DOCSLIB.ORG

January 66 UNITEDSTATESARMY COMMAND and GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
January 66 UNITEDSTATESARMY COMMAND and GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS January 66 UNITEDSTATESARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS COMMANDANT Maj Gen Harrg J. Ledeg, Jr. ASSISTANT COMMANDANT Col Jack A. Boulger Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army SocialSciences . , . Lt Col William M. Hartness,USAR, Ret 3 SovietMilitaryInstitutions . ‘. VyacheslavP. Artemiev 11 last Cavalry Charge . Leo Heiman 15 InternationalDisarmament . , . Curt Gasteyger 23 “Win’’—ItsMeaning . ~ . Cot LeilynM.Young,USA 30 Victoryand Morality . Maj Clinton E. Granger,Jr.,USA 40 Output Measurement . fvfajWilliam E. Odom, USA 43 Men and Equipment . , . Brig C. N. Barclay,British Army, Ret 52 Chineseand Escalation . ., . DavisB. Bobrow 60 Decision of Paddy O’Rorke . Lt Cot Harry J. Maihafer,USA 66 People’sWar . .. “. MarshalLin Piao,Red ChineseArmy 71 / PeopleDiplomacy . Col David M. Ramsey,Jr.,USA, Ret 66 CommunicationsTask . Maj Robert M. Springer,Jr.,USA 92 MilitaryNotes . 101 MilitaryBooks . 106 The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATESARMY, provides a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command. The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORk’ and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College. Edito; in Chief Col Donald J. Delaney Associate Editor Col Algin J. Hughes Army War College Assistant Editor Lt Cot A. Leroy Covay ,. Featurea EdNor Maj Robert L. Burke Layout EWr Capt John A. Maclntyre, Jr. SpatrIsh.Amarican Editor Maj Ren6 Ramos Brazilian Editor Lt Col Luiz de A, Araripa Protluation Officer Maj Norman C. Murray staff Artist Charlas A. Moors MILITARY REVISW-Publishad monthly by the U. S. Arnr Command and General Staff Collaga, Fort Leav­ enwmfh, Kansas, in En Iish, Spanish, and Portuguese. i ae of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Had quarters, rfment of She ArmY, 2S Afay 19SS. Sacond-slees postage~ ~d- at?% Le*en worth, Kansas. Subscription rates $3.50 (US currency] a year in tha Umted States, nited States mihtary peat o~ces, and thoee countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union tinoludirr Spain); $4.50 a year in all other coontwes. Addrees subscri tion mail to the Scok Oeparfrrrant, U. ! Army Command and Genarel Staff College, Fort LeavenworthK. Kansas 6S027. IN APPRECIATION With this issue the Military Review completes 44 years of publication as the Army’s senior professional journal. The year was one of achievement and change. Circulation increased, our “articles were more widely re­ printed than ever before, new ideas were advanced, and old solutions were debated. Once again, you, our readers and authors, have given us your wholehearted support and cooperation. Your vol­ untary contributions for publication reached a new high in both number and professional character, and your nu­ merous expressions of confidence in our objectives and editorial standards have been a source of inspiration and satisfaction. We would like to say our public farewells to Briga­ dier General E. C. Townsend, Assistant Commandant from April 1963 to December 1965, who has been reas­ signed as Commanding General, US Army Intelligence Command, with headquarters at Fort Holabird, Mary­ land, and to six valuable members of our editorial staff who departed during the past yearyLleutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, Assistant Editor; Lieutenant Colonel J050 H. Fac6, Editor of the Brazilian Edition; Major Rob­ ert L. Burke, Features Editor; Major James N. Hale, Ex­ ecutive. Officer; Captain John A. MacIntyre and First Lieutenant Robert K. Lindgren, Layout Editors. We wish them euccess in their new assignments. With your continued support, we will endeavor to bring you in the coming year the best in military thought and evolving military doctrine. Commandant, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Editoriul Staff, the MImrAR~ REVIEW “ Social and Behavioral Sciences in Counterinsurgency Lieutenant CMonel WilIiam M. Hartnea.% United States Armu Reserve, Retired N MARCH 1962 the Chief of Re- States, two salient points were agreed Isearch and Development, Depart­ upon. First, insurgency and counter­ ment of the Army,. sponsored a sym­ insurgency, although two opposing ac­ posium on “The US Army’s Limited tivities, have as their common ohjac­ War Mission and Social Science Re­ tive the winning of paople’s minds and search.” As a result of this sympo­ support. In attaining thh objecthe, sium, attended by some of the fore­ the social sciences have a major role most social scientists in the United to play. Second, the development of January1366 3 .. SOCIAL SCIEN&S the social sciences lags considerably able data eits unread on the ehelves behind that of the pbyeical sciences. of reference libraries, Or, if read, it is in many instances relegated to Information A~ifable background information in tlie mind Since this symposium, social and be­ of the reader, To be truly effective, havioral science research in peychol- the information must be extracted Ogy, sociology, anthropology, political from the many written works avail­ science, h]etory, economics, and inter­ able and adapted and applied in come national relations has heen delving definitive manner to counterinsur­ deeply into the rationale re@ired for gency. relating general smial science to coun­ In the type of environment in which terinsurgency requirements. We now insurgency” flourishes, technicsl devel­ have readily available more informa­ opment ie highly dependent upon the tion about the behavioral patterna and eocial and behavioral sciencee for suc­ focal concerns of people in remote cess. It ia no longer efficient to pos­ areas of the world than ever before. seee only the technical know-how for We have gone a long way in deter­ improving the health, standard of liv­ mining and defining how the over-all ing, and internal security of an emerg­ culture of a &a&lcular group or 80­ ing nation. Technical projects have ciety can be translated into predict­ failed, not because of lack of ekill and able forms of onduct. + equipment, but because of sociological In ehort, we have made a concerted factors. Yet the information which, effort to study those newly emerging if applied, could have meant success nations most susceptible to insurgency, ineteed of failure was readily avail­ accumulating a vast reservoir of data able. on population sise and distribution, basic racial stock and cbaracteriatiee, Applicationof Oata ethnic and minority groups, social We must now develop waye and structur% and culture. These and many means by whkh social and behavioral other sociological fields have been re­ data can be practically applied in the searched in order to find out how these counterinsurgency arena. If the prin­ factors interrelate and cause various cipal objective of counterinsurgency groups to thi~ and act se they do. is, indeed, to gain control over the Unfortunately, much of this velu- minde and emotions of a people and win their suppprt, then the role of the Lieutcmwct Colonel William M. eocial and behavioral sciences is in­ Hartncse, United Statee Amnu Re­ valuable. serve, Retired, is a C%ufitert%eurgenov 05iciaUy defined, insurgency is: Consultant wtth the US Arnw Combat Dsvelopmente Command Special War­ . a condition reewlting’ from a fare Agsncy at Fort Bragg, North revolt or ineckrrection againet G con­ Carolina. Prior to his retirement, he stituted government which fcdb ehort WU8 Chief. Coanterkwwgenoy Com­ of civit war. In the ocwwnt contezt, mittee, US Acvnv InteUigence School 8WbVW8iVt? irwurgcnql ia prhnurily at Fort Holabird, Marplawd. He ie the Communist impired, ez@ported, or ex­ recipiat of the Central InteUigcnoe ploited. Agenqfe 196$ annual awac’d for out­ standing wntributione to intelligmcee ActuaUy, the term ‘(insurgency” is through lit’iwature for his reaenrch in probably one of the most misunder­ wwnteritwurgenelt inteUigwwe. stood words in common use today. It 4. Military Review is generally reaJized that the scope throughout the entire insurgency of insurgency embracee more than procees, juet as guerrilla warfare, guerrilla warfare, that somewhere in once introduced, continues on and the picture economic, poJitieal, and supports the tlnal conventional-type , other sociological feetore are involved. warfare phaee. But the exact role of theee factors Subversion lays the groundwork for —how they are applied in the i~sur­ insurgency, and, without thk+ subver­ gency process-is understood by few. sion, which is designed to cond]tion The broad conceDt of insurxencv the minds of a ueenle asrainet their ,. A?WWNew.Fe.ztuves “Sick Call” conducted by the US-spens&d Medical Civil Actien Program and the Vietnamese Government has treated ever 100,000patients in rural Vietnam might be better understood if we re­ government, guerrilla warfare cannot fer to it as a three-phase process of be successful. The hard-core guerrilla insurrection beginning with subver­ force in an insu~gency movement nor­ sion which progresses into guerrilla mally doee not exceed one percent of warfare and which, if not stemmed, the total population in a country, and may lead into a war of movement cannot long exist without the. support employing conventionally organized of a sizable eegtnent of the population. forces. These three phaees of insur­ During pbaee I, Communist doctrine gency are not rigidly delineated or prescribes tbbomplisbment of five fitted into specific periods of time. progressive activities: They overlap. Subversion continues � Eetabliehingan inteUigencebase Jmuzry 1965 5 1’ SOCIALsCiENm
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Analysis of Russia's
    AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S ‘ALTERNATIVE’ SOFT POWER STRATEGY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSE VIA SPORTS MEGA-EVENTS By NINA KRAMAREVA A Thesis Submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Sport, Exercise and Rehabilitation Sciences University of Birmingham March 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract This thesis seeks to show through both historical and contemporary examples what makes Russia an ‘outlier’ among key sports mega-events hosts. More specifically, this thesis sets out to establish how external and internal objectives Russia pursued in the context of the 1980 Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Olympics differed from those of other sports mega-event hosts, including non-liberal states. The originality of this thesis lies not only in the fact that it sheds light on Russia’s strategy of sports mega-event hosting, but that it does so from the vantage point of the combination of the three most popular approaches in the extant sports mega-event research: public diplomacy, place branding and soft power. Moreover, this study places Russia’s hosting of sports mega-events within constructivist international relations theory, which prioritises identity and interests.
    [Show full text]
  • Chertok Front Matter
    Chertok ch26 12/21/04 11:36 AM Page 345 Chapter 26 The Institute Nordhausen In early 1946, with Ustinov’s support, General Gaydukov managed to reach an agreement in the Party Central Committee in Moscow and in the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin for a significant expansion of operations in Germany.This had not been easy to do. A considerable portion of the Party and state apparatus involved with policy in Germany had demanded that the work in occupied Germany to restore German technology be curtailed and all Soviet specialists be called back to the Soviet Union no later than January or February 1946. Gaydukov and Ustinov, as well as Artillery Marshall Yakovlev, who supported them, did not agree—they insisted on expanding operations. At the same time, the Institute RABE was becoming the foundation for a significantly more powerful organization. I should mention that the aircraft industry,using the Institute RABE as a model, had gathered German aircraft specialists in the Soviet occupation zone for work in Dessau, using the facilities of the Junkers factories. Only the atomic experts immediately brought Professor Manfred von Ardenne and a small group of specialists to the Soviet Union. (The British had captured the primary developers of the German atomic bomb, headed by Nobel laureate Wer ner Heisenberg.) The Institute RABE had a clearly pronounced emphasis in the field of elec- trical control systems because the institute management (Pilyugin and I from the Russian side and Rosenplänter and later Dr. Hermann and Gröttrup on the German side) consisted of specialists in electrical equipment and control.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense by Dr
    The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense by Dr. Lester W. Grau and rebuilding its army throughout succes- government-paid, -led and -equipped MAJ Charles K. Bartles sive retreats. As the army retreated, cavalry and Cossack forces formed into the Russians set fire to their own crops “flying detachments” of up to 500 uni- In the practice and application of his- and villages, leaving scorched earth formed or non-uniformed combatants torical analysis, the Russian General behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet who worked in coordination with the Staff closely examines details of past Russia still refused to surrender and army and attacked the enemy flanks conflicts – noting what they learned soon flames consumed Moscow. Na- and rear.3 Both types of guerrillas were and even unlearned – to keep their poleon had reached his culminating important in the war, but the need for military science and training forward- point, and his supply lines stretched to central control was obvious. looking. Maneuver defense is one of breaking. Russia was fighting a strate- those lessons. gy of “war of attrition,” whereas Na- The Russian army refused to provide poleon was fighting a strategy of “de- Napoleon with the opportunity for a Russia’s strategic struction.” decisive battle that would fit his strat- defense egy of destruction. Napoleon began Russia and the Soviet Union fought A Russian “inverted front” grew in Na- his withdrawal from the ashes of Mos- successful major wars using strategic poleon’s rear area as guerrilla forces cow Oct. 16, hoping to beat the Rus- defense and withdrawal. Russia de- attacked Napoleon’s already inade- sian winter.
    [Show full text]
  • Boris Chertok
    chertok cover full 12/21/04 1:51 PM Page 1 Rockets and People Rockets and People Volume I and Much has been written in the West on the history Rockets of the Soviet space program but few Westerners have read direct first-hand accounts of the men and women who were behind the many Russian People accomplishments in exploring space.The memoirs of Academician Boris Chertok, translated from the original Russian, fills that gap. Chertok began his career as an electrician in 1930 at an aviation factory near Moscow.Twenty-seven years later, he became deputy to the founding figure of the Soviet space program, the mysterious “Chief Designer” Sergey Korolev. Chertok’s sixty-year-long career and the many successes and failures of the Soviet space program constitute the core of his memoirs, Rockets and People. In these writings, spread over four volumes,Academician Chertok not only describes and remembers, but also elicits and extracts profound insights from an epic story about a society’s quest to explore the cosmos. Volume I In Volume 1, Chertok describes his early years as an engineer and ends with the mission to Germany after the end of World War II when the Soviets BiEChtk captured Nazi missile technology and expertise. Volume 2 takes up the story with the development of the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and ends with the launch of Sputnik and the early Moon probes. In Volume 3, Chertok recol- lects the great successes of the Soviet space program in the 1960s including the launch of the world’s first space voyager Yuriy Gagarin as well as many events connected with the Cold War.
    [Show full text]
  • 100 Russian Engineers Who Changed Our Life 100 RUSSIAN ENGINEERS WHO CHANGED OUR LIFE
    100 Russian Engineers Who Changed Our Life 100 RUSSIAN ENGINEERS WHO CHANGED OUR LIFE Moscow 2014 Dear Reader, The book you are holding in your hands is today more relevant than ever. It is unlikely that anyone would doubt Russia’s need in highly skilled engineers. The country requires a breakthrough in science and technology. This means that the time has come to bet on innovative development, drawing on the rich history of Russian engineering. For a number of centuries Russia enjoyed undisputed leadership in science and engineering breakthroughs. Its scientists and inventors were pioneers in many branches of science and technology. The discoveries they made changed our world, creating a new reality, earning admiration for our country and respect as a superpower. The main goal of this book is to remind people of the outstanding contributions our engineers have made towards the progress of science and technology, to teach the younger generations about Russian history and to tell them how interesting engineering can be. The generation of the 21 st century should know about our compatriots, whose inventions and discoveries made such great contributions to human knowledge, and they should strive to meet or surpass those achievements. Despite the unquestionable difficulties of modern Russian industry, the professions of engineers, designers, and science workers are still prestigious and in demand. Developing unique technologies, constantly refining them and looking for new solutions expands the limits of the possible, making the future a reality today; those are the traditional principles our brilliant engineers were guided by. These same principles should also be the basis of how work is organised in any modern company.
    [Show full text]