The Solomons Naval Campaign: a Paradigm for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1985 The Solomons naval campaign: a paradigm for surface warships in maritime strategy. McKearney, T. J. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/21550 x, CALIF01 £ £ NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS THE SOLOMONS NAVAL CAMPAIGN: A PARADIGM FOR SURFACE WARSHIPS IN MARITIME STRATEGY by T. J. McKearney September 1985 Thesis Advisor Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited, T 224405 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entered) READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOD COVERED The Solomons Naval Campaign: A Paradigm Master's Thesis; for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy September 198 5 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 7. author^; 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*) T* J. McKearney 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AC3RESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE Naval Postgraduate School September 1985 Monterey, California 93943-5100 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 276 U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 ADORESSf// dl Heron! from Controlling Oftlce) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thta report) Unclassified 1 5a. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (ol this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abatract entered In Block 20, It different from Report) 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide It neceaaary and Identity by block number) Solomons Naval Campaign Surface Combatant Task Forces World War II War gaming 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide It neceaaary and Identity by block number) This thesis examines the naval campaign in the Solomons during World War II with an emphasis on the relationship between the campaign strategy and the tactics employed. The strategic background is reviewed within the context of the War in early 1942. A central theme developed is that in the Solomons campaign both sides employed cruisers and DD ' s as principal naval forces in place of the fully integrated EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE DD I JAN 73 1473 N 0102- 014- S LF- 6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGe (When Data Entered) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whmn Dmtm Bnffd) 20. (continued) "battle fleets" envisioned as part of pre-war strategy. The role of war gaming in American preparations for the war is shown to explain in part the failure of American commanders to modify existing doctrine in a timely manner during the campaign. Data from the naval battles fought in the Solomons is compiled in an original way and analyzed to explain the factors which consistently influenced the outcome of the eleven battles. Conclusions reached address the nature of mbdern campaigns undertaken to widen a conflict ("horizontal escalation") and the forces that may be required to pursue such campaigns. The parallels between the use of surface combatant task forces in World War II and their projected employment today are noted and discussed. S N 0102- LF- 014- 6601 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(T»7i«n Oar* Enfrmd) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited The Solomons Naval Campaign: A Paradigm for Surface Warships in Maritime Strategy by T. J. McKearney Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1973 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1985 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the naval campaign in the Solomons during World War II with an emphasis on the relationship between the campaign strategy and the tactics employed. The strategic background is reviewed within the context of the War in early 1942. A central theme developed is that in the Solomons campaign both sides employed cruisers and DD ' s as principal naval forces in place of the fully integrated "battle fleets" envisioned as part of pre-war strategy. The role of war gaming in American preparations for the war is shown to explain in part the failure of American commanders to modify existing doctrine in a timely manner during the campaign. Data from the naval battles fought in the Solomons is compiled in an original way and analyzed to explain the factors which consistently influenced the outcome of the eleven battles. Conclusions reached address the nature of modern campaigns undertaken to widen a conflict ("horizontal escalation" ) and the forces that may be required to pursue such campaigns. The parallels between the use of surface combatant task forces in World War II and their projected employment today are noted and discussed. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN IN PERSPECTIVE 11 A. STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN 14 B. TACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLOMONS • CAMPAIGN 16 II. STRATEGIC ROOTS OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN 18 A. CONVERGENT STRATEGIES: HOW EACH SIDE GOT TO THE SUMMER OF '42 18 1. Japan: Struggling Forward 18 2. American Desperation 22 B. STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS AND THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN 32 1. Naval Power-To Be Used Sparingly 33 C. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE: TWO VIEWS 41 1. American Amphibious Operations Within The Solomons Context 43 2. Japanese Amphibious Operations 45 D. FORWARD BASING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE SOLOMONS 5 1. Contrasting Attitudes and Effectiveness 5 5 E. SYNERGISM IN THE SOLOMONS 58 1. The Air Campaign 59 2. The Campaign Afloat 62 3. The Campaign Ashore 64 F. THE SOLOMONS: WORTH THE EFFORT? 66 — - III. THE PEDIGREE OF THE NAVAL FORCES USED IN THE SOLOMONS 70 A. NAVAL TACTICS AND THE FLEET THAT NEVER WAS — 70 B. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE — 7 2 1. The Gun as King of Battle 75 C. CRUISER AND DESTROYER TACTICS: COMPROMISED SUPPORT 77 1. Destroyers 78 2. Cruisers: Neither Thrust nor Pary 80 D. CRUISER CONSTRUCTION AND THE GREAT NON-DEBATE 84 E. UNSOUND ANALYSIS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERWAR FLEET 89 F. AMERICAN NIGHT TACTICS AND RADAR: LOST OPPORTUNITIES 9 5 G. ARMS CONTROL AND THE CRUISER FORCES — 98 IV. FLAWED ORACLES: THE INTERWAR GAMES, FLEET EXERCISES, AND THE SOLOMONS 105 A. THE NAVAL WAR GAMES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD 105 1. The Rules of the Game Floor 107 2. How the Game Saw the Engagement 115 B. THE AT SEA EXERCISES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD 12 9 C. IN SUMMARY 136 V. DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SOLOMONS NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS 139 A. OVERVIEW 139 B. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 140 1. MAGIC in the Solomons Engagements 144 2. Technical Intelligence 147 C. THE SUPERIORITY OF JAPANESE TACTICS 149 D. THE TORPEDO VERSUS THE GUN 152 1. Rcnge and Its Importance 153 2. Tie Torpedo: THE Decisive Weapon? 156 E. THE IIFLUENCE OF TIME AND EXPERIENCE 159 F. FIRST MOVES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE 16 1. ^e Influence of First Contact in an hgagement • 16 2 2. 'ie Effect of Opening the Engagement l Its Outcome 164 G. PATTRNS OF DEFEAT: WHO WON THE BATTLES? 16 7 VI APPLYINCTHE LESSONS OF THE SOLOMONS TODAY: PARADIGI^ AND WARNINGS 171 A. THE )LOMONS AND MODERN STRATEGY 171 1. mflict Escalation and the Solomons: Viable Concept? — — 171 2. e Solomons as A Naval Campaign > 174 B. ON r STRUCTURING OF NAVAL FORCES 175 1. tching Forces and Operational Concept 175 2. Tibined Operations and Force Structure 177 3. ns Control and the Building of Weapons stems 178 C. THEGS OF NAVAL COMBAT AND THE SOLOMONS 17 9 1. : Influence of Tactical Tradition 179 2. Role of Tactical Doctrine 181 3. ernative Tactics for Alternative ategies 182 D. THE) FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE 183 E. THE? OF GAMING IN STRATEGIC AND TAC'j ANALYSIS 184 7 APPENDIX A - ANALYSIS OF BATTLES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY 188 APPENDIX B - SURVEY OF GAMES AND FLEET EXERCISES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY 247 APPENDIX C - DESCRIPTION OF MODEL UTILIZED TO GENERATE EXPECTED BATTLE RESULTS 25 7 LIST OF REFERENCES 269 BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 74 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST-- 275 LIST OF TABLES I. American and Japanese Combatants as of Pearl Harbor 3 6 II. Average Troop Reinforcements at Guadalcanal 4 8 III. Comparison of American and Japanese Cruiser Ranges 5 2 IV. Cruisers and the Washington and London Treaty Agreements 9 9 V. Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Cruiser Forces 101 VI. Comparative Lifespans — U.S. & Jap. Cruisers 117 VII. Overview of Engagement Data from Solomons 141 LIST OF FIGURES 3.1 Standard Disposition of American Battle Fleet 74 3.2 Destroyer Attack in Support of the Battle Fleet — 79 4.1 Effective Firepower of U.S. and Japanese Cruiser s-19 34 • 122 4.2 Effective Firepower of U.S. and Japanese Cruisers-1941 123 4.3 Comparison - U.S. & Japanese CA Firepower (> 15 Kyrd)— 124 4.4 Comparison of Gun Firepower Gained by Closing — 125 10 I. INTRODUCTION: THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN IN PERSPECTIVE The naval battles of the Solomons, fought largely with surface combatants supported by land-based air, offer a likely paradigm for evaluating American naval strategy today. The forerunners of today's Surface Combatant Task Groups (SCTGs) and Surface Action Groups (SAGs) were the cruiser- destroyer task groups of the Solomons campaign. The employ- ment developed for these modern surface forces embodies the same principle as the American drive through the Solomons: a campaign of limited scope, off the central axis of strategic concerns and undertaken with the minimum resources necessary. Just as the Solomons campaign saw the substitution of surface task groups for large, carrier-based offensive forces, so do we now ponder the use of modern SCTGs and SAGs in hostile situations where Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) may be unavailable.