group of officers on the subject of ethics. He made a grave Rbut common error. He argued that be- cause the image of the military was tarnished in the public eye, vve must improve our integritv. He failed to State that by focusing on our image, vve lose sight of our soul. We must have integritv for reasons other than image, and if vve succumb to the institutional neurosis of overconcern for our exterior image, vve vvill in fact prostitute our integrity to embellish that image. The intent of this article is to examine military ethics and to advocate more svstematic and enlightened discussion of the topic vvithin the profession of arms. No one denies the importance of integ- rity, that admirable, abstract quality of a person who abides by an ethical code. But the ethical code for the military man is rarely explored vvith any degree of personal concern or conceptual sophisti- cation. complexities Ethical judgments in the military involve complex and conílicting alternatives that cannot be resolved by an appeal to an abstract notion of integrity. The West Point motto, “Duty-Honor-Countrypro- vides a guide for an ethical code, but 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW these three concepts can, unfortunately, unresolved ethical dilemmas can cause be in conflict. An example illustrates the serious psychological problems for the point. individual and degradation of combat It is conceivable that an oíficer could effíciency for the unit. be urgecl by his superior, peers, or Whv are offícers reluctant to examine subordinates to "pad” a report of combat these issues before they are faced with success. The “padding" may l)e argued in the necessity of immediate action? The terms of debatable assumptions concern- overriding reason is that the issues are ing the action, existing organizational extremely complex and difficult to re- norms concerning reporting, or further- solve. To whom does the commander of ance of the mission or morale goals of a United Nations peace-keeping force the unit. Insofar as the organization asks owe allegiance? Does the “end” of taking the offícer to take this action, it can be care of the troops justify the “rneans” of viewed as his duty. Insofar as this action midnight requisitioning? Is it unethical to conflicts with his desire to be truthful, it refuse to obey a lawful but ill-conceived affronts his integrity and conflicts with orcler that will result in needless loss of his sense of honor. It is also conceivable life? Is the total veracity of the staff that the offícer believes that the action is officer’s report really essential when it not in the best interests of his country. He will result in the termination of careers of might believe that the battle should have competent, dedicated men? These ques- been less restricted by nonmilitary con- tions do not lend themselves to easy siderations or, on the other hand, that Solutions or pat prescriptions. They are the fíghting should have excluded certain extremely complex because fundamental populated areas. Or perhaps the report values are in direct opposition and a will go to the press, which can be ex- judgment must be made concerning the pected to treat it unfavorably. Any of priority of those values. these considerations could convince the Some argue that these issues have been offícer that a given action is not in the addressed in recent years through highlv best interests of his country. It is an publicized accounts. Certainly the stories understatement to say that these ethical of men like Calley, Turner, Wõoldridge, contradictions are complex. Bucher, and Lavelle provide poignant With varying circumstances, this con- case studies of ethical dilemmas. These flict can be made personallv relevant to accounts are indeed demonstrative of all offícers. Ethical contradictions occur in issues involved, but they fail to force the varying degrees of intensity, based on the tvpical offícer to examine his own code of individuafs background and the situa- ethics. The publicity and the stakes in- tions in which he fínds himself. It is my volved make the cases impersonal and belief that far too many offícers resolve distant. It is too easy to praise or con- these dilemmas onlv in the heat of crisis demn from afar without examining one's and emotion. The crisis can derive from own conflicts. The normal dilemmas of social pressure or from the heat of battle, offícers will not make headlines, and by neither of which maximizes rational anal- some they are considered petty or trivial. ysis and predictable behavior so essential The triviality of these decisions is mis- to conducting the business of war. Even leading, however. What is frequently for- in circumstances where the ethical deci- gotten is that one’s behavior over time sion is not immediately needed, Iingering determines one’s attitude in the future. A ETHICS OF THE MILITARY PROFESSION 41

series of “petty infracrions” will erode a a panacea, this framework provides a standard of conduct. The srnall white lies route toward systemadc and enlightened make it easier to tell the big one. The ethical analysis. incipient abuse of integrity not only tar- Conscience. Human beings distinguish nishes the mans integrity in the eyes of right from wrong or gcxid from bad by both soldiers and civilians but, more what is called their conscience or inner important, also permits greater personal voice. The conscience is developed, nur- tolerance for failure by the man himself. tured, and changed throughout life. Ini- These concerns are verv personal and tially an authority figure, such as a par- individual, and they are not likelv to be ent, priest, or policeman, defines “good” divulged over coffee or beer. Officers are in terms of the institution he represents. not prone to confess breaches of integ- The child, adolescent, or adult conducts rity. particularlv when they are not proud his behavior based on fear of punishment of their actions. The sad feature of this or desire for rewarcl by the authority. As institutional inhibition to discuss ethics is the experience of the individual in- that it precludes significam correction of creases, he accepts or rejects the values of unethical behavior. If the specific ethical the authority, and his actions are judged issues were discussed and analyzecl before by his own conscience. Saluting the flag is the frenzy of pressure for a decision an example in the military context. Ini- arrived, individual and group strength tially the serviceman performs this act for supporting “correct action” would be because authority demands it; later, as a enhanced. Naturallv it is impossible to professional, he does it because he thinks foresee all potential ethical dilemmas, but he should. Saluting thus becomes a mat- it is possible to search for likelv hypothet- ter of conscience. ical situations, to examine the issues, and This significant change whereby the to resolve the conflict intellectuallv./ This conscience was developed, or the norm is a more healthy approach than that of internalized, is only possible because of the ostrich. faith in the authority figure. The per- formance of the authority must be con- a framework for ethical decisions sistem, and those acts defined as “good” cannot be contradictory if the conscience As stated earlier, ethical situations are too is to develop. The individual accepts the multifaceted for general prescriptions. dictates of the authority based on a The remainder of the article attempts to rational faith. describe the framework in which ethical The concept of conscience is intensely decisions are made by military profession- relevant to integrity and professional eth- als. This framework consists of four top- ics because a man can only achieve ics: conscience, equilibrium, the core mili- integrity by following his conscience and tary ethic, and a moral calculus. These can only be professional if his conscience topics could well serve as the foundation is not in conflict with professional ethics. for a block of instruction in military This does not mean that the soldier schools at all leveis. This framework should stop questioning his own actions could also be used in an officers call at or orders. With blind, unquestioning obe- the unit levei or as the structure for dience, men become robots, automatons, informal dialogue among a group of animais; with thoughtful obedience, men concerned military officers. Although not become professional soldiers who have 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

not surrendered their human nature. takes precedence over the latter, and this The conscience must be the final guide is a bitter pill for some to swallow in for “right” actions. The alternative is “sin” these times of strategic “sufficiency” and and guilt. Violating one’s conscience is “no-vvin” policies. If the ethical priorities psychologically unhealthy. Violating a were reversed, however, the justification moral rule established by society is socio- for mutiny would have been laid. Mac- logically disruptive and chaotic. There is Arthur, probably the most brilliant strate- no more sensible alternative than to fol- gist and soldier-diplomat of the century, low the maxim “To thine own self be was blinded to this fact by his own pride. true.” It is not an insignificant fact that an Equilibrium. Problems surface, however, offícer being commissioned into the mili- when man is subjected to several sets of tary service takes an oath to support and codes that are not in total harmony with defend the Constitution, a document vvhat he has been taught or holds dear. which describes and symbolizes our tvpe Some values such as honesty are, hope- of government. The oath does not de- fully, central and common to all codes: note lovalty to a given person as did family, church, military, etc. These values oaths taken in feudal times by serfs to form the nucleus of several codes and their lord or in the Third Reich by can symbolically be portrayed as the soldiers to Hitler. In the American mili- center of concentric circles. Other codes tary our loyalty is to the commands of or systems of “rights” and “wrongs” can the President, as authorized by the Con- be incongruent, if not antithetical. For gress and as interpreted by the courts. example, aggressive combat action result- This balanceei governmental machinery ing in danger to self and death to the finances, codifies, and directs the business enemy is not a value taught by most of the profession of arms in those en- societal institutions. This situation can deavors that the government sees as result in ethical disequilibrium, repre- necessary and right. sented symbolically by interlocking non- When the governmental structure dic- concentric circles. tates attack, or attack under certain con- The individual must examine the dis- straints, or reduction of the size of force, parate codes and adjust his values and the military complies. It does so collec- conscience to compensate for these dif- tively and individually because reason ferences. The ethical system must be and observation over time have given the brought into equilibrium or symmetry. military professionals a rational faith in the Failure to do so results in ambivalente, decisions of the civilian authority with anxiety, and uncertainty. Procrastinating regard to what is “right” for national this adjustment function is the mark of a defense. The oath to support the Consti- weak man, a psychologically immature tution, hence the government, is predi- person, an individual vvhose actions are catecl not on blind obedience to authority unpredictable. In the military it could but rather on a rational, intelligent un- well mean a man who may not do what derstanding of that authority. his country is paying him to do. To support the Constitution is to be The core military ethic. The two central obedient to the lawful orders of the values of the military profession are sub- civilian government. All policies, instruc- servience to civilian control and the de- tions, regulations, and laws are derived sire to win wars if engaged. The former from a legitimate authority clearlv spelled ETHICS OF THE MIUTARY PROFESSION 43

Dut in the Constitution. Compliance with act be clear and logical in the emotional :hese orders, whether thev pertain to hair frenzy o f physical or social conflict. These ;tvles or nuclear weapons, is a direct dilemmas should be resolved before the dérivatíve of the officers oath. moment arrives requiring a quick crucial Some may question whether following decision, so that intellect and not emotion every rule and regulation is part of the will be the chief source of inquiry into militarv ethic. It is naiive to think that a the conscience. regulatíon on wearing the uniform is in Man’s psyche is capable of amazing essence different from a regulation on distortion of reality under stress. Ration- the use of government property, treat- alization and displacement of responsibil- ment of prisoners of war, or firing ity are w'ell-documented phenomena of [nuclear weapons. The difference is only both the healthy and the psychotic mind. |in degree of importance. The violation of A moral calculus or an examination of [anv rule, regulation, or order, no matter the issues in a setting unencumbered by how trivial, is a deviation from the mili- stress will minimize the distortion of the tarv ethic. The only difference in viola- issues and will result in the clearest tions is in degree of deviation from the delineation of the ethical code. ethic. The officer vvho believes he may pick and choose between important, logi- I have used a framework for ethical cal, and realistic regulations, on the one decisions to describe the process by which hand, and trivial, ilíogical, and meaning- an officer evaluates an ethical issue, con- less ones, on the other, is guilty of siders his responsibility to support the violating the professional ethic and is a Constitution, and brings into equilibrium victim of serious self-delusion. or harmony any values that are in oppo- A moral calculus. This is not to argue sition. This framework is not intended to that every regulation must be enforced to be a template for correct decisions but ;he hilt but rather that failure to enforce rather a description of a process that a regulation or to follow’ an order will actually occurs. The central point is that exact a price. The understanding of the this process occurs too often in the crisis trade-offs involved, the consequences of of immediacy. I have advocated increased he acts, and the cumulative erosion discussion and analysis of military ethics caused by relatively minor infractions is a in a noncrisis environment in order to \nental process. The locus of this ethical resolve issues rationally and strengthen decision-making is the brain: hence the “right” decisions with the solidarity of term “moral calculus.” fellow' professionals. VVhen an officer is faced with a conflict If the reader now believes he under- between his conscience and an order, he stands the nature of military ethics, this jmust resolve the issue, and for his own treatise has been a singular failure. The psychological health and moral well-being reader should merely have derived an :he decision should be in favor of his appreciation of how complex the subject :onscience. The problem is that the mili- is. Ethical issues are seldom either black ary cannot tolerate this breakdown in or white; they occur in the grey zone. luthority during times of crisis. Nor will The purpose of this article was not to man s reasoning or his intellectual elirninate the grey but to illuminate it. arch into the moral consequences of an t Air Command and Staff College OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

Alook into fundamentais1

1 JHTtNAN I COI ONH Cl.YDK R. RoBBINS N JuJy 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense the decision process.3 This directive Panei passed the following severe judg- stressed that ot&e should be independent ment on Department of Defense Opera- of the developer, timely, and realistic. Itional Test and Evaluauon (ot&e ) efforts: In September 1974 the United States Air Force began using a Special Operating Agency, the Air Force Test and Evalua- There has been an increasing desire, tion Center, to carry out Service ot&e parricularlv at osd levei, to use data from ot&e to assist in the decision-making proc- management functions. ess. Unquesrionably, it would be extremely The defense policy and management useful to replace or support criticai as- structure for ot&e is well advanced, but sumptions and educated guesses with what of the execution of the tests them- quantitative data obtained from realistic selves? Will their quality rise above the and relevant operational testing. condidon reported by the Blue Ribbon Unfortunately, it has been almost impos- Defense Panei in 1970? To some extent sible to obtain test results which are directly ot&e has already improved, simply be- applicable to decisions or useful for analy- cause there is now a feeling that the ses. Often test data do not exist. When results are needed at a levei where impor- they do, thev frequendy are derived from tant decisions are made. It is the premise tests which were poorly designed or con- of this ardcle that further improvement ducted under insuffíciently controlled con- ditions to permit valid comparisons. It is can be had by careful attendon to some especially difficult to obtain test data in fundamental consideradons. The mecha- time to assist in decision-making. Signifi- nism now exists to use ot&e results as cam changes are essential if ot&e is to inputs to decision-making. The work that realize its potential for contribudng to im- remains is to make sure that ot&e quality portant decisions, particularly where the tests is worthy of this important purpose. and the decisions must cross Service lines.1 Since that time there have been impor- What Is OT&E? tant policy changes that significantly in- crease the role of ot&e in the systems In the usaf, the test and evaluation acquisition process. On 13 July 1971 the process for systems acquisidon has been Department of Defense (dod) decisively divided into two types. The first, called linked ot&e to the important decisions to development test, is concerned primarily buy large-scale producuon quanüties. with the engineering function of the de- Test and evaluation shall commence as sign. Development test may also be early as possible. A determination of oper- thought of as one of the later refining ational suitability, including logistic support steps in the design process, where the requirem ents, will be m ade prior to large- entire design or its components are sub- scale production commitments, making use jected to selected test condidons that have of the most realistic test environment possi- been chosen to qualify or pass the engi- ble and the best representation of the neering design. The development test is future operational system available. The largely quandtadve and may also be linked results of this operational testing will be to the development contract as an incen- evaluated and presented to the dsarc at the time of the production decision.2 tive to contractor performance. Another type of systems acquisidon test, On 19 January 1973, dod took further which is the topic of this ardcle, is called steps to assure that ot&e is responsive to operational test. The focus of the opera-

45 46 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW tional test is on the intended operation or manning leveis and operating rates, and use of the system. The dominant consid- employment planning. All these uses re- eration for operational test is the relation- quire information about the expected ship o f the system to other enem y and characteristics of the system when em- friendly systems with which it may oper- ployed in an actual operating situation. Ir ate. T h e operational test will be active, will contrast to earlyiOT&E efforts that suppori involve people, support, Communications, production decisions, information for op- an d tactics, an d will try to judge the erational introduction can be served b) contribution of the test system to the later, more extensive ot&e conducted with overall military effectiveness of the forces production equipment in an environment in w hich it will operate. more closely resembling actual operations. Another aspect that may need clarifica- Both procurement decisions and opera- tion is the use of the term “evaluation.” In tional introduction require two kinds ol current usaf usage, “test” refers to physi- operational information, one relating to cal activities designed to secure data, while effectiveness, the other to suitability. Oper- “evaluation” refers to the mental activity ational effectiveness refers to the ability of used in processing the test results and the system to perform its intended mili- other relevant information to get useful tary task; operational suitability refers to conclusions. From this usage have evolved the compatibility of the weapon system the terms “development test and evalua- with its surroundings. These are not com- tion” (dt&e ) and “operational test and pletely separate questions since suitability evaluation” (ot&e ). factors (i.e., how well the system can be The proper conduct of ot&e , in my supported) may also indirecdy influence opinion, requires that the ot&e tester give combat effectiveness. Still, these classifica- attention to some basic considerations that tions provide a useful way to think about are derived from the purposes served by test objectives, and they are commonly his test. He must be attuned to his role in used. the larger context of systems acquisition and be able to direct his efforts toward Considerations in Conducting OT&E the assigned task. There are several vital considerations Purposes of OT&E that must be addressed in planning and conducting an ot&e . These considerations ot&e serves two main purposes. As are basic and fundamental to a sound test previously noted, it provides information that will convincingly answer the criticai about the system for decisions in the questions. These points may seem basic systems acquisition process. ot&e also pro- and obvious, but the importance to the vides detailed information to support op- usaf of a strong ot&e program, one that erational introduction of the weapon sys- produces high-quality results, warrants tem. This second function has been car- continuing attention to fundamentais. ried out over several years without signifi- The situation in ot&e may be compared cam controversy and has not been the to that of a football team. No matter how subject of recent ot&e policy changes. In sophisticated the game plan becomes, the second function ot&e information evervthing rests on the execution of fun- supports the development of training pro- damental skills. Also, it is important to; grams, logistic planning, verification of realize that these are “considerations,” not OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 47

shortcut methods to “get a handle” on the ot&e . It must also be recognized that problem. In these quickly changing times, many of the detailed questions cannot be each ot&e is a new event, and the burden resolved with a defmitive quantitative an- of proof must be on those who would swer. A question concerning range or bypass these basic considera tions and treat loiter-time requirements may be answered a new ot&e as a repetirion of any past by trade-off analysis to show that there is OT&E. a range of “acceptable” value, each with associated penalties in other capabilities. mission definition Also, not every specific question that may be raised need be answered. The value of The starting point for an operational test the procedure is realized if a judgment is must be a defmition of the operational made as to which factors are important mission, preferably in as much detail as enough to define clearly and which are possible. This defmition should consider not. all intended missions, including combat, The test reference mission may be training, and other uses of the system. derived from the saine source that pro- The defmition should also include the vided the basis for the development pro- likelv range of operating conditions for gram, but it cannot be identical. A num- each mission. Also needed is a full and ber of years will have passed since the complete description of enemy threats that requirement studies were done, and sig- may be encountered, with expected capa- nificant updating changes may need to be bilities and characteristics. Finally, the defi- made due to changes in the threat, sup- nition must consider the friendly support- porting system, logistics, deployment pos- ing systems with which the system will ture, or even added new' missions. The operate. essential point is that there must be a This mission defmition should be as reference (operational mission defmition) thorough and detailed as possible, for in order to make a comparison (opera- consideration of specific questions makes tional evaluation). the criticai test factors more readily identi- The mission definition is inevitable. fiable. For example, consider the questions Even if this mission definition is not “VVhat kind of rumvays will an aircraft writíen and carefully considered, it will normally use?” or “How much loiter time nevertheless exist in the minds of the is needed in the target area?” These evaluators, where it may be erroneous, questions are important to the evaluation fuzzy, or incomplete. This informal, per- of close air support systems, and a com- sonally held mission defmition might be plete evaluation requires some answers. correct, but it is not readily available for To cite another case, in the counterair review by decision-makers. mission much depends on the enemy It is almost self-evident that an adequate defensive capabilities in the intended oper- mission definition must exist as a standard ating area, and complete evaluation of an against which to measure the weapon air-to-air fighter system cannot be made system. until this hostile environment is defined. These cases briefly illustrate the impor- tance of trying to answer specific questions test objectives about the intended use of the system as a Spelling out test objectives may be fundamental starting point in planning an straightforward if two things are known: 48 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

first, the mission defínition is needed; and, the system because there are many obsta- second, there must be a definitive state- cles to realism. The test cannot possibly ment of the information wanted from the have total realism, for the only full meas- ot&e . These information needs are largely ure of combat reality is combat itself. a management function. If the test sup- Furthermore, each instance of combat has ports a production deeision, the key fac- been unique, and it is impossible to pre- tors in that deeision should be identified dict the future unique combat situation so that they may be purposefully satisfied that a new system will experience. Yet, if by the test from its inception. In the the purposes of ot&e are to be met current dod directives these may be de- responsibly, someone must create an ac- rived from the “criticai questions and ceptable description of this unknown fu- issues” that are pertinent to the specifíc ture reality. deeision.4 These key factors must be Realism is vital to keep the ot&e from understtxxl before preparing a test plan becoming a repeat of earlier development because an operational test that supports a analysis. Some analysis and evaluation will production deeision vvill usually use lim- always be needed to convert test results ited quantities of development hardware. into a usable form that can be projected With limited time and resources, the test into the future; but if the test itself has must specifically address the questions in few elements of realism, then a greater the minds of decision-makers. Such spe- amount of analysis and judgment (or cific management questions are the pri- guessing) is needed to bridge the gap mary reason that the early ot&e exists, between test and realitv. The basic reason and the capability to answer such ques- for performing a test is to confirm the tions was the primary incentive to the utility of a design resulting from earlier recent ot&e policy changes. Later ot&e analysis. It therefore follows that the test that supports operational introduetion also should take as large a step as possible requires specifíc information, but these away from analysis and toward full opera- needs are more varied. Varied and di- tional reality. An active effort is needed to verse information needs may never come achieve realism. If realism is not earnestly to focus in a single key event like the sought and operational tests are con- production deeision, but they are no less dueted in the test environment that just important. Operational data are the lubri- “naturally happens” at a test site, the test cating knowledge that should make the situation will be primarily oriented to the introduetion of the system smooth and restraints imposed by engineers, range avoid the slow and painful process of and traffic controllers, safetv supervisors, relearning in actual operations the tech- data collectors, and many others vvhose niques and procedures that have been support is needed. The dominant factor learned by others in a test program. will then be convenience, not realism. Although total realism is not possible, realism there are some steps that can be taken to introduce this vitallv needed realism into Operational testing must be designed to the test situation: reflect adequately the conditions that will Use of two-sided tests. War is a two-sided exist in actual operation. The ansvvers affair. Move and countermove come in an provided by ot&e must deliberately be endless stream. Sometimes the action is made relevant to the real employment of fast-paced, and sometimes events move OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 49

slowly as each side thinks about the situa- Increased scale. As football coaches know, tion and devises new approaches to the a partial two-sided clrill is not as helpful in contest. The human gifts of ingenuity and assessing a team as a full-dress scrimmage adaptation are constandy in use as military against a competent team. Likewise, lhe tacticians try to em ploy m en and m ateriais larger the scale of the test, the more likely in a more advantageous way. This innova- that it will include all the important force tive process has an uncanny way oí elements. In the example of a one-on-one quickly exposing and exploiting the fighter engagement, the test becomes strengths and weaknesses of weapon Sys- more comprehensive when other aircraft tems. These same desirable effects can be are introduced (perhaps four-on-four) and realized in a test situation sim ply by elements of the ground environment are making the test “two-sided.” Even a small added, e.g., radar sites, surface-to-air mis- amount of two-sidedness is helpful. For siles, etc. With the scale of the test in- example, one-on-one engagem ents be- creased in this way, the results may reveal tween tactical Fighters are a useful way to deficiencies in Communications links or in bring out criticai design features for eval- pilot-to-aircraft interface problems that oc- uation, even though it is recognized that cur only when the pilot workload becomes the real world is usually larger than one- high. The major obstacle to large-scale on-one. Limited two-sided tests are valua- tests is their increased cost and complexitv. ble to the extern that they represem key The operating cost of each element in competing elements of the larger situa- active test time may be small, but these tion. same resources will, in all probability, be In the past, one of the problems with lost to other uses for a greater period of two-sided tests has been organizational. time because of the inherent difficulties in For example, the resources needed for a coordinating and scheduling a large and two-sided test of bombers versus fighters complex test operation. One must there- were in different Air Force commands, fore approach increases in the scale of a while the forces needed to conduct an air- test in a selective way, choosing those versus-ground engagement were in differ- elements which experience or analysis ent Services. While no intentional bias has shows to be important while omitting for existed against two-sided tests, the various the sake of economy those which are organizations naturally tended to focus expected to have a minor influence on the attention on their own pressing problems results. to the neglect of objective two-sided oper- Removal of unnecessary constraints. Realism ational tests. Recently some favorable may also be improved simplv by removal changes have come about, and one excel- of the unrealistic and unnecessary re- lent two-sided test, combat hunter, was straints of the normal test environment conducted in 1972 using Army and Air that will not exist in the expected emplov- Force resources. Further two-sided tests ment situation. The key worcl is “unneces- are now being planned, and this trencl sary,” and if a restraint is to be kept, one may be expected to continue, in view of must ask, “Why is the condition neces- expressed dod support for joint tests.5 sary?” Often a doser look at the restraints Also, recent emphasis on coordinated ef- will reveal ways that they can be avoided. forts at the Service levei should help Following are typical test restraints: remove this obstacle to two-sided tests in Data systems. The requirement for en- the organization. gineering data will usually result in limits 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

on altitude or operating area, to remain sought at the expense of safety must be within the instrumented range area. Te- essential to a convincing test that will lemetry reception, photo coverage, and answer important questions. positioning information all have their own Use of representative hardware. Realism is characteristics that may limit the way a test enhanced when the most representative is conducted. test and supporting items available are Weather. The tactically difficult “bad used. In the past, most newrly developed weather” needed for an operationally real- systems have used development hardware istic mission may simply not be readily for operational testing. Under present available at the test site. In another case, systems acquisitions policy, the basic struc- safety or data considerations may require ture of a development program is de- clear weather when the existing weather is signed to provide a reasonably mature actually realistically bad. In most cases, system for operational evaluation. Repre- operational realism will call for considera- sentative test supporting items are also tion of a wide range of weather conditions important. In recent years one of the while the tvpical test restraints will nor- most difficult test problems has been mally favor good weather tests during encountered with targets supporting air- daylight hours. to-air missile tests. Target drones are often Airspace. Airspace for operational test- destroyed during air-to-air missile tests, ing is often smaller than desired and and the development of drones has there- located in places where the earth below is fore emphasized a low-cost vehicle. At the used for a totally unrelated purpose, such same time, a target drone that can ade- as farming, residence, game preserves, or quately reflect the speed, maneuver, and national parks, thus ruling out supersonic radar and infrared signature of an aircraft flight and the dropping or firing of tends to be almost as large as an aircraft. various objects from an aircraft. Unfortu- In fact, one solution has been to convert nately, little can be done about these aircraft that have been retired from active restrictions in existing operating areas. Service into unpiloted targets. This ap- Recognizing this difficulty, the usaf has proach has provided more representative initiated the Continental Operation Range targets, but with these large targets there program, which seeks to make larger, has been a tendency to conserve target more useful airspace areas available for aircraft. It is very difficult to design a fully testing and operational training. realistic missile test and at the same time Safety. The most difficult limitations to conserve the target. There is a basic relieve are related to safety. Safety limita- conflict betw^een the objectives of the tions are usually imposed for good reason, missile test and the desire to conserve based on experience with accidents. The targets. The difficulties in obtaining fully desire for safety may have an even more representative test support items suggest compelling reason during a test program the need for a continuing effort to de- than would normally exist because the test velop improved test techniques and sup- resources may be “one of a kind” proto- porting hardware as a part of the overall types, the loss of which would have seri- ot&e capabilities program. ous consequences to the entire program. It is very difficult to press for test realism in the face of a potentially hazardous point of view situation. The elements of realism that are It seetns self-evident that a test should be OPEfLATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 51

)bjective and should represem the situa- support. From the outset, a test must be ion as viewed by a prospective user, but organized based on knowledge of which jiere is a strong human tendency against organization needs what information, jbjectivity when one is personally involved when, and for what purpose. If these n a project. This tendency, which might things are not known, the test tends to oe cailed the “success syndrome,” occurs serve itself and its internally generated .vhen the tester desires to be associated ends, and one might properly ask, “Why vith a successful vveapon system program is this test being done?” -ather than an unsuccessful one. This The frequency, format, style, and com- ittitude, which stems from a desire for munication of test reports should be spe- personal career success, will inevitably cifically adapted to the test at hand and rreep into the selection of test conditions not simply patterned after precedents. md the subjective interpretation of results. ínterim reports, tv or film reports, brief- In contrast to a successful weapon sys- ing reports, letter and message or tele- em program, a successful test program phone reports should all be considered as does not depend on the test outcome. A possible means to get needed information successful test program may have any into the proper hands on time. result if it is valuable to the decision orocess. A successful test program might ^er> well spell the end of a weapon system evaluation arogram and save production funds from Tests alone do not provide simple answers Deing spent on a lemon. totally applicable to operational reality. The tester must be neither success- Evaluation is needed to apply reasoning oriented nor excessively criticai, for by his and judgment to the test results and actions in test planning and evaluation he answer the operational questions about a :an influence the outcome for the weapon weapon systems effectiveness and suitabil- system. The tester must be objective and ity. In considering this process, it is impor- faithful to his purpose, which is to provide tam to remember that judgment is a xliable, accurate facts and considered personal, subjective quality. It resides with udgments as a basis for good decisions. individual people and reflects their knowl- The decision-maker must also take care edge, attitudes, and experiences. For an Lhat he does not inadvertendy encourage operational evaluation, this background he success syndrome by praising the resides with individuais who possess signif- ester for the successful system. Plaudits icam military experience of a kind most for a successful weapon system belong to closely related to the projected military hose who participated in its development. environment. Iesters, by contrast, must be rewarded for But experience alone does not insure «ound test execution, thoughtful evalua- an adequate evaluation. These same indi- ion, and honest reporting. viduais, while possessing relevant experi- ence, must then apply themselves with an ■eports eye to the future. Their task is not to measure tomorrow’s weapons against yes- The tangible outputs of a test are the terday’s battlefield but to envision the *eports it provides. These reports support conditions of the future and evaluate test cey decisions or other events and must results against that future. Evaluators must Tteet the schedule of the events they not take for granted that any particular 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW aspect of past experience will apply in íull really necessary here because a “fly before measure to the future, but at the same buy” policy has been adopted, and the time they must make full use of the somewhat higher initial program cost* insights gained from this experience to associated with that decision are accepted. produce an operational evaluation ori- both to achieve a better produet and tc ented to the future. control risks. On the other hand, the direct costs oí ot&e are not a closed question. These cost costs will remain vulnerable to the finan- There are two perspectives that may be cial pressures that may exist in a weapon used to view ot&e costs. One viewpoint system program. In such circumstances, stresses the program cost implications or an ot&e program, like a safety program, those costs associated with arranging a should be considered in relation to the weapon system development and produc- disasters it prevents. It is penny-wise and tion program so that adequate ot&e may pound-foolish to cut corners on a test be conducted before committing funds for program that is intended to answer major production equipment. The other view- questions in support of a production point could be called a preventive costs decision. Test resources must, of course, approach, for it stresses the use of ade- be managed efficiently to get the most quate ot&e as a means to minimize the from each test dollar. However, when probability of a serious mistake. allocating test resources, it is better to err In a somewhat oversimplified explana- on the side of a more-than-adequate tesi tion, these two viewpoints may be related than to risk a significant error in a to the Systems acquisition concepts of production decision. A production deci- “concurrency” versus “fly before buy.” In sion error may result in the purchase oí a fully concurrent program, the decision large quantities of ineffective or unsup- to design, develop, and produce the portable systems, causing expensive re- weapon system is made at the outset. All trofit programs and substantial delay in activities proceed together so that the time reaching a combat capability. It is this to complete the full program is minimized sobering possibility that should be bal- and effícient use of design and production anced against the direct costs of an ot&í resources is possible. This is undoubtedly program. the preferred approach—if there are no mistakes. But people do make mistakes, and in a concurrent development pro- Looking Ahead gram the only way to rectify a mistake is to stretch out the program, slow down the Operational testing is now firmly estab- planned production, and then retrofit the lished as a part of the systems acquisition defective items already produced. To process. In the future, new systems ex- avoid these very significant consequences ploiting expanding technology will con- of a mistake, the “fly before buy” concept tinue to create possibilities for operational plans for an orderly “stretched out” pro- employment that cannot be closely linked gram, which uses ot&e to reduce the to our previous experience. This situatior probability of buying weapon systems that will, in turn, demand more careful consid- must later be fixed. A detailed considera- eration and greater ingenuity in the de- tion of program costs related to ot&e is not sign of operational tests and will require OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 53 greater management skill to carry out considered program thal addresses the these new tests. The emphasis must shift fundamental consideradons which may be away from the routine use of established important in his situation. He must avoid test procedures and toward developing the complacent view which holds that all methods of test problem anaJysis. Such ot&e is basically alike and one may simply anaJyses should include the basic consider- pattern the current test after a convenient ations discussed here and stress a tailor- precedent. He must recognize that each made ot&e for each application. test has a unique set of circumstances and may demand a near-total reconsideration of the answers which applied to any T he tester must keep one thought con- stantly in mind: the purpose of the test. previous test. All this he must do with a He must plan, execute, evaluate, and feeling for the combat operations of the report ui th a concern for producing the past and an eye to the possibilities of the information needed by others. He must future. conduct a deliberate, orderly, and well- Air War College

Notes

1. Biuc Ríbbon Defense Panei, Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, Chairman, Report 3. Depaninrnt uf Dt-fcnsc. DOD Directive Number 5000.3. 10 Iuh to lhe Prestdeni and the Secretary af Defetise on the Department of De/eme, 19 7 3 . p a r a 111 Ci 4 Washington. GPO, 1970. p. 89. Alsoralled lhe Fit/hugh Report. ■i.lbid., para III H 1. 2. Department of Defensc, DOD Directive Number 5000.1,13July 1971. para 111 5. Ibid.. para VII E. INTERACTION The Military and the Media

Major J ohn Duncan Wil l ia ms

EW would challenge the notion that in the United States the viability of the ilitary Services rests squarely upon broad- Ebased public support and understanding. Such grass-roots support means that the natioiVs young people will continue to come into the Service, that military installations can effectively and harmoniously coexist with their civilian neighbors, and that congressmen elected by this citizenry can more easily vote the appropriations necessary to build and maintain a first- rate, modem military force. Given this, it seems important to examine the process by vvhich such public support is generated and sustained. In large measure, the publics attitudes toward the military are directly dependent upon the amount of information about the military that they receive and believe. And because most of this information reaches the public via the mass media, the

54 INTERACTION: THE MIUTARY AND THE MEDIA 55

nteraction process between the military some instances, about himself. The find- and the media must be understood if ings yield insights upon which improve- ,vays to enhance this flow of information ments in the interaction process could be are to be found. To this end, an extensive based. iuantitative and qualitative study of the militarv and the media was undertaken. validity of information officer role This research report focuses on two prin- ;ipal actors in the news process: the media As a matter of custom, and in some repórter and the military information offi- instances regulation, the information offi- :er. cer is the primary contact for news media A questionnaire designed to measure representatives who seek information and correlate variables that impact on the about the activity of the given federal government/media interaction was sent to agency. Newsmen occasionally balk, how- he base information officer at each of the ever, at going through the information 100 Air Force bases in the continental office, saying they prefer to eliminate the ted States and then to 150 reporters “middleman”—the information officer— cover these bases on a regular basis. and go directly to primary news sources names of 75 of the reporters were such as, for instance, a base finance officer Í,ided by information officer respond- for a story on military pay increases. , and the remaining 75 were selected Information officers typically prefer that ditors of newspapers located near the all news media contacts with their installa- s. tion be initiated with their offices. Occa- sionally, the media representatives assume ?veral factors influenced the decision that the information officer is not privy to :o use these groups in the study. First of important matters of possible news inter- ill, base information officers are govern- est, and thus they are virtually forced to nent information officials who are primary bypass him. :ontacts at their respective installations for Quesdon: Are you generally willing to use news media representa ti ves. Newsmen se- the base information office as a primary ected for the survey were those who were contact point or do you prefer to go issigned militarv affairs reporting respon- directly to other news sources within the iibility for their respective news organiza- organiza tion? ions. Only one journalist in four, 26.4 per- An excellent response rate was achieved cent, indicated a preference for using the rom both newsmen (58 percent) and information office as a primary contact nformation officers (75 percent). The point. Other data generated by this ques- lata were then keypunched on Computer tion indicate that the government’s prac- íards and analyzed by use of an existing tice of requiring that contact be initiated pmputer program that generated fre- through the information office may well |uency distribution statistics and contin- be a significam impediment to productive fcency tables print-outs. media/government interaction. To gauge role performance in the Conversely, information officer re- nteraction process, a number of questions spondents by a wide margin feel that the kere included in the questionnaire to media are “satisfied” to come to the >btain expressions of attitudes and per- information office First with their ques- ormance ratings by each respondent tions. bout his protagonist counterpart and, in 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Question: Do you think the press is question and indicated by means of mar satisfied to use your office as a primary ginal notes that they were unwilling tc contact point or do you think they would generalize because the individual perform prefer to go directíy to other potential ance of the information offícers witf news sources on base?'' whom they dealt varied so widely. The The high percentage of information percentage of journalists who think the offícers who feel that the press is satisfied information offícers impede news flow to come to them first—some 87 percent— 16.1 percent, is very close to the percent contrasts sharply with the actual prefer- age of information offícers who feel tha ences of journalists as reflected in their journalists believe information officer: responses to the question. impede, 17.3 percent. Several journalist: Still, aimost 80 percent of journalists are noted that they felt that information offi at least willing to use the information cers increased the flow on certain types o: office, although many respondents added news and impeded the flow on others. that they would not hesitate to “go over the io’s head” if necessary. credibility and trustworthiness utility of interaction process Preliminary investigations undertaker prior to the development of the question The regulations and directives of most naire indicated that persistent blockages ir government agencies specify that a pri- the information channel could be attrib mary task of the information officer is to uted to deficiencies in trustworthiness anc assure a maximum possible flow of infor- credibility. Some newsmen would com mation to the public. Nonetheless, some plain that information offícers sometime: newsmen have complained that informa- did not provide complete and factua tion offícers often constitute buffer zones answers to inquiries and might even re between newsmen and news sources and lease untruths or half-truths. In short thus render the task of news gathering sometimes, among some newsmen, tht more difficult. The following two ques- credibility of the information officer wa tions were designed to determine if there suspect. are significant differences in the way the On the other hand, some informatioi information officer function is perceived offícers said that they experienced clifficul by the two groups. ties in working with newsmen becaus< Question: Do you think that generallv the they could not be trusted to quote then io helps you to get information and thus accurately, to respect news embargoes, oi increases the flow of news to the public or to refrain from using information pro that he stands between you and news vided to them “for background onlv.’ sources and thus decreases the flow? Some information offícers declared tha Question: Do you believe that newsmen they could not be more open with report generally think you help them to get ers because they could not trust them t( information and thus increase the flow of observe the “ground rules” that certaii news to the public or that they think you types of information required. stand between them and news sources and Questions were designed to determin» thus decrease the flow? how general were these perceived defi A number of the journalist respondents ciencies in information officer “credibility checked the “no opinion” response on this and in journalist “trustworthiness.” Th< INTEfUCTION: THE M1UTARY AND THE MEDIA 57 dose correlarion of responses from both Responses reflected in Table 2 suggest rroups is shown in Tables 1 and 2. that trustworthiness of newsmen, like Question: As a repórter covering a mili- credibility of information offícers, cannot an activity, vou rely on the base informa- be termed a serious problem in the news ion offícer (io) to accord you fair and process. Although a few of the informa- irofessional treatment. Much of this reli- Table 2. Journalist Trustworthiness mce is based on your concept of the :redibility of the io . Can you rely on the Rating N % o with whom you deal most to give you Rarely 2 2.7 accurate and complete responses to your Occasionally 3 4.0 nquiries? No opinion 11.3 Responses to the quesüon on accuracv Frequently 12 16.0 dearly indicate that reporters generally Most of the time 57 76.0 Delieve that information offícers provide Totais 75 100.0 hem with accurate and complete ansvvers o queries. Over 85 percent of the journal- tion offícer respondents scored journalists sts said that thev could rely on the in the lower two blocks, over 90 percent nformation offícer for accurate responses gave journalists high trustworthiness ‘frequendy or most of the ume.” (Table 1) scores.

Table 1. Information Offícer Credibility negative and controversial news Rating N % Government officials have frequendy 9 larelv 2.3 charged that the press coverage of gov- )ccasionally 7 8.1 ernment activity tends to stress “bad” No opinion 3 3.5 rrequendy 11 12.7 news—the controversial, the sensational, dost of the time 64 73.4 shortcomings, and failures—while “good” news—positive accomplishments and suc- Totais 87 100.0 cesses—is given short shrift. Just as often rhese data strongly support the tonclu- newsmen have retorted that they cover all jon that most journalists do believe the news, good or bad, with equal vigor. The iformation offícers and that lack of credi- following question relates to these points ility is simply not a general deterrent to of contention: le flow of news. Question: Given the difficulty of neatly Information offícer respondents vvere categorizing a news story, how would you sked to evaluate the trustworthiness of characterize most of your stories about the íe reporters who covered their respective nearby military base? rganizations. Obviously—at least from the journalists’ Question: As base information offícer you point of view—allegations that “trouble” ely on the press to accord your activity stories are stressed are exaggerated. Only ür and professional treatment. Much of one respondem was willing to characterize lis reliance is based on your concept of his stories as “mostly about problems.” he reporters trustworthiness. Can you The majority, over 62 percent, said they ely on the repórter with whom you cleal wrote more “success” stories. Several re- nost to report news of your activity spondents indicated in marginal notes that ccurately? they wrote success stories and failure 58 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW

stories as they happened, if they were within which public affairs reporters must newsworthy. operate, what types of information must On the other hand, some 45 percent of be provided to them, and what types may the information officers thought that be withheld. Such educative processes newsmen gave undue play to negative should work to dispel actual or perceived stories about the military. Since propor- “fear of the media” regarding access to tionately so many more information offi- government information. cers than journalists thought adverse sto- A prevailing sentiment of both groups ries were stressed, it is likely that stories was expressed by one repórter: which appear to information officers to have negative connotations are not so The government and the media are all regarded by newsmen. out to do the same job and I feel it’s high time we began treating each other openly and as equals to achieve our common goal obstacles to news flow of information dissemination. Respondents were asked to describe, in Table 3. Reported Obstacles to News Flow their own words, what they felt to be the Information principal obstacles to news flow. Obstacle Identified foumalists Officers Question: In your opinion, what are the N % N % principal obstacles to the free flow of Commander’s fear of information about government to the media 17 19.5 14 18.7 Poor media press and the public? perform ance 10 11.5 810.7 Most respondents appeared to give very Good news only poücy 10 11.5 5 6.7 careful attention to this response. Al- ‘‘M a k e n o w a v e s ” policy 9 10.3 00.0 though some offered a one-word answer, Bureaucracy 7 8.1 15 20.0 many among both groups wrote 500- to Mutual distrust 6 6.9 4 5.3 1000-word essays to express their views on Security considerations 5 5.8 68.0 Poor IO perform ance 4 4.5 4 5.3 obstacles. The thrust of the opinions and Media/lO friendships 22.3 0 0.0 recommendations advanced by both Personal PR for groups was that the public has a right to commander 1 1.2" 8 10.7 News cover-ups 1 1.2 6 8.0 know what their government and the Lack of military are doing, that the press has an communication 1 1.2 0 0.0 obligation to report the news candidly and No response 14 16.0 5 6.6 fairly, and that the information officer has Totais 87 100.0 75 100.0 the responsibility of removing obstacles to the flow of news and assisting the press in G iv e n the responsibility of a free press to getting information to the public. provide the public with complete and Even a cursory examination of Table 3 unbiased reportage of all elements of leads one to the conclusion that certain of governm ental activity— including the mili- the perceived news obstacles can be re- tary— and given the m ilitarys apparent duced or removed. News media perform- interest in assuring maxim uin public un- ance can be improved by assigning more derstanding of its function, it seems ob- knowledgeable and/or more experienced vious that the reduction or removal of real reporters to cover government. Com- or im agined obstacles to the flow o f military manders (or other government officials) news is both desirable and necessary. can be made aware of the parameters Randolph AFB. Texas

S Headquarters usaf leaders shape tion became an active subject within the Ai the Air Force for the time frame of usaf in early 1970 when General John D. the Airborne Warning and Control Sys- Ryan, then Chief of Staff, sent a letter on tem (awacs), the B-l, F-15, and A-10, simulation to Aerospace Defense Com- they face many serious problems. That mand (adc), Air Training Command they vvill be equal to the task is unques- (atc), Military Airliít Command (ma c), I tioned; however, to solve the problems, Tactical Air Command (tac), and Stra- they need to know vvhat the problems are. tegic Air Command (sac). In that letter he Flight simulation is one. Simulation is outlined some training principies used by creating a problem about which little the airlines that he would like to see awareness has been demonstrated, princi- incorporated into command flying train- pally because we appear to be on track. ing programs: The General Accounting Office (gao) 1. Insure that each course is structured has issued its long-awaited report on the to contain precisely the training required. use of flight simulators by the Department 2. Give only training appropriate to the of Defense.1 The Air Force vvas reported individual. to be well ahead of the other Services in 3. Measure training on proficiency, not planning for effective use of simulators. on course length. Nonetheless, we need to look closely at the 4. W hen a skill is particularly difficult, impact of what was saicl. The gao report seek ways to alter the task to make it recommended that the Air Force and easier.4 Navy: He was clearly discussing the formal flying training courses listed in Air Force Man- . . . use simulators as much as possible to reach [Flying Training Squadrons’] and ual 50-5, USAF Formal Schools Catalog. m aintain [Combat Flying Units’] profi- Later, in 1970, a usaf Policy Letter on ciency, including . . . evaluation of pilot Systems Approach to Training (sat ) was proficiency.2 sent to all major commands. This letter explained sat as a technique for manage- The report also developed in great detail ment of training that could lead to signifi- that 25 percent of Air Force flight time cam economies. Application of the sat for bombers and fighters could be re- technique called for the selection of the placed by simulator hours, which could right hardware and software and appro- save about $300,000,000 annually. A 50 priate training.5 The objective of sat was? percent substitution would save about to assure incorporation of the airline! $620,000,000.3 training principies. The stated sat policyi The problem that results from all this is provides that: rooted in the difference between how 1. A t H q usaf, the Directorate of Person- both dod and the gao perceive simulation nel Training, Dcs/Personnel, would pro-i and how simulation can, in practice, be mote the use of sa t in the major com-| applied. Among the various mission areas, mands. the greatest difference in perception lies 2. sa t would be applied to all new, generally in the area of tactical air power training Systems. and specifically in the realm of continua- 3. sa t would be selectively applied tc tion training in combat units. existing education and training svstems.b Let’s turn back the clock and see how During the next couple of years, the we got where we are toclay. First, simula- training course words fell by the wayside

60 INMYOPINION 61

uid all-inclusive words began to come to always result. A similar applicadon can be he fore, such as “Incrementai plans are made to fighter missions. leeded which apply sa t to our flying Upon cridcal examinadon of this simple raining programs.”7 The flying training and desirable alternadve, some interesdng mrse emphasis had disappeared. What facts become apparent. A most important eemed to emerge was a general feeling fact is that flying-hour costs are high íat, because \ve did some of our training principally because of the manpower re- ,-ith simulators, the cheaper simulator quired to generate a flying hour. This fact lours could be traded on a one-for-one is important because it gives a clue as to asis with the more expensive actual flying where large savings are possible. lours. For instance, in a Combat Crew Train- ing School (ccts), where the unit product is a trained pilot, effecdve simuladon can here we are today produce direct flying-hour trade-offs. But, Ve are currendy at a criticai decision time as we look at the combat mission units, it íat requires some backpedaling. Let’s begins to be less clear. >ok at the situation. Take the strategic bomber mission as an I First, simulation on the scale that we are example. If we decide to produce the ansidering is currendy being used in the fatigue of long missions by simulators and -aining of airline crews. While some then allow crews to fly a short bomb run, irline pilots fly the simulators for training we could perhaps save 50 percent of our nd proficiency, other airline pilots fly all currendy expended flying hours. This te airplanes available in passenger and would, in gross terms, tell us to reduce argo revenue-generaung operations. The our maintenance manpower by 50 per- ternative to this is to take aircraft out of cent, and we would have to do so if the ;venue operauons and use them for pilot advertised savings were to be realized. aining. Therefore, simulators are an Now, we could probably stand some re- :onomically wise choice for the airlines. ducdon so long as sufficient manpower he Air Force became interested for the was retained to generate the force in ime economic reason. Simulation was support of war plans. And, in the case of íen as a concept for savings. strategic bombers, training mission sordes It was obvious from the start that any probably exceed warume mission sordes. ivings would have to come from reduced The same kind of logic applies to ying hours and the concomitant econo- strategic defense. Wartime mission re- íies. Flying-hour costs are comprised of quirements are probably less than training etroleum, oil, and lubricants; spares; requirements. To the extern that this is so, laintenance manpower costs in man- full flying-hour-cost trade-offs can be real- ours and overhead. For example, flying- ized through quality simuladon. However, our costs are $1473 for a B-52 and $853 manpower can be reduced only to the >r an F-4.8 Obviously, with simple flying- point where wartime and peacedme mis- aur cost calculadons, if 50 percent of a sion requirements meet. And it is precisely 30,000-hour B-52 flying program could at this point that flying-hour costs must - accomplished by simulation, $148 mil- increase to account for more maintenance >n would be saved. More complex and manpower spread over a smaller flying- >mprehensive calculadons could yield dif- hour program. Incidentally, no one seems rent savings; however, savings would to know really where that point is, and it 62 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW doesnt appear that anyone is searching Tactical air forces are organized, equipped for it. It might be an interesting search, and trained to conduct sustained air opera- since manpower and programming actions tions aimed at destruction or neutralization deaJ in flying hours, and vvartime require- of enemy forces.9 ments are in sorties that must be gener- Tactical aircrews and ground crews to- ated from an unknovvn posture at an gether shape the weapon system contin- unknown time. uum; however, they do have markedly Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that different but equally important functions. some savings are possible by effective use Tactical aircrews are currently assigned of simulation, especially in formal training an almost impossible complement of mis- courses and in airlift and strategic mission sion tasks. They are expected to be expert areas. Hovvever, the savings expected air-to-ground bombers and skilled air-to- from simulation in tactical mission units air tacticians. The myriad of training portend a potentially serious dilution of events for F-4 crews is enough to tell even air power. We have now reached the the less-than-realistic manager that skills point where the record must be set straight—even at the expense of some will be diluted by weather, ranges, mainte- credibility—or we must prepare to man- nance problems, etc. This is the clue tc age significantly different tactical fighter simulation for today’s tacdcal forces. Simu- forces in the future. lation should be viewed as supplementar) Unlike the other mission forces, tactical training aimed at maintaining aircrew fighter forces have a wartime sortie rate skills, which tend to be diluted througf that is greater than the peacetime flying- diversity of tasks and a wartime missior hour program. Likewise, maintenance effort that is greater than the peacetirm manning is based on wartime require- flying program. ments that preclude making the man- Ground maintenance personnel of tac power reductions explicit in a simulation tical forces are the same breed of technica concept focusecl on savings—savings tied specialist used throughout the Air Force directly to peacetime flying-hour costs. If Although training requirements for air crews could justify a larger peacetirm savings were to be directed by dod for economic reasons, serious dilution of tacti- flying program, this program naturalh cal air power would occur. remains less than the seven-days-a-weel Where, then, does simulation fit into program required to support the highei the scheme of things for tactical mission wartime mission sortie rate. forces? Since the ground maintenance person nel assigned to tactical fighter units are a simulation and tactical fighter forces the minimum levei necessary to suppor the specified wartime sortie rate, flying To answer that question, we need to hour reductions cannot include the man examine the mission(s), pilot and ground power component when calculating antici support skills, and future fighter aircraft. pated savings. Therefore, the manpowe The examination need not include ccts’s savings explicit in current simulator/flying where full simulation application and sav- hour trade-off philosophy cannot be real ings are appropriate—assuming they are not ized without degrading combat capabilit) assigned a contingency combat mission. In addition to the mission, pilots, ant The mission of tactical air forces is ground crews, our future aircraft, princ: widely known: pally the F-15 and A-10, need to b IN MY OPINION 63

surveyed. In keeping with the capacity of legislating or directing flying-hour reduc- pilots to master skills, we will be back to a tions in favor of simulation, they need to concept of air-to-air fighter pilots and air- understand clearly that the flying-hour to-ground attack pilots, both essential to savings will be small because the man- accomplishment of the tactical mission. power component of the flying-hour costs, Once more we will be in a position to give which is required to support the combat aircrews and ground crews adequate train- mission, cannot be reduced. As a matter ing to maintain mission skills sufficient to of fact, constant manpower spread over a assure success in combat. Even so, these smaller flying program would have the new aircraft with computer-interfaced undesirable effect of increasing usaf wreapon delivery systems should be easily flying-hour costs for tactical fighter air- simulated, and mission enhancement craft. should be possible. If carried to its logical economic conclu- Let’s look again at the question of how sion, the concept of simulation for savings simulation should fit into the scheme of through flying-hour trade-off presents a things for tactical fighter forces. First, it clear and present danger to the future of should be considered additive to enhance usaf tactical air power. It moves us toward skills, not a trade-off. Likewise, this view the position where our wartime mission needs to be immediately and clearly artic- capability will approximate our peacetime ulated to the Office of the Secretary of flying program, and you cant defeat the Defense, the Office of Management and enemy with a simiilator. Budget, and the Congress. Moreover, if sources outside the Air Force persist in Air War College

Notes I. Grcairr Use of Flight Simulators in Miliiary Pilot Training Can 5. "USAF Policy on the Systems Approach to Training (SAT)," an AF/ Deerease Costs and lncrease Pflot Proficiency." A Repon to Congress by DPTBD letter to all MAJCOMS. 13 November 1970. the Gomptrollcr GeneraLoí the United States. 9 August 1973 (hereafter 6. Ibid., para 4. dted as Comptroller General's Report). 7. "Systems Approach to Training," a letter from CSAF to ADC, 2 2 IbnL. p. 3. February 1972. 3. Ib*1.. Appcndix 1. p. 23. 8. Comptroller GeneraTs Report, p. 16. 4 "Flvmg Training Efficiency." a letter from CSAF to ADC. ATC. 9. AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operatioru. 2 May 1969. para 1-1. MAC. TAC. and SAC, 2 February 1970. THE COMMANDER AND HIS THEOLOGY OF MAN:

C haplain (Lie u t e n a n t Colonel) J ohn G. I ruitt, J r .

HAT is the value of man? Does a the very basic question as to the “value of W person have intrinsic worth inde- man” from a theological point of view pendem from anothers concept of that rather than the more usual political, eco- worth? Shoulcl a military commander even nomic, or tactical perspective. concern himself with such questions? A commander once wrote on the effec- YVhether a commander thinks he should tiveness report of a chaplain that his or not, he consciously or unconsciously sermons did not adhere to the theology of answers such questions all the time. The the command. Such a statement implied question of man, whether asked from an that there was an established theology for economic, tactical, or humanitarian point that command; this was not the case, nor of view, is of vital importance to the should it have been. But it did point out military commander. Any student of mili- that as an individual this commander had tary strategv is aware of the importance of very definite ideas concerning his faith men within that strategv, but that is quite ancí that as a “whole man” he related different from an unclerstanding of the them to his official duties as well as his intrinsic worth of man. The military econ- personal life. omist knows all too well the economic Historicallv, many of our greatest gen- restraints that dictate the number of men erais have considered man from a theo- within his force, but that says nothing logical perspective as well as the more about the real value of man; it considers obvious perspectives of their profession. onlv the costs of obtaining his Services. To Edwin S. Davis, in a research study enti- a tactician, a group of well-trained military ded Faith of Our Generais, concluded thal men executing a battle plan with split- the faith of such famous generais as second precision is like an art form, but Washington, Jackson, Lee, Grant, Persh- that does not address the question of their ing, MacArthur, and Eisenhower was worth. In todays society the military com- “clearly a motivating force.”1 It would be mander is forced to think as a humanitar- an error to infer that the faith of those ian as well as a tactician and economist. As seven generais accounted for their great- a humanitarian he must broaden his ap- ness or that it was the primarv perspective proach. from which they viewed their military At First thought, the commander might duty, but Davis claims that their faith was be turned off by the suggestion of think- a factor in the specific decisions and ing of himself as a humanitarian. How- orders given relative to their command ever, any man who deals with life and responsibilities. death, as the professional soldier does, Today’s commander must still considei should give considerable thought to man man as the basic instrument of war. In from a humanitarian perspective and these days of technical revolution it is easv: eventually even develop his own theology to lose one’s perspective amidst the sophis- of man. Let us explore some of the ticated machinery of warfare to the ne- implications of a commander answering glect of the basic ingredient, namely, man. 64 IN MY OPINION 65

It would be one of the great tragedies of fíes the situation in which the com m ander pmission to become so engrossed in the fmds himself. He is often torn between his imassing of a great arsenal, capable of sworn obligation to be a stone-thrower— nan s destruction, that vve should forget it an instrum ent o f the State— and the Chris- was for man’s protection that such an tian concept that man’s life is of a higher iwesome arsenal was developed. Indeed, order and worth than the laws of society. f we are not engaged in the furtherance That is to say, the whole is not of equal )f man’s protection and dedicated to value to the sum o f its parts. Sociologically, Dreserving his individual dignity and iden- the individual and society are correlative, itv, then in amassing such a destructive but the State assum es the greater value for orce we are perpetrating the greatest itself. However, theologically, the individual ragedy of mankind. To avert such a is pre-eminent over the State. It is, after all, ragedv, one of the basic questions for individual personality th at will transcend íverv military commander should become the time-encompassed State. From a theo- i theological one. logical perspective, it is the freedom of indi- Even though it is recognized that man vidual personality that has the higher value. ias been unable to achieve an adequate In a w orld o f political realities, the State evel of acceptance or understanding from continues to predominate over individuais imong his fellows, vet from within Chris- so that their personalities are suppressed or ian theology war is seen as a tragedy. even lost. While this trend should be stop- \nd man continues to live as though he ped within the State, it should be recognized vere a star playing out that old Western also that individualism has never been a novie theme, “This world’s not big hallm ark o f military life, either. Should a mough for both of us.” Although man A m ilitary com m ander, then, try to adjust tnows that man B is equipped with a somewhat the traditional concept o f his ab- veapon and fully intends to use it if solute authority over the individuais of his rhallenged, he nevertheless continues to command, recognizing the need to pre- aress his will upon him. While that may serve the freedom of each individuaTs per- ;eem too simplistic to explain the complex sonality? T o m ake the point as clear as rconomic and political issues that cause possible, and for purposes of contrast, it is lonflict between nations, it illustrates the Communism that would ultimately socialize ruth that man is not only the basic man so that individualism is destroyed and nstrument of war but also the basic cause. personality com pletely suppressed. When Christ confronted a group of Perhaps that leads us to ask the hard >eople about to stone one of their mem- question (given the functions of the State): >ers to death, he removed the point at Can any State be Christian? Is it possible ssue from a group action to an individual for a State to follow an ethic that was íction and thereby precluded any stones’ conceived for individuais? oeing thrown that day. From that encoun- Looking back to the Jewish beginnings ier, the men holding the stones did not of Christianity, is it correct to assume that really come to any better understanding the Ten Commandments were given to a )f their brother, but they did come to a “community,” to the group of people that setter understanding of themselves. Be- Moses led, or were they offered to the ause of that, hostilities were avoided. individuais who made up that community? What are the implications of that story Perhaps it was the latter and we have or the military commander? It exemplí- been guilty of expecting our State and 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW even its military instrum entalities to be lives have been taken in the name of other than they should. A State cannot Christianity, nevertheless individual re- function from an individuaTs ethic, nor sponsibility within Christianity is a re- may an individual be released from his straint to violence. personal responsibility by the State. This The paradox which the Christian com- intensifies the need for a military com - mander encounters is that, although as an m ander to develop a clear theology of individual he condemns war, he still con- man. It also becomes clear that it would siders it the right thing to do as an be in error to assume that the State should instrument of the State. Although the or indeed could delineate an ethic or absence of war is preferred by the Chris- theology for him. tian commander, he is painfully aware Whereas in the Ten Commandments that the world in which he serves is not individuais are forbidden to kill, and free from evil, his own or his neighbors’. murder is considered a sin, the same This awareness of the human condition is individuais acting as instruments of the an insight derived from his theology of State may fínd it their duty to kill. Thus man. His theology also gives him an the great paradox of the Christian military overriding concept as to the worth of man commander is that, while as an individual even in his sinful nature, and this aware- he is under the mandate of the command- ness of rnans individual worth becomes a ments of God, he is also an instrument of powerful restraint. Perhaps it is the most the State, a professional warrior, a man of important restraint for a world that could war. He cannot expect his responsibility so easily destroy itself. For, today, when under one to eliminate his responsibility men gather to throw “stones” at another under the other. A real danger might be member of the world order, even though that we so deceive ourselves as to forget he may have transgressed the laws under where the truth lies. which we have agreed to live, we could The role of the military profession is to destroy mankind. And again we have a fight. Only when an adversary perceives paradox in that we might also destroy that it is not in his best interest to mankind by not going to war when man’s challenge is there peace as a result of personal freedom is challenged. Even military force. When a commander goes though one equates war with death, there into combat and commits his men to fight, is a condition of life that is worse than they “throw their stones” not as individu- death: indifference to the quality of life. ais but as the military arm of the State. To In the United States we have lived so long relate this to the Biblical example referred in an environment of freedom that it is to earlier, the men in that group were hard to conceive of life any other way. enforcing a law of the community by But another way of life could be ours, and stoning one of their members to death; there are forces in the world that would they were functioning as an arm of the like to banish individuality from existence. society rather than as individuais. It was A theological understanding of rnans only when Christ took the matter out of worth would not permit a policy of isola- the group or “state” context and placed tion or of indifference to other men and each person on his own responsibility that their struggle for freedom. We fínd that the stones were dropped to the ground. each generation within our country has Although a reader of history could make sacrificed and suffered to preserve our a strong case to show that thousands of legacy of freedom. In Davis’s Faith of Our IN MY OPIN/ON 67

erals, he noted that from Washington Every commander needs a theology that £isenhower (which covers every period will help him understand man’s condition, h.f our nation's history up to Vietnam)to understand the worth of the men he >ur highest commanders have been men leads and the worth of those he may be vho acknowledged and exemplified the called upon to oppose. Since men hold mportance of their faith. AJthough Amer- nuclear weapons in their hands rather :a is called a Christian nation, it is only than stones, such an understanding could nore Christian than pagan to the degree become our best and perhaps our only hat the individuais vvho incorporate it acceptable deterrent. levelop a personal theology and permit it Finally, within the military structure o influence them in their decision-mak- itself considerable effort has gone into ig. humanizing the force. Today military But if we must fíght, and if \ve contend commanders are giving each member of lat one who follows the Christian ethic their command more control over his life refers not to engage in conflict, how can style. An enlightened understanding of re reconcile the fact that the American individual worth and dignity has led the ghting man does so vvell in combat? Does Services to deal more courageously than e return to some base drive that is a part any other group with the social issues that f his nature? Perhaps there is real truth plague our nation. í that, yet the manv militar) decorations So, "Right on,” commander, as you sort lat are given by this country for combat through the many complex problems that istinction are not tied to the number of confront you, not the least of which must íen a soldier has killed but rather to the be to answer the question for yourself, Durage, valor, and, if you will, nobility “What is the value of man?” Within your lat rise within man which enable him to answer you will find new elements for an aake the necessary sacrifices to accom- improved organizational management lish tasks that appear bevond his capac- style, but, most important, you will find :y. Could it not be that a Christian the moral incentives to help other people íeologv which emphasizes the worth of win their personal freedom, while defend- tan actually makes such heroism possi- ing your own. The military commander le? Is it not yet another paradox that, who has developed a sound theology of /hile war is seen by a Christian com- man will never fail to secure for himself íander as an outgrowth of man’s (sinful) or his brother a life that permits all men uman condition, he decorates the men of to be free. You might call that détente is command because war raises within raised to the highest power. lem acts of nobility?.I Air Command and Staff CoUege

I. Davis, Edwin S. Failh of Our Generais An Irufutrs into the Signifieanee of Alabama, Air Univcrsiiy, Unpublishcd Air Command and Staff College ligwn m lhe Lives of Snvn Creat Amervan Generais. Maxwell AFB, rcsearch study, 1971. PROFESSIONAL MIUTARY EDUCATION FOR THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER Is It Effective?

CMSgt Donald S. Beshor e, ANG

NE result of the tremendous social ship schools.2 However, it is important t< Oand technological change in the Air note that the number of these schools ha Force has been the creation of profes- periodically increased and decreased ove: sional military education (pme) for the the last twenty years, depending upon th< enlisted airman and noncommissioned of- availability of sufficient funds and suppor ficer (nco). These pme schools were cre- within the commands to conduct thes ated to produce a more efficient, effective, programs. For example, as compared tt and productive enlisted manager for the the 26 leadership schools in operatior highly complex weapon systems of the today, there were 56 in 1962, called ncí United States Air Force. To accomplish preparatory schools.3 A number of com this objective, Headquarters usaf author- mand nco academies have been discontin ized major commands to establish leader- ued at various times since their birth. A ship schools and noncommissioned offícer one time the Strategic Air Command, foi academies. Several major air commands example, operated three nco academies have pme schools under the jurisdiction of today only one is in existence. the individual command. This article, In January 1973 the Air Force ap based on a study of the history and proved a new levei of professional militar) effectiveness of the enlisted professional education for the nco, the usaf Senioi military education system, advocates cen- Noncommissioned Offícer Academy, un- tral control of the many and somewhat der control of Air University, and openec diverse schools. its doors at Gunter Air Force Station Alabama. This new phase of pme did noi history come about by the wave of a magic wand In fact, when first proposed to the Unitec In March 1974, the United States Air States Congress, it was disapproved. The Force celebrated another milestone in its rationale for Congressional disapprovai short but glorious history, the twentieth was the fact that the Air Force alread) anniversary of professional military educa- was supporting eleven nco academies tion for the noncommissioned offícer. The After additionai study by usaf and Aii first nco Academy (ncoa) in the United University, another proposal was submit States was opened at March Air Force ted, and this time it was approved. Thus ii Base, Califórnia, in March 1954. Its fore- has taken the Air Force nearly two dec runner had been an nco school estab- ades to implement fully a professioná lished by the Strategic Air Command at military education program for its non West Drayton, England, in 1952.1 There commissioned corps, which is now compa- are now eleven accredited academies. In rabie to that which has been provided foi addition, there are 26 accredited leader- the commissioned officer since March 68 ÍN MY OPINION 69

1946.4 The established enlisted and officer tion. However, core curriculum for the pme institutions in the Air Force are as Sênior nco Academy is not yet included folio ws: in afr 50-39. Although afr 50-39 provides for en- Officer PME Enlisted PME listed pme for ranks E-6, E-7, and E-8, Leadership Squadron Officer only a few of these noncommissioned School (LS) School (SOS) officers are afforded the opportunity to Noncommis- Air Command and attend, and then only after they have sioned Officer Staff College served as managers for approximately 15 Academy (ACSC) years or more. A similar problem exists (NCOA) for the junior nco seeking education Sênior No nco m- Air War College through a leadership school. At present, missioned Offi- (AWC) only five major commands are operating cer Academy such schools. Many of the leadership (SN COA) schools were closed when a manpower shortage developed as a result of the effectiveness Vietnam war, and very few of them have Just how effective are current enlisted pme reopened. programs in meeting the needs of today’s To further substantiate the point, each Air Force? Unlike officer pme programs, of the three schools is restricted as follows: enlisted pme programs have evidenced a Leadership school. To attend an nco lack of continuity over the years since leadership school, personnel must be in their initial establishment. the grade of E-4 or E-5, with fewer than To be accredited bv usaf, leadership 12 years’ total active federal military Serv- schools and nco academies must meet ice, and have more than 6 months’ retain- minimum standard criteria. The Leader- ability. As stated earlier, there are only 26 ship School curriculum entails at least 136 Air Force leadership schools in existence, hours of instruction, conducted over a and they have an average student load of three-week time period.3 The nco Acad- twenty per class. The nco leadership emy course is of five weeks’ duration and schools conduct eight classes a year and at least 225 hours of instruction.6 The graduate approximately 4000 students an- Sênior nco Academy, which is the highest nually.8 This accounts for only 8 percent levei of nco pme, is of nine weeks’ dura- of the total eligible personnel resource. lion with a total curriculum of 352 hours.7 NCO academy. To attend a command All these schools are required to be con- nco academy, personnel should be in the ducted in an in-residence status, with the grade E-5 and possess a seven-levei or be exception of the Sênior nco Academy. In in grade E-6 or E-7. Personnel in pay November 1973 an Extension Course In- grades E-8 and E-9 may also be selected stitute (eci) correspondence course for the for this levei of professional military edu- Sênior nco Academy program was acti- cation. There are eleven command nco vated, and it may be taken in lieu of in- academies in operation, with an average residence training. Air Force Regulation student load of 123 per class. They have 50-39, “Noncommissioned Officer Profes- eight classes a year and graduate approxi- sional Military Education,” estabüshes spe- mately 10,800 students annually.9 Only 21 cific authority for the operation of these percent of the total Air Force eligible courses and detailed curriculum informa- enlisted personnel resource has the oppor- 70 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW tunity to receive this levei of professional Now Generation.”10 These middle man- education. agers are “the vital element that should be Sênior NCO Academy. The recendy estab- serving as the bridge to span the genera- lished Senior Noncommissioned Officer tion gap which separates the colonel from Academy provides advanced professional the basic airman.”11 In an era when we military education for the senior nco in must do more with less, we cannot afford pay grade E-7 if he is an E-8 selectee and to lose sight of the fact that “these young those in pay grades E-8 and E-9. This noncommissioned officers are forced to school is programmed for five classes per do their job without benefit of any formal year, with an average student load of 240 leadership or management training.”12 It per class. This amounts to 9 percent per is increasingly diffícult to accomplish more year of the total available strength in the with less without adequate education in rank categories eligible to receive this levei leadership and management techniques. of professional military education. Another aspect of pm e must be dis- cussed when considering the question of effectiveness and relevance of the current T he current pm e programs at pm e programs: the core curriculum. the major command academies are effec- In his article Colonel Larson States: tive but inconsistent. For example, some afr 50-39 does not presently outline a commands conduct extensive outdoor mil- course of training that will do the job. That itary training programs vvhile others have course must be revised to provide greater no outdoor military training at all. In the emphasis on human relations, understand- area of student evaluation, some schools ing human nature, and personalized lead- have purely objective pass-fail systems, ership techniques based on a knovvledge of some have a combination subjective and the strengths and weaknesses of the youth objective pass-fail system, and others have of todav .... Leadership schools must be no pass-fail criteria. Even course lengths opened up throughout the Air Force, on e a c h ba s e . . . , 13 vary. Some command academy courses have a five-week program, and others Since the publication of Colonel Lar- have up to six weeks. There are also son’s article, the core curricula for both differences in physical training programs, the leadership schools and the nco acad- in education fielcl trips, and even in the emies are being reviewed annually by number of instructional and administra- major commands. Functioning workshops tive staff personnel. between various academies have dedicated From the foregoing, it is reasonable to themselves to update and recommend conclude that we are not meeting the total changes in core curriculum. Because of needs to improve the professional ability these annual reviews, there have been at all leveis within the nco ranks. In a some increases of time allowed to the 1971 article Colonel Doyle E. Larson said: areas of greatest concern at the middle- “This deficiency in nco leadership training management levei. At present approxi- is affecting the usaf at a crucial point in mately 26 percent of the core curriculum, the organization: at the middle manage- in both the leadership schools and non- ment levei, where young and inexperi- commissioned officer academies, is de- enced noncommissioned officers are at- voted to the areas of human relations, tempting to train, discipline, and motivate understanding human resources, and per- large numbers of young airmen of the sonalized management. IN MY OPINION 71

Control and continuous improvement taken so as to give effective leadership and of enlisted professional military educatíon management training for junior noncom- are vital, if we expect to attain the goals that missioned officers, the E-4 and E-5 work- jhave been established to prepare the en- ing supervisors who make the First contact listed airmen for positions of greater with the young airman.14 This statement responsibilitv throughout their careers. is just as applicable to the middle man- agers—the E-6, E-7, and sênior noncom- recommendations missioned officers. If we are to be successful in meeting To ha ve more effective enlisted pme pro- the requirements levied upon us, we must grams. there are several things that could also have the ability to understand the be done to eliminate the inconsistencies human psychology of today’s youth, those and allovv for fu tu re expansion o f the who work for us as well as those we work enlisted pme programs; i.e., centralized for. We cannot be satisfied with the control vvith decentralized facilities could current curricula and must continue to be established. Under this system each seek change if we ever hope to meet the command would still operate its ovvn needs of a changing Air Force. We cannot academv; however, the Air University continue to relegate ourselves to 1950 would oversee a program of standardiza- management techniques if we expect to tion. Areas that could be effectively stand- meet the Air Force objective in a rapidly ardized are military training programs, changing culture. evaluation systems, improved school facili- ties, increase in school faculties in order to accommodate an increased student load, T he oeficiencies of noncommissioned of- ficers in broad background and education and teaching methods. As the enlisted pme programs continue to expand and im- limit the effectiveness of their leadership prove, Air University could coordinate and management abilities. More impor- such things as guest speaker/lecturer pro- tam, the limited number of nco personnel grams, faculty enrichment programs, in- who are afforded an opportunity to at- structor assignments (exchange programs tend Air Force professional schools points between command academies), and even to the increased importance of establishing printed text materiais. Additionally, lead- additional leadership schools for the jun- ership schools could be more effectively ior noncommissioned officer and central- structured while operating under the de- ized Controls for the existing noncommis- centralized control of base education and sioned officer academies. training offices with Air University moni- The need to broaden the education of torship. Furthermore, Air University today’s force has been stressed many times could become the office of primary re- throughout the past years. In light of the increasing demands of doing more with sponsibility for afr 50-39. With the mandate of an all-volunteer less, as efficiently and effectively as possi- force, greater emphasis should be given to ble, the effort to standardize professional leadership and management in all the military education opportunities for all enlisted pme programs. General Ryan and enlisted personnel must not cease. Some others have stated that more work must years ago Major General J. V. Edmund- be done and done better by fewer people, son citecl this need for education: but immediate corrective action must be If our Air Force is to live up to the trust 72 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

placed in it, if it is to continue to possess then our Air Force needs, in a real sense, the professional competence necessary to educated and enlightened leadership.15 utilize to best advantage the current and future complex and exotic weapons Systems T hat kind o f leadership is the goal of the that are entering our inventory; if it is to Air Force professional militar)' education maintain familiarity with all Sciences and programs. With such leadership, the Air skills necessary to develop, support and F orce will be able to m eet its fu tu re fíght with these new families of weapons; challenges. Sênior Noncommissioned Officer Academy

Notes 1. Major Charles C. Randle, "Opiimum Utili/ation of Sênior Noncom- 8. AFSAF 100-14—I. missioned Officer.' unpublished thesis, Air Command and Staff College. 9. Ibtd. Air University, Maxwell AFB. Alabama, 1963, p. 9. 10. Colonel Doyle F.. Larson,"lmpending C.risis in Air Force Leadership," 2. AFSAF 100-14-1, "AFSA 1973 Programming Conference Projetts," Air Unrvenity Review, XXIII, 1 (November-December 19711, p. 19. Washington. D.C.. Novcmber 1973. 11. Ibtd. 3. Randle. p. 9. 12. Ibtd. 4. Department of the Air Force. Career Facl BookJor lhe Air Force Officer, p. 13. Ibid., p. 20. 24. U.lbid. 5. Air Force Regulation 50-39, "Noncommissioned Officer Professional 15. Major General J V. Edmundson, USAF. an address. "The United Militarv Education," 22 April 1973. para 2. p. 10. States Air Force in Long Range (jualitative Educational Requirements." 6. Ibid , para 2. p. 6. Washington. D.C.. 17 October 1960. quoied in ReporI of Sxmpoiium on Long 7. Curriculum Catalog. "USAF Sênior Noncommissioned Officer Range Qualilaltve Educational Requiremenls. pp. 24-29. Academy." Air University, Gunter AFS. Alabama. 1973, p. 12. oF VICTORIES, DEFEATS, AND FAILURES Perceptions of the American Military Experience

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel David MacI sa a c

At no point on the spectrum of violence does the use of comhat offer much prom- ise fo r the United States today.

R ussell F. W eigl ey. Books and Ideas The American Way of War

)ROFESSOR Weigley’s suggestion, rather more complex than it may appear on Fthe surface or at first glance, vvill be treated in some detail later in this article. It appears in the concluding paragraph of a persuasive history of American military strategy and policy and derives whatever justification it may have from thoughtful considerations of our militar^' experience dating back more than 200 years. Another way to arrive at worrisome conclusions is to concentrate on the relatively recent past—say the last thirty years and the last ten in particular—

73 74 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

thereby to derive generalizations to the post exchange scandals, from drug abusa effect that (1) “the American military to hang-ups over hair length. He mus machine is defeated,”t or (2) American ha ve talkecl with every mumbler on activj military power is a myth based on “mili- duty, the great majority of whom seem t< tary delusions of grandeur,”t t or (3) in derive a perverse joy out of posing thei refusing to acknowledge our “failure” in own particular problems as the most cru Vietnam, “we seem content to tread water ciai and destructive in the history of th. in the hope that somehow the conse- Republic. He is particularly shrill on th. quences of failure will just go away.”tf+ subject of the sex li ves of men stationec Dreary diagnoses these, but nonetheless overseas—Korea, Utapao, Sydney, Saigon indicative of modes of thought that would etc.—concluding his chapter on “Th< likely be far more rampant than they Yobo Culture” by wondering aloud abou presently appear to be were not the the extern to which the military did no country’s attention diverted by domestic mirror a moral breakdown in civiliar political and economic concerns. society but actually/arferaf it! (p. 234) Stuart Loory, former newsman and There’s not much new in all this, excep' now Kiplinger Professor of Public Affairs perhaps the degree to which Loory pa Reporting at the Ohio State University, rades the dirty linen of all the Services became interested in his topic during 1969 rather than singling out just one. Even and devoted most of 1971-72 to research, his central thesis is not particularly origi- interviews, and a tour of military installa- nal, but it is stated with unusual force. tions “throughout the world.” Profoundly Since the end of World War II, he disturbed by much of what he savv and argues, the United States has transformed heard, Loory describes the American mili- itself into a militaristic nation, skewing tary today as Clausewitz to the point where war was no wounded, confused, drugged, demoralized, longer lookecl upon as a continuation of feeling betrayed, its lifeblood clogged in political relations but rather as a substitute\ hardened bureaucratic arteries, its reflexes for political relations. numbed by political intervention. . . . The The defeat was made possible by a civilian American military machine today is not leadership whose conceptions of the uses of qualified to protect the nations vital inter- military power were faulty. Those concep- ests in situations short of nuclear exchange. tions grew from the single idea that the There is some question that it could func- spread of international communism could tion properly even in that ultimate holo- be contained with weaponry and with vast caust. The American military machine is numbers of men to operate that weaponry. defeated. (p. 10) (p. 373) By way of illustrating the “dry rot” Lhe military played along, seeing in this affecting the military Services, Loory pa- perception a justification for its continued rades forth all the horror stories of the existence and expansion and becoming in 1969-72 period, from race problems to the end an entity in itself that had to be

t Stuart H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America’s Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1973, $10.00), x and 407 pages. tt John J. Chodes, The Myth of America’s Military Power (Boston: Brandon Press, 1972, $8.95), 224 pages. tft William R. Corson, Consequences o f Failure (New York: W. W. Norton 8c Company, Inc., 1974, $7.95), 215 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 75 pam pered and m aintained like the na- foreseen circumstances. Things appear to rion’s economy. be a lot better today in this respect than they were during the late fifties and early Mistakes could be tolerated but not the sixties, when flexibility and the freedom to exposure of mistakes, for that might cast doubt on the urility and capability of the disagree were not exacdy the hallmarks of machine. This led to the toleradon of the the then commanding sac system. practice of ahvays putting the best face on A second area of criticism relates very anv situadon, then to the encouragement closely to the fírst—the seeming pervasive- of cover-up, and finally to the widespread ness of what Loory describes as “the yes- pracdce of lying. (p. 334) man syndrome.” Somewhat confusingly, Loory ascribes this phenomenon variously All very neat, and very damning—so to “the doctrine of cya” (p. 336) and at rnuch so in places as to make Watergate another place to the inflation of the oer look like a parish picnic by comparison. In system (p. 54). Whatever the cause, Loory jthe end, however, the ease with which sees no good that can come of it. In this Loory leaps from the gripe of the individ- respect he invokes Navy Captain Robert ual dissident to broad-ranging generalities H. Smith’s prize-winning essay in the leaves the reader wary about aecepting the March 1971 U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- diagnosis in its entirety. What about some ings: of the parts, in particular Air Force- related parts? So long as the system in which an officer Loorys picture of the Air Force singles matures is one that esteems the juggler of out three primary areas of vulnerability. figures, and rewards men who can “sell” The fírst is a certain degree of “institu- shaky programs over a man who stub- tional paranóia” that discourages criticism bornly insists that a bad one be killed, then and experimentation with tactícal formu- we will stay in trouble. (p. 336) lae at variance with established doctrine. The only problem with statements like In this respect one example he cites is that these is that they are a lot easier to agree of Colonel Everest E. Riccionfs long and with over the bar than to act upon in the lonely fight to encourage debate and pinch, when the chips are down and the experimentation in fíghter tactics—specifi- recommendation to tell the emperor callv to run a full-scale test of the Double about his clothes is countered by veiled Attack system in the face of long-contin- threats about one’s continued status in ued opposition from the Fluid Four estab- good standing. Those who were in Sev- lishment at Nellis Air Force Base and enth Air Force or vnaf Headquarters in their allies on the Air Staff. Certain recent late 1971 and fought the good fight developments—the establishment of the against Project credible chase may sym- so-called “aggressor squadron” at Nellis, pathize with Loory’s charges.1 They increasing interest in dissimilar acm, a should also recognize, however, that the watchful eye on the Navy program out at Air Force, as a large organization, is Miramar, and the gradual evolution of hardly unique in this respect. something very much like the Double Finally, in his chapter on “The Bridge Attack idea but referred to as the Fluid at Thanh Hoa,” Loory raises a whole Two—suggest a new element of Air Force series of severe questions about the Air flexibility in this area. This is all to the Force dependence since World War II— good, given the perils of rigidity in tactical First in England and the Marianas, then in doctrine when faced with new and un- sa c, then in Japan and South Korea, 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW presently in Europe, and recendy in Thai- become hung up on replacing men wid land and Guam—on sanctuary bases, machines in warfare—Chodes launchen “completely safe, highly mechanized, heav- right off into a severely unbalanced his ily supp>orted” with men and equipment. tory of the European campaign of Worlc Loory quotes an unnamed young colonel War II. He chooses the European theatei to the effect that “the classic vulnerability because, “like Vietnam, it was a land wai of the sanctuary bases is virtually invisible in which the U.S. mobilized a large con to the current generation of unperceptive script army.” (The Pacific was largely i Air Force leadership.” That specific naval war and, besides, “the American» charge is not quite true, Air Force lead- largely depended upon a small number ol ers—particularly in usafe—having spent highly trained volunteers—Marines—to do a great deal of their time over the last the bulk of the fighting.”) If this doesn’t decade working the base vulnerability sound quite right so far, then consider the problem. Nonetheless, the avionics, spare next sentence: “Thus, only the European parts, and age backup required by F-4s— campaign can give us a clear understanding oj let alone F-llls, F-15s, or B-ls—would the events in Southeast Asia.” (p. 15. Empha- create a logistical nightmare in the face of sis added.) So much for demonstratíons oí an attack by Warsaw Pact forces led by a logic; let’s move quickly to a few of the pre-emptive air strike aimed at our bases “facts” that follow. of operation. Of which, of course, there Chodes describes the war in the air over are only so many, along with about zero Europe as completely ineffectual, both combat aircraft that can operate off psp or misquoting and misunderstanding the re- dirt. What one cannot argue with Loory is ports of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Sur- that the Air Force of today must remain vey to the extent of alleging that it found ever aware that the relatively permissive “the airplane had only a minor detrimental environment surrounding its bases of op- effect on the Third Reich’s capacity to eration—permissive in the sense of rarely make war.” (p. 45) He then proceeds to facing imminent attack by enemy air claim that the U.S. Army Air Forces power—could vanish overnight in a new willfully engaged throughout the war in a conflict. (pp. 339-49) Given the nature of policy of “saturadon bombing,”3 citíng the the equipment to which we are commit- cridcisms of that raf Bomber Command ted, we had probably better win the fir§t policy that were registered by Adolf Gal- air batde.2 land and later by Noble Franldand—both citing specifically Bridsh policies and at- tacks. (pp. 46-52) After referring again to VVhere Loorys Defeated is oc- “Américas saturadon bombing campaign casionally ill-informed and aggravating, against Germany,” he advises that German John Chodess Myth of Américas Military industrial production condnued to rise Power is a disaster area unto itself. Chodes, well into 1944 “in the face of having formerly a promotion copywriter for absorbed an incredible 10,996,063 tons of Forbes, Business Week, and Fortune maga- high explosives and incendiar)- bombs on zines, has also published poetry, fícdon, her cities and factories.” (p. 55) The and a play. There is some of each of unwary reader who does not know that those in this book as well. the grand total of tonnage dropped on Starting from a general charge raised Germany throughout the war by both the by many writers—that Americans have raf and usaaf was 1,419,604 tons may BOOKS AND IDEAS 77

ind these statistics persuasive rather than cesses, even though “failure is as much a xaggerated by a factor of eighll4 determinant of future political behavior as h Perhaps the major danger with a book is success." Corson fervently believes that o blatandy error-ridden as this is the we will repeat our failure in Vietnam ncompetent reviewing that seeks to en- elsewhere unless we as a nation immedi- tourage wider attention. In The Nation it is ately acknowledge the fact of failure and jaUyhooed as “an important contribution undertake a rigid examination of our o the growing awareness of the myths on collective conscience. (pp. 15-18) vhich much military thinking and decision By means of a series of historical case naking are based”; in the prestigious studies, Corson sets out to illustrate how Ijibrary Journal, on the basis of whose the violating or ignoring of certain princi- ecommendadons many librarians depend, pies of “limited war” strategy contributes ve fínd even this: “At times Chodes’s to the failure of a great power in any hesis is quite valid; his attack on airpower conflict that does not affect its national 5 based on scholarly research and it is existence. Starting with the Dacian and jardcularly impressive.”5 Good grief! Parthian campaigns of the Emperor Tra- jan (a .d . 98-117), he moves through the catastrophic involvement of Spain in its B il l Corson’s Consequences of war in the Netherlands during the six- 'ailure bears little resemblance to the teenth century to the British problems on xx>ry or Chodes books. Where Loory this continent during the eighteenth cen- peaks of defeat, Corson treats of what he tury. Then, in somewhat more detail, he >refers to call failure; where Chodes uses treats Britain’s military failure in Ireland listory he tends to invent it whereas between 1916 and 1922. From these ex- x>rson’s grasp of historical perspective is amples Corson derives a number of gen- fhat lends to his analysis its particular eral principies that need be applied (and ogency. Corson, a retired Marine colonel, others that need be omitted) if a great 5 well known to readers of military litera- power is to avoid encountering military ure, particularly for his scathing indict- failure. (pp. 28-30, 72-73) In essence, nent of search-and-destroy tactics in The these boil down to abandoning—for lim- etrayal, which appeared in 1968. In the ited wars not affecting national survival— nore recent book Corson ranges well MacArthur’s definition of victory in favor >eyond I Corps in an attempt to “evaluate of Clausewitz’s rather more complex idea he consequences of America’s failure in that winning means either to achieve one’s /ietnam in terms of its observable effects objectives by offensive action or, defen- ipon the United States and its institu- sively, to thwart the enemy’s intentions; ions.” (p. 17) that losing is defmed simply as the failure j Corson begins by reminding us to un- to achieve one’s objectives even though one’s ierstand that we have not experienced a forces are undefeated and still able to áefeat in Vietnam but a “military fail- engage the enemy. Or, to quote Secretary ire”—defmed as the non performance of of State Kissinger on Vietnam, “In the wmething required or expected—a phe- process we lost sight of one of the cardinal aomenon with distinct characteristics and maxims of guemlla war: the guerrilla wins 7y no means an uncommon experience in if he does not lose. The conventional he life of a nation. Such failures have army loses if it does not win.”6 >een less studied than victories and suc- The rest of Corson’s book deals with 78 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

identifying sym ptom s o f failure as it has The dust jacket describes this book affected American society as a whole— not “authoritative and controversial”; it is boi sim ply the m ilitary establishm ent— and of those and artfully persuasive as we with some speculative scenarios on how Starting with the American Revolutic the nation might react in the end, in and concluding with Vietnam, Weigh terms both of its continued safety and self- traces the whole of American militai respect. He treats drugs, dissent, race, the history and thought, developing in tf career civil Service (“not unlike convicts process a thesis that there has in fa<| serving a life term who have become developed a characteristically America trusties in a well-regulated prison”), the way of conducting war. Borrowing froí confusions of the antiwar groups, the State both Clausewitz and Hans Delbrücl of the economy, and the plight of the Weigley begins by stating that there ai Vietnam veterans. He has particularly basically only two kinds of strategv: th strong feelings about the treatment ac- strategy of annihilation, which seeks t corded the veterans, some of whose antics overthrow—where possible, utterly dt gain them little sym pathy from those still stroy—the enemy’s military power; an on active Service; so strong are these the strategy of attrition, exhaustion, c feelings that they lead him into som e erosion, customarily employed by a strate thoroughly inaccurate comparisons with gist whose means are not great enough tj the returned po w ’s .7 Generally, the second permit him to pursue the direct ovef half of the book fails of its purposes, but throw of the enemy and who therefor this is unclerstandable in what the author resorts to an indirect approach designe him self describes as a “trial essay.” But his to wear down either the forces or the wi major point— that we probably can’t win of the enemy. them all; indeed, in som e instances proba- Given the dearth of American writei bly should not even try without major on strategy prior to 1945, Weigley i modifications of traditional strategies forced to write not a history of ideas bu —comes across well in the first half.I rather a history of ideas as expressed ii actions. The early strategists—Georgi Washington, Nathanael Greene, Winfielc I he term “traditional strate- Scott—were restrained by the limits of th» gies” in the preceding sentence is the resources available to them and thereford major subject matter of the book citecl in tended to adopt moderate ai ms. But late ' the opening paragraph of this article. in the nineteenth century, given both th» Professor Weigley’s American Way of Warf increasing wealth of the nation and thii is the eighth volume to appear in the idolatry afforded the Napoleonic mode Macmillan series on the “Wars and Mili- by army officers the world over, the initia tary Institutions of the United States,” trencl in favor of a strategy of attritior under the general editorship of Louis gave way to the adoption, in fact if not ir Morton. It is also Professor Weigley’s name, of a strategy of annihilation. The second contribution to that series, his turning point carne during the Civil Waw History of the United States Army having when the nature of the North’s problem—l appeared in 1967. to subdue, indeed to conquer, the South—| t Russell F. Weigley, The American Way o f War: A History o f Unitea States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishinf' Co., Inc., 1973, $12.95), xxiv and 584 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 79 iterallv required the escaJation of war stake in “victory” as did the political and jms beyond anything hitherto seen in the military leadership—was not a question American experience. Grant and Sher- that attracted the attention either of the nan, of course, stand out as the premier jcs or their commander on the scene. xemplars of the new approach, but even All very neat, perhaps too neat. The jee’s strategy of the offensive-defensive so thesis has that peculiar symmetry often so nuch emphasized the offensive that it dear to academics and other intellectuals; limed at the destruction of the enemy everything seems to fali into place. But irmy. have all the right questions been asked? From Cold Harbor to Hamburger Hill Were the strategies adopted by Washing- s a long way, a century in fact, yet ton and Scott the result only of limited Veigley establishes a strong case for the resources? Or were they conditioned as mconscious acceptance vvithin the U.S. w'ell by the nature and capabilities of their Wmy of the search for the climactic opponents? Was Lee all that hung up on rictory, the Austerlitz batde designed not the Napoleonic model, or did his strategy mly to dislocate but to destroy the enemy take into account the low opinion in w hich trmed forces, as the only legitimate means he held most commanders of the Army of oward victorv in war. This conception the Potomac? What Weigley would seem itterly dominated the strategy of World to slight is the predominantly pragmatic Var II, was frustrated in Korea, and in nature of Americans, whose general tend- jhe face of similar frustration in Vietnam ency is to react to the circumstances in reasserted itself in the form of “search which they fmd themselves with the tools tnd destroy” tactics and occasional sugges- at hand. That these tools have become ions about tactical nuclear weapons—and ever more devastating may well say more rven, in one jcs paper, a recommended about the history of technology than about nvasion of North Vietnam that “could be the American way of war. Still, the search uspended short of full destruction of the for decisiveness has marked the American >rv if our objectives were earlier approach to war, along with impatience ichieved.” “Full destruction of the drv” is on the part of soldiers and civilians alike i long way from the “whole new kind of when that decisiveness has been delayed trategy and wholly different kind of in its appearance. Impatience, in fact, may orce” proclaimed bv President Kennedy well be the driving force and the adoption n 1962 as an appropriate response to of strategies of annihilation its reflection, inconventional and guerrilla warfare, given the tools available and the delayed rach with its special problems of indeci- results promised by a strategy of attrition, iveness. (pp. 464-67) exhaustion, or erosion. The military, led on in part by the Before concluding with some thoughts mpatience of its civilian superiors and on what the moral of this tale might be, mable to cope with prospects of indecisive the reviewer is impelled to point out that yarfare, abandoned its limited strategy Weigley’s case for the Navy and Air Force ind reverted to traditional modes of ac- having adopted strategies of annihilation is ion in the hope of returning decisiveness less persuasive than his case for the Army. |o warfare. That the means by which this He is correct in seeing Captain Alfred ras to be accomplished would become Thayer Mahan’s batde fleets, designed to bhorrent to large numbers of citizens at produce Trafalgars on the Nelson model, Íotne—very few of whom had as big a as a fairly direct parallel with the search 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW for the Austerlitz batde, albeit at sea. But Weigley identifies all the major contribu his argument that this conception was the tors (individuais, books, institutions, popu actual driving force behind Admirai Nim- lar ideas) to the conceptions of nationa itz’s Central Pacific Drive requires more security policy ushered in with the electioi evidence. of President Kennedy in 1960. It is mus Similarly, his treatment of Air Force reading for all military professionals wh< doctrine in the thirties gives far too much were either too young or too busy to havt weight to Douhet and Seversky at the followed the debate in its original form expense of those within the Army Air For this was also the revolution in thought Corps who devised the American tech- that spurred the McNamaras, Bundys nique and plans for strategic bombard- Enthovens, Hitches, Taylors, and Ros- ment. General LeMay’s campaign over tow^s—and provided both the rationales Japan fits the thesis all too well, of course, and capabilities for eventual wide-scale but that carne cluring the last fevv months military involvement in Southeast Asia. of the war, when eventual victory had In his final paragraph Weigley suggest! been assured and the pressure was on to that the use of combat does not offei achieve final and total victory as soon as much promise for the United States to- possible with the least possible number of day. This tentative conclusion is appar- Allied casualties. What Weigley completely ently based on his dual conviction that: (1 ignores is the work of those who designed nuclear combat, at whatever levei, is un- the American theory for the employment likely to prove controllable and would of strategic bombardment as well as the hence add whole new dimensions of futil- specific goals set down by the wartime air ity; and (2) the record of nonnuclear planners.8 The theory set forth at the Air limited war in obtaining acceptable deci- Corps Tactical School and incorporated in sions at tolerable cost is also less than AWPD-1 and Operation po in t bl a n k was heartening, and therefore the history of most positively not a strategv of annihila- usable combat may at last be reaching its tion but rather of the attrition, exhaustion, end.9 or erosion of Germany’s industrial capac- The reader who would argue these ity for war—Douhet, the Billy Mitchell of propositions with Weigley is more likely to the early 1930s, and Seversky to the come armed with technical reasons why contrary notwithstanding. neither is necessarily true of the future— Weigleys final four chapters treat the this plan, that command and control period since 1945, and they are superbly mechanism, a possible weapon break- done. Especially is this true of Chapter 17, through, etc. What he is unlikely to come “Strategies of Deterrence and Action: The prepared to argue with is an idea implicit Strategy Intellectuals,” covering the period in Weigley’s having undertaken the book 1952-60. Starting with the “New Look” in the first place. and massive retaliation concept of the early Eisenhower years, Weigley traces the This book of history, like probably most civilian-dominated revolution in strategic histories that look back bevond only yester- thought that marked the years 1956 to day, is based on an assumption that what wre believe and what we do today is gov- 1960, the revolution that spawned the erned at least as much by the habits of academic fields of “national security af- mind we formed in the relatively remote fairs and “defense policy.” In these care- past as by what we did and thought fully reasoned and tightJy written pages, yesterday. The relatively remote past is apt BOOKS AND IDEAS 81

to constrain our thought and actions more, too) the direction taken by the Naval War because we understand it less well than we College, beginning with the dass entering do our recent past, or at least recall it less in the fali of 1972, might suggest that the clearly, and it has cut deeper grooves of Air Force’s congenitally cavalier attitude custom in our minds. (p. xx) about the past is open to cjuestion. In an i This assumption—foreign to most address to that class Vice Admirai Stans- rofessional officers though not entirely field Turner, then President of the Col- ncommon among professional histori- lege, noted his dissatisfaction with the iins—formed the essential starting point previous approach to strategy through the or Bernard Brodies Strategy in the Missile study of international relations and politi- ge as long ago as 1958. Brodie was more cal Science. iterested in how the European tradition Í . . . O ur courses of instruction have 1 strategic thought had set the stage for hitherto concentrated too exclusively on the he strategies of the nuclear age, but brief period of military strategy since the professor John Shy of the University of close of World War II. The domination of ^íichigan took a similar line in a provoca- this period by only two world powers will ve and groundbreaking article late in likely prove to have been a temporary 971.10 aberration. The current trend toward a In treating the meaning of a nation’s multipolar world would seem to confirm nilitary experience, Shy suggested that this. Studying historical examples should f enable us to view current issues and trends ny “approximauon of truth must take ito account the deep, primitive under- through the broader perspective of the tanding of what war means in the life basic elements of strategy. Approaehing to- day s problem through a study of the past is one tistory of the tribe.” (p. 227) Speaking to way to assure that we do not become trapped he American experience specificallv, he within the limits of our oum experience. We will ried to shovv how military doctrine not be concerned with history as chronol- has rested upon, and drawn upon for ogy, but w'ith its relevancy and application to today and tom orrow . We will start w’ith emotional sustenance, the characteristic atti- tudes and beliefs that were im planted, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. transmitted, and reinforced by almost four [431-404 b .c .] What could be more related centuries of American military experience. to today than a w'ar in which a democratic ... In the future, those who seek to nation sent an expedition overseas to fight explain American governmental or popular on foreign soil and then found that there behavior on issues involving war and the was litde support for this at home? Or a military must ask more seriously than they war in w'hich a sea power was in opposition have before to what extent they are dealing to a nation that was basically a land power? with leamed responses which operate be- A re there not lessons still to be learned neath the levei of full consciousness. (pp. here? 11 225-26)

Any such approach to straíegic studies I f the National strategy of ias traditionally been frowned upon in the United States today is one of deter- he Air Force, by far the most future- rence, can we afford to continue devoting lirected of the Services and one in which the overwhelming majority of our study to he past is tolerated, perhaps, but gener- how to fight—at whatever levei of force— tlly considered irrelevant. In the Navy on if deterrence should falter or fail? The he other hand (and they fly airplanes, essence of deterrence, to be sure, is a 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW force so capable that it vvill in fact deter a answers to today’s problems, a familiarity potential enemy. And this fact in turn with that experience will make us some- requires that the overwhelming training thing less than strangers to at least the emphasis out in the squadrons be on general parameters to today’s and tomor- maintaining a realistic combat capability. row’s problems. The study of history, But at the levei of the war colleges, and rightly undertaken, contributes to wisdom. on the whole question of preparing the If nothing else it can lead us to realize future leadership of the Service for high- that the unpredicted and unforeseen re- level posts in plans and operations or the sults of particular decisions and actions are Joint Staff, is there not more room for the those that are likely to have the most far- study of war as a social phenomenon, for reaching and long-lasting effect. It can the study of how different peoples and also teach us what questions to ask—of men, nations—but at least our own if no oth- of theories, of systems, and of ourselves. ers—have tended to respond to military Martin Blumenson said it best: “What crisis? And is it not perhaps possible that history teaches is scepticism. W'hat it gives another way to help prevent war is to is wisdom. Out of wisdom may come faith know more about why nations have and hope, tempered by a sense of real- tended to go to war in the first place? All ity.”12 the past is prologue, and while yesterdays United States Air Force Academy experience vvill not provide ready-made

Note» 1 See A via tio n Week Í3 Space Technology, vol. 95. no. 16 (18 October 6. Henry A. Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations." Foreign Afjacrs, 48. 1971). p. 18. 2 (January 1969), p. 214. Quoted in Corson, p. 29. 2. Hopefully. the Dírectorate of Doctrinc. Concepts. and Objectives, 7. For examplc. on p. 170, when he reports that "they were not Hq USAF. has such matters well in hand. Howevcr that may be, the isolated from one another." Still, his comments about the Vietnam doctrinal issue in Air Force history has not enjoyed an tinsullied record. veterans say things about lhe national reaction to Vietnam that we would See. for examplcs: R Frank Futrell, Ideas. ConcepLs, Dnctrine: A History of do well to heed. Basic Dnctrine in the USAF, 1907-64 (Aerospace Studies Institutc, Air 8. See. for cxample, Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. The Air Plan That University. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. June 1971) and I. B. Holley. Jr.. An Dejeated Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Ixrngino & Porter Inc.. 1972). F.ndurmg C.hallenge The Problem of Air Force Doctrwe (16th annual Flarmon 9. Pp xxiii. 477. Weiglev is not alone in questioning the continued Memorial Lecture in Military History, l !SAF Academy, Colorado; publi- resort to war. See, for example. Louis J. Halle, "Does War Have a cai ion schedtiled for December 1974). Future?" Foreign Affanrs, 52. 1 (October 1973), pp. 20-34. and Fred 3. The term "saturation bombing" appears repcatedly, is usually Charles Iklé "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" Foreign preceded bv the adjective “American." and in all instances cited refers to Affatrs, 51,2 (January 1973). pp. 267-85. RAF Bomber C.ommandf 10. John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and 4. Well. actually 7.7. For the full statistics, their sources, and other Lear ning," Journal of In terdisciplinar History, I (Winter 1971). pp. 205-28. games that have been played with both, see the present writers “What 11. Syllabus for Strategy and Policy. Center for Continuing Education. the Bombing Survcy Reallv Savs.".4tr Force Magazine, June 1973. pp. 60- The United States Naval War C.ollegc. I September 1973. p. 1-3, 63. emphasis added. See also Philip A Crowl. "Education versus Training at 5. The Natwn. 16 July 1973. p. 60; Lihrary Journal, vol. 98. p. 3007 (15 the Naval War Collegc, 1884-1972.” Naval War College Review, XXVI. 3 October 1973). Alvin Sunseris review in Lihrary Journal concludes that (November-December 1973), pp 2-10. "this bnok deserves to be read by all Citizen» concerned with the State of 12. Martin Blumenson. "Some Thoughts on Professionalism." Military the armed forces.” "Ignored" would seem a more appropriate verb! Review. XL1V. 9 (September 1964). pp. 12-16. CHURCHILL IN DISTORTED PERSPECTIVE

WlNG COMMANDER R. A. M a SON, RAF

N HIS collecüon of writings Letters atui Social Aims, published in 1876, Emerson wrote: “What anecdotes of any man do we wish to hear Iand read? Only the best. Certainly not those in which he was degraded to the levei of dulness or vice, but those in which he rose above all competition by obeying a light that shone to him alone.” Such lofty interpretations of the literary inclinations of his fellowmen are not shared by R. W. Thompson, who, in his book Generalissimo Churchill,t attempts, in the words of the dust jacket, to show how Britain s World War II leader “as a Prime Minister . . . was poor, as a Minister of Defence, a faulty and dangerous strategist, and as a Commander in Chief a near disaster, imposing intolerable burdens upon his Chiefs of Staff, the Planning Staffs, and on his commanders in the field.” When this, his 39th book, was published in Englarrd last November, Mr. Thompson told a local press repórter: “My books have never been in the best selling lists; I do not write for money or the mass public—my main concern is to tell it like it is.”

t R. W. Thompson, Generalissimo Churchill (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973, $8.95), 252 pages.

83 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW He added, “I don’t rate very highly most This hypothesis recurs several umes late of the books on Churchill. They are all in the book and is, according to th» too indmidated by him.” Mr. Thompson is author, the basic reason why Churchil certainly not intimidated by his subject nor failed to keep the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R daunted by its enormous scope. In three from dictating the later strategy of the wa: parts the author traces first “The Long and the structure of the peace in 1945. Apprendceship” of the Bridsh Prime Min- Mr. Thompson argues that Churchil ister up to his appointment in May 1940, should rather have marshaled the powei then the acdvides of the “War Lord” up to of the Bridsh Commonwealth: with Can the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, and ada to develop the atomic weapon; witf Finally the decüning impact as Churchill— the forces of índia, South África, anc allegedly—mishandles his “Choice of Op- Australia to reduce Britain’s dependenct tions” undl the end of the war. on the power of the U.S.A. If Bridsh inde- In the lOOth anniversary year of pendence (or intransigence?) should have Churchill’s birth and a generatíon after his prompted General Marshall to suppori wartime leadership, it is dmely that his Admirai King’s Pacific preferences, then, contributions to Allied victory should be Such a course would have left Britain ir assessed without either aduladon or deni- Supreme Command of all Allied forces ir gration. Mr. Thompson has already pub- the Aüantic theatre. Provided such force; üshed one book on Churchill, The Yankee were concentrated upon the right places Marlborough, and has established a reputa- provided Churchill could have been re- tion for iconoclasm in his treatment of strained from attempdng too much, the Britain’s victor at El Alamein in Montgom- “Great Amphibian” might have come inte ery, the Field Marshal. It is doubly disap- its own. poindng, therefore, that his latest offering Such an argument can be resisted in has very litde to commend it either to the several ways. Without presendng a detailed serious student or to the history buff. case, one could ask, What about divided Mr. Thompson first recounts the well- loyaldes in South África, poliucal instabiüty documented vagaries in Churchill’s earlier in índia, antipodean nervousness in Aus- career, partícularly stressing the enthusi- tralia? Churchilfs problems in controlling asm with which the polidcian seized op- Commonwealth troops in North África in portunides to play the soldier in índia, 1942 indicate the pitfalls to be found in Cuba, South África, and Flanders. Before co-ordinating the freely volunteered forces the end of the first chapter, however, of independent countries. Where were the there occurs the first intimadon that the necessary landing craft for European ad- author’s analyses may be based on rather ventures to come from, if not from Amer- more than tradidonaí evidence: ican shipyards? Where, in the Common- Churchill’s tragedy was in his mixed blood. wealth, was an industrial base capable of Had he been wholly an Englishman in the waging world war to be found? sense that Charles De Gaulle was a French- man, he might have won the peace and There is, however, a more acceptable found a new and noble role for his country way of refudng Mr. Thompson’s rather as the cornerstone of a new Europe. In- extravagant asserdons. Earlier this year stead he wanted to reconcile the irreconcil- another book was published in England able in himself and achieve a union of the on Churchills part in World War II. On English-speaking peoples, uniting the page 154 of Churchill as Warlord (published U.S.A. and Britain. by B. T. Batsford Ltd., London), Mr. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85

„onakl Lewin quietly explains why, in the He ignored the limitations of industry and evelopment of tube alloys, Britain had the limitations upon the movement of o choice other than to seek the co- armies, navies and air forces, and therefore upon strategy and tactics imposed by logis- peration of the U.S.A.: tics. Technology and the proliferation of In the Spring of 1942 Sir John Anderson weapons, and the manifold and ever made an estimate of the requirements if growing needs of troops, had changed the Britain were to act independently and a nature of warfare and its tempo. Churchill gaseous diffusion and heavy water plant accepted no limitations until he had to, and were to be erected in the United Kingdom. then with bad grace. Constantly he ex- The conclusion was that within 5 years it tended the bounds of the possible. would be possible to produce one kilogram Ideas poured from his mind in a ceaseless of Uranium 235 per dav, at the tolerable flow and demanded the immediate atten- cost of some 50 million pounds. But this tion of dedicated men even when, as was implied a peak labour force of about often true, the ideas were impossible. It 20,000 men, half a million tons of Steel and seems that no rational or reasonable man an extra supplv of half a million kilowatts could have done the job, and Churchill was of electricitv. Britains resources of man- rarely reasonable or rational. His egocen- power and material were already stretched tricity was total, his energy boundless. He to the limit, and it can hardly be doubted was a man with a dimension denied to that, if the question had ever arisen, ordinary men. Churchill and his Cabinet would have been compelled to abandon a speculative propo- Churchill was, Mr. Thompson agrees, sition which, in any case could not be aptly named by Liddell Hart the “great expected to pay dividends before the de- animator of war.” feat of Germany. In his second part, “War Lord,” the a fact, one of Churchilfs greatest achieve- objectivity of Mr. Thompsons first chap- aents must surely have been the securing ter begins to fade as he focuses largely on nd retention of American support from the North African campaign to illustrate íe very beginning of his administration. the extent and effect of Churchilfs “inter- But in Mr. Thompson's first chapter ference" with his commanders. In passing, aere is generally no indication that the however, he refers to Air Chief Marshal ook as a whole is going to be a disap- Dowding being “pushed into retirement. ointment. Although he adds nothing to a Probably his dogged intervention to save nowledge of Churchilfs character already his fighters from being squandered in the ividly illustrated by Alanbrooke, Ismay, final phase of the Battle of France had lopkins, Eisenhower, Moran, and many angered Churchill." In fact, Dowding’s jthers, he does distil with precision the retirement had been mooted on several alient points made by most previous occasions since February 1937, and on 5th L>mmentators. In two paragraphs he cap- July 1940 Air Chief Marshal Newall, íres the superlative contradictions of his Chief of the Air Staff, had askecl him to tbject: continue as AOC in C Fighter Command From the outset Churchill was utterly ruth- “until the end of October.” Churchill less, quixotic, uncertain of temper, driving denied to Dowding’s face that he was all who worked for him and with him to aware of his retirement, and indeed it the limits of their endurance. His demands may well be that the key to the cold were incessant and imperious, covering dismissal of the victor of the Battle of almost every field of human endeavour. Britain lies in his frequently frosty rela- 86 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW tions with his Service colleagues rather paraphrased, but the readers understan than in the rancour of the Prime Minister. ing of either tactical decisions or clash Hereafter Mr. Thompson searches for personalities is hampered by Mr. Thom evidence to substantiate his theorv that sons habit of sometimes repeating or ev< Churchilfs ambition was to be a “super contradicting himself. Thus, on page ' general,” to dictate not only “the strategy Major General Kennedy, Director of Mi of the nations” but “the tactics of the tary Operations, is quoted in a passa; commanders in the field.” Unfortunately dealing with events of August 1940, wh he First alleges that the Churchill of 1940 the same passage is quoted again, was the same man as when “as First Lord length, on page 121 d uring the account [of the Admiralty] in 1914-15 he had the Greek tragedy. On page 92 one rea> longed to seize Bordeaux with his left and that “Churchill refused to understand a to assault the Dardanelles with his right.” ministration and the limitations impost One assumes that the French would have by logistics and transport” but on page í opposed the left-hand seizure at least as that “he knew all about the inevitab bitterly as did the Turks the right! growth of the tail of an army, of tl enormous problems of transport an There is no doubt that Churchilfs atti- maintenance of growing armies of m tude towards Generais Wavell and Au- chinleck left much to be desired. Wavell, chinês.” Nor is clarity of sequence ei the Prime Minister could never under- hanced by the appearance, in the chapte stand; from Auchinleck he expected too concentrating on North África, of occ much too cjuickly. Wavelfs case has been sional outbursts against the bombing o argued with strength and clarity by his fensive “will o’ the wisp” and the machin. biographer John Connell, who First la- tions of F. E. Lindeman to the detrimei belled Churchill the “supergeneral,” while of the “good guy,” Henry Tizard. the desert campaigns have been succinctly Mr. Thompson^ attack leads him i described by Corelli Barnet in his Desert ignore the facts in North África of po< Generais. Mr. Thompson draws heavily on British troop disposition, inefficient an both authors to allege that victories and ineffective leadership, bad judgement ; reputations were denied or sacriFiced sim- the selection of Field commanders, an ply to feed Mr. ChurchilFs egocentricity. repeated failure to analyse and deal wit His arguments are certainly strong, but Rommefs recipe for success. As he accus» they are neither clear nor succinct. In fact, Churchill of jealousy—and worse—in r< in the central chapters of the book he lieving Auchinleck from command of th steadily loses credibility as a selector of 8th Army, he ignores evidence such as th fact, a supporter of chronology, and an comments of Air Marshal Tedder, wh analyst of perception. held General Auchinleck personally i The author interprets the controversial high regard. The desert air com mande events of the desert campaigns without wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff o exception to the detriment of Churchill. 25th July 1942, less than a month befor He also holds the Prime Minister responsi- Auchinleck was Fired: ble for the Greek disaster o f 1941 while I wish he [Auchinleck] was a better judg overlooking the concurrence of Dill, his of character and more ruthless in judgin Chief of Staff, and of Wavell, his theatre people solely by results. 1 also wish he ha general. John Connell s restitution of Wav- the ability to inspire the army here. I’r elfs professional reputation is selectively a f r a i d h e h a s n ’t. . . . Y o u m ay feel thí BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

most of this is quite outside my province. It First Sea Lord, his Chief of Naval Staff, is. I only write it because I feel the whole and his task force commander paid very situation is grave, and so far I see no move dearly, not for failing to estimate Japanese towards improvement. power and intentions, as alleged by Mr. The partiaJity of the narrative is fortu- Thompson, but for failing to comprehend htely both punctuated and, through im- fully both Japanese motivadon and the ication, contradicted by occasional andshipping potential of unhindered air rewd bedrock observations of forces power. lich did, in fact, impei the Prime Minis- Only in his last chapter does Mr. Ír: Thompson take leave of the desert, even In those fírst two years the Middle East was though 2 */2 years of Churchilfs leadership virtuallv the oniy batde ground, the only remain to be analysed. His predilections place where Bridsh troops fought the Ger- have led him to make statements such as: man and Italian enemy. It was his con- “Unlike Churchill and Rommel, he | sciousness of weakness and of American [Auchinleck] coulcl not focus his entire I potential strength that made Churchill har- attendon on the Western Desert.” or “The Iass his generais in the Middle East, and to frustrated Generalissimo-Prime Minister demand impossible victories, to insist upon nursed his rancour, and since he had premature attacks. Every setback in the failed to be in at the kill he denied the field seemed to expose his weakness and k i l l . ” o r “ I b e l i e v e . . . s i m p ly [ t h a t ] his dire need. Churchill felt at a disadvantage with men hv, one wonders, should Mr. Thomp- of the stature and integrity of Auchinleck n spend so much time imputing other, and was always uncomfortable with such >s desirable, motives to Churchill? men.” This last comment is not only In Part Three of the historv Mr. perhaps the best example of Mr. Thomp- hompson covers the events of the war sons pejoradve imputadons but also, by bsequent to the entry of the United implicadon, a massive slur on the charac- ates, developing the progressive theme ters of many men on both sides of the excessive tactical interference and add- Atlantic with whom Churchill worked g the strategic condemnation, already forcefully and successfully. ferred to, of subservience in the Adantic In his last chapter the author reflects trtnership. upon the broader issues of strategy British enthusiasm at the formal entry and in particular reverts to the inhibitíng the U.S.A. into the war was immedi- influence of Churchill’s ancestry first men- elv tempered by the disasters of South tioned at the beginning of his narrative. ist Asia. Surprisingly, Mr. Thompson Although Anglo-American relations are •ends litde time on Churchills share in covered spasmodically throughout the e responsibility for the loss of two book, they are generally viewed from the ittleships and the base of Singapore, pyramids rather than from London or lich together constitute the biggest Brit- Washington. Regrettably, Mr. Thompson ai defeat of the war. Yet Churchill had does not seem to have read any of • erruled his military advisers on two Michael Howard’s studies of grand strat- >ints: his decision to give Egvpt priority egy: either The Mediterranean Strategy in the 'er reinforcement of Singapore and his Second World War, Grand Strategy (Volume ícision to send a naval “deterrent” force IV, U.K. officiaJ history), or The Continen- rough the Malacca Straits. The former tal Comrnüment. Had he done so, he might 88 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW not have generalised so glibly about It is difficult to avoid the conclusic American “smash and grab strategy” or that Mr. Thompson constructed his h’ “how absolutely divorced from political pothesis—excessive interference, person; considerations were American military atti- motivation, and the influence of lineage- tucles and strategies.” He might have and then set out to seek evidence t explained why the torch landings were substantiate it. Consequendy, he has nc “probably a potential threat to Russian probed the strengths and weaknesses c aims”; and before criticising Churchill for his subject with any degree of objectivit’ not drawing more fully on the resources despite occasional redeeming summarie of the Commonwealth, he might have Nor, because of his selectivity and incoi commented on the Ogdensburg discus- sistencies, is his criticism of Churchi sions of Augnst 1940 between Austrahan convincing. Overall, Generalissimo Churchi Premier Mackenzie King and President does not match the quality of his earlie Roosevelt, from which developed the ar- books. Fortunately, his contribution h; rangements for Hemisphere Defence, been overtaken, at least in Britain an without British participation. hopefully soon in the U.S.A., by the wor Mr. Thompson is very familiar with of Mr. Lewin. In his Churchill as Warlon earlier records, for example Bryant’s edi- Mr. Lewin really does synthesise extensh tion of the Alanbrooke diaries; yet he still primary and secondary sources to prc overlooks Major General Brooke’s first duce a clear, concise, and objective asses: conversation with Churchill, on the eve- rnent of the war leader which is in ever ning of 14th June 1940. Brooke withstood way superior to Generalissimo Churchill. A half an hours verbal pressure—including the major issues are clinically analysed: ai insinuations of “cold feet”—to change his to France, North África, the Bombe tactical dispositions in France, and later he Offensive, U-boat wrar, relations with St; commented: “Without sufTicient knowl- lin, Anglo-American planning, weapon edge of conditions prevailing on that front development, South East Asia, Allied leac at that time, he was endeavouring to force ership and strategy in Europe, etc. a commander to carry out his wishes Yet even when further books have bee against that commanders better judgement. written and when all secrets have bee: With all his wonderful qualities, interfer- disclosed, it may still be easier to asses ence of this nature was one of his weak- Churchill in two paragraphs, as Mi nesses. . . . The strength of his powers of Thompson does in his first chapter, tha persuasion had to be experienced to real- attempt to dissect him in volumes. O ise the strength that was required to August 18th 1943 at Quebec, the Prim counter it.” It is odd that Mr. Thompson, Minister’s dispassionate and often critic; with all his insights, does not recognise in personal physician committed two par; Churchill the familiar characteristics of the graphs to his diary after reflecting on hi powerful man who will ride roughshod patienfs declining influence on Presider, over, and even despise, those who will not Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins: face up to him and, conversely, will For that matter, it is not only the Presidef eventually accept and respect a logical and Marshall who are uneasy about th opposition equally forcefully argued. Ma- P.M.’s judgement. Brooke is worried by h jor General Brooke became Field MarshaJ inability to finish one subject before takin Lord Alanbrooke, despite his initial and up another, by the darting processes of h frequently repeated opposition to his mind and by the general instability of h chief. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

judgement. But are his critics measuring the superb confidence he exudecl in 1940. Lhe Prime Minister by the right yard-stick? W hen the Prime Minister set out to inspire His claim to a place in history does not rest the country with his will to win he m ade on his strategy. His gifts are of a rarer up his mind that it must begin in his own kind. bedroom . I have been with him there at all VVhat his critics are apt to forget is that you hours, I have seen him take a lot of cannot measure inspiration. That is vvhy it punishment, and not once did he look like is not easy to bring home to the military a loser. Not once did he give me the hierarchy the list of assets which easiiy tilt feeling that he was in any way worried or the balance in his favour: the strength of anxious as to the outcome of the flght. will that has bent all m anner of men to his Gradually I have come to think of him as purpose; the extraordinary tenacity—the invincible. Americans call it obstinacy—with which he The one who “obeys a light that shines clings for months, and if need be for years, to him alone” may well rise above all to his own plans; the terrific force of competition, but Emerson should perhaps personality that can brush aside all doubts and hesitations and sweep away inertia, have added that he can be a most difficult refusing to listen when weaker men begin man to work for. to whine about difficulties; above all else, Royal Air Force Brampton

MILITARY HISTORY IN SYMPOSIUM

D r . Rjc h a r d I. Lest er

OHN ADAMS committed to his diary Statesmen. t Published in 1973, this compact, in 1770: “Pen, ink and paper and a sit- medium-sized volume is worthy of attention J ting posture are great helps to attention and for its penetrating insights into the impor- thinking.” Many pens, flowing ink, more tant historical relationship between soldiers than 200 pages of paper, and much and statesmen.1 The study has special sig- thought and attention characterize the monograph study entitled Soldiers and

f Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek, editors, Soldiers and Statesmen (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, $1.60), vi and 211 pages. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW nificance in that it provides an elongated tors or principies regarding the relatio perspective of military-civilian relations, ships between soldiers and statesmen, ai achieved through that useful historical it sought to comprehend the past in ord phenomenon, the history symposium. Ac- better to understand and cope with tl1 tually, the study embodies the printed “Pro- future. ceedings of the Fourth Military History At the symposium that produced tl Symposium,” held in October 1970 at the study Soldiers and Statesmen, the parti< United States Air Force Academy.2 pants had excellent academic credentis The symposium provided a forum for a and impressive professional backgrounds criticai examination of documentary Their extensive publications are testimor sources, scholarly presentations, and em- to their productivity and scholarly conti pirical observations concerning the com- bution, covering such subjects as tl plex subject of civil-military ties from 1815 Third Crusade in the 12th century, Mar to the cold war era. Historical conferences, land during and after the Revolution, tl when well organized about a single topic, historian and the diplomat, Hindenbui as this symposium vvas, usually achieve and the Weimar Republic, total war an historical conceptualization by assembling cold war, national security in the nucle; a representation of early and late period age, and a host of other significam topic scholars. This range leads to more effec- Organizationally, the papers were pn tive historical inquiry and broadens the sented in chronological order. The s perspective of the subject under review. lected period emphasis was effective. One may ask, YVas it necessary even to The two key papers in the openir consider this subject? The answer is ob- session treated the theme of soldiers an viously in the affirmative. The history of statesmen from 1815 to 1919 in Fran< human society has always been punc- and Germany. In the first paper, Profe tuated by war; but the study of military sor Gordon Wright, analyzing the Frenc history has all too often been undertaken experience, emphasized the relative n> as if war existed in a vacuum. In our glect of this topic by French historians ; historiography until only recently and with compared to those of Germany. General few exceptions, there has been a lack of speaking, there was an absence of crises i sense perception in the subtlety of civil- French civil-military relations in the 19t military relations. The symposium signifi- century. Wright maintained that routini candy contributed to the literature of this minded, unimaginative soldiers, abetted l fascinating and labyrinthine subject. Every ineffective and weak politicians, large generation, as Mark Pattison once said, contributed to this situation. The Frenc requires that the facts be recast in its own Republic made little headway betwee mold and demands that history be rewrit- Waterloo and Sarajevo toward creating ten from its own point of view. This is viable system of civil-military relation essential, because ideas change, and the The contrast with Germany during th whole mode and manner of looking at same period is incleed striking. Whi things alters in every age. Thus, the task French scholars virtually neglected th of those scholars attending the Academy subject, substantial reference was bein symposium was formidable and ambitious, made to it in Germany. but history is both an ambitious and a In the second paper Professor Andre; formidable discipline. Dorpalen noted the great significance ( The symposium searchecl for basic fac- the relative position of soldiers and State BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

ien in German history. He shows that by the established government can begin a ie 1870s the German army had become, war and decide on the measures necessary p a large degree, an integral part of the to bring it to a successful conclusion. adon, “the trailblazer of the united em- Thus, policy is the master and strategy the ire." Within this frame of reference were servant. Our own Civil War was indeed an id the foundations for the so-called object lesson in this regard. Working out a íenomenon of “Prussianism," the quasi- proper balance between the civil and ilitarv organic structure of civil society military requires statesmanship of a high id the vital role of the army and its elite order on the part of both the civil execu- fficer corps. Dorpalen suggests that the tive and the military commander. iain conclusion to be drawn from Prusso- The second session covered the period erman experience is a reaffirmation of from 1919 to 1945, and the focus was e Clausewitzian doctrine that the mili- entirely on the American scene. Dr. For- ry should be subordinated to political rest Pogue, who opened the second ses- adership in all matters pertaining to sion, concentrated on observing particular adonal policy. Dorpalen rightly concludes soldiers and statesmen. at militarism is a civil-political problem With a straightforward writing style, id that every country is the recipient of containing both comment and solid e kind of civil-military relations it de- interpretation, Dr. Pogue’s analysis of the rves. wartime Chiefs of Staff and the President Commenting on the Wright and Dorpa- has practical potential application for fu- n papers, Professor Weigley viewed ture similar situations. The necessity for em from the perspective of American teamwork in Washington was recognized ilitary history. Weigley, who is both early in the war. Accordingly, the Joint Dquent and persuasive, maintains that Chiefs of Staff was created to coordinate e period from Vienna to Versailles is the operations of our armed forces on a ie of contrasts rather than comparisons worldwide basis. Dr. Pogue took as his tween the French and German experi- central theme an examination of the Sam- ce, with soldiers and statesmen on the uel P. Huntington thesis that the Joint e hand and the American encounter on Chiefs, rather than President Roosevelt, e other. Weigleys summary emphasizes conducted World War II and that they at in the United States during the 19th did it by abandoning military values in ritury the roles of soldier and statesman favor of civilian ones. Pogue’s paper illu- d not become clearly differentiated. minates with varying intensities of light lis, in effect, is the basis of his thesis and shadow that “the full facts concerning at, in the United States during this the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” riod, soldiers and statesmen were inter- including such key personalities as Mar- angeable; their roles had not become shall, Arnold, and King, do not substanti- arlv separated as in fact they had in ate the position that the conduct of the rope, especially in Germany. Although war rested, as Huntington has suggested, ? histoncal record corroborates Weig- primarily with sênior military staff. With s proposition, civil-military relations in historical sensibdlity and factual accuracy, ? United States from 1815 to 1919 were Pogue has attempted to put the role of :h that it was generally agreed that the the Joint Chiefs into a meaningful rela- ntrol and direction of war are the tionship with that of the President though, ncdon primarily of the statesman. Only in the main, the functions and duties of 92 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally m ore suitable to better civil-military rei defined during the war. The Joint Chiefs tions, it is imperative that there be advised the President with regard to mili- “broad continuing education o f milita tary strategy, the requirements, produc- officers in history and the social Science; tion, and allocations of munitions and on the one hand, and “broad educatio shipping, the manpower needs of the including som e education in military hí armed forces, and matters of joint Army- tory and principies, for the civilian side i Navy policy. Further, the Joint Chiefs national leadership,” on the other. made strategic plans and issued the imple- After the traditional evening banqu< menting directives, but essential policy and General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, Pri decision-making remained with the Presi- cipal of Kings College, London, deliven dent. Pogue concludes that differences the 13th Annual Harmon Memorial Le arose, to be sure, between the views of the ture, which constituted the third sessio Chiefs and those of the President; but in Sir John addressed his topic, “The Mi the main, the Chiefs followed the guid- tary in the Service of the State,” from tl ance laid down by the Commander in standpoint of “what the relationship b Chief, and the fundamental principie of tween the military and the State looks lil civilian control survived the war intact. today, what changes have taken place in What also clearly emerges in the Pogue in our time, and what factors are at woi paper is that Marshall actually became the leading to further change.” As an o principal spokesman of the Joint Chiefs of soldier trained in the best tradition of tl Staff to the President, and thus by the British army, the ethical aspects of tl early part of 1945 President Roosevelt soldier-statesman relationship were of pa relied upon Marshall extensively. General ticular concern to Sir John. Concentratir Marshall, by any measure, must be consid- on the American experience, Sir Joh ered one of history’s great leaders. He suggested that future historians will vie had the imgination, foresight, and ability the period 1945 to 1952 as a landmark i to prepare and guide this nation to victory civil-military relations. He advised th; in the Second World War. He served his until 1945, the United States approach i President and the nation well, but, per- war was fundamentally anti-Clausewitziai haps more important, he had tremendous the national ethic being “not greatly ji leadership qualities and was a man of favour of the application of armed fon enormous moral authority. to a political end.” In the first of two scheduled commen- However, events from 1945 to 19! taries, Dr. Maurice Matloff concluded considerably changed the military dimei “that in the last year of the war, perhaps sion. It was clearly seen that militai the war itself outran both the military and preparedness, perhaps more than ev< statesmen, as problems of winning the before, required a military establishmei peace began to come up against those of capable of supporting the foreign polici* winning the war.” pursued. In effect, military power is mo In the second commentary, Professor meaningful only in direct relation to stra Gaddis Smith, with a synthesizing intelli- egy, and strategy is most meaningful on gence, supports Pogue and further blunts in relation to national objectives. Und< the Huntington thesis, which he catego- these circumstances, the military leade rized as “just plain wrong.” Smith asserts ship is usually the first to recognize tl that in order to create an atmosphere inherent limitations of their professio BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 >Vithin this context, students of the sol- stoutness of heart, he has been classified lier-statesman relationship doubted by others as a querulous, dropsical man *hether Clausewitz’s aphorism that “war is with a shrill, ungoverned ambition—a nothing but the continuation of political man of outraged morality. Neither a saint .elations by other means” retains its origi- nor a senile scoundrel, Dulles is a figure aaJ meaning. Serious doubts have been of considerable fascination—a “magma” :aised as to whether all-out war can still be erupting in the cataclysm of the cold war. ontemplated as a viable alternative in With ample evidence of detached, objec- jursuit of national objectives. Sir John tive assessment, Professor Challener care- ndicates that military force is quite clearly fully examines the record of Secretary of ery much a part of current world affairs State Dulles. He devotes particular atten- nd has become not only an instrument tion to those special qualities of the man »ut an end in itself. This situation requires that made him both the spokesman for ffesh look at the leadership roles and and the Symbol of the foreign policies of Mjrpose of both soldiers and statesmen the Eisenhower Administration. Challener ,here the “wars of tomorrow will almost points up that the Secretary absorbed—if ertainly be limited wars, fought for lim- not inherited—the Puritan conscience and ;ed ends.” that this, together with his religious back- | Although Sir John presented a highly ground, colored his perception of “atheis- itelligent interpretation of the symposium tic communism.” Dulles held fast to the aeme, his confessio fider—a confession of concept of a coherent moral order in the aith—was in the judgment of this re- world; and he believed that the Soviets ãewer the most significam aspect of his were the enemy of a just and lasting xture. This soldier-academician stressed peace. Preaching a vigorous foreign pol- |nat the military life is a good life. “The icy, Secretary Dulles denounced more auman qualities it demands include forti- “containment” of communism and advo- ide, integrity, self-restraint, personal loy- cated “liberation” of subject peoples be- Ity to other persons, and the surrender hind the Iron Curtain. Although Challe- f the advantage of the individual to a ner mentions that Dulles was the aposüe ommon good.” Emphasizing that the mil- of “massive retaliation” and “brinkman- ary is a mirror of its parent society, ship,” it should be noted that in actual eflecting strengths and weaknesses, Sir practice the foreign policy of the Eisen- ohn has correctly concluded that the hower Administration was far more cau- rmed forces form a repository of moral tious than Secretary Dulles’s slogans would ?source that should always be a source of suggest. To President Eisenhower and to rength within the State. This distin- the more responsible military leadership uished soldier concluded with the convic- during this period, nuclear war was un- lon that the highest service of the military thinkable, since it might mean the destruc- rofession to the State probably lies in the tion of Western civilization. iioral sphere. On balance, Challener suggests that I The fourth and final session dealt with Dulles was “no innovator but rather a |ohn Foster Dulles: The Moralist man who carried inherited policies to their rmed.” This paper was presented by logical conclusion.” Although this may be rofessor Richard D. Challener. Dulles is a true, insofar as the soldier-statesman rela- mtradiction in terms. Claimed by some tionship is concerned, the military adapted > be a man of immense courage and its strategy to the Dulles concept of mas- 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sive retaliation. In keeping with this broad in the ongoing drama of soldiers and policy, conventional ground forces were statesmen. cut, and military-civil relations seemed to The Fourth Military History Sympo- be fairly well orchestrated as the United sium, as reflectecl in the printed proceed- States concentratecl on developing nuclear ings, thus made an effort, through histori- weapons and airplanes to deliver them to cal perspective, to cope with the vital roles their targets. In his commentary, Profes- of soldiers and statesmen in attaining the sor William Appleman Williams reminded pre-eminent goal of national security. The the audience that Dulles was not the first symposium tried to evoke, not just ex- amateur theologian with a hand in foreign plain, the past, but to fill the pages of the policy. He mentioned Woodrow Wilson proceedings with real people and ideas. and William Jennings Bryan as examples Through solid effort and knowledgeable of others who also held similar beliefs. In discussion, the symposium brought a fresh further discussion of this paper, Professor dimension to a topic of considerable inter- Louis Morton suggested that Dulless leg- est to those concerned with the soldiers acy could lead one to conclude that the and statesmen. The final lesson as per- major problem today would appear to be ceived bv this reviewer is that perfectibility not whether the civilian leadership can in the soldier-statesman relationship is to control the military but whether civilian be continually sought, not as an end to be leadership is being militarized in outlook. achieved necessarily but as an ideal. This is The militarization of civilian leadership is perhaps the real message of the Fourth a rich area for serious historical research Military History Symposium. and would be a profitable topic to explore Air University Institute for Professional Development

Notes ium of the USAF Academv is scheduled for 10-1 I October 1974, treating I This reviewer is appreciative of lhe excellent introduction to the 'T h e Military History of lhe American Revolution.” Publication of the "Proceedings" wntten bv Major David Maclsaac, USAF. Executive proceedings nriginated with the Office ol Air Force History, Headquar- Director. 1970, Founh Military History Svmposmm. The Introduction ters USAF. and the USAF Academv. was very helpful in preparing this revicw. 3. The principal participants in the symposium were Richard D. 2. T he First Military History Symposium. held at the U.S. Air Force ChaJlener (Ph.D.). Princeton University; Philip A. Èrowl (Ph.D.), Univer- Academv on 4-5 May 1967, considered the topic "Current Concepts in sity of Nebraska: Andreas Dorpalen (Dr. Ju r), Ohio State University; Military History.*' Its proceedings were not pnblished. The Second General Sir John Winthrop Hackett (MA.), Principal of King’s College. Symposium met on 2-3 May 1968 and discusscd "Command and London; Maurice Matloff (Ph.D.). Chief Flistorian, Office of the Chief of Commander in Modern Warfare." Its proceedings were published and Military History, D epartm ent of the Army; Louis M orton (Ph D.). have gone through a second printing. The third meeting in the series, Dartmouth College; Noel F. Parrish (Ph.D.), Trinity University; Forrest held on 8-9 Ma\ 1969. was also published and analyzcd. It was cntitled C. Poguc (Ph.D.). Director. George C. Marshall Research Librarv: "Science. Technology, and Warfare." The fourth meeting considered Richard A. Preston (Ph.D.). Duke University; Theodore Ropp (Ph D.). "Soldiers and Statesmen." the subject of this revicw. l he fifth meeting Duke University: Gaddis Smith (Ph.D.). Vale University; Russell F was held on 5-6 October 1972 and discusscd "The Military and Societv.” Weigley (Ph.D.), Tem ple University; William Appleman Williams (Ph D.), Its proceedings were also published. The Sixth Military History Svmpos- Oregon State University; Gordon Wright (Ph D.), Stanford University. The Contributors

D*. Adrian Phest on (Ph.D.. University of London) is an Associate Professor of Ffis- tory and War Siudies at lhe Royal Military College of Canada He served as captain in the Canadian Army, 1954-62. and is a graduate ol the Royal Mililary College. He has lecturcd at defense colleges in Canada and India and is aulhor of three buoks and numerous articles in profcssional journais tvorldwidr. Dr. Preston was Visiting Profes- sor ol Military and Strategic Siudies at Acadia University. Nova Scotia. Canada, during 1973-74. He is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and of the Royal Historie j Society.

Major John Duncan Wil l ia ms (Ph.D.. University of Texas) is Chief. Analysis and .onel Ray L. Bowers (USNA; M.A., Evaluation Division. Directoratc of Advcr- versitv of Wisconsin) is assigned to thc tising. DCS/Recruiting Service, Hq Air ice of Air Force History, Washington. Training Command. Randolph AFB. '.. and u complrting a volume on tacti- Texas He has served as personnel Services airlift for the official history of (he officer, base information olficer. director 4F in Southeast Asia He served as of information. and as action olficer. igaior-bombardier in tactical bombers Southeast Asia desk, Serrelary ol thc Air ing the nfiies and as a C-ISO navigator Force Office of Information. Major Wil- he Far East, 1967-68. He has served as liams has published articles in protessional ociate Professor of History at the USAF journais and won three Frccdonfs Founda- deray. Colonel Bowers is a frcquent tion honor medals. xíbutor to the Air University Revtew and -r miiitary journais. Major Robert C. Carroll, USA. (M.A., Northwestern University; M.P.A.. Auburn University) is Executive Officer, Ist Battal- ion. 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanired). Fort Carson, Colorado. His assignments have included advisor to the Vietnamcse Ranger School. coinmandcr of a rifle companv in Vietnam. teacher of leadership at West Point. and operations staff officer in Hq MACV. Major Carroll is an associate editor of thc Juurnal uj Pulilieal and Military Sociolugy. He is a 1974 distin- guished graduate of the Air Command and Staff College.

onel J ames H. K as ler (B.S.. University Colonel Harrv A. Goodall (M.S.B.A., )maha) is Vice Commander. 366th George Washington University: M.P.A., ical Fighter Wing (TAC). Mountain Auburn University) is Commander. 8th ne AFB. Idaho. He served as a B-29 Combat Support Group, Ubon Royal Thai ner. 1944-46. including combat over Air Force Base. Thailand. He has flown F- n. He received his wings in 1951 and I02s and F-I06s at Sellridge and McChord 100 combat missions in Korea. becom- and Iroin Clark AB, Philippincs. where he an ace with six MIG-I5s destroyed. He completed 213 combat missions. 42 over rd as operaúons oflicer. 354th Tactical North Vietnam. He has served as an air ter Squadron, Takhli AB. Thailand, Lieu t en a n t Colonel Cl vde R. Robbins operations staff officer and Chiei. Fighter I shot down over North Vietnam in (M.S.. University of Southern Califórnia) is Branch, DCS/P&O, Hq USAF. Colonel ust 1966; he was captured and in- Assistant Chíef of Staff. Operations and Goodall is a graduate ol Air Command ed until March 1973. Colonel Kasler is Plans (J-3), Icrland Defense Force. His and Staff College and Air War College. aduate of Air War College. tactical fighter expericnce includes opera- tional duty in the F-84F. F-I00D. F-IOIA, and F-4C. and he flew 100 combat missions over North Vietnam. He has bcen an operatíonal pilot with F-4E Joint Tcst feam and an operations staff officer and division chicf in DCS/Rcquírements. Hq Tactical Air Command. Colonel Robbins is a 1974 graduate of Air War College.

95 ment Department, Air National Guard Noncommissioned Officer Academy. ANG Professional Military Education Center, Knoxville. Tennessee. He has served in a number of related positions in the Guard during his 23-year career. He was selected as lhe ANG Professional Military Educa- tion Center's Instructor of thc Year in 1973 and nominated for Outstanding Air- man of the Year in the Air National Guard. Sergeant Beshore is a graduate of the ANG NCO Academy and the USAF Sênior NCO Academy.

W ing Com m an der R. A. Mason. RAF (M.A., St Andrews University: M.A.. Lon- Chaplain (Liel t ena nt Colonel) J ohn G. don University) is on the staff of the Air T ruitt. Jr . (M.Div.. Union Theological OfFicer Commanding in Chief, RAF Train- Seminary) is thc installation chaplain at ing Command. Bramplon (Huntingdon- lraklion, Cretc. He is an ordained minisier shire), England. He has served in the of the United Church oí Ghrist and licld Education Branch of the RAF since 1956, pastorates in North Carolina. New Jcrsey, lectured at several British universities, and and Virgima prior 10 entering the Air had articles and reviews published on both Force in 1961. He has since served as sides of the Atlantic. He was RAF Ex- chaplain in TAC. USAFE. ATC, AFLC, change Officer to the Department of His- MAC. and PACAF Chaplain Truitt re- lory, USAF Academy. 1969-71. Wing ceived s penal recngnition as a humanitar- Commander Mason is a graduate of lhe ian from the President of South Vietnam USAF Air War College and the RAF Staff while serving therc. He is a graduate of College. His next assignment will be as Air Command and Staff College. Command tducaiion Officer, RAF Sup- port Command.

Lieu t en a n t Colonel David MacI saac (Ph.D.. Duke University) is Tenure Associate Professor and Deputy for Military History. Department of Historv, USAF Academy. Other assignments have included five vears with the Strategic Air Command as a per- sonnel offtcer in Texas and Spain; AFIT student at Duke; and adviser to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. Hq Vietnamcse Air Force. His articles and reviews have ap- Dr . Rk hard I. Lest er (Ph.D., Institutc of peared in Air Force Magazine. Mtd-America, Historical Research?University of London) The Social Studies, and the Air University Re- is Director of C.urriculum and Evaluation. vieu>. In st uuie lor Professional Development. Air University. Previous assignments have been as Chief. Social and Behavioral Sciences, United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI). and education officer with SAC Chie* M aster Ser geant Donald S. Be* and USAFE. Dr. Lester has also served on shor e is Chiei. Leadership and Manage- the faculties of the University of Marvland and Auburn University.

V

The Air University Review Awards Comniittee has selected “The Role of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Last Decade” by Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting as the outstanding article in the September-October 1974 issue of the Revieiv. EDITORIAL STAFF Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF Editor J ack H. Mooney M anaging Editor Major Ric h a r d B. Comyns, USAF Associate Editor J ohn A. West cot t , J r . Art Director and Production M anager Enrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition Lia Mid o si May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition Wil l ia m J. De Paola Art Editor and Illustrator

ADVISERS C olonel J ames F. Sunderman Hq Aerospace Defense Command

C olonel Ger a l d J. H ic k ma n Hq Air Force Logistics Command

D r . H arold M. H el fman Hq Air Force Systems Command

C olonel H. J. D alton, J r . Hq Air Training Command

C olonel H. A. D avis, J r . Hq Military Airlift Command

F rancis W. J ennings SAF Office of Information

C olonel J ohn W. W alton Hq Strategic Air Command

C olonel Ric h a r d D. M oore Hq Tactical Air Command

C olonel Mel vill e A. M adsen Hq United States Air Force Academy

ATTENTION Air University Revietv is published to stim ulate pro- fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its eontents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be coastrued as carrving any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. REVIEW