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YUG~SLA VI A: STUMBLI NG BLOCK TO STALIN A series of nine articles by the Pulitzer prize winning correspondent Chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor ~IUJm THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR JULY 24 to AUGUST 12, 1950 'his series of articles has been copyright cleared for republicLh_·,,. n all countries except the United States and Canada. All rei!-.-t.hl·. o.ust give credit to the author and the publication. · ~ THE CHRiSTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR nOSTON, :MONDAY, JULY 24, 1950 Where .'itand.s Yugosla vitl today? Against Stalin-and therefore firmly in t lte western camp? Or faithful to com nwni.sm of the Tlto b1·and-and con~equ. ently a bitter joe of democ1·acy? The Communist attack. in Korea showed the We st how quickly the storm can break, and many observ ers-includ ing the Y ugoslavs themseLves- feel that Marshal Tiw's country may be ne:'Ct to hear tl1e thunder of So t.: iet arm.'i. Wi t/~ T iwland tensed for trouble, The Christian Scie11CP Monitor has sent its Pulitzer Prize -winning correspondent, Edmund Stevens, to Yugos!a 1> ia io get the answers. Few newspapermen knou: Russia a.'i intir.tately as Mr. Steven$, and in thi s new series of articles, appearing Mouday. Wednesday, and Frtday for three wePks, h.e u:eighs Yupo- · slavia in the bal-ance. This is the first arti.cle of the teries. 'J'ito Avoid.~ Bish Of lnciti11g Bear By_E dmund Stevens Chi!/ fl/ t(! r Mtr/ ,tur"lf"t'f" Neua BrtrtaiJ ot Tht Chrl &t1an Scunct Mornt or Belgrade As the war in Kofea spreads, this. capital of Communis_l but dispute the validity of the majority decision'. Between the fines anti-Staliriisl Yugoslavia gives a growing impression that I .,.ained the impression that nowhere had the vigorous stand imp() rlant events are impending. oft he United Star.es caused greater satisfaction than in Belgrade. Although foreign diplomats here are more alarmist than the Yugoslavs themselves. including their government, never theless· there is a strong feeling that this country may be on Conslanl Alarm Dulls Effect of Korea Event• borrowed time so far as peace is concerned. For eVeryone knows Thoug h Korean events have magnified the peril :nt invasi(m. that Marshal Tito may be next on P rime Minister Joseph the 'hock to the people has been lessened by the fact t.hat Stalin 's list. Yu goslavia has been living in a state of perpetual alarm ifor · I asked a top figure of the regime why, when Yugoslavia almost two years-ever since the Cominform ceased hoping :for might soon need all-out United Nations assistance, it had voted internal collapse of the Tito regime. The cry of "WOlf!'' has_, be~ against the UN Security Council resolution on armed aid to rome familiar. Actually the Yu goslavs will tell you that the South Korea. His answer was simple: The Yugoslavs sought Soviets already have tried every trick in the book short of open to avoid gi ving the Soviets the slightest pretext for provocation. wa:·: economic sanc'..ions, sabotage, a ~sassi nation, political ter · They were determined to maintam their independent stand of rorism. ;mrl attempts to foment gue-rrilla warfare. no alliant'!e with either East or West as long as this was physi ~ Bo rder incidents are part of the weekly rouHne, from the cally possible. accidental straying of Cominform sheep into Tito pastures to There were also, he added, ideological reasons for the neutral actual planned armed incursions. Although any one of these position on Korea: the persistent hcpe that Communist China could serve as pretext for major trouble, the Yugoslavs do not might presently break away from the Kremlin, hesitancy to fear their immediate Cominform neighbors. They are confident \ !=ii dc actively against any Communist state no matter how i~l that thei r own 30-odd battleworthy divisions, w·en-trained and advised its actions. strong in morale, are more than a match for the combined "But," he concluded, "the resolution passed, didn't it, forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, whose armies have regardless of our vote? And wasn't that t~t? main thing?" been sapped and demoralized by recurrent purges and reor Further questions made it quite clear Yugoslcryia would not ganizations. With such unde---.:ndable satellite forces, the Yu~o- - I - slavs do not believe the K.r~mlin will try to repeat the Korean tainous terrain\where they yo.ay b~ relied· tipon to giver-It good tactic of & war by proxy against them. account of them~lves. Hence despite constant reports of troop movements in HungarY or of tanks rumbling through the streets of So~a .Comlnfonn's Fifth C.olumn Strength Unknown reports that ar( often deliberately played up and ~ramatl~ed An unknown quantit:; in the picture is the pro-Cominform as a sign of alerlness-Belgrade observers do not '!>elleye achon 'fifth column which government spokesmen insist is virtuaUy against Yugoslavia can be imminent ~nless there _1s. ey1dence of nonexistent. Purges of such elements have been made in the Soviet troops concentrating in satellite areas adJOining Yugo party and army, bu.t on a modest scale compared with Soviet &lavia. purge standards. Conceivably, some secret Cominform supporters still may Attitude Toward Kremlin Deeply Jarred hold posts in the army or Ministry of the Interior. However, one Until very recentJy, the Yugoslav leaders, while persuaded of the chief sources of Soviet blunders in Yugoslavia has been of the Kremlin's cynicic;;m and utter ruthlessness-the tone of the inferior quality of the Russians' intelligence work, com Soviet press attacks has had a highly educational effect ort pared to the high caliber of Yugoslav intelligence in neighbor Marshal Tito and his immediates-have found it hard to believe ing Cominform countries. This would hardly indicate the their erstwhi1e allies and teachers ever would make open w~r presence of secret Cominform agents on the inside track. upon them. The Yugoslav attitude also was influenced by the Opposition to the regime in the country at large is mostly traditional friendship of the Russians and south Slavs, and by anti-Communist, and in a showdown with the Cominform, even the abiding conviction that the Russian people bear them no the monarchists would back the government. grudge and do not want war. But Korean developments have Given the present state of the world and the possibility of deeply jarred the pattern of their thinking. swift developments, many observers in Belgrade, including In the event of Sovi~t attack. local strategists believe the top diplomats, feel it is high time that in the common interest initial thrust might come from Bulgaria. But this, they con .. western policy toward Marshal Tito emerged from the phase eili.er, would be only a feint. The main invasion drives would of generalities and took concrete form. develop farther north, from Hungary and Romania, where the One obstacle to fuller understanding has been Yugoslav Danube provides the sole natural barrier between the frontier Jntractability on their differences with Italy and Greece, thereby and such major objectives as Belgrade and Zagreb. One prong delaying a long overdue. rapprochement with these countries, probably would be aimed at Fiume, in an effort to cut off the Commenting on the sudden recall of the newly appointed Yugo .. Yugoslavs from western aid. slav ambassador to Athens before he had presented his creden The character of Yugoslav defense would depend on how tials. one foreign resident in Belgrade remarked that sometimes much outside help could be marshaled to swiftly counter over in their foreign policy the Yugoslavs knocked down with one whelming Russian weight. But given western land inferiority hand what had laboriously been set up with the other. on all sectors of the European front, little optimism exists Whatever the faults of the Tito regime, its survival so far is about the early stages. While fighting delaying actions, the • testimony of stamina and courage. And these are qualities Yu~oslavs would withdraw thP.ir mairo force!' to the moun~ . the West cannot undervalue in the coming days. and you were constantly having to produce .it. This time my request in Belgrade for sUch a pass met with the answer that Police Ease Curbs: it was no longer needed-we were free to go wherever we wished. And never once, in our extensive travels, were we challenged. In Russia, meanwhile, the trend has been in the opposite IJ. S. A1nity Stressed direction. In 1947 we still could travel, subject to regulation. When we left Moscow, less than a year ago, most of the country · Having dealt with Yugoslavia's danperous position on the was out of bounds to foreigners. :'nst-West frontier in his first article, Edmund Stevens now People Eager to Talk~d Friendly i ·eats some further political and economic questions in .'ito land. For upon the successful solution of these problems This time in Yugoslavia totally vanished was the previous ··ests, to a considerable extent, Yugoslavia's juture abilitp attitude of reserve, even outright hostility, toward Americans. to resist Russian pressure. This is the second in- a series of Everywhe:re people crowded around, eager to talk to us, took nine articles. us into their houses, invited us to share their bread. In Moscow last year it was no longer possible to see our Russian friends By Edmund Steven5 of longest acquaintance. Our next-door neighbors were even Chief o/ !111 .lltdU~rrllll(C'I Nu:~ Bv~ellll "J/ Tlu Clirillnnr. StltiiCt Jlollllot afraid to say hello, · Cop~i1ghl, JISO', b)! Tht Chrldillft Settare P•blbhmg SOC'idJ' The friendliness of the Yugoslav people was expressed in many Belgrade ways.