Transitions and the Modern Presidency1

Of Hazards and Opportunities: Transitions and the Modern Presidency1

In 1980, Richard Neustadt added three essays to his original study of presidential power, one of which he entitled "The Hazards of Transition." The subject of presidential transitions has continued to engage his interest and he has articulated a well developed view of both the importance of transitions and the challenges and difficulties they present. His subsequent work reflects the view expressed in his 1980 essay that transitions are times full of hazards.2 He warns of pitfalls; his counsel is caution.

I argue for postponement.... Transitions are not forever, ignorance wears off, hopefulness cools down....it should be worth a forfeit of presumptive gains to skirt the losses lurking when one's ignorance and hopefulness combine.3

On what do his concerns rest? What accounts for his emphasis on risks and his celebration of caution? How do his views on transition fit into the larger tapestry of his conception of the Presidency?

The original edition of Presidential Power, not surprisingly, contained little about transitions. Since the early 1930's when Franklin Roosevelt became President until late 1959 when Neustadt was putting the finishing touches on Presidential Power, there were but two presidential transitions, only one of which involved a change of party. The thirty six years following the 1960 publication of Presidential Power have produced eight presidential transitions,4 five of them involving a change of parties.5

1 Paper prepared for Conference on Presidential Power Revisited, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1996. 2 In addition to chapter 11 of Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: John Wiley, 1980), Richard E. Neustadt's other writings on transitions include: "The Reagan Transition," Presidency Research 3, 2 (April 1981); "Memo on Presidential Transition," The American Prospect Issue 11 (Fall 1992), pp. 53-60; "Can Clinton Govern?" The American Prospect Issue 14 (Summer 1993), pp. 7-10; and "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" Miller Center Journal Vol. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-12. Three Neustadt memorandums in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library also deal with aspects of transitions: "Organizing the Transition: A Tentative Check-List for the Weeks between Election and Inaugural;" "Staffing the President-Elect" (October 30, 1960); and "Cabinet Departments: Some Things to Keep in Mind" (November 3, 1960). 3 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: John Wiley, 1980), p. 231. All future references will be to the 1980 edition unless otherwise noted. 4 1961, 1963, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1981, 1989, and 1993. 5 1961, 1969, 1977, 1981, and 1993. 2

Moreover, transitions have grown not merely in frequency, but arguably in importance as scrutiny by the media and the public has risen, party changes have increased, and previous experience in Washington by newly elected presidents has declined.6 Neustadt's contributions to our understanding of transitions begin with his effort to define the term with some precision:

A President's transition can be defined in two ways, narrowly by the time-span between election and inaugural, broadly by the time until he and his principal associates become familiar with the work they have to do, including what to ask of one another and what to expect in response. Transition in the first sense lasts approximately eleven weeks. Transition in the second stretches on until about the time, two years after election, when the "new" Administration has experienced both sessions of a Congress, along with friends and adversaries overseas, and begins to see the shape of the events, hence commitments, that will dominate the presidential term.7

By contrasting the relatively short pre-inaugural transition period with a much longer post-inaugural transition, Neustadt underscores his conviction that the Presidency involves much experiential learning. During transitions presidents acquire a feel for people and institutions, for events and needs, for friends and foes, for possibilities and priorities. Transitions, defined in this sense, extend well beyond an initial honeymoon period; indeed, the settling in may last for upwards of half a term.

Given this view of transitions, Neustadt, not surprisingly, finds the time for modern presidents between their election and inaugural as too short. "The eleven weeks are hazardous because they are so few.”8 He longs wistfully for a longer pre-inaugural transition noting approvingly that presidents before Franklin Roosevelt's second term had four months between their election in early November and their swearing-in on March 4 in which to plan and prepare.9

6 In the period between 1929 and 1977 every President had some claim on significant experience in Washington -- Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, Franklin Roosevelt as Secretary of the Navy, Harry Truman as a Senator and Vice President, Dwight Eisenhower whose military career included extensive experience in Washington, John Kennedy as a member of the House and Senate, Lyndon Johnson as a member of the House and Senate and Vice President, Richard Nixon as a member of the House and Senate and Vice President, and Gerald Ford as a member of the House and Vice President. Since 1976, only George Bush as a member of the House, CIA Director, and Vice President had significant previous Washington experience before assuming the Presidency. 7 Presidential Power, p. 217. 8 Ibid. 9 The change was occasioned by the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution ratified on February 6, 1933. Before the Twentieth Amendment presidents traditionally delivered their State of the Union address in December after Congress had convened on the first Monday of that month. 3

Moreover, since the Congress by tradition departed on March 3 and did not reconvene until December unless the President called it into special session, presidents were provided an equally ample post-inaugural settling-in period. Furthermore, presidents could learn outside the glare of television cameras as they and the administration they had assembled began the tasks of governing. Given that an extended pre-inaugural period is gone, certain urgent tasks for presidents loom large: "a pattern for the presidential staff and initial appointments to suit... Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments... a legislative program or at least a holding action with a start upon specifics... a point of view toward diplomatic and defense initiatives left dangling by the previous Administration...(a point of view on the budget of) the outgoing regime...(and) a 'memorable' Inaugural Address." Furthermore, "the new look of the President-elect... has to be impressed upon a temporarily attentive public and an insatiably curious Washington."10 The president-elect will almost certainly undertake this necessary and unquestionably challenging array of tasks following a lengthy, intense, and exhausting campaign. Some rest as well as reflection seems in order. Instead of rest and reflection, however, the weeks between election and inauguration are frenetic and a time for misjudgments that later come to haunt presidents after they are in office. Neustadt's examination of Jimmy Carter's transition does not fill him with hope. Rather, he describes the Carter transition as characterized by: battles between parallel campaign and transition organizations; an overly large transition staff fueled by excessive public funding for pre-inauguration salaries and expenses; a long delay in appointing White House staff with too little time to permit them to plan, organize and establish working relationships before being thrust into their jobs; an overemphasis on the importance of department heads which resulted in an unhealthy competition between White House staff and executive departments; and a failure to cultivate the press who were bored covering Carter in Plains, Georgia.11 Using these criteria Neustadt assesses the 1981 Reagan transition as substantially more successful than Carter's with less internal friction and more time devoted to establishing working relationships among the President's key aides and between them and him, and to planning for the early weeks after taking office. Having a successful model, however, is no guarantee that one can imitate it. His verdict on the Clinton transition mirrors his assessment of Carter's 1977 experience:

With the best of intentions, no doubt, Clinton essentially ignored Reagan's experience and reproduced Carter's. When the Clinton campaigners rebelled at his initial choice for White House chief of staff, he scrambled to find a substitute who then took a month to decide whether to accept the position. Halfway through the eleven weeks, Clinton named the man then in charge of personnel selection to be secretary of education. Two-thirds of the way through, Clinton named Warren Christopher, then acting chief of staff, for most intents and purposes, to be secretary of state. The President entered office with a late appointed White House staff that had not worked together in their new jobs or become familiar with each other and with Clinton's organizational needs in their new setting.12

10 Presidential Power, p. 217. 11 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 12 "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" p. 10. 4

Having accepted the reality of an approximately eleven week period before the inaugural, Neustadt's recommendations for the pre-inaugural period are modest. A presidential aspirant should: keep transition planning "informal and anonymous before election;"13 spend more time with his staff before inaugural; and "organize his staff soon after election and insulate it thereafter."14 Simpler is often better. Building an effective team to govern requires time, care and attention. Few uses of his energy will pay as high a dividend for a president-elect as tending to these tasks.

III

It is with respect to the period following the inaugural, however, that Neustadt devotes his greatest attention. Presidents face "the greater hazards" during their early months in office. Several developments have combined, he argues, to make the challenges of transition more formidable. A slippage in sub-cabinet appointments has left cabinet appointees overburdened and undersupported. The contact of Cabinet officers with career expertise has diminished as new levels of political appointees "have pushed career officials down four levels in twenty years."15 At the same time, the press is more critical and intrusive, and presidents, like other public officials, face citizens who exhibit a "growing mistrust of politics since Vietnam."16 Moreover, "the mob scene created by transition teams has grown increasingly obtrusive during the eleven weeks between election and inauguration."17 Not least, "atomization," Anthony King's evocative phrase for the dispersion of power in Washington among larger and more highly fragmented staffs, interest groups, executive departments and agencies, and the Congress, has heightened the challenge. For Neustadt, the "hazards of transition rise as 'atomization' proceeds."18 In weighing the argument that transitions are more difficult and problematic than a quarter or half century ago, it is worth considering the setting in which modern transitions occur. First is the matter of expectations. As the "nomination and general election campaigns have lengthened, and as media scrutiny of the policies and styles of presidential candidates has increased, the expectations associated with newly elected presidents and their administrations have also risen. These expectations find expression in intense pressure on newly elected presidents to present a relatively comprehensive legislative program or set of proposals shortly after taking office. Contrast the pressure for action on economic and domestic issues facing Dwight D. Eisenhower with that of his successors four or five decades hence. Eisenhower confided in his diary on February 2, 1953:

13 Presidential Power, p. 219. 14 "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" p. 9. 15 Ibid., p. 8. 16 Ibid., p. 9. 17 Ibid. 18 Presidential Power, p. 217. 5

Today I give my first "state of the union" talk before a joint session of the congress. I feel it a mistake for a new administration to be talking so soon after inauguration; basic principles, expounded in an inaugural talk, are one thing, but to begin talking concretely about a great array of specific problems is quite another. Time for study, exploration, and analysis is necessary. But, the Republicans have been so long out of power they want, and probably need, a pronouncement from their president as a starting point. This I shall try to give.

I hope, and pray, that it does not contain blunders that we will later regret.19

Since Gerald Ford, every president has felt the need to advance a relatively ambitious economic and domestic agenda soon after taking office.20 Not only have presidents come to accept the expectation that they will deliver a comprehensive series of proposals, but congressional committees, particularly when the Congress is controlled by the opposing party, often press new administrations to produce detailed proposals quickly. Having indicated he would support a modest increase in the minimum wage during the 1988 campaign, within days after George Bush took office, the Senate Education and Labor Committee had scheduled hearings and was pressing for a detailed Administration proposal. One of the most urgent pressures on a president early in his administration is proposing a unified federal budget. Departing administrations now typically acknowledge reality and submit a current services budget proposal leaving the detailed work of submitting a comprehensive unified federal budget to the incoming administration. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 required the Director of the newly created Bureau of the Budget located in the Treasury Department to submit a unified federal budget to the Congress leaving the President free to negotiate with the Congress on its particulars. Not only are the pressures to act greater, but the internal dynamics of staffing arrangements have also changed with the advent of large, personal campaign organizations filled with young, eager staffers who have dedicated upwards of two years of their lives to the election cause. Their demonstrated loyalty combined with their detailed knowledge of the President-elect's thinking on a wide range of issues make them near indispensable during the weeks preceding the inaugural and the months that follow it. These "keepers of the campaign promises" exercise enormous influence in meetings asserting confidently not only what the candidate said, but the meaning behind those words. Their nuanced understanding of the nature of the commitments made to particular groups is often decisive during the first months of a new administration. Early policy deliberations are

19 The Eisenhower Diaries, edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), p. 226. 20 Gerald Ford delivered his 31-point economic plan to a Joint Session of Congress on October 8, 1974 within two months of his swearing in. Jimmy Carter advanced his "Economic Recovery Program" on January 31, 1977 and addressed the nation from the White House on February 2, 1977. Ronald Reagan outlined his detailed "America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery" to a Joint Session of Congress on February 18, 1981. George Bush presented his administrations goals, including his comprehensive economic and domestic proposals, "Building a Better America," to a Joint Session of Congress on February 9, 1989. Bill Clinton delivered the outlines of his economic program to a Joint Session of Congress on February 17, 1993. 6

frequently dominated by "the keepers of the flame" as discussions revolve around which campaign promises should have priority in defining an initial agenda. At the same time, considerable influence is often exercised by those with previous White House experience. Their institutional memory can prove valuable in demonstrating how to get things done and how to benefit from the lessons they have often painfully learned. Those who have served faithfully in presidential campaigns have been rewarded with White House posts for decades. What has changed are the sheer numbers. The size and personalized nature of modern presidential campaigns help create the conditions for scores of campaign staff moving with the President to the White House. The practice of meticulously cataloguing campaign promises and the public nature of those commitments has also served to raise expectations and focus early evaluations.21 The expansion, size, and visibility of formal post-election transition activities have also contributed to heightened expectations. Pre-inaugural task forces to refine and develop proposals for the incoming administration are now standard.22 This activity, and its attendant publicity -- whether its products prove useful once the inaugural is over -- helps shape the environment surrounding a new administration as it takes office. It is in this milieu that hazards loom on the horizon.

The core of Neustadt's argument is that Presidents can and do learn experientially, that there is a form of on-the-job training. For Neustadt, the risks "in learning time" are threefold: ignorance, haste, and hubris.23 He might have added a fourth -- overreaching. Ignorance. The classic illustration of the hazard of ignorance or newness is that of John F. Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy's handling of the CIA plan he inherited from the outgoing Administration to encourage and facilitate a counterrevolution in Castro's Cuba sparked by a well-trained brigade of invading exiles illuminates the risks attending a relative lack of experience both among the president and his appointees during the early months of an administration. The sequence of decisions that led to approving the mission and that contributed to its failure rested heavily on a compartmentalization of information and analysis within the CIA,

21 In the wake of his 1976 election victory, Jimmy Carter had his staff review every campaign speech, statement, press release, white paper, or letter outlining a policy position that he had signed looking for anything that someone might legitimately consider a campaign promise. These were compiled by subject and a comprehensive document was prepared for internal use. After repeated requests and considerable delay, the White House press corps was provided with a copy which they quickly named "Promises, Promises" in recognition of the Broadway musical. Subsequent successful presidential candidates have similarly commissioned the preparation of comprehensive campaign promise documents. 22 Many task forces are announced publicly as in the case of Bill Clinton's announcement of a group of economic advisers who would put together his economic plan. The President-elect also announced that he would hold an Economic Summit Conference of leading business and labor leaders in Little Rock to gather ideas and to test out his thinking. The Economic Summit was avidly covered by a press corps hungry for news and insights into his style and policy inclinations. 23 Neustadt often uses terms interchangeably –- ignorance and newness, hubris and arrogance. 7

across the executive branch, and among new presidential appointees. Unaware of the nuances of intelligence community organization and of its relationship with the uniformed services, and concerned about maintaining confidentiality, Kennedy failed to pose certain questions and to press other ones. The result was an underinformed decision maker confronted by proponents of the venture largely free from significant internal challenge. The risks were heightened not only by the newness of the President to his appointees but of the President's appointees to one another. At the same time, a new inexperienced president faced the momentum that a plan in motion often acquires and a set of assumptions on the part of proponents that were divorced from reality. Neustadt concludes:

In this Bay of Pigs affair the new regime's decision-making showed two striking features, ignorance and hopefulness. The ignorance was tinged with innocence, the hopefulness with arrogance.24

The ignorance experienced by presidents during times of transition comes in at least three forms. The first is a limited knowledge of Washington and of its institutions and folkways. Three of the last four incumbents have arrived at the White House with no Washington experience, although all three had served as state chief executives and had dealt with Washington from a distance. As governors, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton had never contended with a legislature controlled by an opposing party and, given the composition of those legislatures, they were able to fashion their legislative relations without having to rely heavily on putting together bipartisan coalitions. This experience ill-prepared them for Washington. Few developments will solidify a group like the perception that others are ignoring them. Uniform Republican opposition in 1993 to the Clinton February stimulus package and spring budget proposals rested in part on substantive differences, but it also rested on their exclusion from discussions and negotiations in shaping the detailed provisions of these omnibus bills. Ignorance may also have contributed to Carter's decision to advance a controversial water projects proposal that undermined his administration's relationship with the Democratic Congress.25 A second type of ignorance involves the nuances of foreign policy. The transfer of responsibility on January 20 is total, but the transfer of understandings, expectations, and tentative agreements is often far from complete. Institutional memory is often sketchy. Even when all relevant documents are readily available, they rarely describe fully the range of nuances that are crucial to an effective negotiator. Jimmy Carter's far-reaching arms control proposal carried to Moscow under presidential instruction by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in early 1977 not only caught many U.S. officials by surprise, but put the Soviet leaders on edge regarding U.S. intentions. The episode set back arms control efforts for months while the damage was repaired.26

24 Presidential Power, p. 223. In addition to the account in Presidential Power (pp. 220-225), see "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" pp. 4-6 and Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 140-156. 25 See James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), pp. 147-149. 26 See Thinking in Time, pp. 111-133. 8

A third type of ignorance involves a limited understanding of the nature and nuances of executive branch capabilities, sensitivities, inclinations, routines, and relationships. How should presidents calibrate advice from various quarters? What is the range of perspectives that a president should seek? The Bay of Pigs episode illustrates the range of executive branch lore essential for presidents to master and the risks associated with failing to do so. The issue of ignorance raises at least two crucial questions. First, how much damage has the Presidency sustained as an institution with the progressive dismantling of the institutional memory around it and the increasing politicization of entities in the Executive Office of the President? Second, how should presidents weigh the value of policy continuity across administrations (e.g. the North America Free Trade Agreement, multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT and its successor, the Panama Canal Treaties, and most favored nation status for China) and the need to carefully and closely scrutinize the plans (such as the Bay of Pigs) and policy positions that are bequeathed from the previous administration? The sensitivity of such trade-offs is particularly acute in foreign affairs where a new administration often comes into office at a time when multiple international negotiations are underway. Hubris. Neustadt is eloquent in his description of the euphoria that accompanies electoral victory -- newness, vigor, exhilaration, and potential seem abundant. He correctly ascribes much of this euphoria to the nature of contemporary campaigns and the young who man them.27 Presidents, having survived the ordeal of a strenuous campaign, are faced with responsibilities large and small that leave them little time to savor their victory. They are struck by the enormity of the tasks ahead. As Neustadt notes: "Presidents are usually sober compared to their staffs. Hubris is primarily a problem for staffs."28 A part of hubris is the sense of confidence bordering on invincibility that often afflicts new administrations. Neustadt's second primary example of transition failure is the Bert Lance affair during Jimmy Carter's first year. The mistakes here, according to Neustadt, were ones of ignorance (of the Washington press corps, the Congress in general and the confirmation process in particular), of sloppiness and lack of attention to detail, and of judgment (in allowing the imperatives of friendship to overwhelm the need to cut one's losses). The result was not merely an end to whatever remained of a first year honeymoon, but damage to the President's professional reputation and public prestige.29 Three particular types of hubris are common to incoming administrations. First, there is a failure to learn from those who are leaving. One of the little noted features of modern transitions is that officials from the departing administration are generally willing and interested in being helpful to appointees from the incoming administration. Rather than harboring resentment and ill-will, they recognize the difficulties of their jobs and are prepared to share the lessons they have learned and the wisdom they have often painfully acquired. Modern presidential transitions typically include carefully prepared briefing books and elaborate formal procedures uncommon in earlier times. What is often missing on the part of those arriving is a sense of their vulnerability and a recognition that they could learn much from those who are leaving.

27 Presidential Power, p. 224. 28 "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" p. 7. 29 Presidential Power, pp. 225-231. 9

This attitude is explained in part by the flush of electoral victory. It is particularly evident when there is a change of parties involving the defeat of an incumbent. Transition officials from winning campaigns reason: What can they teach us? If they are so smart, why did they lose? What is missing is an appreciation for the differences between campaigning and governing. And it is lessons in governing that are most needed and frequently in shortest supply. Second, and perhaps even more crucial, is a failure to learn from those who remain. Newly appointed political officials often ignore or treat with suspicion career civil servants. This phenomenon is reflected in a sharp increase in the layering of political appointees between senior officials and career civil servants over the past quarter century. Another manifestation is the progressive conversion of formerly career positions into political ones. The distance maintained by many incoming officials in part is evidence of an unspoken suspicion regarding the loyalty of careerists. Campaigns are crusades where loyalty is prized and necessary. The shift to governing is neither natural nor automatic. Having worked alongside the outgoing administration, career civil servants are frequently assumed to have a preference for past policies. At its most benign the suspicion of careerists takes the form of a lack of inclusion; at its most aggressive it is expressed in an effort to malign the character of those who remain. The failure to fully utilize the permanent government also reflects a belief by the incoming administration about their own capabilities and the lack of any sense of need. Victory begets confidence. Moreover, campaigns provide much experience in dealing with adversity and in improvising to meet challenging circumstances. The value accorded to institutional memory is limited. A third manifestation of hubris is revealed in a superiority that includes making two types of assertions: previous administrations ignored problems that require immediate attention; and the new administration must respond to an urgent need to raise ethical standards. This type of hubris sometimes takes the form of making pledges during the early weeks following an election that later prove imprudent or impractical to keep.30 Haste. Neustadt's third hazard is the haste that often characterizes the development of initiatives and proposals during the early weeks of an administration. His prime example is the Reagan 1981 budget and tax proposals. The wide range of accounts of the events leading to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act later that summer agree on two central facts: (1) these twin pieces of legislation were developed quickly, and (2) the recession which began the following December seriously undercut the assumptions on which the program was based. Retrospective analyses of the events of 1981 often overlook the environment in which the decisions on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue were made. The fiscal policies of that year were heavily driven by a widely shared conviction that current economic conditions required immediate action. Two years of back-to-back double-digit inflation, rising unemployment, no growth in real economic activity or in productivity, and a 21 1/2 percent prime interest rate the month before Ronald Reagan took office combined to produce an understandable sense of urgency.

30 One of the most common of such promises concerns reducing the size of the White House staff, a common pledge that has led to remarkable creativity in accounting to try to satisfy an understandably skeptical press and public. 10

Reducing the rate of growth of Federal spending, which was rising at 17 percent annually, and reducing the rate of growth of taxes due to the combination of high inflation and bracket creep was widely viewed as an imperative rather than a hastily concocted remedy. The 25 percent increase in the consumer price index during the 24 months before Reagan took office had pushed virtually all income taxpayers into a higher marginal tax rate most with no increase in their real income. Likewise, there was widespread agreement on the need to reduce the rate of growth of the money supply, which was helping to fuel inflation, and to reduce the rate of growth of Federal regulation. Not least, both Carter and Reagan had pledged a sharp increase in defense spending during the campaign, a commitment that reflected overwhelming public support.31 The economic assumptions on which the program was based were optimistic, and produced a spirited debate during the weeks that followed the unveiling of the Reagan proposals. Under the provisions of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President in advancing his budget proposals is obligated to specify the economic assumptions underlying his proposal. These assume not what the administration thinks will happen, but what they assume would happen if the President's proposal was adopted without change. Neither Reagan nor his Budget Director David Stockman accurately anticipated three developments that dramatically transformed the economy and contributed to high and rising deficits. First, the Federal Reserve sharply reduced the rate of growth of the money supply in an effort to stem the rising inflation. Reagan had called for reducing the rate of growth of the money supply in half over four years; it was done in nine months. This had the dual effect of wringing inflation out of the economy and producing a sharp, steep recession in late 19 81 that dramatically reduced federal revenues and increased outlays on income transfer payments. Secondly, congressional deliberations translated the original Reagan tax proposal into a much larger tax reduction by adding such provisions as safe harbor leasing and, most significantly from a revenue standpoint, indexing the personal exemption, the standard deduction, and marginal rate brackets. Third, producing congressional support for the Reagan proposals to reduce the rate of growth of nondefense spending proved impossible. The slowing of the growth of discretionary spending in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 was substantially less than the original proposal. Whether, or to what extent, Reagan and Stockman should have anticipated these developments, is a matter of judgment, as is the question of the extent to which these judgments were the product of haste and of a time of transition. At bottom is the question: Was information and analysis available at the time that the process for advising the President should have brought to his attention? And if so, would it have altered his judgment and decisions? Existing accounts of the development of the Reagan economic program in 1981 reveal a White House that was sensitive to the political realities of the need for putting together a workable coalition given opposition party control of the House and the need to move quickly to seize the moment. Both factors contributed to the decisions to accept the negotiated compromise legislation on taxes and spending.

31 Polls conducted in January 1981 during the Reagan transition asking what government spending programs voters thought should be increased, decreased, or stay the same showed overwhelming public support for an increase in defense spending. In terms of the public's priorities, increasing defense spending finished a close second to increased spending on health care. 11

Overreaching. A fourth potential hazard that has characterized some transitions is overreaching, or overloading the agenda. Transitions are times of enthusiasm when the desire to launch a host of new initiatives often seems overpowering. In 1977, Jimmy Carter arguably overloaded the agenda in two important senses. First, he advanced a large number of proposals simultaneously. As he confided in his diary on January 28, 1977:

Everybody has warned me not to take on too many projects so early in the administration, but it's almost impossible for me to delay something that I see needs to be done.32

Part of the problem was a function of the structure of congressional committees. A disproportionate share of his proposals fell within the purview of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees overloading their circuits and making it virtually impossible for them to comply by acting on them all. Secondly, Carter refused to identify priorities, even when requested by the congressional Democratic leadership, and to convey a sense of what issues and initiatives he considered most important.33 The temptation to advance a large number of initiatives is common to new administrations, particularly following a change of parties. The Clinton Administration during the early months of 1993 also promised a wide range of initiatives including its deficit reduction and tax increase package and comprehensive health care reform proposal while attempting to secure congressional approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Neustadt's emphasis on the hazards of transition seems to stem from a belief that Presidents grow into the job. Presidents often arrive in office with limited federal or executive experience. They will get better over time. Why not proceed cautiously and prudently while learning on the job?

Transitions, however, are also times of great opportunity. As Neustadt argues in Presidential Power, presidents possess limited formal authority and must skillfully use their powers of persuasion to achieve their ends. This suggests that transition periods are not only times to avoid mistakes and overcome ignorance or hubris. They also may prove crucial in building one's professional reputation and public prestige. Viewing transitions as opportunities rests in part on an assumption that in the weeks and months following their election presidents benefit from a measure, sometimes a generous measure, of deference and goodwill. The term "honeymoon" is perhaps too strong and somewhat misleading. But whether the audience is the public, the press, or the Congress, presidents start with something of a clean slate. To be sure, their reputation precedes them.

32 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 65. 33 In April, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal warned Carter that the timing of his welfare reform proposals could adversely affect his tax initiatives given committee jurisdiction in both the House and the Senate. Carter reportedly responded: "I have no preferences; my preference is to move ahead with everything at once." Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and David deF. Whitman, The President as Policymaker: Jimmy Carter and Welfare Reform (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), p. 271. 12

But there is also a sense of newness that is accompanied in some by much enthusiasm and in others by at least a wait-and-see attitude. Harsh judgments are rarely rendered. If strong criticism is deemed appropriate, plenty of time remains to offer it. This benefit-of-the-doubt attitude usually extends at least to the time of inauguration and often beyond.34 The country wants peace and prosperity; the Congress wants a successful working relationship; the press wants interesting issues and interesting people about which to write. All are generally hopeful that a new administration will provide a good measure of these. Given these early attitudes, presidents, even those with limited electoral mandates, can do much to strengthen their hand during times of transition. The ground is rarely more fertile for new ideas and fresh approaches. Three areas of opportunity deserve particular attention during transitions -- symbolic actions, organizational arrangements, and legislative initiatives.

Symbolic Actions. Transitions are a time when the president's publics -- citizens at large, and the Washington community -- are especially attentive -- looking for signals, for signs, for cues regarding his style, his priorities, his interests, his habits, and his capacity to wield governmental power (as opposed to his prowess in securing votes in an election). Even in a well-known political figure they are eager for such information. But this hunger is especially true in those presidents who arrive in the White House without previous Washington experience. During the period between their election and inaugural, successful presidential candidates are free from the responsibilities of office and thus have great latitude in taking symbolic actions that can help shape the perception of how they will govern. John F. Kennedy reached out to his defeated opponent for a meeting that illustrated his grace and interest in healing the divisions of a bitter campaign. On November 14, Kennedy flew from Palm Beach, where he was recovering from the election ordeal, to Nixon's vacation retreat at Key Biscayne. Kennedy also visited the LBJ ranch in Texas, met with Dwight Eisenhower, Herbert Hoover,

34 Gallup Poll presidential approval ratings taken near the time of inauguration typically are high even following a hotly contested and close election. The Gallup Polls taken nearest to Inauguration Day show the following pattern: Truman January 7, 1949 69% Eisenhower January 11, 1953 78% Eisenhower January 17, 1957 73% Kennedy-February 10 , 1961 72% Johnson Early December 1963 78% Johnson January 7, 1965 71% Nixon January 23, 1969 59% Nixon January 26, 1973 67% Ford August 16, 1974 71% Carter January 1, 1977 66% Reagan January 27, 1981 51% Reagan January 11, 1985 62%

See Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale, The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency (Washington, DCCQ Press, 1988), pp. 295-307. 13

Billy Graham, farm leaders, labor leaders, and black leaders while dividing his time between Boston, Palm Beach, Washington, and the Carlyle Hotel in New York. He conferred with leading Democrats from both houses of Congress and was accessible to the media, holding nineteen press conferences of one kind or another. Recognizing the fragility of his mandate and overriding the advice of several friends, he demonstrated a commitment to continuity by retaining Allen Dulles as CIA Director and J. Edgar Hoover as FBI Director. He showed his willingness to reach across party lines and to reassure the New York financial community by persuading C. Douglas Dillon to serve as his Secretary of the Treasury. Not least, he showed his wit. Arriving for his final meeting as a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers, he announced to the throngs of cheering students in Harvard Yard: "I'm here to go over your grades with President Pusey, and I'll protect your interests."35 His schedule and activities communicated a sense of youth, energy, and action. He assiduously cultivated the White House press corps, skillfully capturing the attention of the country and developing an expectation of freshness and innovation. By the time of his inaugural his approval rating had risen to 72 percent.36 Where the president-elect chooses to spend his time, with whom, and doing what sends signals about him and the shape of his administration that are eagerly watched. Pre- inaugural symbolic actions can convey prudence or carelessness, energy or complacency, openness or reserve. Wisely managed, they can help create an environment for transforming a narrow election victory into a capacity to govern. In particular, symbolic actions during the early days of an administration are carefully watched and calibrated by those in Congress. Ronald Reagan meticulously met with scores of Republican and Democratic members of the House and Senate during his first weeks in office taking their measure and conveying his interest in establishing a good working relationship with members on both sides of the aisle. Bill Clinton reached out to congressional Democrats in his choice of a vice presidential running mate and in his cabinet appointments selecting perhaps the most respected Democrat in the Senate, Lloyd Bentsen, as his Secretary of the Treasury; Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, as his Secretary of Defense; Leon Panetta, chairman of the House Budget Committee, as his Budget Director; and Mike Espy, a Southern Democratic Member of the House, as his Secretary of Agriculture. But congressional Republicans were virtually ignored in early 1993.37 He invited the Democratic congressional leadership to dinner in Little Rock, challenged the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader to reduce the size of congressional staffs consistent with his proposed reduction in the size of his White House staff, and then acquiesced when they demurred. He similarly showed remarkable deference to Democratic

35 See Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965). 36 See Gary King and Lyn Ragsdale, The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1988). 37 See Roger B. Porter, "The Realities of Governing," Conference on Beyond the First 100 Days: What the Clinton Administration Must Do. University of London, Institute of United States Studies, March 11-12, 1993. 14

congressional leaders in the management of legislative initiatives during his first year in office, from the content of deficit reduction legislation to strategy on health care-legislation. Official Washington also watches presidential actions, habits, preferences, and style. Transitions provide a powerful opportunity for newly elected presidents to draw contrasts with their predecessors. Jimmy Carter repeatedly sought to contrast his personal style with an imperial Nixon White House carrying his own traveling bag, sharply limiting transportation and amenities for his White House staff, and walking hand-in-hand with his wife down Pennsylvania Avenue in the inaugural parade. Ronald Reagan, who like his predecessor had campaigned against an intrusive and bloated Washington bureaucracy, charmed the Washington establishment during the weeks and months following his election. He invited prominent political and civic leaders to a party at the F Street Club surprising some prominent Democrats who thought they had been invited by mistake. He attended a dinner at the home of columnist George Will and a party hosted by Katherine Graham of the Washington Post. AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, the National Urban League's Vernon Jordan, and scores of other major figures in Washington rubbed shoulders with him where they had an opportunity to take his measure, and he theirs.38 His approach emphasized calmness and an aura that he would not enmesh himself in details in contrast to his predecessor. Presidents also send signals about the type of relationship they want to establish with the public. These signals include how frequently and where they travel, with whom they meet, their openness in answering questions, and the topics they choose to emphasize. Early in his presidency, Ronald Reagan began a series of short weekly radio addresses at Noon on Saturdays. The idea was reminiscent of Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats yet far more frequent and less dramatic.39 Presidents also send signals regarding the relationship they want to establish with the permanent government, the executive departments and agencies over which they preside. Jimmy Carter within weeks of taking office visited each major executive department, spoke to the assembled employees, and answered questions. George Bush spoke fondly of his relationship with career civil servants during his service as UN Ambassador and CIA Director and commended public service as a profession. Bill Clinton, during his first weeks in office, challenged the defense establishment on the treatment of gays in the military, proposed a freeze on cost-of-living adjustments limited to civilian Federal civil servants rather than on all federal inflation-adjusted programs, proposed sharp decreases in defense spending, and launched a concerted effort to reduce the size of the Federal bureaucracy. Not least, transitions are times when images of work habits and a sense of priorities are conveyed. Gerald Ford hosted a Summit Conference on Inflation, meeting publicly with business and labor leaders, Republican and Democratic economists, and leaders from a dozen key sectors of the economy. He created the President's Labor-Management Committee with eight major corporate executives and eight major labor leaders. He immersed himself in the

38 An excellent account of Reagan's early moves is found in Laurence I. Barrett, Gambling with History: Reagan in the White House (New York: Penguin Books, 1984). See especially chapter 5, "Seduction and Blitzkrieg." 39 The innovation of a weekly radio address proved so successful that it has continued under both his successors. 15

preparation of the Federal budget and personally briefed the press on its contents. He cultivated a sense of openness and a willingness to listen to opposing views. Bill Clinton focused much attention during the period before his inauguration on economic issues, hosting a Summit Conference of business and labor leaders and economists in Little Rock. The exercise was eagerly covered by the media who interpreted the sessions as evidence of his interest in ideas, his willingness to listen, and his commitment to an inclusive decision-making process. Times of transition are important in part because early impressions are lasting and remarkably resistant to change. Jimmy Carter, despite a marked change in his work habits during the last two years of his term, never shed his image as a micromanager. Ronald Reagan remained in the public's eye as someone who focused on the big picture. George Bush, who actually spent more time on domestic policy than foreign policy issues and traveled more extensively at home than internationally, was perceived as someone primarily interested in foreign affairs in part because of his comment that he preferred dealing with foreign leaders than congressional committee chairs. Bill Clinton, whose division of time and effort between foreign and domestic matters closely parallels that of his predecessor, nonetheless retains the image of someone whose greatest interest and attention is on domestic policy issues. Reversing early images becomes extremely difficult and efforts to do so are often viewed skeptically by both the press and the public.

VII

Organizational Arrangements. Transitions are also times for organization and institutional innovations. Enormous deference is accorded the President in organizing his administration and in ordering the relationships of his White House with the executive branch, the Congress, interest groups, the media, governors and mayors, and the public. Few question his right and judgment in such matters. The notion that the way a president organizes ought to reflect his personal style, habits, and decision-making preferences is widely accepted. This is particularly true during the early weeks and months of an administration. Later reorganizations, however, are more difficult. Changing processes and rearranging responsibilities is possible but often expensive in political capital. Egos are bruised easily; rationales and explanations are expected for why the new arrangements are preferable and for why the old arrangements didn't work satisfactorily. The sheer effort is often considered more costly than the anticipated benefits. Presidents may shuffle personnel and recruit fresh blood, but the institutional arrangements are considered less flexible. Ronald Reagan established a series of cabinet councils during his first term and then streamlined the system into two policy councils at the beginning of his second term. Bill Clinton established a National Economic Council at the outset of his administration. Gerald Ford was able to organize his economic policy making machinery with few objections while eliminating scores of existing councils and committees. As a close presidential confidant and architect described the effort:

There was a new president and that helped in making a major change. After all, this (creating the Economic Policy Board) dumped a whole bunch of people out before they even woke up to the fact that it had happened. If you had tried this in the middle of an administration you would have had the damndest bureaucratic fight in history. It was really the equivalent of a major reorganization which took place so fast that the normal 16

bureaucratic ability to react and start a fight didn't happen. This was particularly true because there was a new president and it seemed to come from his close advisers. So nobody stood up to fight. This was one of those rare times you could get that done.40

Contrast the ease of the Ford and Clinton innovations with the struggle within the Reagan Administration during his first term over the locus of international economic policymaking responsibility. The cabinet council structure put in place in January 1981 included both a Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs and a Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. At the same time, the National Security Council had a strong interest in formulating policy on those economic policy issues they considered crucial to the effective pursuit of particular foreign policy objectives. The result was much duplication of effort and frequent confusion regarding which entities were responsible for what issues. Cabinet level officials expressed strong interest in the outcome and resolving the issue required presidential involvement. The resolution was the creation of yet another entity, the Senior Interagency Group on International Economic Policy, while leaving all the existing councils in place. It was only at the start of a new term that the system was finally streamlined and rationalized. The beginning of a presidential term is also a crucial time for developing good working relationships within executive branch policy communities. Patterns are established that tend to persist. Likewise, transitions are full of opportunities to help establish constructive White House-departmental relations and to institute procedures and patterns within the White House staff.

VIII

Legislative Initiatives. Transitions are also a time of great legislative opportunities. Presidents rarely have as much leverage with Congress as they do at the outset of their term. Members of a president's own party are anxious to help him succeed and want him to be viewed as successful. This is particularly true when a party out of power in the White House has once again captured the Oval Office. There is the sense of a joint mandate, however modest, that unites those on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. A measure of deference and goodwill often characterize a president's early relations with Congress, particularly with members of his party. Moreover, individual members of Congress want to maintain good relations with the White House during the crucial early months of an administration when the President is making hundreds of appointments to subcabinet positions, and thousands of appointments to boards and commissions. Members are eager to develop a reputation as someone who is constructive and helpful and whose views and recommendations deserve a careful hearing. The unity exhibited by the congressional Republicans in the key legislative votes of 1981 and of congressional Democrats in 1993 in supporting a new president of their party is striking. Sustaining this discipline and allegiance is not easy. In legislative terms, presidents rarely have the same deference and leverage in the second half of their term that they do in their first two years. Initial hopefulness often gives way to disappointment. Reality replaces inflated expectations.

40 Roger B. Porter, Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 44. 17

In part, declining presidential leverage is a simple function of numbers. Since Abraham Lincoln's first victory in 1860, the party holding the presidency has lost seats in the House of Representatives in 32 of 34 midterm elections. The last time a President's party failed to lose seats in the House during midterm elections was 1934. On fourteen occasions the President's party has lost 45 or more seats including the loss of 116 seats in 1894. Given that only one third of Senate seats are typically contested every two years, the midterm loss of Senate seats is usually less dramatic. While the magnitudes are often less than in House elections, the shift against the President's party in Senate elections remains the rule. Since 1860, the President's party has lost seats in the Senate during midterm elections on 21 occasions and has gained seats on 13 occasions. Since 1918, however, the ratio is 16 losses against 4 gains. In short, not only does the euphoria of victory and the enthusiasm for a fresh administration recede over time, but the ranks of the opposing party in Congress generally swell at the mid-point of their administration. Paul Light has illuminated this phenomenon of what is commonly referred to as the cycle of decreasing influence.41 The Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies amply illustrate the point. During his first months in office, Ronald Reagan was able to rely on the skillfully-led new Republican majority in the Senate and to construct a working majority of Republicans and boll weevil Democrats in the House in securing enactment of an ambitious economic recovery program. Admittedly, the size of the tax reductions enacted exceeded his request and the size of the spending restraint measures fell short of what he had proposed, but his initiatives dominated the agenda. One of the keys to Reagan's success was his capacity to focus and his determination to pursue his strategy in a disciplined way. The loss of 26 seats in 1982 mid-term elections, however, made negotiations with the Congress more difficult and reduced his leverage. Likewise, the loss of Republican control of the Senate following the 1986 midterm elections eroded Reagan's ability to secure his legislative objectives. When George Bush took office, he faced the largest congressional majorities held by an opposing party of any newly-elected President in U.S. history. Throughout his administration the Democratic Party enjoyed large majorities in both houses (a 10-14 seat majority in the Senate and an 87-101 seat majority in the House). Bush offered what he described as "an extended hand" as he advanced a large number of economic and domestic proposals.42 During the first two years of his administration, a large number of his initiatives were enacted. Much attention has centered on the 1990 Budget Agreement, but Bush also successfully negotiated the Clean Air Act, child care legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act, an affordable housing bill, minimum wage legislation, and the 1990 Farm Bill. During his second two years only four major pieces of legislation dealing with civil rights, surface transportation, fast track trade negotiating authority, and energy were enacted. The difference in Bush's legislative success during the first and second halves of his term is striking. His leverage with Congress had ebbed. He was unable to secure passage of his

41 See Paul Light, The President's Agenda, second edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1991) 42 Bush advanced specific proposals dealing with economic growth, crime control, education, clean air, child care, surface transportation, job training, affordable housing, civil rights civil justice reform, financial institution reform, and product liability. He proposed a comprehensive health care plan and a national energy strategy, as well as calling for a Summit and engaging in extended negotiations with congressional leaders on a budget deficit reduction plan. 18

economic growth, education reform, banking reform, health care, violent crime control, enterprise zone, capital gains tax reduction, and civil justice reform proposals. Bill Clinton's early budget and tax increase victories were made possible because of overwhelming support from congressional Democrats. Many members did so reluctantly. It was the fear of failure, as much as any single factor, that produced the 1993 Clinton victories. Democrats in Congress did not want the first Democratic President in more than a decade to fail in the opening months of his term. The November 1994 Republican electoral victory changed all that. The 104th Congress was disinclined to follow Clinton's lead. His major threat and weapon in legislative negotiations became his veto pen. Reagan, Bush, and Clinton in their own ways illustrate the extent to which presidents can effectively use their early months in office to advance their legislative agenda. These administrations also demonstrate how missed early opportunities are difficult to recapture.

Transitions are a time for caution. Hazards do loom large. Richard Neustadt has insightfully illuminated the dangers associated with ignorance, haste, and hubris. Moreover, transitions are a time of high expectations. Presidents and their new appointees sense a need to fulfill campaign promises which often leads to overreaching. It is a time not conducive to a disciplined, focused approach to policymaking. Presidents now benefit from limited institutional memory in the institutions closest to them. The prevailing ethos is often to ignore it. But transitions are also a time of great opportunity. Symbolic actions can shape impressions regarding one's style and priorities. Skillfully taken, they can help transform a limited electoral mandate into a capacity to govern. Times of transition are also an opportunity for presidents not only to select officials who will work well together as a team, but to organize them and relations between officials in executive departments and on the White House staff. Organizational innovations later in an administration are almost always more problematic and consume political capital. Finally, the early months of an administration provide great opportunity for advancing a focused legislative program that can build momentum for a new president. Presidents want and need to strengthen their professional reputation and to enhance their public prestige. Doing so requires not only avoiding hazards but seizing opportunities.