DOCSLIB.ORG

Transitions and the Modern Presidency1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Transitions and the Modern Presidency1 Of Hazards and Opportunities: Transitions and the Modern Presidency1 Roger B. Porter Harvard University In 1980, Richard Neustadt added three essays to his original study of presidential power, one of which he entitled "The Hazards of Transition." The subject of presidential transitions has continued to engage his interest and he has articulated a well developed view of both the importance of transitions and the challenges and difficulties they present. His subsequent work reflects the view expressed in his 1980 essay that transitions are times full of hazards.2 He warns of pitfalls; his counsel is caution. I argue for postponement.... Transitions are not forever, ignorance wears off, hopefulness cools down....it should be worth a forfeit of presumptive gains to skirt the losses lurking when one's ignorance and hopefulness combine.3 On what do his concerns rest? What accounts for his emphasis on risks and his celebration of caution? How do his views on transition fit into the larger tapestry of his conception of the Presidency? I The original edition of Presidential Power, not surprisingly, contained little about transitions. Since the early 1930's when Franklin Roosevelt became President until late 1959 when Neustadt was putting the finishing touches on Presidential Power, there were but two presidential transitions, only one of which involved a change of party. The thirty six years following the 1960 publication of Presidential Power have produced eight presidential transitions,4 five of them involving a change of parties.5 1 Paper prepared for Conference on Presidential Power Revisited, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1996. 2 In addition to chapter 11 of Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: John Wiley, 1980), Richard E. Neustadt's other writings on transitions include: "The Reagan Transition," Presidency Research 3, 2 (April 1981); "Memo on Presidential Transition," The American Prospect Issue 11 (Fall 1992), pp. 53-60; "Can Clinton Govern?" The American Prospect Issue 14 (Summer 1993), pp. 7-10; and "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" Miller Center Journal Vol. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-12. Three Neustadt memorandums in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library also deal with aspects of transitions: "Organizing the Transition: A Tentative Check-List for the Weeks between Election and Inaugural;" "Staffing the President-Elect" (October 30, 1960); and "Cabinet Departments: Some Things to Keep in Mind" (November 3, 1960). 3 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: John Wiley, 1980), p. 231. All future references will be to the 1980 edition unless otherwise noted. 4 1961, 1963, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1981, 1989, and 1993. 5 1961, 1969, 1977, 1981, and 1993. 2 Moreover, transitions have grown not merely in frequency, but arguably in importance as scrutiny by the media and the public has risen, party changes have increased, and previous experience in Washington by newly elected presidents has declined.6 Neustadt's contributions to our understanding of transitions begin with his effort to define the term with some precision: A President's transition can be defined in two ways, narrowly by the time-span between election and inaugural, broadly by the time until he and his principal associates become familiar with the work they have to do, including what to ask of one another and what to expect in response. Transition in the first sense lasts approximately eleven weeks. Transition in the second stretches on until about the time, two years after election, when the "new" Administration has experienced both sessions of a Congress, along with friends and adversaries overseas, and begins to see the shape of the events, hence commitments, that will dominate the presidential term.7 By contrasting the relatively short pre-inaugural transition period with a much longer post-inaugural transition, Neustadt underscores his conviction that the Presidency involves much experiential learning. During transitions presidents acquire a feel for people and institutions, for events and needs, for friends and foes, for possibilities and priorities. Transitions, defined in this sense, extend well beyond an initial honeymoon period; indeed, the settling in may last for upwards of half a term. II Given this view of transitions, Neustadt, not surprisingly, finds the time for modern presidents between their election and inaugural as too short. "The eleven weeks are hazardous because they are so few.”8 He longs wistfully for a longer pre-inaugural transition noting approvingly that presidents before Franklin Roosevelt's second term had four months between their election in early November and their swearing-in on March 4 in which to plan and prepare.9 6 In the period between 1929 and 1977 every President had some claim on significant experience in Washington -- Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, Franklin Roosevelt as Secretary of the Navy, Harry Truman as a Senator and Vice President, Dwight Eisenhower whose military career included extensive experience in Washington, John Kennedy as a member of the House and Senate, Lyndon Johnson as a member of the House and Senate and Vice President, Richard Nixon as a member of the House and Senate and Vice President, and Gerald Ford as a member of the House and Vice President. Since 1976, only George Bush as a member of the House, CIA Director, and Vice President had significant previous Washington experience before assuming the Presidency. 7 Presidential Power, p. 217. 8 Ibid. 9 The change was occasioned by the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution ratified on February 6, 1933. Before the Twentieth Amendment presidents traditionally delivered their State of the Union address in December after Congress had convened on the first Monday of that month. 3 Moreover, since the Congress by tradition departed on March 3 and did not reconvene until December unless the President called it into special session, presidents were provided an equally ample post-inaugural settling-in period. Furthermore, presidents could learn outside the glare of television cameras as they and the administration they had assembled began the tasks of governing. Given that an extended pre-inaugural period is gone, certain urgent tasks for presidents loom large: "a pattern for the presidential staff and initial appointments to suit... Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments... a legislative program or at least a holding action with a start upon specifics... a point of view toward diplomatic and defense initiatives left dangling by the previous Administration...(a point of view on the budget of) the outgoing regime...(and) a 'memorable' Inaugural Address." Furthermore, "the new look of the President-elect... has to be impressed upon a temporarily attentive public and an insatiably curious Washington."10 The president-elect will almost certainly undertake this necessary and unquestionably challenging array of tasks following a lengthy, intense, and exhausting campaign. Some rest as well as reflection seems in order. Instead of rest and reflection, however, the weeks between election and inauguration are frenetic and a time for misjudgments that later come to haunt presidents after they are in office. Neustadt's examination of Jimmy Carter's transition does not fill him with hope. Rather, he describes the Carter transition as characterized by: battles between parallel campaign and transition organizations; an overly large transition staff fueled by excessive public funding for pre-inauguration salaries and expenses; a long delay in appointing White House staff with too little time to permit them to plan, organize and establish working relationships before being thrust into their jobs; an overemphasis on the importance of department heads which resulted in an unhealthy competition between White House staff and executive departments; and a failure to cultivate the press who were bored covering Carter in Plains, Georgia.11 Using these criteria Neustadt assesses the 1981 Reagan transition as substantially more successful than Carter's with less internal friction and more time devoted to establishing working relationships among the President's key aides and between them and him, and to planning for the early weeks after taking office. Having a successful model, however, is no guarantee that one can imitate it. His verdict on the Clinton transition mirrors his assessment of Carter's 1977 experience: With the best of intentions, no doubt, Clinton essentially ignored Reagan's experience and reproduced Carter's. When the Clinton campaigners rebelled at his initial choice for White House chief of staff, he scrambled to find a substitute who then took a month to decide whether to accept the position. Halfway through the eleven weeks, Clinton named the man then in charge of personnel selection to be secretary of education. Two-thirds of the way through, Clinton named Warren Christopher, then acting chief of staff, for most intents and purposes, to be secretary of state. The President entered office with a late appointed White House staff that had not worked together in their new jobs or become familiar with each other and with Clinton's organizational needs in their new setting.12 10 Presidential Power, p. 217. 11 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 12 "Presidential Transitions: Are the Risks Rising?" p. 10. 4 Having accepted the reality of an approximately eleven week period before the inaugural, Neustadt's recommendations for the pre-inaugural period are modest. A presidential aspirant should: keep transition planning "informal and anonymous before election;"13 spend more time with his staff before inaugural; and "organize his staff soon after election and insulate it thereafter."14 Simpler is often better. Building an effective team to govern requires time, care and attention. Few uses of his energy will pay as high a dividend for a president-elect as tending to these tasks. III It is with respect to the period following the inaugural, however, that Neustadt devotes his greatest attention.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Look at Presidential Power and What Could Have Been John T
    Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC Honors Theses University Honors Program 8-1992 The Difference One Man Makes: A Look at Presidential Power and What Could Have Been John T. Sullivan Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses Recommended Citation Sullivan, John T., "The Difference One Man Makes: A Look at Presidential Power and What Could Have Been" (1992). Honors Theses. Paper 60. This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Difference One Man Makes: A Look at Presidential Power and What Could Have Been By John T. Sullivan University Honors Thesis Dr. Barbara Brown July 1992 A question often posed in theoretical discussions is whether or not one person can make a difference in the ebb and flow of history. We might all agree that if that one person were a President of the United states, a difference could be made; but how much? While the presidency is the single most powerful position in the U.s. federal system of government, making it a formidable force in world affairs also, most scholars agree that the presidency, itself, is very limited, structurally. The success of a president in setting the nation along a desired course rests with the ingredients brought to the position by the person elected to it. Further, many events occur outside the control of the president. Fortune or failure depends upon how the individual in office reacts to these variables.
    [Show full text]
  • Richard Neustadt
    !RICHARD NEUSTADT Presidential Power and the Modern President From this often-read book comes the classic concept of presidential power as "the power to persuade. " Richard Neustadt observed the essence of presidential power when working in the executive branch during Franklin Roosevelt's term as president. He stayed to serve under President Truman. It is said that President Kennedy brought Presidential Power with him to the White House, and Neustadt worked briefly for JFK. The first half of the excerpt, in which he shows how presidents' well-developed personal characteristics permit successful persuasive abilities, comes from the book's first edition. The excerpt's closing pages reflect Neustadt's recent musings on the nation, on world affairs, and on the challenges presidents face. IN THE EARLY summer of 1952, before the heat of the campaign, President [Harry] Truman used to contemplate the problems of the general-become-President should [Dwight David] Eisenhower win the forthcoming election. "He'll sit here," Truman would remark (tapping his desk for emphasis), "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." Eisenhower evidently found it so. "In the face of the continuing dissidence and disunity, the President sometimes simply exploded with exasperation," wrote Robert Donovan in comment on the early months of Eisenhower's first term. "What was the use, he demanded to know, of his trying to lead the Republican Party. ..... And this reaction was not limited to early months alone, or to his party only.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Power in the Modern Era
    1 Presidential Power in the Modern Era With box cutters and knives, nineteen hijackers took control of four commercial jets on the morning of September 11, 2001, and flew the planes into the towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The South and North Towers in New York collapsed at 10:05 and 10:28 a.m., respectively. Fires in the Pentagon burned for another seventy-two hours. In all, over three thousand civilians (including several hundred New York City fire fighters and police) died in the attacks. The greatest terrorist act in U.S. history sent politicians scrambling. Not surprisingly, it was the White House that crafted the nation’s response, little of which was formally subject to congressional review. In the weeks that followed, President Bush issued a flurry of uni- lateral directives to combat terrorism. One of the first was an execu- tive order creating a new cabinet position, Secretary of Homeland Se- curity, which was charged with coordinating the efforts of forty-five federal agencies to fight terrorism. Bush then created a Homeland Security Council to advise and assist the president “with all aspects of homeland security.” On September 14, Bush issued an order that au- thorized the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force to call up for active duty reservists within their ranks. Later that month, Bush issued a national security directive lifting a ban (which Gerald Ford originally instituted via executive order 11905) on the CIA’s ability to “engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination”—in this instance, the target being Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants within al Qaeda, the presumed masterminds behind the September 11 at- tacks.
    [Show full text]
  • President Trump's First Term
    The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research Volume 5 Article 1 2-15-2020 President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 Robert X. Browning Purdue University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse Part of the American Politics Commons Recommended Citation Browning, Robert X. (2020) "President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5," The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: Vol. 5 , Article 1. Available at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact [email protected] for additional information. President Trump’s First Term: The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research, Volume 5 Cover Page Footnote To purchase a hard copy of this publication, visit: http://www.thepress.purdue.edu/titles/format/ 9781557538826 This article is available in The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ccse/vol5/iss1/1 “For almost 25 years I have watched the C-SPAN Video Library evolve into the nonpareil of data on congressional institutional behavior. Most instructors of the legislative process have utilized the C-SPAN’s material in the classroom with great success. Here, in this volume, Robert X. Browning once again demonstrates the myriad ways scholars can advance conventional wisdom on the U.S. Congress and institutions with the C-SPAN Video Library’s seemingly unlimited data. Debates, hearings, and floor speeches are just a few fascinating resources that are brilliantly used in this volume.
    [Show full text]
  • Simply the Best: FDR As America's Number One President Tony Mcculloch in the Words of Tina Turner's Iconic Pop Song of the 1
    Simply the Best: FDR as America’s Number One President Tony McCulloch In the words of Tina Turner’s iconic pop song of the 1980s, to be “the best” is simply to be “better than all the rest.” While this is self-evidently the case, historians and political scientists who write about the institution of the U.S. presidency are obliged to justify their preferences and to produce a more detailed set of criteria against which the best presidents can be distinguished from “the worst” or from “the average” or from “the near great.” This is no easy task but the aim of this essay is more ambitious still – to distinguish between those presidents who are universally regarded as America’s greatest chief executives – George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt – and to justify FDR’s claim to be America’s number one President.1 The starting point for this quest is the survey undertaken by Professor Iwan Morgan, Director of the U.S. Presidency Centre (USPC) at the UCL Institute of the Americas, and published in January 2011. In this survey of British experts on the U.S. presidency, FDR was placed first, Lincoln second and Washington third. This result was in contrast to similar surveys in the United States that have usually chosen Lincoln to be the greatest, with FDR and Washington jostling for second and third position. The USPC survey therefore raises three main questions which it is the purpose of this chapter to answer. Firstly, why did a survey of U.S. presidents amongst British academics lead to a different result from that usually obtained in the United States? Secondly, what criteria would it be best to use in judging the greatness or otherwise of a U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Tragedy Or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside The
    Tragedy or Choice in John Garofano Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box A Review Essay Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins ofthe Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. In 1965, the United States launched a major air and ground war on behalf of a weak ally against an experienced and committed enemy. Policymakers understood that domestic support would not last forever and would likely decrease as casualties mounted. War games and simulations had suggested that Washington might end up isolated internationally. Yet the nation embarked on a war that reduced U.S. power and prestige, claimed the lives of some 58,000 of its citizens, and led to a skepticism of limited war that still shapes civil-military relations and foreignTragedy or Choice in Vietnam? policy today. Given the risks and uncertainties, why did the United States go to war in Vietnam? After three decades there still is no consensus on this or any number of other basic questions regarding U.S. policy. The exchanges that followed U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s conditional apologia in 1995 demonstrated that neither a central architect nor his critics could agree on 1 whether the war was inevitable or winnable. In 2001, on the thirtieth anniver- John Garofano is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at the Robert and Renée Belfer Cen- ter for Science and International Affairs, John F.
    [Show full text]
  • Persuasion Is Not Power – the Nature of Presidential Leadership
    PERSUASION IS NOT POWER The Nature of Presidential Leadership George C. Edwards III Texas A&M University and University of Oxford Abstract After briefly reviewing the theory and evidence regarding the impact of presidential persuasion, I provide an alternative view of presidential leadership as facilitating change. Next, I analyze current issues to show that the different orientations lead us to ask different questions about the president’s leadership efforts and to arrive at different conclusions about their consequences. Finally, I suggest avenues for studying leadership without persuasion that will enhance the prospects of our making progress in understanding presidential power. Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 29-September 1, 2013. 1 Leadership is perhaps the most commonly employed concept in politics. Politicians, pundits, journalists, and scholars critique and analyze public officials, attributing both success and failure to the quality of their leadership. When times are bad, as people often perceive them to be, the reflexive call is for new—and better—leadership. The president is the most prominent focus of political leadership in the United States, and the notion of the dominant president who moves the country and the government by means of strong, effective leadership has deep roots in American political culture. Those chief executives whom Americans revere have taken on mythic proportions as leaders. Anecdotes abound about their remarkable persuasive powers, fed by the hagiography that envelops presidents and distorts both our memories and our critical faculties. Even though both the public and commentators are frequently disillusioned with the performance of individual presidents and recognize that stalemate is common in the political system, Americans eagerly accept what appears to be effective presidential leadership as evidence on which to renew their faith in the potential presidential persuasion to engender change.
    [Show full text]
  • Mcgeorge Bundy, Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 3/1964 Administrative Information
    McGeorge Bundy, Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 3/1964 Administrative Information Creator: McGeorge Bundy Interviewer: Richard Neustadt Date of Interview: March 1964, May 1964 Length: 192 pages Biographical Note Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1961-1966). In this interview, he discusses John F. Kennedy’s thinking and decision making style; his relationship with other members of his administration, including his close working relationship with Theodore C. Sorensen; the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Cuban Missile Crisis; Laos and the Vietnam War; the threat of military conflict with the Soviet Union over Berlin; and JFK’s relationship with other heads of state, among other issues. Access Open. Usage Restrictions Copyright of these materials have passed to the United States Government upon the death of the interviewee. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
    [Show full text]
  • HKS Magazine
    HARVARD + KENNEDY THE DECISION SCIENTIST A RIVER IN THE DESERT SCHOOL HELP YOURSELF magazine spring 2019 FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ELEVATING CIVIL DISCOURSE GOES TO THE HEART OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP THE SIXTH COURSE WHEN 63 NEWLY ELECTED MEMBERS of the U.S. Congress came to Harvard Kennedy School in December to attend the now- traditional orientation program hosted by the Institute of Politics, HARVARD PRESIDENT LARRY BACOW encouraged them to see the country’s colleges and universities as resources on which to draw. “We are a source of expertise, and I hope you will use us and exploit all of us mercilessly, because every college and university in America exists to serve the nation in one form or another. That is what we do; it’s why we’re here,” he said. But he also reminded them, as they were about to dive into the cauldron of national politics (and a government shutdown), that they had a “special responsibility” to model respectful behavior and proper civil discourse. “We need to demonstrate to the rest of the world that we believe in the fundamental decency of this country by how we treat each other,” Bacow said. — PHOTO BY MARTHA STEWART spring 2019 | spring 2019 | harvardharvard kennedy kennedy school school 1 1 2 HKSmag_su19_IFC2-11_F r1.indd 2 4/2/19 11:12 AM 2 HKSmag_su19_IFC2-11_F r1.indd 1 4/2/19 11:13 AM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN THIS ISSUE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS during the past few years I have spoken about how economic, social, Associate Dean for and political changes have eroded people’s trust in governments and in leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Harold Wilson, Lyndon B Johnson and Anglo-American Relations 'At the Summit', 1964-68 Colman, Jonathan
    www.ssoar.info A 'special relationship'? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B Johnson and Anglo-American relations 'at the summit', 1964-68 Colman, Jonathan Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Monographie / monograph Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks) Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Colman, J. (2004). A 'special relationship'? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B Johnson and Anglo-American relations 'at the summit', 1964-68.. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-271135 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de A ‘special relationship’? prelims.p65 1 08/06/2004, 14:37 To Karin prelims.p65 2 08/06/2004, 14:37 A ‘special relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo- American relations ‘at the summit’, 1964–68 Jonathan Colman Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave prelims.p65 3 08/06/2004, 14:37 Copyright © Jonathan Colman 2004 The right of Jonathan Colman to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance
    [Show full text]
  • The Kennedy Administration and the Bay of Pigs by Thomas W
    The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy Working Paper Series Speechwriting, Speechmaking, and the Press: The Kennedy Administration and the Bay of Pigs By Thomas W. Benson Shorenstein Fellow, Spring 1999 Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Rhetoric Pennsylvania State University #2000-4 Copyright Ó 2000, President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved 2 This paper is about the construction of presidential leadership through public rhetoric; about the authorship of that rhetoric; and about the mediation of that rhetoric through the press. As our master example, we take the case of John F. Kennedy’s speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1961. President John F. Kennedy delivered many important speeches; he is especially remembered for the Inaugural Address and his speeches on foreign policy, international crises, and civil rights. Though others might have made the arguments offered in those speeches, only the president could have said the precise words and only the president could have enacted the performances embodied in those speeches. And yet President Kennedy was not the sole author of his speeches, and many of the speeches became known to his audiences through the contexts, interpretations, and mediation of the press. How that process worked--how those utterances came to be made and understood is the subject of this investigation. My methods in this study are largely historical and critical, but I do hope to suggest something like a grounded theory of one aspect of presidential rhetoric. At the conceptual level, this research report addresses the relations among presidential speechwriting, presidential speechmaking, and press coverage of presidential rhetoric.
    [Show full text]
  • Harold Wilson (Wilson of Rievaulx) Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 3/23/1964 Administrative Information
    Harold Wilson (Wilson of Rievaulx) Oral History Interview –JFK #1, 3/23/1964 Administrative Information Creator: Harold Wilson (Wilson of Rievaulx) Interviewer: Richard E. Neustadt Date of Interview: March 23, 1964 Place of Interview: London, England Length: 72 pp. Biographical Note Wilson, Harold (Wilson of Rievaulx); Member, House of Lords. Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, (1964-1970); (1974-1976). Leader of the Opposition, (1963-1964); (1970-1974). Wilson discusses his meeting with John F. Kennedy [JFK] on April 2, 1963, and how JFK held himself as a politician, as head of state, and as the head of his respective administration. Wilson also discusses the Multilateral Force proposal and the Nassau Agreement, among other issues. Access Restrictions No restrictions. Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed October 24, 1996, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement.
    [Show full text]