The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense by Dr. Lester W. Grau and rebuilding its army throughout succes- government-paid, -led and -equipped MAJ Charles K. Bartles sive retreats. As the army retreated, cavalry and Cossack forces formed into the Russians set fire to their own crops “flying detachments” of up to 500 uni- In the practice and application of his- and villages, leaving scorched earth formed or non-uniformed combatants torical analysis, the Russian General behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet who worked in coordination with the Staff closely examines details of past Russia still refused to surrender and army and attacked the enemy flanks conflicts – noting what they learned soon flames consumed Moscow. Na- and rear.3 Both types of guerrillas were and even unlearned – to keep their poleon had reached his culminating important in the war, but the need for military science and training forward- point, and his supply lines stretched to central control was obvious. looking. Maneuver defense is one of breaking. Russia was fighting a strate- those lessons. gy of “war of attrition,” whereas Na- The Russian army refused to provide poleon was fighting a strategy of “de- Napoleon with the opportunity for a Russia’s strategic struction.” decisive battle that would fit his strat- defense egy of destruction. Napoleon began Russia and the Soviet Union fought A Russian “inverted front” grew in Na- his withdrawal from the ashes of Mos- successful major wars using strategic poleon’s rear area as guerrilla forces cow Oct. 16, hoping to beat the Rus- defense and withdrawal. Russia de- attacked Napoleon’s already inade- sian winter. He did not. Napoleon feated Napoleon by initially conduct- quate supply columns and eroded his abandoned his army as it disintegrated ing a strategic defense and multiple fighting strength. There were two and froze. Some 27,000 soldiers of the withdrawals, followed by decisive types of guerrilla groups. The first original 500,000-strong Grand Armée counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of were volunteers who took up arms survived. Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved su- against the enemy and had no affilia- In October 1813, the coalition of Rus- perior to that of his enemies and his tion with or support from the Russian sia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden de- operations were primarily offensive. government. Theirs was a popular feated Napoleon’s reconstituted army Napoleon was often successful in sur- “people’s war,” even though some of at Leipzig. Just before the Battle of rounding an enemy army or defeating these guerrillas were little better than Leipzig, Wellington’s army defeated it in one decisive battle and then oc- opportunistic highwaymen and free- the French army in Spain and Portugal cupying its capital city and taking booters. There was little coordination 2 and then crossed into France. The Rus- charge of the country. between the Russian ground forces sian army constituted part of the oc- and the “people’s war” guerrillas. Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion cupation force in Paris. by losing battles, yet maintaining and The second type were Their attrition strategy of fighting bat- tles and retreating while reconstitut- ing their force and sapping the enemy strength, coupled with a strong series of counterstrokes, worked. Russia had traded space for time, drawing Napo- leon deep into Russia, overextending his supply lines over Russia’s muddy, often-impassable roads and launching counterstrokes at the opportune time. The Soviet Union did not intend to de- feat Nazi Germany in this fashion, but after bungling the initial period of war, they inadvertently emulated Tsar Al- exander I by fighting a retreat all the way to Moscow while building the forces for a series of counterstrokes. This time, Moscow held while the Ger- man effort culminated and their sup- ply lines stretched to breaking. The Figure 1. A 1920 painting depicts Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow. muddy roads and “inverted front” of 47 Spring 2021 uneven distribution of weapons from World War I, the uncompromising goals of the Reds and the Whites, and the expanse of the territory on which the war was fought were far better adapted to this dynamic, mobile form of combat, unlike the continuous trench-line warfare of Western Europe during World War I. During the Russian civil war, several echelons using unprepared lines and engineer obstacles initially conducted maneuver defense. In a short time, however, it sometimes evolved to in- clude positional defenses, coupled with active counterattacking forces that conducted flanking attacks and encirclements. Daring cavalry raids Figure 2. As irregular cavalry, the Cossack horsemen of the Russian steppes into the rear of the enemy often dis- were best suited to reconnaissance, scouting and harassing the enemy’s tracted the enemy during necessary flanks and supply lines. withdrawals to new lines or posi- tions.11 Moscow-controlled guerrillas compli- He commits the minimum possible cated an already difficult German sup- combat power to his fixing force that During the mid-war period, Western ply effort. conducts shaping operations to con- theorists such as J.F.C. Fuller discussed trol the depth and breadth of the en- future war in terms of combined arms After Kursk and Stalingrad, the Axis al- emy’s advance. The fixing force also and new weapons such as the tank, liance was on the defensive and the retains the terrain required to conduct airplane and radio. The Russians had operational counterstrokes of the Red the striking force’s decisive counterat- actual practical experience in this new Army drove the invaders out of the So- tack.”6 theoretical maneuver war that their viet Union and Eastern Europe. The Western counterparts lacked. Granted, Red Army constituted both the initial, This differs from the Russian concept large horse-cavalry formations played and later part of the Allied occupation in that the Russians do not intend to a much larger role than the few exist- force in Berlin, deep within the Soviet permit the enemy to advance to coun- ing tanks present in the Russian civil Occupation Zone.4 terattack. They intend to contest the war, but the scale and scope of the enemy and reduce his forces without Russian maneuver fighting in Russia incorporated the vi- becoming decisively engaged. Russian sion of that future combat. Victory defense maneuver battalions and brigades would belong to the state that could Maneuver defense [манёвренная conduct maneuver defense, whereas concentrate superior forces to over- оборона] is a tactical and operational the United States considers mobile de- 7 whelm an enemy at a particular loca- form of defense whose goal is to inflict fense as a corps-level fight. In future tion and could rapidly maneuver enemy casualties, gain time and pre- conventional maneuver war, continu- against flanks, penetrate positions and serve friendly forces with the poten- ous trench lines, engineer obstacles encircle forces to destroy a thinly tial loss of territory. It is conducted, as and fixed defenses extending across spread enemy.12 a rule, when there are insufficient continents, as occurred in Europe in forces and means available to conduct World Wars I and II, will not occur. Ac- The Red Army’s 1929 field regulations a positional defense.5 cording to Russian military guidance, used the term подвижная оборона the maneuver defense, eventually [mobile defense] in Article 230: “Mo- This differs from the U.S. concept of leading to a positional defense, will be bile defense takes place when the the mobile defense, which “is a type their primary defense and will be con- combatants do not defend to the end, of defensive operation that concen- ducted by the maneuver brigades as rather slip away from the enemy and trates on the destruction or defeat of their base formation.8 move to a reinforce a new defensive the enemy through a decisive attack line when the operational concept is by a striking force. It focuses on de- Maneuver defense occurred in medi- that it must sacrifice a portion of ter- stroying the attacking force by permit- eval Russia but was realized as a new ritory to gain necessary time and pro- ting the enemy to advance into a po- form of combat action near the clos- tect the lives of the force.”13 sition that exposes him to counterat- ing of World War I.9 The first extensive tack and envelopment. The command- use of maneuver defense occurred The follow-on 1936 and 1939 field reg- er holds most of his available combat during the Russian civil war10 and was ulations provided recommendations power in a striking force for his deci- due to a variety of equipment, politi- for the preparation and conduct of sive operation, a major counterattack. cal and geographic factors. The mobile defense. The 1936 field 48 Spring 2021 regulation envisioned two possible from the 1948 field regulations. The moving the fight to terrain that de- mobile defense maneuvers. With the ongoing concept of the unified de- feats or degrades high-precision sys- first, two defensive lines would leap- fense [единой оборона] precluded tems – mountains, jungle, extensive frog through each other; in the sec- such a variant to positional defense. forest, swamps and cities – while con- ond, a strong rear guard would cover After Stalin’s death in 1953, the de- ducting a long-term war of attrition to a single retreating line. The 1939 field bate over the conduct of land warfare sap the enemy’s political will. regulation slightly modified the 1936 on the atomic battlefield began. Sovi- guidance by discussing what condi- et ground-force structure dramatically Difficult terrain will also be a valuable tions may precede initiating a mobile changed as battalions became smaller, ally in future conventional maneuver defense and what steps could be tak- completely motorized or mechanized, war, as will camouflage, electronic and en to strengthen the defense.