The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense by Dr

The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense by Dr. Lester W. Grau and rebuilding its army throughout succes- government-paid, -led and -equipped MAJ Charles K. Bartles sive retreats. As the army retreated, cavalry and Cossack forces formed into the Russians set fire to their own crops “flying detachments” of up to 500 uni- In the practice and application of his- and villages, leaving scorched earth formed or non-uniformed combatants torical analysis, the Russian General behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet who worked in coordination with the Staff closely examines details of past Russia still refused to surrender and army and attacked the enemy flanks conflicts – noting what they learned soon flames consumed Moscow. Na- and rear.3 Both types of guerrillas were and even unlearned – to keep their poleon had reached his culminating important in the war, but the need for military science and training forward- point, and his supply lines stretched to central control was obvious. looking. Maneuver defense is one of breaking. Russia was fighting a strate- those lessons. gy of “war of attrition,” whereas Na- The Russian army refused to provide poleon was fighting a strategy of “de- Napoleon with the opportunity for a Russia’s strategic struction.” decisive battle that would fit his strat- defense egy of destruction. Napoleon began Russia and the Soviet Union fought A Russian “inverted front” grew in Na- his withdrawal from the ashes of Mos- successful major wars using strategic poleon’s rear area as guerrilla forces cow Oct. 16, hoping to beat the Rus- defense and withdrawal. Russia de- attacked Napoleon’s already inade- sian winter. He did not. Napoleon feated Napoleon by initially conduct- quate supply columns and eroded his abandoned his army as it disintegrated ing a strategic defense and multiple fighting strength. There were two and froze. Some 27,000 soldiers of the withdrawals, followed by decisive types of guerrilla groups. The first original 500,000-strong Grand Armée counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of were volunteers who took up arms survived. Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved su- against the enemy and had no affilia- In October 1813, the coalition of Rus- perior to that of his enemies and his tion with or support from the Russian sia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden de- operations were primarily offensive. government. Theirs was a popular feated Napoleon’s reconstituted army Napoleon was often successful in sur- “people’s war,” even though some of at Leipzig. Just before the Battle of rounding an enemy army or defeating these guerrillas were little better than Leipzig, Wellington’s army defeated it in one decisive battle and then oc- opportunistic highwaymen and free- the French army in Spain and Portugal cupying its capital city and taking booters. There was little coordination 2 and then crossed into France. The Rus- charge of the country. between the Russian ground forces sian army constituted part of the oc- and the “people’s war” guerrillas. Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion cupation force in Paris. by losing battles, yet maintaining and The second type were Their attrition strategy of fighting battles and retreating while reconstitut- ing their force and sapping the enemy strength, coupled with a strong series of counterstrokes, worked. Russia had traded space for time, drawing Napo- leon deep into Russia, overextending his supply lines over Russia’s muddy, often-impassable roads and launching counterstrokes at the opportune time. The Soviet Union did not intend to defeat Nazi Germany in this fashion, but after bungling the initial period of war, they inadvertently emulated Tsar Al- exander I by fighting a retreat all the way to Moscow while building the forces for a series of counterstrokes. This time, Moscow held while the Ger- man effort culminated and their supply lines stretched to breaking. The Figure 1. A 1920 painting depicts Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow. muddy roads and “inverted front” of

47 Spring 2021 uneven distribution of weapons from World War I, the uncompromising goals of the Reds and the Whites, and the expanse of the territory on which the war was fought were far better adapted to this dynamic, mobile form of combat, unlike the continuous trench-line warfare of Western Europe during World War I. During the Russian civil war, several echelons using unprepared lines and engineer obstacles initially conducted maneuver defense. In a short time, however, it sometimes evolved to include positional defenses, coupled with active counterattacking forces that conducted flanking attacks and encirclements. Daring cavalry raids Figure 2. As irregular cavalry, the Cossack horsemen of the Russian steppes into the rear of the enemy often dis- were best suited to reconnaissance, scouting and harassing the enemy’s tracted the enemy during necessary flanks and supply lines. withdrawals to new lines or positions.11 Moscow-controlled guerrillas compli- He commits the minimum possible cated an already difficult German sup- combat power to his fixing force that During the mid-war period, Western ply effort. conducts shaping operations to con- theorists such as J.F.C. Fuller discussed trol the depth and breadth of the en- future war in terms of combined arms After Kursk and Stalingrad, the Axis al- emy’s advance. The fixing force also and new weapons such as the tank, liance was on the defensive and the retains the terrain required to conduct airplane and radio. The Russians had operational counterstrokes of the Red the striking force’s decisive counterat- actual practical experience in this new Army drove the invaders out of the So- tack.”6 theoretical maneuver war that their viet Union and Eastern Europe. The Western counterparts lacked. Granted, Red Army constituted both the initial, This differs from the Russian concept large horse-cavalry formations played and later part of the Allied occupation in that the Russians do not intend to a much larger role than the few exist- force in Berlin, deep within the Soviet permit the enemy to advance to coun- ing tanks present in the Russian civil Occupation Zone.4 terattack. They intend to contest the war, but the scale and scope of the enemy and reduce his forces without Russian maneuver fighting in Russia incorporated the vi- becoming decisively engaged. Russian sion of that future combat. Victory defense maneuver battalions and brigades would belong to the state that could Maneuver defense [манёвренная conduct maneuver defense, whereas concentrate superior forces to over- оборона] is a tactical and operational the United States considers mobile de- 7 whelm an enemy at a particular loca- form of defense whose goal is to inflict fense as a corps-level fight. In future tion and could rapidly maneuver enemy casualties, gain time and pre- conventional maneuver war, continu- against flanks, penetrate positions and serve friendly forces with the poten- ous trench lines, engineer obstacles encircle forces to destroy a thinly tial loss of territory. It is conducted, as and fixed defenses extending across spread enemy.12 a rule, when there are insufficient continents, as occurred in Europe in forces and means available to conduct World Wars I and II, will not occur. Ac- The Red Army’s 1929 field regulations a positional defense.5 cording to Russian military guidance, used the term подвижная оборона the maneuver defense, eventually [mobile defense] in Article 230: “Mo- This differs from the U.S. concept of leading to a positional defense, will be bile defense takes place when the the mobile defense, which “is a type their primary defense and will be con- combatants do not defend to the end, of defensive operation that concen- ducted by the maneuver brigades as rather slip away from the enemy and trates on the destruction or defeat of their base formation.8 move to a reinforce a new defensive the enemy through a decisive attack line when the operational concept is by a striking force. It focuses on de- Maneuver defense occurred in medi- that it must sacrifice a portion of ter- stroying the attacking force by permit- eval Russia but was realized as a new ritory to gain necessary time and pro- ting the enemy to advance into a po- form of combat action near the clos- tect the lives of the force.”13 sition that exposes him to counterat- ing of World War I.9 The first extensive tack and envelopment. The command- use of maneuver defense occurred The follow-on 1936 and 1939 field reg- er holds most of his available combat during the Russian civil war10 and was ulations provided recommendations power in a striking force for his deci- due to a variety of equipment, politi- for the preparation and conduct of sive operation, a major counterattack. cal and geographic factors. The mobile defense. The 1936 field

48 Spring 2021 regulation envisioned two possible from the 1948 field regulations. The moving the fight to terrain that de- mobile defense maneuvers. With the ongoing concept of the unified de- feats or degrades high-precision sys- first, two defensive lines would leap- fense [единой оборона] precluded tems – mountains, jungle, extensive frog through each other; in the sec- such a variant to positional defense. forest, swamps and cities – while con- ond, a strong rear guard would cover After Stalin’s death in 1953, the de- ducting a long-term war of attrition to a single retreating line. The 1939 field bate over the conduct of land warfare sap the enemy’s political will. regulation slightly modified the 1936 on the atomic battlefield began. Sovi- guidance by discussing what condi- et ground-force structure dramatically Difficult terrain will also be a valuable tions may precede initiating a mobile changed as battalions became smaller, ally in future conventional maneuver defense and what steps could be tak- completely motorized or mechanized, war, as will camouflage, electronic and en to strengthen the defense. lost their organic direct-fire artillery aerial masking, effective air-defense and received T-55 tanks with lead lin- systems and secure messaging. Ma- The 1941 field regulation changed the ers to soak up the radiation. Unfortu- neuver defense will clearly be a fea- term to маневренная оборона [ma- nately for the motorized rifle soldiers, ture of future conventional maneuver neuver defense]: “The maneuver de- their personnel carriers and trucks had war. fense includes the conduct of a series no such lining, although initial plan- of defensive battles leading to succes- One thing that may change dramati- ning involved driving over nuclear-ir- sive designated lines, synchronized cally is the fundamental concept of radiated zones in the attack.16 Defense with short surprise counterattacks. the main, linear, positional defense to would be temporary and positional. The maneuver defense forces are in- which maneuver defense leads. Per- haps the main linear defense will be cluded in the coordinated maneuver A lively debate began within the anchored in difficult terrain. Perhaps of the force using fires and the broad ground forces, positing that maneuver the main defense will more closely re- employment of all types of obsta- defense was optimum for the nuclear 14 semble the security-zone maneuver cles.” battlefield. Marshal of the Soviet defense. The main defense may be- Union R. Ia. Malinovskiy, commander The Germans invaded the Soviet Union come an expanded security zone con- of Soviet Ground Forces, ended the June 22, 1941. The Soviet tried to or- taining counterstrike/counterattack debate on maneuver defense, stating: ganize counterstrokes while they were forces and a concentration of high- “This point of view is wrong and is retreating or were being enveloped. precision weapons systems. Open completely unsuitable for these times. They failed. Initial positional defenses flanks may be covered by maneuver- We do not have the right to train our crumbled, nor could the Soviets orga- ing artillery fires, aviation and posi- forces, commanders and staffs where nize a maneuver defense before it was tional forces not under duress. every commander, based on his own overrun. The Wehrmacht reached the judgment, can abandon his [defensive] Mozhaisk defenses outside Moscow by The Russian concept of maneuver by positions, regions and belts to maneu- Oct. 13, 1941. The Mozhaisk defenses fire may dominate the battlefield, as it ver. …There is one unshakeable truth 19 were a hastily constructed series of alone may enable maneuver. with which we must conduct our lives four lines of undermanned defensive – with unswerving stubbornness we The linear battlefield may be replaced positions. will hold our designated lines and po- by the fragmented, or nonlinear General of the Armies Georgy Zhukov sitions, hold them to the death.”17 [очаговый], battlefield, where bri- issued a special directive: “In the gades maneuver like naval flotillas, de- event that it is impossible to check the At the end of the 1980s, the USSR ploying maneuver and fire subunits enemy offensive, transition to a ma- Minister of Defense, Marshal of the over large areas, protected by air-de- neuver defense.”15 A list of necessary Soviet Union Dmitry Yazov, re-estab- fense systems, electronic warfare and planning steps and considerations fol- lished maneuver defense in Soviet mil- particulate smoke. Strongpoints will lowed this directive. The Germans at- itary theory as one of the accepted be established and abandoned, artil- tacked through the end of October forms of defense. Technology and lery fires will maneuver and difficult and ground to a halt. The Soviets con- warfighting techniques were changing. terrain will become the future for- ducted maneuver defense in some Deep fires, distance mining, ambush- tresses and redoubts. sectors, upgraded and reinforced their es, fire sacs, air assaults, flanking and other defenses, and stopped the sec- raid detachments were changing mod- Fragmented battlefield ond German offensive conducted Nov. ern war and facilitating counterat- World War I in the West was a posi- tacks. Maneuver defense fit within the tional fight where artillery, field forti- 15 to Dec. 5; the Red Army slowly be- 18 gan their own counteroffensive Dec. 5. changing dynamics. fications and interlocking machinegun The operational-level maneuver de- fire prevented maneuver. World War I fense had evolved. Divisions and regi- Maneuver defense in in the East, however, was not always ments mainly conducted tactical-level contemporary combat positional but was sometimes fluid. maneuver defense. Since the 1990-1991 Gulf War, ground The antithesis to the stalemate in the forces have realized that unprotected West was the tank. Yet the tank did ‘To the death’ maneuver in the open may lead to not spell the end of linear defense. Despite the Red Army’s success using decimation. Less-modern ground forc- During World War II, the tank enabled maneuver defense, it disappeared es have attempted to negate this by maneuver in some places, but in other

49 Spring 2021 places, difficult terrain and integrated Enduring Freedom, most of Operation in history. It conducted a fragmented defenses prevented maneuver and Iraqi Freedom, the Libyan civil war, the offense and defense against a linear fires prevailed. Sudan conflicts, the Saudi Arabian-Ye- German force.23 men conflict – all have involved frag- For example, the Korean War began Afghanistan, Chechnya and now Syria mented battlefields.21 with a great deal of maneuver but also featured fragmented offense and stalemated into positional mountain How do peer forces fight conventional defense. combat enabled by fires. Vietnam was maneuver war on a fragmented battle- about the maneuver of the helicopter, field? Permanent combined-arms bat- Analysis of Russian but difficult terrain dominated the talions appear to be an important defense battlefield. component. If the Russians fight a near-peer com- petitor, the maneuver defense may The antitank guided missile and preci- For decades, the Soviets and Russians sion-guided munitions currently become the “normal” defense, with have struggled with fielding, training the positional defense as an anomaly. threaten maneuver. Still, advances in supporting and fighting a combined- fires, electronic countermeasures, ro- In a maneuver defense, within the bri- arms battalion with its own tanks, mo- gade the battalion is normally as- botics and air defense may enable ma- torized rifle, artillery, antitank and signed an area of responsibility of neuver. support subunits capable of fighting 10x10 kilometers (frontage and depth As another example of an army using and sustaining independently over a respectively), and a company position difficult terrain, the Serbian army large area. Russian maneuver brigades is up to two kilometers in frontage and proved quite adept at hiding and sur- now constitute one or two battalion up to one kilometer in depth. There is viving in it during the 78-day Kosovo tactical groups and are working to a distance of up to 1½ kilometers in air war. What they lacked was an op- eventually achieve four.22 depth between positions, which en- posing ground force to combat at the sures mutual support of defending The Russians have a long history of termination of the bombing.20 subunits and allows maneuver to the conducting a fragmented defense on subsequent position.25 The fragmented battlefield has be- a fragmented battlefield. The Russian come common following the Gulf War. civil war is replete with such exam- Figure 3 shows a Russian motorized ri- The Soviet-Afghan war, the Angolan ples.23 During World War II, in addition fle brigade in a maneuver defense.27 civil war, the Chad-Libya conflicts, the to its large conventional force, the So- Battalion positions are shown, and Battle of Mogadishu, Operation viets fielded the largest partisan army company fighting positions are

Figure 3. Russian motorized rifle brigade in a maneuver defense. (Diagram by Charles K. Bartles)26

50 Spring 2021 Figure 4. Motorized rifle brigade in a maneuver defense. (Diagram by Charles K. Bartles)29

depicted within the battalion posi- Battalion, which again forces the ene- The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion again tions, showing that the companies will my to deploy while Russian aviation or moves directly back and goes on-line fight from more than one position artillery fire again damages the enemy with the tank battalion to its north. within each battalion position. The bri- advance. Neither battalion becomes The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion gade defends against an attack from decisively engaged but withdraws. The moves through 1st Motorized Rifle Bat- the west with its tank battalion to the tank battalion withdraws under the talion and tank battalion to take up a north and 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion covering fire of 1st Motorized Rifle Bat- reserve position or to deploy as a for- to the south. The 2nd Motorized Rifle talion, moves through 2nd Motorized ward detachment to start the se- Battalion is deployed further to the Rifle Battalion and assumes a central quence again. west in forward positions and is not defensive position to the east. The 3rd Figure 4 shows a Russian motorized ri- initially shown on this diagram. Motorized Rifle Battalion moves di- fle battalion in a maneuver defense rectly back and goes on-line with 2nd The tank and 3rd Motorized Rifle Bat- within its initial battalion box. (In this Motorized Rifle Battalion to its north. talion cover three enemy high-speed case, it is the initial position of 3rd Mo- The enemy continues to advance and avenues of approach. The northern torized Rifle Battalion in the brigade- is engaged by 1st Motorized Rifle Bat- approaches are considered the most defense figure.) The battalion is facing talion and the tank battalion, which dangerous. The enemy initially engag- an enemy attack from the west and again forces the enemy to deploy es 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, which has a reconnaissance patrol forward. while being engaged by Russian artil- forces the enemy to deploy and slows The battalion has a shallow security lery or aviation. The 1st Motorized Ri- his advance while Russian artillery or zone consisting of a motorized rifle fle Battalion and tank battalion do not aviation fire damages the enemy ad- squad in ambush to the north, a mo- vance. The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battal- become decisively engaged but move torized rifle platoon reinforced with a ion does not become decisively en- to a new position north of the tank tank, obstacles and two mixed mine- gaged. Rather, it withdraws to the battalion. fields in the center, and a tank in am- north and through the tank battalion, bush protected by a mixed minefield. The enemy continues to advance and moves past 1st Motorized Rifle Battal- is engaged by Russian artillery or avia- The battalion mortar battery is in the ion and occupies a defensive position tion fires while deploying against 2nd security zone in support of these ele- in the north.28 and 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalions. The ments. As the security-zone elements The enemy then engages the tank bat- 2nd and 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalions withdraw and reposition, the enemy is talion and 3rd Motorized Rifle do not become decisively engaged. met by three motorized rifle

51 Spring 2021 companies (of two platoons each) on- intermediate and alternate lines. The near-real-time. The Russian reconnais- line. The companies are reinforced by rate of advance of the enemy fighting sance-fire complex now links recon- a tank platoon and protected by seven through the defensive positions is naissance assets with a command and mixed minefields. Man-portable air- problematic; however, the Russians fire-direction center with dedicated defense systems are moved up to the calculate that, should the Russian de- artillery, missiles and aviation for de- rear of the company positions. The fensive positions prove stable, stan- struction of priority enemy targets in mortar battery has repositioned be- dard values in average conditions find near-real-time. This system is tied in hind the center company. There are that the enemy may be capable of cov- with the aviation and maneuver head- four firing lines for the antitank re- ering the distance between defensive quarters and will be involved in the serve protecting the flanks and junc- lines in one to 1½ hours. Depending maneuver defense when appropriate. tures of the companies. The third pla- on the location of supporting helipads, Maneuver defense requires close co- toons of the forward companies occu- aviation support must function quick- ordination between fires and maneu- py fighting positions in an intermedi- ly and effectively to mitigate this ad- ver. Maneuver-force tactical training ate line from which they can cover the vance, particularly should the enemy to support it will probably include mu- withdrawal of their companies. Three attempt to flank or encircle the de- tual covering, withdrawal and counter- self-propelled artillery batteries are lo- fenders using ground and air-assault attack drills. Engineers should train in cated each in support of a forward forces.30 rapid obstacle placement and move- company but able to mass fires. The Thus, in a maneuver defense, defend- ment support to support this defense. battalion command post is centrally ing troops displace from line to line Artillery battalions should more often located. both deliberately and when forced. fire in support of individual maneuver The companies do not become deci- The enemy organizes pursuit with the battalions than as a group. Artillery sively engaged but withdraw under interdiction of routes of withdrawal batteries should often be attached to the covering fire of their rear platoon and attacks from the flanks and rear. maneuver companies. These actions require separate fire to take up new positions. The north Widespread camouflage discipline and support in which army aviation units and south companies move directly use of corner reflectors are probable. are assigned to support covering-force back to new positions in an alternate Push-supply-forward should be ex- subunits and rear guards, to engage line, while the combined-arms reserve pected, and evacuation collection flanking detachments and to slow the and anti-landing reserve cover the point establishment should be part of rate of pursuit. In certain sectors, ma- center. The central company moves maintenance and medical training. neuver will be combined with blocking further back on-line with the forward- Battle-damaged systems need to be and employment of flanking and raid- company reserves and the on-order immediately repaired or evacuated in ing detachments.31 positions of the combined-arms re- situations where terrain is being trad- serve and anti-landing reserve in an ed for time and advantage. intermediate line. The battalion com- Conclusion mand post, mortar battery and three In conventional maneuver war under Maneuver defense is appropriate to artillery batteries move behind the fi- nuclear-threatened conditions, ma- combat conducted in Russia or on its nal position shown on Figure 4. neuver defense leading to a positional southern and western boundaries. It defense seems most likely to Russian is again part of Russian military theory The enemy advance encounters a line theorists and planners. The preceding and practice. of six platoons that cause the enemy example is conducted on fairly open to deploy and slow down while being terrain, and the distances and disposi- Dr. Les Grau, a retired U.S. Army infan- hit with artillery or aviation strikes. tions will change with the terrain. try lieutenant colonel, is the Foreign This line does not become decisively Military Studies Office (FMSO)’s re- engaged but withdraws behind the Skilled maneuver defense is designed search director. Previous positions in- two companies now on an alternate to destroy enemy systems at long clude senior analyst and research co- line with on-order positions for the range and then withdrawing without ordinator, FMSO, Fort Leavenworth, combined-arms reserve and anti-land- becoming decisively engaged. Aviation KS; deputy director, Center for Army ing reserve. Again, the enemy attack is and artillery are key to this long-range Tactics, U.S. Army Command and Gen- slowed and punished, and then the destruction but do not work the same eral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; line withdraws to its eastern position target simultaneously. Artillery usually political and economic adviser, Allied with the battalion on this alternate fights the enemy in front of the ground Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The line. After slowing and punishing the formation, while aviation fights any Netherlands; U.S. Embassy, Moscow, advancing enemy, the battalion with- enemy trying to flank or encircle the Soviet Union; battalion executive offi- draws to its next battalion box, hand- defenders. cer, 2‐9th Infantry, Republic of Korea ing the battle off to a supporting bat- A key target for both aviation and ar- and Fort Riley, KS; commander, Head- talion. tillery is mobile enemy air defense. quarters and Headquarters Company, The battalion defends a 10-kilometer- The Soviets and now the Russians 1st Support Brigade, Mannheim, Ger- by-10-kilometer box. Russians consid- have long worked on developing a sys- many; and district senior adviser, Ad- er that normally there will be a two- to tem that could detect, target and de- visory Team 80, Republic of Vietnam. 2½-kilometer distance between stroy high-priority targets in His military schooling includes U.S. Air

52 Spring 2021 Force War College, U.S. Army Russian McClellan Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, that maneuver defense is the major type Institute, Defense Language Institute KS 66027-1350. Or email Dr. Grau at used; the 2013 and 2014 field regulations (Russian), U.S. Army Command and [email protected]. both state that maneuver defense is the General Staff College, Infantry Officer basic form of defense. Advanced Course and Infantry Officer Notes 9 The armies of medieval Russia were pri- Basic Course. He has a bachelor’s of 1 P.A. Zhilin, Отечественная Война 1812 marily cavalry forces maintained by arts degree in political science from года [The Fatherland War of 1812], Mos- boyars (nobility) augmented by peasants, the University of Texas‐El Paso; a mas- cow: Nauka, 1988. who fought on foot. 2 ter’s of arts degree in international re- Ibid. Austria 1805 and Prussia 1806. 10 Editor’s note: The Russian civil war lations from Kent State University; and 3 Lester W. Grau and Michael Gress, The (Nov. 7, 1917, to June 16, 1923) occurred a doctorate in Russian and Central Red Army Do-It-Yourself Nazi-Bashing in the former Russian Empire (the last Asian military history from the Univer- Guerrilla Warfare Manual (The Parti- tsar, Tsar Nicholas II, abdicated March 15, sity of Kansas. His awards and honors san’s Companion), Havertown, PA: Case- 1917) immediately after the two Russian include U.S. Central Command Visiting mate, 2010. Translation and commentary revolutions of 1917. The two largest com- batant groups were the Red Army, fight- Fellow; professor, Academy for the of the 1943 Soviet edition, Спутник Партизана, used to train partisans to ing for the Bolshevik form of socialism Problems of Security, Defense and Law fight the Nazis. led by Vladimir Lenin, and the loosely al- Enforcement, Moscow; academician, 4 lied forces known as the White Army, International Informatization Acade- David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army which included diverse interests favoring my, Moscow; Legion of Merit; Bronze Stopped Hitler, Lawrence, KS: University political monarchism, capitalism and so- Star; Purple Heart; and Combat Infan- Press of Kansas, 1995. This book remains cial democracy. Also, rival militant social- try Badge. He is the author of 13 books the premier short history of the Soviet ists, as well as non-ideological Green on Afghanistan and the Soviet Union Union’s defense and series of operational armies, fought against both the Reds and and more than 250 articles for profes- counterstrokes that defeated Germany in the Whites. Thirteen foreign nations in- sional journals. Dr. Grau’s best‐known World War II. tervened against the Red Army, notably the former Allied military forces from books are The Bear Went Over the 5 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Fed- World War II with the goal of re-estab- Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in eration, Манёвренная оборона, lishing the Eastern Front. Three foreign Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Военный энциклопедический словар в nations of the Central Powers also inter- Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the двух томак [Military Encyclopedic Dic- vened, rivaling the Allied intervention Soviet‐Afghan War. tionary in Two Volumes], Volume II, with the main goal of retaining the terri- Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001. tory they had received in the Treaty of MAJ Chuck Bartles is an analyst and 6 Department of the Army, “Chapter 10: Brest-Litovsk. the Mobile Defense,” Field Manual 3-90, Russian linguist with FMSO, Fort Leav- 11 A. Shelomskiy and D. Maksimov, Tactics, Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- enworth. His specific research areas Маневренная оборона: История и ment Publishing Office, July 2001. include Russian and Central Asian mil- современность [Maneuver Defense: itary force structure, modernization, 7 Ibid. “Units smaller than a corps do not History and Contemporaneity], tactics, officer and enlisted profession- normally conduct a mobile defense be- Армейскнй сборник [Army Digest], May al development, and security-assis- cause of their inability to fight multiple 2020. engagements throughout the width, tance programs. MAJ Bartles is also a 12 Glantz and House. depth and height of the [area of opera- space-operations officer and major in 13 tions] while simultaneously resourcing Ibid. the Army Reserve who has deployed to striking, fixing and reserve forces.” This is 14 Ibid. Afghanistan and Iraq, and who has not to say that Russian army groups 15 Ibid. served as a security‐assistance officer would not conduct maneuver defense, 16 at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan nor that their concepts will differ radical- Lester W. Grau, “Reorganizing for Bat- and Kazakhstan. MAJ Bartles has a ly from those of a U.S. corps. Rather, the talion-level Combat,” Military Review, December 1989, https://apps.dtic.mil/ bachelor’s of arts degree in Russian training and planning for such is at lower sti/pdfs/ADA216368.pdf. from the University of Nebraska‐Lin- level in the Russian force. 17 A. Shelomskiy and D. Maksimov. coln, a master’s of arts degree in Rus- 8 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Fed- 18 sian and Eastern European Studies eration, Боевой Устав Сукопитных Ibid. from the University of Kansas, and is a Вонск, Частъ 2 (Баталъон Рота) [Ground 19 Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, PhD candidate at the University of Troops Field Manual, Part 2 (battalion, The Russian Way of War: Force Struc- Missouri-Kansas City. company)], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2013. ture, Tactics and Modernization of the This is a major change since Stalin’s infa- Russian Ground Forces, FMSO, 2016. FMSO assesses regional military and mous Order 227 issued July 28, 1942: 20 Ibid. “Не шагу назад” [“not one step back- security issues through open-source 21 D. Kalachev, “Оборона-тоже маневр: media and direct engagement with ward”] – which condemned thousands of Soviet soldiers to die needlessly in posi- Мотострелковый батальон и foreign military and security special- tional defense. In 2009, V.I. Popov in his маневренная оборона” [“Defense is ists to advise U.S. Army leadership on book Боевой Устав Сукопитных Вонск, Also Maneuver – the Motorized Rifle Bat- issues of policy and planning critical to Частъ 2 (Баталъон Рота) stated that po- talion and Maneuver Defense”], the Army and the wider military com- sitional defense was the primary defense Армейскнй сборник [Army Digest], Oc- munity. Forward comments about this used, but the 2011 field regulations re- tober 2016. article to FMSO, ATIN-F Dr. Grau, 731 versed this. Since then, it is consistent 22 Lester W. Grau, “Restructuring the

53 Spring 2021 Tactical Russian Army for Unconventional [Army Digest], August 2017. War,” Red Diamond, February 26 Ibid. Acronym Quick-Scan 2014. 27 Ibid. FMSO – Foreign Military Studies 23 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Fed- 28 The figures and their supporting text Office eration, “Очаговая Оборона” [“Frag- were originally published in Lester W. mented Defense”], Military Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Avi- Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], ation in Support of the Maneuver De- Vol. 6, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2002. fense,” Aviation Digest, October-Decem- ber 2018 issue; https://www.rucker.army. 24 Grau and Gress. mil/aviationdigest/assets/archive/AVN_ 25 A. Artemyev, “Подержка с воздука: DIG_2018_10-12.pdf. Армейская авиация в маневренной 29 Artemyev. обороне сухопутных войск” [“Air Sup- 30 port: Army Aviation in Ground-Troops Ibid. Mobile Defense”], Армейский сборник 31 Ibid. LEGENDS OF ARMOR

54 Spring 2021