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Commentary Principles for Thinking about Dioxide Removal in Just Policy

David R. Morrow,1,* Michael S. Thompson,2 Angela Anderson,3 Maya Batres,4 Holly J. Buck,5 Kate Dooley,6 Oliver Geden,7,8 Arunabha Ghosh,9 Sean Low,10 Augustine Njamnshi,11 John Noel,€ 4 Olu´ fẹ́mi O. Ta´ ı´wo` ,12 Shuchi Talati,3 and Jennifer Wilcox13 1Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy, American University, Washington, DC, USA 2Carnegie Climate Governance Initiative, New York, NY, USA 3Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC, USA 4Independent scholar, USA 5UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, CA, USA 6Australian-German Climate and Energy College, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia 7German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany 8International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 9Council on Energy, Environment, and Water, New Delhi, India 10Institute for Advanced Studies, Potsdam, Germany 11Pan-African Alliance, Nairobi, Kenya 12Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA 13Chemical Engineering Department, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA *Correspondence: [email protected] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.07.015

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is rising up the climate-policy agenda. Four principles for thinking about its role in climate policy can help ensure that CDR supports the kind of robust, abatement-focused long-term climate strategy that is essential to fair and effective implementation.

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR), some- agencies are wrestling with the chal- Different people and institutions will times called carbon removal or negative lenge of forming positions on CDR, have different expectations about long- emissions, is the practice of capturing including whether to support it at all term climate strategies. These include dif- carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and, if so, what mix of approaches to ferences over the kinds of social, eco- and storing it for long periods of time. support, what kind of policies should nomic, and technological transformations There are many approaches to CDR, govern it, and how to connect it to other that societies should or will use to decar- including nature-based solutions, such elements of climate policy. The following bonize, the kinds of policies societies as restoration, and more engi- four principles crystallize some of the should adopt to spur those transforma- neered approaches, such as direct air key ideas that shape our own thinking tions, and the urgency and speed with capture with carbon storage.1 These about CDR. We present them here in which the world can completely decar- encompass a variety of options for storing the hope that others will find them useful bonize. These differences imply slightly carbon, ranging from and to as they deliberate about their own different roles for CDR as part of the and geological reservoirs to long- positions. long-term strategy or different roles for lived products such as timber buildings or different approaches to CDR at different (Figure 1). CDR does not include Don’t Forget the Long Game times. In particular, some might see a fossil carbon capture and storage (CCS), First, CDR is only one part of a long-term role for CDR in mopping up residual emis- such as CCS on a gas-fired power climate strategy. Cutting sions while we figure out how to decar- plant, or carbon capture and use that em- emissions must remain at the center of bonize harder-to-abate sectors such as beds carbon in short-lived products, such that strategy: CDR would be too slow, construction, heavy industry, and heavy as synthetic fuels; they might reduce expensive, and technically uncertain to transport. Others might prefer to limit emissions, but neither of these technolo- replace the need for rapid emissions re- CDR to compensating only for gies removes carbon dioxide from the ductions.3 Furthermore, attempting to and land-use emissions or to use it after atmosphere. do so would mean missing out on the so- complete decarbonization to draw down CDR is rising rapidly up climate-policy cial and environmental benefits of transi- ‘‘legacy carbon’’ remaining in the atmo- agendas because it could provide a tioning to clean energy. Adaptation, both sphere from past emissions. useful—perhaps essential—supplement incremental and transformative, also It turns out that these disagreements to emissions abatement as the world plays an essential role, as do measures have relatively little impact on the question works toward meeting the Paris Agree- to address loss and damage. The world of whether to devote time and resources to ment goals for limiting global warming.2 needstodoallofthesethingstofight CDR research, development, and deploy- As a result, civil society organizations, —a ‘‘both/and’’ approach ment now. Even if the world can philanthropic funders, and government rather than ‘‘either/or.’’ completely decarbonize quickly without

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Figure 1. Some Proposed Methods of Carbon Dioxide Removal Some of the many approaches that people have proposed for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it are presented here without assessment of their respective potential for removing or storing carbon or their social, environmental, or economic sustainability, which will vary between methods and depend on the details and context of implementation. These methods are often divided into ‘‘natural climate solutions’’ and ‘‘engineered’’ ap- proaches, although the precise boundary between these categories is contested and somewhat vague. Illustration by Matt Twombly.

CDR, almost any path to decarbonization proaches to CDR have different resource lated in the abstract, such as cost and to- still leaves the world facing dangerous requirements and different social and tal carbon sequestered. Those aspects of climate impacts.2 By cleaning up legacy environmental impacts.1,7 Whether it is CDR matter, but a complete assessment carbon, CDR could lower carbon dioxide an individual farmer adopting cover-crop of CDR requires assessing not only cost concentrations and reduce , rotations or a large corporation building and sequestration potential but also envi- though lowering concentrations signifi- a facility, the value of ronmental and social impacts. cantly would require removing hundreds any CDR project depends not just on Three questions about social and polit- of billions of metric tons of carbon dioxide.4 whether and how much carbon it can ical context deserve special attention. The To reach that scale, societies can begin sequester at what financial cost but also first is whether a particular project, pro- rolling out some approaches now, such on the project’s environmental, social, gram, or policy comports with equity and as ecosystem restoration, informed by de- and political impacts. In some cases, the principle of common but differentiated cades of experience at the intersection of especially with natural climate solutions, responsibility and respective capabilities. land management and climate policy. positive impacts could justify adoption CDR is fundamentally about cleaning up Other approaches, such as enhanced independently of the climate benefits. In pollution. It makes sense for polluters to mineralization, require further research, others, negative impacts could outweigh pay for it and to have excess costs fall development, demonstration, and deploy- any climate benefits. In all cases, those on those who are best able to bear ment. Whatever mix of approaches soci- impacts depend on the context and de- them. It would be patently unfair for the eties adopt, scaling up CDR capacity to tails of the project and not just on the Global North to pass the responsibility the multi-gigaton scale, if feasible, would particular technology or practice in ques- for cleaning up carbon pollution to the take several decades.5 Therefore, if we tion. For example, compare a small bio- Global South, which contributed much want to remove hundreds of billions of energy with carbon capture and storage less to the problem. Some observers metric tons by the end of this century, (BECCS) facility fueled by local municipal worry that the very corporations that whether as part of a net-zero strategy or waste with a BECCS system in which contributed so much to carbon pollution to clean up legacy carbon,6 now is the huge swathes of commercially farmed could use CDR to evade accountability, time to begin developing and adopting land provide switchgrass to fuel large po- but it could be that assigning these corpo- appropriate policies for CDR research, wer plants that pipe carbon dioxide long rations responsibility to undertake or development, and rollout. distances for sequestration. These two finance CDR offers a way to hold them At the same time, thinking only about the approaches would have very different im- accountable. Thus, a key social and polit- long game isn’t enough. Reducing emis- pacts, which could include impacts on ical question about any CDR undertaking sions and adapting to climate change , water use, infrastructure needs, is the extent to which the costs and the must remain top priorities in the near term. food prices, and biodiversity. Evaluating social and environmental burdens associ- CDR at the level of broad technologies ated with it fall on those who bear the It’s Not All about the Carbon or practices obscures these differences. greatest responsibility for the problem. Second, social, economic, and environ- As a result, technology-level assessments The second question is about the over- mental impacts matter. Different ap- tend to focus on things that can be calcu- all political and economic context in which

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CDR would be deployed in the future. grind the rocks, and the two approaches heavily on vast plantations of Many civil society organizations argue involve very different social, economic, crops for BECCS to keep warming below that nothing short of radical social trans- and environmental systems. 2C or 1.5C.2,11 Critics noted that formation will enable us to stop climate Furthermore, the social, economic, and counting on future CDR in this way puts change, and some fear that CDR would political contexts in which people imple- future generations’ well-being at risk: if be used to delay that transformation. But ment CDR will affect its acceptance and large-scale CDR never emerges, for a vast, decades-long carbon-clean-up impacts. For example, consider a direct whatever reason, then future generations operation would look very different after air capture facility financed by will find themselves saddled with a radical social transformation than it companies or a petrostate. Some would dangerous levels of atmospheric carbon would in the current political and eco- regard such a facility’s fossil fuel financing dioxide.12 We agree that precaution pre- nomic climate. Moreover, because CDR as unforgivable. Distinguishing between cludes us from betting it all on CDR’s at the multi-gigaton scale would require different projects and different contexts, panning out as the models project. We vast infrastructure and because some op- however, allows those who oppose fossil also worry about making the opposite tions, such as direct air capture, assume fuel financing to take a nuanced position mistake by counting only on rapid emis- widespread cheap renewables, large- that opposes that particular project while sions abatement: if the world fails to scale CDR implies widespread voter will- leaving open the possibility of direct air decarbonize quickly, for whatever ingness to fund carbon clean-up and capture projects that operate free from reason, or if we decarbonize quickly but deep decarbonization, making CDR a fossil fuel influence in a context of trans- the climate does not respond as we consequence of social transformation, parency and good governance. That expect, then future generations could changed values, and renewables deploy- makes it important to assess CDR on a find themselves saddled with dangerous ment rather than an obstacle to them.8 We case-specific basis rather than just as ab- levels of carbon dioxide. Robust, flexible, might need to stretch our imaginations to stract technologies. It is only at this level precautionary climate policy requires envision economic and political futures in that organizations can distinguish be- recognizing that, despite our best-laid which CDR fits into the world we want tween bad technologies or practices and plans, future generations might benefit rather than delaying or undermining it. bad projects by accounting for the envi- from large-scale CDR in the second half The third question is about the level of ronmental, social, political, and gover- of this century. Ensuring that large-scale transparency included or required for nance contexts of specific projects. CDR is a possibility by mid-century any given CDR undertaking. It is difficult In short, fine-grained analyses of car- means beginning research and develop- to assess an undertaking’s social, eco- bon-removal projects, programs, or pol- ment now. Playing ‘‘wait and see’’ with nomic, and environmental impacts icies allow us to avoid throwing the good CDR could leave us with several extra without adequate transparency, making out with the bad or allowing the bad in decades of global heating that could transparency essential for effective and with the good. By analogy, support for have been avoided and an increased legitimate decision making. emissions reductions doesn’t automati- risk of crossing climate tipping points. cally translate into support for every strat- Split, Don’t Lump egy that would cut emissions.10 Some see Why It Matters Third, assessing CDR requires going some kinds of low-carbon energy as bet- What’s at stake in making the right call on beyond technology-level analyses. This ter than others, and many outright oppose CDR? We worry about three things with follows from the second principle. Not all certain technologies or practices, such as respect to CDR: societies could do too lit- carbon removal is created equal in terms plants or large hydroelec- tle, they could do too much, or they could of social, economic, and environmental tric dams, because of costs, risks, or im- do it wrong. On the one hand, if the world impacts, and nuanced positions are pacts on vulnerable communities and does not devote enough time and re- needed to distinguish better technolo- . It is even possible to support sources to developing and deploying gies, practices, projects, and policies a particular technology while opposing CDR, we will face higher carbon dioxide from worse ones. specific projects. For example, an organi- concentrations—and therefore a more Broad categories, such as those in zation might support policies to incen- dangerous climate—than necessary. On Figure 1, usefully convey the breadth of tivize development of solar energy the other hand, societies that pursue options for CDR, but they also conceal while opposing a specific project because CDR at too large a scale, adopt the wrong important differences between specific it is sited on high-value biodiversity land. mix of approaches for their circum- technologies and practices. For instance, CDR deserves the same nuanced stances, or govern CDR ineffectively forest restoration and monoculture tree analysis. could face serious social and environ- plantations might both fall under the mental downsides. By engaging thought- heading of , but only the Don’t Bet It All on Being Right fully with CDR on the basis of the princi- former can promote adaptation, preserve Fourth, climate policy needs to be resil- ples we have outlined, civil society biodiversity, and deliver long-term carbon ient against unexpected outcomes. The organizations, funders, and government storage.9 As another example, spreading long-term scenarios that the Intergovern- agencies can help ensure that CDR plays finely ground basalt on cropland and scat- mental Panel on Climate Change a positive role in the kind of robust, abate- tering olivine pebbles on coastal seabeds analyzed for its Fifth Assessment Report ment-focused long-term climate strategy both count as enhanced weathering, but in 2014 and its Special Report on the im- that is essential to fair and effective the former requires far more energy to pacts of global warming of 1.5C relied climate policy.

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