A I R reuieinvU M I VE R S I T Y THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAl OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE USAF A ir l if t and the Airmobility Idea in Vie t n a m ........................................................ 2 Col. Rav L. Bowers, USAF T he Hanoi POL S trike........................................................................................................................... 19 Col. James H. Kasler, USAF N ational Sec u r it y as an Intellectual Challenge...............................................................29 Dr. Adrian Preston E thics of the Mil it a r y Profession.....................................................................................................3 9 Maj. Robert C. Carroll, USA O per a tional T est and Evaluation: A L ook in t o the Fundamentals......................... 44 Lt. Col. Clyde R. Robbins, USAF I nteraction: T he Mil it a r y and the Med ia.................................................................................. 54 Maj. John Duncan Williams, USAF In My Opinion S im u l a t io n : A T hreat to T actical A ir Power............................................................... 59 Col. Harry A. Goodall, USAF T he Co mmand er and H is T heology of Man..................................................................... 54 Chaplain (Lt. Col.) John G. Truitt, Jr., USAF P rofessional Mil it a r y Education for the No nco mmissio ned O fficer: I s It Effective? ........................................................................................................... 0 g CMSgt. Donald S. Beshore, ANG Books and Ideas O f Vic t o r ies, D efeat s, and Faillr es: P er c ept io ns of the A mer ican Mil it a r y Experience.................................................................................. 7 3 Lt. Col. David Maclsaac, USAF C hurchill in D ist o r t ed Per spec t ive.................................................................................. 83 Wing Com m ander R. A. Mason, RAF M il it a r y Hist o r y in Sympo sium............................................................................................... 89 Dr. Richard I. Lester T he Contributors.................................................................................................................................... 9 5 THE COVER A ddrett manusr ripto lo E ditor. Air U niversitv Sevcral articlcs in this issue of the Rrviru»— Revirw Division. Bldg. 1211. Maxwell AFB. AÉ thosc by Colonel Bowers, Colonel Kasler. 36112. Pnnted by CGovernment Printuig OHicr. anrl Licutcnant Colonel Maclsaac— derive Addres» sulxcriptiom to Superintendent of at least in part from our reccnt involve- Documento, CGPO. W ashington DC: 20402: yearlv ment in Southcast Asia In particular, th.OO domettie, $10.00 foreign-, single copv $IJ>0. though. the cover—withJC-1 30 Hercules and GH-47 C.hinook in rhe loregroiind and the aird ro p operaiion alx>ve—reflccts Colo- Vol. XXVI No. 1 NovF.MnrjR-DECE.MBKR 1974 nel Rav L. Bowers’s "CSAF Airlift and the Airm obility Idea in V ietnam ,” which re- views U.S. Army and Air Force experience with airlift and airmobility from Korca to the I970s and emphasizes “pragmatic antl scnsible accommodaiion by botli Services.” USAF AIRLIFT AND THE AIRMOBILITY IDEA IN VIETNAM COLONEL RAY L. BOWERS " | “HE usefulness of the transport air- excellent short- and rough-field potentiali- I plane in theater operations became ties, combat zone assault work had be- Idear during the Second World War. come secondary.3 An important doctrinal contradiction re- One potentially important development mained. however. Many American air and had been short-lived. Design studies in ground offícers saw in the parachute and 1949 had indicated that rotary-wing craft glider assault a new order of combat zone of vvorthwhile payload were within reach. mobility for ground units. Others realized Although some offícers fell that helicop- that the fixed-wing transport had proven ters were overly vulnerable to ground fire, better suited for less rigorous, though tac organized its first rotary-wing unit in important. tasks. The korean War seemed early 1952. The helicopter fit easily into to support the latter view. Paratroop as- older airlift doctrine: the craft possessed saults were rarities in Korea, but several obvious advantages over the parachute for hundred usaf transports ranged the war the assault and short-haul resupply, along zone dailv—landing with ammunition and with unmatched capacity for pickup of other supplies, hauling units and person- casualties. By the end of 1955, five heli- nel. dropping supplies to isolated units, copter squadrons had been activated in and evacuating casualties to Japan.1 tac, building toward a nine-squadron Post-Korean tactical airlift doctrine vvas force. divided. The quest for batdefield mobility Lhe decision to dismande the helicopter brought into existence the Fairchild C- airlift arm was a reluctant one, made after 123. The twin-engine Provider was called repeatecl and firm refusals by U.S. Army an “assault transport,” having been devel- officials to support a usaf combat zone oped from a glider airframe for the helicopter lift role. Major General Chester purpose of rough-field landings at for- E. McCarty, commanding airlift forces ward landing zones. The craffs assault widiin tac, dissented, warning that future landing capabilities complemented the improvements in rotary-wing craft would parachute-delivery strengths of the older eventually result in “real airlift potential C-119, still in active Service in the mid- that definitely should be integrated with fifties.2 and assigned to the Theater Combat The larger and more powerful C-130 Airlift Force.” Most Air Force leaders joined the active force in 1956. This four- became reconciled to the loss of the engine Lockheed turboprop brought helicopter airlift arm. aware of the very vastly improved speed, range, and pay- limited range and payload capacities of load—qualities useful for high-volume or existing helicopter types. Thus, in 1961, intertheater operations. During the next with the usaf helicopter arm stillborn and decade of Cold War crises, the mission of with the athletic C-123s programmed for moving task forces to overseas trouble retirement from the active force, usaf spots became foremost. Patterns varied, batdefield delivery capabilities were not but often the C-130s of Tactical Air impressive.4 Command deployed men and equipment of tactical air units overseas, while the larger C-124s hauled ground troop ele- the airmobility challenge ments. Although C-130 crews continued Robust ideas w'ere emerging in the U.S. to practice parachute techniques and al- Army—toward greater, not less, use of though for its size the Hercules had airlift for mobility in the combat zone. 3 4 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW The promise of helicopters hacl been the Services over ownership and control of glimpsed in Korea, and in 1954 Army airlift forces grevv firm. In the regularly staff studies vvere reflected in a Harpers held joint field exercises, activities focused article entitled “Cavalry, and I Don t Mean on the parachute assault, avoiding the Horses!” The author was Lieutenant Gen- issue-laden matter of helicopter troop mo- eral James M. Gavin, G-3, Department of bility. Numerous technical questions relat- the Army. Later, from retirement, Gavin ing to airmobility thus remained unan- in War atui Peaee in the Space Age (1958) svvered, among them methods for air called for creation of “sky cavalry” forma- traffic control at forward airheads and tions, capable of dispersai and movement agreed responsibilities for medicai evacua- over the nuclear battlefield. Field Manual tion, cargo handling, and pathfinding. 57-35, Airmobile Operations, described the Army and Air Force aircrews remained movement of combat elements about the etjuipped with incompatible radio equip- battlefield in Army-owned air vehicles; for ment, unable to converse with one an- example, following up nuclear detonations other at future crowded airheads.6 or—conceivably—in counterguerrilla situa- Secretary of Defense Robert Mc- tions. In The Uncertain Trumpet (1959), Namara and members of his civilian staff General Maxwell Tavlor, the retiring moved firmly to unblock airmobile policy. Armv Chief of Staff, wrote that nevv After several months of preliminary dis- equipment for tactical airlift (and for cussions, McNamara by memorandum of tactical air support) shoulcl be organic April 1962 called upon the Army for within the Army, claiming that the Air “fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts Force hacl long neglected these responsi- which will give us a significam increase in bilities to the Army. By 1960, the Army mobility.” Four months later, an Army possessed 5500 helicopter and fíxed-wing board under the chairmanship of Lieuten- aircraft (up from 3200 in 1953) and ant General Hamilton H. Howze reported planned a further expansion to 8800 over (in its ovvn words) “a single general con- the next ten years. Few of the active clusion: adoption by the Army of the helicopters, however, vvere sufficiently airmobile concept.” The group recom- powered to fulfill the kind of large-scale mended formation of “air assault” divi- mobility envisioned by Gavin, Taylor, and sions, equipped with large numbers of the nevver generation of airmobility lead- aircraft for hauling troops into battle and ers.5 providing fire support. Separately orga- The Air Force consistently opposed nizecl air transport brigades, equipped expansion of the Army’s transport heli- with heavier helicopters and Caribou copter arm, convinced