ST/DPI • ORAL HISTORY (02) • G175 • Yale-UN Oral History Project • Robert GallucciGallucci lamesJames Sutterlin, InterviewerInterviewer February 3, 1998 • \,.\,. • Washington, DCDC • • • • • • • • • •

• \ • • Yale-UN Oral History Project Robert Gallucci James Sutterlin, Interviewer February 3, 1998 Washington, DC

Index: UNSCOM

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) 13,22,25,44 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 5-6, 10,25,33 Foreign Service 6, 19,47 Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 24,27-28,39 Gulf War 20,22,35-38 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 4,22-23,43-46 Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 25 Iraqi Weapons Inspections 6,9-10,14,16-31,33,36-37,39-46,48 National War College 1 Negotiations 47 Non-Proli feration Treaty 45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 15 Resolution 687 1-4, 34-35, 40, 43 Resolution 715 40 UN Field Service 10-11 United Nations Department of Disarmament 2-3,38,42-43 United State Department of Energy 6 United States Department of Defense 4 United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 1-5,8-10,15,21-23,26,28,37,43-44,46 Double agents/intelligence 32-33 Funding 13 Operations/missions 1,4,7-8,12-14,17-18,24,43-44 Relations with New York Headquarters 42 Weapons Inspections 9-10,14,16-31,33,36-37,39-46,48 Security Cou ncil 1,4,35,43-45 UN Special Commission Resolution 68 18 Weapons ofMass Destruction 16, 20-21, 25-26,29-30, 32-33, 36-41 Yale University 42 I

I Yale-UN Oral History I Robert Gallucci Interviewer: James Sutterlin

I February 3, 1998 I Washington, DC

I James Sutterlin: Mr. Gallucci, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the Yale Oral I History program. The subject today is UNSCOM in Iraq, and I'd like to start by asking I you how you first became associated with this operation,

I Robert Gallucci: I was teaching at the National War College and on assignment I from the Depm1ment of State. I was first asked to leave classes to help draft what became UN Security Council Resolution 687. I did that, I worked with a lot of other people

I drafting that Resolution, and then I was asked ifl wouldn't... I JS: In New York? I

I RG: Well, the drafting was in Washington, and it was a struggle back and f011h with I Tom Pickering who was our ambassador at the UN acting as the US Advocate. We went back and forth with the text, we were negotiating with the French, and particularlypmticularly with

I the British and the others, until we ended up with Resolution 687. Then, of course, itit was I a matter of getting it passed, and I was asked to go up to New York and work with Ambassador Pickering to help with its passage, and I did that. Then, they asked if I I I • • 2 would help with the establishment of the Commission. II would makemake aa pointpoint here,here, whichwhich • I think as people look back they may miss, thatthat nobody knew what thethe SpecialSpecial • Commission was. The Resolution had few words, so when II saidsaid "to"to establishestablish aa Commission" this will shock, I am afraid, Americans who assume thatthat peoplepeople inin

• government know more than they know sometimes. II wasn't suresure whatwhat aa UNUN CommissionCommission • was, exactly. I knew there were a lot of commissions, but thisthis oneone waswas velYvelY operational,operational, as I looked at the text that we had all produced. ItIt was supposed toto dodo aa blillchblillch ofthingsofthings

• on the ground in a country that had just lost a war and been bombed. So,So, II didn'tdidn't havehave anan • image of a lot ofpeople in three-piece suits as a commission. • Interestingly, nobody had an image thatthat I could find,find, neither thosethose ofof usus thatthat werewere involved with drafting, nor when I went to see thethe people [who[who were]were] responsibleresponsible forfor thisthis

• in the Secretariat who ran the disarmament portion of thethe UN under Mr.Mr. Akashi,Akashi, whowho • became well-known later on in the Bosnian context and thethe Cambodian context.context. 11 Anyway, we had to figure this out, whole-cloth, make itit up. And whenwhen II talkedtalked toto thethe 11 people in the disarmament area, they had a rather, what II thought,thought, bizarrebizarre view,view, whichwhich was of a geographically balanced commission. They would have thethe developingdeveloping worldworld

I and others represented, and do what the UN normally does, thatthat is,is, createcreate kindkind ofof aNewaNew I York City political party ticket, a "balanced" ticket.ticket. II said, "This mightmight workwork forfor aa bunchbunch ofoverseers, but not for the executive arm ofthisthis entity; toto do thisthis stuff,stuff, itit wouldwould havehave toto

I be something else." So that was one issue thatthat I ended up ...... II thinkthink 'negotiating''negotiating' isis thethe I right word. And the second was who exactly would be thethe Executive ChainnanChainnan oftheofthe I Special Commission, and who would be thethe deputy Executive ChairmanChairman ofof thethe SpecialSpecial Commission. 11 III • 3 I can't actually remember too clearly, nor probably should I, exactly what

• transpiredtranspired at that meeting, putting myself, as the US government wished me to, forward • toto the UN as the Deputy Executive Chairman, and the process by which the United States worked with others to develop support for Ambassador Ekeus, who as I recall would

• actually be named by the Secretary-General. But that process went on in its own special • littlelittle way, and Ambassador Ekeus was the first choice ofthe United States, and he was • indeed named. I first met Ekeus at the UN Plaza hotel, across the street from the UN; we met for coffee, I think, and then walked across the street to the UN to see what there was • ofthe offices. I strongly suspected that there would be nothing, and indeed I was quite • wrong -- there was something, there was a secretary, who is still there, by the way, thethe secretary to the Executive Chairman, and Derek Boothby was assigned to us from thethe • Disarmament group. That was pretty much it. However, the assignment for this Swedish • diplomat, myself, one staffer, and one secretary, was to disanndisarm Iraq. In retrospect, itit isis quite fUlU1Y. We didn't think it was so fUlmy when the first press call came in that day, as

• we were sitting around the little room with glass partitions, someone from the press • asking when our first mission to Iraq would begin. Now, you might think, at this point, 11 that the US government would simply step into the breach, since it had played such a I leading role in the coalition, in forming the coalition and fighting the war, and in helping 11 toto draft and design Resolution 687 and the Commission itself.

I 1S: So, the Special Commission was a US idea? 11 11 11 • 4 RG: I can't say thatthat right at thisthis moment. I might be able to go back and try to find that

• out. But at thisthis moment, thethe languagelanguage I remember fighting over in the Special • Commission had toto do a great deal with what would be thethe real objectives, the standards • we would have inin thethe resolution with respect toto weapons of mass destruction, what role thethe IAEAIABA would play, how thethe Security Council would relate toto thethe IAEAIABA and the nuclear • sub-group,sub-group, all thosethose kinds of things.things. And I don't remember, actually, thethe languagelanguage • creating thethe Special Commission. Others will, I'm sure. InIn any event, thethe point II wanted toto get toto was thatthat itit was not thethe view ofthethe United • States government thatthat thisthis was now theirtheir job.job. ItIt was an interestinginteresting reaction I got when I • calledcalled backback toto Washington, sayingsaying "Well,"Well, we're here, we're readyready toto spearhead thethe US governmentgovernment when itit comes in,"in," which isis kind ofthe the model inin my mind ---- I had no ideaidea

• howhow toto putput thisthis together.together. The reactionreaction of many, particularlypmiicularly inin thethe Department of • Defense,Defense, was,was, "We"We gavegave at thethe office. ItIt isis now thethe timetime forfor thethe internationalinternational community, 11 'others;''others;' wewe havehave nono budget,budget, nono intentionintention of doing any of this."this," So, itit was a long,long, longlong 11 wayway fromfrom thethe threethree ofof us,us, fourfour ofof us,us, II guess,guess, counting thethe secretary,secretary, sittingsitting around tryingtrying toto figurefigure outout howhow wewe wouldwould getget teamsteams together,together, where we would get assets, how we

I wouldwould getget funded,funded, howhow wewe wouldwould knowknow whatwhat toto dodo when we got there.there. There wasn't any I USUS governmentgovernment comingcoming inin toto helphelp usus out.out. That'sThat's howhow II gotgot there.there. I JS:JS: AndAnd so,so, howhow diddid youyou solvesolve that?that? I I RG:RG: AA lotlot ofofthings things happened,happened, somewhatsomewhat simultaneously.simultaneously. RolfandRolfand II mademade thethe rOlmdsrOlmds withinwithin thethe UN.UN. TheThe UN'sUN's idea,idea, interestingly,interestingly, waswas toto putput thethe SpecialSpecial CommissionCommission somesome 11 - I 5

I five or six blocks away from the headquarters, to keep itit as far away as possible. PerezPerez dede I Cuellar was not particularly taken with having this under his wing. And, he hadhad manymany more impOliant things to do in this thirty-eight story building thanthan a littlelittle Special

I Commission to disarm Iraq. We argued he had nothing more importantimportant toto do inin thatthat I building, and we were the last people who should be blocks away. So, thethe firstfirst thingthing waswas fighting within the UN system to get some space, to get some staff. We asked forfor aa

I lawyer, a reasonable thing since we were going to have toto stmi drafting thingsthings rightright away,away, I and Legal Offices said no. Legal Offices said, "You rely on us. We are a fewfew floorsfloors downstairs from where your office is, and you'll just come down when you need usus andand

I we'll put you in the queue with the other work we have toto do." So, we went offoff andand wewe I hired a retired legal advisor for the United Nations. We wanted toto get someonesomeone outout inin thethe I field right away. And [there were] the little things, like how toto get toto Iraq,Iraq, sincesince nono oneone was allowed to fly in -- where would we fly from? So, we got a Romanian charter

I aircraft. But then nobody would go anyplace near target inspectioninspection sites, because theythey I would have been bombed. So we needed EOD people, explosives ordinance disposal, because every place we wanted to go we had bombed, and therethere would be unexploded

I mtmitions. Where would we get EOD? I asked the US government forfor EOD, andand theythey I said, "We gave." So, we went to private firms for EOD people. We also begged somesome ofof I the other governments, first the Germans, for EOD people. Then, of course, whenwhen wewe went to the private firms, they said, "We aren't going anywhere without insurance."insurance." AndAnd

I we went on the private insurance market to buy insurance for thethe people who werewere goinggoing I in. And then the question was "Where would we get our experts?" We were particularlyparticularly interested in the nuclear issue, to get on that right away. I rapidly recognized recognized thatthat II I I I 6

I needed a few more connections, and I took -- I begged and got -- Mary Ryan, who was a I wonderful Foreign Service officer in the State Department. Ultimately, she would be replaced by one of the most talented military officers I have come across, US Army

I Colonel Doug Englund, to be Chief of Operations. First Mary did this for a few weeks, I then Doug came down. And we got the Department ofEnergy to get us some nuclear experts from Livermore Labs out in California.

I Early on, we figured out something, which I don't think people now quite I understand. These teams have to be a mix of experts who know the technical side of I weapons systems and how they are put together, and people who are sort of operationally capable. Particularly in the early days, the 'operationally capable' was a big deal, because

I this was not a pleasant environment to work in. By 'pleasant' I first mean we were I staliing these inspections, the first one went off in May in Iraq, and normally inin May and June temperatures are well over 100 degrees, so you need people who aren't going toto fallfall

I over from heat exhaustion. On my first mission out there, which was in June, I had I someone literally fallfaU over on me, an EOD person. So it was not a pleasant place. And the Iraqis made it even more unpleasal1t. So you had to put these teams together.together. We did

I this through other governments and through the United States government, quite I grudgingly. I I am leaving something velY, very important out, and that is of course, how we decided where we were going to go. It did not take a rocket scientist, although itit did forfor

I some of the work on the SCUDS, but it did not take a rocket scientist to figure out thatthat I we would not get very far if we stuck to the Iraqi declarations, which they knew and II knew from intelligence, were lies. I I I 7 r r 1S: You knew that from the beginning? r RG: I knew that... the chemical declaration, II didn't know,know, a)a) becausebecause atat thatthat pointpoint II r wasn't pmiicularlypaliicularly up on the Iraqi CW program, although trusttrust me,me, eventuallyeventually II was,was, II wasn't initially. I knew a bunch about thethe nuclear program andand II knewknew thatthat theirtheir r declaration was inaccurate, and 'inaccurate''inaccurate' would bebe aa nicenice wordword [for[for it],it], inin thatthat nuclearnuclear r area. About BW I knew nothing, and about SCUDS II knewknew little.little. I 1S: Did Ekeus have better knowledge of thesethese things?things? I I RG: No, RolfRolfhad had no IQ1owledge,lQ1owledge, toto my knowledge, ofof anyany ofof thosethose things,things, exceptexcept CW,CW, which was an area he had worked inin at thethe CD, and he knewknew CWCW prettypretty well,well,

I interestingly, but he knew it as a diplomat. He knew aa lotlot ofof peoplepeople inin thethe CWCW world,world, andand I he was hooked into the dismluamentdisalluament world and toto thethe EuropeansEuropeans extremelyextremely well.well. WhatWhat RolfRolfbrought brought to the operation was brains ---- and diplomacy. II mean,mean, hehe waswas extraordinm'y,extraordinal'y,

I I think, from the very early days of set-up rightright up toto thethe momentmoment hehe walkedwalked outout thethe door.door. I That is an incredible -- when we get toto thethe politics of thatthat high-wirehigh-wire actact ---- toto pullpull off.off. II I have nothing but respect for the way he did it.it. So, the intelligence. The intelligenceintelligence community inin thethe USUS governmentgovernment waswas

I initially, I think the word for it,it, someplace between hostile andand non-communicativenon-communicative onon I assisting the Special Commission. However, theythey did havehave thethe viewview thatthat itit isis possiblepossible that the Special Commission might be of some help toto them.them. TheThe ideaidea thatthat theythey wouldwould I

I 8 pass information to us that they regarded as at all sensitive, was hilarious. However, thatthat if we managed to get in on the ground and walk around, then they would likelike toto talktalk toto us;us; if we got out, that's another matter. There was some interest in debriefing. We had toto flip that. This was a very long, slow process, or it seemed that way toto me. ItIt probably waswas not more than some two or three months before the intelligence community made a 180 degree turn and set up support for the Special Commission.

JS: That is the US intelligence community?

RG: The US intelligence community. We had a lot of consultation with our colleagues in Europe, particularly the British, but not only. Now, we are ...... I would lovelove toto telltell you all about the intelligence cOlUlection and physically what was done, but my instinctinstinct tellstells me I can't. But that's too bad, because some day that needs to be explained. One of thethe things that I would love for Americans to understand about intelligence isis thatthat once you accept the nature of the world and one particular approach to international affairs, itit cancan be very useful, it can be very important to our security. It's important, I think,think, thatthat thethe international community understands that the United Nations, if itit isis going toto undertake missions like this, is going to have to figure out ways of working with intelligenceintelligence communities. This is not all obvious. The whole idea, to many inin thethe UN, thatthat therethere isis aa link between the Special Commission, a UN entity, and the intelligence communities of

France and Britain and Gennany and the United States, and Russia, and toto go on, isis II think probably utterly unacceptable, and we never put that forward as a concept. But itit would have been obvious, I think, to anyone who gave it a moment's thought,thought, thatthat therethere I 9

I was no way to know where to go on these inspection trips if we did not have intelligence. I And the intelligence linle,link, even in the field, if you could imagine -- and I am not leaving anything out -. when we anivedalTived in Baghdad we sort of had no place to go. I mean, except

the hotel. We had no transportation for the first missions. We were using Iraqi buses. I

- mean, it took us a while to convince, I believe, the Norwegians to give us vehicles that we mean, it took us a while to convince, I believe, the Norwegians to give us vehicles that we - could ride around in, to get communications equipment installed. We used to - communicate, I don't know ifpeople who know about these things, by book codes -- two - people have the same books. - JS: Pads?

- RG: You can use a dime-store novel, which is what we used, if you don't have a pad. I We had no instruments of intelligence. So [we would put] one guy here, and those of us ­ out the field, and we had the same book, that takes a long time to say "hello mom" using I that system, so this was not the ideal way of communicating.

I JS: So, that was all you had when you went into...? I I RG: Yeah, initially that's all we had. I mean, eventually Motorola made commercially available telephones in which you can speak securely. But then, of course, the other end,

I where you are speaking has to be secure, and that doesn't help you. I mean, you can I listen pretty good under those circumstances. So, there's all kinds of... And we had lots of reason to believe that the Iraqis were very interested in finding out where we were I I I 10

I going to go the next morning, and suspected that they were working on us not only when I we were in Baghdad, and also when we were in New York. And by the way, I also leftleft out a very interesting step in this: we couldn't, as the military like to say, "stage" fromfrom

I New York into Baghdad. We needed a place to stage, so we needed to convince, and we I did, the Bahrainins to let us stage from Bahrain, and that has been, and remains, critical for the Special Commission to operate. It took a lot of courage to get on thosethose Romanian

I charter planes; even the EOD people weren't happen about that. They would much ratherrather I disarm a bomb than fly in those airplanes, and I don't blame them. We eventually got thethe I Germans to provide us with fixed-wing aircraft, and then ultimately rotary-wing craft on the ground to help us move around. I mean, by the time I left, and I left tenten months after

I stmi-up, in February of 1992, we had gone from absolutely no support on thethe ground, thatthat I is, requiring the Iraqis to drive us around, and they would cause us all kinds ofhavoc, and put us in physical danger, particularly people who were vulnerable to heat, any number of

I times. Going from that situation to being able to sustain ourselves in thethe parking lotlot I when we were held there in September, in a very few number of months we had our own vehicles. We went in with MREs and our own water, so we had food and water and we I could sit in the parking lot for a week, we could have sat there longer -- I mean, not I happily, but we could have if necessary. So, building up a logistical capability toto support I the inspections, getting the intelligence, and continuing to maintain the political suppOli in order to overcome Iraqi resistance, which was relatively constant, was a real trial.trial. I I JS: Now, the UN has a field service. That was not available to you? I I I 1111

I RG: We used elements of the field service. When you look at the UN, and II talktalk I sometimes to U1\T people, even Kofi some, about how we can change thethe imageimage of thethe UN, which is not altogether positive in the United States, have them looklook at thethe fieldfield

I service. If Americans could see what UN Field Service people do, they would be velY I impressed. These are folks who go to disasters and do all kinds of wonderful thingsthings and put their lives at risk, and they are professional international civil servants. We had somesome

I wonderful folks, patiicularly our communicators, who ran our TAC-SACs so we could I communicate, these came from New Zealand; we had a doctor, some of thethe medical people were New Zealanders. So, the Field Service helped us in a number of ways, but

I they did not take us on as a mission. We kind ofplugged them into what we were doing. I And there was always also this fmillyfmmy problem of who could have access toto what I information. Actually whoever was leading a team would get certain information,information, and have to figure out with whom he could share it and how he would manage thatthat

I information, which was difficult. So, this was not a Field Service operation. I JS: I wanted to ask about that, but let me first say that ifthere are parts or thingsthings thatthat

I you want to say that you feel should not be made generally available, theythey can be I restricted and not released for whatever amount of time you want. I RG: My hesitation, and I will tell you that there is nothing I've done inin my twenty-onetwenty-one

I years of government service that is anywhere near as interesting as some of thethe elements I of this, including the Korean negotiation. But the most interesting parts go toto thethe most sensitive parts, and I at one point asked whether there was any interest, when II was an I I I 1122

I Assistant Secretary, asked whether there was any interest in the US government inin having I this declassified or put out, even in a very positive SOli of way, so that people could understand how intelligence could be used constructively against somebody who had

I been identified, one of the very few people on earth, as an enemy, Saddam Hussein. The I answer was no. And so I have not written about this; I have not spoken about it.it. Those of us who were involved, particularly with that operation, UNSCOM-16 thethe "parking lotlot

I tour" as we liked to call it -- let me say a word about that: if you would thinkthink about thosethose I of us who spent a large portion of our careers worrying about the proliferation of nuclear I weapons, actually finding the designs to make a weapon in a country thatthat insistedinsisted itit had no nuclear program, finding those boxes of documents labeled "top secret" by thethe Iraqis,Iraqis, I the excitement of that and how that came to happen, is a wonderful story. And thethe I operational character of that story, that we actually took down that building, isis wonderful, and there's virtually nothing about that that I can say that isn't out already. When thethe

I time comes, I would talk to the people, I mean David Kay was key toto thatthat mission, a I number of other people, at Los Alamos; there were people involved who could telltell great stories. I

I JS: Well, I'll come back to probe you to see what you can say on that,that, because II have I seen the film. I've read the descriptions, and I was fascinated by the question of how you knew which boxes to look at, and did you have enough Arabic speaking people toto identifyidentify

I things? I I I I 1133

I RG: You should have questions about that kind of stuff; I can answer thosethose questions I explicitly. That's not a problem

I JS: Let me go, first though, go back to what you're saying about the organization, I because there are some things there that are especially UN, in a way. Normally there'sthere's a tremendous problem about money, about paying for things when you stmi up something.

I You got started pretty quickly. How did you do that? Where did you find thethe money? I I RG: I hope Rolfremembers.Rolfremembers. We were given... we had a budget of some kind, and we kept begging to get more, and I think the US government, particularly, put money intointo I that pot. But exactly, and I remember the kind of $1 0 or 11 million figure -- itit was I around there -- and we would just spend and then, and we had this sequence, even inin those first ten months, and then afterwards and going and saying "in another six weeks

I we'll have to stop operations, we can't fund a mission." I JS: But that actually did not hold you up, The lack of money did not hold you up? I

I RG: No. I'd say no, We kept getting... see, one thing that happened, and you always I have to be sensitive to the politics here [or] the story doesn't make any sense. I thinkthink ifif the Commission hadn't been, immediately had resistance from the Iraqis, and pressed......

I this image is very clear in mind, of the nuclem' mission where we were physically pushed I around a bit by the Iraqis, when we were looking for the EMIS program, and we had very good intelligence on where to look and they blocked us from going to the site. We went I I I 1144

I up to some high ground, took some pictures, and when they blocked us II said, "I'm going I to go back," and David was with Mauricio Zifferero, who was the agency person, David was on a trip, Mauricio was his superior, and I said "I'm going toto go back and make thethe

I political case that they are obstructing the inspections." While I was off, going back, I David led, it was principally David, a sort of very cowboy-like activity, which was essential to funding. I mean, they went and they had trucks chasing trucks,trucks, and thethe IraqisIraqis

I fired in the air, and this all made wonderful newspaper stories. Wholly apart fromfrom all I that, that was all, in my view, essential to everybody recognizing, toto keeping thisthis issueissue before the public so that we could not be let down. And, as soon as thatthat kind of thingthing

I happened, it was clear the Iraqis were doing, actually, sort of obstructing thisthis small group I of unarmed people from the UN who were supposed to go in and inspect.inspect. That, II think,think, I provided the basis for the political support that gave the financial support toto thethe Special Commission, so that it was easier to get the assets. And I think, also, forfor thethe intelligenceintelligence

I community, that was one thing that opened them up. "Hey, these guys are actually goinggoing I to push! We tell them where to go and they don't walk away." So thethe intelligenceintelligence community came forward and so did the funding. I

I JS: Now, this question of intelligence from US sources has consistently been a I problem at the UN because they don't trust the UN. You said you were able toto overcome that within a certain amount oftime. Was that by giving assurances on, forfor instance,instance, thethe

I restrictive measures in the distribution of the intelligence? I I I I 1515

I RG: I can't say that I overcame, or thatthat atat anyany pointpoint wewe overcame,overcame, thethe mistrustmistrust withinwithin I the intelligence community of thethe ability ofof thethe UNUN toto keepkeep secrets,secrets, becausebecause II don'tdon't trusttrust the UN to keep secrets, so I wouldn't trytry toto convinceconvince them!them! WhatWhat wewe wantedwanted toto convinceconvince

I the community of, was that we could play byby whateverwhatever rulesrules theythey neededneeded soso longlong asas somesome I of us got the information and we could guide thethe missions,missions, thatthat wewe would,would, youyou know,know, putput in place whatever control mechanisms theythey needed.needed. II pointedpointed outout thatthat II maintainedmaintained allall mymy

I clearances and I worked for the US government; II wasn'twasn't eveneven secondedseconded toto thethe UN,UN, II waswas I assigned to the UN. The US government was was payingpaying mymy salary.salary. SoSo II said,said, youyou know,know, "I"I should be able to have this intelligence. You shouldshould bebe ableable toto telltell meme wherewhere thethe teamsteams

I have to go, and you should be able toto trusttrust thethe Chairman,Chairman, thethe ExecutiveExecutive Chairman."Chairman." AndAnd I so we had Doug Englund, an active duty USUS colonel,colonel, asas ChiefChief ofof Operations,Operations, soso wewe putput I enough Americans and people who were fromfrom NATONATO countriescountries andand thatthat sortsort ofof thing,thing, toto make them feel OK about this. They still,still, withwith veryvery goodgood cause,cause, werewere nervousnervous aboutabout

exactly what was provided, because thisthis waswas veryvery currentcurrent intelligence.intelligence. ItIt wasn'twasn't goinggoing toto

- help us a lot to Imow what happened lastlast year. IfIf theythey werewere movingmoving somethingsomething whilewhile wewe - were on the ground, and we had a teamteam out there,there, andand theythey werewere goinggoing toto telltell usus aboutabout it,it, I they put an asset at risk if we seemed toto be respondingresponding toto thatthat andand thethe IraqisIraqis figurefigure out,out, I you know, that that is happening. So, II don't ImowImow thatthat wewe everever overcameovercame this;this; II thinkthink I that we worked with it, and we got sufficient confidenceconfidence fromfrom themthem thatthat theythey wouldwould provide the help we needed. I I JS: One other question on thethe organizational sideside ---- thethe CommissionCommission hadhad twenty~ontwenty~onee members, and you just mentioned thethe selection.selection. HowHow werewere theythey selected?selected? 1I I I 1616 I I RG: Ah! Well, a little arrangement that I worked out with Mr. Akashi was that he could have, not complete, but virtually complete freedom to use his "UN sense" to shape

I a Commission that would garner suppOli within the United Nations, provided that the I executive element, that which was under the Executive Chairman, RolfEkeus, and he could shape the instrument of the inspections himself. Then the Commission would

I oversee what we were about. The Commission would be composed of the people from I these countries. We did ask that we not be silly about this. In other words, since we were dealing with weapons ofmass destruction in this Commission, countries that had no

I knowledge of any of these things sending us people as Commissioners might not malcemake

I much sense. So it was good, for example, that if Japan is paying and Japan has a self­ I defense force and there are people there who understand about chemical weapons if not missiles, that's fine. But there would be some countries that would be able to contribute

I nothing, in terms of a knowledgeable Commissioner, so we asked, as he sought balance, I that he be sensitive to that. And he was. Rolf used the Commission, I think, in a very savvy political way. We had the

I Commission come and meet, and we briefed them on everything we were doing. We I tried to make sure they felt informed and supportive so that they would do what we hoped I they would do in the lJN and back in their own governments. He would keep them in town for a couple of days, at my recollection... I I JS: "In town" meaning New York?

11 I I 1177

I RG: In New York. And sometimes if a government had nominated a CommissionerCommissioner I who was really savvy, and I think the Brits did this and thethe Aussies did that,that, hehe wouldwould askask them to stay for six months, instead oftwo days, and say, "Could you kind ofofjoinjointhethe

I executive portion of our operation for a while?" 80So we got additional freefree expertise.expertise. I Now, these were generally many more senior people who would not go on aa mission,mission, butbut they provided some weight to what we were doing. I I JS:J8: Yes -- that was the next question. None ofthe Commission members actuallyactually I participated in the missions?

I RG: I don't think so, but Rolf might. .... I don't recollect thatthat during my tenten monthsmonths thatthat I that happened, but I couldn't say for certain.

I JS:J8: I'd like to go on to the operational part. Your first contacts with thethe Iraqis,Iraqis, telltell meme I about that.

I RG: Well, the initial approach of the Iraqis was, I thought,thought, well, II was surprised, surprised, I frankly. I was surprised that they were so clearly inin an adversarial mode. I JS:J8: From the beginning? I I RG: From the beginning. The second mission was thethe mission thatthat II wentwent on.on. TheThe first mission I stayed by the phone and I talked toto themthem constantly, and II rememberremember thatthat I I I 18

I first mission very clearly because I sat in our little office. The second mission, I was on I it, Mauricio was on it, and David was on it. I remember sitting, I don't think David went to the meeting, it was with a deputy foreign minister, I can't remember his name, and I've

I told this story before, but it really was striking, and it doesn't fit into anything else I've I done, either before or since. We were talking about scheduling inspections the next moming, and we didn't have much of a record of inspections -- we'd only done one

I mission, for a week or so, about three or fom days, and I said, "We are going to start I tomorrow moming, and etc." And the Deputy Foreign Minister said, "You are not starting tomorrow morning, because tomorrow is an Islamic holiday." And I said,

I "Actually, there is nothing, ifyou look at UNSC Resolution 68, there is nothing about I excepting Islamic holidays." I said, "We've got a schedule; we're going tomorrow." And I he said, "It would be really unfortunate if something happened to you or your team tomorrow." And that was a very clear threat, in that you have that in the context of sitting

I in his office and looking at this guy and the people around him. I thought this was odd. I mean, you would have imagined that ifhe wished to threaten us, physically, he would have found another way to do it than that way. So, this set a tone, which I don't... I still

I maintain that people do not understand how intimidating that environment can be, either I because the Iraqi authorities allow a hostile population that has been whipped up to get I close, and they lmow they can't actually control it entirely and you get a sense that something bad could happen, or because there's a physical shoving, or they... just things

I about this and that. That set a tone. That was my first meeting with a senior Iraqi Deputy I Foreign Minister [sic], which I took to be a threat. And I said, "We'll be starting tomorrow morning." I I I 1199

I The minders we had, thethe people who ---- and rememberremember inin thethe beginning we were inin I theirtheir bus ---- and theythey would say, "Where do you want toto go?" and we would say, "Well II want toto go here." II rememberremember thethe firstfirst site we were going toto go visit, and II can't

I rememberremember thethe name, AI-Goreed maybe, justjust west of Baghdad. II was inin a car with I Mauricio sitting next toto me and Abigail Freedman, my special assistant thatthat II tooktook fromfrom thethe State Department, a femalefemale Foreign Service officer and a lawyer,lawyer, sitting inin thethe front.front.

I Abigail had been lookinglooking at thethe maps and compass and she said, "Whoa! We're going I rightright by it."it." And he said, "No we're not!" and he kept going. And itit took a while before we convinced him he needed toto stop thethe car. They were going toto drive all day, justjust keep

I us inin thethe car. We had toto insist,insist, so we got out of thethe car, we insistedinsisted we were going toto go I back, tmntmn all thethe cars around, thethe caravan and thethe bus, and go back. We got there,there, and I yes, itit was thethe rightright place, thethe guy said we couldn't come in.in. Everything was a trial.trial. [Eventually][Eventually] "Yes, you can come in,"in," and thenthen inin thethe middle ofthethe day, theythey had us out

I and theythey rolledrolled thethe windows up, and therethere was no air conditioning, itit was 110 degrees I outside, 120 inin thethe car. They really,really, reallyreally did a lotlot of thingsthings toto make itit unhappy forfor us, toto make us want toto go home. I~ ItIt seemed toto me thatthat thisthis was going toto be a reallyreally longlong haul. When we met I resistance,resistance, though,though, itit encouraged us because we interpretedinterpreted thatthat as meaning we were I close. This was a hiders-finders game. And so, we kept finding.finding. I mean, one of thethe thingsthings thatthat was wonderful about thethe early days was thatthat we kept getting rewardedrewarded by, and

I II don't mean toto be cruel here, but by IraqiIraqi incompetence.incompetence. We were rewardedrewarded on thatthat firstfirst I mission, and throughthrough thatthat firstfirst tenten months II was there,there, we were rewardedrewarded repeatedly,repeatedly, by themthem saying, "Something wasn't there.there. Something wasn't there.there. You can't go here." and I I I 2200

I thenthen findingfinding justjust what we wanted toto find.find. So, thethe contacts with thethe IraqisIraqis were quite I hostile inin thethe beginning, and theythey certainly hadn't gotten any better, or much better, when II left.left.

I I'llI'll telltell another contact story which will give you a littlelittle context. Much laterlater inin I another inspectioninspection when II was going on a CW inspection,inspection, but also II was interestedinterested inin still ---- theythey had by thisthis timetime come clean on a lotlot of thethe stuff having toto do with thethe centrifuge

I program inin thethe nuclear area, but therethere was still some questions we had, thatthat hadn't fitfit I together.together. Particularly II was going forfor thethe chemical weapons inspectioninspection but also toto talktalk toto I some ballistic missile people. II would stop by inin Bonn toto talktalk toto thethe export people, and thethe Germans put on a wonderful presentation toto us of what theythey had discovered inin tennsterms

I of Gennan companies' exports toto IraqIraq before thethe war. They said a lotlot of thisthis was inin thethe I process of litigation,litigation, because theythey had -~-~ therethere was another word theythey used because theythey were bringing some companies up on some sort of legallegal procedures and charges, so theythey

I could not be made public. But theythey gave me data, which would be useful inin Baghdad. II

I went fromfrom BOlU1 then,then, throughthrough Bahrain toto Baghdad, and II sat down, and II had Mauricio, who was with me Jthinkthink on thatthat one too.too. II thoughtthought II was holding a pretty good hand, I sitting across thethe tabletable and thethe fellow,fellow, who II thinkthink now isis thethe Foreign Minister, was theirtheir

I opposite number. II said essentially, "Have you shown us evelything thatthat you have toto I show us inin thethe centrifuge area?" And he said, "Absolutely." II said, "There's no other materials or equipment?" He said, "Absolutely not." II said, "Would you looklook at these,these,

I which thethe Germans have toldtold us theythey shipped toto you, and II have here everything you have I: so farfar declared and destroyed ---- none of thisthis material thatthat theythey shipped toto you have you shown us," And therethere was a huddle, and theythey huddled forfor a fewfew minutes, and thenthen he I I I 2121

I said, "We'll take you there tomorrow." I said, "Let's stop a minute. I asked you did you I have it, and you said no. I show you the evidence and you say yes? Why don't we stop the games that have gone on, and we could be finished with this. You know the light at

I the end of the tUlll1el,tUlmel, how long can the inspections drag on. Show us the stuff -- we're I going to destroy it." And he put up his hands and said, "Stop. This is not a cooperative endeavor we are engaged in." He explained to me, "You have this information, we'll

I show you the things...". Now, that was pretty clear, I think And that's how it was: ifyou I find it, you get to destroy it; if you don't find it, we get to keep it.

I JS: And a lot of the keys lay outside of Iraq, in factory inventories and things like that, I ll1VOlcesmVOlces..?...... ? I RG: It depends on the area. Obviously some oftheir programs were very dependent on

I imports, and a lot of what they did was indigenous. You may recall that there one of the I many issues that arose was, to what extent was the Special Commission, as it went about its work, going to expose other governments or companies in other countries that had

I cooperated in one way or another with Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons of mass I destruction. This is one of the four thousand cases of Rolf Ekeus' exquisite good I judgment, in saying that when we found things like this he would notify the governments. On certain points they may be part of the publications that we put out about the sources of

I the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but he wasn't in a "Gotcha!" mode, trying to catch I a German company or to try to expose these kinds [of things]. His job was not that. The press was good after that; there were a lot ofpeople trying to write about that. His job I I I 2222

I was toto find stuff inin Iraq, and alienating governments wasn't going to be the way to do it. I So, he kept his eye on thethe ball I thinkthink very well.

i.,I l JS:JS: II thinkthink inin a way you answered this,this, but how skillful were thethe Iraqis inin I camouflaging what theythey had?

I RG: Well, II laugh,laugh, but letlet me firstfirst give thethe disclaimer: it'sit's likelike when people ask after

we frozefroze thethe program inin Korea, theythey say,say, "Have you gotten everything?" You don't know

whatwhat you don't know, and inin thethe Korean case II say,say, "Koreans"Koreans dig tunnelstunnels when they'rethey're

hidinghiding stuff."stuff." AndAnd thenthen II referrefer toto thethe IraqiIraqi case and II say,say, "Look, before thethe Gulf War, we

focusedfocused ourour intelligenceintelligence capability on Iraq.Iraq. So did a number of other countries, includingincluding

Israel.Israel. EverybodyEverybody prettypretty muchmuch lmewlmew thatthat thethe IraqisIraqis seemedseemed toto be interestedinterested inin centrifuge

technologytechnology toto enrichenrich uraniumuranium toto highhigh levels.levels. The IsraelisIsraelis have bombed thethe Osirak

reactionreaction inin thethe earlyearly 1980s."1980s." However,However, havinghaving saidsaid that,that, andand spentspent all thisthis energy on this,this,

nobodynobody hadhad pickedpicked upup thethe principalprincipal IraqiIraqi technologytechnology beingbeing pursuedpursued toto produceproduce highlyhighly

enrichedenriched uranium,uranium, meaningmeaning thethe electromagneticelectromagnetic isotopeisotope separationseparation technologytechnology which wewe

hadhad usedused fiftyfifty yearsyears earlier.earlier. So,So, thethe IraqisIraqis werewere clearlyclearly goodgood atat hidinghiding aa program.program. TheyThey

alsoalso obviouslyobviously fooledfooled thethe IAEA.IAEA. SomeSome wouldwould callcall thatthat notnot aa terrificterrific accomplishment,accomplishment, butbut

itit waswas interesting.interesting. TheyThey wentwent soso farfar asas toto telltell usus atat oneone pointpoint thatthat whilewhile thethe AgencyAgency wouldwould

bebe goinggoing aroundaround inin Tuwatha,Tuwatha, theythey wouldwould bebe drivingdriving aroundaround inin aa trucktruck aheadahead ofofthem, them, withwith

I stuffstuff theythey didn'tdidn't wantwant thethe IAEAIAEA toto see.see. InIn oneone buildingbuilding inin TuwathaTuwatha thatthat wewe walkedwalked inin waswas I wherewhere theythey hadhad thethe reactor,reactor, whichwhich waswas inspected,inspected, itit waswas thethe veryvery nextnext building,building, thethe buildingbuilding nextnext door,door, wherewhere theythey hadhad aa testtest standstand forfor thethe EMISEMIS program.program. So,So, theythey werewere ' ",1,I, 1; 23

I good at hiding things.things. Were theythey good when a Special Commission comes in,in, aImed as I we were? No. Hans Blix said itit really quite clearly inin thethe summer of 1991, when he was subject toto all thatthat criticism because of what UNSCOM had found aI1d thethe IAEA had not. I The IAEA did not conduct inspectionsinspections likelike that,that, itit did itit according toto a book thatthat I essentially said, "You go where thethe host government letslets you go." "Well," he said, "if we had intelligenceintelligence likelike thatthat and we had thisthis kind of operational capability, and we had thethe - political support toto overcome resistaI1ceresistance when we met it,it, we could find itit too!"too!" And he's right. You could argue thatthat thethe request for special inspectionsinspections thatthat brought us thethe crisis inin - NOlih Korea was a direct result ofhis experience inin Iraq ---- he wasn't going toto have thatthat - happen again. Good move, I say, on Hans Blix's part. So, I'd say thethe Iraqis were good up toto a point, but you let people inin with intelligence,intelligence, letlet themthem roam, give themthem thethe

- freedom...... I mean, right now, we are inin thethe crisis we are in,in, not because thesethese inspectorsinspectors - know for sure thatthat therethere isis stuff being hidden, which isis one of thethe problems with a bombing campaign toto solve thisthis problem, but because theythey know for sure where theythey are

- not allowed to go. I'd say, no, they were not terribly good. I not allowed to go. I'd say, no, they were not terribly good. I! I'll telltell one littlelittle anecdote which has always struck me as funny. I was getting a briefing before an inspection,inspection, and itit was thethe summer of 1991, I thinkthink itit was thethe summer I of 1991. The briefing was inin thethe US mission, aI1dand itit was from members of our intelligenceintelligence I community giving us some thoughtsthoughts on where we might find thingsthings thethe Iraqisis were hiding, and theythey weren't sure but theythey had ideas.ideas. And I remember one young woman who

I said, "It's not on our list,list, but ifif you have some time,time, free time,time, could you check thisthis I; building out?" And I said, "OK -- why?" She said, "I justjust have a hunch. It's justjust funny, thisthis building, where itit is."is." And so I tooktook those coordinates down. By thethe way, we were I I ":,:,",',t I 'I 2244

'\,1, 1,I, by that point on GPS, which was not like it isis now thatthat everybody had it.it. TheThe IraqisIraqis werewere I stunned at what GPS could do, and so ifyou went inin with thethe coordinates whichwhich youyou gotgot from satellites, and you had a GPS with you, you could go ...... II mean, II havehave aa terribleterrible I sense ofdirection, I used to get lost running cross-country, so thisthis was...... I JS: What is a GPS? I

RG: I'm sorry: Global Positioning Satellite. Right now, all thethe sailors,sailors, everybodyeverybody onon - Chesapeake Bay have GPS. It tells you where you are exactly, or how toto getget toto wherewhere youyou - want to go. A compass and GPS and you are set. So, we were at Tuwatha, itit waswas anan I afternoon and I remember the teams had split and I thinkthink George Ansalon fromfrom I Livermore was taking a team up one place, and I thinkthink we were pretty muchmuch done.done. WeWe had gone and looked at the place that we had wanted to,to, and thenthen II rememberedremembered thatthat thisthis

I woman said that, "You ought to go and check thisthis out." So, II toldtold thethe IraqisIraqis thatthat II wantedwanted

to go someplace and they said, "Where?" And I said, "Actually, II don't lmow,lmow, trusttrust me.me. ­ We'll guide the car. Just go down here, make a left."left." So, we are doing thisthis thisthis way,way, andand I I said, "That's it." And then I looked at the building thatthat lookedlooked likelike wherewhere itit wouldwould be,be, I configured to the river and up the road and so far from thethe berm at Tuwatha, therethere isis aa I berm around there; so we were walking down thethe road, and thethe IraqiIraqi said,said, "Why"Why dodo youyou want to go there?" And I said, "I just do." And thethe IraqiIraqi mindel'minder said,said, "Well,"Well, youyou knowknow

I what that was?" And I said, "No, I'd be interested." "Well, thatthat was anan automotiveautomotive I' maintenance facility for the army and it's now abandoned." And II said,said, "Then"Then therethere should be no problem." He said, "Right." So we walked in, and indeed,indeed, itit waswas aa bigbig openopen I I 2255 warehouse, and there was nothing inside. I walked in, and one of my guys -- I'm not technical in any way whatsoever; I mean, I know the technology ofthe nuclear weapons stuff, but I don't know equipment -- and so I looked up and I saw a big overhead crane, and it meant nothing to me...

End of Tape, Side 1

RG: [There was an] EOD guy, who walked on the other side of another, a smaller overhead crane, and he called me over. He said, "Look up there and read what it says."

On my side of the crane, it was in Arabic, and said, "I don't read Arabic," and he said,

"Well, it's in English on this side." So, on the other side, it said, I swear, it said "Iraqi

Atomic Energy Commission" on the crane. So I called over my mindel'minder and I said,

"Automotive repair?" And he gave me a face, and we called the guys from the other inspection team, the technical people around. George, who is teclmical, who is a centrif'ugecentrif-uge expeli as well as nuclear weapons expert generally, over, and George came over and looked at it, and this was another building, it turned out, which had the test stands for the EMIS [electromagnetic isotope separation] program. What we were doing, and wanted to do, and which the Commission is still trying to do, and trying to explain to evelybody, is to have a full picture of each one of the programs, so that if something doesn't fit then you knowlmow something's missing. What they wanted, they wanted to see the whole EMIS program, where magnets were, where the calutrons were, how you testedtested them, and in each of the areas. They wanted to do that in the chemical area,mea, inin thethe bio area, and in the missile area. This was another piece in that program. II would say thatthat that wasn't too smart. 2266

JS: Now, there were always Iraqi minders with you, no matter where you went?went?

RG: Absolutely.

JS: Even though you had your own drivers?

RG: Ah! When we got our own vehicles and we drove them,them, thethe deal, by thethe timetime wewe got to UNSCOM 16 and the only way that UNSCOM 16 worked was by us surprisingsurprising them. In other words, instead of the night before a friendly littlelittle inspection,inspection, where wewe would get together at 6:00 o'clock and say, "OK, tomorrow we're going toto begin aroundaround

8:00 or 9:00, and we're going to go here, here, and here, please telltell thethe people wewe areare coming, so that we can get into the gate" -- that kind ofthingthing thenthen we can do anan inspection. For UNSCOM 16, we said be at the hotel at 05:30, theythey said, "It's"It's dark."dark." WeWe said, "We know. We'll ... ?" Actually, we started somewhat earlier thanthan that,that, interestingly. Even though that's when we told them to be there, and we had ourour vehiclesvehicles and they said, "Where are you going?" and we said, "We'll telltell you tomorrow."tomorrow." WhenWhen they got there, and they said, "Where are we going?" we said, "Follow us." AndAnd thenthen wewe went to the building we knew we wanted to go to. We had already had people therethere toto make sure nothing happened in advance, and then we worked toto seal itit off ---- whenwhen II saysay seal it off, I don't mean physically prevent, but be able toto film anything thatthat was goinggoing inin or coming out. We were all aImed with Sony Mini-cams, so we could shoot anything wewe needed to shoot and try to capture. • 27 , Wc.Wc. by that time, by September, of the !irst year of \99199 I, we were inin our mvn , vehicles and able to move around, but never anywhere \vithout them.them. That \\'ould\\'ould haw,,' not been wise. It still wouldn't he wise.

•11 JS: But you didn't have to announce it in advance'?

11 RG: No.

• JS: And how important were the U2 overnightsoverf1ights there: were you still therethere or not?

"11 RG: The U2 nights started while JI was there. This was an interesting...... rthinkthink 1SllllUld 11 have brought that up in the context of the intelligence, because thethe lJ2U2 photography could actually be shown to the staiTstair of the Special Commission. 11 11 JS: They could?

RG: Yeah. ­11 ­ JS: But not the satellite photos'?photos? 11 RG: The satellite photography, to my knowledge, was not. 11 11 - 28

JS: I remember at oneonc point Ambassador Ekeus said thntthnt therethere were very useful pictures but they could only keep them for a little while and c;ouJdcould not show them.them.

RG: Yes -- that's... What RolfRoll' saw, Rolf saw a great deal, virtually everything.cvcrything. AndAnd

Roll'Rolf was taken into the confidence of the US government.governmcnt, but I'm talkingtalking about whatwhat could be actually used, kept, manipulated, by the UN staff. The U2 photography \vas\vas briefed, you know, people would come down and then explain what thethe photography was.was.

The Special Commission went and got from governments people who were PIs, photograph interpreters -- the military always has them because everybody does BDABDA -.-. bomb damage assessment, after the ... bomb ... to re-photograph toto understand thethe thingsthings you're looking at. So they all have these kinds offolks,offolks, and thethe U2 photography thethe

Commission could keep on file and compare over time. The satellite photography isis another matter entirely. That you don't pass out.

JS: But the U2 photography was useful then, in identifying?

RG: It was useful in, I think, establishing a baseline, and very useful forfor establishing nn monitoring program, but for the kind of activity that wewc were engaged inin initially,initially, duringduring the first year of operations, we needed something a littleIittlc different. II don't thinkthink thatthat it'sit's aa great secret that U2 photography isn't quite as precise as satellite photography. That's clear. 29

JS: Which brings me to the question of'of 'live' live' sources. How important were they?they?

Could you talk about that? Internally or externally.

RG: All I would say is that we, you know, you talk about photo intelligence, photo-int.. or communications intelligence, is called comm-int., human intelligence isis called hum­ int., in the trade, right. Now, hum-int. was, well, there was an awful lot of bad hum-int. around, because everybody who wanted to cause trouble would tell you thatthat ififyou wanted to find Iraqi nuclear weapons or biological weapons, all you have to do isis dig up thatthat grave site, for example, or go to this mosque and take it apart, or go to that minister's home. So, a lot of stuff was just not useful, and that would come from essentially what we would call 'walk-ins.' And that's maybe all I can say about hum-int. I would say therethere was an awful lot of noise out there.

JS: But it was not crucial while you were there, no?

RG: I don't think I can speak to hum-int.

JS: Right, right. Well, I know that it was much later that Ekeus actually interviewedinterviewed the son-in-law, and...

RG: Yes, that was [later].

JS: ...and apparently that was quite revealing. •...' .I! 3300

,• RG: Uh-hum.

, JS: I don't think anybody lmows quite how revealingrevealing yet. , RG: I still want to lmow why he went back.

,.:

)1'!.c •r: JS: We talked about the selection of thethe Commission, but whatwhat aboutabout thethe missions?missions? , Was any effOli made to select, I knowmow that a special effort was mademade toto havehave realreal experts,experts, , right? 11 RG: Oh yes. But real experts, first, planning, II mean, we needed aa strategy,strategy, wewe neededneeded to plan, and then we needed tactics, we needed thethe strategy of howhow youyou gogo about,about, andand II

, don't mean just the logistics part, but I mean thethe search, and what wewe werewere lookinglooking forfor 11 and how we were going to proceed, and thenthen thethe tacticstactics of how youyou putput missionsmissions together,together, and then the real logistics of who would be on them,them, and which governmentsgovernments wouldwould

11 contribute. So, it was a layered process, starting with IIthinkthink Ro 1f,1f, andand myself,myself, andand thethe 11 Chief of Operations Doug Englund, and others who were tryingtrying toto havehave anan over~sightover~sight,, andand ~ bring in some senior people from other governments. Make suresure atat thethe CommissionCommission wewe had somebody we could count on who knew chemical weapons, somebodysomebody wewe couldcould 11 count on who knew nuclear weapons stuff, and each of thesethese wewe brokebroke downdown toto individualindividual weapons areas. Initially the teams were very, very separate, and II thinkthink theythey areare nownow

,c' , somewhat mixed -- I mean, there would be a BW team,team, and thenthen therethere wouldwould bebe aa CWCW ~ . ~ -"'i;••"".,"I. 31 ~.•• '~. .r~lE.\.. team that would be different, and then the missile team would have missile people on it,

and sometimes we would have two or three teams in the field at the same time, iI;.. 1 .[ ft. controlling all tlu'ee of them separately.

,~~ -.. JS: Was the search for [the right people] done primarily from New York or from - Bahrain, or what?

,- RG: That was all New York, all New York. Yes, RolfRolfhad had very good contacts with people so we got good diplomats to help us work with other governments and the

~ missions in New York. Then we could also go back and, ifwe wanted to increase the ask, , we could ask Washington to support a request that we'd made for some assets. ~ JS: And the first criterion was expertise? Did you ever get to the UN criterion: , regionally representative? , RG: Not in my recollection. We wanted to have... we made sure this was not an

, American operation. I think the most sensitive thing, and the thing Rolf constantly ~ contributed, much to his credit, was that this was not going to be an American operation. When he went up to talk to Washington, I never went with him. When he made the - rounds inside the UN, I never went with him. This was not going to be Amel'ican,AmeJican, because that really undermined the operation. That it be international, was important. - That it be balanced was, in my recollection, not even a thought, not in terms of 11 operations. 11 11 ~ .i~...... I.. l.if 32 fi 1S: Now, the other question in this connection [is][is] thethe Iraqis,Iraqis, ofof course,course, claimclaim thatthat ,IIII.~•..·.-. there are spies in the midst. Do you know ifif any precautions were takentaken toto ensureensure thatthat inin ,­ fact there were not agents among those that you chose? RG: I think I've been on the record on thisthis already. The process byby whichwhich wewe wentwent andand

got people is, we did not go to the US Army and say, "Give me an ArmyArmy guyguy ---- aa "IJ chemical guy." We didn't call up Livermore and say, "I need a LivermorianLivermorian toto comecome , out." We went to capitals, we went to ministries, and said, "We needneed expertiseexpertise inin thisthis area," and that includes Washington. When thethe Brits came up and theythey said,said, "This"This guyguy

knows nuclear stuff," great. When the Swedes said, "This isis a chemical man,"man," wewe said,said, - "Great." When the Americans said whatever, we said, "Great." WeWe didn'tdidn't say,say, "And"And - where has he worked?" And, it wouldn't make any sense forfor us toto dodo that.that. That'sThat's thethe process, so if someone has intelligence experience, and isis on thisthis trip,trip, wewe mightmight notnot eveneven

- know about it -- we probably wouldn't know about it.it. Something elseelse thatthat isis truetrue ofof thethe 11 US government and other governments is thatthat people sometimes havehave tourstours withwith

, segments of the intelligence community; theythey might work inin defense intelligence,intelligence, theythey , might work in army intelligence. Are they spies, because theythey had somesome experience?experience? II , just think that that charge should have been deflated a longlong timetime ago. WhatWhat wewe diddid notnot dodo is ever go and say, "Send us some spies." And I don't remember,remember, andand thisthis isis anan incredibleincredible , statement to make, but I don't remember a single case inin which we gotgot someonesomeone whenwhen wewe , went after an expert and we did not get expertise. InIn other words, whenwhen someonesomeone camecame , and he was supposed to be the bio expert and he didn't know what anan ErlenmeyerErlenmeyer flaskflask , .' 111.,...'.. ' 9F1 33 '" Ii, was. It never happened. So, that if govemments were sendingsending usus peoplepeople whowho hadhad intelligence experience, they were sending us experts. We didn'tdidn't say,say, "Make"Make suresure thatthat nono •,,~ one knows anything about intelligence, thatthat you send us." WeWe said,said, "Send"Send usus anan expertexpert

in this area." We did that with the US government, et cetera. - Now, when you go and you ask for an EOD expert, thisthis guyguy hashas toto bebe anan expertexpert inin - explosives ordnance disposal, so he's going toto come out of aa cel1aincel1ain kindkind ofof communitycommunity ~ in the military.military.

,-....' 1S: Switching to the Iraqi side, could you judgejudge anything aboutabout thethe IraqiIraqi methodmethod ofof

•.....t' III operations? I mean, what communication chalUlels did theythey have?have? It'sIt's beenbeen saidsaid thatthat

nothing is decided in Iraq without Saddam Hussein's personal agreement.agreement. DidDid youyou findfind - that they were afraid to make any decisions without going upup atat leastleast oneone step?step? - 11 RG: [For] anything important, the answer toto thatthat isis 'absolutely'absolutely true.'true.' AbsolutelyAbsolutely true.true. 11 We were always looking for the man who was thethe wizard behindbehind thethe nuclearnuclear program,program, forfor example, and I think we probably met him. He showed up inin somesome ofof thosethose tapes.tapes. 11 During the UNSCOM 16 mission he came toto thethe firstfirst day, wherewhere wewe gotgot thethe mostmost 11 sensitive stuff, which was not the place where we were held inin thethe parkingparking lot,lot, itit waswas thethe night before, which probably was I think...think... Jabal'Jabar was his name.name. II think,think, wheneverwhenever wewe gotgot

11 to something important, it was clear thatthat higher agreement waswas necessary.necessary. HowHow farfar 11 Saddam himself was tracking us in thosethose early days, II had nono wayway ofof knowing.knowing.

11 1S: And you had no contact with Tariq Aziz?

,,,;',

'.f·.;}: ~! 3344

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RG: I had one meeting, Rolf and II did, oror II hadhad oneone meeting,meeting, whichwhich II rememberremember .;!•..- ' meeting with Rolf, with Aziz, during thatthat summer.summer. II thinkthink itit waswas afterafter thethe hostagehostage oror I whatever you want toto call thethe parking lotlot tour,tour, situation.situation. II wentwent back,back, II stayedstayed inin Bahrain,Bahrain, , waited for Rolf, after we came out, and went backback inin andand waswas treatedtreated toto aa complaintcomplaint byby the Iraqis over our behavior, which ledled toto oneone ofof thethe moremore colorfulcolorful exchanges.exchanges.

,­ JS: He's quite a talker.talker. You were inin thethe parkingparking lot?lot? AndAnd fromfrom the:filmthe film II noticednoticed thatthat you had lots of boxes of files, which you were tryingtrying toto getget outout ofof there.there. OnOn whatwhat basis,basis,

you had lawyers by thatthat time,time, what basis do youyou seizeseize filesfiles fromfrom aa governmentgovernment office?office?

•j''.') •..... • RG: Resolution 687.687. , JS: Under Chapter VII? _i RG: Yes. 11 , JS: And that was thethe basis?

, RG: Yup.Yup. r~1 ." " , JS: Another legal question, II thinkthink thatthat IraqIraq hashas nevernever ratifiedratified thethe bacteriologicalbacteriological , convention. Did that make any difference inin thethe operation?operation? , J 3535 J J RG: We were looking at. .. Resolution 687, as you know, is muchmuch moremore farfar reachingreaching inin all these areas than any other regime,regime, and essentiallyessentially thethe capabilitycapability toto produceproduce asas wellwell asas , the items themselves, and that's what we referredreferred toto constantly.constantly. ~ JS: So we went on the assumption that the Resolution reallyreally supersedes anyany otherother...... ~

RG: Supersedes? It is more demanding on thethe IraqisIraqis thanthan anythinganything else,else, anyany otherother • commitments they have, and it is the Resolution that isis directly tiedtied toto thethe SecuritySecurity • Council and the legal basis for the use of force. That's why itit was so germanegermane toto us.us. • JS: That's why it was... yes. Right. Now, inin your task,task, whichwhich waswas somewhatsomewhat tJ different, but were you able to reach any assessment of thethe effect ofof DesertDesert StormStorm ,'i bombing? RG: Sure. I mean, a couple ofthings: First, I was in Baghdad inin May, forfor thethe firstfirst

, time, ever, which was only a couple of months after thethe end of thethe war.war, OneOne waswas struckstruck , by limited damage in Baghdad, not that there weren't buildings thatthat were hit, but II usedused the phrase, it was sort of "building-ectomy." This was not leveling, this was not likelike thethe

, pictures I have seen of cities that were bombed. Baghdad wasn't bombed; I mean, maybe pictures I have seen of cities that were bombed. Baghdad wasn't bombed; I mean, maybe 11 along the line of confrontation, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, maybe that,that, thethe B-52 bombing,bombing, but Baghdad itself was not in any way leveled. So the first thing was we were able toto seesee 11 , the impact of the bombing on the ground, in terms at least of what the level of destruction , 11 36 J was, and there wasn't massive destruction inin Baghdad. However, whenwhen youyou drovedrove byby aa building that was hit it was clear that this lookedlooked likelike a sortsort of modernmodern artart twistedtwisted

J structure, so that if they went after a particular building... ItIt seemsseems toto meme thatthat somesome ofof I' those, assuming that the buildings that I saw thatthat had been struckstruck werewere thethe onesones thatthat werewere being aimed at, then I would say that thethe precision guided munitions werewere prettypretty • impressive as compared to other types of bombing. And we, by thethe way,way, wewe wentwent through buildings that had been hit. The building where we fOlmdfOlmd thethe designsdesigns forfor thethe

• nuclear weapon was a building that had been hit, and therethere was aa wholewhole wallwall thatthat wasn'twasn't

there. So that when you went up to, I think, the eighth floor,floor, ifif you walkedwalked toto thethe edge,edge, "II~- ..,.,1 there was nothing there -- the whole wall had been taken out. The place hadhad been hit,hit, soso ~ you could not take the elevators in that building, for example. This was [the[the case]case] withwith ~, many buildings that had been bombed. We'd been to many sites thatthat had been bombed.bombed. •..pr.•i: However, if you look at the impact on weapons of mass destruction...... taketake thethe 11 nuclear program: We bombed sites that were related to theirtheir nuclear program. TheyThey , moved their fuel, spent fuel and fresh fuel, into the fields, and we didn't lmowknow wherewhere theythey were, where it was, [and] couldn't have hit them. They had an enormous amount ofof

, equipment and stuff that we didn't know about, technology we didn't know about, andand itit ~ was not destroyed. They, after the war, went about burying it,it, but we didn't hit itit becausebecause we didn't know about it. Celiainly all those facilities like bunkers used toto develop thethe

, implosion system for the device weren't hit. Outside of the nuclear area, [in] the implosion system for the device weren't hit. Outside ofthe nuclear area, [in] the , chemical area,area " well,well we now know,know, since the Special Commission did thethe destruction, , hundreds and hundreds of tons of mustard and nerve agents, were there.there. During thethe IraqiIraqi war, the Gulf War, I don't think now that the judgment is that a single SCUD oror SCUD­SCUD-

P;'. ~r~: J 37 J' variant was destroyed by the SCUD hunters on the ground, during the Gulf War. We certainly crushed up a whole lot of them, the Special Commission did.

J What's left -- BW? I really don't have any reason to believe that there was much lA success by the air war on BW. I mean, I don't know, maybe one factory was, that was in It fact a site. So, in the areas ofWMD, the bombing campaign was not overlyovedy successful.

~ JS: Now, I saw those pictures of some of the chemical weapons that were leaking. ,~ What about the Iraqi maintenance procedure that you found? RG: Awful. Ifyou go to Aniston Anns, the Army detail, and you go through some of , their igloos, you could eat offthe floor. I mean, its really very nice and the nerve agents , in the artillery shell have a certain kind of stripe around, and the mustard agents have a different colored stripe, and a white phosphorus round has another kind of stripe around

it. You don't have to worry about opening up a chemical munitions, or in the disposal r-""",,',' 11 mode, and finding that you're not dealing with a chemical agent but you're dealing with a white phosphorus. The Iraqi situation was awful. I mean, they said, "These rockets are a

, HE, they're not a chemical." And as you probably heard this morning, at least one , incident [where] one of the vehicles crushed a rocket and it was a sarin rocket, but their nerve gas, the potency doesn't stay very long so while one oftheir guys was exposed to it,

, he was not. .. he lost consciousness. , , JS: One of their guys oror...... , j i ,111 " i· 'irj~'

" ~ 38

~ RG: Their guys. Our guy was not exposed toto it;it; theirtheir guyguy wentwent down,down, ourour guyguy pickedpicked J him up, threw him in the back seat of thethe car, and drove himhim toto aa medicalmedical area,area, andand theythey hit him with an injection and the next day he was pretty muchmuch OK.OK. There'sThere's allall kindskinds ofof J problems with their munitions which were lealdng,leaking, which werewere justjust inin badbad shape.shape. ItIt waswas J a mess. It was a real mess. There was an area, an airbase, II wentwent toto wherewhere justjust belowbelow thethe surface they had thousands of artillery rounds, probably bombsbombs forfor aircraftaircraft butbut II can'tcan't

J remember. I remember the artillery rounds inin paIiicular andand thenthen theythey hadhad mustardmustard

rotmds just out there, so that you could actually walk out therethere aI1daI1d getget aa whiffwhiff ofof thatthat inin

the air. I don't know how many places on eal1h you can do that. I would say it was not ­~ the air. I don't know how many places on ealih you can do that. I would say it was not up to standard.staI1dard. ~ JS: Now, when you were there, I think,think, you foundfound thethe so-calledso-called bigbig guns,guns, whichwhich

<)(, seemed to be very obvious, but theythey had not been destroyed inin thethe war,war, right?right? -~ ~ RG: Yes. The big guns were...... I found thisthis otherworldly. II nevernever sawsaw themthem onon thethe ground myself, but I saw pictures. Doug Englund went out,out, hehe ledled somesome ofof thethe ballisticballistic -,: missile teams. These were, they lookedlooked likelike sewer pipes toto me,me, anyway,anyway, butbut theythey werewere forfor launching, I guess, Volkswagen-sized shells. Very impressive.impressive. I)f:' ~ - JS: But they had not been destroyed inin thethe war? -~

-M" ~ 3399

~ RG: I guess not. No. Certainly in the pictures I saw they were not destroyed. There J was a lot of talk, I remember, about what was the best way to make them non-useable for the purpose they were intended for. ~ J JS: In your judgment, I realize that you were not there more recently, but would it be possible ever to detect everything that the Iraqis had if they don't want you to? J J RG: Well, it depends what we mean by that exactly. I mean, that's kind of the CUlTent situation, because this blends into that, I think, rather nicely. If the Iraqis can keep large ­ areas off limits to inspection, they can hide things in that area. As soon as you put things ~ in a garage you can't see them from satellite. Could they have fifty AI-Hussein rockets, ~ some of them with warheads with binary chemicals in those? Yes. Would that be significant? Yeah -- it would be. Could they have a biological weapons factory that

~ would be significant in terms of what it would produce, antIu'ax,antlu'ax, or something?

Absolutely, they could, because there are large areas where they could do that. Could

~' - they have a serious chemical weapons production facility? [It's] very hard, I think, to - hide that; [it's] possible, depending on the area we're talking about, but that gets harder. Could they have a nuclear weapons development program in one of those areas that we - wouldn't know about? I don't think so. I don't think they could sneak a reactor in there - and secretly build one, nor have a centrifuge hall running and all that that would require. I No. Now, there are a couple of tricks to what I'm saying. I'm saying that in some of the areas you could do stuff in a relatively small place and hide it from the inspectors, if you

It could prevent them from going there. If the inspectors could really go everywhere, it's I

t;il l~: 40 going to be hard for them to do anything outside of the BW area, or just, you know, if they've got missiles stashed somewhere and they don't move them, and they could stash them -- anything they've got stashed they can stash. There is nothing here that you could be sure you're going to find with inspecting the country. If you're talking about a program, though, to build them, I'm saying that if you really have full access, then BW is the only one I see as safe from discovery. I don't think they can secretly build missiles, secretly have a chemical program, and secretly have a nuclear program, not if you have full access.

JS: And this leads to the next question. The resolution provides for more-or-less permanent monitoring, and I think you from the beginning began to think about how that should be developed. How far did you get on that, and how practical do you think it is?

RG: Well, we got to the early stage offiguring out, I think it was Resolution 715, I'm not sure, that we would need to go into a different mode for continuous monitoring in terms ofthe teams and the composition and the size and how they'd operate. I mean, there would not be a lot of surprise inspection. This would be a more routine kind of thing, checking on areas, unless you got some special information somehow to go someplace else. The monitoring process would be establishing a baseline, getting a whole, complete understanding of the program that existed before, and getting a real grip on things. So that then, I think the theory we had was that at some point if they started, once the embargo was lifted, and they started importing in numbers, that you could sort of 41 go where I think you might expect them to be able to regenerate one of these programs.

We were thinking along those lines.

How reasonable is it? I think as long as you see this regime in power, or to put it more precisely, Saddam there, it is very difficult for me, anyway, to conceptualize situations where one is not worried anymore about them in these weapons areas. Now, it's clear they pumped in billions and billions ofdollars into WMD. I mean, the nuclear estimate I've seen, seven to eight, nine to ten, billion dollars on nuclear alone. That's serious money. So, they are pretty committed to this. He is pretty committed to this. So long term monitoring seems like the only way to go, to me, under that scenario, if your objective really is to have some assurance that those programs are not regenerated.

JS: And long term monitoring would mean persons, from your observation, actually stationed in Iraq?

RG: Well, it just makes a lot more sense. And in fact, that's what we have now.

We've worked out of that building that we had occupied then. We did set up a base in the former UN building in Baghdad. We were working out of that during the first year, when

I was there. It is not a secure place, in the same way that your base area is in Bahrain, but it allows you to run teams and stay at a hotel, and you can run teams in and out pretty easily. And the more routine you make it, I think the better off you are.

JS: A technical question there, going back to communication. You do have the office in Baghdad, with scrambler phones, to a certain extent, but is there a possibility, and this 4422 may seem naive, but thethe diplomatic pouch procedure ---- can you send sealed messages toto

Baghdad, and ifif so what would you do with itit when theythey get there?there?

RG: Well, certainly when people come in,in, and theythey come inin knowing what theythey want toto do, and theythey can carry thingsthings with them,them, and you don't have toto give up anything sealed at thethe airport....,,

JS: You do not?

RG: No. II wouldn't thinkthink about putting themthem inin thethe mail, but II thinkthink you carrying stuff inin and out [is[is OK]. II mean, you can't carry weapons inin and out, but you can carry sealed envelopes. II thinkthink thatthat you remindremind yourself you are inin Iraq.Iraq.

JS: II want toto go back toto thethe very begilming inin a way, and ask ifif you have anything else toto say about UNSCOM's relationsrelations with headquarters inin New York, any relationshiprelationship with thethe Secretary General, with Akashi, Derek Boothby, thethe old disarmament hands. Did your contact with headquarters remainremain centered inin thethe Disarmament Department?

RG: Disarmament has probably reorganized,reorganized, but we, no. Once we got set up and

Derek was given toto us, he was marvelous, by thethe way. ,.,.

JS: He may be coming toto Yale. 43

RG: Really? I really quite liked him. Once we got Derek, we had a lot less toto do with

Disarmament and Akashi. We worked with the Secretmy General's office, Ron Spiers,

Mitch Werner, Mitch is back there by the way, and a lot through the Security Council, a lot of briefing with the Security Council, it was very important toto us. There was a lively tension over our presence that continued, and it is still there. I mean, some of the things you're seeing now. I was just talking to, I ran into Charlie Duelfer in the park a couple of mornings ago, and Charlie was telling me about thethe attempt toto increaseincrease thethe influenceinfluence of the Commission because that allowed greater access by the Commissioners to the operation ofthe Commission, something Rolf always resisted, as a way ofkind of dialing it back a bit, I mean, he was worried about that. That tension was always there the first year, and still is.

JS: And what about the relations with the IAEA?

RG: Very, very difficult period. Some of my worst periods in my twenty-one years in government came over some things that happened with the IAEA. I remember distinctly

David and I -- David was very much ofthe activist in the Agency; I think he drove Hans crazy and Mauricio and everybody else over there with his enthusiasm for this mission, and we loved it -- David and I agreed to communicate when he was out inin the field. He was out in Baghdad and I was in New York and he was faxing me some stuff which he was also faxing to Vielma. He faxed it to me at the same time in New York. And you understand, let me back up here, 687, in the Resolution, the nuclear stuffis given to the

IAEA, but not exclusively. The Special Commission still has a purview over it, so it's a 4444 funny [situation]. Any mission had toto be technicallytechnically runrun byby thethe IAEAIAEA ifif itit waswas inin thethe nuclear area. UNSCOM-16 was technically, SOli of, David waswas thethe missionmission person,person, butbut all the planning for the mission I had done back here, and wewe hadhad stagedstaged thatthat missionmission initially out of London, before going toto Balu'ain, and II brought DavidDavid andand aa fewfew peoplepeople toto

London, in order to explain how we were going toto do thisthis mission.mission. ItIt hadhad toto havehave someone from the official IAEA, or itit couldn't be a nuclear mission.mission. EarlierEarlier on,on, II think,think, the tension was clearly manifest when David sent me thisthis stuffstuffwhichwhich indicatedindicated thatthat thethe

Iraqis had, earlier on, irradiated some fuel elements inin a safeguardedsafeguarded reactor,reactor, whichwhich theythey had manufactured secretly. They had irradiatedirradiated elements secretlysecretly inin thethe reactor,reactor, pulledpulled them out, and separated gram quantities of plutonium, all withoutwithout tellingtelling thethe IAEA.IAEA. Now,Now, you may say, "compared to everything else theythey did, why isis thatthat important?"important?" That'sThat's important because this was a safeguarded reactor.reactor. It'sIt's one thingthing forfor HansHans BlixBlix andand thethe

Agency to say "Calutrons, EMIS, all this,this, we don't know fromfrom that.that. ItIt wasn'twasn't whatwhat wewe were inspecting. We were inspecting a declared program." OK·-OK·- thatthat reactorreactor waswas declared, you inspected it. They snuck inin fuel elements, theythey irradiatedirradiated them,them, theythey pulledpulled them out, and the separated plutonium. That's on your watch. Now,Now, II sawsaw thatthat asas explosive. The Iraqis had admitted all thatthat toto David and hishis team,team, DavidDavid faxedfaxed thatthat back,back, so I called the Agency in Vienna from New York, and II said,said, "What"What areare youyou goinggoing toto dodo with this? This is dynamite." And he [Zifferero] said, "Neahhh"Neahhh ---- II don'tdon't know,know, wewe don't... probably nothing." And I said, "Look," thisthis was onon Friday,Friday, "on"on Monday,Monday, thethe

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar isis going toto go toto thethe Security COlmcilCOlmcil andand reportreport onon stuff. I got this report in my hand, Rolfisn't here, II can't sitsit onon this.this. You'reYou're supposedsupposed toto report this. On Monday I'm going to call you, you're sixsix hourshours aheadahead ofof me.me. ByBy thethe timetime I 45 J we get to ten o'clock in the morning, you had better telltell me you'reyou're goinggoing toto gogo aheadahead withwith this, or I'm going to go ahead with this. I'm not going toto be thethe oneone holdingholding thisthis bag."bag."

I That's Friday. Nothing happens over thethe weekend; on Monday, theythey haven'thaven't moved.moved. II gogo

and I'm sitting with this information, I wrote up a littlelittle reportreport onon whywhy thisthis waswas significant,significant, ~­ and I still remember this, it was an informal of thethe Security Council,Council, andand I'mI'm sittingsitting andand I've got in front of me Undersecretary General Ron Spiers.Spiel'S. RonRon SpiersSpiel'S hadhad beenbeen aa lotlot ofof

places, including Assistant Secretary of State forfor IntelligenceIntelligence andand Research,Research, andand 1'd1'd -" , worked with him in the Department -- he would get thisthis picture, II don'tdon't havehave toto explainexplain aa , lot about this [with] my little note. So, Ron isis sitting inin frontfront ofof me,me, asas anan Undersecretary, Undersecretary, and there's Perez de Cuellar, and there's thethe Security Council! So,So, II givegive thisthis toto Ron,Ron, letlet , him hold the bag. Ron turns around, tellstells me toto give itit toto thethe Secretary-General.Secretary-General. II givegive itit to the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reportsreports it.it. [The][The] AgencyAgency goesgoes crazy:crazy:

I "How did you get this?" "Well, I don't particularly want toto burnburn aa membermember ofof thethe IAEAIAEA I who is cooperating with the Special Commission, but II got itit fromfrom aa teamteam inin thethe field."field." I "Well, that is never going to happen again." So, now we know everythingeverything isis goinggoing toto gogo through Vienna. That's one case, and by thethe way, theythey thoughtthought thisthis waswas grandstanding.grandstanding.

ITI To me, this was incredibly important -- thisthis was another case oftheofthe IraqisIraqis havinghaving beenbeen ~ found cheating the IAEA, violating theirtheir undertakings under thethe Non-ProliferationNon-Proliferation Treaty,Treaty, very significant in political terms of what was going on. That waswas thethe kind ofof thingthing thatthat - the Agency would have managed. A big mistake, inin my view. There were lots of these things. Even Hans when he wentwent overover toto BaghdadBaghdad inin I- early July, the team that had been out therethere thatthat had been shovedshoved ffi'OlU1dffi'OlU1d andand pushedpushed around and, you know, shots fired in thethe air, he showed a great sympathysympathy forfor thethe IraqiIraqi I I 4466 position and people going everywhere and lookinglooking where theythey weren'tweren't invited.invited. ThatThat waswas not the right posture to strike. I've never really seen a case likelike this.this. II thinkthink thatthat withinwithin aa matter of a month to six weeks, Hans re-calibrated, and re-calibratedre-calibrated thethe Agency,Agency, andand wewe were dealing with something entirely different six months later.later. ByBy thethe timetime wewe gotgot toto

North Korea, which was only really, if you thinkthink about this,this, notnot thatthat muchmuch later,later, aa fewfew years later, he had brought that Agency, I mean he brought thethe Agency,Agency, toto wherewhere itit shouldshould ,, have been before. But he really adjusted. As an internationalinternational civilcivil servantservant interestedinterested inin organizational learning, I think he did an extraordinary job.job. But initially,initially, itit waswas aa veryvery rough patch. And by the way, ifyou think,think, as 1did, thatthat thisthis isis goinggoing toto bebe great,great, thethe twotwo

Swedes will talk to one another in Swedish, and all will be wonderful ---- there'sthere's aa naivetenaivete in that that I can't begin to describe toto you, thethe depth there,there, whichwhich II had.had. ThatThat waswas wrong.wrong.

I don't mean that they were mortal enemies, but toto assume thatthat becausebecause theythey werewere bothboth

Swedes and came out ofthe Swedish foreign ministry, thisthis waswas goinggoing toto greasegrease thethe skidsskids when there was so much of a difference inin orientation of theirtheir organizationsorganizations waswas crazy.crazy.

They did work it out, and they did worlework togethertogether very effectively, butbut initiallyinitially therethere waswas aa very, very big difference over posture and attitude of how toto approachapproach thethe inspections.inspections.

JS: You've got time for two more questions? One isis II thinkthink youyou establishedestablished inin

Bahrain, an assessment staff to assess thethe informationinformation thatthat was comingcoming in,in, becausebecause apparently initially you didn't have that capacity. Was thatthat successful?successful? HowHow diddid thatthat work? 4477

RG: I'm caught here. I can tell you about what we had at the headquarters in New

York, but I can't tell you about what we had in Bahrain.

JS: OK. All right -- we'll cut that question out.

RG: Clearly, it's a good question. It's an excellent question

JS: We'll come back to that in a couple of years. Final question is, how would you compare the Iraqis to the North Koreans?

RG: Really, entirely different. I'm no expert on culture and politics. We have a major here at this School in Culture and Politics, but that is, even though its been twenty-one years at State, I don't consider myself, as some people in the Foreign Service are, as really sensitive to the way culture impacts upon negotiations, etc. Though I cetiainlyceliainly observed it. The Iraqis were... let me give you an example. I could say to an Iraqi, "You are lying," and I could get a smile in response. I can't tell you what the response would have been had I been so stupid as to say to a North Korean across the table, "You are lying."

There's a sense of, even if the North Koreans were lying, that's not something you could say and then continue the conversation. They would not smile back. This would be an insult that would need to be responded to. They have a much greater sense of -- I don't know if 'propriety' is the right thing -- but things you cannot do, and a sensitivity that I did not find in, I won't say the Iraqi people, but I would say the Iraqi government people that I dealt with. These people were nasty, physically, they were very difficult to deal 4848 with inin everyevery sortsort ofof way,way, andand notnot inin termsterms of.of. .... youyou mightmight saysay thethe NorthNorth KoreansKoreans havehave thisthis crazycrazy ideologyideology thatthat theythey stillstill areare holdingholding to,to, eveneven asas itit causescauses themthem toto starvestarve toto death,death,

II could capture no IraqiIraqi ideology.ideology. This was not dealing with Islam.Islam. This was dealingdealing with nasty, largelylargely military, folks,folks, who would use thethe cmdest typetype of advantageadvantage anyany timetime theythey could findfind it.it. And thisthis isis again not a comment about IraqiIraqi people,people, butbut aboutabout thethe people who theythey put toto deal with us, thethe inspectors.inspectors.

JS: Who were the loyalists?

RG: Well, when you're inin a country inin which failure toto show loyaltyloyalty can leadlead toto thethe death of you, your family,family, and your neighbors, you can end up with a lotlot ofloyalists.

JS: Thank you very, very much. Yale-UNYale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory ProjectProject RobeltRobelt GallucciGallucci JamesJames Sutterlin,Sutterlin, InterviewerInterviewer FebruaryFebrualy 3,3, 19981998 Washington,Washington, DCDC

Index:Index: UNSCOM

Akashi, Yasushi 2, 16,42-43 Annan, Kofi 11] 1 Ansalon, George 24 Aziz, Tariq 34 Blix, Hans 23,44-45 Boothby, Derek 3,42-43 Duelfer, CharJieCharI ie 43 Ekells,Ekeus, Rolf 3-4,7, 13,16,21-22,28-31,34,44]3,16,21-22,28-31,34,44 Englund, Doug 6, 15,30,38]5,30,38 Freedman, Abigail 19 Hussein, Saddam 12,33,40-41 Kay, David 12,14,18,43-44 Perez de Cuellar,Cllellar, Javier 3,5,42,44-45 Pickering, Tom 1] Ryan, Mary 6 Spiers, Ron 43,443,455 Werner, Mitch 4433 Zifferero, Mauricio 14, 18-20,43-418-20,43-444 _.. _- I, UNIIUNIItU tVNA NAIIUI'tVt IIUI'tVtUI'\\J U/'\\JrJf\IYll'Ilnllul\l.IvLov rJf\IYll'Ilnllul\l.IvLov"lw,,,,,,, "Iw,,,,,,, ' '

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