Mapping Mass Mobilization

Home , Alfredo Bravo, Alla Horska, AutoMaidan, Jerzy Onuch, Korrespondent, Mass mobilization

Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine

Olga Onuch Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Mass Mobilization Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Mass Mobilization Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine

Olga Onuch Senior Lecturer, University of Manchester, UK Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch © Olga Onuch 2014 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–40976–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Onuch, Olga, 1982– Mapping mass mobilization : understanding revolutionary moments in Argentina and Ukraine / Olga Onuch. pages cm Summary: “Moments of mass mobilization astound us. As a sea of protesters fills the streets, observers scramble to understand this extraordinary political act by ‘ordinary’ citizens. This study presents a paired comparison of two ‘moments’ of mass mobilization, in Ukraine and Argentina. The two cases are compared and analyzed on a cross-temporal and an inter-regional basis, thereby offering two critical cases in response to assumptions that the processes and patterns of mobilization, and democratization politics more broadly, are region specific. This study challenges political science’s focus on elites and structural factors in the study of political participation during democratization” — Provided by publisher. ISBN 978–1–137–40976–8 (hardback) 1. Social movements—Argentina—History. 2. Social movements—Ukraine— History. 3. Protest movements—Argentina—History. 4. Protest movements— Ukraine—History. 5. Political participation—Argentina. 6. Political participation—Ukraine. 7. Democratization—Argentina. 8. Democratization— Ukraine. 9. Argentina—Politics and government—1983– 10. Ukraine— Politics and government—1991– I. Title. HN263.5.O68 2014 303.48 409477—dc23 2014025005 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch To Mirka and Jerzy Onuch From ‘bileciki-bileciki’ to DPhil and beyond, no one has given better advice or fostered my intellectual curiosity and creativity more than you. For your unconditional support and faith, I will be eternally grateful. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Contents

List of Figures, Tables, and Maps ix Acknowledgements xi About the Author xiii List of Abbreviations xiv Maps xvi

Part I 1 Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization 3 2 Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 27

Part II 3 Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920–2004 55 4 Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920–2001 82

Part III 5 Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process 109 6 Context Is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process 129

Part IV 7 The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game 157

8 The Duty to Protest: Participation of ‘Ordinary’ People in Mass - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Mobilization 183 9 Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements 212

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch viii Contents

Epilogue: It Happened Again – The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine 237

Appendices 246 Notes 305 References 311 Index 328 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Figures, Tables, and Maps

Figures

1.1 Most typical analyses of 19/20 mass mobilization 7 1.2 Most typical analyses of the Orange Revolution 12 1.3 Interviewee distribution 17 2.1 Key actors in the mass mobilization process 37 2.2 Activists/SMOs as key actors in the mass mobilization process 39 2.3 Politico-economic elite as a key actor in mass mobilization 41 2.4 ‘Ordinary’ citizens as key actors in mass mobilization 43 2.5 Interlocutors and facilitators in mass mobilization 45 2.6 Actor overlap and interaction during mass mobilization 47 3.1 The historical trajectory of mobilization in Ukraine and Argentina 56 3.2 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1955 60 3.3 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1979 69 3.4 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1991 73 3.5 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–2004 81 4.1 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1955 87 4.2 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1980 93 4.3 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1990 98 4.4 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–2001 103 6.1 Simple versus complex causality in process tracing 131 6.2 Politico-economic satisfaction Argentina (1996–2008) 133 6.3 Rise in unemployment, 1990–2003 133 6.4 Satisfaction with the economy in Ukraine 134 6.5 Satisfaction with politics in Ukraine 134 6.6 Support for the Government of Ukraine, 2000–2009 135 6.7 Economic satisfaction in comparative perspective 136 6.8 Poverty in Argentina, 2001–2009 137 6.9 Informality in Argentina, 1998–2003 137 8.1 Approval ratings for Presidents de la Rúa and Kuchma 187 8.2 Perceived causes of protest 197 8.3 Description of protests, Ukraine 199 8.4 Description of protests, Argentina 200 8.5 Participation in protests 203 8.6 Media sources for protest information 207 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch x List of Figures, Tables, and Maps

Tables

1.1 On-street surveys 19 1.2 Triangulation with secondary data and social surveys 20 1.3 Analyses employed 21 3.1 Moments and movements most often referenced in interviews and focus groups with activists in Ukraine 58 3.2 Prosvita membership and activity 61 3.3 Key protest events in Ukraine between 1965 and 1979 66 3.4 Key Samvydav publications in Ukraine, 1950–1979 67 3.5 Labour strikes in Ukraine, 1960–1980 68 4.1 Moments and movements most often referenced in interviews and focus groups in Argentina 83 4.2 List of organizations of the CTA 100 9.1 Scenarios of large protest to mass mobilization based on actor action 222

Maps

I Map of Ukraine xvi II Map of Argentina xvii Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to thank those who made the research, writing and editing of this book possible. This has been a long and enjoyable ride, where each interview disaster, computer crash and methodological conundrum, and the scars they produced, have hopefully made me a better researcher. Thanks to all who have been there throughout this process. I have had the pleasure of working with wonderful mentors over the last seven years. I owe my deepest gratitude to Gwendolyn Sasse, whose encouragement and support have been incalculable. She has on numerous occasions gone beyond the call of duty, from the initial planning stage until the final moments of frantic Skype conferences. She is a true mentor, and I am thrilled to be able to call her not only a colleague but also a friend. I am also very thankful for the comments and the ongoing support of my former advisor, Laurence Whitehead. Laurence, with his incredible patience, who had to listen to my first attempt at explaining my case selection (then including Brazil and Poland as well as Ukraine and Argentina), and politely said, ‘Ola, that will simply not work, make it simpler’. This was my first lesson in the practicalities of research design and conducting field research, and it proved to be incredibly helpful. My second, third and fourth lessons in research design and methodology came from Nancy Bermeo. While I have much still to learn from her, I can say that my discussions of comparative method and analysis with Nancy have had a deep impact on me and I have passed on many of her insights to my own students. I would also like to mention Mark Beissinger, whose suggestions and advice helped me turn my research into a book accessible to a larger academic audience. Mark’s work has impacted my own in countless ways. Not only have I been heavily influenced by his work on nationalist mobilizations and the Orange Revolution, his application of process tracing method has greatly impacted the analysis presented in this book. I would like to thank Jeffrey Kopstein, Marta Dyczok and Peter Solomon who have made insightful comments on my work and supported my research activities, whilst at the University of Toronto. I would like to especially thank Lucan Way, whose intense and charismatic focus forced me to narrow my analysis. Since my return to the University of Oxford, UK, I have worked with Leigh Payne, Paul Chaisty and Tim Power. Their support and advice on publishers has been key in me finishing my book. Next, I would like to sincerely thank the individuals who have read, edited - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and given comments on chapters, articles and other drafts of the book including Michael Biggs, David Pettinicchio, Juta Kalwerowicz, Sara Motta- Mera, Enrique Peruzzotti, Lucan Way, Marta Dyczok, Orest Zakydalsky,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch xii Acknowledgements

Ashley Millar, Malan Rietveld, Mykola Ryabchuk, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Graeme Robertson, Petra Schleiter, Daniel Fedorowycz, Tamara Martsyniuk, Irene Menendez, Jeffrey Lenowitz, Nadiya Kravets, Henry Hale, Joshua Tucker and Francisco Panizza. Their comments and suggestions have greatly improved the quality of my work. My greatest thanks also go to the graduate community at the London School of Economics and the post-doctoral community at Nuffield College, UK; you have all challenged me and forced me to develop and defend my research. Special thanks to Jose Javier Olivas Osuna, Johannes Wolff and Fredrik Sjoberg, who along with me proudly hold the title of academic ‘snipers.’ I shall forever be reminded of the many deliberations and discussions of everything from theory and empirics to “who cares.” I will always remember these riveting debates and your critical analysis of my early research. It would have been next to impossible to complete the intensive field research without the aid and advice of the following individuals in Argentina and Ukraine: Carlos A. Magarinos, Paula García Comas, Hernán Alberro and CADAL, Esteban Magnani, Diego Rozengardt and La Base, Jacqueline Behrend, Alejandra Otamendi, Diego Fleitas, Xenia Baluk, MTD la Matanza, Comedore los Pibos de la Boca, Asamblea Colgan, La Colectiva Radio, Yaroslav Zen, Ostap Kryvdyk, Yaryna Yasynevych, Anastasiya Bezverkha, Olya Salo, Adryi Kohut, Tamara Martsenyunk, Yuliya Baganova and CCA staff, Olya Klymenko, Olena Zoc. I would also like to thank the 12 canvassers who helped me complete on-street surveys in Buenos Aires and Kyiv. I would like to show my gratitude to the following organizations for their previous and ongoing financial support of my research: the Depart- ment of Politics and International Relations, Nuffield College, UK; the Latin American Centre at the School of Area and Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Oxford, UK; Osyp and Josaphat Neporany Educational Fund; the Oxford Santander Abbey Scholarship for Research in Latin America; the Norman Chester and Andrew Mellon, and Cyril Foster funds at the DPIR; the University of London Central Research Fund; Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Prize at the University of Toronto, Canada; the Newton Fellowship of the Royal Society and British Academy. I would like to thank the editors at Palgrave Macmillan and my copy editor Jane Roberts for their helpful suggestions and support throughout the process. Finally, I thank all the brave ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians and Argentines and activists, who are the motivation for this work. Though I only met a small Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright group of those remarkable protest participants, your extraordinary political acts have influenced and inspired me not only in the writing of this book but also in my future study. I remain in awe of your bravery and your devotion to defending not only your own rights but also the rights of others!

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch About the Author

Olga Onuch is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester and an Associate Member of Nuffield College, University of Oxford, UK. She has recently held the post of Newton Fellow (in Comparative Politics) at Nuffield College and School of Interdisciplinary and Area Studies, University of Oxford. Olga holds a DPhil in Politics from the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. She specializes in comparative study of protest politics, political behaviour and institutions in democratizing states in Latin American and Eastern Europe. She is an expert on protests and activism in Ukraine and is the principal investigator of the Ukrainian Protest Project, which has received funding from the John Fell Fund and The British Academy/Royal Society. In 2013–2014, she was a Fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, USA, where she completed writing her second book The Making of a Civil Society: Democra- tization Through Social Mobilization in Ukraine (1975–2014). Previously, Olga held the post of Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto, Canada. In 2008–2009, and again in 2013, Olga was a Visiting Fellow at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Olga also holds an MSc (2006) in Compara- tive Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. Olga received her first degree, BA Honours (2005) in Political Studies and International Development Studies, from Queen’s University, Canada. Her research has been highlighted on Al Jazeera English, BBC World, International Business Times, National Public Radio, Radio Free Europe and the Washington Post. Follow her on Twitter @oonuch and at www.olgaonuch.com Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Abbreviations

Alianza La Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación – Coalition party: (UCR), (FrePaSo) and some smaller parties (The Alliance for Work, Justice and Education) CCC Corriente Clasista y Combativa – piquetero SMO umbrella org (Classist and Combative Current) CGT Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina – Union 1930 (The General Confederation of Labor of the Argentine Republic) COA Confederation Obrera de Argentina – Union founded in 1926 (Workers Confederation of Argentina) CP Communist Party CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CTA Central de Trabajadores Argentinos – independent union 1991 (The Argentine Workers’ Central Union) CVK Centralna Vyborcha Komicija (Central Election Commission of Ukraine) EE Eastern Europe FORA Federación Obrera Regional Argentina – union founded in 1901 (The Argentine Regional Workers’ Federation) FreNApo Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza (National Front against Poverty Political Party) Frepaso El Frente País Solidario (The Front for a Country in Solidarity Political Party) FTV Federación de Tierra y Vivienda – piquetero SMO umbrella org (The Federation of Land, Housing and Habitat) GBA Gran Buenos Aires (Greater Buenos Aires) GDR German Democratic Republic IFI International Financial Institution IGO Intergovernmental Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IRI International Republican Institute - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright JP Joventude Peronista (Peronist Youth, militant youth party wing) LA Latin America

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch List of Abbreviations xv

MST Argentina Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Socialist Movement) MST Brazil Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers’ Movement) MTA Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos – semi-independent union 1992 also known as radical CGT MTD Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados – piqueteros MTL Movimiento Territorial Liberación – piquetero SMO umbrella org (Territorial Liberation Movement) NDI National Democratic Institute NED National Endowment for Democracy NGO Non-Governmental Organization OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists OUN-B Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Bandera wing OUN-M Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Melnyk wing PJ Partido Justicialista (The Justicialist Party, ofﬁcial name; Peronist Party, unofﬁcial name) SAP Structural Adjustment Program SMO Social Movement Organization UBK Ukraiyna Bez Kuchmy (Ukraine without Kuchma) UCR Unión Cívica Radical – Political Party (La Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) Radical Civic Union) UHHRU All-Ukrainian Association of Public Oranizations Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union UNDP United Nations Development Programme UPA Ukraiyns’ka Povstans’ka Armia (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) USA Unión Sindical Argentina (Argentine Trade Union) – founded in 1922 UVO Ukraiyns’ka Viys’kova Orhanyzatsiya (Ukrainian Military Organization) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Maps

20 BELARUS 30 40 Prypyat Chernihiv POLAND Luts’k Chornobyl’ Sumy 50 C KYIV 50 A R Zhytomyr P A L’viv Kharkiv T H Poltava I A SLOVAKIA N Cherkasy RUSSIA

Uzhhorod Luhans’k D Dn Hora ni Kirovohrad iep Dnipropetrovs’k Chernivtsi es er Hoverla M ter Donets’k O Kryvyy Rih HUNGARY U Zaporizhya N T MOL. A Mariupol’ I Mykolayiv N Berdyans’k S Odesa Kherson Sea of ROMANIA Azov 20 45 Izmayil Crimean Kerch 45 Reni Peninsula SERBIA Simferopol’ Feodosiya 0 100 200 km Sevastopol’ 30 Black Sea 40 0 100 200 ml Yalta

Map I Map of Ukraine (CIA World Factbook) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch xvii

BOLIVIA South BRAZIL Pacific Ocean PARAGUAY

San Miguel de Tucumán Resistencia

á n a r a P

o San i Santa R Juan Córdoba s Fe Mendozaa Rosario p URUGUAY m Rio Cuarto aBUENOS AIRES P La Plata Rio de Bahia la Plata CHILE Blanca Mar del Plata

San Carlos Viedma de Bariloche South a Atlantic i

n Ocean

g Comodoro Rivadavia

P Falkland Islands Puerto (Islas Malvinas) Santa Cruz Administered by U.K., claimed by ARGENTINA. Ushuaia

Cape Horn 0 200 400 km 0 200 400 ml

Map II Map of Argentina (CIA World Factbook) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Part I Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 1 Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization

I could barely believe my eyes, there were hundreds of thousands, millions. (Yuriy Polyukhovych, Activist; yellow Pora, Kyiv Coordinator)

Introduction

Moments of mass mobilization, like those in Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004), tend to catch governments and analysts by surprise. These are moments when millions of previously disengaged ‘ordinary’ citizens1 join activistsinprotestsen masse, making regime change likely and systemic (social, economic or political) transformation possible. First the media, then social scientists, scramble to understand and explain the presence of ‘ordinary’ citizens, who left their private homes and entered the political arena. In recent years, we have witnessed several moments of mass mobilization and yet we still struggle to understand them. Be it in Argentina in 2001, Greece in 2007, Egypt in 2011, Turkey in 2013 or Ukraine in 2004 (or more recently in 2013), we watch as the sea of ‘ordinary’ citizens and activists floods the streets, filling up every nook and cranny of large cities and seemingly pushing aside all conventional and status quo politics in one swift swoop. We are astounded by their political courage and determination, and thus we marvel at the profound moment as it unfolds. Such exceptional moments astound us, not least because accepted theories in political science, such as those by Lichbach (2004), Muller and Opp (1986), Opp (2009), Popkin (1979), would have us believe in ‘collective action problems’ and ‘free rider’ incentives. Puzzled, we ask ourselves: How can we explain this mass mobilization? This question is difficult to answer because mass mobilization seems Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to come out of nowhere, and it fades away seemingly just as fast. Mass mobilization is also difficult to map because it is likely preceded by and followed by mostly activist protests. Thus, allow me to take a quick detour to better define mass mobilization. Such mass protests tend to be not

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 4 Mapping Mass Mobilization only proportionally larger than other protest events (where a substantial proportion of the population are taking part in the protests, usually 100,000–250,000 people) but also tend to share three distinct characteris- tics. First, the balance of participation shifts away from activists, opposition members/organizations and students to a new protest majority made of ‘ordinary’ citizens. To borrow language from electoral behaviour literature, one could say that these are protests when ‘ordinary’ citizens become the ‘median protester’. Second, in cases of mass mobilization, ‘ordinary’ citizens tend also to form cross-class and cross-cleavage coalition. People with different political preferences are united momentarily in protest. Third, these protests are more extemporaneous; that is, they are in part undirected and lack a clear leadership (at least at ﬁrst). Put otherwise, activists and opposition politicians lose control over the protests (even if only for a short period) when ‘ordinary’ citizens join in en masse. Due to our inability to grasp these rare instances of political deﬁance, the word ‘revolution’ is often used to describe the protest events. While in some cases mass mobilization has helped in bringing down a regime, the protests themselves are not ‘revolutions’ per se. The term creates expectations of systemic change that may not be possible or even sought by the protesters. Perhaps these extraordinary protests are simply, as Charles Tilly wrote, only ‘revolutionary’ situations or moments,2 when the mass mobilization in the streets creates the potential for systemic and/or regime change, but does not make ‘revolution’ a certainty. Thus, these are brief periods in time, when ‘ordinary’ citizens and activists have the opportunity to become the main players in politics, a game otherwise reserved for elite and formal institutional actors. Through such extra-institutional political participation, ‘ordinary’ citizens and activists can potentially push their countries to democratize (or to further democratize). But at the same time, these are moments when the regime can decide to retrench, to use even more repression, and even backslide away from any democratic achievements of the past. This engagement is especially interesting in democratizing contexts, such as in the cases of Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004), when citizens are still learning the ‘rules of the democratic game’ and when the risks of joining in are potentially higher than in established democracies. Analyses by journalists and political scientists have tended to focus on several things: Sudden material deprivation which is understood to cause an angry and emotional response; the apolitical spontaneity of ‘the crowd’s’ actions; or, discounting their participation wholeheartedly, on the co-optation of ‘the masses’ by other political forces, be they national (politicians) or international (foreign governments, non-governmental orga- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright nizations (NGOs) and think tanks, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)). Accordingly, when ‘ordinary’ citizens protest, this is seen as wholly spontaneous and emotional, or co-opted and contrived by exogenous or local political forces.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 5

Two trends have emerged in the analysis of mass mobilization, specifically in Eastern Europe (EE) and Latin America (LA), and more recently in Southern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, that focus on the economics of protest rather than the politics of participation. The first trend identifies economic crisis and deprivation as explanatory causes of protest, and the second places emphasis on western IGO and NGO funds in ‘creating’ or ‘diffusing’ activism. Two best-case examples of these trends are the analyses of mass protest in Ukraine in 2004 and in Argentina in 2001. In Ukraine, foreign financing that sponsored, facilitated or diffused activist protests, and helped engineer an ‘electoral revolution’, is seen as the crucial explanatory factor of the 22–30 November 2004 mass mobilization (Åslund and McFaul 2006, 152, 97). In Argentina, the economic crisis, specifically the corralito policy, has been identified as the motivating factor behind mass mobilization on 19 and 20 December 2001 (Fiorucci and Klein 2004, Giarraca and Teubal 2004). Furthermore, initial studies of recent Egyptian and Greek protests also bear similarities to these trends (Bhuiyan 2011, Bratsis 2010). Following this logic, economic crises have produced many predictions of mass mobilization in Latin America, Eastern Europe and North America, and targeted foreign financing has left us expecting ‘revolutions’ in Belarus, Russia and Iran. Unfortunately, such structurally focused analyses failed to note that although there is multiple and ongoing deprivation causing economic crises, and continuous attempts at the financing and diffusion of ‘electoral revolutions’, there are actually very few instances of mass mobilization. The empirical reality does not meet our expectations, and thus, when we do witness these extreme protest events, the puzzle continues to haunt us: How can we explain this mass mobilization?

A ‘revolutionary moment’ in Argentina, December 2001

From 1999 to 2001, President Fernando de la Rúa’s3 government was plagued by ongoing political and economic meltdown in Argentina. While it is true that de la Rúa inherited the majority of Argentina’s politico-economic woes from his predecessor President Carlos Menem, these problems were exacerbated by his administration’s poor governance and mismanagement. The country’s economic problems included rising public debt, double-digit unemployment, mass capital ﬂight and industrial bankruptcy. Politically, there was the problem of widespread systemic corruption coupled with a growing crisis of representation and legitimacy. In 2000 the notorious Senatorial bribes scandal implicated high-ranking members of the Alianza4 government and triggered the resignation of the popular Vice President Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Carlos Álvarez.5 And with his departure, the unstable governing coalition began to crumble. In October 2001, 25 per cent of the ballots cast in the Con- gressional elections were purposely spoiled or marked incorrectly in protest at the lack of real political options for the electorate. Thus, by November

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 6 Mapping Mass Mobilization

2001 Argentina was in the midst of its worst politico-economic crisis since its transition to democracy in 1983, and it was ‘ordinary’ Argentines who were increasingly feeling the brunt of these hardships. When in late November 2001 Argentine banks reported account draining, President de la Rúa and his then Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo6 began implementing emergency measures to stop capital flight and prevent complete economic collapse. On 1 December the corralito (play-pen) policy was announced (‘Cavallo Analiza Dolarizar Los Plazos Fijos En Pesos’ 2001). With this policy, all dollar accounts were frozen and Argentines were only permitted to withdraw ARS 250 per week (at the time equivalent to USD 250). Within days, small groups were protesting outside the banks demanding withdrawal of their savings. On 16 December food riots and lootings broke out in poorer working-class neighbourhoods in Rosario and Córdoba and later spread to the suburbs of Gran Buenos Aires.7 Between 14 and18 December, independent unions, Piquetero8 Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and ‘leftist’ activists intensified their coordination of large protests, already underway since August 2001, and expanded them to the Capital Federal (Buenos Aires City).9 At 21:45, on 19 December, embattled President de la Rúa declared a ‘state of siege’ via live televised address, banning all public gatherings and introducing a national curfew. When the announcement was made, several activist groups were already congregated in local squares and neighbourhood intersections. Although cacerolazos (‘pot/pan banging’ protests) were used throughout the year as a signal to politicians that the people were dissatisfied with their policies, on the evening of 19 December there was a citywide cacerolazo. ‘Ordinary’ citizens, still wearing their slippers and housecoats, gathered their children and dogs and began to march with their neighbours to the city centre. There was the ‘revolutionary moment’, the moment of mass mobilization, when ‘ordinary’ Argentines from different socio-economic backgrounds united in the city streets. The largest group congregated in front of the Casa Rosada (presidential palace) in the historical Plaza de Mayo (May Square), while others assembled in front of the Congreso (Congress) and a smaller group in front of Cavallo’s private home. The main slogans used were ‘¡Que se vayan todos!’ (‘May they all go’ or ‘throw them all out’) ‘¡Piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola!’ (‘Picket and pot, the struggle/ fight is one’) (‘Piquete y Cacerola, La Lucha Es Una Sola’ 2002). After midnight the Argentine National Gendarmerie came into the Plaza de Mayo to disperse the protestors. There were some violent clashes with militants but the bulk of ‘ordinary’ citizens had already gone home. Students, militants, journalists, independent union members and piquetero leaders stayed in the plaza and congreso and were joined by more activists the following day. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright On 20 December, ‘ordinary’ citizens stayed mostly in their neighbourhoods, but they continued banging pots/pans and began organizing local grassroots groups, which came to be known as asambleas (neighbourhood assemblies). As protests continued to intensify, and turned violent, de la Rúa announced

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 7 his resignation and fled from the presidential palace in a helicopter. In the span of four weeks, Argentina saw a total of five presidents (Fernando de la Rúa, Ramón Puerta, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, Eduardo Camaño and Eduardo Duhald). The protests continued but were increasingly coordinated by party, opposition and activist groups and by local neighbourhood assemblies. By mid-January locally organized co-operatives and assemblies began to expand and merge under umbrella organizations (asambleas populares –popular assemblies) coordinated by leftist party militants10 and other activist groups and unions. The protests persisted throughout January and February and although the mobilization began to fragment in March, frequent but much smaller protest events by specific groups continued into August 2002.

How has the 2001 mass mobilization in Argentina been analysed? The December ‘19/20’ mass mobilization, or ‘Argentinazo’ as it is called by leftist parties and SMOs (implying a revolutionary nature of the protests), was a multifaceted, multi-actor, multi-event phenomenon. While each group of actors who participated in the events remembers this ‘moment’ differently, their own recollections are plagued with contradictions. Analy- ses to date have focused more often on economic and material variables and have been less able to fuse the economic and political explanations, present- ing variations of the two themes. The explanations can be divided between those that focus on endogenous or exogenous contextual variables, which resulted in political economic crisis, which in turn produced the socio-tropic or ego-tropic socio-economic dissatisfaction or deprivation, which triggered a protest response (see Figure 1.1). The economic argument has dominated most media11 and economists’ accounts. Some have even called the 19/20 ‘regime collapse’ and the 2001–2002 crisis the ‘Latino Americanization’ of Argentina – the moment when a once prosperous country, seeing itself more akin to ‘European’ Spain

Theoretical frameworks for analyzing the 19/20 protests / ‘Argentinazo’

Economic & materialist Political explanations explanations

Socio-tropic Elite game Ego-tropic Crisis of deprivation: Class based peronist party in levels of poverty, deprivation: rejection of representation Global finance opposition unemployment, Corralito policy neoliberal inequality paradigm Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Endogenous Exogenous Micro level analysis of protest

Figure 1.1 Most typical analyses of 19/20 mass mobilization

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 8 Mapping Mass Mobilization than ‘Latin American’ Bolivia, became as poor and as economically and politically unstable as the majority of its neighbours on the continent (‘La Latinoamericanización de Argentina’ n.d.). Although social scientists such as Mahon and Corrales (2002) and Rodrik (2003, 2006) agree that local politicians are in some way responsible for the economic demise, their explanatory focus has rested on macroeconomic variables. Stiglitz (2003) argued that the International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Pro- grams (SAPs), coupled with the fixed exchange rate of the Convertibility Plan, promoted a cycle of devaluation and raised the probability of capital flight and debt default. Together they have argued that these macroeconomic policies increased local unemployment and poverty rates, and thus heightened social stratification and socio-tropic deprivation in Argentina. This deprivation is understood to have first mobilized the suburban poor from the industrial ‘interior’ of the country in the late 1990s and then, in December 2001, the urban middle class. These explanations that focus on exogenously driven macroeconomic policy, as a cause of crisis, as well as protest response to said crisis, still leave us asking why did ‘ordinary’ people wait so long to join in? What about the economic fallout that triggered the mass mobilization, and why only on 19 December? Furthermore, why did protests shrink in 2002, when new macroeconomic restructuring produced even harsher economic realities? Thus, what role did exogenous macroeconomic policies play in the mobilization process? A further neo-Marxist and Gramscian variation on the above, like that presented by Armony and Armony (2005) and Cheresky (2002a, 2002b), focuses on the broader problematique of the exogenously driven neo-liberal policies of the 1990s and the compounding social exclusion and loss of dignity they produced. Placing their focus on the class-based ‘social’ roots of the protests, Armony and Schamis (2003) have framed the crisis and the mass protest response, as the collapse of the neo-liberalist paradigm in Argentina. Alas, this class-based analysis does not adequately explain the cross-class and cross-cleavage nature of the 19 December protests. It is still not clear how and why different sectors of society, which arguably would have been affected to differing degrees by various economic policies, were mobilized simultaneously in the span of a few hours. Thus again we ask, what role did exogenous macroeconomic policies play in the mobilization process? A separate group of political scientists and sociologists, including Auyero (2006, 2007), Delamata (2004), Levitsky and Murillo (2003), Svampa and Pereyra (2009), have given more focus to microeconomic causes of crisis. They have placed differing levels of emphasis on growing social stratification, inequality, unemployment and poverty as mobilizing variables. The Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright focus here is more on ego-tropic dissatisfaction and deprivation. These authors agree that one or a combination of these economic variables mobilized the suburban poor and workers. But the analyses specifically highlight the role of the corralito, the fact that people were unable to get their money

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 9 out of banks, as the specific ego-tropic trigger mobilizing the urban middle classes in December 2001. Furthermore, while microeconomic variables are understood to have caused deprivation and dissatisfaction among citizens, these authors highlight key elite actors and SMOs, which capitalized on this sentiment and used it to mobilize the local populations. Impor- tant works by Auyero (2006, 2007), Campione and Rajland (2006), Delamata (2004) and Dinerstein (2003) identify and problematize the leading role of two key actors in this process: The Movements of the Unemployed and the Peronist Party of the Gran Buenos Aires (specifically the networks connected to former Governor of Buenos Aires, Eduardo Duhalde). These two actors are understood to be coordinators of protest events that predate 19 December. But, in relying mostly on economic variables as motivating factors, these analyses are less convincing in their explanation of the specifically surprising, and brief, cross-class and cross-cleavage mass mobilization of 19 and 20 December. Even if we accept that the economic crisis and the corralito policy created severe dissatisfaction and in some cases deprivation, why did people protest en masse on 19 December and not soon after the policy was announced on 1 December? Furthermore, why did they not stay out in the streets in the same numbers when Duhalde devalued the currency in January 2002, when savings lost more than half their values? The focus on the immediate material deprivation of the corralito as a central explanatory ingredient of mass mobilization overlooks two key elements: The longer term process leading to the mass mobilization and the fact that the majority of the 19 December protest participants generally did not participate in other protest events throughout the year, before the 19th and after the 20th. Thus highlighting the puzzle that while the economic variables mobilized smaller portions of society for a longer period of time, there was something particular on the evening of 19 December 2001, which brought out millions of ‘ordinary’ citizens into the streets. And so we ask: What role did microeconomic variables and deprivation play in the mobilization process? And, when did different actors, activisms, SMOs, political opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens mobilize? Argentina’s collapse has also been analysed by some political scientists as primarily a political crisis. Ollier (2003), for one, has focused extensively on the Argentine party system, which favours the Peronist majorities and polarizes the political sphere, making crisis management for weak non-Peronist governments nearly impossible. Corrales (2002), Helmke and Levitsky (2006), Schamis (2002) have focused on the weakness of democratic institutions in Argentina, the delegative style of governance of the executive and the growing political illegitimacy of the regime. Weyland (2004) focused Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright on how the Menem and de la Rúa administrations’ poor governance and the levels of systemic political corruption in Argentina triggered an angry protest response. Lastly, going beyond structural and elite level variables, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2002) have highlighted the role of the ‘crisis of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 10 Mapping Mass Mobilization representation’, stating that Argentine politicians failed to uphold part of the democratic contract – accountability to their citizens. Accordingly, a ‘crisis of representation’ occurred, as claims for political accountability collided with the indifference of the politico-economic elite. Again, we are left wondering: If the political elite were increasingly viewed as ineffectual and illegitimate, why did people not protest sooner? Was it a case of compounding political factors? Was the corralito policy the last piece of the puzzle? And thus we ask the question: What role did political elite and political crisis play in the mobilization process? Few of the above analyses go beyond structural variables, and most fail to analyse the combined role of political and economic factors in the lead up to mass mobilization. Only by making this connection can we explore how these two factors had a compounding effect on the government’s inability to manage the crisis, how the SMOs and opposition participated in the crisis mobilization, how ‘ordinary’ citizens viewed their government in December 2001 and why they joined the protests. The above perspectives highlight that we need to dissect the mobilization process over a longer period of time. We still need to identify the different actors involved and map out when their participation is integral to the mobilization story. While most qualitative comparative studies focus on processes of democratization and even protest mobilization within one region, the phenomenon of mass mobilization is rare, and thus there are typically few cases to choose from, which pushes us to compare cases from different regions. When we see such similar phenomena taking shape in different parts of the world they spark our comparative interest. While living in Ukraine in 2004, I was surprised to see a very similar type of mass mobilization to the one I previously studied in Argentina. There it was again, people joining protests en masse, and the similarities to the self-organization observed in Argentina were striking. But this was happening in a country with a different history of activism, resulting from a post-communist past. But the mass mobilization was the same, and equally unexpected.

A ‘revolutionary moment’ in Ukraine, November 2004

After a decade of President Leonid Kuchma’s delegative rule (1994–2004), comprised of shady privatizations and an increasingly despicable human rights record, by 2003 Ukraine was considered a democratic backslider or semi-authoritarian regime. After a brutal repression of Ukraine without Kuchma protesters on 9 March 2002, Kuchma’s popularity, already low, declined even further. Concurrently, opposition candidates’ popularity, espe- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright cially that of former Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko’s,12 rose among the majority of Ukrainian voters. With presidential elections approaching, activists and opposition party members were conﬁdent that Kuchma would use his heavy-handed political machine, built on clientelist networks, to

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 11 secure victory for his chosen successor, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.13 By September 2004, the control of media had become so severe that most election coverage was skewed in favour of Yanukovych. Students and activists began organizing strikes and protests, most notably in Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.14 After the first round of elections on 31 October, when it was clear that Yanukovych and Yushchenko would go head-to-head in the run-off, activist and student protests intensified. During the second round of the elections on 21 November, as reports of fraud were filtering into activist and opposition headquarters, both groups called for protests. By the end of the day, it was clear that the vote count, giving Yanukovych a surprising 3 per cent lead, differed from the results of multiple independent exit polls, which gave Yushchenko a 5–11 per cent lead. Immediately, student and activist groups began to congregate at their headquarters and campuses. By dawn on 22 November, the activist groups marched to the Maidan Nezalezhnosty,15 the central square in Kyiv. They erected a tent city on the main street Khreshchatyk and vowed not to leave until the election result was overturned, and Yushchenko was elected president. SMO leaders called on all ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians to join the protests. This was the beginning of what is now known as the Orange Revolution.16 The protests grew in size on 23 November, and when on 24 November the Central Electoral Commis- sion (CEC) officially sanctioned Yanukovych’s victory, ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians joined the protests en masse. What had started as protests of approximately 100,000 students, activists and opposition members on 22 November expanded to include approximately 500,000 to 2 million protest participants in the streets of Kyiv as well as in other regional cities in central and western Ukraine by 24 November. Like their Argentine counterparts, Kyiany (residents of Kyiv) organized protest groups in their neighbourhoods and welcomed their compatriots from other regions of the country, allowing strangers to stay in their homes. The protesters’ main slogans were ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty!’ (‘Together we are many, we cannot be defeated’), ‘Pora Stavaty’ (‘Time to rise up’) and ‘Yushchenko tak!’ (‘Yushchenko yes!’). The protests, combined with rock concerts and multiple tent cities, continued for a month. As the protests raged every evening onwards, the government and the opposition held internationally supervised roundtable negotiations and struck deals regarding the country’s political future, behind closed doors. Under pressure from protestors and the international community, the Supreme Court overturned the election results, and a re-run of the second round was called for 26 November. A few weeks afterwards, Yushchenko was officially declared the winner and within a few days the once mass protests, already smaller, completely subsided. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright How has the 2004 mass mobilization in Ukraine been analysed? What was first called the ‘Kashtanova (Chestnut) Revolution’, and is now known as the Orange Revolution, will continue to mean different things to

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 12 Mapping Mass Mobilization different people. It will be remembered as a spontaneous emotional outburst, a memorable election, an event orchestrated by external actors, a coordinated collective mobilization of Ukrainian activists and NGOs, or simply as a moment of mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians seeking to protect their civic rights. It is the task of students of politics to explain the November–December 2004 events in a manner that will contribute to our understanding of Ukrainian politics and the dynamics of mobilization more generally. Instead of investigating the processes and actors leading to this mass mobilization, academics have allowed their preconceived assumptions about transition to guide their interpretation of the Orange Revolution. There is a sophisticated literature that discusses the phenomenon of the ‘colour revolutions’ or ‘electoral revolutions’,17 in general, and the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, in particular. Four perspectives on the Orange Revolu- tion can be identified – I acknowledge that these are not mutually exclusive and that this review necessarily simplifies the predominant theses (see Figure 1.2). The first is the Foreign Financiers Thesis. Åslund and McFaul (2006), McFaul (2007) and Wilson (2006) place varied emphasis on the role of British and American (and to a lesser extent EU and Canadian) non-governmental and partisan organizations. They argue that these foreign actors financed and/or orchestrated the Ukrainian SMOs, mass protests and even helped in the coordination of opposition party coalitions. These analyses see such financing as part of the promotion of ‘western’ democracy, an attempt to build up liberal, market-friendly democracies in Eastern Europe.18 Some authors, such as Lucas (2009) and Mackinnon (2010), go as far as to say that this was an extension of ‘new Cold War’ politics, whereby Ukraine is a mere battleground between the Russians and the western champions of liberal free-market democracy (EU and the USA). Similarly to the Contagion or

Theoretical frameworks for analysing the ‘Colour Revolutions’ and Orange Revolution

Diffusion and Foreign Elite game technological Micro-level financiers political pacts transfer analysis Exogenous Endogenous Structural: Local actors are affected by structural power Agency-based explanations - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of foreign knowledge or finance

Figure 1.2 Most typical analyses of the Orange Revolution

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 13

Diffusion Thesis, Ukrainians are described as passive ‘receivers’, who have the ‘revolutionary’ process imposed upon or taught to them. Yet the question remains unanswered: How exactly did foreign financing bring millions of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians into the streets? Thus more generally we must ask: What role did exogenous structural factors play in the mobilization process? A more popular perspective is the Colour Revolutions Contagion or Diffu- sion Thesis, presented most notably by Beissinger (2007), Bunce and Wolchik (2006) and McFaul (2007). While only Beissinger focuses on modular revolution, these authors predominantly maintain that powerful structures/networks of foreign NGOs and SMOs were the main sources of exogenous ‘ideas’ of ‘electoral revolution’ that were diffused or imported into the Ukrainian context. The different analyses elucidate how activists from other post-communist countries (namely Georgia, Serbia, and Kyrgyzstan), after achieving successful Rose, Bulldozer and Tulip ‘revolutions’, exported their tactics directly to activists in Ukraine. It is understood that these outsiders, financed by foreign NGOs, helped organize and train the Ukrainians and thus enabled Ukrainian SMOs to achieve their own ‘success’ of the Orange Revolution. In this model, knowledge transfer comes from an outside source, which through financing and training creates the structural requirements (understood to be previously missing) to implement an ‘electoral revolution’. Notably, some of the theses, and specifically that of Beissinger, whose work elucidates the role of interaction between endogenous and exogenous factors, are more complex. However, they generally fit into this structurally centred framework. Thus, two questions come to mind: Was there no history of activism in Ukraine, so that it had to be ‘created’ by foreign activists and NGOs? Was this type of democracy promotion new to Ukraine in 2003/2004? And even if it was the case that foreign funds and training were integral to the mobilization of activists, how can they explain the mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians that followed? Thus, these analyses still leave us asking how can we explain the mass mobilization of November 2004? And specifically, what role did foreign and local activists and NGOs play in the mobilization process? The third perspective is what I call the Elite Power Politics and Pacts Thesis. Åslund and McFaul (2006), D’Anieri (2006), Kudelia (2007), Kuzio (2000) and Way (2008, 2009), with some variation, argue that the Orange Revolution was a political game between elites. And thus, the movements and protests are understood to be in part or entirely managed and even created by the coalition of opposition parties. These analyses explain the ‘success’ of the Orange Revolution, here meaning the election of Yushchenko, as resulting from the political pact made between the Kuchma camp and the ‘orange’ Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright coalition, and not from the protests themselves. While concentrating on endogenous factors, these analyses are still focused only on formal elite and institutional level variables and do not place enough emphasis on the agency and participation of activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens. Based on these

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 14 Mapping Mass Mobilization explanations, we are still uncertain why ‘ordinary’ people join in protests. Were they simply motivated by partisan support? Were they coordinated by opposition forces? What about non-partisan (or anti-partisan) activists? And if so, why have the opposition forces not been able to mobilize ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians in the same way, both prior to and since the Orange Revolu- tion? We are left asking: What was the role of politico-economic elite in the mobilization process? Finally, while some studies have focused specifically on activist mobilization (Nikolayenko 2007) and micro-level protest participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens (Beissinger 2013, Lane 2008, Tucker 2007), there is still room to further unpack the mobilization process. Most importantly, while detailing other important aspects of the Orange Revolution, few studies adequately distinguish between the longer term process of mobilization by activists and opposition lasting more than one year, and the momentary coalition of up to two million ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, who protested, mostly in Kyiv, between 22 and 30 November 2004. Both processes require closer attention. In both cases of mass mobilization, in Argentina in 2001 and Ukraine in 2004, we still need to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous contextual variables and actors. Secondly, in mapping the mobilization process, we need to identify when and where different actors fit into the mobilization equation. And lastly, when we reach the moment of mass mobilization, we need to assess what motivated the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens, by allowing them to speak for themselves. Different subsets of the population will have protested for different periods of time and will have been motivated by different political and economic claims. Yet, while some individuals may have been motivated by socio-economic claims for a better future, ethno-linguistic or even nationalist claims, something special unified the protesters for a fleeting moment. The puzzle still stands: How can we explain mass mobilization? Anyone who has stood in the middle of one of these crowds knows very well that there is a strange coalition of divergent groups that forms in these streets. There are activists, politicians, political parties, unions, journalists, police and other militia, and a cross-class, cross-cleavage group of ‘ordinary’ citizens, all who take their participation in the protest seriously. When interviewed, they seem to be aware of the risks, and yet they still protest; they seem to have considered their options, and they seem to be there for a reason. Thus, we have to acknowledge just how rational and political the act of civic protest really is. The main focus of this book is the mapping and analysis of two such ‘revolutionary’ moments of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001 and in Ukraine in 2004, when –nearly two million Argentines and Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Ukrainians defied their governments and risked repression to voice their discontent en masse. In order to better contextualize the moments of mass mobilization, this book tells two mobilization stories. The first is the complex longer term mobilization of activists in SMOs, leading to the moment

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 15 of mass mobilization. The second is the process motivating the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in mass protest. By simply asking to explain mass mobilization, we focus on the crisis and are drawn to the easier structural, elite level and economic explanations. Yet, there are a few more questions that need be explored before we are able to address the primary puzzle of mass mobilization.

Puzzle of mass mobilization in democratizing contexts

The main questions addressed in this study are twofold. This book draws on a long history of paired comparison case selection in political science, but rarely has this been done using cases in countries in two different regions. Thus, because we are dealing with democratizing contexts in two different regions, and because democratization theory (explored in greater detail in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2) assumes that processes of social mobilization and civic engagement are different in post-authoritarian LA and post-communist EE, the ﬁrst question is contextual and deals with mobilization in social movements over time: Are the patterns of mobilization actually different in democratizing states with differing authoritarian legacies such as those in EE and LA? Or put differently: Can we identify similar patterns and types of social mobilization in different regions, despite variation in historical legacies? By looking at past trajectories of mobilization in each country, we will be better equipped to understand the actors’ involvement and interaction in the lead up to and during the moments of mass mobilization under study. The primary question of this study, and majority of my analysis, focuses squarely on dissecting and mapping two moments of mass mobilization. First, I ask: How can we explain the phenomenon of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001–2002 and in Ukraine in 2004? But clearly, based on the gaps in the literature presented above, this question should be further broken down into four sub-questions: What is the process leading to the moment of mass mobilization? How do contextual (endogenous and exogenous) variables affect this process? Who are the key actors involved in this process and when are they involved? And only then can we ask: What motivated the ‘ordinary’ citizens’ behaviour? Why did they join in en masse? Employing the two moments of mass mobilization as critical cases, we can develop the three hypotheses or arguments based on the current analyses of these two moments of mass mobilization. First, as will be further addressed in the conceptual framework: The long-term patterns of mobilization in Latin America and Eastern Europe follow similar trajectories and are connected over time by ideas, institutions and actors. Second, I postulate that the process leading Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to mass mobilization is a multi-actor affair, actors who either set the stage for mobilization or participate in the mobilization itself. Third, contextual variables such as economic crises and foreign ﬁnancing and training do not trigger mass mobilization, but rather provide opportunity structures for the larger mobilization

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 16 Mapping Mass Mobilization process. These variables can exacerbate political divisions and can become catalysts for the interaction between elite and activists which, in turn, can make mass mobilization more likely. Fourth, in the crisis context, sustained interaction, cooperation and exchange of information between activists, the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens exacerbates collective political impatience and creates an opportunity for mass mobilization.

Methodological notes and case selection

It must be highlighted that while there has been a recent rise in country cases where high-proﬁle protest events have taken place, there are still very few cases of mass mobilization and thus the population from which a case can be selected is quite limited. The cases of Argentina 2001 and Ukraine 2004 can be understood as two critical cases of economic crisis deprivation and foreign ﬁnancing based explanations. Following Tarrow (2010), this study presents a paired comparison of two ‘moments’ of mass mobilization: In Ukraine (2004) and Argentina (2001). The richness of primary data collected (detailed below), as well as secondary data available for the Argentina and Ukrainian cases, can help illuminate the study of recent large protests in the Middle East and North Africa, Southern Europe and most recently Brazil, Turkey and Thailand. But alas, unlike the recent cases of mass mobilization, the cases of Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004) are no longer moving targets. Since people in these two cases are no longer experiencing the upheaval of political repercussions (as they are in Egypt and Turkey), and economic deprivation associated with the protest events (as they are in Spain and Greece), ‘ordinary’ citizens are more willing to participate in research activities and surveys and data is easier to collect. Thus, before I outline the chapters and their focus, I would like to detail the extensive data collected, upon which the analysis will be based.

Data collection

Those who study protest know that there is an absence of adequate data on protest participation. It is probably one of the weakest areas on data collection in the social sciences. We rely on newspapers and police reports to assess protest size and turnout, which is highly problematic and makes comparative research difficult. It is very difficult to conduct surveys, focus groups or interviews during large protests events, making the study and analysis of these phenomena difficult. For the most part, social scientists have to rely on the recollections of participants, which could undoubtedly Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright have been altered and influenced by popular discourse overtime. Several steps were taken to avoid and remedy the serious methodological concerns associated with collecting information about people’s motivations and participation after the fact (two to four years in Ukraine and eight years in

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 17

Argentina). First, I was able to systematize data collection and analysis in the two countries by employing an identical research design and similar question schedule, replicating the data as well as possible and thus facilitating comparability. Second, I employed multiple cross-referencing checks in the research design and data collection phases and triangulated multiple data sources in the analysis stage. Data I collected includes: Participant observation, elite interviews, focus groups, surveys, the analysis of participants’ e-mails and letters written during the time of their mobilization, as well as content analysis of raw video footage of the protests, provided by local videographers and journalists. This data was collected over a period of 28 months, between June 2007 and March 2010. I will brieﬂy describe each of the data sources.

Formal elite interviews I conducted formal elite interviews, which were documented and are available digitally (see Figure 1.3). A total of 192 individuals were interviewed in total (89 in Argentina and 103 in Ukraine). Each interview was just over an hour long and included activists, politicians and journalists, but also local high-ranking NGO practitioners, diplomats and academics. The Argentine interviews were conducted in Spanish, in Buenos Aires and Rosario provinces. The Ukrainian interviews were conducted in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Lviv oblasts (interviewees had the option of Ukrainian

Conducted interviews n = 192

Politico- economic elite, Experts politicians and 5% party insiders 5%

Activists 42% Military and police 8%

NGO practitioners - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Journalists 14% 16%

Figure 1.3 Interviewee distribution

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 18 Mapping Mass Mobilization or Russian languages, most chose Ukrainian). The questions were designed to achieve three goals: An identiﬁcation of mobilization process (the key events), the key actors involved (when and how they were involved) and any interaction between the different groups of actors. The ﬁnal three questions of the interview focused on the most common or most typical analyses of the two moments of mobilization. Through this, I sought to identify which, if any, analyses attracted positive responses and which, if any, spark criticism or disagreement. A smaller sample of the interviews was later transcribed and content analysis was used to identify trends in discourse, as well as the most typical and most different perspectives.

Focus groups To reach the participants of protest I triangulated focus groups, surveys and private correspondences. Sixteen focus groups were conducted with activists and ‘ordinary’ people in Ukraine and Argentina. In each country four ‘ordinary’ people and four ‘activist’/NGO focus groups were conducted (in total: 73 participants in Argentina and 77 in Ukraine). The focus groups were conducted in four cities: Buenos Aires and La Matanza in Argentina, and Kyiv and Lviv in Ukraine. These locations were chosen in line with time and funding limitations, as the areas are representative of the highest protest involvement. The ‘activist’ participant samples were targeted and individual activists or SMOs were asked to take part by the author’s invitation only. The ‘ordinary’ people participant samples were recruited from on-street canvassing, by e-mail invitations sent through community, university and private list-serves and posted on community and local newspaper sites. Each focus group completed a mapping exercise. To deal with the problems of participant recollection after the fact and of focus groups favouring collective discourse, discussions were preceded by small group activities. One key activity was a small group mapping exercise. Participants were divided into groups of two or three and given a task to demonstrate (draw, design, indicate) on large chart paper a timeline of the most important events leading to mass mobilization, the key actors involved and the timing of their involvement, the main location of protest events, and differentiate where (if possible to distinguish) different actors participated. They were also asked to identify their own personal involvement (or lack thereof). The maps were then each presented to the others in the focus group, who were asked to identify things that they interpreted differently or disagreed with and to explain why. This exercise not only acted as an icebreaker, helping participants to open up and relax, but it also facilitated participants’ recollection of the events in greater detail. By initially dividing the participants into Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright small two or three person groups, we were able to avoid the pitfalls of focus group discussions whereby one strong personality or vocal participant can inﬂuence, intimidate or frame the rest of the group’s recollections. The discussion that followed was based on 10–15 scheduled questions (available

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 19 on request). It sought to identify points of commonality and disagreement within the groups regarding the chronology and location of events and helped trace the decision-making process whereby each individual came to participate in the protest events (or why they chose to stay home). To stimulate open discussion, investigators stressed that participants would remain anonymous, only first names used, and members signed participation, dis- closure and privacy agreements. To test for participant influence over the group, one half of the individuals were asked to fill in short questionnaires before and after the focus group discussion. While it is impossible to remedy all the concerns related to after the fact recollections, the author believes that we were able to make the focus group data more reliable with these measures. Acknowledging that the focus groups were composed of a small and not truly representative sample of the broader population, I tested some of the data collected in the focus groups by adding the most typical and most controversial responses to the surveys.

Surveys On-street surveys were conducted by myself and a team of six locally based canvassers in Kyiv, Lviv and Buenos Aires (see Table 1.1). Random sampling was employed, with every sixth passer-by being approached to complete the survey. The surveys were conducted in each country, over 12 weekdays, in 2008–2009, between the hours of 10:00–14:00 and 16:00–21:00. Canvassers were stationed simultaneously at transit points in different neighbourhoods of the greater city areas, designated by local city geographers. The teams alternated locations each day. Supervisors travelled between the locations to ensure consistency. Random spot checks were performed by volunteers from local political science departments to ensure that the canvassers adhered to rigorous and replicable standards of survey interviewing. The sample sizes are 689 in Argentina and 608 in Ukraine. Although the core schedule of the questionnaires is the same, there was an opportunity to include a slightly broader range of questions in the Ukrainian survey. The surveys were able to replicate national sociological poll statistics (INDEC – Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos in Argentina and KISS – Kyiv Institute of Sociological Stud- ies in Ukraine) regarding the proportion of participants to non-participants, as well as the general socio-economic and ethno-linguistic make-up of the local city populations. But because the question schedule only focused on the

Table 1.1 On-street surveys

Sample size City Dates - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

N = 608 in Argentina Buenos Aires February–March 2008 and 2009 N = 689 in Ukraine Kyiv, Lviv June–August 2008 and February 2009

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 20 Mapping Mass Mobilization protest events, new data about perception of protest and protester participation is of a greater quantity and quality. Two questions on ‘ordinary’ citizens’ participation in mass mobilization were added to a larger survey of Ukrainian Voters Abroad during the first- and second-round presidential elections held in January and February 2010.19 The survey was completed simultaneously in 22 cities in Europe (including the FSU) and North America. The sampling procedure targeted the local population of Ukrainian voters at consulates and the sample size was 2686. Online surveys were sent by e-mail to half of the participants before, and half after, their interviews and focus groups. But the bulk of online survey respondents were people who were interested in participating in a focus group but were unable to do so because they lived in a different city or the dates and times did not fit their schedules. The sample sizes of 131 in Argentina and 153 in Ukraine are less representative than those of the on- street surveys. The online survey was longer in both cases and had more options for the participants to write comments and open-ended responses. Although the questionnaire was nearly identical, the questions were altered to be context- and country-specific and were developed based on interviewee responses. Translated samples of the Ukrainian and Argentine surveys are found in Appendices 11–13.

Other documents and secondary data A variety of other data sources were used to complement and triangulate collected primary data (see Table 1.2). Archival and document research was conducted in both countries, but here I relied more on private activist papers and collections than on police and state archives. In the case of Ukraine, the Kharkiv Human Rights Group NGO digital archives were employed. I also surveyed local newspaper, television and radio archives. In Ukraine this included Ukrains’ka Pravda, Dzerkalo Tyzhnja, Korrespondent, Novynar, Postup, Lvivs’ka Hazetta, 5-tyj Kanal, 1plus1, Radio Svoboda and Unian Press Agency. In Argentina this included Clarín, La Nación, Página/12 and local news bulletins. Archived news video clips from the protests were found on ﬁle-sharing sites such as YouTube, and private collections of local journalists were accessed. Attitudinal, descriptive-level data from the World Values Sur- vey, Latinobarometro (Latin America only), European Social Survey (Europe

Table 1.2 Triangulation with secondary data and social surveys

Type of data Argentina Ukraine Total

Archival documents 307 337 644 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Organizational documents 262 509 771 Activist private notes/recordings 21 37 58 Personal correspondences (e-mails) 69 165 234 Video footage 7 4 11

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 21

Table 1.3 Analyses employed

Type of analysis employed Data analysed

Process tracing • Focus group mapping exercises • Organizational documents • Personal correspondences • Archival documents • Private notes • Video footage • Interviews Content analysis • Focus group discussions • Interviews • Organizational documents • Personal correspondences • SMO pamphlets/posters/signage Discourse analysis • Focus group discussions • Interviews

only), Razumkov Social Survey (Ukraine only) as well as from national statistical institutes were also used. The ﬁnal validity check of the participants’ responses in interviews, focus groups and surveys were personal communications (online and written) and an in-depth analysis of raw video footage of the protest events. In the case of the former, these were volunteered by focus group and interview participants, but online sources, such as blogs and social network sites were also analysed. Access to the latter was provided mostly by local journalists working for large television networks (1+1 and Channel 5 in Ukraine and Clarín group in Argentina), as well as activists’ own video footage. In many cases the journalists had been unable previously to use the never before seen full footage. In the case of Ukraine, I beneﬁted from personal participant observation, as well as video footage (Table 1.3).

Analysis through process tracing

The analysis of the data in this book employs process tracing methodology, influenced by Beissinger’s usage in his study of Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (2002) and by methodological insights presented by Bennett (2010) and Collier (2011). Through process tracing, the initial step was to identify the boundaries of the ‘moment’ of mass Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mobilization and the actors involved. From this point, I used interviews, in- depth focus groups, and archival research to map out the sequence of events leading to the specified moment. Since process tracing does not imply uni- directionality, first the events and actors’ participation are traced backwards. Beginning at the ‘end’ with a chosen ‘moment’ of mass mobilization, the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 22 Mapping Mass Mobilization process was recorded until the origins of (a) the chain of events leading to the 2001 and 2004 protests, (b) key SMO campaigns and (c) other key actors’ involvement including that of ‘ordinary’ people were reached. When the relative point of origins was mapped, the three dimensions were traced forward, this time mapping (a) the development of networks and effects of contextual structures, (b) the actor interaction and cooperation and (c) the development of a social discourse around the infringement of ‘ordinary’ people’s civic rights, leading to their participation. Subsequently, each phase of the mobilization process leading to and during the ‘moment’ of mass mobilization was analysed in depth and compared across the two cases, identifying convergent patterns in actor activity, coordination and motivation. This method allows us to identify a historical trajectory of the ideas, institutions and actors involved in the long-term mobilization process in the two countries and their respective regions (Eastern Europe/Latin America) and help to contextualize the ‘moments’ of mass mobilization under study. Through process tracing, I was also able to identify ‘positive’ cases (Argentina 2001 and Ukraine 2004) where we observed mass mobilization and ‘negative’ cases (Argentina 1990 and Ukraine 2002) where large activists’ protests took place but mass mobilization did not occur. Thus, by employing process tracing and comparative methods, I was able to identify cross-spatial and also cross-temporal patterns of mass mobilization. Finally, this being a book that deals with foreign language translation and transliteration, I should clarify that all translation was done by myself and all transliteration follows the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Ofﬁcial Use (PCGN) (BGN/PGGN) System (see Appendix 14 for details). Because individuals interviewed had the right to request that their names be spelled according to their personal usage or documentation, their names do not necessarily correspond to the Romanization system employed. It is my belief that this is an ethical issue, and out of respect for my informants, different spellings of their names may be used.

Chapter outline: What is to come

Before I dive into the theoretical framework, I shall detail the outline of the chapters that follow. This book is divided into four parts of two chapters each. The ﬁrst part is composed of this introduction to the questions and the cases, and the methodology is complemented by a deeper theoretical exploration in the next chapter. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the analysis presented in this book. Its main focus is Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ﬁvefold, and it addresses (a) The conceptual problems with inter-regional comparison between Eastern Europe and Latin America and the role of historical legacies in the process of mobilization; (b) the theoretical divisions between structural and agency-based explanations of mobilization; (c) the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 23 actors involved in the mobilization process; (d) the role of the interaction between politico-economic elite and activists; and lastly (e) the motivations of ‘ordinary’ citizens who join in mobilizations. Because ‘moments’ of mass mobilization, such as the 2001–2002 and 2004 mass protests in Argentina and Ukraine, do not occur in a vacuum, they are generally connected to ongoing mobilization in social movements. Although the main purpose of this book is to analyse and understand the processes and actors involved in two specific ‘moments’ of mass mobilization, it is important to understand how these two ‘moments’ fit into the broader historical trajectory of protest and activism in social movements in their respective countries. Chapters 3 and 4 map and analyse the history of mobilization in Ukraine and Argentina throughout the last century (rounded off as approximately between 1920 and 2004/2001 respectively). There are three levels of comparison over time: Within the countries, within the regions and between the countries/regions. Three general points of comparison are used: The ideas (claims and repertoires), institutions (types, structures and networks of social movement organizations) and actors (key participants including activists, politicians, and ‘ordinary’ citizens) involved in the mobilization process. Chapter 3 concentrates on Ukraine and Eastern Europe and Chapter 4 focuses on Argentina and Latin America. These two chapters are divided into four roughly defined periods of mobilization between 1920 and 2004/2001. These four periods are also thematically divided within each region/country separately. The aim of each chapter is to demonstrate the long-term inter-movement connectivity within each country and present how the historical trajectories of mobilization in Ukraine and Argentina fit into broader regional trends of mobilization. There are three main questions that Chapters 3 and 4 seek to answer: Has mobilization in social movements been historically weak or even absent in Ukraine/Eastern Europe as compared with a strong presence in Argentina/Latin America? Are individual mass protest events, which seem to be period-bound and contextually driven, connected over time through ideas, institutions or actors? Does historical legacy matter for ongoing mobilization in SMOs, and if so, which aspects of historical legacy matter, and how do these affect mass mobilization? Chapters 5 and 6 build on this region-specific discussion of the longitudinal processes of social movement mobilization in LA and EE and present an inter-regional comparison of social mobilization by narrowing the focus to two specific ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. These two chapters focus on the medium- and short-term structural and contextual factors behind the process of mobilization. Chapter 5 explores the importance Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of three medium-term structural variables in the process of social mobilization in Ukraine and Argentina. The first factor is that of pre-existing social networks – where like-minded individuals meet and interact, thus creating an opportunity for activism. The second factor is that of political

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 24 Mapping Mass Mobilization and economic structural opportunities, such as access to financing and other forms of support from formal or informal sources including political parties, private enterprise, clientelist networks, government subsidies and NGO grants. The third factor is that of previous experiences of protest events, their size, their claims and their participants. These previous protest events serve as ‘learning’ opportunities for activists and form part of the collective memory of a society. Furthermore, the chapter explores how medium-term structural variables are only possible impediments or opportunities for mobilization. It is argued that they set the stage for contention in a given country and can foster institutional and relational ‘rules’ or ‘play books’ of the mobilization ‘game’. The actors through experience can create precedents for future interaction based on previous cooperation or lack thereof. Although such ‘rules’ may change over time and are affected by ‘new’ experiences, they can also be reproduced and sustained. Chapter 6 focuses on short-term structural variables that can affect the process of mobilization. It is argued that the process leading to mass mobilization can be understood as a causal sequence, but that it is not linear, and each link enables multiple outcome options. Four immediate structural variables are analysed. The first is the important catalyst variable of a severe economic or political crisis. Such a crisis can exacerbate or facilitate (a) the division of the politico-economic ‘elite’ and (b) the division of the party in power (PiP) vis-à-vis the unity of the party in opposition (PiO). This can, in turn, have a negative effect on the politico-economic elite’s ability to respond to the crisis in a manner perceived as acceptable by the citizens. The second variable, the division within and between the government and opposition, can have an effect on the ability and/or willingness of the opposition to interact or cooperate with the SMO leaders. The third variable is the level of foreign – financial or political – support (for the government, opposition or SMOs), or foreign inability, disinterest or reluctance to get involved in the crisis and its resolution. This variable can again exacerbate or facilitate elite divisions and strengthen the opposition and SMOs. The fourth contextual variable is the presence, absence or rise of organized/coordinated strikes and protest events (over the preceding 6–12 months) leading to the ‘moment’ of mass mobilization. These are distinct but not mutually exclusive types of structural variables that influence the phenomenon of mobilization in different ways. Medium- term structural variables are more likely to affect ongoing mobilization in SMOs and their networks. Nonetheless these variables can have an effect on ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. On the other hand, short-term, context- driven variables, such as political-economic crises, can be catalysts of a series Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of events and actor action that can increase the likelihood of mass mobilization occurring. There are two key questions that Chapters 5 and 6 seek to answer: What is the role of medium- and short-term structural variables in the process of mass mobilization? How do medium-term structural variables

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Introduction 25 differ from short-term contextual variables in the process leading to mass mobilization? While the chapters above analyse how structural variables affect the mobilization process, Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the roles mass mobilization of four distinct actors: SMOs, the government (party in power), the opposition (party in opposition) and ‘ordinary’ citizens. Chapter 7 aims to address and explain the role of elite and activist interaction as a facilitating variable for mass mobilization in democratizing states. The analysis is divided into four phases of protest, from small activist protests to mass mobilization. It is argued that the government, in moments of extreme political or economic crisis, grows increasingly protectionist and isolated and resorts to desperate measures to maintain political control. It is hypothesized that increased informational exchange between two actors – the politico-economic elite (in opposition) and activist leaders – reciprocally strengthens their position vis-à-vis the regime. As the opposition elite and activists increase their interaction, they are able to access information from former or current government interlocutors and are thus able to signal to ‘ordinary’ citizens that the regime is losing its political control and legitimacy. This actor interaction makes it more likely that the regime will infringe upon the collective rights of ‘ordinary’ citizens, who in turn will be more likely to join protests. Chapter 7 seeks to answer three questions: What is the role of activists and the politico-economic elite in the process leading to mass mobilization? How are these actors affected by, and how do they affect, contextual variables? Do their actions shape the mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens? And if so, how? Chapter 8 investigates the critical and yet most elusive variable of ‘moments’ of mass mobilization – the en masse participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Even in the presence of key variables discussed earlier, without the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens, at most we could expect to observe a large protest event organized by activists and SMOs. Activists and SMOs represent a smaller portion of the population and are expected to take part in some form of collective action. The chapter’s discussion will concentrate on the moment at which the collective threshold of political patience is broken when ‘ordinary’ citizens join in the protests. The focus of the empirical section is on how ‘ordinary’ citizens themselves understood their own participation. This chapter concludes with an original theoretical framework of the breaking of a collective threshold of political patience/tolerance, to be used in future analyses of mass mobilization. Chapter 8 seeks to answer three questions: What is the role of ‘ordinary’ citizens in mass mobilization? Why do ‘ordinary’ citizens join mass mobilizations? How are ‘ordinary’ cit- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright izens connected to, affected by or able to affect the politico-economic elite, activists, and their respective actions and interaction? Finally, Chapter 9 highlights the central ﬁndings of this book, the main contributions made to the study of comparative democratization and social

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 26 Mapping Mass Mobilization mobilization and highlights possible avenues for further research. I outline the six-phase model of mass mobilization and apply it to recent cases of mass mobilization in Greece in 2007, in Egypt in 2011 and in Ukraine in 2013. I trust that by the end of this volume the reader will have a more complete insight into the complexity of longer process of mobilization, a grasp on the role of different actors involved and a better understanding of what motivates ‘ordinary’ citizens to ﬁnally join in. As if through a magnifying glass, the chapters that follow will trace the mobilization process and the different actors involved, until we reach the moment when ‘ordinary’ citizens join in. I present a detailed comparative explanation of the processes leading to the moments of mass mobilization. Demonstrating that these ‘moments’ do not come ‘out of nowhere’, I will present the argument that their analysis must be contextualized. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 2 Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization

Introduction

Before any attempt to answer the main question regarding mass mobilization is made, we first need to establish a theoretical framework for the discussion and analysis to come. As noted earlier, this book is novel in that it presents a detailed comparison of the phenomenon of mass mobilization in two countries, in two different regions, both at the time undergoing recent democratization. Thus, before we are able to move forward with the analysis, we require a deeper exploration of how democratization, formal politics and social mobilization have been addressed in the literature relating to the two regions. To this end, there are four theoretical themes that frame the empirical analysis in this book. The first theme revolves around the methodological and conceptual difficulties of comparing the ‘east’ and the ‘south’. This includes the problem of the regionalized nature of democratization literature; the assumption that historical legacy (namely of communism) is an explanatory variable of the presence or absence of social mobilization; and finally, the conceptually unconvincing theories that insist on civil society’s weakness in EE as compared to its strength in LA. The second theme is the overemphasis on structural variables in social movement studies, and thus I will shift the discussion to agency. In doing so, I will also outline the key actors in the mobilization process and will describe who these actors were in Ukraine (2004) and Argentina (2001). The third theoretical theme is the role of crises and actor cooperation during the mobilization process as presented in studies of ‘revolution’. The last theme deals with how ‘ordinary’ citizens fit into the broader study of mass mobilization. In this review I aim Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to not only highlight key inconsistencies and gaps in the literature but also make a case for how inter-regional analysis is not only a possible but a necessary method that will enrich our understanding of social mobilization in democratizing contexts globally.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 28 Mapping Mass Mobilization

But ﬁrst, I will address the elephant in the room; why compare political phenomena and processes of social mobilization in an East European country (with the perceived to be a weak post-communist civil society) with a post-authoritarian Latin American country (with a reputation for protest)?

Conceptual constraints of comparing the ‘east’ and the ‘south’

With the recent emergence of politico-economic transitions in LA and EE, academic writing has focused on the prospects and obstacles of successful transition to and consolidation of democracy. Attention has moved away from linear assumptions of democratization to the analysis of vari- ant and divergent transition experiences in EE, and the predicament of ‘non-consolidation’ in LA. A steadily growing number of empirical and theoretical studies are trying to explain the asymmetries and obstacles to democratic consolidation. These include debates about the effects of institutional design (Horowitz 1990, Linz 1996, Tsebelis 2002), socioeconomic factors (Przeworski 1991), cultural heritage (Lipset 1994), international influ- ences (Whitehead 2001), ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000), strong legislatures (Fish and Wittenberg 2009), illiberalism (Zakaria 1997, 22–43), and the role of elites as ‘winners’ of transition (Hellman 1998, 203–234, Schamis 2002b, 18, 178). Our academic inheritance on the subject of democracy’s rise and decline is immense; however, apart from its elite and economic bias there are at least two limitations inherent in the existing transition literature. The first is the conceptual confusion resulting from the conflicts between comparativists and regional experts and the second is a continued reliance on structural analyses that focus on the durability of institutional and historical legacies. One might question the premise of comparing a country considered at the time still to be undergoing ‘transition’ (Ukraine) and a ‘post-transition developing democracy’ (Argentina). But such questions rest in part on a flawed assumption of the deterministic effect of the different historical legacies, political cultures and a vague reference to the high number of variables for which one would need to take account. This is because there is serious conceptual confusion between what is deemed as politico-economic ‘transition’ in EE and politico-economic ‘development’ or ‘democratic deepening’ in LA. Transition is seen as long-term process in EE, while in LA transition is restricted to a moment of regime change. Thus, even though there is a respectable division of labour between comparativists and area studies experts, the protectionism among and between those two groups has at times led to theoretical miscommunication. The use of the different terms Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ‘transition’ and ‘democratic development/democratic deepening’ to describe what in many ways appears to be a very similar process impedes our ability to communicate our findings across disciplinary and regional boundaries effectively.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 29

The area studies and cross-regional comparative literatures suffer from a propensity to justify and reproduce an assumption of difference through the production of multiple meanings for the same terms or the creation of multiple terms with the same or overlapping meanings (that is triple/quadruple transition, democratization, democratic development and democratic consolidation). It is often noted that countries of EE have undergone a triple or even quadruple transition, which has included social, political and economic transformation (Kuzio 2000). This implies that East European experiences differ from other ‘third wave’ democratizations in LA and are even described as being part of a separate ‘fourth wave’ (Kuzio 2000). Yet, much like their East European counterparts, Latin American countries have also undergone fundamental and simultaneous transitions, including social transitions from post-military-dictatorship, neo-liberal economic reform and institutional democratization. Furthermore, in some countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, the concept of the nation has (often violently) been challenged by large indigenous groups, while other countries are striving to cope as multi-ethnic, multi-racial (Brazil) and multi- cultural (Argentina) states. There are serious limitations to the assumption of the exceptionality of post-communist transitions to democracy, in particular when singling out state and nation-building as their most distinctive char- acteristic. In terms of market reforms, a stronger case can be made that there are valid regional differences in the scale of reforms undertaken. Pop-Eleches (2008), for instance, has argued that the response of the IMF and governments to economic reform largely depends on the regional and temporal context. But the speed, style and the actors involved in the implementation (such as the IMF) are similar. Likewise, the harsh market reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s in LA and EE have had regionally inconsistent effects on socio-political outcomes, indicators or processes. Thus, cross-regional and cross-temporal analyses are required to grasp what is and what is not different. When confronted with divergent or convergent patterns of democratization within and across regions, we should not automatically assume that legacies of authoritarianism explain all or even most of the differences. It is possible, as this study will show, that more recent events, actors and institutional changes are significant variables for our analysis, particularly when it comes to understanding the processes behind social movement formation and mass mobilization. In the case of Argentina and Ukraine specifically, in the period prior to the mass mobilization under study, both countries’ democratic credentials were debated. Both countries were labelled ‘hybrid regimes’ (Bogaards 2009, Diamond 2002, Hale 2008, Karl 1995, Wigell 2008), ‘competitive authori- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tarian’ (Belfield and Levin 2002, Levitsky and Way 2010) and ‘delegative’ democracies (Kubicek 1994, O’Donell 1994, Peruzzotti 2001). Moreover, both countries were condemned by analysts for being plagued by ‘machine parties’ and ‘large oligarchies’ that manipulated post-transition elections

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 30 Mapping Mass Mobilization as well as economic policy and privatization (Aslund 2005, Auyero 2007, D’Anieri 2006b, Panizza 2000). The moments of mass mobilization under study here occurred within the ﬁrst two decades of initial democratization, but were plagued by low trust in politicians and democratic institutions. Thus, I think it is justiﬁed to employ the term ‘democratizing context’ to describe the two countries’ political climates at the time of mass mobilization. Thus, there seem to be similar democratic dysfunctions present in both post-authoritarian and post-communist settings. Next, we need to further explore what the literature says about the role of social mobilization and civil society engagement in the democratization process in the two regions.

Social mobilization in democratizing contexts

It has been argued by Avritzer (2002, 104–106), Habermas (1991, 122–126) and Linz and Stepan (1996, 9) among others that the transition to and consolidation of democracy require the development of a ‘public sphere’ and a ‘civil society’ in order to foster a socio-political environment of participation, accountability and legitimacy. Collective engagement in SMOs and civic associations is a crucial element of the development of a participatory ‘public sphere’. In order to better understand third-wave democratizations it is important to also analyse the trajectories and patterns of collective action. Here again, the literature has identified what seems to be regionally divergent patterns. As noted by Greskovits (1998), while there seems to have been a surge of post-authoritarian collective action in LA, the same surge has not been witnessed in post-communist EE, until more recently. Transitologists, including Greskovits (1998), Kopecky and Mudde (2003, 1–10), and Kuzio and D’Anieri (2002, 22, 47), focusing on EE have in the past agreed that an engaged civil society and public sphere are by and large absent. This perceived dichotomy between the two democratizing regions is explained by the different authoritarian legacies, military and socialist respectively, and their effect on participation in civic associations. While participation in civic associations, SMOs and protest has been studied extensively by scholars of LA (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, Armony and Schamis 2003, Delamata 2013, Dinerstein et al. 2013, Eckstein 2001, Epstien 2004, Foweraker 1995, Lewis 2002, Ollier 2003, Ortiz Crespo and Mayorga 2012, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, Petras and Veltmeyer 2009, Roberts 1997), the same field has been relatively under-studied in EE, specifically from a historical perspective.1 First I will address protest participation and second I will unpack engagement in civic associations and NGOs otherwise referred to as civil society. In Ukraine, Russia and even Poland, protests Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright have often been underreported in the media, while in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, even small localized protests are more likely to be covered in national print and television media (even if negatively). State police records and archives are also notoriously difficult to access in post-communist countries

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 31 and the majority that deal with dissidents and 1980s–1990s activism in the former Soviet Union are still closed. A considerable amount of protest data is so far simply missing or unattainable in EE. For instance, the novel comparative studies, such as those by Ekiert and Kubik (2001) and Greskovits (1998), which focus on calculating and comparing the number of reported protest events, are often faced with the problem of missing data. Robertson’s impressive work on protests in Russia is novel in this regard, and the quality of protest data to which he has gained access is rare (Robertson 2011). More- over, unlike in the case of LA, where many studies focus solely on SMOs and their long-term trajectories (Agosin et al. 1992, Dagnino 2002, Eckstein and Merino 2001, Kohan 2002, Langer and Muñoz 2003, Massetti 2004, Petras and Veltmeyer 2011, Stephen 1997, Warren and Jackson 2002), few studies have looked specifically at social movement organizations in post- communist countries (Beissinger 2002, Joppke 1995, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2005, Kuzio 2006, Osa 2003). The problem is that social movement organizations can exist without any regular or sizeable protest events. As in the case of dissident activism, which will be further addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, having existed (or survived) ‘underground’ for decades, some types of SMOs may even be more successful when their members finally enter formal politics. Thus, we may turn back to our first question: are patterns of mobilization different in EE and LA, or are protests and especially social movement organizations under-studied in the post-communist region? I propose that because of problems with data access, a qualitative study using process tracing of associations and networks and their activities, accessing organizational archives and activist recollections, is required in order to make further judgements about the strength and presence of activists and the movements they form over time and space. Finally, as will be further explored in Chapters 3 and 4, in both regions there have been few instances of mass mobilization that involve the en masse participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens alongside activists.

Civil society as a proxy for social mobilization in democratizing contexts

As we saw in the analyses of the two mass mobilizations under study, political scientists rarely focus on the activity of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Although they focus on the organizations, the groups and the networks in which ‘ordinary’ citizens participate, the individuals are usually missing in the discussion. As noted by Bermeo (2003, 7), this structural bias can help explain the growing ‘fascination with the abstraction called civil society.’ Although it Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright is elusive and conceptually messy, it has been used as a measure of the levels of mobilization and participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in new democracies. In recent years we have seen a handful of studies attempting to measure the strength of civic participation by using the concept of ‘civil society’ (Almond

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 32 Mapping Mass Mobilization

1989, Anheier 2004, Arato 1994, Bermeo 2003, Ferguson 1995, Gellner 1994, Ottaway and Carothers 2000, Putnam 2000, Salamon and Sokolowski 2004, Salamon, Sokolowski and List 2003). Most prominently, Howard’s (2003) comparative study of ‘civil society’ associations in post-communist, post-authoritarian and older democracies is a good illustration of this trend. ‘Civil society’ associations are understood to be the basis of key networks for social mobilization, regardless of their political or apolitical nature. Finally, the democratic value of civil society association is assumed. Employing the World Values Survey to calculate average membership in associations, as a measure of mobilizational capacity, Howard posits that post-communist ‘civil society’ is distinctively weak. In light of the problem of underreporting of associational membership, and the level of formality an association needs to have to be included, such studies are problematic. Yet, more concerning than the quality of the survey data is the operationalization of an associational measure of ‘civil society’. Such measurements of mobilizational capacity rely heavily on diverse definitions of ‘civil society’ associations. Because the theoretical field dealing with the concept of ‘civil society’ is so divided, it is easy to come up with one’s own definition. Howard, for instance, includes sports clubs in his calculation but gives lower priority to religious groups. While sports clubs and religious groups may or may not promote democratic practices, and be mobilizing, their inclusion or exclusion and ranking must be substantiated. Furthermore, their effect on social mobilization and therefore their democratic value may vary across countries. For instance, Osa’s study (2003, 60–78) has concluded that membership in organized religion and participation in places of worship are associated strongly with democratizing political activism. Osa cites examples such as the links between the Catholic church and Solidarnosć´ in Poland, the Liberation Theology Priests and ‘left’ militants in Central America and the role of Baptist churches as safe havens during the civil rights movement in the United States. Moreover, in a recent working paper van Sickle found that if religious organizations are taken into account, the ‘mobilizational capacity’ of East Europeans is on a par with that of Latin Americans (Van Sickle 2009). Accordingly, religious associations fit into most normative definitions of ‘civil society’ and their exclusion would, at the very least, have to be justified and demonstrated empirically. Van Sickle also found that, when European Social Survey data and the Latinobarometro data are used instead of the World Values Survey, the distinction in ‘mobilizational capacity’ between post-authoritarian and post- communist regimes fades away even further. Thus, if we take Van Sickle’s studies into account we see more convergence between the regions, further Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright highlighting the potential utility of comparison. Lastly, although momentarily impressive, any perceived pattern is usually explained by reverting to the initial hypothesis about the explanatory

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 33 nature of the communist legacy. In seeking to explain a distinctive post- communist pattern, Howard points to three explanatory factors: ‘a) the legacy of mistrust of organizations; b) the persistence of friendship networks; and c) post-communist disappointment’ (Howard 2003, 30). Yet, one could equally make a claim that Latin Americans also distrust political institutions and organizations, that they rely on private ‘friendship’ or clientelist networks and that they are also disappointed with post-authoritarian democracy and its institutions (UNDP, RBLAC 2004). According to the 2004 report, Democracy in Latin America, over half of the individuals surveyed preferred the stability of authoritarianism over democracy and displayed consistently low levels of trust in democratic political institutions. While these criti- cisms do not dismiss studies that focus on inter-regional difference, they do point to one of their weaknesses. Findings based on problematic surveys and calculations omitting key associations do not substantiate a hypothesis conclusively. Second, if there is a significant difference between the regions in terms of levels of participation in civil association or protest event frequency, we have to test the perceived causal variables. This is specifically important if we find that commonalities of democratic disappointment exist in both regions. Only recently has serious work been conducted on the effects of post-communist legacy on political behaviour, and specifically social mobilization (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 2013a, 2013b). But even Pop-Eleches and Tucker find that there is divergence in the communist legacy effect on behaviour, not only across the region but also over different generations of citizens. Lastly, the legacy variable per se fails to explain any rupture or rise in social mobilization as well as intra-regional convergence or divergence in patterns of mobilization, both of which we have seen with the advent of the ‘colour revolutions’ in EE and the diversity of protest responsiveness in LA. Based on such assumptions, and the empirical findings they produce, Eastern European countries should never have developed any large anticommunist and independence movements in the 1980s or anti-regime mobilizations in the 2000s. The ‘velvet’ or ‘colour’ ‘revolutions’ and large mobilizations in Russia (2010) and Ukraine (2013) since, should never have happened. As noted by Kuran (1991, 7–48), social scientists have been faced with several instances when ‘out of never’ we were faced with ‘revolution’. Whether during military dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina (early 1980s), or during communist authoritarianism in Poland and Ukraine (late 1980s), we have been surprised by the ability of activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens to coordinate and participate in ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. Some authors, such as Crawford and Lijphart (1997), logically point out that inher- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright itances can be overcome and regional trends can converge. This dynamic process can lead to the development of inter-regional commonalities. Thus, when examining the analogous modes, developments and trajectories of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 34 Mapping Mass Mobilization social mobilization in the democratizing contexts of Argentina and Ukraine, although there are differences, it is the similarities that are most interesting. These commonalities will be further explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus taking us back to our ﬁrst question: Are the patterns of mobilization actually different in democratizing states with differing authoritarian legacies such as those in EE and LA; or, Can we identify similar patterns and types of social mobilization in different regions, despite variation in historical legacies? Based on the inconsistencies and gaps in the literature discussed above I put forth a critical hypothesis: The long-term patterns of mobilization in LA and EE follow similar trajectories and are connected over time by ideas, institutions and actors.

Bringing in social movement theory

In order to better analyse longer term social mobilization and specifically moments of ‘mass mobilization’ under study in this book, it is important to go beyond the historical and cultural assumptions in the democratization literature and incorporate theories of ‘contentious politics’. I will briefly present a critical overview of theories dealing with various aspects of social mobilization that have sought to explain how, when and why activists form social movement organizations, organize protest events and coordinate their activities with other actors. Second, going beyond the structural biases inherent in the social movement literature, I will map out the actors involved in the mobilization process. Expanding on political process theory I will tease out the role of dynamic relationships between the different actors involved in the mobilization process. Lastly, I will expand the theoretical discussion to how ‘ordinary’ citizens’ participation in the mobilization process has been theorized in studies of contentious politics. Finally, based on this overview, a theoretical framework for the analysis of ‘revolutionary’ moments and movements is presented, and the different actors involved in the process are described. Firstly, it is important to differentiate between two different phenomena usually combined into one analysis. The first is a long-term mobilization process by activists and SMOs in social movements over time, and the second is that of individual protest events, and in rare cases moments of mass mobilization, when ‘ordinary’ people join in en masse. Second it is important to clarify the difference between SMOs and social movements. SMOs are the associations that together form a social movement. For instance, the feminist movement is actually divided into hundreds of organizations, which may or may not have independent or overlapping members, ideology/claims repertoires, and relationships to the politico-economic elite. The SMOs are Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright connected through social networks and form the movement based on their common goal (for example gender equality). Within each movement the level of cooperation and coordination between the SMOs is varied and can fluctuate over time (intergenerationally). While the literature varies in its

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 35 use of terminology, in order to maintain consistency, I will refer to SMOs as individual units and to social movements when referring to their connection over time and space. The history of the study of ‘contentious politics’ can be summarized as an evolution from culture and psychology to networks, or from collective behaviour and relative deprivation, as proposed by Gurr (1970) to resource mobilization and political processes, as championed by Tilly (1978). An early understanding of mobilization claimed that protests were emotional, irrational and spontaneous reactions by a group of citizens who felt neglected or repressed. But as explained by Jasper, ‘such emotions do not render protestors irrational; emotions accompany all social action, providing both motivation and goals’ (1998, 397). Thus, current theories see SMO activity and protest as rational and structured efforts to generate external leverage on formal institutions, via informal channels. Proponents of the theory of ‘new social movements’, including Hanspeter et al. (1995) and Offe (1985), have conceptualized ‘new social movements’ as embodying a specific category of collective action, rooted in ‘new’ social, political and/or economic exclusion. More recent environmental, equal rights, human rights and civil rights movements of the last 60 or so years have been understood to be exemplified by a new ‘identity and solidarity’, challenging existing power structures and redefining what is ‘political’ (Melucci 1996, Tarrow 1998). These theories make broad assumptions about how ‘new’ collective identities are fostered through collective experiences of isolation or marginality. Unfortunately, these theories have been unable to explain how this process occurs, or why other instances of mass-exclusion have not produced the outcome of collective organization. Recent studies by Della Porta (2006) and Diani and McAdam (2003) have focused on structurally oriented analyses. They have highlighted the role of established networks, opportunity structures (contextual factors) and mobilizing structures (organizational networks and resources), which can promote or impede collective action (Diani and McAdam 2003, 15). Mobilizing structures are understood by Melucci (1996), Osa (2003) and Tarrow (1998) to be resources (technical or financial) found in social networks. These social networks can be made up of religious groups, universities, work places, literary or sports clubs and so on. These associations can be mobilizing structures under the right circumstances if opportunities that promote mobilization arise. Mobilizing networks can bring SMO members and protest participants into contact. They can be spaces (physical or virtual) where it is possible for individuals to realize that they have common identities, claims, and interests, and which can help them collect or access Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright resources. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, through historical tracing it is possible to identify an ongoing history of social network-based mobilization in both LA and EE. Thus, the question moves from whether networks exist or are relevant to the political process to the more important

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 36 Mapping Mass Mobilization question of why they rise and how ‘ordinary’ citizens with no or little previous experience come to join these networks or how ‘ordinary’ citizens are influenced by these networks. Thus, the next step is to incorporate the role of political and economic opportunity structures, in both the long- and short-term mobilization processes. According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), there are ‘dynamic components’ to political opportunity structures. These can include the level and type of state repression, access to state or NGO programmes that help provide resources (financing, training) or the group’s access to political institutions and political insiders (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 24–28). Although analysts of contentious politics have made strong claims in favour of viewing ‘opportunity structures’ as explanatory variables behind mobilization, this assumes that the SMOs actively try to use these opportunities (Keck 1998). Furthermore, according to Tilly and Tarrow (2007) activists can also shape the usefulness and outcome of political or economic opportunities, based on the nature of their interaction with the politico-economic elite. ‘Opportunity structures’ are negotiated and can be reciprocally beneficial to the providers as well as the receivers, as will be further explored in the cases of Argentine and Ukrainian activism in Chapters 5 and 6. Nonethe- less, it is impossible for an SMO to emerge if there are no articulated claims, resources and pre-existing networks, regardless of how valuable an ‘opportunity structure’ might be. Moreover, various ‘opportunity structures’ affect organizations differently, precisely because the SMOs have assorted claims, and repertoires and are rooted in distinct networks. The concept of ‘political opportunity structures’ specifically deals with opportunities that are derived from the interaction of activists and political actors or institutions (Koopmans 2005, 19). As will be detailed empirically, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, political-economic elite can enable, inspire and constrain collective engagement through legislation, taxation and the distribution of public benefits and other financial resources. As was the case in the two cases under study, the type of impact the activists have on their political environments (the outcome of protest events) is thus shaped in part by the relationship they have with the politico-economic elite (Tarrow 1998, 78). Although isolation and marginality are still assumed to be possible predictors of activism, this stream of theories focuses on the structural links between existing participants that can facilitate mobilization (Diani and McAdam 2003, 179). Lastly, while these ‘opportunity structures’ can have a long-term effect on mobilization in social movements, theorists also assert that short-term ‘opportunity structures’ can have an important effect on the mobilization outcome. Examples of short-term ‘opportunity structures’ given in the lit- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright erature include politico-economic crises, as explained in Chapter 6, as well as sudden shifts in public support for the government, the government’s infringement of civic rights, divisions within the politico-economic elite and the defection of insiders, all addressed in Chapter 8.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 37

Beyond structure, key actors involved in mass mobilization

Although social movements are interesting points of study in themselves, the main evidence of their existence is when their contention is physically and audibly demonstrated. The same can be said for ‘ordinary’ citizens, outside their participation in electoral processes. It is when SMOs and ‘ordinary’ citizens contribute to and/or organize protest events and for the purposes of this study, specifically ‘revolutionary’ moments of mass mobilization, that we begin to take note of their extra-institutional significance in politics. We need to strike a delicate balance between acknowledging the process of ongoing collective mobilization in social movements and the rise, if not spontaneous outburst, of ‘moments’ of mass mobilization (Figure 2.1). This book broadens the mainstream discussion of social mobilization beyond structural variables and re-incorporates the role of agency in mobilization. Structural variables such as social networks and crises combine with the particular actions of individuals in the mobilization process. Thus, a central contribution of this text is the focus on the actors involved in the mobilization process. I will briefly jump back to the primary question of this study: How can we explain the phenomenon of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001–2002 and in Ukraine in 2004? What is the process leading to the moment of mass mobilization? Who are the key actors involved in this process? When are they involved? Based on the literature I propose a hypothesis, that the process leading to mass mobilization is a multi-actor affair. These actors can either set the stage for mobilization or participate in the mobilization itself. As explained by Opp (2009), Saunders et al. (2012) and Tilly (1978), there are in fact different types of actors involved in different aspects of the mobilization process. Activists for one, to use the language of Saunders et al. (2012), can be considered early joiners and stalwarts, opposition politico- economic elite can be also considered early joiners, but are usually only repeaters rather than stalwarts, since they tend not to contribute consistently

Key players in the mass mobilization process

Interlocutors Party in ‘Ordinary’ Party in power Activists/SMOs and facilitating opposition citizens actors Politico-economic elite Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Integral to mass mobilization

Figure 2.1 Key actors in the mass mobilization process

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 38 Mapping Mass Mobilization and formally to the mobilization process throughout. Finally, ‘ordinary’ citizens are typically late joiners to the mobilization process, but can quickly become repeaters or stalwarts. And of course it was their participation that tipped the scales from activist protest to mass mobilization, and sparked a series of negotiations among the politico-economic elite. Thus, not only do these different actors participate at different points in the political process of mobilization, as postulated by Tilly (1978), and further explained empirically in Chapters 7 and 8, but one group of actors’ participation has a mutual or even reciprocal impact on other groups of actors and can foster opportunities for interaction. Based on this literature as well as my own process tracing, I have identi- ﬁed four key actors involved in the mass mobilization process in Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004). These are activists and their SMOs, the party in power (the government), the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens (see Figure 2.1). As will be demonstrated in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, these diverse actors were involved in different developments and participate at different levels throughout the mobilization process. I will now outline the different SMOs and individual activists central to the mobilization process in Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004). I should note that it was the informants themselves who self-identiﬁed as activists (in Ukrainian aktyvisty, in Spanish militantes, activistas), politico-economic elite or ‘ordinary’ people (in Ukrainian zvychaini liudy, in Spanish gente común).

Social movement organizations Social Movement Organizations are engaged in long-term activism and protest. They are coordinated organizationally and have defined claims, agendas and methods. At the individual level SMOs are divided between activist leaders, rank and file activists and casual members (see Figure 2.2). At the institutional level SMOs can be organized locally, regionally, nationally or transnationally (Della Porta 2006). The SMOs and activists are united via diverse networks and together they combine to make what we would call a social movement. SMO leaders are important as they are representatives of SMOs but also coordinators of larger networks. While some SMOs are non- hierarchical and claim to have horizontal power structures, each SMO has leaders. Since not all members of SMOs and participants of individual protest events are long-term rank and file activists, and because SMOs rely on using pre-existing non-activist community organizations and networks (such as student clubs, unions, church associations and cooperatives), they tend to be closely linked to ‘ordinary’ citizens. These closer ties to ‘ordinary’ citizens within their communities enable SMOs to inform and mobilize individuals Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to join special protest events and activities. In 2003–2004 the SMOs in Ukraine could be described as being rooted in claims of national liberation, human rights and liberal democracy. A core group of activist ‘leaders’ were the initial organizers of multiple civic

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 39

Process

Activists and SMOs

SMO networks

Activist leadership

SMOs

Rank and file activists

Casual members

Figure 2.2 Activists/SMOs as key actors in the mass mobilization process organizations. Together these organizations formed a network that com- municated via formal and informal committees, conferences and meetings. They coordinated the initial protests in 2004. Recent academic research has focused on one SMO of the Orange Revolution – Pora. There were actually two Poras (yellow and black). Beyond having different logos and colour schemes the two Poras’ organizers were part of two different regional contingents (tusovkas) of core Ukrainian activists. The two Poras,toalarge extent, amalgamated the other organizations or managed cooperation with and between them. Most importantly there was no one key organization, but rather there was a large cross-Ukrainian network of SMOs active at this time. Process tracing has identiﬁed the following SMOs active between 2003 and 2005: Khvylja Svobody (precursor to yellow Pora), Studentska Khvylja, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Opir Molodi, Za Pravdu, Sprotyv, Chysta Ukraina, Znayu, Maidan, Molodyi Rukh, Ukrains’ke Bratstvo, Sumy University Student Activist Committee, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy Student Activist Committee, as well as Kharkiv and Odesa-based human rights organizations. These SMOs

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 40 Mapping Mass Mobilization were composed mostly of ‘middle class’ educated youth, journalists, NGO practitioners, would-be politicians and lawyers, who had previous experience in civic activism. The urban or rural poor were not generally members of these organizations. These SMOs had weak but at times formal ties to political parties and political party insiders with who they once participated in protest events and previous activism. Most of the leaders of the Ukrainian SMOs were also previously involved in party youth wings and youth congresses. Because of their level of education and previous protest experience (as will be further detailed in Chapters 4 and 5), these activist leaders were very capable of executing an information dissemination campaign, coupled with creative non-violent direct action. In Argentina, the key activist and SMO actors involved in the process leading to the 2001–2002 mass mobilization can be divided into six (though not mutually exclusive) groups: (1) mainstream Unions (Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (CGT) – loyal to Menem, Movimiento de Trabajadores Argentinos (MTA) – Peronist but anti- Menem); (2) independent Unions (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), includes unemployed and retired workers); (3) unemployed worker/piquetero organizations (Movimiento Territorial Liberación (MTL), Movimiento de los Trabajadores Desocupados (MTDs), Federación de Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), and Bloc Piquetero); (4) ‘leftist’/socialist party activist wings; (5) Peronist militants (Joventude Peronista); and (6) recov- ered factories and cooperatives. Human rights SMOs like the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo and other smaller local middle-class SMOs, while important, did not play a key role in the 2001–2002 mobilizations. And the much described asamblea movement was a product of the mass mobilizations and not a key mobilizing structure on 19 December 2001. Boundaries could be drawn between these organizations, but in reality some of their members (and leaders) switch party affiliations and association so often that it is difficult to say that one group is solely connected to the Socialist party and the other to the Peronists. For instance, the CTA were initially connected via their membership to FrePaSo and via the FTV and their member MTDs to Peronists. Unlike the Ukrainian activists, the Argentine SMOs were less able to reach out directly to a large portion of ‘ordinary’ citizens or disseminate information to the general ‘public’. The SMOs were capable of demonstrating their strength and influence by organizing direct action protest events and large inter-city marches and strikes, disrupting daily business and main routes in the industrial belt, the GBA and the Capital. Their connections to political actors were informal and resulted from an unequal reciprocity2 developed over the years of clientelist control of labourers and the dispersion Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of Planes Trabajar throughout the 1990s.

Politico–economic elite While most analyses look only at activists and protesters, it is important to note that politicians, economic leaders, political parties, companies and

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 41

Politico-economic elite

PiP party in PiO party in Interlocutors power opposition

Individual Institutional Individual Institutional level: level: level: level: Government/ Government/ Opposition i.e cases of regime state/ministries/ politicians/ cohabitation, politicians/ military/special insiders coalitions, or insiders forces etc. federal versus state police forces etc.

Figure 2.3 Politico-economic elite as a key actor in mass mobilization

industries can also play an important role in the mobilization process. Throughout this book I refer to this actor as ‘politico-economic elite’. This group, called ‘power elite’ by Mills (1999), is made up of ‘elite’ actors who control the political and economic institutions of a polity (see Figure 2.3). The term ‘politico-economic elite’ is closest to how the ‘elite’ was described in interview and focus group discourse, namely informants referenced the fact that the political and economic elite are closely intertwined and connected via clientelistic networks and, thus, cannot easily be differentiated. The systems of political parties based on clientelism and oligarchic ‘clans’in Argentina and Ukraine make it difficult to separate some institutions (including economic and judicial ones) from the ruling party in government (local, provincial or national). In many ways the political elite is dependent on powerful economic actors who support various competing political parties and projects. For the purpose of our investigation of mobilization, this actor is further divided into the party in power (or the government) and the party in opposition. In Ukraine the party in power (PiP) was composed of President Kuchma, his Cabinet of Ministers that made up government, the State Adminis- tration, the Prime Minister and presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych and his campaign team, the Party of Regions and the ruling coalition majority in Parliament, Governors of the eastern and southern oblasts, the financial backers from the metallurgy, mining, and energy industrial clans, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright namely Medvedchuk (also the head of Kuchma’s Presidential Administra- tion), Pinchuk, Akhmetov and Surkis (among others), and finally some elements of the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).3 Their main foreign supporter was Russian President Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, the party in opposition was composed of presidential candidate Viktor

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 42 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Yushchenko, leader of Our Ukraine party and his campaign headquarters, Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) leader Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Moroz – leader of the Socialist Party, and the leaders of several small liberal and nationalist parties, most importantly Rukh, led by Boris Tarasyuk. The ﬁnanciers of the opposition came mostly from western and central Ukraine, with the exception of Kuchma deserters such as Kolomoyskyi and Poroshenko. Yushchenko had the support of liberal elements in the SBU and key Western governments and NGOs from Canada, the United States, Poland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, and others. In Argentina the party in power was composed of President Fernando de la Rúa, his UCR party and Alianza coalition members, and the few state institutions and ministries under the President’s control. Alianza was a weak alliance between Unión Cívica Ridical and El Frente País Solidario (FrePaSo)4 that was united in its opposition to the Menem government’s neo-liberal policies. Most FrePaSo leaders had strong connections to militancy (youth activism) and the Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA).5 The Fed- eral Police, national Gendarmerie (border guard) and the Naval Prefecture (coast guard) were under the President’s control. It is important to note that key FrePaSo leaders such as Carlos Álvarez as well as presidential administration insiders defected and acted as interlocutors working with the activists and opposition. The party in opposition was, on the other hand, composed mainly of the Justicialista Party (Peronists), its members, deputies, senators and provincial governors.6 The Peronists also controlled the CGT union. The Justicialista party also had a strong connection to the Buenos Aires Provin- cial Police (who answered to Governor Carlos Ruckauf, a Peronist). Menem’s pro-privatization policies connected key Peronist politicians to large business and the ﬁnancial sectors.

‘Ordinary’ citizens ‘Ordinary’ citizens are usually referred to as ‘the masses’, ‘the public’, ‘the people’, ‘average citizens’ or ‘the citizenry’ (see Figure 2.4). They are the residents of a country who are not politicized, and generally not engaged in politics or civic organizations. Their participation in politics is usually restricted to voting, if anything. The composition of ‘ordinary’ citizens is cross-class, gender neutral and is not discriminatory of particular age groups. It is their en masse participation that makes the difference between a large activist protest event and a moment of mass mobilization. When ‘ordinary’ citizens join in protest events in large enough numbers they change the rules of the mobilization game. Activists and their SMOs are closely tied Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to ‘ordinary’ citizens in their local communities. ‘Ordinary’ citizens can be participants in mass protest but they can also be non-participants and supporters of either the government or the opposition, during a moment of mass mobilization.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch

2015-01-01 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - PalgraveConnect - Zurich Zentralbibliothek / Hauptbibliothek UZH to licensed - www.palgraveconnect.com from material Copyright

43 supporters Activist/SMO Non- supporters PiP supporters Not protest participants PiO supporters ‘Ordinary’ citizens PiO supporters PiP Protest 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, supporters participants Non- supporters ‘Ordinary’ citizens as key actors in mass mobilization supporters Activist/SMO Figure 2.4 44 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Facilitators and interlocutors While the above three types of actors are the key players, essential to the mobilization process are other groups of actors, which can take the roles of facilitators or interlocutors, and which, in times of mass mobilization (and as will be explored in Chapter 7), can be instrumental in bringing the different actors together. Foreign actors, armed forces and the media can all play the role of interlocutors and facilitators (see Figure 2.5). These actors’ roles can be important in the analysis of the type and trajectory of the mobilization. But mass mobilization can occur without their inﬂuence or participation. While foreign actors have been referred to in interviews and focus groups as elite actors, it is understood that they have a distinct, and perhaps even less important, role compared to national actors. Foreign actors, while capable of providing long-term ﬁnancial and technical support to the opposition or activists, are unable to mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens. In Ukraine the key foreign actors include foreign governments, non-governmental and partisan organizations (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy Inc. (NID), National Endow- ment for Democracy (NED), Westminster Fund, Open Society Institute, and The German Marshall Fund), and the foreign mass media. In Argentina the key foreign actors were decidedly more important in their unwillingness to help with economic crisis management than they were in the mass mobilization process. The United States of America and the IMF were the most important foreign actors, in that they ‘abandoned’ Argentina. Also important in the spiralling of the crisis throughout 2001 was the role of foreign hedge funds, speculators and investors that drained their investments and targeted attacks against the Argentine economy. The armed forces, divided here between the different levels of police, militia and military, are clearly formal elite actors and they can be connected to the government or the opposition. The armed forces’ chain of command may be centred in multiple institutions, and thus it is possible for the opposition to have access to, or power over, some groups. Although the government and the head of state usually have constitutional author- ity to deploy the military or special forces, these groups are also supposed to serve and protect the laws and constitution of the polity. Thus, there were instances when the army adopted a moral stance and acted against the orders of the government. Similarly, top-ranking generals have been known to notify the government or opposition that they are unwilling to engage their troops in the repression of protesters, when they are being peaceful. At the same time, military factions have in the past used force

to take over government during a crisis, seeing civilians as ‘not ﬁt to rule’. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright In each instance the armed forces become a separate actor and can affect the mobilization outcome. Last, the local media (print, radio, television and the Internet) is divided between independent and mass media. The latter can be state, public or

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch

45 PiP owned if supporting Privately applicable Mass-media Media PiO supporting Publicly owned if applicable Social media/ internet if applicable Federal police if applicable if applicable State owned media Army Independent Special including i.e. Berkut militia forces Armed forces news CBC, Russian Foreign i.e. CNN, Guardian, NYT, BBC, cable & state Mass-Media: police if regional applicable Provincial/ oblast and Khmara Foreign i.e. Otpor, Activists: solidarno ść , police if Municipal applicable 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Interlocutors and facilitating actors involved in mass mobilization NGOs: i.e. OSI Foreign AID Fund. Foreign Agencies: SIDA, CIDA, Government : UN, USAID, Japan IMF IGOs, Foreign IFIs Interlocutors and facilitators in mass mobilization Tanks: Foreign Partisan and Think Foundation, Westminster Foreign actors Organizations Fund, NED, NID Foreign German Marshal and their Consulates Embassies/ locally based Governments Figure 2.5 46 Mapping Mass Mobilization privately owned and can be linked to the government or the opposition. These multiple subsets of the media have diverse mandates, publics, access to and provision of information and thus varying levels of influence. The media has been theorized as being able to shape the perception of ‘ordinary’ citizens, but as noted by Dyczok (2009) it is difficult to prove and qualify such a hypothesis (Dyczok and Gaman-Golutvina 2009). Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, the media is a source of biased information and it is assumed that ‘ordinary’ citizens sift through the various sources and choose the information that they are willing to believe. Their ideological tendencies and political perceptions are already shaped before picking up a newspaper – they can be reinforced but rarely changed by the media alone. Thus, while media can be influential in the way they reproduce mainstream rhetoric and in what type of information they report, they are not key actors in the mass mobilization process and can at times be dependent upon the politico-economic elite. The literature on social mobilization leaves open to question the circumstances under which relationships between actors turn into opportunities for collective engagement. Thus, it is necessary to integrate classical theories of ‘Revolution’, which elucidate this mobilizational process. Again I turn to the primary question of this study: How can we explain the phenomenon of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001–2002 and in Ukraine in 2004? How do contextual (endogenous and exogenous) variables affect this process? When are key actors involved in the mobilization process? (Figure 2.6)

The interaction of elite and SMOs and ‘revolutionary’ moments

Social scientists see activists and their SMOs and the politico-economic elite as separate and juxtaposed; their interaction is mostly overlooked. Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) describe a two-way struggle between social movements. They argue that the political elite ‘shape the conﬂict environment and the alliance systems’ which in turn shape the trajectories and developments of social movements (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 11). Yet social movements are also important agents of political change, as their actions also affect the political elite and their ability to put policies into practice. Thus, together they create an environment of contestation and act and react to each other, generating new opportunities. As noted by Noakes and Johnston (2005, 157), SMOs are typically linked to the political elite through political party networks (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 157). This connection to political parties varies in its level of formality and interaction. At the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright individual level, interlocutors in one group can collaborate or exchange resources with each other. At the institutional level, youth wings or civic campaigns funded or organized by political parties can be seen as a ground force ready to be mobilized, or as next-generation successors.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 47

PiP politicians Armed forces

Media PiO

SMOs Activists

‘Ordinary’ citizens

Figure 2.6 Actor overlap and interaction during mass mobilization

Bermeo, in her book Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (2003), states ‘that much of what the elite attempt to do is conditioned by their judgment of how ordinary people will behave’ (Bermeo 2003, 6). On the other hand, Meyer (2002) addresses the fact that the social and political climates formed by the political elite affect potential activists’ perception of the necessity for and/or the possibilities of protest. Meyer adds that we can understand the process of movement mobilization by examining the different coalitions between formal politico-economic elite and movement activists (Meyer, Whittier and Robnett 2002, 15). SMOs can also be seen as interlocutors between ‘ordinary’ citizens and the political parties; they not only can pass on information and mobilize local constituencies, but can also turn them against the political elite. Thus, over time different coalitions between formal politico-economic elite and activists are forged. In the event of a severe crisis these coalitions can be used to assist in the demise of a government in power and to mobilize large protests in support of the opposition’s bid to take over political ofﬁce. Classical revolution theory helps to elucidate this point about actor interaction in the lead up to and during moments of mass mobilization. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Although certain contextual factors such as political or economic crises can create structural openings for mobilization, these opportunities are usually ﬂeeting moments. According to Thucydides, opportunities for moments of revolution are shaped by a weak and divided centre of power and preceded

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 48 Mapping Mass Mobilization by the participation of and interaction between different elements of society, including the elite in power (the ‘Oligarchs’), the elite in opposition (the ‘Democrats’) and the ‘revolutionary movement’. Contemporary studies of social science expand on Thucydides’ analysis by explaining that these moments of opportunity are preceded by or can be attributed to elite divisions (Lane and Ross 1999), electoral realignments (Linz 1996, 332) and changes in governing coalitions (Axford, Browning and Huggins 2002, 466). Not all socio-political or economic crises will trigger mass mobilization, just as not all moments of mobilization will topple governments. There- fore, crises are merely possible triggers and opportunities for a series of processes between actors that can lead to mobilization. They are moments when ‘revolution’ is possible but not predetermined. My thinking here has been heavily inﬂuenced by Thucydides and Plato, who understood the causes of a revolutionary situation (referred to by the author as a ‘revolutionary moment’)7 to be what we now call the economic and political opportunities (Aya in: Kousis and Tilly 2005, 89). In such moments, ‘revolutionary’ movements (SMOs) attach themselves to a political faction. They exchange their support for elite cooperation, hoping to achieve a ‘revolutionary’ outcome (Thucydides 1998). Thus, the opposition and SMOs seek access to power because they know that without it they cannot achieve their political goals. Thucydides noted that a ‘revolutionary’ situation, whether successful or not, is based on the hope and perceptions of possible success. The opposition/SMOs seek information from key interlocutors or insiders of the opposing faction, who (momentarily) switch allegiances. These breakaway oligarchs or democrats actually help the activists engineer the ‘revolutionary moment’. Through their cooperation they signal that the government is weak and that there is an opportunity to challenge its power directly. In this model, expanded by Tilly (1995, 10–12), and Aya (1990, 19–20), acquiescence is often rooted in uncertainty supported by a lack of insider knowledge. Aya states that citizens or opponents of those who hold power will wait for such a signal to present itself and be relatively inactive until they have justiﬁed hope of success (Aya 1990, 42, 75). If the opposition and SMOs can forward information regarding the government’s weakness or lack of political legitimacy to ‘ordinary’ citizens, this can be seen as a signal of the possibility of success at overturning the oligarchic government. Thus, as we will see in Chapters 6 and 7 when we break down instances of mass mobilization into researchable elements of action, counteraction and interaction between the various actors of a polity, we can easily see how the divisions within the elite provide avenues for mobilization. This classical Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright framework of revolutionary situations helps us understand the actors’ interaction in operational terms. It is a useful framework for the analysis of the trajectories and developments of the ‘moments’ of mass mobilization, which are at the centre of this book. Thus, building on these theories of revolution,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 49 this study will demonstrate that mass mobilization in Argentina (2001–2002) and Ukraine (2004) coincided with not only precisely such moments of elite fragmentation and state weakness but also the interaction (and even overlapping) of movement leadership with the formal economic and political elite. Thus, based on this literature, I hypothesized that contextual variables such as economic crises and foreign ﬁnancing and training do not trigger mass mobilization, but rather provide opportunity structures for the larger mobilization process. These variables can exacerbate political divisions and can become catalysts for the interaction between elite and activists. In the crisis context, sustained interaction, cooperation and exchange of information between activists, the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens exacerbates collective political patience and creates an opportunity for mass mobilization. Finally there is one piece still missing in this puzzle, the ‘ordinary’ people. And thus, I once more turn to the primary question of this study: How can we explain the phenomenon of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001–2002 and in Ukraine in 2004? Noting that once we have traced the different events and actors’ roles in the mobilization process, once we have assessed the role of SMO networks and contextual variables, we can ﬁnally ask: What motivated the ‘ordinary’ citizens’ behaviour? Why did they join in en masse?

Bringing ‘ordinary’ citizens into the equation

Social scientists struggle with the role of ‘ordinary’ citizens in politics as well as their political engagement. Social scientists place ‘ordinary’ citizens somewhere between two of Habermas’ spheres, the private and the public. Post-communist transition experts, predominantly Greskovits (1998) and Howard (2003), have asked why people in EE have not protested post-1989, in an attempt to explain the perceived weakness of the region’s collective engagement. Their counterparts studying Latin American democratization, predominantly Almeida (2007), Eckstein (1988), Escobar and Álvarez (1992) and Weyland (2004), have made assumptions about the materialist (economic, poverty and deprivation-based) causes of protest in the region. The reality is that social scientists still know relatively little about why people join SMOs and protest events, let alone why ‘ordinary’ citizens join in a ‘moment’ of mass mobilization. When it comes to contentious politics, ‘ordinary’ citizens are the pool from which SMO members and protesters originate, but until their moment of entry they are not included in the analysis. When they do enter and participate, we refer to them as ‘masses’ or ‘protesters’. I argue here that their participation should be isolated and presented as something different from that of rank and ﬁle activists, who are in Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the ‘business’ of protest. If protests were workplaces, rank and ﬁle activists would be the employees, while ‘ordinary’ citizens would be the temporary workers. Like temporary workers their commitment to the job (the SMO or protest claims) and their dependence on the successes and failures of the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 50 Mapping Mass Mobilization

firm (the SMO or protest event) are much weaker than those of the activists, who are in it for the longer run. Some scholars have attempted to unravel the question behind why an ‘ordinary’ citizen would decide to join a protest. This has included studies on social trends (Baran and Davis 2008), critical mass (Opp 2009, 189) and tipping point theories (Lamberson and Page 2012, Shapiro 2004). The majority of theoretical endeavours explaining the probability of participation are grounded in rational choice theory. Popkin (1979, 245) states that since an individual is being asked to contribute directly to a social movement or a protest they would make two separate calculations: One of the perceived costs of participation, and the second of the benefits made available upon entry. Because the personal risks of participation are plentiful and success far from guaranteed, in such a dual calculation the dominant incentive is to free-ride. It is assumed that if the protest succeeds it is almost certain that some of the benefits will permeate throughout society as a whole and those who did not participate directly can still benefit from the successful outcome. Of course, one may argue that not all individuals are indeed rational agents, or that even rational agents can see benefits in collective association. It is also possible that under particular circumstances ‘ordinary’ citizens do not see themselves as individuals but collectively as citizens. By holding an exclusive membership to the citizenship club, they expect a particular set of civic rights to be bestowed upon them. If these rights are abused en masse, it is possible that citizens see this event through a collective rather than an individual lens. Hirschman, who initially intended his model to be used for corporate firms, notably extended his ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ theory to the mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens. He incorporated the collective understanding of political oppression as a trigger factor (Hirschman 1970). Accord- ing to his model, any disgruntled citizen can ‘exit’ (emigrate) or can ‘voice’ their disapproval (through protesting or voting). Where there is strong ‘loyalty’ to the state, such as strong patriotism, the option of ‘exit’ may be reduced. Attempts have been made to alter the model but there are still certain weaknesses. We often see that ‘bad’ governments which infringe civic or human rights not only survive but even thrive for long periods of time without any notable mass exodus or mass protest. Furthermore, some countries maintain a continuous flow of ‘exit’ migration that fails to affect the government’s longevity or choice of policies. Thus, ‘exit’ does not seem to be as important a corrective factor as the model would have us believe. ‘Exit’ is perceived to be costly to a state that wants its citizens to pay taxes. But if it Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright encompasses the emigration of their civic or political opposition, the state can even welcome it. Furthermore, ‘exit’ can be costly to ‘ordinary’ citizens. Emigration is difficult from a socio-economic perspective, and there is no guarantee that life will be better afterwards. ‘Exit’ is also more likely under

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization 51 certain circumstances. If there is an expectation of mass-violence, citizens are more likely to ‘exit’ if they have the option. When new hardships or infringements of rights occur concurrently or in swift succession, the case for ‘voice’ grows stronger, and the option of ‘exit’ may be too complicated in such a short time.8 Thus, in an electoral democracy, where the government does not engage in systemic acts of violence against the majority of the population, while hardship or the infringement of rights may continue over an extended period of time, ‘exit’ is an unlikely option for the vast majority of citizens when a sudden crisis occurs. While in the long run non-participation could be interpreted as loyalty to the regime, it could equally be interpreted as political apathy, or political patience/tolerance. If citizens faced with growing hardships receive signals from the opposition and SMOs as to the weakness or lack of political legitimacy of the government, they can lose their faith in the government and its institutions. When citizens lose their faith in political institutions, a ﬁnal infringement of civic rights by the regime can break the social threshold of political patience/tolerance. In such a moment ‘ordinary’ citizens, who do not have the option to ‘exit’, are more likely to join protests en masse. Building on the micro-theory of protest participation, this book will demonstrate that the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens is predicated on the structural circumstances of a severe crisis, the interaction between activists and the opposition, and a ﬁnal breaking of the collective threshold of political patience/tolerance due the government’s attempts to quell the crisis and/or SMO protests.

Conclusions

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for the inter-regional analysis of the long- and short-term process of mass mobilization. First, the claims that historical legacies are sufﬁcient explanatory variables in predicting mobilization have been shown to be based on methodological and conceptual weaknesses. Second, it has been underscored that two separate though interconnected phenomena, social movements and ‘moments’ of mass mobilization involve different processes and are diversely affected by long- and short-term structural variables such as social networks, and political opportunity structures. Third, it has been shown that there are four key actors involved in the mobilization process – activists and their SMOs, the government, the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens. The relationship and interaction between these actors can facilitate or impede mass mobilization. Finally, it has been suggested that after enduring long-term hardships, if they Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright have lost faith in the government and if the government infringes their civic rights, ‘ordinary’ citizens can see their position through a collective lens and thus be willing to join activist protests to defend their rights as citizens.

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10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 3 Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920–2004

How far can we trace back the Orange Revolution? ...at least to the dissidents, the Shestydesiatnyky and the human rights groups, Chornovil and Rukh, and the ‘revolution on the granite’ and Ukraina Bez Kuchmy ...activism has been alive for a long time in Ukraine. Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv

Introduction

Moments of mass mobilization, such as those experienced in Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004), do not occur in a vacuum. And thus, we return to the ﬁrst question of this study: Are the patterns of mobilization actually different in democratizing states with differing authoritarian legacies such as those in EE and LA; Can we identify similar patterns and types of social mobilization in different regions, despite variation in historical legacies? A thorough process tracing of the connections between different SMOs and protest events over time can help us identify similarities of the types and trajectories of mobilization. The following two chapters will do just this, by mapping the history of moments and movements in each country throughout the last century (1920–2004), against the backdrop of regional patterns. This mapping will demonstrate that mobilization has followed similar patterns in both regions, and in both countries. At the same time, employing political process theory, the mapping will help identify how contextual political opportunity structures and mobilization resources have over time affected the way activist networks were formed, what repertoires they employed and how they framed their activities and claims. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Historical mobilization in social movements is often described as occurring in tides or waves, with booms and busts; this metaphor, however, is only capable of encompassing the most visible repertoires and not the formation, planning and coordination phases of activism (Freeman and

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 56 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Johnson 1999). Although the main purpose of this book is to analyse the process of mobilization behind two specific ‘moments’, it is important to understand how these two ‘moments’ fit into the broader historical trajectory of protest and activism in their respective countries and regions. There are three levels of analysis over time: Within the regions (Eastern Europe and Latin America), within the two countries and finally between the countries and regions. The intra-period connectivity within the countries is explained through commonalities between ideas (understood as SMO mobilizational frames, claims and repertoires), institutions or networks (understood as SMOs and specific networks they form) and actors involved in the mobilization process (understood as activists, politicians and ‘ordinary’ people). The following two chapters map historical movements and protest moments, first in Ukraine and EE (Chapter 3), and second in Argentina and LA (Chapter 4). Each chapter is divided into four historical periods of mobilization (see Figure 3.1). Employing interview and focus group and archival data I identified the institutional (SMOs and networks) or ideological (claims) beginnings of the SMOs highlighted by activists as influential.

Ukrainian SMOs Argentine SMOs connectivity connectivity

Foundations 1920–1949

Cultural Militant national national Labour Peronist liberation liberation movement movement

Authoritarian 1950–1982 (Argentina) 1950–1991 (Ukraine)

Dissident Human rights Radical 'Left' Student movement movement militancy militancy

Independence Transition 1983 (Argentina) movement 1991 (Ukraine) Human rights movement

Pro-democracy anti-Kuchma

Democratization 2000s

Pro-democracy Pro-democracy Autoconvocado civic rights civic rights

Localized grassroots and Democratization after neighbourhood mass mobilization Piquetero Asamblea Cooperative Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Pro-EU

Figure 3.1 The historical trajectory of mobilization in Ukraine and Argentina

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 57

In the case of EE and Ukraine specifically, this ideological and institutional ‘origin’ of contemporary activism is the National Liberation Movement (NLM) of the early 20th century. In the case of LA, and specifically Argentina, I have traced the ideological ‘foundations’ of contemporary mobilization to the claims and repertoires of early unionism and populism. I argue that the discourse of activism in Ukraine (and EE more broadly) and in Argentina (and LA more broadly) has moved from national liberation and populist redistributionism to broader human and civic rights frames. While general patterns of activist mobilization were similar, I was able to identify only a few ‘moments’ of large protest. Furthermore, we will see that while mobilization in SMOs is ongoing, it fluctuates in size, scope and visibility over time. I base my tracing of historical mobilization in each country primarily on activist and expert interviewee recollections and references. Thus, the organizations that are highlighted are those that contemporary activists themselves found to be important and ones they felt connected to. This allows us to better understand how activists frame their contemporary engagement as a reflection of past-activism or how past-activism has influenced their engagement today. Thus, I asked respondents in interviews and focus groups the following questions: When did you become politically engaged (in activism, civic organizations, militancy)? Please trace your involvement in activism/militancy. Did you participate in any previous large protests? If so which ones, and in what capacity? What other SMOs have influenced you, and your activism? What other SMOs are important in the history of your country? In the past were there any other moments of mass protest? If so which ones? Very quickly it became clear that most activists had a very similar trajectory of personal involvement in activism in each country and that their participation overlapped with that of other informants. Moreover, the same individuals were members of several different organizations over time, and they were the key transporters of claims and mobilizational frames. Identifying these connections, and being able to speak to people involved in different SMOs dating back to the 1970s, I then filled in the gaps with secondary and archival references. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 provide an insight into the ideological discourse of mobilization that the activists involved in the 2001 and 2004 protests believe is connected to, or frames, their participation. Let us now move to the central discussion in this chapter. While the ‘communist legacy’ argument would expect us to find little mobilization in EE, and Ukraine specifically, this chapter aims to demonstrate that the legacy of preceding activism and protest, and connectivity to it, has not been sufficiently explored. The discussion in this chapter is divided into four periods of mobilization in Ukraine and EE: Period I: Beginnings of Mobi- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright lization 1920–1949, Period II: Authoritarian Regime 1950–1979, Period III: Perestroika and Transition 1980–1991 and Period IV: Democratization 1992– 2004. Each period is introduced with an outline of the regional trends of mobilization in EE and is followed by an in-depth discussion of Ukrainian

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Table 3.1 Moments and movements most often referenced in interviews and focus groups with activists in Ukraine

Ukrainian SMOs Foreign Inﬂuences Protest events

Pora solidarno´s´c 2004 Orange Revolution Yellow Pora Otpor 2001 Ukraine without Kuchma (UBK) Black Pora Lech Wał˛esa 1986–1991 Rukh Protest Events UBK USA/ Europe /West 1991 Revolution On The Granite Komitet Za Pravdu Vaclav Havel 1990–1991 Student Hunger Strikes OUN Khmara War time mobilization Rukh Charter 77 1968/1969 Protest by students in Lviv Student Rukh OK 98 1976 Helsinki Group Hunger Strikes Maidan The Civil Rights Movement 1986 Democracy protest in Kyiv Moloda Prosvita The Paris Commune 1970s Labour strikes Shestydesiatnyky Che Guevara 1960s–1970s Dissident actions, self-immolation Prosvita Fidel Castro 1986 Chornobyl Protests Helsinki Human Rights Ukrainian Brotherhood Sumy Students Opora Students’ka Hvylia Helsinki Group Sprotyv Save Old Kyiv Kozak Brotherhood Student Brotherhood Kharkiv Human Rights Group

Source: Author’s discourse analysis and displayed in descending order of frequency of being mentioned. activism. The focus here is on the prevailing ideas and how they travel through networks and actors, and thus connect the different periods of mobilization over time (see Table 3.1). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Period I – Foundations of mobilization in Eastern Europe 1920–1955

Between 1920 and 1950 EE was in a state of ﬂux and was the main battleground of the Second World War. In this crisis context of economic

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 59 depression, war and uncertain statehood, most East Europeans were ﬁghting against their colonial or wartime occupiers. Thus, it was national liberation movements that coordinated the majority of protest events in the region throughout this period. These SMOs tended to have ethno-nationalist claims and some used violent repertoires of action. One example was the 1937 Great Peasant Uprising in Poland. Organized by the extremist Peas- ant Order Guard, it was the largest political protest in the Second Polish Republic, with over 10,000 participants (Kersten 1991, 17). This period also saw the communist regime and its policies take over the region, resulting in a series of anti-collectivization peasant and worker strikes, also nationalist in character. The 1930 Pitelinskii Uprising in Riazan was one of the largest peasant uprisings against collectivization in the Soviet Union. These protest events were part of a general wave of what the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) called ‘collective disturbances’ and ‘terrorist acts’ (Viola 1999, 84–86). Based on an OGPU1 memorandum ‘Forms of class war in the countryside in 1930’, Viola calculates that the number of ‘terrorist acts’ and ‘collective disturbances’ in Russia’s Central Black Earth region was 1088, second only to Ukraine, where 2779 acts were documented (Viola 1999, 88). Furthermore, according to the ﬁgures quoted by Viola, in 1930 nearly 2.5 million peasants participated in protest events and armed resistance (Viola 1999, 88). This trend continued throughout the Second World War and became increasingly militarized and nationalist over time. The Soviet and the Nazi leaderships severely repressed both ethno-nationalist and peasant uprisings in the region. And by 1945, the majority of the leaders of ethno-nationalist movements were imprisoned in labour camps or living in exile or dead. Thus, nationalist and peasant mobilization in the region peaked between 1930 and 1939 and began to dramatically decline after 1945.

Period I – Foundations of Ukrainian mobilization 1920–1955

We can say that contemporary Ukrainian activism had its foundational moment during the inter-war period, and thus the ideas and repertoires were heavily influenced by this context. Ukraine was not yet independent, but its residents spoke their own language, had separate religious and cultural practices from that of their neighbours, and some activists saw the need for nation-building and statehood. Thus, mobilization in Ukraine during this period can be divided into two streams of National Liberation activism: The first non-violent cultural and the second radical militant. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright These two streams were not mutually exclusive, and thus their networks overlapped significantly (see Figure 3.2). The main claims were framed as the cultural and political preservation of Ukrainian identity, but over time came to include human rights rhetoric. As noted by Yevhen Zolotariov, a human rights activist, the National Liberation Movement is identified

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 60 Mapping Mass Mobilization

National Liberation Movement

Other ethno-cultural Militant groups and political Cultural groups organizations

OUN Prosvita

OUN-M UPA OUN-B Young Prosvita

Figure 3.2 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1955 by current-day activists as the ideological and institutional foundation of Ukrainian mobilization:

There was no ‘revolution’, it was an ‘evolution’, part of the national liberation movement ...it began with Ukrainian Nationalists, then the dissidents, students in 1990s, and Ukraine Without Kuchma ...without these there would be no Pora, many of the techniques and ideas are the same ...later on the people were the same! (Yevhen Zolotariov, yellow Pora and human rights activist, 7/9/2008, Kyiv)

The National Liberation Movement in Ukraine began with SMO activities predating the First World War, such as those of the Brotherhood of Kozak Independence (1912). From 1920 onwards the SMOs and the ideology of National Liberation created a historical legacy of activism which framed future mobilization in Ukraine. Historically, cultural and student organizations played an important structural role in the mobilization process in Ukraine. These were key channels for the activation and ideological politicization of young activists who would later join militant SMOs.2 During the inter-war period, multiple ‘anti- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Polish’/‘pro-Ukrainian’ student organizations, such as the UnionofUkrainian Nationalist Youth,theUkrainian Brotherhood and the Kozak Brotherhood, were formed (Armstrong 1963, 23). Together they loosely composed a network of National Liberation SMOs in Polish-occupied Western Ukraine. As conﬁrmed

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 61 by Volodymyr Viatrovych, a historian and black Pora leader, student and cultural organizations were the backbone of the non-militant wing of the National Liberation Movement (Olya Salo, black Pora activist, 4/19/2007, Lviv). The most influential youth SMO was Moloda Prosvita (Young Enlighten- ment), founded in 1922. This was the activist youth wing of the Prosvita Society, founded in honour of Ukrainian poet laureate Taras Shevchenko in 1868 (‘Prosvita’ 2010). Prosvita’s goal was to resist the colonization and Russification of culture in Ukraine. The focus of this SMO was on mobilization through education and preservation of Ukrainian language. The main repertoires included the organization of local literary clubs across Ukraine (‘Moloda Prosvita’ 2008). Membership rose exponentially in the 1930s (see Table 3.2); at its height in 1937 the national network had approximately a million members. Due to contextual constraints of wartime repressions, Prosvita was forced underground in 1939 (Armstrong 1963, 36–43). During the Soviet era, Prosvita networks remained active informally underground in the dissident movement and resurfaced after independence. The activists involved in the student and cultural SMOs, in the 1930s and 1940s, also used their networks to disseminate information about underground and militant national liberation SMOs. The non-violent and non-militaristic structure of cultural SMOs led to a fragmentation of rank-and-file members. Those who preferred more aggressive repertoires and claims joined the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and even Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) organizations. By far the most famous (or infamous) SMO of this period was the militant OUN founded in 1929 by activists, students and former Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) officers (Krokhmaliuk 1972, 43–57). As noted by black Pora leader Volodymyr Viatrovych, the OUN is highly respected among many Ukrainian activists for their ability to activate and coordinate a complex network of related SMOs in different regions of Ukraine, for their defence of Ukrainian language and culture, but not for their use of violent tactics. Viatrovych explained, ‘the influence of the OUN ...on activists today is undeniable ...we even used some of their organizational techniques, of “sotky” when we coordinated activities in 2003/04, but we adhered to

Table 3.2 Prosvita membership and activity

Year Members Reading-rooms Moloda Prosvita groups

1928 12,500 600 50 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 1934 500,000 3045 132 1936 1,000,000 3210 260

Source: Data taken from Armstrong (1963, 36–43).

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 62 Mapping Mass Mobilization non-violent repertoires guided by liberal values’ (Volodymyr Viatrovych, black Pora activist, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv). The best way to understand the OUN from a social movement theory perspective is as a network of many socio-political National Liberation SMOs. Its members adhered to a militant repertoire, which included everything from publishing banned Ukrainian literature to violent campaigns against governments occupying Ukraine. In 1940, the OUN split into two competing factions: The more conservative OUN-M, under Andriy Melnyk’s leadership, and the radical OUN-B, composed of younger militants with strong revolutionary views, under Stepan Bandera’s leadership (see Figure 3.2). OUN-B over time became closer to the UPA.3 Although, the OUN’s radical repertoires have been labelled ‘terrorist’ by Polish and Russian governments, their activities have to be contextualized as a struggle against Soviet and Nazi occupation during the Second World War. Even if extreme, these organizations’ repertoires were no more violent than those of 20th-century ‘left’ militancy and guerrilla movements in LA. We have to understand that these National Liberation SMOs were very much influenced by the violent context and political frames of the time. The National Liberation Movement continued in the 1950s and 1960s as a feature of western Ukrainian activism. Its leaders helped in the development of key SMO networks, and its influence should neither be embellished nor underestimated. In 1943 the exiled members of OUN-B founded the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (Stetsko 1971). They continued their activities and supported dissident mobilization financially from abroad. But most importantly, for many years to come, the National Liberation SMOs (cultural and militant) framed activist claims and repertoires in Ukraine. While the OUN’s militant repertoires were discontinued after 1947, the ideas of National Liberation persisted. Future activists, whether demanding cultural-linguistic protection, human and civic rights, or better conditions for workers in eastern and southern Ukraine, all made claims against foreign colonization and demanded Ukrainian independence (‘History of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement (Ozernyanskyi Archive)’ 2005).

Period II – Authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe 1955–1979

Internationally, the 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in radical politics and rights- based mobilization. In EE this period was marked by a continuity of, or return to, repressive authoritarianism, an expansion of dissident SMOs mobilizing against these trends. Claims were framed less in ethno-nationalist terms but rather in civil and human rights rhetoric. But most importantly, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright activism of the 1960s and 1970s was structurally important in that it helped produce the networks and entrench the non-violent repertoires that the independence and pro-democracy movements of the 1980s and 1990s were built upon. During this period, there were three peaks in mobilizational

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 63 activity in the region, in 1956, 1968 and 1976–1978. These ‘moments’ of heightened activism were driven in part by the region’s post-Second World War politico-economic crisis context, which in turn fostered divisions within the CPSU and EE Communist and Socialist party structures. Destabilized by Stalin’s death and uprisings in East Germany, in 1953 the region’s leadership was in disarray. A rise in dissident activism was concurrent with Khrushchev’s 24 February 1956 ‘secret’ speech, criticizing the excesses of Stalinism. Once disseminated, the speech presented an opportunity for political defection and increased mobilization. As in the cases under study, the crisis within elite ranks created a political opportunity structure for mobilization. During this period dissident activism was channelled through cultural, labour and student networks. Cultural SMOs like the Crooked Circle Club (1955) in Poland and Charter 77 (1977) in Czechoslovakia began to ﬂour- ish in the region (‘1956 – a European Date. Polish Government Cultural Archives’). These intellectual activists coordinated activities and published critiques focusing on socio-political repression and underground National Liberation Movements. The samizdat (self-published) movement promoted the independent publication of critical work, exposing broader groups of society to activist rhetoric (Pollack and Wielgohs 2004, 3–27, Tuma 2004, 29–49). For instance, Charter 77 took its name from the title of a document initially circulated as a samizdat, published in a West German newspaper and became a manifesto for those who opposed communist authoritarian rule (Havel 1985). The main success of mobilization in this period came from the fusing of the SMO networks that made up cultural and labour movements into one. After 1956 the political crisis in the Communist Bloc was coupled with economic collapse and with the worsening of workers’ living standards. Workers’ conﬁdence in the Party steadily declined and factories became a source of dissident activity. Although workers’ strikes took place in nearly every country in the region (including Ukraine), Polish labour took the lead. In 1956 a general strike broke out at a metallurgy plant in Poznan and was followed by street demonstrations of approximately 10,000 participants. The Poznan events set the stage for larger mobilizations, such as the Polish ‘Octo- ber Revolution’ as well as the Hungarian ‘Revolution of 1956’ (‘Poznanski´ Czerwiec ’56 Archive’ 2003). During the following decade dissident activity was mostly organized underground, but notably 1968 was an exceptional year of student activism in the region. Mobilization related to the March Crisis in Poland (8–23 March) and the ‘Prague Spring’ in Czechoslovakia (5 January–21 August) was diffused throughout the countries, involving Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright worker and student strikes and developing network links between dissidents across borders (Williams 1997, 15). Although most attention has been paid to the 1956 and 1968 mobilizations, human rights organizations, such as the Helsinki Group promoting

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 64 Mapping Mass Mobilization human rights in the Soviet Bloc, are crucial to disseminating human rights norms throughout the region, and thus changing the manner in which dissident claims and repertoires were framed. This human rights discourse became the glue between cultural and labour activism (Gribanov and Rubenstein 2005). By the late 1970s activists had reformulated workers’ rights within a human rights discourse and when EE faced a fresh round of labour strikes, these included political as well as economic demands. The most famous labour strikes were organized in Poland (in Gdynia, Szczecin, Elblag and Gdansk). Most signiﬁcantly, the Gdansk Shipyard strike in 1976 marked the beginning of the Solidarno´s´c pro-democracy movement (Staniszkis 1981). During this period the institutional networks of labour and cultural SMOs were strengthened by their collaboration. This was also an important period of intergenerational learning opportunities, as individual actors in national liberation and human rights activism overlapped in their participation, exchanged their experiences, setting precedents for the mobilizations in the 1980s.

Period II – Dissident mobilization in Ukraine 1955–1979

Although opposition groups existed in Soviet Ukraine during Stalinism, after the 1956 thaw underground activism began to multiply (Brumberg 1968). Using mobilization theory it could be argued that the de-Stalinization period was a ‘political opportunity structure’ that created a momentary space for intellectual freedom. Using pre-existing SMO networks, individual activists began mobilizing and demanded the protection of cultural-linguistic and human rights. The dissident groups of the 1960s did not oppose Soviet Com- munism per se but rather the use of socialist rhetoric of equality to impose Russification (Liber and Mostovych 1978). Protest events were organized in opposition to the destruction of cultural monuments, the control and banning of Ukrainian language publications, the falsification of Ukrainian history, the policies of Russification, and generally demanded the protection of political, religious, ethnic and workers’ rights. As noted by activists and experts in interviews, non-violent struggle against the Soviet regime was a key element of the Ukrainian dissident movement and not a ‘new’ repertoire of the Orange Revolution. Contrary to widespread assumptions, the Ukrainian dissident movement was geographically widespread and active in all Ukrainian regions. In the 1970s there were an equal number of political arrests in western and eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2004a). In western Ukraine the dissident movement was made up largely of national liberation Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright or religious claims, while in eastern Ukraine national and religious concerns were combined with human rights and labour claims. The protection of human rights was central to activism in large cities in eastern and southern Ukraine (Kharkiv, Odesa, current day Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, Donets’k). By the end of the 1970s even these groups had moved closer to National

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 65

Liberation rhetoric. It is important to note that as in the rest of EE, mobilization in Ukraine peaked between 1965 and 1969 and again in 1976, but was faced with violent repression and waves of arrests directly after each peak (see Table 3.3). The Ukrainian dissident movement was mostly based in the intelligentsia. As noted by activist and young public intellectual Ostap Kryvky:

...thedissidentsinﬂuencedactivistsforgenerationstocome...‘the Shestidesyatniki’ used alternative education and information as a tool against the regime ...intellectual activism based on the promotion of culture and language can beneﬁt all of society and create a space for like-minded activists. (Ostap Kryvdyk, yellow Pora activist and journalist, 7/18/2007, Kyiv)

Thus, the ideas of radical activism through cultural and non-violent repertoires link the various SMOs, from the 1950s onwards. The expansion of intellectual activism in Ukraine was marked by the establishment in 1963 of a loose network of dissident writers across the Soviet Union, dubbed the Shestidesyatniki (the ‘sixtiers’ or the generation of the 1960s). In Ukraine, the Shestidesyatniki were a group of writers, poets and literary critics, some previously connected to Prosvita, who were members of the Klub Tvorchoyi Molodi (The Club of Creative Youth) (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2004b). Although there was no formal membership, the majority of Ukrainian dissidents active in the 1960s were de facto ‘members’ or had strong ties to the organization (Bilocerkowycz 1988, 23–31). The Shestidesyatniki (notably: Ivan Drach, Viacheslav Chornovil, Valentyn Moroz, Vasyl’ Stus, Vasyl’ Symonenko and Ivan Svitlychnyi) were most famous for their satirical samvydav (samizdat in Ukrainian) critiques of communist society, life and Party. One very inﬂuential samvydav publication was the anonymous newsletter Ukraiin’skyi Vistnyk (Ukrainian Bulletin) (1970– 1973) (see Table 3.4), founded by the attorney, human rights activist and political prisoner Viacheslav Chornovil (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2004c). Chornovil himself resumed publishing the Bulletin between 1987 and 1990 and along with other Shestidesyatniki was also one of the key founders of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and Rukh (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2005, Rusnachenko 1998, Zakharov 2004). The Shestidesyatniki became a symbol of national resistance and were severely persecuted and imprisoned for their activities. There were three main waves of repressions and arrests of Ukrainian Dissi- dents in 1965–1966, 1972, and 1976–1980 (Bilocerkowycz 1988). In response Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to an increase in the repression of Ukrainian dissidents and political prisoners, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was founded in 1976. The group’s goal was to monitor the Soviet government’s compliance with the Helsinki Accords (Krawchenko et al. 1983, 43–44). As in the rest of the region, the rise of human rights rhetoric was concurrent with the rise of labour strikes in

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch

66 1000 1 2000 139 1 1000–2000 Est. # of participants Kyiv Kyiv Dnipropetrovsk 300 Vyshhorod 350 Kyiv Kyiv City Kyiv 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Hunger strikes by political prisoners on the Day of Soviet Political Prisoners. Hunger strikes by political prisoners on the Day of Ukrainian Political prisoners. Hunger strikes by political prisonersdecree on beginning the ‘the anniversary red of terror’, the and signing leading of to the the 1918 creation of political camps. Hunger strikes by political prisoners on Human Rights Day. member of the S hestidesyatniki . the city of Dnipropetrovsk. authorities. On the 51st anniversary ofhimself the on October fire Revolution in of centralHe Kyiv. 1917, proclaimed Vasyl the Makukh slogans set ‘RidUkraine’ Ukraine as of he the set himself colonizers’ on and fire. ‘Long live free Description restriction of culturo-linguistic rights. Residents signed a letter in opposition to the abuses of local political and police Ukraine were violently repressed by KGB special operations units. Residents signed a letter in protest to a waveResidents of signed arrests the as ‘Letter well from as Creative the Youth’ continued protesting the Russification of Demonstration, protesting the trial of the activists Bohdan and Mykhailo Horyn. Lviv Demonstrations on the anniversary of the transfer of Taras Shevchenko’s body to Key protest events in Ukraine between 1965 and 1979 from 1974 from 1974 from 1972 from 1969 Every 30 October Every 12 January November 1970 Demonstrations broke out protesting the murder of activist Alla Horska – a Every 5 September August 1968 Every 10 December October 1968 February 1969 Mykola Beryslavsky attempted self-immolation near Kyiv University. May 1968 April 1968 Table 3.3 Month/year April 1966 Note : Data from interviews conductedData by from the Crowley author. (1995), Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (2004a, 2005), Kubicek (1999, 2002) and Siegelbaum and Walkowitz (1992, 1995). May 1967 Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 67

Table 3.4 Key Samvydav publications in Ukraine, 1950–1979

Date Author Title Substance

1955 13 Ukrainian Political ‘Open Letter to the Produced and Prisoners United Nations and disseminated by political the Human Rights prisoners serving Commission of the sentences of hard labour UN’ in Mordovian camps 1964 Vasyl Symonenko A pamphlet entitled A critical piece about the ‘On the Occasion of May 1964 suspicious Pogruzhalsky’s Trial’ burning of the Central Scientiﬁc Library of the Academy of Sciences in Kyiv in 1964 1964 Vasyl Symonenko ‘Appeal to the Communists of the World’, by the ‘Communists of Ukraine’ Valentyn Moroz ‘Report from the Beria Reserve’ 1966 Viacheslav Chornovil The Chornovil Papers Documented the 1966 trials of Ukrainian intellectuals Mykhailo Osadchy ‘Bil’mo’ (Cataract): prison memoirs. Pavlo Skochok The 1966 trial of Transcripts of political M. Ozerny trials Political prisoners Petitions and letters of (multiple authors) protest 1970 Collective of dissidents Ukrains’kyi vistnyk This became the main (Ukrainian newsletter detailing Gazette/News Letter) Ukrainian dissident activity, eight issues were published by 1973 1973 Zorian Popadiuk and Postup. Yaroslav Mykytka

Note: Data from interviews conducted by the author. Data from Crowley (1995), Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (2004a, 2005), Kubicek (1999, 2002), Siegelbaum and Walkowitz (1992, 1995).

Ukraine (see Table 3.5) (Thomas 2001, 165). Labour activists collaborated with the Helsinki Group and Kharkiv-based human rights protection groups. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright As noted by human rights activist, Yevhen Zolotariov, ‘we have had a very active human rights group in Kharkiv historically and it has been one of the most inﬂuential elements in Ukrainian activism and unionism, we were able to unite the two’ (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). In 2004,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 68 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Table 3.5 Labour strikes in Ukraine, 1960–1980

Date City Short description

1963 Kryvyi Rih Strike: Workers demanded that food prices be restored to lower levels and that the government deal with food shortages. 1963 Odesa Strike: Labourers in Odesa refused to load butter for export to Cuba, showing their disapproval for the USSR’s activities in the South American country. 1969 Berizka A wave of strikes at the hydroelectric station. 1972 Dnipropetrovsk A wave of protests in opposition to the increase of Russian labourers into factories as a result of migrations. 1972 Dniprodzerzhynsk Strike and violent clashes between workers (ironically protesting the harsh conduct of the local authorities) and police and armed forces. 1973 Kyiv A large strike at an automobile plant.

Note: Interview conducted by the author. Data from Crowley (1995), Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (2004a, 2005), Kubicek (1999, 2002), Siegelbaum and Walkowitz (1992, 1995). the Ukrainian Helsinki Group founded the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), an association of all human rights organizations in Ukraine (Verba, Yasen and Committee 1980). As noted in interviews, leading to the Orange Revolution, the UHHRU organized local systems of reporting the political repression of journalists, the electorate and electoral commission members. Their activities and membership overlapped with that of yellow and black Pora and other student and opposition SMOs. Ukrainian dissidents did not end their activity in 1980, but were forced to continue it underground or in exile. The period between 1975 and 1985 was highly repressive, and the majority of dissidents ﬂed the country or were incarcerated in prison camps and psychiatric hospitals. The massive repression was de-mobilizing in the case of the Soviet Union, but it did not destroy the legacy of activism in Ukraine. While imprisoned, dissidents such as Chornovil met with other activists from the entire Soviet Union, and when they came into contact in cells, they exchanged ideas and tactics, and their resolve was strengthened. Together, they organized numerous hunger strikes and together developed a new anti-Soviet discourse, drenched in democracy and civil rights rhetoric. But alas, unlike the majority of activists in Czechoslovakia and Poland, it was not until the Glasnost period in the second half of the 1980s that the Ukrainian dissident Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright leaders (and only those who survived) were released from prisons and camps. Among the unexpected outcomes of Glasnost was an opportunity structure for new mobilization in Ukraine (as well as in the rest of the region). Shortly after their release, the very same individuals active in the 1970s reactivated

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 69

National Liberation Movement

Other ethno-cultural Militant groups and political Cultural groups organizations

OUN Prosvita

OUN-M UPA OUN-B Young Prosvita

Dissident movement

Labour Human rights Student activism Intellectual activism unionization and movement strikes

Kyiv based Lviv based Sumy based Samyvydav Shestydesiatnyky Odesa based Donbas based students students students

Figure 3.3 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1979 previous SMO networks and began the organization of the independence movement called Narodnyi Rukh (Peoples’ Movement). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the influence of dissident activists permeated throughout Ukrainian society. Some key dissidents, like Chornovil, even became politicians and set up political parties after 1991. However, the most influential group were the Shestidesyatniki. By fusing National Liberation and human rights claims, yet promoting non-violent, intellec- tually based repertoires, the Shestidesyatniki represented a shift in Ukrainian activism. Institutionally, the dissident movement for the first time united SMO networks from the different regions of Ukraine. While it is evident that the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s were not themselves key activists in the 2004 mobilization, some remained key figures in political parties and acted as interlocutors between politicians and activists in the lead to mass mobilization. Much like OUN, the dissidents’ influence on future movements is their ability to frame mobilizational discourse and assure the continuity of particular claims (Figure 3.3).

Period III – Transition mobilization in Eastern Europe 1980–1991

In the early 1980s the Eastern European regimes experienced an increas- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ing difﬁculty in managing their economies and political systems through repression. The communist leaders were faced with severe political and economic crises. The long-term crises included political and administrative divisions within the communist regimes, the failure of the industrial

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 70 Mapping Mass Mobilization complex, shrinking economic growth rates and a growing informal economy. In the short term, a severe economic recession coupled with the war in Afghanistan exacerbated the Eastern bloc’s instability. Beginning in 1981, activists in Poland and Czechoslovakia were severely repressed and forced underground. There was a lull in activity until the latter half of the 1980s, when, in response to the growing socio-economic crisis in the Eastern bloc, Gorbachev announced the policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Perestroika and glasnost created ‘political opportunity structures’ for mobilization. These policies gave the Charter 77 and Solidarno´s´c movements the catalyst they needed. Although it is true that the role of SMOs is overestimated in the bigger picture of the demise of socialism, these organizations were important in setting the stage for mass mobilization and aided in strengthening the opposition and pro-democracy wings vis-à-vis the CPSU and local communist regimes. The policies and the rise in activism divided the CPSU leadership, who became more open to managing a transition with the opposition in order to retain some power. The year 1989 ended with a succession of ‘moments’ of mass mobilization across the region. By the end of 1991 the USSR had collapsed, and all the countries in the region were undergoing their own transitions to independence and democracy. Three themes dominated the mobilization. Structurally there was a combination of labour, dissident and student SMOs. In terms of actors, not only activists and politicians but also ‘ordinary’ people participated in protests. Finally, the ideological rhetoric combined a demand for western liberal values and living standards with the desire for national liberation through independence. The mobilization in the region peaked in 1981 and 1989–1991. The 1989–1990 protest events can be labelled (in Poland and East Germany) as moments of mass mobilization, as large groups of ‘ordinary’ people not connected to activist groups took part.

Period III – Transition in Ukraine: ‘New’ institutions and ideas 1980–1991

There were several ‘moments’ before 2004 ...the Ukraine Without Kuchma ...‘student hunger strikes’ ...‘revolution on the granite’ ...Some of us were part of these movements ...where do you think the ﬁrst tent-city came from 1990! ...it was a Ukrainian invention! Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist and National Deputy Pora Party, 4/19/2008, Kyiv

During the 1980s, nationalist, dissident, human rights and labour move- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ments shifted their focus towards independence and pro-democracy claims. After the imprisonment, persecution and ﬂight into exile of the majority of dissident and Helsinki Group activists in the late 1970s/early 1980s, there was a lull in activist mobilization as most activities moved underground. SMOs remained active between 1980 and 1986 but it was the onset of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 71 perestroika and then glasnost that created opportunity structures for the wave of mobilization activity peaking, as in the rest of the region between 1989 and 1991. Participation of a broader portion of the general public also increased throughout this period starting in the mid-1980s and ending in the Velvet Revolutions of 1989, which saw the en masse participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens. When in 1987–1988 Ukrainian dissidents began returning from prisons and exile, they quickly began to play an active role in formal politics. Former dissidents became leaders in newly formed political parties, started to again produce and disseminate banned publications and organize new and rein- state old SMOs (Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist and National Deputy Pora Party, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). As explained by insiders of the process, the two years between 1986 and 1988 marked the end of the dissident movement and the beginning of a new phase of activism, characterized by much wider participation of ‘ordinary’ people and an increased focus on civil rights and democratization, and Ukrainian independence. In interviews, experts explained that the most well-known SMO of this period was the People’s Movement of Ukraine or Rukh (Ukrainian for ‘movement’), which first began its activity as a loose network of literary and language protection groups. Established in 1989 as the People’s Movement in Support of Perestroika, Rukh was reorganized as a political party in 1990. Rukh’s main goals, right out of the OUN and dissident playbooks, were to protect the Ukrainian language and culture and to re-establish the independence of Ukraine (Pavlo Kachur, former National Depute and Min- ister of Construction and Architecture of Ukraine, Rukh Party, 7/20/2009, Kyiv). It co-organized mass demonstrations in 1990 and 1991 (‘Rukh About Us’ 2008). Rukh’s organizers, most famously shestidesyatniki Viacheslav Chornovil and Ivan Drach, had deep ties to former dissident groups and saw Rukh more as a continuation of their previous activity (Satzewich 2003, 20). Throughout the 1990s the movement continued activities and coordinated a youth wing called Molodyi Rukh (Young Movement). But in order to maintain its independence, Molodyi Rukh was formalized and registered as a separate SMO. The founding members of Rukh, specifically those involved in the Union of Ukrainian Writers, also reactivated Prosvita in Kyiv in 1988 (Prosvita 2010). Prosvita joined Rukh in demanding the protection of the Ukrainian language and socio-political reconstruction. Yaryna Yasynevych, a black Pora leader, explained that Prosvita was highly influential in expanding civic networks in western and central Ukraine and uniting young activists: Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ...‘molodaprosvita’, this is the beginning of my and many others’ activism, ...together ‘moloda prosvita’ members joined the Ukraine Without Kuchma Movement ... and then the Committee for Truth . . . and then, [black] Pora ... it united a generation. (Yaryna Yasynevych, black Pora activist, 4/16/2008, Kyiv)

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 72 Mapping Mass Mobilization

‘Moloda Prosvita’ organizations focused on the education of a new generation of young Ukrainians. Through detailed process tracing we can identify this SMO as one of main networks from which the broad majority of ‘leaders’ of SMOs active in 2004 were drawn. Thus, the same dissidents who were involved in activities in the 1960s and 1970s, and who started Rukh, were also key institution builders during the transition period, setting up the framework of SMO networks, and recruiting and uniting a new generation of activists. Moreover these transition era SMOs also actively worked to mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens, at an unprecedented level. There are two important moments of mass protest during this transition period, the 1986 Chornobyl protests and the ‘Revolution on the Granite. While the former was a direct reaction to the lack of information around the Chornobyl Nuclear Plant explosion in April 1986, the latter was sig- niﬁcant as a hunger strike and protest campaign organized by Ukrainian students in 1990 and supported by Rukh (Muravs’kyj 2008). The student activists demanded the ‘nationalization’ and ‘Ukrainization’ of the property and industry owned and controlled by CP, the resignation of the Council of Ministers of Ukraine, and democratic elections (Oleksandr Doniy, National Deputy (unafﬁliated) and student leader of Revolution on the Granite and the Last Barricade Movement, 07/06/2008, Kyiv). After tracing key participants of the student hunger strikes and the ‘Revolution on the Granite,it is evident that some of the younger coordinators of these events, such as Oleksandr Doniy, would later go on to become leaders of the most important SMOs of the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests and inspire or train the leaders of SMOs involved in the 2004 mass mobilization. This period’s pro-independence and pro-democracy mobilization was based directly on the structures and ideas of the previous SMOs and even founded or coordinated by the same groups of actors as the national liberation and dissident movements. Institutionally, the networks underwent a generational shift and while using former SMO structures, they changed in size and regional scope, spreading to central and southern Ukraine. The mobilizations in Kyiv on the Maidan, and the creation of youth wings, are the variables connecting activism in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma (UBK) and 2004 Orange Revolution (see Figure 3.4). Although the dissident activists became involved in formal politics they continued to act as mentors to the next generation of activists.

Period IV – Democratization and NGO-ization in Eastern Europe 1991–2002 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright The 1990s were a period of economic and political liberalization, reckless privatization and general politico-economic restructuring in EE. In some countries, such as Georgia and Yugoslavia, independence left ethno-national questions unanswered, or re-opened them, which coupled with elite power

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 73

National Liberation Movement

Other ethno- Militant groups cultural and political Cultural groups organizations

OUN Prosvita

OUN-M UPA OUN-B Young Prosvita

Dissident movement

Labour Human rights Student activism Intellectual activism unionization and movement strikes

Kyiv based Lviv based Sumy based Samyvydav Shestydesiatnyky Odesa based Donbas based students students students

Independence movement

Congress of Student hunger Revolution on Postup Rukh Ukrainian nationalists strikes the Granite connected to OUN

Figure 3.4 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–1991

struggles led to wars and ethnic cleansing. While some countries were guided along the path of European Union accession, and from 1994 onwards received funding and incentives to ‘Europeanize’, others such as Ukraine were not yet accepted by their western neighbours, and essentially expected to fend for themselves. During this period there was a general decline of protest events, labour strikes and activism. Attention shifted to building civil society, and thus there was a dramatic increase of foreign funding for ‘democracy promotion’. Foreign organizations set out to ‘...create a liberal, west-friendly, civil society network in the region’ (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). Hundreds of millions of dollars were thrown at the ‘...“civil society” problem ...’ in EE (Ibid.). The results were mixed: Some foreign NGOs were successfully taken over by local practitioners (for example, the Soros Open Society Institutes), but many local NGOs struggled, closed down, minimized their activities or simply stayed completely dependent on Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright external sponsorship (Phillips 2008, 81–83). Although the ‘civil society’ promotion paradigm is a difﬁcult trend to access, after several years of inactivity, in the late 1990s and 2000s a wave of protests and electoral revolutions seemed to spread across the region like a slow moving disease.

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The wave of mobilizations now referred to as the ‘colour revolutions’ has been framed as a foreign NGO-sponsored phenomenon, which was made possible by the western-led diffusion of protest technologies. Yet, what analyses often fail to acknowledge is that this wave of protests is actually quite dispersed and divergent, and thus, perhaps, is better explained by endogenous factors and contexts. Beginning in 1998 in Slovakia, OK98 sponsored a ‘get out the vote’ campaign leading to a key election. The repertoires of the ‘colour revolutions’ that followed seem to mimic that of OK98.They involved student activism, ‘get out the vote’ campaigns, the use of catchy ‘positive’ slogans, election monitoring teams, the use of hotlines and ﬁnally street protest in city centres. The 2000 ‘Bulldozer Revolution’ in Serbia resulted in the overthrow of Milosevic (White and McAllister 2009). The repertoires and claims were similar to OK98 but the majority of activists were students who were connected to the SMO Otpor. In 2003, Georgian Khmara is said to have helped coordinate the ‘Rose Revolution’. This was followed by the Orange Revolution and ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. But these events greatly differed from each other. The 2005 protests in Kyrgyzstan were never larger than 10,000–30,000 participants, while the 2004 Ukrainian protests included two million participants (White and McAllister 2009). Belarusian students, activists and opposition groups attempted to organize the ‘Denim Revolution’ in 2006. Notably ‘ordinary’ citizens did not participate in this protest event at the same levels as else- where, furthermore, the regime violently repressed the protests. Lastly, the attempted ‘Birch Revolution’ in Russia in 2008 was equally unsuccessful in attracting en masse participation, yet, out of all the cases, its activists had received the most foreign NGO training, support and funding (Lane and White 2010). But if we analyse these events from a social movement theory perspective, the differences in the resources used, coordinating network structures, in part the types of claims and the composition, size and duration of the protest events, outweigh the similarities. This is especially true if we consider the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Few of these instances can be compared to the estimated 20–25 per cent of the Ukrainian population that took part in the protests (KIIS 2005, Lane 2008). Thus, while following a regional trend, the Ukrainian moment was in some ways ‘exceptional’. A uniting factor between all of the cases was that former dissidents-turned politicians and student SMOs were key organizers of the protest events. Thus, again demonstrating historical continuity in activist networks, claims and, in most cases, repertoires.

Period IV – Democratization and NGO-ization in Ukraine - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 1992–2002

While the 1990s were a period of regime change, state-building and the establishment of new quasi-democratic ‘rules of the game’, the second half of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 75 the 1990s should be considered a regressive period in Ukraine, in terms of the development of democracy. This period saw a burgeoning of the informal black market economy, a rise in poverty rates, wild privatization of industry and the expansion of maﬁa-style criminal networks (D’Anieri 2006b, Wilson 2005). After the initial boom in ‘Ukrainization’, the re-election of Kuchma in 1999 marked a turn away from both democratization and nation- state building. Clientelist networks, dubbed clans, came to rule both the economic and political spheres, and Ukraine became an oligarchic hybrid regime, with an authoritarian tinge. Activism in 1990s also underwent a phase of transition and for a while disappeared from public view. Three themes persisted throughout this period: The NGO-ization and formalization of SMOs, the continuation and expansion of student activism, and after 1999, an increase in the use of repression and even severe violence against activist and opposition networks. Unlike the Polish and Czech cases, in 1991 the Ukrainian dissidents did not take over the majority of top political, governmental and NGO posts but had to share these roles with former CP elite, who were sceptical of ‘western’ outsiders and sought to maintain their clientelist networks. According to practitioners on the ground, foreign NGOs faced systemic obstacles in the running of their operations. Nonetheless, foreign funding ﬁltered into the country. The Soros Renaissance Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy and the German Marshall Fund had the greatest impact on the establishment of local NGOs, but the World Bank and IBRD programmes focusing on good governance and civil society also had an important effect (Ottaway and Carothers 2000, 189). These foreign actors provided basic administrative training, as well as project and small grants funding (Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). The introduction of small grants has been expressly highlighted in interviews as ‘a key source of funding’ for activists (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). The foreign NGOs also organized and sponsored regional and national conferences on various ‘civil society’ topics, giving activists and like-minded practitioners the opportunity to meet, interact and form network alliances (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). It is important to note that these grants and conferences did not build up new networks, but supported already existing ones. As noted by long-time activist Ostap Kryvdyk:

...I know that the NGOs funded the conferences and gave us grants ...but we had to ﬁnd out about them ourselves ...We had to already have an interest in civic activity ...already be activists ...have experience ...otherwise it would not have made a difference . . . Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv)

Western NGOs and their funding were not the foundation of any mobilization or activism that followed in Ukraine. Most activists already had a strong

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 76 Mapping Mass Mobilization protest resume prior to entering the world of western NGOs. The activist networks were nonetheless strengthened and consolidated with the help of the conferences and funding. At the same time the inﬂux of uncoordinated civil society funding, as described by insiders who were interviewed, led to the growth of what locals call ‘hranto-iidy’ or ‘grant-devourers’, a series of organizations, think tanks and individuals who made a career out of applying for grants. Thus, while NGO-ization and foreign funding aided some activists in their activities, insiders explain that much of the grant money simply fell through the cracks, not only in Ukraine but also in the region as a whole. The 1990s saw the continuation of the rebuilding of previously active organizations. Using the new SMOs’ institutional make up, dissidents coordinated a new cohort, who in time took over the organizations and sought more autonomy from the old guard. The majority of the reactivated organizations were youth and student SMOs. As detailed by a yellow Pora coordinator:

...ourﬁrsttasteofactivism...came in party youth-wings and student organizations coordinated by dissidents and those that coordinated the Revolution on the Granite ... (Yuriy Polyukhovych, yellow Pora Kyiv activist, 8/3/2008, Kyiv)

The formerly clandestine groups like Studenske Bratstvo (Student Brother- hood) and Ukrains’ke Bratstvo (Ukrainian Brotherhood) connected previously to the NLM, re-emerged on university campuses as progressive nationally oriented SMOs. They supported the promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture in academia, media and politics, as well as freedom of speech and civil rights (Anton Berezhnyi, yellow Pora activist, 4/13/2008, Kyiv). Moreover the student activists who took part in these SMOs and the ‘Revo- lution on the Granite’ also joined Molodyj Rukh and other party youth-wings starting in 1993. This decade also witnessed the renaissance of mobilization in eastern Ukraine. The reinvigorated SMOs in the region were as before composed of student, human rights and labour organizations. As explained by activist leader Yevhen Zolotariov, SMO mobilization was centred in larger cities, and there were particularly active groups in Kharkiv and Sumy, and to a lesser extent in Luhansk and Donets’k oblasts. Even during the Kuchma regime, when the eastern regions were under severe control of clientelistic networks, students from Kharkiv and Sumy organized human rights and Ukraine With- out Kuchma protest events. In his interview, Zolotariov went into details about how his own student activism in Kharkiv overlapped with activities Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright taking place in Kyiv, describing how over time activism in the regions collaborated more with Capital (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). Mykhailo Plotnikov, one of the coordinators of the yellow Pora tent cities and Maidan protests, himself from the Donbas region, also stressed that he was heavily

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine 1920–2004 77 influenced by Memorial and the Kharkiv Human Rights Group and that he joined the Ukrainian Brotherhood shortly before moving to Kyiv (Mykhailo Plotnikov, yellow Pora activist, 7/09/2008, Kyiv). A key national organization that was particularly active starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the Committee of Ukrainian Voters in Donets’k and was credited by local experts with being one of the most active branches in the country. Through process tracing we can identify a network of coordinated activists and SMOs in eastern Ukraine in the late 1990s, albeit less prominent and mobilizing on a smaller scale; these islands of contention were significant and represented some continuity from previous decades. After the re-election of Kuchma in 1999 the state of Ukrainian politics took a more negative turn. Kuchma and his regime employed ‘machine politics’ to manipulate the electoral system, commit fraud, repress opposition views and control the production and dissemination of information (D’Anieri 2006a). Activist and non-governmental organizations ‘came under attack and some were forcibly closed down under suspicion of various con- cocted charges ...such as “tax fraud” ’ (Volodymyr Chemerys, coordinator of Ukraine Without Kuchma Campaign, 7/10/2008, Kyiv). As explained in interviews, journalists in particular felt the brunt of the political repression. Kuchma’s administration produced daily temnyky (dark notes), which outlined acceptable news stories. Journalists and media outlets that did not follow these ‘informal’ rules would risk intimidation or violence (Unnamed, Channel 5 anchor, 8/8/2009, Podil, Kyiv). Bearing the burden of political repression, journalists became the strongest and largest cohort of activists in Ukraine in the 1990s. Journalists connected by professional networks over time began holding informal meetings in Kyiv locations such as Bar Baraban to discuss the violation of democratic rights. Here they developed independent news sources and debated the potential usefulness of protest activities, and some committed to publishing exposés, critical of the regime. Unfor- tunately, such activism by the media led to the tragic disappearance and death of journalist Georgiy Gongadze. This devastating incident triggered the first post-transition mass protest, the Ukraina Bez Kuchmy or Ukraine Without Kuchma (UBK) movement. The events that followed were a pre- lude to the 2004 Orange Revolution, many of the same activists who led the 1991 protest events and many who coordinated SMOs in 2004 were key participants in UBK protests. The September 2000 disappearance of Gongadze, an activist-journalist critical of the regime, and the subsequent surfacing of his headless corpse on 3 November, shocked ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians and triggered the mobilization of activists. On 28 November, Socialist Party Leader Oleksandr Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Moroz publicized secret recordings of meetings held in Kuchma’s office made by Mykola Melnychenko, a presidential guard, thereby confirming the rumours of Kuchma’s implication in Gongadze’s murder. Transcripts of the tapes were quickly distributed online including through the newly created

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Maidan Inform (Åslund and McFaul 2006, 76, ‘Ukrainian Transcripts of the Melnychenko Tapes’ 2001; ‘The English Translations’). As Kuchma’s implication became clearer, activists began to mobilize within days of the tapes’ publication (Mykhailo Svystovych, activist, journalist, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). The network of activists consisted of former dissidents, party members, journalists, former student activists of the ‘Revolution on the Granite’, and university students. As noted by a participant, ‘we mobilized after losing one of our own, everyone who had any civic experience joined in’ (Unnamed, Channel 5 anchor, 8/8/2009, Podil, Kyiv). Two separate tusovky (cliques or networks) of activists began organizing protests in demanding Kuchma’s resignation, and an investigation into his role in Gongadze’s murder. Experienced politicians and former activists, Volodymyr Chemerys and Yuriy Lutsenko were the de facto leaders of the two different mobilizations (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). The first group organized under the banner UBK and included a broad coalition of opposition members and dissident and student SMOs. They organized a campaign of protests between November 2000 and March 2001. The first protest was organized for 15 December and lasted until 27 December. A small ‘tent-city’ was erected, with approximately 10,000 participants. The protest zone was cleared by police under the pretext of the commencement of construction on the Maidan. On 14 January 2001 the group launched the second phase of UBK protests. The activists erected a ‘tent-city’ on Khreshchatyk Street in the centre of Kyiv. As explained by long-time activists, the format attributed to the Orange Revolution was tried out in 2001. This included tent cities, concerts and food distribution points (Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv). On 1 March 2001 the first wave of police repressions and detentions hit the protesters (Ibid.). Student strikes in universities as well as smaller maidan protests in Lviv and other western and central Ukrainian cities supported the protest events in Kyiv (Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Kyiv). The UBK quickly became a trans-Ukrainian moment of activist and student mobilization. Following the annual tradition begun by dissidents in the 1960s, on 8 March 2002, on the anniversary of Taras Shevchenko’s birth, a group of activists and party members organized a UBK protest event at the large mon- ument of the poet opposite Shevchenko University. The event was intended to be peaceful; the protestors laid down flowers and called for the protection of freedom of speech (Ibid.). The same day a protest was organized on Bankivska Street, the location of the Presidential Administration. The protests turned violent on 9 March, when what were suspected to be ‘hired provocateurs’ began throwing bottles at the police, ‘resulting in a bloody Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright clash between activists and police ...’ (Ibid.). Over 300 people were arrested and many protesters were beaten (‘Maidan Website’ 2002, Ukraine Without Kuchma 2001). When making arrests Kyiv police identified ‘law breakers’ by whether they were wearing any ‘UBK-related symbols, such as the Ukrainian

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flag or crest/tryzub, or if they were speaking in Ukrainian’ (Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Kyiv). Key figures received sentences ranging from a couple of months to five years in prison (‘Maidan Website’ 2002, ‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’ 2001). This severe repression was a signal that the regime was united and strong; the activists, in cooperation with the opposition, would have to coordinate a long-term plan that would enable them to mobilize more ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, who were conspicuously not joining in in the numbers activists hoped for. After the repressions, it was necessary for the activist organizations to regroup, reorient and in some instances begin recruiting the next generation of activists. As noted by Ostap Kryvdyk:

Many lessons were learned, on our own skin ...we knew that we had to get more bodies out on to the street ...and learn crowd control. We organized meetings ...we discussed strategies ...we had to re-organize. (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv)

On 19 March, a group of activists met in the Budynok Uchytelya (House of Teachers) and founded the All-Ukrainian Public Resistance Committee for the Truth!, for short, Za Pravdu! (For Truth!) (Ukraine Without Kuchma Protests’ 2001). The committee started out with a document published by Lviv-based activists, demanding truth about Gongadze’s disappearance and murder. Over the course of 2001 the organization set up cross-national committees that included activists, politicians, journalists, intellectuals, NGO practitioners and students. The goal ‘was to create a network of like-minded organizations on the territory of Ukraine’ (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). In social movement theory terms, Za Pravdu! became a mobilizational structure that connected and strengthened activist networks across Ukraine. Andryi Yusov, the Odesa regional head of Za Pravdu! and other key members, Volodymyr Viatrovych, Yevhen Zolotariov and Vladyslav Kaskiv went on to become leaders of the two Pora SMOs in 2004 (‘Maidan Website’ 2002). Importantly, in 2004 Yuriy Lutsenko took on the role of key interlocutor between the SMOs and Yushchenko’s presidential campaign. Again, in tracing their activity we can identify an evolution of activism, and continuity not previously understood by transitologists studying the region. The mobilization behind the UBK protests and Za Pravdu! solidiﬁed the network ties between various activists and their SMOs. As noted by Svystovych, ‘because of this overlap, we all knew each other, I knew who Kaskiv was and he knew who I was ...most of us could pick out the top 50 activists in a crowd of a thousand if we needed to’ (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). By 2002/2003, the key actors, networks and Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright claims of the 2004 protests were known to the activist community; because of their increased inter-network coordination, the structural ‘stage’ was set. Most activists interviewed described the 2004 events as a continuation of UBK.

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The post-UBK period was a phase of heightened SMO growth and consolidation. In the fall of 2003 a group of young Lviv-based activists who knew each other from their activities in Moloda Prosvita,UBKandZa Pravdu! began coordinating a youth SMO against Kuchma’s regime (‘Kuchmizm’). By December 2003 they combined their efforts with the Kyiv-based network Maidan and in February 2004 they named themselves Pora (black). Shortly after, in January 2004, a group of activists from Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv combined their networks of the Civic Organization Khvylia Svobody (Wave of Freedom), Ukrains’ke Bratstvo, the Kharkiv Human Rights Orga- nization, and by March 2004, had consolidated under the name Civic Organization Pora (yellow) (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). The two Poras united against Kuchmizm in August in preparation for the 2004 elections (Yaryna Yasynevych, black Pora activist, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). There were over 20 other SMOs coordinating various activities, from early monitoring and education on election laws and civic rights to direct action campaigns (Dmytro Potekhin, Znayu activist and NGO practitioner, 8/14/2008, Kyiv). Their cooperation with elite actors, their dissemination of information and their coordination brought together a combination of actors active in 1991 and 2001. They fused mobilizational frames of National Liberation and Human Rights and were the glue between SMO networks that had developed since 1991. Most importantly they brought their mobilization to ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, making their involvement a key goal. In many ways the legacies of activism inherited by activists helped them gain momentum in the lead up to mass mobilization in 2004 (see Figure 3.5).

Conclusions: A trajectory of Ukrainian activism 1920–2002

There is a strong element of continuity throughout the course of 20th- century mobilization in Ukraine. Because ﬁrst-hand accounts and process tracing were used, the historical trajectory of mobilization, as presented in this chapter, can possibly overestimate the extent of mobilization and continuity, but at the same time, without the use of these methods and data sources, we would miss a crucial dimension. The main connectivity between the four periods of mobilization in Ukraine is found in the continuity of mobilizational frames and protest claims that centre around National Liberation and the protection of the Ukrainian language and culture. These foundational ideas travelled through the networks and SMOs, which were connected over time by the intergenerational learning between actors. There are institutional network connections between all of the periods as the SMOs overlap in their membership. These Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright network connections are most obvious during the 1980s and 1990s and then again between 2000 and 2004. From 1976 onwards, there is also considerable intergenerational learning between all the phases of heightened activity. In terms of participants, it is evident that only in some instances is there

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National Liberation Movement

Other ethno-cultural Militant groups and political Cultural groups organizations

OUN Prosvita

OUN-M UPA OUN-B Young Prosvita

Dissident movement

Labour Human rights Student activism Intellectual activism unionization and movement strikes

Kyiv based Lviv based Sumy based Samyvydav Shestydesiatnyky Odesa based Donbas based students students students

Independence movement

Congress of Student hunger Revolution of the Postup Rukh Ukrainian strikes Granite nationalists connected to OUN Pro-democracy anti-Kuchma movement Helsinki Group for Human Rights

Komitet Za UBK Maidan Young Prosvita Pravdu Kharkiv Groups for Human Rights

Figure 3.5 Network connectivity in Ukraine, 1920–2004 actual actor continuity. For instance the early national liberation period and the dissident movement mostly shared institutional (Prosvita) and ideological connections. Although the majority of OUN members were in exile, they actively supported the dissidents and their endeavours. The dissident activists were key organizers of 1989–1991 protests and new political parties. The student and dissident activists reactivated the youth SMOs in the 1990s, which created the institutional structures for next generation activism from 2001 to today. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 4 Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920–2001

the most important movements? ...these are ...the unions, the radical/leftist and unemployed workers’ movements ...the militant students and the Joventude Peronista ...in different formations [in different organizations], at different periods they make the connected map of militancy in Argentina. Matias Triguboff, 3/20/2009, Buenos Aires

Introduction

Social movements in LA seem to follow a similar pattern of busts and booms to those in EE. The main difference is that the claims through which mobilization has been framed seem to be almost opposite. Whereas liberal and nationalist ideas were combined in EE, socialist and socio-economic claims were the key in predominant opposition movements in LA. Based on Argentine interviewees’ responses, key protest events and SMOs were traced historically – the most often mentioned are featured in Table 4.1. On the basis of these responses an archival, media and literature review was again conducted, and process tracing was used to identify links and discontinu- ities between the different phases of mobilization. In the case of LA and speciﬁcally Argentina, I have traced the ideological roots of mobilization to the claims and repertoires of early unionism and populism (Peronismo speciﬁcally). The rhetoric of social mobilization in Argentina (and in LA more broadly) has developed from National Liberation and populist unionism to include broader human and civic rights issues. This chapter maps the trajectory and connectivity between and within moments and movements in Argentina Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright from 1920 to 2001. This chapter is divided into four phases: Period I: Begin- nings 1920–1959, Period II: Authoritarian Regime 1960–1979, Period III: Transition, 1980–1990 and Period IV: Democratization 1990–2001. The argument is made that, as in the case of Ukraine and EE, different SMOs and

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Table 4.1 Moments and movements most often referenced in interviews and focus groups in Argentina

Protest events SMOs Foreign inﬂuences

2001 Cacerolazo, Peronismo (Joventude) USA-negative 1983 Protestas de la Piqueteros Foreign NGOs Guerra de las Motoneros Che Guevara Malvinas, Radicalismo-(leftist Hugo Chavez 1989–1990 militants) of the 1960s The MAS Bolivia Protests/food riots, Movimiento Obrero The MST Brazil 1969 Puebladas: CTA Zapatistas Mexico Rosariazo, Córdobazo, Asambleas Anarchist movement in Italy Corrientazo, Autoconvocados French Unionism 1956 in Plaza de Mayo MTD Solidarnos´c´ 1996 Cutral Co Barrios de Pie Poland 2002 Anti-Violence FTV Protests Co-opertativismo 2008 Campo Protests CCC 2009 Campo Protests Student organizations

Note: Displayed in descending order of most often mentioned. protest events are connected over time through actors, ideas (claims and mobilizational frames) or institutions (SMO networks) and follow a pattern of busts and booms of mobilization. As in Chapter 3, a temporal snapshot of mobilization that is presented through the use of a map of the network connections between SMOs is also presented at the end of each section. Here I highlight key SMOs and how they connect to the broader movement. Unless otherwise stated, the empirical content presented in Chapter 4 is based on the comments, mapping and documents presented by activists in interviews and focus group discussions.

Period I – The beginnings of mobilization in Latin America 1920–1950

During this period Latin American countries were undergoing national ‘revolutions’, breaking colonial ties, and after 1945 were pawns in Cold War ‘proxy’ conﬂicts between the United States and the Soviet Union. This period was marked mainly by the rise in organized unionism and communist mobilization. In the early 1900s, Brazil and Argentina were among the ﬁrst to witness the power of the workers, with the onset of general Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright strikes, factory occupations and the expansion of industrial unionization. As in EE, there was also a rise of right-wing movements in opposition to the centre-left and populist regimes in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia (Bethell and Roxborough 1997, 19). After the Second World War, Chile, El

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 84 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Salvador and Mexico were all faced with communist and nationalist militant movements (Joseph and Spenser 2008, 20). During this phase, the main ideological themes of mobilization were socialist, labour (union) and anti-colonial (indigenous) claims. Structurally, powerful unions and populist leaders used these ideologies to promote or maintain their political control. Populism in LA is usually traced back to Juan Peron, who like other populist leaders adopted a nationalist and redistributive rhetoric (Di Tella 1965, 47–74). The main participants of these populist movements were members of the working class and urban poor. It is worth noting that throughout this initial period, the majority of the movements were co-opted by elite factions. This phenomenon of connectivity to political projects and parties has had a long-term impact on mobilization in the region; throughout history the boundaries between formal politics and activist mobilization have been difﬁcult to decipher.

Period I – Labour and populist beginnings in Argentina 1920–1950

Argentine mobilization between 1920 and 1950 was rooted in the ideology of labour and Peronist movements, framing mobilization in terms of protection and advancement of the worker. As noted by Edguardo De Petri, a CTA leader, ‘...we have a strong history of the conception of the worker in this country; you really cannot understand mobilization today without looking back to Peronismo and the early Unions’ (Edgardo De Petri, Secretary of Organization of the CTA, 3/19/2009, Buenos Aires). It is difficult to separate the two movements as their leadership and participants overlap. Participants’ demands centred on the identity of the ‘worker’ and ‘workers’ rights’. The ideologies collided between socialist perspectives on the ‘proletariat’ and populist rhetoric of ‘equality and redistribution’ for the ‘common man’. Institutionally, mobilization was directed and controlled by union networks or clientelist networks of the populist regime (Campo 2005, 36). Participation in SMOs, marches and strikes secured access to certain services and privileges, from employment security to hand-outs of food and clothing (Auyero 2001, 167–168). For many, to mobilize was to secure their family’s basic needs. Although the history of Argentine labour unionism begins earlier, it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that the unions began to play a powerful role in the political sphere. The first union, the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), was founded in 1901 (Campo 2005, 33). In January 1919, the FORA organized demonstrations in Patagonia, which came to be known Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright as the Patagonia Rebelde. From its inception the FORA was fragmented ideologically between socialist/Trotskyist hardliners and moderates, leading to a series of splits. This legacy of ideological conflict foreshadows future divisions between Peronists, unionists, and even the Piqueteros.

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At the time of the 1930 military coup, three trade unions existed in Argentina: The FORA, the most radical in its socialist ideological adher- ence; the Unión Sindical de Argentina (USArg, founded in 1922, absorbed the moderate FORA faction); and the Confederation Obrera de Argentina (COA, founded in 1926). The latter two unions were more conservative ideologically and had stronger ties to the government. After the coup, Pres- ident Uriburu, who had taken power, dissolved the FORA due to what he considered its socialist tendencies (Alexander 2003). On 20 September 1930, the COA and the USArg merged to make up CGT, which would become the most powerful institution of labour mobilization for decades to come. As mentioned by practitioners in interviews, the military government’s support of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies in 1935 created a political opportunity structure for unions to strengthen their bargaining power. Strikes and protests, although met with repression and violence, became more prevalent and maintained the confrontational position of unions vis-à-vis the government. This early labour activism was the foundation of the ideas and institutional structures of future mobilization framed around workers’ rights and socialist redistribution. Labour activism, although strong, did not take over the sphere of socio- political contention until Peron and his populist political machine came to power. For those unfamiliar with the case of Argentina it is difficult to explain the interrelationship of labour unionism, Peronism and leftist militancy. Peronist insiders explained in interviews that institutionally there were/are four different overlapping networks: The formal Justicialista Party, labour unionism under the umbrella of the CGT, Peronist ‘movement’ organizations and radical leftist/Peronist youth wings. In the 1940s and 1960s the CGT and the Justicialista Party were far from uniformly united in their support for Peron, even though the majority faction organized militant groups and mobilized supporters in defence of Peron and Peronismo. As Secretary of Labour in 1943, Juan Peron began creating personalized institutional opportunities for mobilization. Peron used the union networks to foster mass support from the working class (Alexander 2003). The union networks became Peron’s base constituency, the rank and file of Peronismo mobilization. And thus, when Peron was briefly imprisoned in 1945, the CGT factions that supported him organized an unprecedented mass mobilization in the Plaza de Mayo, demanding his freedom. The discourse used by interviewees stresses the fact that Peronist supporters infiltrated the union system and from 1945 onwards the labour union and Peronist networks were indistinguishable. As noted by a respondent Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in a focus group discussion ‘Peronismo, is completely all-encompassing in Argentine politics ...they used the workers, the “piqueteros” ...alltogain political power ...throughout history’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). Peron’s presidency

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 86 Mapping Mass Mobilization marked the intensification of the government’s corporatist alliance with organized labour for decades to come (Alexander 2003, 53). This in turn affected the perseverance of mobilizational frames connected to the protection of labour rights, the ‘rights of the worker’ and the right to ‘employment with dignity’. Peron’s non-unionized followers were also organized in a movement led by Peron and his wife Eva Peron, (Evita). These ‘social organizations’ were disguised as attempts at redistribution of Argentine wealth, but were actually direct populist appeals for political support. In exchange for food, clothing, healthcare or other social services, the members of the movement attended meetings, organized marches and demonstrations in their support of both Peron and Evita (Godio 1990, 19–26). More than two-thirds of those interviewed (including top-ranking politicians, CTA leaders, Piquetero leaders and NGO practitioners), regardless of their current partisan affiliation, had portraits of Evita and Peron in their offices or homes (although Evita was the more popular). They explained that although they do not support the current Peronist party, they do support the ideology of the ‘Peronismo movement, of social dignity’ (Unnamed, former Joventude Peronista member, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). The cult created around Peron and his wife by the labour, militant and political movement membership represents an ideology of socio-economic dignity and equality, which was, and still is as we will see, tied to systemic partisan clientelism. Thus, in a contradictory manner, the radical Peronist rhetoric of redistribution has been maintained by patronage, which in turn has reproduced inequality between the working poor, the unions and political leaders. The moment of Peron’s downfall was a testament to his movement’s institutional ability to stage protests. After a failed attempt to secularize the government in 1955 with a constitutional amendment, the predominantly Catholic middle class (which is said to have historically supported the military) organized protests against Peron. Peronist workers and movement loyalists attacked the protesters and staged their own counter-protests (James 1993, 41). This sparked the looting of churches and inter-protester violence. The military responded with a coup that forced Peron into exile. It has been suggested by Peronist insiders that this was a foundational event of Peronist militancy and the Joventude Peronista (JP). As mentioned by an anonymous former JP militant: ‘the JP are trained militants ...they can organize protestors and can disband the protests of others ...they were initially radicalised in the 1950s when Peron faced opposition’ (Unnamed former JP militant, author’s interview, 2/16/2009). Not only have the ideas of unionism and Peronist redistribution persisted throughout the different Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mobilization periods, but so have the various networks. The JP has remained one of the most influential militant and political forces in Argentina and has been a breeding ground for top politicians on both sides of the political spectrum. A finding not surprising to scholars of Argentine politics, the majority

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Unionization

FORA Peronismo

COA Syndicalist

USA CGT

Joventude Peronista

Figure 4.1 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1955 of SMO leaders interviewed began their civic engagement in JP militancy in the 1970s. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the labour and Peronist movements. All conversations with activists and experts during a year’s worth of field research included a mention of the former and current importance of these two movements. To understand the breadth and depth of Peronismo in Argentina it is important to conceive of it as a broad umbrella movement, which includes trade unions, populist clientelist organizations, student and independent working-class ‘militants’, a large portion of ‘ordinary’ Argentines and an official political party wing (see Figure 4.1). Thus, Peronism is an ideology, as well as a network of institutions, composed of a broad base of different actors. Even after Peron’s flight into exile, the labour movement and the radicalized Peronist networks remained the key institutional and ideological sources of coordinated resistance to the series of governments that succeeded Peron during the 1950s and 1960s.

Period II – Authoritarian regimes in Latin America 1950–1979

The period between 1950 and 1979 was an era of fermentation of the ideologies and repertoires of social mobilization in LA. There were three main Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ideological trends: The continuation of labour mobilization, the rise of the radical left (Third Worldist and Guevarist mobilization) and an increase in indigenous and ethnic-based mobilizations – the latter particularly in the Andean region. Regional SMOs of this period were inﬂuenced by both

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 88 Mapping Mass Mobilization the successes and failures of the Cuban (1959) and the Bolivian (1952– 1953) national ‘revolutions’. These ‘revolutions’, and the continuation of the Cold War, presented a political opportunity for the rapid expansion of radical left, speciﬁcally Trotskyist and guerrillero parties. These included the Bolivian Partido Obrero Revolucionario, the Brazilian Trotskyist Movimiento Convergencia Socialista,thePartido y Movimiento Obrero in Argentina, the Columbian Movimiento Obrero Independiente y Revolucionario and the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker and Vanden 2008, 45–46). The US-sponsored coup against the Allende government in Chile in 1973 also triggered Marxist radicalization in the region. This ideological move to the ‘left’ mostly inﬂuenced university and union-based institutional networks and represented a radicalization and militarization phase of activism (Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker and Vanden 2008, 45–46). As in the case of EE, the nationally based mobilizations peaked in the mid-1950s, late 1960s and late 1970s, but these in LA were more radicalized, more militant, and therefore violently repressed by military junta and/or authoritarian regimes. This period was also the beginning of the Liberation Theology Movement. In 1955 in Rio de Janeiro, a group of Catholic priests, inspired by Marxism, created the Conselho Episcopal Latino Americano (Latin American Episcopal Council) (Gutierrez 1980, 175). Between 1960 and 1979 Latin American priests and nuns cooperated with left and radical groups and suffered repressions from military regimes for promoting a socialist redistributive ideology (Berryman 1987, Sigmund 1990, Smith 1991). Following the rise of populist and leftist parties and movements, the period from 1960 to 1980 was marked by US-sponsored military coups, military violence, dictatorships or conservative authoritarianism (May and Milton 2006, 54–55). As in EE there was a high degree of variation between the types and styles of authoritarian rule. The Brazilian military regime of 1964–1985, for instance, was gradualist and not severely repressive or violent (May and Milton 2006, 51–60). In Chile and Argentina the military created new institutional systems of governance while also engaging in widespread violent repression (Pereira 2003). These variations in repression had an effect on the claims of SMOs. As explained in interviews by human rights practitioners, during the 1960s and 1970s, following an international trend, the rhetoric shifted from radical left and labour claims to demands for basic human rights.

Period II – Authoritarian regime in Argentina 1950–1979

In Argentina, this period ﬁrst marked the radicalization of activist ideol- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ogy (socialist claims and violent repertoires) followed by a brief decline of Peronist networks after their fragmentation in the late 1970s. After Peron’s forced exile in 1955, the ties between the military and the unions were exposed as weak and opportunistic, and the political opportunity structures

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 89 once presented by close ties between the labour movement and the government were lost. The Junta government implemented the ‘law on the repression of Communism, which gave the police the right to detain political activists and trade unionists that were deemed to be sympathetic to communism (Lewis 2002, 33). The Peronist party and its broad membership was branded as ‘communist’ and was banned from taking part in elections. Similarly to EE, mobilization in Argentina, as in the rest of LA, peaked in 1969 and 1978. The continued pressure exerted by the military regime triggered the radicalization of younger worker organizations and presented a structural opportunity for cooperation with already radicalizing university and youth networks, including the Joventude Peronista. These groups were loosely connected through existing institutional Peronist and leftist networks. Their cooperation can be attributed to the fact that all three of these groups were nurtured and inﬂuenced by the Peronist and labour rhetoric of the previous decade. The more important shift, however, was the embrace of the use of violent repertoires by young workers and students. These ‘new’ repertoires were inﬂuenced by active diffusion of Third Worldist and Guevarist ideologies throughout the region (Lewis 2002, 15). The combination of student and worker participants with a radical left ideology led to the foundation of the Argentine guerrilla movement (Lewis 2002, 33). Together these two networks created multiple guerrilla organizations devoted to restoring radical Peronism (Godio 1990). Not only did the majority of Argentine interviewees mention these two groups and their cooperation, but they also described the historical trajectory of urban street protests (puebladas), which were sponsored and coordinated by the groups. Notably, the puebladas also involved the participation of ‘ordinary’ Argentines. As noted by Luis Oviedo, a leader within the Polo Obrero:

there are other mobilizations similar to the 2001 Argentinazo ...the Rosariazo,theCorrientazo,theCórdobazo ...the Santiangazo ...organized by leftist worker and student militants ...and included the participation of ‘el pueblo’ (the people). (Luis Oviedo, journalist and member of Polo Obrero Party, 2/5/2009, Barracas, Buenos Aires)

The puebladas (mass uprisings) referred to by Luis Oviedo were clustered throughout 1969. They were highly important in the expansion of radical networks throughout the interior of the country (Robben 2007, 40–56). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Thus, like 1968 in EE, 1969 can be considered a year of regional ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. With the continuation of puebladas in 1969, participation in the protests actually extended to ‘ordinary’ citizens residing in the interior. Shortly after

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 90 Mapping Mass Mobilization the ﬁrst Rosariazo, on 29 May, in the city of Córdoba, a general strike turned into a mass protest bringing out thousands of residents who were not connected to unions or the university (Robben 2007, 40–56). A deputy with Coalition Civica bloc described in an interview how the ‘Córdobazo and Rosariazo really affected the political psyche of many people ...people were angry and getting poorer ...the interior of the country has always been the heart of militancy’ (Monica Peralta, Deputy with Coalicion Civica, 2/4/2009, Congresso, Buenos Aires). The Córdobazo was different from other protests because of the extent to which the local population took control of the city, setting up barricades and capturing ofﬁces and stores. Several city buildings were destroyed or burned down (Robben 2007). Although the military came in to repress the protestors, news of the Córdobazo triggered similar events in other parts of the Argentine interior. The structural importance of the interior’s activist and labour networks were noted by former activist and anthropologist Matias Trigubof:

Like the Córdobazo and the Rosariazo ...the piqueteros and autoconvocados, were ﬁrst active in the interior ...there was a denser network and stronger history of labour activity in the interior ...the structural basis of which was the industrial sector. (Matias Triguboff, anthropologist, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires)

Over the course of 1969, multiple mobilizations took place in the ‘industrial belt’ of Argentina. The protest events included the same violent repertoires of looting, vandalism and barricades. The participants continued to be a mix of radical students and workers, and their claims contested the military dictatorship’s repressive rule and called for radicalization of trade unionism (Lewis 2002, 90–91). The continued social pressure of activism and riots convinced the Junta to allow the return of a civilian government and the reinstatement of the Peronist party, which would be allowed include their own candidate in the semi-free presidential elections. After Peron’s death, the Peronists were highly fragmented between the radical militant youth (JP) and workers, on the one hand, and the moderates, on the other hand (Lewis 2002, 51–55). The pragmatic moderates, led by Isabel Peron (Peron’s second wife), were keen to hold onto political power, and therefore sought to cooperate with the military to avoid a coup. In reaction to this pragmatism, the radical guerrilla mobilization continued. The most prominent SMO, the Revolutionary Peronist Montoneros, wanted the Peronists to take a more radical approach to Argentine politics (Manzano 2007). Like Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the OUN in Ukraine, they used extreme and violent repertoires, such as kidnappings, bombings and vandalism, to get their message across. The anti- guerrilla death squad known as Triple A (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance) was created to repress radical groups’ activities (Lewis 2002, 90–91). Their

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 91 pervasive use of brutality against the activists triggered an even more violent response from the Montoneros and other guerrilla groups. Unfortunately in an attempt to quell the chaos between the warring Peronist groups, the military organized yet another coup in 1976, restoring Argentine politics to Junta authoritarian rule. The mass repression that became known as the ‘Dirty War’ triggered the mobilization of new participants and promoted the use of human rights rhetoric. Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was ruled by a succession of military juntas that employed systematic state terror to intimidate and demo- bilize Argentine society. Civil and political rights were routinely denied and the constitution was suspended (Brysk 1993). Anyone who was connected to, or perceived to sympathize with the guerrillas, unions and militants came under suspicion of treason. More than 15,000 people are said to have ‘disappeared’ and 5000 have been identiﬁed as murdered by the state (Lewis 2002, 185). While repression could have impeded collective action, it actually seemed to have sparked a new wave of mobilization, but one that went beyond the networks and inner circles of radicalized activists. As Gabriel Chamoro explained in an interview, the repressive tactics expanded the claims of previous activists, to include basic intolerance for any human rights abuse and peaceful repertoires of protest:

...otherimportantmomentsarethebeginningsofthe Mother who came out to protest the disappearances ...like in 2001 they came out because they thought that the state overstepped some limit of acceptable action ...they protested peacefully and in silence, and used a discourse of Human Rights to get global attention. (Gabriel Chamorro, academic and human rights lawyer, 3/9/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires)

As the rumours about the disappeared grew, mobilization came from an unlikely group: The mothers and grandmothers of the missing activists. One of the most famous and highly respected SMOs in Argentine history (mentioned in 74 of my Argentine interviews) was organized by a subset of society that the government least suspected to mobilize, namely ‘older’ women. This connection between the activists of the 1960s and 1970s and their spouses, mothers and grandmothers is a perfect example of how collective action can be sustained and even expanded through informal and private networks. On 30 April 1977, 14 founders of the group started their weekly gatherings in the Plaza de Mayo, in front of the Casa Rosada.1 They demanded that the military regime make known the whereabouts Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of their missing children and grandchildren (‘Historia de Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo’ 1996, Madres de Plaza de Mayo 2003). They took the name Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the May Square). The Madres were repeatedly repressed by the military. Three of the founders of the Madres

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 92 Mapping Mass Mobilization also ‘disappeared’, while others were imprisoned and tortured repeatedly (Bonaﬁni 1996). The military wanted to avoid any public knowledge of the movement and ordered media outlets not to cover the weekly gatherings (Bonaﬁni 1996). As noted by Patricia, a former activist, the protests were nonetheless seen by ‘ordinary’ people and had a great impact on their lives:

...Irememberseeingthe‘Madres’andtheirsilentprotests,andcasero- lazos ...this had an impact on my views and activities ...I mean people were scared then, those were terrible times ...when I did protest and in 2001, I deﬁnitely thought of the Madres ...being a mother myself now [in 2001] and thinking of my ‘radical’ [uses hand quotes and laughs] children protesting somewhere ...they [the Madres] hold a special place for us Argentines ...especially for us women activists. (Patricia, former militant, 2/17/2009, Buenos Aires, Micro Centro)

The Madres movement was visible, easily accessible and quickly gained popularity. Despite a black out of the media and police harassment, participation was extended to other groups of Argentines. While this was an activist movement organized by women, a majority of whom were connected to leftist and militant organizations, it also incorporated other actors, such as lawyers and teachers, who were not engaged in collective activity prior to 1977 (Ibid.). The repertoire of the mothers was simple and repetitive; their demonstrations were deliberately staged at the same sym- bolic place of the Plaza, and they maintained collective rituals such as wearing white scarves on their heads and holding pictures of their disappeared relatives. The use of one location and the ritualistic nature of the protests were easily adopted by newcomers and thus more ‘ordinary’ citizens, who previously did not take part in protest, could easily join the Madres (Bosco 2001). As the pressure of a growing popular movement, economic crisis and internal disputes within Junta ranks increased, the military’s position grew weaker. And by 1983 the Malvinas crisis demonstrated conclusively the military’s inability to take charge, and its growing isolation (see Figure 4.2).

Period III – Transition and neo-liberalism in Latin America 1980–1990

Accompanied by the debt crisis and an aggressive instalment of neo-liberal Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright economic policies, the decade between 1980 and 1990 marked the return of civilian rule in LA. Continuing economic stagnation and the beginning of privatization led to growing unemployment. Five main themes shape the continuity of ideas and institutions of mobilization throughout the region.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 93

Unionization

FORA Peronismo

COA Syndicalist

USA CGT

Joventude Peronista

Student Guerrilla movement movement

Cordobazo Rosariazo Human rights movement

Madres de Plaza de Mayo

Figure 4.2 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1980

The ﬁrst of these is the anti-military mobilizations of the early 1980s. Sec- ondly, we saw the restoration of labour unions as centres of political power (speciﬁcally in Bolivia and Brazil). Third, we saw the structural NGO-ization of the human rights movement. Fourth, we saw increasing instances of socio-economic protest in response to the rise of poverty. And lastly, we saw a steady growth of indigenous movements, in particular in the Andean region (Roberts 1997, Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker and Vanden 2008).

Period III – Transition and neo-liberalism in Argentina

1980–1990 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

In Argentina the decade started with a boom of mass mobilization in 1983 and was followed by a period of ideological quiescence. Moreover, as in the case of Ukraine, transition was also a period of institutional

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NGO-ization. So while being a time of expansion in terms of the actors involved, notably expanding to include ‘ordinary’ Argentines, it was also a decade of institutional and ideological distress, as economic woes grew and human rights were co-opted by NGOs and an increasingly dominant ‘civil society’ discourse. In the early 1980s, weekly protests by the Madres de Plaza de Mayo put pressure on the Argentine regime. The Madres’ protests educated the general population about the mass repressions of the Junta against activists and their families. With growing public debt and inflation, by 1980 ‘ordinary’ Argentines who had supported the military’s intervention in 1976 increasingly came to disapprove of the regime’s economic policy and human rights record. The contradictory policies, erratic dismissals and alter- ations in leadership circles were signs of a growing ‘crisis of confidence’ within the Junta ranks. Argentina’s leaders miscalculated and the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 presented the final catalyst for anti- Junta mass mobilization (‘Argentina: Human Rights Commemoration’ 2004, ‘Crimes Past, Crimes Present’ 2004). As explained by Daniel Pomerantz of AMINA:

the Malvinas protests were a big moment ...it was the moment that people, not only militants, joined in ...because they disapproved the repressions, the economy and saw that the military could not EVEN win wars ...THEY ARE THE MILITARY ...they were supposed to stand for all these national republican ideals and it was clear they were incapable of doing even that. (Daniel Pomerantz, Director of AMIA, 2/10/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires)

Publicly the military was humiliated, activists organized mass protests and encouraged the general public to join in. At their height the protests num- bered approximately a million participants (Ibid.). Shocked by the mass mobilizations, the Junta decided to step down, but not before they had secured amnesty for all ofﬁcers involved in the regime since 1976. The 1983 elections had a turnout of 86 per cent, and Raúl Alfonsín (Unión Cívica Radical) won the presidency (Dirección Nacional Electoral 1983). The new government, elected after a wave of mass mobilizations, was faced with intense pressure from the varied, and at times contradictory, expectations of ‘ordinary’ people and human rights organizations. The human rights movement beneﬁted from an increase in lawyer-coordinated rights protection groups as well as the continued efforts of the two factions of the Madres Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright de Plaza de Mayo. Nonetheless, military and to an extent civilian courts were reluctant to prosecute any of the human rights abuse cases brought against members of the military. As explained by Carlos March, Director of AVINA:

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 95

The mobilization and demands of the human rights activists did not stop in 1983 ...in reaction to continued pressure, Alfonsín cut the military budget and initiated the persecution of high ranking military personnel ...We saw this as a huge success ...but it certainly was not enough. (Carlos March, Director of AVINA, 1/29/2009, Belgrano, Buenos Aires)

Much like in Ukraine, beginning in the late 1980s the human rights movement in Argentina was in transition from activism to NGO-ization. According to March, this process began with an influx of western Inter- national Financial Institution (IFI) and IGO funds tied to the requirement to strengthen ‘civil society’: ‘this was short form for the liberalization of radical activist movements, so that they would not be a threat’ to the neo- liberalization of Argentine political and economic spheres (Carlos March, 01/29/2009, Buenos Aires). This process of the liberalization of activism even affected the famous Madres. In 1986 the Madres fragmented into two groups due to an internal conflict about the direction of post-transition mobilization. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo–Founding Line remained focused on promoting progressive human rights legislation, recovering the remains of the disappeared, and bringing former military and civilian officials to trial, in cooperation with the NGO and civil society networks (Bouvard 2002). The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Association, a faction led by Hebe de Bonafi, grew more radical (Bouvard 2002). This second group was and still is supported by militants, leftist parties and, most recently, independent trade unions, piquetero groups and autonomist organizations. According to NGO practitioners, the 1980s and the early 1990s were a period of fragmentation and co-optation of social movements by political parties and NGOs (Ibid.). This period of institutional formalization led to a period of quiescence, which lasted until 1989. Although the 1980s was a period of relative quiescence, there was a moment of class-based mass protest: The 1989 Rosariazo and food riots. This was a series of intense protests in May and June of 1989, which followed a rise in inflation (78 per cent in May 1989) and the 14 May presidential elections, won by Peronist Carlos Menem. Unions and various SMOs organized protests and strikes against Alfonsín’s Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) government in the lead up to the elections. When emergency economic measures were announced by outgoing President Alfonsín on 24 May, the scope and style of mobilizations changed dramatically. On 28 May, Argentines living in the poorer ‘conurbano’ areas of Rosario, Córdoba and Buenos Aires, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright began to join the protests in large numbers. The following six weeks saw a series of eclectic protest events including marches, picketing, violent looting and rioting in the streets. Insiders to the process have explained in interviews that Peronist punteros sponsored these protests. Albert Amato,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 96 Mapping Mass Mobilization an editor at Clarín newspaper, based on his own research noted that the riots were:

...a precursor to 2001 ...there were combinations of economic, political and social problems at the time ...there was JP promotion and some union activity too. (Alberto Amato, editor at Clarín, 1/26/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires)

The protest events varied in size, ‘a few thousand participants ...much smaller than those of 2001’ (Unnamed, activist and researcher, 1/23/2009, Plaza Once, Buenos Aires). And as explained by several interviewees, ‘the middle class did not join in ...it was a poor and lower working class protest’ (Alberto Amato, 1/26/2009, Buenos Aires). As in 1969, the protests moved through the ‘industrial corridor’ (Córdoba, Rosario, Gran Buenos Aires), accompanied in some cases by roadblocks, pickets and cacerolazos, suggest- ing that union and activist networks of the region were involved. It was also suggested by activists and experts in interviews that, similar to the rioting and looting of 2001, these events were fuelled by Peronist militants to increase the pressure on Alfonsín to step down sooner. On 30 May, the president announced a state of siege (‘Argentina Declares State of Siege Amid Riots Over Economic Steps’ 1989). One month later, on July 8, Alfonsín resigned and President elect Carlos Menem took charge, six months early. In February and March of 1990 a new but smaller wave of riots erupted in Rosario and in the conurbano. The Peronist-supported police contained the riots quickly. In response the government promoted community soup kitchens and new state social programmes. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, it was such soup kitchens and the distribution of social assistance that became ‘mobilizational networks’ for suburban activism in the late 1990s (Águila 2006). The 1989 protests not only reactivated the networks of the 1969 militancy but they also created new spaces for the formation of networks among the poorer population. Leftist political parties and their youth militants also began working with the social service centres and soup kitchens, thus once again strengthening ideological ties between the ‘left’ and the urban poor (Auyero 2001). The 1989 wave of class-based protests was signiﬁcant in four ways. First, it reactivated and re-politicized some elements in society after a period of quiescence. Second, it reproduced and continued violent and physical repertoires of protest akin to those used by the militants of the 1960s and 1970s. Third, the military did not intervene to quell protests; civilian rule and democracy were maintained. Fourth, the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright moment represented the development of new socio-economic rights claims of the unemployed, based on old labour and leftist ideologies of the 1960s and 1970s. The decade also marked the era of the return of Peronist and Joventude networks.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 97

It is difﬁcult to assess the impact of the 1983 protests and the human rights movement on the 1989 riots, or the connection between the two. It is possible, however, to connect this protest event to future Piquetero as well as the 2001 protests (see Figure 4.3). The 1989 mobilizations, if not the beginning, were the re-invigoration of grassroots activism based on socio- economic claims, which along with the development of the autoconvocado (self-organized) movement would employ human and civic rights rhetoric with the right to employment and a ‘life of dignity’. With the continued implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes and the introduction of the convertibility plan, unemployment and poverty rates grew exponentially in the coming years. Soon, the previously active and unionized base of the Peronists, now calling themselves ‘unemployed workers’, would take centre stage as seemingly ‘new’ actors in Argentine mobilization.

Period IV – Democratization in Latin America 1990–2001

The 1990s and 2000s have been dubbed as a period of re-activation or renaissance of mobilization in LA (Almeida 2007, Roberts 1997, Stahler- Sholk, Kuecker and Vanden 2008). The best-known cases of SMO and protest mobilization in LA during the 1990s were the Piqueteros in Argentina, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism or MAS) in Bolivia, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers Movement or MST) in Brazil, La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (The Con- federation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador or CONAIE), El Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario200 (The Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 or MBR-200) in Venezuela and the Zapatistas in Mexico. Each of these SMOs was impressive in how it could unite a variety of participants, including trade unions, unemployed workers, farmers and peasants, indigenous groups, human rights groups, leftist militants and political parties. In the 1990s, SMOs continued direct action tactics, but also became associated with political parties, and some cases, for example in Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia, have remained connected to the parties and Presidents in power. The MAS is one of many militant SMOs in Bolivia. Bolivian factory unionization, mine cooperativism and indigenous groups represent the wide scope of mobilization and intensity of MAS activism in the country (Castro 2004). The leader of the movement, Evo Morales, was elected President in Decem- ber 2006. In Brazil the most important social movement organization is MST founded in 1986. The MST is one of the largest social movements in LA (‘MST’ 2009). The MST has speciﬁcally maintained a close but still turbulent relationship with the main union (CUT), the Workers’ Party (PT) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. CONAIE has been an important opposition force, speciﬁcally in the overthrow of Presidents Bucaram (1997) and Mahuad (2000) (Martin 2003). In Venezuela the neo-populist rise of Chavizmo has created a political opportunity for a variety of left-socialist

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Unionization

FORA Peronismo

COA Syndicalist

USA CGT

Joventude Peronista

Student Guerrilla movement movement

Cordobazo Rosariazo Human rights movement

Madres de Plaza de Mayo

Transition/democracy movement

Figure 4.3 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–1990

SMOs. Mass protests in 1989 and 1992, in reaction to the perception that the government and party leadership in power was corrupt, unwilling to share oil profits and unable to manage the Venezuelan economy, resulted in the election of Hugo Chavez as president in 1999 (Fernandes 2010). In recent studies, Panizza (2009) and Petras and Veltmeyer (2009) have identified ideological shifts or reversions to ‘neo’-populism and ‘new left’ Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright policies, which have co-opted activist SMOs into political machines. In the cases of the MAS and Morales, Chavez and the citizens’ assemblies, the PT and MST (in Brazil), it is evermore difficult to draw concrete boundaries between the SMOs and political party networks (Foweraker 1995, 64, 68, 99). The activists have in many instances become extra-institutional appendages

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 99 to the state and to the parties in power, and their autonomy has been severely compromised. As explained in interviews by an activist who participated in trans-Latin American activism during this period, SMOs have become fragmented and smaller groups have again become radicalized. These new radical groups rejected all elements of formal politics and resorted to violent repertoires to be seen and heard (Lucianna Ghiotto, activist and researcher, 3/3/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires).

Period IV – Democratization and autoconvocados in Argentina 1990–2001

what else were (we) to do ...when the system fails you, you create a new system ...even the unions failed the workers, the Peronists failed the workers ...we did what we had to do ...independently and on our own! ...the CTA, the MTD, the Piqueteros ...the cooperatives ...all of it – Participant in Activist focus group Argentina #2, MTD La Matanza, 2/17/2009, La Matanza, GBA.

The Menem presidency in Argentina can be described in four words: Liberal- ization, unemployment, convertibility and corruption. A remarkable portion of my informants (on both sides of the political spectrum) explained that they feel Menem was a Peronist only in name. They seem to be right, as he was not a supporter of progressive labour policy or of the continuation of human rights abuse trials of the military (Brysk 1993, O’Donell 1994). Menem and Economic Minister Cavallo were staunch supporters of neo-liberal policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’. In order to stop hyper- inﬂation, the dollarization of the Argentine economy was initiated, pegging the peso to the dollar one to one under the ‘Convertibility Plan’.2 As mentioned by interviewees, this new economic plan created a division in society. While the Argentine middle class, thanks to the convenient conversion rate, could take annual trips to Miami or Europe, afford frequent asado dinners in restaurants, buy country homes and maintain their children’s private education, a larger portion of Argentine society fell below the poverty line. Between 1990 and 1999, unemployment rose exponentially and the national public debt grew by 60 per cent (‘Ministro de Economia Y Finanzas Publicas de La Republica Argentina’ 1999). This so-called Latin Americanization of Argentina, as was mentioned in the introduction, is often used to explain the development of ‘new’ SMO actors: The autoconvocados (self-organized), piqueteros (those who picket) and ‘new’ independent unions (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007, Burdman 2002, Campione and Rajland 2006). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Some of the more radical union leaders were disappointed with the direction and role of unions after the transition from military rule, and speciﬁcally after the 1990 election of Menem. They began coordinating a more radical left-leaning breakaway union. The Central del Trabajo de la República Argentina (Union of Argentine Workers, or CTA) was founded in

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Table 4.2 List of organizations of the CTA

CTERA – Confederation of Education Workers of Argentina ATE – Association of State Workers Feter – Federation of Energy Workers of Argentina Electricity and Energy Union of Mar del Plata SUTNA – Tyre-makers’ Union UOM – Villa Constitución Metal Workers Union FeTi – Federation of Industry Workers Argentina APDFA – Personnel Management Association of Argentine Railways CONADU – National Confederation of University Teachers CONADUH – Historical CONADU FJA – Judicial Federation Argentina NSF – National Federation of Health and Social Security AMMAR – Association of Women Prostitutes of Argentina AAA – Association of Argentine Actors Some movements and groups part of the CTA (not trade unions) are: FTV – Federation of Land, Housing and Habitat MTL – Territorial Liberation Movement MOI – Occupants and Tenants Movement

Source: Data collected by author from CTA websites.

1991 and was later connected to the FrePaSo political coalition (Godio 1990). The CTA was the ﬁrst ‘open’ trade union, which did not require its members to be formally employed. It was created in reaction to the reluctance or inability of traditional Peronist unions (that is the CGT) to deal with the implementation of neo-liberal reforms, which led to the informalization of the workforce and rising unemployment. In 1995, the CTA incorporated several of the self-organized piquetero groups into its structure (see Table 4.2). The piquetero phenomenon is traced to have started in 1995 after a wave of privatizations, amalgamations and downsizings of state-owned industries in the Argentine interior, previously the hub of Argentine industry. Workers’ livelihoods that depended on employment in a particular factory were destroyed. These workers, no longer protected by their unions, coordinated autoconvocado (self-organized) SMOs. Since they were unable to formally strike, they reclaimed picketing as their main protest repertoire, taking over roads and setting up large blockades (Lucianna Ghiotto, activist and researcher, 3/3/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires). Initially these were unconnected protest events, organized locally with speciﬁc locally oriented socio-economic claims (that is the right to employment). The workers wanted to be seen and heard, not only by the management and govern- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ment but also by middle-class Argentines (Auyero 2001, Burdman 2002, Massetti 2004). When media outlets interviewed the protesters, they simply referred to themselves as piqueteros (Jose Guerrero and Filippe Guerrero, MTL, 02/19/2009, La Matanza, Gran Buenos Aires). Although the political aspects

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 101 of democratization and implementation of neo-liberal reforms by the state are important contextual factors shaping the origins of the piquetero movement, it was not until they were incorporated into other structures, such as the MTD regional councils, CTA and ‘left’ parties, that the piqueteros made policy-oriented demands. As elucidated by activist-turned-politician Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores, ‘the political parties politicized the piqueteros’ (Héctor Flores, leader of MTD la Matanza, Deputy for Coalicion Civica, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). A key moment of piquetero mobilization was the June 1996 Cutral-Có road- block, in Neuquen Province. The state-owned oil company YPF (taken over by multinational Repsol) announced mass layoffs. The workers who were laid off quickly organized a picket blockade in response to their redun- dancy. Although the plant leadership and government tried to negotiate with the workers, Menem authorized the use of force against the Cutral-Có piqueteros (Kohan 2002). This repression arguably inspired a national trend. Highlighting the inﬂuence of Cutral-Có, Héctor Flores noted:

We (the piqueteros) have roots back to 1996 ...do you know Cutral- Có? ...although the MDT of La Matanza did not start up until later, we had the same issues. It was simple, we were workers, and when we started losing our jobs, we felt our dignity and identity were taken away ...we had no choice but to take the problems into our own hands. (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires)

Within a year piquetero protests sprung up throughout the country and picketing became the repertoire of choice of unemployed workers. By the end of 1997 there were 23 roadblocks in Buenos Aires Province and 77 in Argentina as a whole (‘El 2005 Está Mostrando El Mayor Nivel Mensual de Cortes de Rutas Y Vías Públicas Desde 2003’ 2005). Also in 1997, a network of autonomous SMOs formed under the umbrella ‘Unemployed Workers Movements’ (Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados, or MTDs). Despite this broadening of the piquetero networks, the main ideological claims represented a continuity of previous mobilizational frames, based in civic and socio-economics rights and ‘una vida dignida’ (a digniﬁed life). Moreover, it was the same ‘workers’ who had previously been involved in formal unionism who coordinated these ‘new’ SMOs. Throughout the 1990s the CTA organized multiple marches and strikes, but its rise was slow. The context of the 1999 election of de la Rúa, growing public debt, fallout from the convertibility plan and contagion effects of the 1998 economic crisis changed this. After 1999, seemingly a symptom Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of history repeating itself, the president’s Alianza coalition was fragmented between two conﬂicting groups, the liberal pragmatics and the left-leaning progressives. As the economic and political meltdown continued between 1999 and 2001, the rate of piquetero and union-organized protests rose.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 102 Mapping Mass Mobilization

As noted by Carlos Chile, a leader in the MTL, ‘we organized protests and marches every week, and larger ones every month. The period was tense and you could see the protests and strikes building up, there was momentum’ (Carlos Chile, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires). As the trend of rising levels of unemployment and poverty continued, so did the autoconvocado movement and the use of pickets and roadblocks. As noted by journalist Alberto Amato, ‘it was not possible for ordinary middle-class Argentines not to have heard or seen the protest movements of the interior and conurbano areas ...they paid attention because they were also losing their privileged status’ (Alberto Amato, 1/26/2009, Buenos Aires). After the 2001 election the political and economic situation did not improve. Organized strikes continued until in December the individual strikes and marches turned into a cross-class mass mobilization. A new actor came onto the scene: The ‘ordinary’ citizens participating en masse.

Conclusions

Both continuity and change can be observed in regard to social mobilization in Argentina since 1920. Mobilization has been framed in claims for rights to employment and redistributive measures by early unionists and Peronists, and these have persisted over time. SMO networks have been reproduced over time, but have also repeatedly succumbed to divisive conﬂicts between pragmatic conciliatory groups, willing to cooperate with a variety of formal political forces and those demanding radical change and the continuation of the use of violent repertoires. A new development has been the inclusion of autoconvocado groups, which strictly maintain their autonomist stance. Politicians continue to attempt to co-opt and use the SMOs to their own advantage but have had limited success (this trend will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 7). Both the current opposition and the party in power have piquetero groups associated with their parties and use them to demonstrate support and legitimacy (Figure 4.4).

Part II – Comparative conclusions: Historical legacy of inter-movement connectivity in Ukraine and Argentina

If we once more turn to the ﬁrst questions of this study: Are the patterns of mobilization actually different in democratizing states with differing authoritarian legacies such as those in EE and LA; Can we identify similar patterns and types of social mobilization in different regions, despite variation in historical legacies? In answering these questions, there are four key ﬁndings that the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mapping presented in Chapters 3 and 4 can put forth. First, there is a historical trajectory of mobilization in both Ukraine and Argentina. Second, this historical trajectory is composed of waves of booms and busts that centre around wider regional patterns. Third, even in phases of quiescence the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 103

Unionization

FORA Peronismo

COA Syndicalist

USA CGT

Joventude Peronista

Student Guerrilla movement movement

Cordobazo Rosariazo Human rights movement

Madres de Plaza de Mayo

Transition/democracy movement

1989–1990 Rosariazo riots

CTA

Piquetero movement Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 19/20 mass protest

Figure 4.4 Network connectivity in Argentina, 1920–2001

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 104 Mapping Mass Mobilization institutional networks of mobilization remain connected and are reproduced over time. And fourth, in each country these network connections are established through three variables tied to preceding mobilization: Ideas (claims or mobilizational frames), institutions (SMOs’ continuity over time) and actors (individuals who were active in several SMOs over a longer period). As illustrated, in both Ukraine and Argentina there was an important ‘foundational’ moment when particular claims were institutionalized and became the main mobilizational frames that were to be reproduced over time. Thereafter, these ‘ideas’ travelled through SMOs and their networks and were either accepted and reproduced or broadened and amended by the subsequent generations of activists. As noted, the overlap in membership between periods can help explain the passage of ideas through intergenerational learning. Nonetheless, because activists are affected by structures and specifically by context, there were moments of intergenerational shifts in claims and repertoires, when claims are expanded. This contextual effect can explain key shifts or expansions of claims to include human rights rhetoric (in both countries in the late 1970s – concurrent with a period of global expansion of human rights rhetoric); ‘unemployed’ workers’ rights (in the 1990s in Argentina – a period when workers involved in unions became unemployed during recession); and the expansion of civic rights- based claims (in the 1990s and 2000s in Ukraine – a period of post-transition democracy promotion and financing). Similar to the patterns of the SMOs in most of their neighbouring countries, the movements in Ukraine and Argentina can be broken down into four general periods of activity: The beginnings of mobilization 1920–1950 (nationalist/independence and labour movements), mobilization in response to authoritarianism 1950–1979 (dissident and radical left and human rights movements), mobilization of transition 1980s–1990s (civic rights movements) and mobilization of the democratization period 1990–2001/2004 (civic rights, localized grassroots and socio-economic movements). Thus, by the time the 2001 and 2004 ‘moments’ of mass mobilization crystallize, we are not encountering something entirely ‘new’ but at least in part built upon a historical legacy of claims, repertoires and SMO mobilization brought forth by the ‘next’ generation of activists. These mobilizational legacies are not causal factors but a foundation upon which ‘new’ activism is built. Finally, because activists themselves actively make these connections – highlighting that the past is important to them, that they were influenced by past protest events and SMOs – we can be certain that they internalize previous mobilization when coordinating contemporary protest events. Thus, the legacies of mobilization only matter in so Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright much as current actors allow them to. Yet, knowing that activists today frame their activity in reference to the activity of those who came before them is an important factor to keep in mind when we analyse the process leading to mass mobilization.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina 1920–2001 105

In response to the three questions posed we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, mobilization has not been historically weak or absent in Ukraine (and EE) compared to Argentina (and LA), but there have been differences. The key difference is that there were more instances of participation by non-activist citizens in Argentina, specifically in puebladas and riots than in Ukraine. It should also be noted that in Argentina it was predominantly the lower and working classes who protested, and they were usually coordinated by powerful unions and clientelistic networks linked to formal politics; whereas in Ukraine, it was the cultural and literary elite that became the main protagonists in dissident and human rights movements. Second, individual mass protest events, which may appear to be period- bound and contextually driven, are in fact connected over time through claims which travel through activist institutions. In the Ukrainian case, the role of ideologically driven networks is very important to the maintenance of ideas of Ukrainian National Liberation. The most important shift occurs in the late 1970s, expanding claims to include broader conceptions of human rights and political freedoms. The post-1990 Ukrainian activists continue this trend but extend the claims to include civic and local/grassroots issues. In Argentina, the clientelist networks and ideologies of the workers’ unions and of Peronismo stand out as the most important connections between mobilizations over time. Lastly, the different generations of actors are connected through institutions in both cases, and older generation activists seem to act as mentors to activist youth, even if they themselves are no longer participants. Third, it is difficult to answer the question of the ways in which historical legacy matters in relation to mobilization. What has been demonstrated here is that contextual factors can create ‘opportunity structures’ for mobilizations, such as the First World War in Ukraine and the Great Depression in Argentina. Furthermore, crisis events can trigger mobilization, as they did in 1955, 1969, 1977, 1983 and 1989 in Argentina, as well as in Ukraine in 1986, 1991, 2001 and 2004. These medium and immediate structural and contextual factors will be analysed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Yet, as discussed in this section, it is the legacy of specific ideas that has the most lasting influence on mobilization. Moving forward, the analytical focus will be comparative at the inter- regional level, between the two cases. The following two chapters explore the role of structural and agency coordination factors involved in the medium- and short-term processes leading to the two ‘moments’ of mass mobilization under study. A deeper look into two negative cases, 1989 in Argentina and 2001 in Ukraine, when we observed ‘protest but not mass mobilization’, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright will highlight how 2001 in Argentina and 2004 in Ukraine are qualitatively different. Thus providing insight into which factors were missing, and what can help us explain the mobilization of ‘ordinary’ people in 2001 and 2004.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Part III Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 5 Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors in the Mobilization Process

Introduction

Now that we have mapped the historical foundations of activism, helping us understand the important legacy of mobilization in both countries, we can turn to the next stage of the mobilization process. As explained in the introduction, analyses of the Ukrainian (2004) and Argentine (2001) ‘moments’ of mass mobilizations have predominantly focused on structural variables. Medium-term ‘opportunity structures’, including international democracy promotion networks in Ukraine and the mounting economic crisis in Argentina, have been highlighted as the key factors mobilizing activists leading to the events. In line with social movement theory, civil society associations, networks, resources and political opportunity structures have been highlighted as central to activist mobilization. Yet, only a few analyses of mass mobilization look back to how these medium-term structural factors were important in the mobilization process (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, Levitsky and Murillo 2003). Thus, this relative gap in the literature leads us to turn to the second series of questions posed in this book: What is the process leading to the moment of mass mobilization? How do structural or contextual (endogenous and exogenous) variables affect this process? The following two chapters will explore these questions by dividing the discussion between medium-term (Chapter 5) and immediate (Chapter 6) structural variables, and their specific roles in setting the stage for larger mobilization. Employing process tracing, I have identified that key SMOs, networks and actors launched influential protest campaigns up to five years prior to the mass mobilizations. When asked to describe or map out the mobilization process leading to 2001 or 2004, an overwhelming number of activist infor- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mants focused on SMO networks that developed in those five-year periods. They saw these as instrumental learning phases that set up the boundaries of future mobilization. Furthermore, activists also focused on key moments when they coordinated large protest events but were unable to expand them

109

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 110 Mapping Mass Mobilization to include a cross-cleavage coalition of ‘ordinary’ citizens. They described these protest events as ‘failed attempts’ at mass mobilization and saw them as trial or practice runs. Aside from identifying key mobilizing networks and protest events, activists also explained that certain patterns of interaction within SMO networks and between SMOs and politico-economic elite were developed in the years prior to mass mobilization. They pinpointed how these political opportunity structures affected the mobilization process, focusing on resources and avenues for cooperation. In this chapter, I focus on such medium-term structural factors, the composition of SMO networks, interaction with politico-economic elite and the access to key resources. I argue that together these provided learning opportunities whereby key players rehearse the scenes of the mobilization play, setting vital precedents for their future interaction and shaping the mass mobilization process. This chapter will first map out the spectrum of ‘mobilizing structures’, including civil community associations, SMOs and their networks, thus placing a magnifying glass over key networks and the dynamics of activist organization in the five years prior to mass mobilization. Second, we will explore how more recent periods of protest activity have solidified particular political opportunities, including the level and type of interaction between activists and politico-economic elite. We will learn how these patterns of interactions set important precedents and can condition the level and type of cooperation, or the lack thereof, between activists and the political elite leading to mass mobilization.

Civil associations as mobilizing structures

Before we jump into activist networks directly, we need to briefly touch on the networks that activists are born from. As discussed in Chapter 2, we know that various local, national or international networks made up of activist and civil associations can be ‘mobilizing structures’ providing access to resources (financial or technical). Such ‘mobilizing structures’ have been understood to be the foundations of SMO activism, organized protest events and, to some extent, mass mobilization (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Chapters 3 and 4 focused on how activists perceived such networks as vehicles through which political ideas, techniques or experiences of collective action are disseminated over time. Alas, some clarification is needed; Ekiert and Kubik (2001) explain that there are actually important distinctions between the varying roles of activist SMOs and civil associations (church groups, parent–teacher groups, book and sporting clubs) in the mobilization process. First, activist networks can Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright be locally, nationally and transnationally coordinated. Second, their claims can be targeted at different levels of government, state and public institutions, intergovernmental organizations and local, national or transnational private enterprises. As explained by Putnam (2000), civil associations are

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 111 typically (though increasingly less so with the advent of social media) are oriented and organized at the local or community level. Such associations tend to reﬂect particular social cleavages (such as religion, class, ethnicity, race, gender, educational level) and are less likely to be formally politicized. While ‘social capital’ theories, as described in Putnam (2000), Schneider et al. (1997) and Tarrow (1996), have investigated the importance and democratic value of civil associations in predicting engagement, I see civil associations as only a potential starting point or meeting place. Civil associations can –but do not always – bring like-minded people with similar experiences together, and they can provide at least the initial ‘public’ space for discussion. This ‘public’ space can under the right circumstances, with the right ‘opportunities’, lead to collective engagement and even protest events. Moreover such a ‘public’ space can be particularly important in the democratization context, when formal ‘rules of the game’ are being learned. Let us now brieﬂy investigate what are the important civil associations and their role in the lead up to mass mobilization in both countries. In both Argentina and Ukraine, the 1980s represented a period of increased freedoms with the end of military dictatorship in Argentina and the GlasnostandPerestroika policies in the USSR. The transitions to electoral democracy in 1983 in Argentina and in 1991 in Ukraine marked a turning point for both countries and placed civic rights at the forefront of socio-political life. Importantly, both transitions to electoral democracy were attained in part by activist mobilization and mass protests involving ‘ordinary’ citizens.1 Thus, both countries embarked on the path to democratization with a recent collective memory of ‘people power’ and activist mobilization. The incremental increase in personal freedoms that followed encouraged the (albeit informal) reinvigoration of religious groups, non-partisan and scouting youth groups (in Ukraine), cooperatives (in Argentina), independent professional associations, including legal and journalist associations focusing on the protection of human and civic rights, and previously banned partisan youth associations (in both countries). Notwithstanding their level of ideological politicization, according to interview respondents and internal documents, these associations served as initial ‘mobilizing structures’ and points of recruitment for the next generation of activists. While civil associations were created and reinvigorated, their activity did not swell exponentially as the democratization literature on civil society would have us expect in a post-authoritarian context (Linz and Stepan 1996, 255–272). It seems that in both countries after winning (or regaining) freedom and democracy, ‘ordinary’ citizens concentrated on their day-to-day lives. As explained by one Argentine activist Rosa, ‘the 80s Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and 90s were a period of reclamation, waiting and seeing what the new democratic government will do’ (Activist focus group Argentina #5, Piqueteros MTL, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, Gran Buenos Aires (GBA)). According to activists, instead of observing a large swelling of civil associations in their countries,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 112 Mapping Mass Mobilization the 1980s and 1990s were a period of incremental recouping of small community spaces or organizations, such as literary clubs, churches or parks. While it is difﬁcult to calculate the long-term effects of this incremental rise in the informal participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in such civil associations, it is far easier to trace the concurrent renaissance of grassroots and activist networks and their connection to the 2001 and 2004 events.

Mobilizing structures: Restructuring and activation

As described in Chapters 3 and 4, it is clear that both Ukraine and Argentina have a long history of activism. Even if it is difficult to causally connect the long history of activism to the 2004 and 2001 protests, the proliferation of SMO networks in the mid- to late 1990s specifically can be unequivocally understood as the creation and reproduction of integral ‘mobilizing structures’ shaping the contemporary mobilization game. Process tracing reveals that the SMOs of the 1990s share not only participants but also claims, repertoires and in some instances financial or technical resources with those SMOs linked to the mass mobilization in 2004 and 2001, respectively. I will first map out the network post-transition foundations of key mobilizing structures and will then expand the discussion to their activation.

Post-transition restructuring of mobilizing structures in Ukraine Process tracing reveals that dissident groups were the foundations for post- transition activism in Ukraine. These networks should be considered as the roots of key ‘mobilizing structures’ behind the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma (UBK) and the 2004 Orange Revolution campaigns (Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv). But as explained by Rukh member Pavlo Kachur, after the initial goal of independence had been achieved in 1991, the claim that united the divergent SMO networks disappeared, and activism in the early 1990s was overshadowed by internal divisions (Pavlo Kachur, former National Depute and Minister of Construction and Architecture of Ukraine, Rukh Party, 7/20/2009, Kyiv). These divisions were both generational and geographical and had a direct effect on the proliferation of two types of SMOs. Early on, tensions arose between the ‘old guard’ dissident activists, who were more nationalist in their political orientation, and the ‘younger generation’, more focused on liberal democratic values and civic rights (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). The geography of social mobilization in Ukraine was also divided. Accord- ing to maps drawn by activists in focus groups and interviews, there were four key islands of contention located in Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright According to Volodymyr Viatrovych, a black Pora leader, the Lviv network represented what was increasingly described by pundits and politicians, but notably less so by the activists themselves, as a ‘new western Ukrainian identity’ (Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv). The Lviv-based

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 113 activist SMOs were more radical and focused on ethno-cultural as well as political claims (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). According to Mykhailo Svystovych, founder of Maidan, Kyiv was the activist hub for all of Ukraine (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). The capital was home to multiple overlapping networks, and its SMOs made diverse, but typically policy oriented, claims and were more likely to be linked to politicians and parties (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). It was in Kyiv were activists from the regions came together through representatives, but like in any country there was a level of inequality and competition between the networks of capital and those of the regions. Yevhen Zolotariov, an activist leader from Kharkiv, explained that two themes described ‘eastern’ activism. The first was the brief spike of labour union activity in the Donbas region in 1990s. The second, mostly concentrated in Kharkiv, was the prominent network of human rights SMOs (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). Finally, according to Andriy Yusov, southern activists hailing from Odesa and Crimea had a more ‘cosmopolitan cultural composition’ and were the smallest network of the four islands (Andriy Yusov, yellow Pora activist, 8/13/2008, Kyiv). SMOs located in the south were focused mostly on civic and human rights and to a much lesser extent on cultural and linguistic issues (Andriy Yusov, 8/13/2008, Kyiv). These four islands of contention represented four broader regionally based activist networks, often referred to in a more colloquial manner by the activists themselves as tusovky or cliques (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). Although all eyes were on the political and economic programme of transition and democratization in Kyiv, these tusovky, while not mutually exclusive, were to some extent independent from each other and coordinated their own activities (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). This concept of tusovka is essential to our understanding of the variation in the level of formality of Ukrainian civil society and SMOs. Ukrainian SMOs have been built upon informal networks, composed of various organizations with diverse repertoires and resources and varied levels of interaction and connectivity to the formal political sphere. While activist networks remained informal (based on tusovky) and were rarely defined by formal names and structures, Ukrainian activists historically maintained close ties with formal political projects, such as the OUN, Rukh and other parties. Thus, at times, SMOs were misunderstood to have grown out of political projects, even if they were actually developing in parallel. Yevhen Zolotariov explained that the early to mid-1990s represented a boom in ‘Ukrainization’ and the promotion of civic rights and the initiation of NGO funding. An initial increase in mobilizational resources from NGOs allowed the four regional networks Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to expand and reconfigure their membership at the local level (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). And thus, what has been framed traditionally as the absence of a post-transition ‘civil society’ in the 1990s was in fact a period of intergenerational and geographical readjustment of networks

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 114 Mapping Mass Mobilization and claims, coupled with a return to the regions for many activist tusovky. Thus, these four islands of contention and the networks they formed were by 2001 the central nervous system of Ukrainian activism, connecting smaller organizations and individual activists to a broader social movement.

Post-transition restructuring of mobilizing structures in Argentina Similar to Ukraine, Argentine SMO networks were undergoing a period of reconfiguration during the 1990s. As pointed out by activist-turned- academic Paula Lenguita Saávedr, these networks were already fragile when Argentina faced its first post-transition politico-economic crisis in 1989, further weakening SMO networks (Paula Lenguita Saávedr, former activist and researcher, 1/23/2009, Plaza Once, Buenos Aires). In the midst of hyperin- flation, riots erupted in Rosario and Cordoba provinces, diffusing to the GBA. Yet, perhaps surprisingly the protests did not diffuse to the Federal Capital of Buenos Aires and did not include the participation of the middle class. When President Carlos Menem took power in June 1990, he ordered a swift containment of the rioters. In interviews, activists referred to the Menem period of hyper neoliberalism and individualism as a lost decade for activism and SMO mobilization. Yet, as explained by Carlos Chile, a leader of the MTL, although formal institutions that linked workers, political parties and union activists together began to fade, ‘unofficial associations and networks’ persisted and some became even more radicalized (Carlos Chile, National Coordinator of the Movimiento Territorial de Liberación (MTL- CTA), 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires). Thus, SMO networks did not disappear in the 1990s; they underwent a period of deinstitutionalization and experienced a structural shift. As in Ukraine, SMOs were divided into two groupings. The division of networks was loosely described in interviews as between ‘middle class’ SMOs that focused on human rights and the ‘worker’ and ‘left/socialist’ SMOs that focused on labour and socio-economic rights. Moreover, as in Ukraine, the divisions between activists were also regional, between the capital and the industrial interior, and between cities and suburban areas. Finally, as in Ukraine, in Argentina the SMOs overlapped with local political party bosses and developed in tandem with activities orchestrated by political parties. In helping me map out the human rights movement in Argentina, Carlos March, an insider to this process in Argentina, explained that after an initial intensification following the fall of the Junta, the momentum of mobilization and advocacy began to stagnate. He explained that this was mostly ‘due to a lack of political will and ability, first during the Alfonsín government’ and then also under Menem (Carlos March, 1/29/2009, Buenos Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Aires). Initially, human rights SMOs were strongly connected to local NGOs and universities in larger cities (specifically in Córdoba, Rosario and the Capital). Yet, by the early 1990s these organizations were also increasingly integrated into political party politics and state institutions, as was mainly the case with particular factions of the Peronist Partido Justicialista. Through

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 115 their cooperation with mainstream NGOs, the human rights SMOs ‘themselves became mainstream’ (Carlos March, 1/29/2009, Buenos Aires). Radical activists explained that mainstream human rights SMOs were blander and did not push as hard as they perhaps should, in an attempt to be politically pragmatic. Their technocratic sensibility made it difficult to connect to leftists and labour SMOs in the interior of the country. One activist explained that despite being fairly resource rich, mainstream human rights SMOs lost their militant supporters as well as their political independence, due to an infiltration of formal actors and an acceptance of financing from them (Unnamed, argentine activist 1, 2/18/2009, Almirante Brown). Conse- quently, the human rights movement split into two clusters: (a) one larger, formalized, NGO-driven and active in legal spheres, cooperating with (or as some would say co-opted by) high ranking government insiders; and (b) one much smaller, radicalized and allied with ‘leftist’ parties and some militant organizations. Much as in Ukraine, and perhaps signalling a global trend, the post-transition democratizing public sphere was increasingly taken over by NGOs and permeated by political parties. In parallel, the historically powerful labour and left SMOs also experienced at first a decline and then an organizational shift. As was repeatedly stressed by experts and activists in the interviews, post-transition labour and left SMO mobilization ‘came in from the interior, to the capital’ (Juan Wahren, former activist and researcher Gino Germani Institute, 2/25/2009, Buenos Aires). This is significant because, as shown in Chapter 4, the industrial interior has always been the ‘heartland of unions and Peronists ...’ and it was the workers of the interior who ‘...were the first to feel the [political and economic] effects of “new” Menem style Peronismo’ (Juan Wahren, 2/25/2009, Buenos Aires). It was in the industrial interior that the structural foundations of activist mobilization of 2001 were laid, when activists set up new SMOs. In mapping key medium-term mobilizing structures, two networks were consistently identified as vital to the mobilization process by labour activists and experts. First, the CTA (Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos)anew ‘autonomous’ labour union, founded in 1991 by radical union leaders who did not agree with the pragmatic approach of the CGT (Confederación Gen- eral del Trabajo de la República Argentina). And second, in response to Menem era privatization, those who were left behind formed informal unemployed workers’ groups (piqueteros), which can be understood as localized and autonomous enclaves of the labour struggle in the interior of the country. These enclaves, much like the islands of contention in Ukraine, were later coordinated by national entities like the CTA and became the rank and file army ready to mobilize almost at a moment’s notice. They became the orga- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright nizational framework for potential national mobilization, and at least at first were underestimated by the regime. Hence, the post-transition phase represented a critical juncture in the configuration of mobilizing structures in both Argentina and Ukraine. Tra- ditionally perceived as a period of decline of activism, in both countries the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 116 Mapping Mass Mobilization

1990s are better understood as a phase of SMO restructuring, new (or perhaps simply renamed and refashioned), smaller, geographically dispersed SMOs, which set the stage for activist engagement. The SMOs ﬁrst underwent a renaissance and expansion, becoming more independent or autoconvocado (self-organized) before once again, being co-opted by formal political actors. As we will see below, SMO networks and their relationships with the formal politico-economic elite soon transformed the boundaries and rules of contention in both countries.

Activation of mobilizational structures in Ukraine Even though activists were already restructuring their SMOs from 1994 onwards, to cope with the new and at times harsh reality of democratization, it was not until the 1999 presidential election that we can see a clear structural shift in SMO institutions and networks. The 1999 re-election of President Leonid Kuchma, an election marred by large-scale manipulation and fraud, ushered in a semi-authoritarian style to Ukrainian politics. Through the use of violence and intimidation against opponents or competitors, the Kuchma regime was able to consolidate an industry- and energy-based clientelist network. Kuchma, being a skilled manager, brokered an impressive coalition between competing politico-economic ‘clans’, predominantly from Donets’k and Dnipropetrovsk. Oligarchs from these eastern regions received access to policy making and certain economic benefits, in return for financing and supporting the government. Kuchma’s industry-based political network used ‘machine politics’ to systematically control the base electorate, the opposition, key industries and institutions and, most importantly, the media. NGO workers and journalists who were interviewed explained that any vocal opponents, political or civilian, suffered severe consequences for challenging the regime. Polit- ical repercussions would include everything from having personal financial assets seized, having to flee the country, being imprisoned on trumped-up charges or being physically threatened, and even killed ‘accidentally’ or simply ‘disappearing’.2 Bohdana Kostiuk, a Radio Free Europe correspondent, provided a great deal of detail about attacks that targeted universities and media outlets, including the suspension of professors and the enforcement of temnyky. But she also explained that ‘these attacks instead of supressing activism’ provided ‘...a platform for activists to unite against’ (Bohdana Kostyuk, journalist and activist, 7/25/2008, Kyiv). The repressions became a focal point that brought a dispersed and diverse group, from the regional islands back to the centre. Thus, when political oppression grew in 2000, and when Gregoriy Gongadze, an outspoken critic of the regime, was murdered Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and Kuchma himself was implicated, activists were easily mobilized under the umbrella of anti-Kuchmizm. In response to the growing repressions, and employing the mobilizational structures afforded to them, the regionally dispersed activist tusovky first

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 117 organized small localized protest events within their own regional networks. But soon after, explained Vladyslav Kaskiv, by late 2000 and early 2001, the ‘Kyiv network’ was joined by ‘Lviv, Kharkiv and Odesa based activists’ and a ‘co-ordination process of engagement’ began (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). Yet instead of creating one structure, in 2000 and 2001 activists were still divided into two networks of activists (described as UBK-1 led by Chemerys and UBK-2 led by Lutsenko), and each attracted the support of divergent opposition politicians, and coordinated separate protest events.3 The UBK protests that followed were structurally significant in four different ways. First, the protests made it possible for the opposition parties to identify two coordinating committees of activist leaders, representing two broader SMO networks with whom they could cooperate. Second, as elucidated by Yevhen Zolotariov, the activists made mistakes. Although they employed their ‘previous experiences from the student hunger strikes ...and the Revolution on the Granite’, since they were dealing with a different political climate (perhaps even more restrictive then the post-perestroika failed state anarchy of 1991), they misjudged their strength vis-à-vis the party in power (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). The main mistakes named by the bulk of activists interviewed included ‘the lack of unity between coordinating groups’, a low level of information dissemination to and involvement of ‘ordinary’ people, and the activists falling victim to ‘provocation of the militia’.4 It was these mistakes that would propel activists to alter their coordination strategies in 2003/2004. Third, as explained by activist Yuriy Polyukhovych, a yellow Pora coordinator, thanks to substantial recruitment measures, which included ‘...identifying universities as key locations for finding new activists ...’, the level of protest participation in both Kyiv and the regions rose exponentially, and a new generation of activists joined the SMO ranks (Yuriy Polyukhovych, yellow Pora Kyiv activist, 8/3/2008, Kyiv). This expansion of membership also increased the density of the SMO networks after 2001, making them stronger. Lastly, activists interviewed identified an unexpected outcome from repression; unjustified violence and imprisonment seemed to motivate activist cross-network cooperation. According to yellow Pora leader Vladyslav Kaskiv, the violence provoked activist leaders and opposition party members:

to get over ...differences and work together to coordinate an ‘all- Ukrainian committee’ of activists called Za Pravdu ...we knew that if we were united and worked together it would be difﬁcult to defeat us ...you cannot imprison everyone, a lesson worth learning on your own skin. (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Za Pravdu (For Truth) lived up to its name; it involved the participation of activists from all the regions and was coordinated by local committees, in four SMO hubs in Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Using the existing regional

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 118 Mapping Mass Mobilization networks, Za Pravdu was able to consolidate the divergent SMOs into one anti-Kuchma movement. Structurally speaking, this was a period of institutional strengthening for SMO networks in Ukraine. The local committees provided a new formalized space for the formation and communication of ideas, claims and repertoires. These reconfigured ‘mobilizing structures’ reinforced ties and amplified opportunities for coordination between different types of actors including activist leaders, NGO practitioners, students, former dissidents, journalists and politicians. The main organizers of UBK and Za Pravdu continued to run individual SMOs but information from different activist networks and political insiders flowed more freely in the two years prior to the mass mobilization. On the activist level by 2002 the main networks that future SMOs would be based in were easily identifiable by insiders. Process tracing reveals that there is consistent continuity between the mobilizing structures related to the events of 2001 and those of 2004. As was explained by one activist ‘the stage for mobilization was erected, we just had to write the lines of the play’ (Unnamed, yellow Pora activist, 2/15/2010, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv).

Activation of mobilizational structures in Argentina Similarly in Argentina, what started as scattered and discrete instances of piquetes by laid-off industry workers incrementally turned into a nationwide phenomenon between 1995 and 2000, as localized groups increased intergroup communication and coordination and began inﬁltrating national structures for support. Analysts, including Isman (2004), Massetti (2004, 2006) and Sala and Mafﬁ (2005), have focused on the innovative elements of the piquetero protests. These include the use of piquetes (pickets) and roadblocks, the grassroots and localized nature of the piquetes and the protesters’ ‘no name’ brand, simply calling themselves Piqueteros (those who picket). Yet, as accentuated in interviews with piqueteros, neither the repertoires nor the actors were new to the mobilization game (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). Roadblocks and piquetes themselves were not novel protest technologies in Argentina, but their increased frequency and diffusion to the provinces (Neuquén, Salta), rather than a concentration in the core industrial corridor (Rosario, Córdoba and GBA), did represent a crucial alteration in the spatiality of contention. According to Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores, co-founder of the MTD la Matanza, the piqueteros (he prefers the term unemployed workers) included some very experienced former union and activist members (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). Moreover, their claims were also hardly ‘new’: Their quest for ‘...the right to work, to earn a fair wage ...’and for the ‘...the right to live a life of dignity through work ...’wasacontin- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright uation of traditional Argentine labour rhetoric (Jose Guerrero and Filippe Guerrero, 2/19/2009, GBA). The distinctions or innovations were in fact structural and institutional in that the strikers no longer enjoyed the support of a formal union and were no longer formally employed. Although locally

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 119 organized and grassroots-based, the piqueteros over time brought their claims to the national level. Through small repeated actions and consistent disruptions, it was only a matter of time till the whole nation would be discussing the piqueteros. The repertoires used by the unemployed workers made even a small protest event highly visible. Hence, even if the Argentine middle classes, at the time enjoying the economic freedom afforded to them by the convertibility plan, were not yet sympathetic, they had no choice but to become aware of the problems in the interior. The expansion of the piquetero protests led to the intensification of direct political conflict between local authorities and the piqueteros, as well as to their institutional politicization and coordination by other SMOs and political parties (Denissen 2008, 201). Through increased interaction, some groups became connected to, co-opted by or defined in relation to several groups: Leftist parties and their existing SMOs, the ‘new’ alternative labour union (CTA), the FrePaSo party as well as the Peronist punteros5 which connected to President Menem’s biggest competitor, Governor of Buenos Aires, Eduardo Duhalde. The piqueteros were never a unified or cohesive movement, but rather separate protest groups. Therefore the different clusters were integrated on an ad hoc basis into existing SMO and party networks.6 This structural shift was important to future mobilization in three ways. First, as in Ukraine, this shift was coupled with a structural realignment of SMO networks that were more visible and thus increasingly identifiable by political elite. Second, the piqueteros would receive particular mobilizational resources depending on who they cooperated with. Thus certain piquetero networks would develop closer ties to political parties. And lastly, attempts at a countrywide coordination within the CTA or party organizations would make the role of activist organizations more prominent in national party politics, making them probable partners. As in Ukraine, by 1998 the networks that would become the key mobilizational structures in 2001 were all set up; these very same actors would, as we will see, be central players in the protest events leading to mass mobilization.

Political opportunity structures: Alliances and resources

Beyond understanding the foundational mobilization structures, it is important to unpack how SMOs interacted with formal political forces and what resources they were able to access. As with the legacy of mobilizational structures, these two factors also set precedents that framed future mobilization. As explained in Chapter 2, political or economic opportunity structures are important in the mobilization of activists and the SMOs they Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright coordinate. Opportunity structures are exogenous to SMOs and are arrived at through direct or indirect interaction with politicians and the institutions they control. The late 1990s (Ukraine and Argentina) and early 2000s (Ukraine) were periods when interaction – direct and indirect, negative and

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 120 Mapping Mass Mobilization positive – between activists and the politico-economic elite intensiﬁed. Over time the nature and scope of this interaction created models for negotiation and cooperation with, or co-optation of, SMOs by politico-economic elite, and in the case of Ukraine, NGO practitioners. During this medium-term phase, in both Ukraine and Argentina, there was a rise in opportunity structures that facilitated, or impeded, mobilization of competing SMOs. These opportunity structures affected the SMOs’ protest repertoires, their autonomy, the trajectory of their engagement, the likelihood of fragmentation and the potential for sustainability.

Alliances and resources: Setting precedents in Ukraine In Ukraine there were two overlapping phases when political opportunity structures facilitated mobilization. The first phase was characterized by the intentional establishment of youth wings and youth organizations associated with political parties. The second saw a mass influx of NGO funding for youth and civic organizations and activities that could fit under the democratization umbrella. Practitioners explained that the financial and political opportunities provided by NGO grants and programmes commenced in the early 1990s, intensified around 2001 and expanded exponentially between 2000 and 2005 (Yevhen Bystrytsky, Director of the Renaissance Foundation, 8/20/2008, Kyiv). But an important aspect to understand is that the rise of NGO-derived financial resources coincided with SMOs’ increased interaction with the politico-economic elite. More than any other factor it was party youth wing organizations that provided the ultimate structural opportunity for forging ties between politicians. It is noteworthy that the national liberation and liberal political parties were more eager and successful in this undertaking (Unnamed, yellow Pora activist, 2/15/2010, Kyiv; Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Admin- istration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv). Yellow Pora activist Anton Berezhnyi described how activists ‘sought a place to be active, to have our say and there were these organizations, ready for us to join ...so we did ...they provided us with the foundations for future activism’ (Anton Berezhnyi, yellow Pora activist, 4/13/2008, Kyiv). Students used these associations as platforms to receive grants and training, meet other ideologically politicized youth and coordinate small public campaigns (Anton Berezhnyi, 4/13/2008, Kyiv). Thus, while NGO grants presented SMOs with mobilizational resources, closer interaction with politico-economic elite created political opportunity structures for further mobilization. This bringing together of activist and politico-economic elite was most prominent during UBK. The 2001 protests were the first big post-transition test of the ability of activists and opposition Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to work together. Unfortunately, in 2001 the political opposition in the Ukrainian Par- liament was, much like the activists, divided between and within party factions. The opposition consisted of three subgroups of political

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 121 parties – ‘leftist’, ‘liberal/Christian democrat’ and ‘nationalist/Christian democrat’. The most notable opposition leaders of the key party blocs were Yuliya Tymoshenko (liberal, nationalist: Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), and The National Salvation Committee, turned Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc); Kostenko and Udovenko (nationalist, Rukh (People’s Movement of Ukraine)); Oleksandr Moroz (‘leftist’, Socialist party); Petro Symonenko (‘leftist’, Com- munist Party), along with leaders of smaller political factions.7 According to Lutsenko and Chemerys, the leaders of the UBK protest groups, activist SMOs were divided along similar lines as the opposition. These divisions made effective coordination or efficient dissemination of information difficult, thus drawing smaller numbers of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians out onto the streets (Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv). At first, then Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko publicly called the protestors ‘fascists’, but the opposition soon realized that greater cooperation with activists was needed in order to gain more popular support (Siromakha 2005). The politicians’ need for SMO support was known by the activists. Describing a meeting with politicians, Volodymyr Chemerys explained that they:

sat around in a small room and it was packed ...each representative explained what he would bring to the table and how his organization/party could help in the protest organization ...politicians need ‘people power’ and the activists knew they could guarantee numbers. (Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv)

This knowledge that activists could legitimize the opposition helps explain Yushchenko’s turnaround. According to an insider, ‘after being ﬁred from the post of prime minister, Yushchenko quickly understood that he was on the wrong side of history during the protests, and did everything to distance himself from Kuchma’ (Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv). According to administration insiders, he agreed that they should seek to make links with activists and students. Nonetheless, in 2001 the opposition lacked the ability to coordinate their activities adequately and would have to wait two more years before seriously challenging Kuchma’s dominance. Even if lacking coordination, the UBK protests created and strengthened links between key opposition parties and the activist leadership. This was mostly due to the fact that the leaders of the protest events were themselves activists turned politicians. Lutsenko, a former student activist, was representing the Socialist Party and Chemerys, a founding member of the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Ukrainian Helsinki Union was previously a deputy of the right-centrist Ukrainian Republican Party. Such leaders represented a double-edged sword for the regime, while they were still connected to activists and had access to student associations, they simultaneously had insider knowledge about

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 122 Mapping Mass Mobilization political parties and direct access to Moroz and Tymoshenko (Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv). Such individuals acted as connectors between the formal and activist political spheres. They saw themselves as valuable co-conspirators and interlocutors. In many ways the precedent set by this style of informal cooperation was a rehearsal of the mobilization play. The two groups were not only introduced to each other’s techniques and capabilities but they also developed a manner of easy interaction. The cooperation between opposition politicians and activists created a precedent for a system of interaction and negotiation between the two groups. This interaction included an exchange of ﬁnances and technical resources for help in running electoral and protest campaigns, as well as adding activists to party lists, or giving them administrative positions (Mykhailo Svystovych, activist, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). When opposition parties were preparing for the 2002 parliamentary elections, they supported the Za Pravdu committees indirectly through interlocutors and invited key activists to take part in the People’s Forum ‘For The Democratic Development Of Ukraine (14–15 September 2002) (Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv). While Za Pravdu aimed at uniting the non-partisan opposition under one umbrella, the two-day forum brought opposition party leaders together from across the political spectrum. In both instances the groups discussed strategies for how to remove President Kuchma from power and to stop the corruption of Kuchmizm (‘Press Release on the Occasion of the 7th Anniver- sary of the Creation of the Democratic Association “Ukrainian National Council” ’ 2009). By 2002, each of these two groups could boast about having insider knowledge, and their membership overlapped. Activists and the political opposition were already stronger and increasingly more coordinated than the regime understood. Unfortunately, as we will see later on, these closer ties left SMOs susceptible to cooptation by politicians and created opportunities for schisms in activist circles when faced with the ethical dilemma of whether to accept the ﬁnancial support of political parties, thereby com- promising their autonomy and integrity (Andriy Yusov, yellow Pora activist, 8/13/2008, Kyiv). The precedents for opposition and activist alliances also tied the activists and their SMOs closer to the political fortunes of parties and politicians. Together they would rise in 2004, but they might also fall from grace together, a risk perhaps not yet understood by some activists.

Alliances and resources: Setting precedents in Argentina Alliances fostered between SMOs and political elite followed a similar, though more unequal pattern in Argentina. By the mid-1990s the previ- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ously autonomous and localized piqueteros began to organize themselves into small, more formal SMOs called MTDs. Between 1996 and 1999 they were either co-opted by political party militancy or invited to join larger SMO networks.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 123

Piqueteros can be divided into roughly four overlapping clusters. The ﬁrst cluster consisted of the groups connected to radical left parties and their SMOs, most notably the CCC (Classist and Combative Current), founded in 1994 and led by Juan Carlos Alderete, and the MST (Movement of Socialist Workers) founded in 1992 (Burdman 2005, Campione and Rajland 2006). The MST and CCC are connected to the communist parties Polo Obrero and the Partido Comunista, but Alderete was also linked to FrePaSo and the Peronist insiders. The second cluster includes the piquetero groups associated with the CTA. In the 1990s these were connected to the progressive FrePaSo and Alianza coalitions. Included under the CTA umbrella were the FTV (Feder- ation for Housing and Habitat) headed by Luis D’Elía, ATE (the Association of Workers of the State) and the MTL (Workers’ Liberation Movement). The third cluster (overlapping in some cases with the ﬁrst two) are the piqueteros closely associated with the Peronist party. These MTDs’ leaders came into close contact with the punteros and manzaneras8 controlled by Duhalde. The fourth cluster consists of the independent MTDs that maintained some level of political autonomy (Isman 2004, Kohan 2002, Massetti 2006, Oviedo 2001). The incorporation of each of these clusters into existing party or union networks and/or their coordination with politico-economic actors created not only political opportunity structures for mobilization but also dangerous avenues for future co-optation of the movements. According to piqueteros interviewed, the ‘leftist’ parties, the CTA and the Peronist networks offered different resources in exchange for the piqueteros’ support, participation or full membership (Filippe Guerrero, 2/19/2009, La Matanza). As explained by a Polo Obrero insider, ‘left’-leaning parties, for instance, encouraged Marxist or Trotskyist ideology and offered employment in cooperatives and services in exchange for toeing the ideological line of a proletariat revolution and marching in local or national party strikes (Luis Oviedo, 2/5/2009, Barracas, Buenos Aires). The ties to political parties were established on an unequal footing and maintained client–patron relationships between local piqueteros and the party punteros. Nonetheless, these ties provided structural access to the politico-economic elite, the institutions they ran and ‘mobilizing resources’. The newly formed independent unions, CTA (1991), MTA (1994) and the MTD Popular Assembly (1997), who are better understood as breakaway organizations composed of former union leaders, militants from the 1970s and some disgruntled former Peronist party members, developed alliances with piqueteros (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). A CTA insider, Víc- tor Mendibil, explained that by extending their membership to include piquetero groups, the CTA was able to broaden their network and ability to Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright protest, thus making themselves stronger political players (Víctor Mendibil, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires). In exchange for strengthening the size and scope of the organization, by becoming members, piquetero SMOs would also receive access to the CTA, MTA or MTD network itself, new skills through

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 124 Mapping Mass Mobilization training, and possibly local social services (Lucianna Ghiotto, activist and researcher, 3/3/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires). This heightened access to the CTA, MTA or MTD frameworks made piquetero SMOs look more attractive to new members, as they could offer substantial socio-economic beneﬁts through membership and participation. The most turbulent and uneven relationship was between the piqueteros, local pro-Duhalde Peronist punteros and the Menem government. Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores, an activist-turned politician, explained that the local and provincial governments (loyal to Menem) often reacted with violent repression against the piquetero protests. Because of the very visible style of the piquetero repertoires, usually broadcast on national television, these protests helped expose the violent nature of the government’s repression. But overtime, both Menem (then president) and Duhalde (then Governor of Buenos Aires) increasingly saw the piqueteros as potential collaborators and used their local punteros to bargain with the protesters. Duhalde in particular, as Menem’s main political competitor, saw to it that at least a portion of piqueteros could be used as a political tool to destabilize the Menem government (Auyero 2001). Duhalde has been credited by all insiders as having used his puntero networks to create a web of manzaneras who mobilized people in their neighbourhoods. As explained to me by residents in La Matanza (a notorious partido in the GBA), the manzaneras would work for Duhalde and co-opt the piquetero SMOs by granting access to clientelist networks, providing members with preferential access to soup kitchens, skills training and employment services (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #4, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, GBA). Moreover insiders close to the cooperative movement in La Matanza and seeking anonymity explained that in most cases the larger claims of ‘digniﬁed work and life’ were not met. This bargaining for resources has been linked to the introduction (1996) and expansion (1999) of the Plan Trabajar welfare programme, whereby local manzaneras and party punteros could hand out employment and food vouchers directly to their supporters (‘Cómo Se Distribuyen Los Planes de Trabajo’ 2000). Unfortunately, this interaction between political actors and activists created a system of depen- dency. This precedent of unequal relationships between Duhalde punteros, or in some cases the CTA, and the piqueteros would prove to become very important in 2001 when the Peronists and the CTA (along with FrePaSo defectors) sought to destabilize the de la Rúa government through coordinated strikes and protests.

Mobilization resources in Argentina: Financing and technical support Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright As explained above, after a series of protests, standoffs and bargaining sessions, the ‘leaders’ of the unemployed piqueteros struck deals with the CTA, ‘leftist’ political groups or at the community level with Peronist punteros. These agreements of inclusion or cooperation came with access to signiﬁcant

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 125 resources. Piquetero insiders described that some groups would get ‘ “paid to protest ...”, to show a lack of support for an organization, party or politician, or would get ...paid not to protest and maintain stability, demonstrating “allegiance to their political patrons” and legitimizing politicians’ (Activist focus group Argentina #5, Piqueteros MTL, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, GBA). Although the CTA did not ‘pay’ protesters per se, it offered access to information about funding and other training related resources. At the same time the ‘left’ parties, the CTA and MTD, provided an umbrella cover for piqueteros who were in conﬂict with local authorities and not willing to completely cooperate with, or be clients of, the punteros. In some cases the CTA and ‘left’ party SMOs acted as intermediaries in the bargaining process, as well as in the allocation of government subsidies and social assistance programmes. Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores explained how difﬁcult it was for his group the MTD La Matanza to maintain its independence:

very few piqueteros and cooperatives remain truly autonomous ...because once you accept money it is difﬁcult to say no ...the process repro- duces unequal power dynamics ...and, not in favour of the poor, the piqueteros ...some [groups] are ﬁne with it ...but we [MTD La Matanza] try to be independent. (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires)

One way that the political actors ‘paid’ for protest was the distribution of state resources. The Plan Trabajar programme was mentioned in two-thirds of the interviews conducted and is considered by insiders as the key ‘mechanism’ connecting the piqueteros to political clientelistic networks (Juan Wahren, 2/25/2009, Buenos Aires). It was often emphasized that Peronists used these state plans to ‘pacify’ the protesters. Insiders argue that the piqueteros would negotiate with the government and its local representatives, at first seemingly ‘winning’. But over time this interaction only intensified the dependence of the unemployed and poor on the local punteros,whoin return for access to work and services ‘demanded political support by the vote or in the street’ (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). Alas, most piquetero groups were able to use political and policy opportunities to lobby their causes and gain some financial and political resources. The evolution of such mechanisms of piquetero financing through political party or organizational interaction are crucial in order to understand their involvement in the mass mobilization of 2001. Mobilization resources mattered in that they tied certain groups to particular parties and politicians, making it quite difficult to clearly separate them. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Mobilization resources in Ukraine: Financing and technical support As was explained, in Argentina it was blue collar ‘unemployed worker’ groups and cooperatives that bargained using violent direct action tactics,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 126 Mapping Mass Mobilization in order to receive state social assistance via intermediaries. In the Ukrainian case, the state was not the source of any ﬁnancial resources, and opposition parties were limited in what they could offer. Ukrainian activists did receive ﬁnancial and technical resources, but this came directly from local and foreign NGOs, as well as local businessmen excluded from the Kuchma clientelist clan. Ukrainian activists of the 1990s and early 2000s were generally highly educated (with tertiary education) and had strong connections to (sometimes even employed by) foreign and local ‘democratization and development’ NGOs, the mass media and arts associations (Andriy Yusov, yellow Pora activist, 8/13/2008, Kyiv). Practitioners explained that most of the directors or project managers at various foreign NGOs either sympathized with the general plight of civic- and human-rights-based claims made by activists or were themselves formerly involved in dissident activity (Yevhen Bystrytsky, 8/20/2008, Kyiv). Thus, the NGOs were

liberal with giving grants ...[they] favoured student and journalist activism ...[that] promoted an open and democratic society ...[and the] protection of culture ...[that] strengthened political institutions and raised civic participation ...inline the priority policy areas. (Unnamed, Renaissance Foundation insider 1, 7/30/2008, Kyiv)

According to one such insider Yevhen Bystrytsky, the director of the Soros Renaissance Foundation, activists applied for ‘thousands of grants’ in the 1990s, at times with insider help. These grants included everything from ‘...starting up local student associations ...covering conference fees ...publishing alternative press’ and coordinating technical training and know-how symposiums with youth groups, journalists and activists from other Eastern European countries (Yevhen Bystrytsky, 8/20/2008, Kyiv). One insider explained that in most cases the grants were tenable by an individual representing an organization. This policy favoured small grassroots organizations, and thus individuals representing multiple organizations applied and received multiple grants. This influx of financial assistance on the one hand created an opportunity for sustaining and strengthening SMO mobilization, but as Dmytro Potekhin detailed, ‘the onus was on the activists to approach the NGOs and apply for the grants’ (Dmytro Potekhin, Znayu activist and NGO practitioner, 8/14/2008, Kyiv). Once in the system, the foreign NGOs facilitated the mobilization of activists by providing resources and helped organize events. According to activists interviewed, by 2002 they knew they could count on their connection to opposition party insiders for structural sup- - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright port, and the NGOs and local businesses for financing their activities via small grants and donations.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Setting Precedents 127

Beyond ﬁnances: The role of ideas as resources for mobilization in Ukraine As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the case of the ‘colour revolutions’ the diffusion of ‘ideas’, ‘protest technologies’ and ‘civil society training’ has been identiﬁed as a key structural factor behind mobilization and has received a great deal of academic attention (Beissinger 2007, V. Bunce and Wolchik 2007, Finkel and Brudny 2013, Hesli 2006, Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009, Korosteleva 2012, McFaul 2007, Wilson 2006). For this reason, I will address the issue of training and ideas as a mobilizational resource solely in the Ukrainian case. The presence of NGO grants, their promotion of ‘civil society’, their ability to connect activists and their dissemination of liberal democratic ideology provided an opportunity for mobilization. However, this story puts too much emphasis on external actors and ideas. As explained by Andriy Kohut, co-ordinator of black Pora,‘...these grants were not falling from the sky ...we had to apply for the grants or for the conferences ...’, noting that the activists had already to be sympathetic to the liberal values proposed by the NGOs (Andriy Kohut, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). Moreover, as explained by Anastasiya Bezverkha, the yellow Pora coordinator, activists who were well educated and experienced knew how to ‘manipulate’ the NGO grants systems. The activists would write what was needed, not because they were ‘hypnotised’ by western NGOs, but because they ‘knew how to get what they needed’ (Anastasiya Bezverkha, 5/23/2007, Oxford). In many ways activists were empowered by the process of seeking out these NGOs and their resources and by choosing to participate according to their own rules. Undeniably, the precedent set by accessing NGO funding in the two or three years prior to the mass mobilization provided activist SMOs with important resources for mobilization. But, as in the case of Argentina, access to resources came with drawbacks, which included being accused of western agents or, worse, being portrayed as creations of western NGOs and being an outcome of an NGO-sponsored diffusion process in the region.

Conclusions

In this chapter we examined in detail how medium-term structural factors tend to affect mobilization in social movements rather than mobilization of the masses. By mapping key networks and associations, we can understand how mobilizational structures guide future engagement. Also, by identifying the ‘political opportunities’ created by the interaction of SMOs with political - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright parties and political insiders or NGOs, we can see that while some interactions between actors facilitate mobilization, others can merely reproduce

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 128 Mapping Mass Mobilization the unbalanced relationships between activists and political parties. Most importantly, the outlined patterns of interaction described here create structural precedents for future relationships between activists and politico- economic elite. While these precedents are important, they leave open the question of the circumstances under which these established mobilization structures and relationships between actors turn into spaces for mobilization. Chapter 7 will further explore how crisis context creates such an opportunity. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 6 Context Is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process

A crisis is a terrible thing to waste! (Friedman 2008)

Introduction

As touched upon in the introduction, it is common practice for political scientists to infer causal implications of short-term contextual factors, such as political or economic crises, in the production of mass mobilization (Åslund and McFaul 2006, Birn 2005, Eckstein 2001, Epstien 2004, Giarracca and Teubal 2001, Tucker 2007). In the case of Ukraine, a political crisis in the form of election fraud, as noted by Tucker (2007), and foreign influence, as noted by Åslund and McFaul, are seen as the main explanatory factors of the 2004 mass mobilization (Åslund and McFaul 2006, 97, 152). In the case of Argentina Fiorucci and Klein (2004) and Giarraca and Teubal (2004), among others, highlight the economic crisis and specifically the corralito as the main factor explaining mass mobilization in 2001. These explanations seem to miss a piece of the puzzle, namely, that while there have been several instances of economic and political crises in both countries, not all have produced the outcome of mass mobilization. It must be that factors beyond crisis and deprivation are equally if not more important in the process leading to the moments of mass mobilization in 2001 and 2004. This puzzle leads us to return to our main question: What is the process leading to the moment of mass mobilization? And we are provoked to ask: How do contextual (endogenous and exogenous) variables affect this process? In answering this question, this chapter analyses how four immediate contextual variables – politico-economic crises and socio-economic deprivation, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the internal political division of the elite, foreign actor involvement and the intensification of SMO protest events – can become opportunity structures for mass mobilization. While such contextual factors are necessary, they are in themselves insufficient explanatory variables. They are significant

129

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 130 Mapping Mass Mobilization because they continue to help set the stage for the potential mobilization play. In particular, this chapter analyses how a political or economic crisis context is intensiﬁed by SMO protests, which, when combined with the crisis, exacerbate divisions between and within political factions in opposition and government and create opportunities for a series of actions and interactions between actors facilitating mass mobilization. The argument proposed here is that while not directly ‘causing’ mass mobilization, contextual variables act as catalysts for a range of processes connected to the build-up of mass mobilization. First we shall look at the role of socio-economic deprivation caused by the economic and political crises in Argentina (2001) and Ukraine (2004). Through the use of process tracing, we can problematize the dominant hypotheses and arrive at how crisis and deprivation alone are insufﬁcient in predicting mobilization. Second, the discussion will focus on how political divisions within and between party factions can be aggravated by or exacerbate an acute crisis. These divisions cause contradictions in governance, which may push the party in power to act illegitimately in order to maintain power. Third, I shall examine the role of exogenous contextual structures, such as immediate foreign diplomatic support for political factions, and partisan or non-government funding of activists and SMOs. Finally, I will present an argument against the interpretation of crises as causes but rather as intervening variables that can make mass mobilization more likely.

What is the role of crises in the mobilization process?

Processes are thought of as involving a straightforward linear connection where x (economic crisis, foreign financing) yields y (mass protest). Yet, process tracing allows us to see that the story runs more like: x (contextual opportunity) can be a catalyst or intervening variable for a, b, c (i.e. division of the government, internal defection, activist protests). If a, b, c occur, indi- vidually or in combination, then they can trigger all or some of d, e, f (i.e. isolation of the government, opposition and activist cooperation, infringement of collective rights) which in different cluster combinations can yield y1 (large activist protests), y2 (mass protest) or z (no protest). The protest outcome is conditioned by the different configurations of the clusters of variables present in the process leading to it (see Figure 6.1) (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Yet, because social processes are not unidirectional and do not occur in cleanly bound stages, d, e, f can also exacerbate x, a, b or c (Lieberson 1997, 359–385). In the following sections the chapter will first dissect the causal logic of the deprivation thesis in Argentina in 2001, and Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright second the foreign financiers and diffusion models in Ukraine in 2004. The oversimplification of the direct influence of deprivation or foreign financing on protest – asserting that ‘rational’ actors will only protest if you pay them money or if you take it away from them – is undoubtedly

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 131

Simple causality Multivariate causality Complex cluster causality Complex cluster causality multi directional in process tracing

f e X X X X f e C d C d f f Z Z B e Z B e d d d A A d Y f Y Y Y e e f

* Arrow between X and Y is not solid, relationship is not direct

Figure 6.1 Simple versus complex causality in process tracing

flawed. Although contextual variables such as crises and foreign financing of NGOs are important, they are merely potential opportunity structures that can exacerbate an ongoing political crisis. They can be triggers of three important elements: The division of the politico-economic elite, the increase in SMO protests and the loss of support and weakening of the government. These events can be catalysts for the interaction and cooperation of activists and elites, followed by the defection of government insiders, which isolates the party in power and triggers the government’s decision to infringe mass collective rights, which in turn makes mass mobilization extremely likely. It is important to remember that although this can unfold as phases in a compounding manner, events can also be concurrent and mutually reinforcing. When economic indicators such as unemployment and poverty rise, or when economic crises occur within the same time span as mass protests, it is often assumed that mass mobilization is a direct reaction to and result of the economic crisis. Mainly, the central assumption is that because people experience some level of personal economic deprivation, they resort to protest (Walker and Smith 2002, 201). According to the relative-deprivation thesis, championed by Gurr (1970, 13, 24, 60, 251), mass mobilization is driven by economic discontent, when socio-economic security falls ‘short of expectations or below acceptable levels of insecurity’. If a large enough portion of the population is affected by the economic crisis the reaction should be a mass protest. This theory downplays the collective agency of politicians, activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens, in mass mobilization. Materialist variables of personal economic loss have been found to be insufficient in predicting protest. Empirical work to date within the realm of contentious politics sug- gests that socio-economic hardship alone is not more or less of a mobilizing Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright factor than other political ‘triggers’ (Kassiola 1990, 191–192). Interestingly, Skocpol, in her study of social revolutions, observed that mass mobilization begins at times when levels of discontent are by historical standards not unusual (Skocpol 1979, 10–19). As we see below, this finding seems to be

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 132 Mapping Mass Mobilization confirmed by the cases under study here, where dissatisfaction was growing over the course of a decade preceding mass mobilization and actually peaked more than a year after the moment of mass mobilization. As mentioned in Chapter 2, four factors other than deprivation have been identified as facilitating social mobilization: (a) proponents of ‘social capital’ and network analysis have acknowledged that individuals need to be able to unite with other individuals who have had similar experiences, and thus be part of or have access to pre-existing networks of civil associations (Diani and McAdam 2003, Putnam 2000); (b) individuals need to be able to formulate their deprivation in the form of a claim (Tilly 2006, 35); (c) participants of collective action must be willing to accept that they might suffer physical violence, imprisonment and more deprivation if they join a protest (Opp 1989), and as noted by Tilly, unless there is a collective perception of the possibility of success, ‘ordinary’ people will not join protests; and finally, (d) participants of protests need to be able to coordinate the repertoires and protest events, use slogans and choose key locations of the protest (Tilly 2006, 126–137). Therefore, getting from point X, the source of deprivation (economic crisis), to point Y, mass protest, involves multiple processes: The formation of ideologies and claims, the creation and maintenance of institutions (formal or informal networks) and overcoming risks and obstacles associated with the collective engagement of individuals. Emotional dissatisfaction caused by a form of deprivation is simply one step in the process.

The role of crisis and deprivation in Ukraine and Argentina

The cases of the 2001 corralito in Argentina and the 2004 electoral fraud in Ukraine could be perceived as being too different to merit a comparative analysis. But if these crises were catalysts of similar patterns and processes leading to mass mobilization in each country, the distinctions between the crises lose their explanatory power. In the case of Argentina’s currency crisis there seems to be a clear economic trigger, and in the case of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution there seems to be a clear political trigger. However, in both cases the acute crisis trigger was overwhelmingly political (and as we will see in Chapter 8, perceived as such by participants), though bound by the contextual differences of an electoral or a ﬁnancial cycle. Furthermore, if we look at the socio-economic and political indicators in the run-up to the crises we can identify contextual similarities of ongoing deprivation in both countries, which contributed to the crisis context of the 2001 and 2004 mass mobilizations. Sociological polls reveal similarities in the levels of ongoing economic and Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright political dissatisfaction in Ukraine and Argentina. It has been reiterated in expert interviews that socio-economic expectations in both countries had continuously not been met since the mid-1990s. As mentioned in Chapter 2, post-transition socio-economic satisfaction had persistently declined in both countries. Yet, as noted by nearly all focus group respondents, ‘ordinary’

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 133 people see their socio-economic hardships as the outcome of ‘politics’ or rather ‘political mismanagement’, and many blamed politicians for their personal economic or political deprivation. According to the Latinobarometro poll, Argentines’ economic and political satisfaction had been declining from 1996 onwards. Moreover, economic dissatisfaction as well as a rise in poverty and unemployment peaked in 2002 and 2003, well after the moment of mass mobilization (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). While the peak of economic dissatisfaction in Argentina does not coincide with the mass protests, the level of the survey respondents’ conﬁdence in the president is lowest in 2001 and concurrent with the mass mobilizations. In Ukraine economic and political dissatisfaction has been consistently low between 2004 and 2011, but the country did not experience any moments of mass mobilization (see Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6). In the years leading to 2004, support for the government was consistently low, with between 35 per cent and

Not satisfied with the economy 100 Confident in the 90 government 80 No confident to the president 70 Confident in congress 60 50 40 30 20 Per cent of respondents Per 10 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 6.2 Politico-economic satisfaction Argentina (1996–2008) Source: Author’s calculation of data from Latinobarometro Sociological Polls (Argentine data 1996– 2008).

Unemployment as share of population

25% 22% 17% 17% 15% 14% 14% 15% 12% 12% 9% 6% 6% 7% Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Figure 6.3 Rise in unemployment, 1990–2003 Source: Author’s calculation, INDEC annual reports (Unemployment 1995–2003).

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 134

How satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in your country? 100

60 Dissatisfied (scale 1–5) 50 Satisfied (scale 6–10) 40

30 Per cent of respondents Per 20

0 2004 2006 2008

Figure 6.4 Satisfaction with the economy in Ukraine Source: European Social Survey: ESS2-2004, ed.3.1 ESS3-2006, ed.3.0 ESS4-2008, ed.3.0.

How satisfied are you with the National Government?

100 90 80 70 60 Dissatisfied (scale 1–5) 50 Satisfied (scale 6–10) 40 30 20 Per cent of respondents Per 10 0

2004 2006 2008 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Figure 6.5 Satisfaction with politics in Ukraine Source: European Social Survey: ESS2-2004, ed.3.1 ESS3-2006, ed.3.0 ESS4-2008, ed.3.0.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 135

I do not support the Government of Ukraine 2000–2009 100 90 80 Do not support 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Per cent of respondents Per 0 Jul-02 Jul-07 Apr-01 Oct-03 Apr-06 Oct-08 Jun-00 Jan-05 Jun-05 Feb-02 Feb-07 Mar-04 Mar-09 Aug-04 Aug-09 Nov-00 Nov-05 Dec-02 Dec-07 Sep-01 Sep-06 May-03 May-08

Figure 6.6 Support for the Government of Ukraine, 2000–2009 Source: Author’s calculation of data from Razumkov Sociological Poll in Ukraine 1996–2005.

50 per cent of respondents approving of the government’s actions. There were hardly any notable fluctuations preceding the 2004 mass mobilizations. Yet, after 2004 there has been a consistent rise in the disapproval of the government’s actions, reaching its highest point of 68 per cent in early 2009. Respondents in both Ukraine and Argentina seem to be continuously disappointed with the politico-economic situation in their country, and their dissatisfaction peaks or continues to grow after the moment of mass mobilization was over. In both cases, crisis-related deprivation, defined here as politico-economic dissatisfaction, does not seem to follow any pattern associated with moments of increased mobilization. Thus, a country- based exploration of levels of deprivation and political dissatisfaction draws inconclusive findings. Furthermore, if we compare within and between regions, Argentines were as dissatisfied as Brazilians with their personal and the country’s economic situations, but more satisfied than either Ukrainians, Poles or Russians (see Figure 6.7). In 2002 Polish, Brazilian, Russian and Ukrainian citizens were as dissatisfied with the economic situation in their country as Argentines, and yet this high level of dissatisfaction did not provoke mass protest in these countries. In Ukraine few interview and focus group respondents cited economic dissatisfaction as one of the main reasons why they took part in protests. Yet, according to multiple surveys, Ukrainians’ satisfaction with their income and the state of the economy has consistently been lower than that of their neighbours. These survey results are consistent with the opin- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ions expressed by the majority of focus group and interview respondents, who claimed that while they had been dissatisfied with the political and economic situations in their country for several years, the inability of the government to manage the crises in 2001 and 2004 – rather than the crises

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Country’s economic situation is bad 100 90 80 70 60 2002 50 2007 40 2008 30 2010 20

Per cent of respondents agree Per 10 0 Argentina Mexico Poland Russia Ukraine Brazil Country

Figure 6.7 Economic satisfaction in comparative perspective Source: Author’s calculations of Pew Global Attitude Project data 2002–2009. themselves – was the catalyst for protests. In focus group discussions and surveys conducted by the author, Ukrainians and Argentines cited political ‘mismanagement’, ‘chaos’ and ‘corruption’ as the key problems, rather than their personal economic deprivation.1

The role of the economic crisis in the mobilization process in Argentina The crisis of 2001 and the concurrent mass mobilization was not a single- policy, single-day or single-month affair. It was the cumulation of factors and processes, some exogenous but most endogenous to Argentine politics, policy and actors. The crisis was a long time in the making and, as noted by most interviewees, had its roots in radical policy choices dating back to the early Menem years and their continuation and mismanagement under the de la Rúa administration. From the 1990s onwards poverty and unemployment, two often cited indicators of material deprivation, grew each year. In 1994, 1.8 million people were living below the poverty line. This ﬁgure grew to three million in 1996 and to over six million by 2001 (see Figure 6.8). During the same period unemployment more than quadrupled, from 6 per cent in 1991 to a high of 25 per cent in 2003. Moreover, levels Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of informal employment increased dramatically between the mid-1990s and 2003, contributing to the already unstable socio-economic environment (see Figure 6.9). Just as with poverty levels, both unemployment and informality rates reached their highest points between October 2002 and January 2003,

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National moderate poverty as percentage of population

58% 55% 54% 44% 38% 39% 31% 23% 18% 14%

2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 6.8 Poverty in Argentina, 2001–2009 Source: Author’s calculations based on INDEC reports (2001–2009).

Share of salaried workers in informal jobs 44%

39% 38% 38% 38%

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Figure 6.9 Informality in Argentina, 1998–2003 Source: Author’s calculations based on INDEC and SEDLAC reports (2001–2009). not in December 2001 during the moment of mass mobilization. Although these statistics seem to support the deprivation thesis at first glance, the economic effects of the crisis were intensely felt throughout the 1990s and peaked in 2002 and 2003, making it quite unlikely that socio-economic deprivation alone is sufficient in explaining the 2001 mass mobilization. The ongoing crisis was compounded by political corruption and the onslaught of capital flight. According to insiders, in this period of near- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright collapse and staggering poverty there was ‘only one solution to prevent total collapse and capital flight’ – placing restrictions on the withdrawal of all private assets, a policy called the corralito. Former Minister of Econ- omy Domingo Cavallo reiterated the opinions that his Peronist counterparts

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 138 Mapping Mass Mobilization stated off the record: Because of the fragility of the political system after the October elections the corralito policy only finished ‘the political implosion’ that was underway (Domingo Cavallo, former Minister of Economy, 12/6/2008, Buenos Aires). Cavallo explained that in many ways the political crisis was worse than the economic crisis, as it was impossible to get the hostile opposition to join the government in a cooperative response to the economic emergency. Vilas, among others, has pointed out that the specific policy of the corralito and the deprivation it created caused the middle class to protest on 19 December 2001 (Vilas 2006). While surely contributing to the general social mood, the corralito policy dated 1 December occurred more than two weeks before the mass mobilization of 19 December. According to many insiders interviewed, including opposition members, the corralito did not in fact affect the different strata of the middle classes in the same way. Specifi- cally, those who could use credit cards and debit cards to make purchases were less affected by the cash shortage. ‘The lower middle and working classes typically did not have accounts and if they did, they did not have large savings’, and thus were not as deeply affected by the policy (Unnamed, economist, advisor to Nestor Kirchner Administration, 12/7/2008, Buenos Aires). This sentiment was also frequently repeated by middle-class focus group participants. They explained that they understood things were bad – but could still get by using their bank cards. The corralito had harsh effects on a large portion of the population, but it did not affect the very diverse ‘middle class’ in the way it is assumed by some analysts. Furthermore, based on respondents’ recollections as well as Clarín, la Nación and Página/12 archives, it seems clear that dissatisfied account holders participated in separate protest events. Labelled ‘tie-wearing protesters’ by activists, these protesters predominantly had larger savings in accounts and tended to separate themselves from neighbourhood assemblies, unions, piqueteros and their protest activities (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). These ‘depositor’ protests predate the 19/20 December mass mobilization and continued beyond February and March 2002. Their peaks coincided with the corralito and devaluation policy announcements (Paula Lenguita Saavedr, 1/23/2009, Buenos Aires). The corralito mostly affected the upper middle class who had larger savings in their accounts, the poor working class living in the outskirts of Buenos Aires and who were employed in informal labour and relied on cash. It is crucial to note that these two groups of protesters participated in protests separate from and predating the 19/20 December mass mobilization. The first Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright group protested in front of banks from 1 December, and the second group were involved in looting, marches and roadblocks in the GBA on 16–19 December and after. As will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 8, the 19/20 December protests that drew a cross-class cross-cleavage response of middle- and working-class residents of the GBA (and to a lesser extent

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Córdoba and Rosario) were triggered (according to the participants) by an intolerable political reaction to the initial class-based protests, compounded with the dissatisfaction of the mismanagement of the economic crisis (‘Ordi- nary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). Focus group participants reiterated that the economic crisis was rooted in the political hubris of both Argentine politicians and foreign economists and in their joint mismanagement of the situation as the crisis unfolded, including their ‘inability to accept accountability’ (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). Most importantly, this severe economic context highlighted the already failing political system in Argentina. It exacerbated existing divisions between political factions within parties and between the opposition and the party in power. In the absence of foreign support, the dual crisis exposed the isolation of de la Rúa’s government. As the crisis became more acute each event multiplied its severity (Filipe Noruega, Political Consultant, 11/26/2008, Buenos Aires). Thus, the acute economic crisis provided the context for a chain of government actions and reactions. These diverse variables had a compounding effect on the mobilization process.

The role of electoral crisis in the mobilization process in Ukraine Social mobilization in EE has tended to come into the spotlight when contested elections became central to politics, as in the case of the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine. Similarly, in Argentina the 2001 crisis also coincided with an election cycle. The congressional elections contributed to the crisis context and the elite’s inability to recover from the decline in political legitimacy extended the level of politico-economic crisis. Accord- ing to Ibarra (2003), contested elections can promote social mobilization by providing a contextually based space for public support of the opposition. Once the regime formally allows even limited ‘public discussion of major issues during an election, it becomes harder to silence that discussion’ and any opposition to the regime it may breed (Ibarra Güell 2003, 107–110). Secondly, elections tend to ‘legalise assemblies of citizens’ and create network-based mobilizational structures for protest (Ibarra Güell 2003, 26, 107–108). Thus, election cycles can be considered context-based political opportunities for mobilization. The ‘electoral revolutions’ technology, promoted by NGOs and activists in EE, is based on the assumption that elections can create openings for the mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens. The regime expects to be able to pre-empt this opening by increasing political repression and resorting to systemic electoral fraud in order to ensure the preservation Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of political power. In turn, if the context of an electoral campaign has already created openings for public discussion and assembly, any increase in political deprivation will be more visible. Focus group participants in Ukraine explained that while the regime’s political repression had been on the rise since Kuchma’s re-election, political violence and intimidation extended to

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‘ordinary’ citizens only in 2004, and at an unprecedented level. As noted by an activist in a focus group discussion:

Kuchma and Yanukovych knew they could not win without manipulations and fraud ...But they went too far, people could see ...in their villages ...at work ...that there was direct political pressure. People sympathised with activists, unlike in 2001 ...they were more personally affected by this political repression. (Activist focus group Ukraine #8, black Pora, 7/13/2007, Lviv)

The context of an election cycle made people more aware of politics in general, and when the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime responded with increasing political repression, ‘ordinary’ citizens looked to activists and the opposition. This created a structural opening for potential mobilization. According to Ukrainian politicians and academics interviewed, the very visible electoral fraud during the ﬁrst round of the elections created a crisis of political legitimacy. According to several focus group discussions, respondents felt that ‘ordinary’ people who opposed the regime, or found its actions illegitimate, began ‘to seek out activist and opposition organizations’ (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). The regime’s decision to further increase the level of electoral fraud and political violence during the second round of elections – after activist protests had begun – signalled to Ukrainians that ‘the elections were completely virtual ...a political show ...’ consolidating the crisis of political legitimacy (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). While the election cycle created a contextual opportunity for activist mobilization, it also made an increase of political repression more likely, which in turn created and then exacerbated a crisis of political legitimacy.

Crisis as an opportunity structure in the mobilization process

The distinction between economic and political crises as triggers of protest in Argentina and Ukraine is not as clear-cut as it appears at ﬁrst glance. Furthermore, their role in the complex multi-step process of mass mobilization is not direct, but rather crises create a contextual opportunity for events that can possibly trigger mass mobilization. Lopez Levy’s study of the Argentinazo has highlighted that the economic crisis in Argentina was part of an extended process that developed over the course of several months, if not years (López Levy 2004, 6). The events from October 2001 onwards unfolded in a cascading manner; the elite and activist reactions to events were connected to, but not determined by, the crisis. Thus, while cushioned Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in the context of ongoing politico-economic crisis, the moment of mass mobilization on 19 December could be understood as the culmination of events leading to an infringement of civic rights triggering large protests. Similarly, in Ukraine, mass mobilization was not simply about the elections

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 141 and the electoral support of one candidate over another. The context of the political crisis of November 2004 was a culmination of ongoing post- transition dissatisfaction with the corrupt state and the politico-economic elite who ran it. While there was no ‘economic crisis’ in Ukraine between 2003 and 2004 – on the contrary, the country experienced economic growth – there was a perception among focus group respondents that the politico-economic elite in power represented by Kuchma and Yanukovych were ‘stealing from ordinary Ukrainians’ and that their ‘wealth was growing at the expense of ordinary Ukrainians’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, Lviv). Thus, it is difficult to qualify the crisis experienced in Ukraine as strictly ‘political’. Protest participants expressed their perception of an oligarchic political system that tied economic interests to political office and infringed their socio-economic well-being. Con- versely, most focus group participants explained that they saw political sources to economic crises. According to interviews and focus groups conducted in Argentina and Ukraine, activists, politicians and ‘ordinary’ citizens alike believed that ‘political betrayal and corruption of the regime’ was the main reason why people joined protests. This does not mean that respondents saw this betrayal as only political but as a mixture of ‘political mismanagement of the economy’ and a ‘lack of the regime’s respect for the rule of law’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/04/2009, Di Tella Universidad, Buenos Aires; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). This sug- gests again that the elite reaction to a crisis and their success, or lack thereof, at managing it are more important to citizens than deprivation alone. According to Tilly, journalists and social scientists are equally to blame ‘for reproducing the pseudo-explanations’ that ‘frustration, poverty, and oppression’ account for protest, in general, and mass mobilization, in particular (Tilly 2005, 32–37). Such analyses fail to see that there are three separate components to any human action: Motive, means and opportunity. As observed in Ukraine in 2004 and Argentina in 2001, such opportunities for action are usually fleeting moments in time when a political or economic crisis exposes already present ‘political impotence, elite divisions, and stim- ulates institutional sponsorship of challenges to the government’s power’ (Tilly 2005, 32–37). The contextual factors that make it more likely for the party in power to become isolated and divided also make it more likely that the opposition and SMOs will increase their interaction and mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens. The ability of SMOs and the political opposition to stimulate Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and sustain the mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens is linked to their ability to capitalize on perceived contradictions in governance. By doing so, they are able to ‘signal to’ or ‘inform’ citizens of the conflicts and inefficacy of the party in power.

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Crisis context and contradictions in governance in Ukraine According to politicians interviewed, insiders within the opposition realized not only that the Kuchma regime was out of touch with growing public sentiment and the extent of activist cells and networks in Ukraine but also that it was also divided over a preferred candidate for the presidency (Pavlo Kachur, 7/20/2009, Kyiv). As reported by a Kuchma administration insider, it was never clear whether Kuchma really supported Yanukovych’s candidacy:

Kuchma privately made comments about how he cannot, ‘hand over the presidency to a gangster’ ...he lamented that his international legacy would be tarnished – Yanukovych must have known this, there must have been conﬂicts. (Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, 2/7/2010, Da Vinci, Kyiv)

Conversely, while the growing political crisis weakened the regime, the opposition was not as divided in 2004 as it was in 2001. According to ‘Our Ukraine’ coalition insiders interviewed, between the 2001 UBK protest campaigns and the beginning of the 2004 presidential campaign, the opposition factions held a series of private meetings, where deals were struck to support Yushchenko’s candidacy for president (Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv). The most important agreement was reached between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko in 2004, which was called Syla Narodu (the strength of the nation). Furthermore, although not formally in any coalition, and even being a contender in the 2004 presidential elections, Oleksandr Moroz and his Socialist Party also made informal agreements to support Yushchenko leading to the ﬁrst round, and formally supported him after the second round (Mykola Yakovyna, National Deputy in Our Ukraine Bloc, 7/07/2007, Kyiv). Thus, the growing political crisis created an opportunity for the opposition to arrive at a truce and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the increasingly isolated Kuchma administration and Yanukovych government. As will be explained in Chapter 7, internal political cohesion was lost when the level of planned and committed electoral fraud and manipulation became so obvious that ‘even insiders were giving information to the opposition and dividing the Yanukovych and Kuchma supporters’ (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). As electoral fraud became exposed, the crisis was exacerbated, the regime became increasingly divided and the political legiti- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright macy of the party in power declined even further. At the same time the party in opposition was strengthened by temporary crisis-based cross-partisan unity and extended this cooperation and unity to their interactions with SMO leaders.

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Crisis context and contradictions in governance in Argentina In spite of its obvious economic aspects, Argentina’s crisis was political. Contextually, the economic crisis was compounded by what Linz might call a ‘semi-loyal opposition’ (Linz and Stepan 1978, 72–74). The crisis severely divided the political elite within and between factions. While the Peronist opposition did not formally launch a campaign against the government, and even supported the corralito policy, it contributed to the regime’s destabilization through inaction, non-cooperation and the promotion of localized protest events in the poor suburbs. In Argentina, the collapse of political legitimacy was more widespread than in Ukraine, and it occurred incrementally from Vice President Álvarez’s resignation in October 2000 onwards. By the October legislative elections, the regime had lost its last bit of political legitimacy. Electoral turnout was relatively low, with 75 per cent of eligible voters turning out to vote (in a country where voting is mandatory), compared to the preceding years: 82 per cent in 1999 and 1995, 80 per cent in 1993 and 1991, and 85 per cent in 1989 (Medeo 2001). Furthermore, 22 per cent (Senate) and 24 per cent (Chamber of Deputies) of the ballots were cast in protest (purposely spoiled), known as the voto bronca (angry vote) (Medeo 2001). According to most interviews conducted, this election was evidence of a severe ‘crisis of representation’ in Argentina and a precursor to the December protests. Any economic collapse that followed further de-legitimized the government and exposed it as unable and unﬁt to rule. According to a focus group respondent, ‘the election was a signal to politicians that we are at the edge, we have had enough, we are watching you and we will not just let you get away with it – it should have been a wakeup call’ (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). The political crisis was exacerbated by the fact that FrePaSo members were abandoning the Alianza coalition and de la Rúa in order to save face (Sergio Ivaldi, Deputy for with Coalicion Civica, 2/4/2009, Congresso, Buenos Aires). As noted by an individual who had the opportunity to observe and meet de la Rúa during the crisis, members of the coalition and de la Rúa’s administration ‘were having meetings without him, trying to ﬁgure out how to manage the situation ...and strike some deals with rogue Peronists’ (Unnamed, Justicialista Party, political consultant, 11/26/2008, Buenos Aires). As the economic and political crises deepened, the divisions and incapacity of the government created a contextual opportunity for opposition and SMO interaction. Activist SMOs and the opposition were provided with an opportunity that temporarily facilitated cooperation (see

Chapter 7). According to the majority of elite actors interviewed, this cooper- - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ation aimed to either further destabilize the de la Rúa government internally or promote protests by using already activated union and piquetero networks (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires).

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The crisis context triggered a divide-and-rule mentality among the politico-economic elite both inside the ruling coalition and among the opposition. The Peronists wanted to distance themselves from the perceived perpetrators of the economic crisis and regain some political support by not cooperating with a government that was seen as illegitimate by the majority of Argentines (Esteban Marino, NGO worker, 3/12/2009, Buenos Aires). By working against the government, using both political insider and protest tactics, the opposition was able to ‘isolate the government and make it less able to manage the crisis, while blaming its mismanagement’ (Unnamed, Alianza Coalition political analyst, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires). Thus, in both Ukraine and Argentina the contextual factors of political and economic crisis became a catalyst that exposed political conﬂict, weakness and divisions to the public, creating opportunities for SMO and opposition interaction. This crisis context made it more likely that the governments in power would become increasingly desperate and continue to infringe civic rights, thus setting the stage for mass mobilization to occur.

Political opportunities of foreign involvement: Adding fuel to the ﬁre

Whereas this book underscores the role of endogenous factors behind mass mobilization, contextual opportunities for events leading to mobilization can also come from foreign sources. As opposed to their medium-term role explained in Chapter 5, the involvement of foreign actors is understood here as a short-term structural variable, contributing to the crisis context of the process immediately leading to mass mobilization. It is important to highlight the role of external foreign and trans-national players, in particular how they can help prevent, manage or deepen a political or economic crisis. Specifically, the level of financial or diplomatic support that foreign actors give to either the government or the opposition matters in this respect. In both Argentina and Ukraine, the regime in power was not helped or supported by the majority of foreign governments, financiers, NGOs or IGOs (Russia is a notable exception). Rather, significant foreign actors sided with the opposition (even if by omission in the case of Argentina) and exacerbated divisions in, and isolation of, the government. Their lack of support for the regime promoted the shifting of alliances and deepening of the crisis in the final months leading to the moment of mass mobilization.

Foreign involvement in Ukraine In Ukraine, external interference, aside from the Russian government’s sup- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright port of Yanukovych’s candidacy, was predominantly on the side of the opposition coalition and supported Yushchenko. This ‘support’ for the opposition and pressure on the government came initially through embassies and then in late October and early November included direct phone calls

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 145 from the White House and Westminster, as well as visits of Polish and Czech former presidents and other EU politicians (Unnamed, Yushchenko Presi- dential Administration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv). As noted by an unnamed employee of the Polish Embassy in Kyiv:

Our phones did not stop ringing ...we were receiving formal and informal signals from Warsaw to maintain contact with the Yushchenko team and some local organizations ...we unofﬁcially supported them ...then Kwasniewski and Walesa ﬂew in. (Unnamed, Polish Embassy in Ukraine insider, 7/13/2008, Warsaw)

Although western governments had an undeclared preference for the ‘liberal, democratic and pro-western candidate’, their direct diplomatic involvement came after the first round of elections. The majority of SMO leaders and Yushchenko campaign insiders interviewed felt that, prior to the first round, foreign governments refrained from diplomatic pressure tactics, pre- ferring soft diplomacy of democracy promotion programmes (such as those of the German Marshall Fund, Westminster Foundation, USAID and CIDA), in order to ‘fund and promote opposition SMOs, youth groups and alternative media’ (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). This soft influence also included the work of foreign NGOs such as the George Soros Open Society Foundation and private financiers such as Boris Berezovsky. As noted by the director of the Soros Renaissance foundation, Yevhen Bystrytsky:

Everyone was ﬁnancing opposition groups, whether partisan or not ...NGOs supported anyone who claimed they were working to strengthen ‘democracy’ ...not all of them took hold or were successful. (Yevhen Bystrytsky, 8/20/2008, Kyiv)

Foreign actor support in Ukraine was a mixture of direct diplomatic pressure and support and indirect funding of SMOs sympathizing with the opposition. This double-pronged approach created a contextual opportunity that strengthened the opposition alliances and sent a signal to ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians: ‘you are not alone ...we are with you’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, Lviv). Furthermore, by isolating the party in power, the foreign actors exacerbated the political crisis, and as will be elucidated in Chapter 7, facilitated opportunistic divisions among the regime’s supporters.

Foreign involvement in Argentina - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright In Argentina the role played by foreign actors is somewhat different. Foreign actors, preoccupied with economic and political woes of their own, particularly the post-9/11 United States, backed neither the opposition nor the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 146 Mapping Mass Mobilization party in power. But, as noted extensively by administration insiders, the former allies – the Americans and the IMF – let Argentina down. It was explained that the political and economic vulnerability was made worse by the lack of foreign diplomatic support, and several deputies interviewed criticized the United States and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for creating a moral hazard in Argentina (Unnamed, Deputy for Unión por Todos, 3/18/20, Buenos Aires). According to economist Julio Gambina, by supporting unsustainable policies and then leaving Argentine politicians to fend for themselves when these policies led to economic collapse, the IMF, foreign banks and the US Treasury encouraged speculative attacks and financial draining (Julio Gambina, economist, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). As noted by Cavallo, their ‘toughen as you sink’ approach after the Tequila, Asian and Russian currency crises, followed by an ‘abandon sinking ship’ approach to the de la Rúa regime, demonstrated to speculators as well as to the government and opposition insiders that de la Rúa’s administration was isolated (Domingo Cavallo, former Minister of Economy, 12/6/2008, Buenos Aires). Cavallo believed that the lack of foreign aid ‘gave the Peronists a go-ahead to detach themselves from any policies trying to save the economy ...their goal was to get back the reins of political power ...they could [only] do this by destabilising the government and society’. Thus, the context of the economic crisis fostered political hostilities and divisions, and it is these divisions that play a part in the build-up to mass mobilization. Cavallo acknowledged that unfortunately for Argentina and de la Rúa, the United States was undergoing a recession as well as a post-9/11 crisis of its own. We can assume that Peronists were aware that this lack of diplomatic and financial support would create an opportunity to destabilize the government. This abandonment by ‘the architects of the Argentine liberalization’ revealed that the government was completely isolated. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that one intergovernmental organization, the UNDP, along with several local and international NGOs and the Catholic Church, coordinated a Democratic Dialogue roundtable in the weeks leading to 19 December 2001 and for several weeks thereafter. Norberto Rodríguez, Director of YMCA in Argentina and co-organizer of the proceedings, explained that the local elite saw UNDP as sufficiently independent to be facilitators of a cross-partisan compromise (Norberto Rodríguez, Director of YMCA Argentina, 2/6/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). But as noted by a UNDP insider, ‘the de la Rúa administration did not participate ...and very few members of the opposition joined the proceedings’ (Julian Bertranou, UNDP practitioner, 11/14/2008, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). According to several organizers interviewed, the Dialogue was a missed opportunity for Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright reconciliation and cooperation. The organizers saw this lack of interest in cooperation by the de la Rúa government as an event that further isolated the regime from political and civil society. As noted by Carlos March, whose organization AVINA took part in the Dialogue, ‘I think, although not 100 per

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 147 cent perfect, the Democratic Dialogue project demonstrated the strength of Argentine civil society and the weakness of the political society’ (Carlos March, 1/29/2009, Buenos Aires). The political elite’s non-participation in the Dia- logue only magniﬁed the profound divisions among the politico-economic elite and ‘their inability to take accountability for their actions publicly and openly ...they wanted easy way out solutions, but they had no support’ (Norberto Rodríguez, 2/6/2009, Buenos Aires). The aloofness of other foreign actors also sent signals to the Peronist opposition as well as the SMOs to seize the moment, organize protests and reach out to ‘ordinary’ citizens, reminding them of the government weakness, ineptitude and illegitimacy. In both instances, the foreign support for the opposition in Ukraine and the unwillingness of foreign actors to interject with aid in Argentina, aggravated the crisis context, the political divisions, and therefore the weakness and isolation of the party in power. This politico-economic crisis environment was a catalyst for a series of events that facilitated interaction between the SMOs and the opposition and pushed the isolated regime to take desperate actions in order to maintain power. The crisis grew concurrently with activist protests, which could only further destabilize the regime.

Protest movements preceding mass mobilization in Argentina

The moments of mass mobilization in Argentina and Ukraine were preceded by a rise in coordinated activist protest events over a period of six months. SMO protests also exacerbated the crisis effects and intensiﬁed political divisions. In Argentina during most of 2000–2001, and in particular in December 2001, the CTA, MTL, FTV, CCC and independent MTDs coordinated national strikes, marches, protest assemblies and local piquetes. The MTA and CGT also heightened their union activities and recruitment of members. While strikes have been typical practice for these SMOs, from 2000 onwards their size and diffusion rose exponentially. As far back as 31 May 2000, a protest against the IMF-sponsored austerity plan was held in the Plaza de Mayo (Calv 2000). The protest was organized jointly by the MTA, CTA, members of the Catholic Church and leading politicians including Kirchner and Duhalde (Peronist leaders seeking to run for the presidency in 2003), as well as disgruntled Alianza members.2 Also eight Human Rights Organizations and Hebe de Bonaﬁni, leader of the Madres de la Plaza del Mayo, took part (Calv 2000, Carrera 2001, Jozami and Gonzales 2004, 156). By winter 2001 the activists had already strengthened their networks and begun their informal cooperation and coordination with opposition members and government defectors. This increasing cooperation of SMOs with political insiders inspired de la Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Rúa to consider a new cross-partisan coalition with Peronists in March 2001, but the Peronist leadership refused any offer that would not give them access to the presidency (Van Der Kooy 2001). On 21 March 2001, a-24 hour strike coordinated by the MTA and CTA (unions that include teachers and state

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 148 Mapping Mass Mobilization administrators) was held concurrently with an MTD, ‘March of the Unem- ployed’, in opposition to the austere economic proposals of the Minister of Economy Ricardo Lopez Murphy (Rios 2001b). The rise in cooperation and solidarity between the employed and unemployed workers created opportunities for inter-class network links and made it easier for the SMOs to reach out to citizens and receive their sympathy. On 19 July the CTA organized a national assembly and strike aimed at uniting the different SMOs under its umbrella network (‘Prevén Un Alto Acatamiento Al Sexto Paro Contra De La Rúa’ 2001). A month later, on 8 August, the ATE (CTA state employees) and the CTERA (CTA teachers) organized a 48-hour strike interpreted by political insiders as a middle-class protest, in solidarity with the urban and suburban poor who were most affected by the crisis (Calvo 2001). As explained by participants of the protests, ‘contestation and militancy gained momentum’ and political co-conspirators built up the SMOs’ strength vis-à-vis the weakening and increasingly isolated de la Rúa government throughout the winter and spring (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). The Secretary of regional integration of the CTA explained in an interview that the different organizations connected to the CTA aimed to unify Argentine activism by coordinating multiple cross-sectoral protest events. Narrowing his discussion to 2001, he highlighted the months-long coordination of various SMO networks via the FreNaPo (Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza, National Front against Poverty). FreNaPo united organizations under the objective of the fight against poverty. In September 2001 the first decision was to organize local committees, which were seen as a space for cross-sectoral popular consultation. CTA insiders explained that this was a momentous event for the reconstruction of Argentine activism and called it the great federal pact between all who believed in social justice. Once the recruitment process was complete, the local committees sent representatives to national congresses in Buenos Aires and Córdoba, where they would discuss the tactics of engagement. This ‘popular consultation’ was completed over four days, 14–17 December. Simultaneously, in order to publicize the engagement and demonstrate their strength to the government, the FreNaPo committee, headed by the CTA and affiliated organizations, organized a general strike that started on 13 December. This was followed by a national march of SMO members from the interior of the country through the GBA and into the Capital, starting on 16 and 17 December. These events occurred concurrently with the first lootings in the GBA, which began on 13 December (Rios 2001a). Activists anticipated that while substantive, their protests would be limited to 500,000 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright activists of the MTDs, FTV, MTL and other affiliated organizations. As was explained by Carlos Chile:

We thought that we would have less than a million participants, but we knew that a million and a half would be completely debilitating to the

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government. On the ﬁrst day of the march we reached this number, and the following day there was more, an obvious signal of the generalized social tension at the national level. (Carlos Chile, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires)

As in the case of the Ukraine, activists felt that there was a sense of urgency and opportunity. They knew that they had to demonstrate their strength and coordination, recruit smaller SMOs to join the larger organizations, create links between different groups of politicians and demonstrate a united front. The march was an opportunity to unify the SMOs from the interior of the country under one umbrella. For most of the 1990s these SMOs (made up of various piquetero groups) had been severely fragmented. The national march was a way for activists to demonstrate that there was growing opposition to the government’s failed attempts at managing the economic crisis. Their ability to coordinate was anticipated to signal to ‘ordinary’ citizens that the time to join in is now. While willing to take credit for the protest events that took place in the Capital and throughout the interior of the country in 2001, none of the activist leaders interviewed, unlike their Ukrainian counterparts, were willing to claim that the mass mobilization of 19 December had been planned or coordinated by them. SMO leaders were also very wary of admitting to having known of their members’ involvement in Duhalde-manzanera and piquetero-sponsored riots. At least they refused to say this on the record. Carlos Chile, a CTA leader and regional coordinator of the MTL, synthesized this point:

There was a process of activation ...and accumulation ...anger with the system ...but we cannot presume anything. This historic episode had a multiplicity of actors and many of them were not militants ...the 19th was not organized ...but everything that preceded it was. (Carlos Chile, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires)

He explained that the activist forces, even if momentarily united, were unable to take control of the protests or attain formalized access to the political powers. He stressed that no formal pacts were made. Other activists interviewed agreed with Chile when he explained that the mass mobilization:

had no clear leadership ...no political project, and thus while we had great ability to hit the power and the government, we had no ability to Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright replace it ...the fact that I went to the square with a hundred, or with two thousand or ten thousand of my peers ...the fact that Peronists were able to entice lootings ...this does not mean that I, or they, have led a conﬂict of millions. (Carlos Chile, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires)

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Activists stressed that while there was some unity among activists and the opposition, they were incapable of coordinating a formal alternative or opposition coalition. Their partnership was unlikely to occur at the top levels but rather at the local levels with local punteros and SMO leaders. Nonetheless, this period of activation and intensiﬁcation of protest events was important as their increase signalled to the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens that there is a compounding momentum of activist and political opposition to the government. In Argentina even at the last moment, the information channels between the opposition and the activists were informal and the exchange of information or any interaction leading to coordination took place at the local or personal level. If the delegitimization of the government is the central trigger of mass mobilization that began on 14 December, I argue that the cooperation between the opposition and piqueteros, even if limited, aided in sparking large activist mobilization; it sent signals that there is strength in numbers and that the politicians are unable to solve the problem. Thus activist mobilization only further destabilized and delegitimized an embattled de la Rúa government.

Protest movements preceding mass mobilization in Ukraine

In Ukraine, SMOs began organizing as early as 2003 in preparation for the lead up to the presidential elections. By July 2004 Ukrainian activists were coordinating electoral education, mass recruitment and some smaller direct action campaigns. Although direct action campaigns, strikes and marches were part of their repertoire, Ukrainian activists focused on informing ‘ordinary’ citizens about their civic and electoral rights. Since the strength of the Kuchma regime relied upon the control of information, having alternative media and informational sources was vital to winning over the general population. According to activists interviewed, the ﬁrst step in activist re-engagement was the establishment of informational and educational campaigns. Throughout early 2004 the SMOs coordinated small protest events, activist training and recruitment and intensiﬁed their means of disseminating information to ‘ordinary’ people. Black Pora started the What is Kuchmizm? campaign and launched a website www.kuchmizm.info that detailed the corruption and violence perpetrated by members of the Kuchma regime. According to Yaryna Yasynevych, a leader of black Pora, ‘The idea was to get people to think about what kind of times they were living in and just how oppressive a regime was Kuchmizm’ (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). In late March 2004, yellow Pora formally launched the Prosivtna Kampanyia Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Pora (Educational Campaign Pora) and set up its own informational website www.PORA.org.ua. A third site founded in 2000, www.maidan.org.ua, served as inspiration for the two Poras, as it housed a multitude of informational exchanges between like-minded activists and SMOs in Lviv, Kharkiv and,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 151 primarily, Kyiv. Ukrainian SMOs continued their post-1960 non-violent approach, concentrated on informational wars rather than street fights with police. Peaceful protest events were advertised on these sites, as was any information collected by activists or journalists who had personal connections to the opposition campaign teams or even to the government. The use of these new technologies made it more difficult (though not impossible) for the state militia and security forces to intimidate the individual activists or disband the networks of the movements in case of incarceration. In June 2004, the different SMO networks formed around two hubs in Lviv and Kyiv and began ‘testing the campaign methodology’ in advance of the final ‘act’ scheduled for November (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). The direct action campaign was centred on the prevention and adequate reporting of electoral fraud and voter manipulation and intimidation in Ukraine. The activists aimed to prevent or publicize any election campaign infrac- tions and all infringements of voter rights. Prior to the 2004 presidential elections, similar monitoring at a series of parliamentary by-elections and mayoral elections in several oblasts were considered as small victories in the periphery, and proxies for the ‘Big One’ coming up in October. The most significant demonstration of the capabilities of the two Poras to disrupt and overturn a fraudulent election, and the moment when the opposition started to see them as a viable partner, was during the mayoral elections in the Transcarpathian town of Mukachevo (Kysel’ov 2004). This was a moment comparable to the Federal March in Argentina, when activists representing different regions of the country had the opportunity to join the opposition and begin to forge a common plan of action. As detailed by black Pora Coordinator Andriy Kohut:

After our success of stopping the fraud [in Mukachevo], we both [black and yellow Poras] knew that we were on the right track for the October Presidential elections. We were ready to sit down with them and work out a common action plan. (Andriy Kohut, 4/16/2008, Kyiv)

As described in Chapter 3, Ukrainian activists, including those not part of yellow or black Pora, knew each other personally from previous years of activism. This made cooperation both easier and more difficult (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). Cooperation was easier because they had easy access to each network and more difficult because personal conflicts plagued the top level of the leadership. As early as May 2004, informal discussions began about the coordination of a common or concurrent cam- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright paign. Inter-network tensions were high and progress in cooperation was slow. As elucidated by Yaryna Yasynevych, ‘some of the more politically oriented leaders wanted to monopolise the activist sphere’ (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). Nonetheless, the activists were decisively united on the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 152 Mapping Mass Mobilization point of continuing a common educational and ‘get out the vote’ campaign. Yasynevych explained that the activists realized that it was necessary to get over petty differences. She continued, ‘it became clear that we needed each other to spread the word in different regions and it became our goal to use all possible channels to disseminate information’ (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). Yellow Pora took a greater initiative in reaching out to the electoral ‘commission officials about their criminal liability if they were to break electoral laws’ (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). Black Pora and Sprotyv organized public performances and handed out pamphlets, stick- ers and newsletters, each detailing facts about all the electoral campaigns, including programmes of the individual candidates and listing voter rights. Last, the training of activists was vital for the intensification of activist mobilization. Like their counterparts in Argentina, Ukrainian SMO leaders felt they had to recruit new young members who would protest for free and risk being the first in the streets. Black Pora used Serbian experiences and Gene Sharp’s handbook From Dictatorship to Democracy to structure and formulate their training camps. One of these camps, held in the mountains, became an official planning camp where the group of participants was collectively responsible for coming up with the plan of action for the months that followed (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). Yellow Pora used the experiences of Pavol Demes and Ukrainian activists who organized workshops on: How to Bring Truth to The People, Rights During Arrest, Violations of the Electoral Law, Internal Communication and Coordination of Actions (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). Yellow Pora also organized a training conference Pora pochynaty! (Time to begin!) in the Crimean town of Yevpatoria on 1–8 August 2004. It is important to note that some black Pora coordinators also attended his training camp (Olya Salo, 4/19/2007, Lviv). Altogether, more than 300 leaders from all regions in Ukraine (mainly Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Crimea) were present. Ostap Kryvdyk a long-time activist and journalist originally from Lviv, an active yellow Pora coordinator who also had very strong ties to black Pora and Sprotyv, explained that these training sessions were:

essential ...some of these guys knew a lot, and had loads of experiences, but some were very young, ripe and naïve – we had to pass on a great deal of information very quickly, efficiency was necessary ...believe me if the Serbs would be the ones telling us what to do, the efficiency would have been lost. (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Ostap wanted to emphasize that Ukraine-specific training conducted by Ukrainians (he was one of the instructors), with knowledge of the precedents of interaction with Ukrainian armed forces and politicians, was required. During one of our interviews Ostap took out a pocket-sized manual titled

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Context Is only Part of the Puzzle 153

How to protest without violence, how to spot an agitator, written by a Ukrainian dissident during the UBK protests. He said he based his training of the ‘new’ generation of activists on his own training, which predated 2001. Vladyslav Kaskiv agreed with Ostap and highlighted both the importance of inter- SMO cooperation and the Ukrainian roots of the mass mobilization of 2004 (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). In an interesting show of interaction between activists and politicians, Yushchenko campaign team members were also present at the training camps. Insiders explained that they scouted the SMO rank-and-file members to find individuals who were ready to join their campaign teams (Anton Kushnir, 7/23/2007, Kyiv). The informal communication between SMO leaders and the opposition began during these initial gatherings and was formalized as the crisis intensified. Other SMOs including Lviv-based Sprotyv, or political party and university student organizations such as Studentska Khvylia and the Sumy student union, also coordinated their own educational and recruitment campaigns. The two Poras were simply the largest and most well-known SMOs. This created the illusion of SMO unity and thus made them seem a great deal stronger. By September/October 2004, the Ukrainian SMOs had organized weekly protest events and set up tent cities in Kyiv and Lviv. They recruited tens of thousands of youth and university students to contribute to the protests and activities. As in Argentina, as the activist protest grew in size, the stage was set for mass protest, but this was still not inevitable and required in-depth interaction between the opposition and the SMOs.

Conclusions

As we have seen, if we focus only on contextual variables, such as political or economic crises, we put too much emphasis on deprivation rather than on the actions of politicians and activists as key explanatory factors behind mass mobilization. Social deprivation and politico-economic dissatisfaction occur over a prolonged period, thereby making it difficult to qualify why some instances of deprivation, or certain moments along the time line, are more likely to cause moments of mass mobilization than others. Further- more, not all instances of acute political or economic crisis produce this same outcome. In Ukraine, even oppressive political manipulation and electoral fraud, leading up to and during the presidential elections in 1999 and parliamentary elections in 2002, did not result in the same level of mass mobilization as in 2004. Nor did the severe economic crisis of hyperinfla- tion in Argentina (1989–1990) result in the same level of cross-class mass Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens as it did in 2001. Similarly, as the crisis context intensifies, it is clear that it can create or exacerbate divisions within and between political factions. We can now hypothesize that if the divisions are severe they can affect the ability of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 154 Mapping Mass Mobilization the government to manage the crisis, which perhaps makes it more likely that it will lose its political legitimacy. Moreover, it is certain that we need to critically assess the role that foreign support, or the lack thereof, has in the exacerbation of contextual crises. If we understand contextual factors, such as political or economic crises, as opportunities or potential catalysts of a process that leads to mass mobilization, structural variables, including foreign involvement, which may exacerbate it, become important in setting in motion a chain of possible actor actions and interactions. These interactions will be further examined in Chapter 7. Process tracing allows us to apply Goldstone’s sentiment on revolutions to mass mobilization. It is preceded by a moment when the normal political conflict ‘is escalated by both the intensity of [the crisis] ...and the magni- tude of resources ...when normal political processes for conflict mediation and resolution fail, and [thus] the political system is violently split apart’ (Goldstone, Gurr and Moshiri 1991), thus creating an opportunity for the coordination and strengthening of the opposition. Together, Chapters 5 and 6 have mapped out the short-term contextual and medium-term structural variables which create opportunities and precedents for mobilization. The following two chapters will look at the linkages between politico-economic elite and SMO activists as well as the outcomes of their interaction and its effect on the perceptions and mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens. As we will further examine in the following chapter, when the crisis gives rise to an intra-elite conflict, exposing divisions and promoting a decline in the government’s political legitimacy, they can become an opportunity for the formation of temporary (context based) coalitions between opposition, regime interlocutors, journalists and SMO leaders. These coalitions are rooted in previous experiences of interaction and cooperation as detailed in Chapter 5. Within coalitions these various actors take on complimen- tary roles. Through their interaction, they exchange information and then disseminate information and attempt thus to mobilize people. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Part IV Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 7 The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game

Introduction

We have thus far mapped out the different developments and structural factors of the mobilization process leading to mass protest. In order to place the moments of mass mobilization in context we traced the longer history of activism, we analysed medium-term and contextual structural variables, and investigated how these variables help us identify how patterns of mobilization and crises set precedents for actor coalitions, and set the stage against the backdrop of which the mobilization process is played out. We have identified several attempts at mass mobilization on the part of activist and opposition politicians in the past, which did not bring mass support out onto the streets. And we have identified how past political and economic crises (in both cases), as well as ongoing foreign financing in the case of Ukraine have not consistently produced a protest response. Therefore we need to delve deeper into the analysis – taking into consideration past experiences, structural variables and the immediate context. We are promoted to ask again: Who are the key actors involved in the mobilization process? and When do they become involved? In this part, we will explore in greater detail the moment of mass mobilization itself, through the eyes of the key actors involved. In this part we focus on agency. We dissect at which point each actor joined into the mobilization equation, exploring what motivated their actions. In Chapter 7 we analyse specifically the role of SMO leaders and the politico-economic elite and their interaction and cooperation leading to the process of mass mobilization. Drawing on Thucydides (1998) and Tilly (2003), the analysis of mass mobilization in Argentina in 2001 and Ukraine in 2004 is broken down into a theoretical framework of action, interaction and cooperation between or within the competing sectors of the politico-economic elite and SMO lead- - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ers. This chapter will build on the earlier discussion of how elite divisions and the presence of SMO protest, in a crisis context, can set in motion a range of possible actions and interactions between and within the political

157

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 158 Mapping Mass Mobilization elite and activist groups. We will trace chronologically the intensiﬁcation of elite divisions and actor interaction during the moment of mass mobilization, and in its immediate aftermath. The main argument explored in this chapter is that as the party in power becomes increasingly divided in the context of a growing political or economic crisis, the regime, in trying to maintain political control, isolates itself from the opposition and activists and stokes the disapproval of ‘ordinary’ citizens.

What are the possible actions of each actor?

As we noted in Chapter 6, if the party in power is not capable of managing an acute crisis and is losing public support and political legitimacy, it still has several options. First, to avoid protests, the government can choose to cooperate with the opposition and demonstrate a united front. Second, the regime can choose whether or not to use violence against the opposition and SMOs. Third, once protests begin it can attempt to reach a compromise with the opposition. The government can also try to bring its supporters out to the streets to balance the protests. Under the same conditions, the opposition can make four choices as to their actions. First, it can choose whether or not to cooperate with the government. Second, it can choose whether or not to cooperate with the SMO leaders and at what level of formality. Third, the opposition can try to co-opt the SMOs and their leadership and claim legitimacy over all protests. And fourth, if mass mobilization begins the opposition can decide whether or not to strike a compromise with government. In the context of a severe crisis with divided politico-economic elite, the leaders representing SMOs have four possible choices. First, they can decide whether or not to coordinate protests, recruit new members and synchro- nize their SMO networks. Second, they can choose to reach out to ‘ordinary’ people by recruiting them, coordinating their activities or simply disseminating pertinent information. Third, SMO leaders can decide to cooperate with the opposition, and whether to do so on a formal or informal basis. And fourth, SMO leaders can choose whether or not to allow their SMOs to be co-opted by the opposition either by formally joining their coalition and receiving political posts or by informally receiving technical or ﬁnancial resources. Lastly, ‘ordinary’ people can decide whether or not to join mass protests, join or coordinate local protest groups or remain non-participants. Or, if they feel their rights have not been abused, they can actively support the government. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Theory of actor interaction in the process of mass mobilization

Even if the party in power is unable to govern and there are ongoing activist protests, in a democratizing context the opposition (especially one

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 159 calling itself a democratizing force) still wants to attain political power legitimately – through constitutional means. Taking power through force may come with the risk of losing support of the citizens – something an election-focused opposition is not willing to take lightly. Thus, a clear option available to the party in opposition is to attain the support of SMO leaders and work with the SMOs to mobilize citizens for their cause. The party in opposition, because of its elite status, can strike a deal with the SMOs because it may have valuable information about the party in power, as well as different state institutions (such as the armed forces), to which the SMO leaders may not have access on their own. And even though SMOs may have broader claims and divergent ideologies, on a pragmatic level their leaders (if not all their members) may want to achieve particular policy goals and have their claims acknowledged within the formal political system, and thus cooperation with the opposition may be viewed positively.1 SMOs also know they have value as they have closer ties to ‘ordinary’ citizens through a variety of civil association networks, and are not (yet) tarred with the same brush as self-interested politicians. While social mobilization literature has highlighted the overlap of political economic elite and SMOs, this interaction is typically studied from the perspective of politicians co-opting SMOs and not from the perspective of mutual exchange, however unequal a playing field (Auyero 2007, Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, Slater 2009, Tilly 1978, Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Van Cott 2005). The logical questions that follow from this discussion are: What exactly is meant by interaction? What is the information being exchanged? Who actually participates in the exchange? Here I will highlight that three types of informational exchange are important: Between opposition and SMO interlocutors, between opposition and government interlocutors and between the activists and citizens. There are several ways in which opposition and SMO interlocutors can find their interaction mutually valuable. For one, the opposition elite may be able to provide protection (from imprisonment or police violence), resources (financial or technical), implementation of particular policies, or even employment in political office, in exchange for activists’ cooperation. SMO leaders, in turn, can offer the participation of their SMOs rank-and-file, can aim to mobilize large groups of citizens and can provide protest coordination and management skills which the opposition has no knowledge of, nor access to. Once assurances by the opposition have been made and resources have been provided, the SMO leaders can reach out to ‘ordinary’ citizens by disseminating information and resources and the assurances they have received. As noted by Snow and Benford (1992) these groups then have the ability to use mobilizational frames and signal to citizens to join in. It is Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright hypothesized that the more these two groups of actors interact and the more information they exchange, the stronger they become vis-à-vis the party in power, which becomes increasingly locked out of the exchange and often overestimates the strength of its position.

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Second, information exchanged between the government and opposition interlocutors can include details about the division or cohesiveness of the ruling elite. This includes the informal defectors who are, even if temporarily, willing to be interlocutors providing the opposition with insider information. Financiers could, for example, switch informally between financing political contenders of the party in power, the opposition or SMOs. Infor- mation shared between opposition and government interlocutors about the willingness and capacity of the government to use force, including the support of the armed forces against the protesters, is particularly significant. If it is known that the party in power has conditional, institutionally con- strained or no support among the armed forces, it is easier for activist leaders to mobilize SMO members and increase their outreach to citizens. The information exchange can be a temporary or a deep alliance and it can occur at various levels of formality. It is usually difficult to trace this process, as there is seldom a paper trail of this cooperation. Moreover, this process is unlikely to be direct, as it is extremely rare for high-profile opposition politicians to sit down with SMO leaders or rank-and-file activists. Through process tracing I was able to identify informational exchanges as seeming to taking place at the level of close allies and aides of the political leaders, or lower ranking politicians and SMO leaders representing a network of SMOs. As was identified by insiders of this process, the information exchanged was generally informal, and while informative did not commit any actor legally – making risks associated with collaboration quite low. Interaction of this kind was identified as valuable because it allowed the actors to conduct a risk analysis of each actor’s willingness to oppose the government through protest as well as the chances of mobilizing citizens. Moreover, exchange with regime interlocutors allowed opposition insiders to calculate how weak, incompetent or isolated the government was, and whether it was unwilling to use or incapable of using force. Under such circumstances, it was explained in interviews, it is more likely that protest can effect immediate change and ‘benefit’ both the activists and the opposition. Furthermore, if the opposition is consolidated, strengthened by defectors and offers some concessions, protection or political office to activist leaders, it can be seen as a useful partner for the SMO leaders. Lastly, if the SMOs are well organized, have strong dense networks and can reach out to the public or guarantee a certain amount of protest, support or disrup- tion, they can be seen by the opposition as a viable partner or temporary co-conspirator. Once the potential for collaboration is identified, insiders explained that each group must choose a game plan, based on the known information. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Next, we will examine these interactions in the cases of Argentina 2001 and Ukraine 2004, in a chronological manner, highlighting key moments of information and resources exchange. The main argument explored here is that once a crisis has intensified, is it more likely that the opposition

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 161 and SMO leaders will decide to engage in some interaction and exchange information? It is suggested that interaction between these two groups of actors can make the party in power weaker, which then either resorts to desperate measures to maintain power or is able to strike a pact with the opposition forces.

Actor interaction and crisis intensiﬁcation in Argentina

Preceded by heightened protest activity, the October 2001 elections and continued economic crisis were the final triggers of regime implosion in Argentina. After the results of the election, the de la Rúa government was divided, and it was supported by a weak coalition party. President de la Rúa was unable to attract opposition compromises or coalition pacts. The opposition did not want to carry the burden of blame for the acute economic crisis without receiving all the powers of governance. Most avenues of action were closed to de la Rúa. And yet, although the Peronists were capable of uniting against the opposition, internally the leaders were also fragmented and competing for the party nomination for the 2003 presidential elections. The concurrent escalation of activist engagement destabilized the political and economic situation. At the centre of the ‘new’ coalitions between defectors and the opposition was Senator Eduardo Duhalde, the frontrunner for the Peronist nomination for the 2003 presidential race. As a former governor, Duhalde had a strong hold on the Peronist patronage networks in Buenos Aires province and had meetings with current and former de la Rúa administration insiders. It was explained in interviews that when the news broke about Duhalde’s rapprochement with popular FrePaSo leader Carlos Álvarez, de la Rúa’s isolation became obvious to everyone (‘Duhalde Y Chacho, Cerca’ 2001). After riots broke out in the suburbs of the GBA and key industrial cities on 14 December, de la Rúa could not even muster the support of his coalition and the police to quell the violence. It is estimated that there was a total of 289 riot, looting and protest episodes, primarily in suburban areas where Peronists had majority political control (Auyero and Moran 2007). This was a significant demonstration that de la Rúa was losing control and that the Peronist political machine was working to aid in the government’s demise rather than to prevent its collapse. In an interview, Cavallo explained that de la Rúa seemed to be in denial ‘with his hands covering his eyes and ears’, unable to find a way out and reluctant to compromise. Regime insiders stressed that they believed the riots were 100 per cent organized or facilitated by the Peronists. Cavallo nonetheless highlighted that not all ranks of the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Peronists ‘were in on it’ and that it was specifically the Duhalde manzaneras and punteros that had experience from 1989 and the 1990s and knew how to reach out to the piqueteros to ‘destabilise the situation’ (Domingo Cavallo, 12/6/2008, Buenos Aires).

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Most individuals interviewed were either sceptical of calling the looting and pickets ‘spontaneous’ or knew personally through friends and colleagues that this was not the case.2 As described by Auyero, the looting events ‘extended unevenly [to] ...the poorest and most unequal states [while] ...the poorest districts in Buenos Aires (Florencio Varela, for example) suffered no lootings’ (Auyero 2006, 249–250). Auyero described the creation of ‘free zones’ by Peronist punteros where looting could ‘proceed without police presence’ particularly in La Matanza and Moreno partidos, both of which had strong Peronist networks. All interviewees referenced the Peronist political machination behind the lootings and protests. It was clear that all insiders and observers saw that ‘these were organized actions by the political powers of the GBA’ (Carlos March, 1/29/2009, Buenos Aires). The majority of the individuals interviewed agreed with Cavallo’s assessment that the lootings were the speciﬁc work of Duhalde’s patronage network pushing for the government’s destabilization (Amato and Guagnini 2002, ‘Posse Acusó a Duhalde de Ser El “autor” de Los Saqueos de 2001’ 2002). Alberto Amato and Lucas Guagnini, two Clarín newspaper editors, conducted an in-depth investigation into the involvement of the Peronists in the lootings in 2002. During my interview with Amato he stated unequivocally that:

The lootings were connected by the JP militancy and the Piqueteros ...The activists were paid between 30 and 100 pesos ...the local punteros provided buses and coordinated the police ...Duhalde’s and Ruckauf’s punteros were responsible ...there is no question about it. (Alberto Amato, editor at Clarín, 1/26/2009, Buenos Aires)

Economist Julio Gambina explained that although there was poverty and misery in the GBA, the ‘sectors supported [the lootings] because they saw the Alianza government as their political adversaries’ (Julio Gambina, economist, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). Other key insiders, including unnamed members of the security forces, highlighted that it was not a coincidence that ‘large ﬁrms were well defended’ during the riots. Interest- ingly, and not surprisingly, Peronist insiders were reluctant to agree with this perspective and most were only willing to discuss the issue off the record. Nonetheless, through detailed process tracing there is enough evidence to conclude that local Peronist punteros and manzaneras initiated or facilitated the process in an attempt to further destabilize and isolate the government. The question remains, how closely were they working with or through piquetero networks? Unlike in the Ukrainian case, the interaction between Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright activists and the opposition was informal but direct at the level of key SMO leaders and local punteros and politicians who made up the Peronist network. Key SMO leaders, such as D’Elía, already had patronage-based connections to the Duhalde puntero and manzanera networks, and they were capable of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 163 mobilizing rank-and-file members of local MTDs and FTV-related SMOs in poorer suburbs. As explained by interviewees, the Peronist punteros rather than the politicians provided the SMO leaders with resources and assurances, who in turn provided their members with some small payments, transporta- tion and even protection from direct police violence. This interaction at the level of political interlocutors was based on the long-term process of clientelist interaction described in Chapters 4 and 5. Thus, the order did not formally come from a Peronist general assembly, but rather through quasi-official network ties. The MTDs and the CTA also organized their own semi-independent protest events, pickets and marches in the GBA during this period, and it is difficult to unravel which protest events were connected to the opposition and which ones were not. Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores, a well-known piquetero activist and one of the founders of MTD la Matanza, now a deputy in congress with Coalicion Cívica, supported the hypothesis that the Peronist punteros attempted to go through the local SMOs. Flores explained that:

The ﬁrst lootings were organized by the Duhalde networks. They were organized in the Unidades Basicas, we were also invited to participate but we did not go ...but we also exited on to the streets at the same time to protest. (Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires)

Thus, while the Peronists tried to recruit SMOs, the lootings appear to have taken place alongside piquetes and other autonomous protests. During focus group discussions in La Matanza, the largest partido in the GBA, the piquetero activists and cooperative members described their personal experiences of being approached by the local punteros and police. The most memorable exchange was between members of the cooperative MTD La Matanza. When asked to discuss the difference between the 14 Decem- ber lootings and 19–20 December mass mobilization, they described their speculation of the Peronists’ involvement at the local level. They explained that Peronist punteros ﬁrst tried to ignite and then quell the lootings. In a focus group discussion, Silvia and her colleague Maria described in tandem how the police – which they suspected to be controlled by the Peronists – tried to coordinate and manipulate the different neighbourhoods, seeking out activist groups that could mobilize larger groups. They explained:

They knew who we were ...they knew who ‘Toti’ was ...ﬁrst they would come and say, there are lootings in so-and-so neighbourhood ... Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Local people connected to the police would also come by and say they are not arresting people ...we wanted to protest. We also marched trying to join the federal march ...

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 164 Mapping Mass Mobilization

But on the 20th there would already be police blockades set up every couple of blocks telling us to go back. (Activist focus group Argentina #2, MTD La Matanza, 2/17/2009, La Matanza, GBA)

The two women described the attempts of local ofﬁcials to co-opt existing activist organizations and control their protest activity. Jose Guerrero of the cooperative Pupore and Filipe Guerrero of the cooperative Desde el Pie, both piqueteros and members of the MTL (Movimiento Territorial Liberacion), explained in a separate interview that local Peronist punteros have had a long and complicated connection to various piquetero groups in the GBA. Jose said that:

The Peronists had almost total control of the partidos ...to get anything done it would have to go through their councils ...we were all losing our jobs, we were desperate ...if someone offers you free food when you do not have anything, you go and take it, you go and mobilize others ...you set up pickets. (Jose Guerrero and Filippe Guerrero, 2/19/2009, La Matanza, Gran Buenos Aires)

Both brothers were in informal leadership positions in their local piquetero groups and they also stated that they had coordinated their own pickets in 2001 and 2002. Other piqueteros explained that they were embarrassed that they resorted to violence and looting; they assured that any piqueteros who participated in Peronist-sponsored activities did so out of desperation and poverty built up over the last half of the 1990s. One former piquetero stated that ‘when you are desperate ...you cooperate with who you have to’ (Unnamed, piquetero activist 1, 2/19/2009, La Matanza, GBA). Thus, while able to make local bargains with individual SMOs, the opposition resorted to the tactics of using local clientelistic networks and the vulnerability of the local populations to promote and facilitate destabilizing lootings. Yet, once initiated, these protest events took on a character and momentum of their own. The opposition, while stronger and better connected to grassroots constituencies than the UCR, was unable or unwilling to formally coordinate with larger better-organized SMOs like the CTA. They were nonetheless able to make inroads with top-ranking piqueteros and increase their collaboration with the MTA and CGT unions. As described by Víctor Mendibil of the CTA, the SMO activities, like the FreNaPo and the Federal March, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright were already coordinated prior to the 1 December announcement (Víctor Mendibil, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires). At the same time the Peronist networks were attempting to use their informal connections to the piquetero and urban poor to further destabilize the failing government. Coinciding with

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 165 the corralito, the lootings spilled over into the homes of ‘ordinary’ citizens, who were watching the events on television.

Actor interaction and crisis intensiﬁcation in Ukraine

The story of SMO and opposition interaction in Ukraine presents a slight variation on the same theme. Yellow Pora Leader Vladislav Kaskiv highlighted that ‘from the summer of 2004 onwards, the opposition and the civic organizations were working together on an informal basis ...we all knew people inside and they knew us’ (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). The opposition and SMOs tried to smooth over any internal disputes and presented a united front. The moment of crisis intensification in Ukraine began in late September when the Kuchma and Yanukovych teams resorted to black PR campaigns attacking both the opposition and the SMOs. On 5 September Yushchenko attended a dinner with a group of senior Ukrainian officials at the house of Volodymyr Stasyuk, the Deputy Chairman of the Secret Services of Ukraine (SBU) – an institution under the control of President Leonid Kuchma. It is suspected by most insiders that he was poi- soned at this dinner with dioxin (Franchetti and Krushelnycky 2009, Naiem and Leshchenko 2004). Although he did not die, he was severely disfigured – and his poisoning became front-page news in Ukraine and around the world. In reaction to the sympathy Yushchenko was receiving, on 24 Septem- ber a fake assassination attempt on Yanukovych was planned by his own campaign team (Kuzio 2004). On his campaign trail in the western oblast Ivano-Frankivsk, Yanukovych wore a bullet-proof jacket, thereby demonstrating that he was under threat. But unfortunately, when an activist pre-empted the staged scenario and threw an egg at him, Yanukovych fell to the ground and went limp as the secret service guards carried him away. Activists caught the event on video, which was circulated around Ukraine within hours via the Internet, and has been immortalized on YouTube. In reaction, coupled with SBU warnings that the SMO networks were increasingly influential in local communities, on 15 October Kuchma ordered raids of all SMO headquarters (‘Proty Hromadyans’koyi Iniciatyvy “Pora” Porusheno Kryminal’nu Spravu’ 2004). The regime was still trying to win the election by controlling and manipulating information flow. Kuchma severely underestimated the ability of the opposition and the SMOs to work cooperatively and thus his raid did not have the desired effect. The regime was slowly losing the information wars. During the first round of the elections, the regime was unaware that the SMOs were well coordinated, that their networks were larger than perceived Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and that they had a good ability to inform citizens about the electoral manipulations taking place. Victor Yushchenko received the plurality of the votes in the first round (39.9 per cent to Yanukovych’s 39.3 per cent) and the third-place candidate Oleksandr Moroz obtained 5.8 per cent of the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 166 Mapping Mass Mobilization vote (‘Povtorne Holosuvannya Central’na Vyborcha Komisiya’ 2004). Within hours, Moroz formally joined the opposition coalition and publicly asked his supporters to vote for Yushchenko (‘Moroz Pratsuye Dl’ya Yushchenka’ 2004). Yanukovych anticipated that Petro Symonenko would endorse his candidacy, yet the leader of the Communist party and former opposition coalition member refused to make such a statement. The party in power was unable to force Symonenko’s support, and the predictions pointed to Yushchenko’s victory. A high-ranking Kuchma administration insider explained in an interview that ‘instead of reaching out to the opposition they [Kuchma and Yanukovych] resorted to intensifying voter intimidation and violence ...thinking the world would not care and Ukrainians, the “ryaby, khakhly”3 would not do anything about it’ (Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, 2/7/2010, Da Vinci, Kyiv). Insiders explained that it was at this moment that the balance began to swing in favour of Yushchenko, as key interlocutors began passing on information about planned electoral fraud. Although at first the SMOs did not work formally with the Yushchenko campaign or with his financiers, this level of interaction changed after the first round of elections. The ensuing political crisis brought the two groups closer together. It was detailed in interviews that there was an acute understanding on the part of both sides that they needed to cooperate and to coordinate their actions formally. SMOs did not have the necessary financial resources, and the Yushchenko campaign feared it could not bring enough people onto the streets on its own. Although there was plenty of negative sentiment towards the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime, most focus group members admitted that they did not vote necessarily ‘for Yushchenko but against Yanukovych ...who represented the Kuchma clan’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #4, 8/4/2009, Lviv). Low support for the incumbents was not enough alone to mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens onto the streets. Knowing that they would be the first to organize protests and the first to enter the streets, the SMOs wanted to secure protection and resources from the opposition. Hence, on 15 November, the yellow Pora council, with their colleagues at black Pora and with representatives from smaller SMOs, decided to formally coordinate their activities with Yushchenko’s campaign (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). This was the central moment of cooperation between the Yushchenko campaign – managed by Roman Bezsmertnyi (a wealthy politician whose nickname is ‘little Medvedchuk’ [named after Victor Medvedchuk the head of the Kuchma’s Presidential Administration]), Taras Stetskiv (deputy in parliament and former president of the National Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright TV company) and Yuriy Lutsenko (former activist and deputy in parliament, who was not formally a campaign team member but received the title of ‘chief of the maidan’) – and activists. Together the two Poras, Yushchenko’s campaign team and other organizations composed a common protest action

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 167 plan which detailed what elements of protest would be coordinated and secured by which actor. Although black Pora never signed the document officially, their representatives were present at meetings, but did not want to be seen as formally supporting one candidate over another (Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv). Black Pora’s engagement with the opposition in Ukraine was similar to that of the SMOs in Argentina who did not want to support the Peronist opposition outright as an alternative to de la Rúa. Yet, while in Argentina only a small group of individual piquetero leaders defected and joined forces with the Peronists, in Ukraine more SMO leaders were willing to intensely cooperate with, and later be co-opted by, the political opposition. A difference between Ukraine and Argentina in this respect is that in Ukraine SMO leaders were mostly composed of middle-class constituencies; they therefore enjoyed easier access to resources and financing. Cooperation between Ukrainian SMOs and the opposition was not driven by the desperation that the piqueteros and the poor faced in Argentina. Unfortunately, the SMOs’ financial records are practically non-existent. The activists from both SMOs, and other smaller entities such as Sprotyv, Znayu, and Maidan, all claim that local Ukrainian businessmen were instrumental in maintaining each movement’s balance sheets. What is certain is that the interaction and cooperation between the activists and opposition was, at least in the case of yellow Pora, more formalized, and even in case of black Pora and Znayu it was more direct than that of the piqueteros and the Peronists. Second, the opposition did not have an easily deployable clientelistic network, and insiders explained that they believed they needed the help of SMO leaders in order to organize large protests and reach out to grassroots constituencies. According to yellow Pora activist and political insider Kostyantyn Kanikov, this coalition between the activists and the politicians was seen as a necessity because:

no one believed that many people would come out on to the streets ...because we thought they were scared ...or because Ukrainians had the ‘moya khata z krayu’ [the world ends at the edge of my house] mentality ...we had to be prepared, with activists and youth. (Kostyantyn Kanishev, yellow Pora activist and Nasha Ukrayina campaign coordinator in Kharkiv, 7/14/2007, Kyiv)

Because the Ukrainian SMOs had a broader network that encompassed both the main cities (Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa) and rural districts (central and western Ukraine), they were seen as a useful resource. They could also help Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright with ‘getting out the vote’, informing local constituents about their rights, and most importantly recruiting large numbers of youth and university students to join opposition protests. The perception that ‘ordinary’ citizens would not protest was a reason for the opposition and SMO activists

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 168 Mapping Mass Mobilization to cooperate more actively in Ukraine. The government was still relatively strong and until the ﬁnal moments in December 2004 controlled most of the state and judicial institutions (Mykhailo Svystovych,7/30/2007, Kyiv). Real- izing its weaknesses, the opposition sought to formally tie the SMO leaders and their organizations to its campaign. The Yushchenko team was sure that they could win the election, but that the election would be stolen. Therefore, their goal was to document and expose the fraud and to protest the falsiﬁed results. These goals coincided with the goal of SMOs, who wanted a fair election and an end to Kuchmizm. Because of this overlap in aims, the opposition and SMOs found it easier to cooperate in Ukraine than in Argentina.

Crisis and defection of government insiders in Argentina

As SMOs organized protests and began to collaborate with the opposition, they sparked defections within the party in power, in each country case. By October 2001 the government had become almost completely delegitimized and the Peronists had a strong party machine based in clientelist networks. The opposition learning from the experiences of 1989 knew that they could use these networks to destabilize the suburban areas, creating a perception of the country plummeting into chaos. Importantly, the opposition calculated that Argentine people would protest if the opportunity presented itself. The protest events were used as a tool to get rid of the government in a way that would make it difﬁcult for them to rebuild their parties before the next election cycle. However, the activists were not coordinated enough and suffered from fragmentation. Moreover, most SMOs were not yet formally incorporated into party wings (as would happen after 2002) and were unwilling to strike formal deals with Peronists. By 19 December local protest events and lootings were already spread throughout the GBA. De la Rúa was reluctant but nonetheless called on the Peronists to join him in coalition talks (‘El Gobierno Llamó Al PJ Pero Aún No Consigue Sacarle Un Acuerdo’ 2001, ‘El Peronismo Prevé Una Larga discussion: Hay Diferencias Entre Los Diputados Economistas; Para Matzkin, No Se Aprobará Antes de Fines de Año’ 2001). An important fact that came out of communication between interlocutors was that both the opposition and government insiders already knew that the president ‘was unable to make any valuable concessions or any concrete offers, the whispers in halls were about what the Peronists were up to as if they were already in power’ (Unnamed, Alianza Coalition political analyst, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires). Furthermore, as described in focus groups, this was a sentiment shared by the media and acknowledged by the public. For instance, La Nacíon reported Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright on 17 December that within two days Puerta would be the next Peronist president of Argentina (‘El Peronista Puerta Será Dos Días Presidente: Será El Jueves Y El Viernes Próximos’ 2001). De la Rúa’s cabinet also faced multiple public resignations throughout November and December, including

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 169 well-known hard-line politician Patricia Bullrich (‘Patricia Bullrich, Sin Apoyo, Renunció a Su Cargo’ 2001). According to Felipe Noguera, a political consultant who was able to meet de la Rúa on 17 or 18 December, it was evident that there was a ‘power vacuum ...and complete inaction on the part of his government’ (Felipe Noguera, 11/26/2008, Buenos Aires). Explaining how shocked he was at being given time for a tête-à-tête meeting with the president in a time of severe crisis, Noguera realized that de la Rúa was quite isolated that ‘no-one wanted to speak with him because he was no longer in control’. Similarly, Patricia Bullrich, a former minister in de la Rúa’s government, recalled how the president blamed the Peronists for not being willing to cooperate, but was unable to accept any responsibility himself (Patricia Bullrich, Deputy for Unión por Todos, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires). Bullrich explained that the worst part was that de la Rúa did not seem to compre- hend the severity of the crisis and his own demise, and because of this he increasingly isolated himself. As regime insiders defected, some increased their channels of communication with the Peronists (‘Realineamientos Que Trae La Crisis’ 2012). In addition to the complete destabilization of de la Rúa’s inner circle, activists pressed on with their coordinated efforts and 18 and 19 December saw more protests coordinated by them. However, the CTA leadership was communicating and coordinated with Peronist insiders. As noted by Juan Gonzales:

The Peronist intendente of Moreno – one of the areas where there was the heaviest looting – organized various forces of civil society, and held an assembly to decide how to achieve social peace. Their decision was to march to the Plaza de Mayo ...this was on the 19th in the morning ...we were all meeting up in the ATE. The Secretary General of the ATE and Victor de Genaro were there and when they called us and told us they were stopped at El Cruce and could not make it into the capital ...we decided to march to the Plaza de Mayo in their place. (Juan Gonzales, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires)

According to a number of investigative reports it was in Moreno that the local Peronist Mayor Mariano West encouraged lootings and called on his constituents to picket in the centre of the municipality (José Lucesole 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that the activists from Moreno were among the ﬁrst to decide to march to the capital on 19 December. But what had been unclear prior to conducting extensive interviews is that while not formally connected, these groups were actively exchanging information as they were Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright planning their actions. It is important to note that El Cruce, the city where the Moreno protesters were stopped, had also been the site of heavy looting in 1989 (Granovsky 2001). This interaction and repetition of events points out that as the crisis intensiﬁed the lines of cooperation between

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 170 Mapping Mass Mobilization the Peronist networks and other SMOs formerly connected with FrePaSo remained open. Juan Gonzales explained that as 19 December progressed, different activists, including the Peronist youth, joined the Congreso and the Plaza de Mayo protests. All informants were able to trace that at ﬁrst mostly activists and youth protested, then more ‘ordinary’ citizens joined in. Thus, most local observers believe that the point of no return (the ﬁnal straw that would spark mass mobilization) had not yet been reached. Yet, at approximately 21:45pm, even after his ‘offer’ for a coalition with the opposition was rejected, to show that he was still in control the president addressed the public with a televised speech (Van Der Kooy 2001). In a desperate act, de la Rúa, declared a state of siege, forbidding public gatherings and instituting a curfew. Most participants of focus group discussions and interviews described de la Rúa’s speech as having a scolding tone, ‘like a patriarch speaking to his children’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). But this was a severe miscalculation on the part of de la Rúa, who was almost completely isolated. Sergio Kiernan, the Sunday Editor of Página/12, recalled that the shift from activists’ to ‘ordinary’ people’s participation on 19 December ‘was obvious ...these people were amateurs, they were not activists with experience ...families brought their toddlers ...they felt they had to defend their rights’ (Sergio Kiernan, journalist, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). Some people began marching to the congress and the presidential palace, guided by activists in their midst, while others began the local organization of what would become ‘neighbourhood assemblies’. One young activist explained that he received texts and calls from other activists who passed on the messages through their circles. He remembered vividly being told, ‘go to Plaza de Mayo; that is where the activists are gathering’, and so he joined (Unnamed, militant and researcher, UBA, 4/21/2009, Buenos Aires). Although semi- spontaneous, the activists claim to have informally coordinated the protests by guiding the crowds through the streets. Institutionally, de la Rúa did not have many options left, and the Peronists were unwilling to facilitate the deployment of the local and provincial police (Unnamed, associate of Mariano West, 2/10/2009, La Matanza, GBA). The initial refusal of the police forces to suppress or arrest protesters signalled the total disappearance of a chain of command, and demonstrated that de la Rúa no longer had any support within state institutions. The military, still dealing with their dark past, was unwilling to take the blame if violence grew worse and they too did not want to step in (Gustavo Yabarra, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). Sometime after midnight de la Rúa was able to activate the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Federal Police and National Gendarmerie, the only structures over which he still had control (Calvo and Barbano 2001). This repression of mostly youth and activists deterred most ‘ordinary’ citizens from returning to the Plaza the following day, but activists regrouped and returned (Víctor Mendibil,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 171

2/20/2009, Buenos Aires). Although opposition members did join the government for discussions lasting until 2:30 am, they were unable to reach any agreement (de Eulate 2001). De la Rúa attempted to use Cavallo as a scape- goat, and blaming the corralito for the protests, he gave in to the Peronist demands Cavallo’s resignation on the morning of 20 December (‘Rige El Estado de Sitio Después de Los Saqueos; Renunció Cavallo’ 2001). Insiders to the process explained that Peronists were informally supporting the siege, knowing that this would be the ﬁnal blow from which de la Rúa’s government could not recover. The protests did not subside on 20 December but diffused throughout the city and the GBA. On 20 December there was a second semi-organized protest consist- ing mostly of activists, in the city centre. ‘Ordinary’ citizens stayed local and mobilized and coordinated local cacerolazos (pot-banging protests) in their barrios. Fewer ‘ordinary’ citizens turned up to the Plaza de Mayo and Congreso, but the CTA, CCC, MTA and MTDs as well as individual activists returned. Activists from certain organizations with more radical repertoires, such as some MTDs, Pole Obrero, Izquierda Unida and the Movimiento Al Socialismo, created blockades and vandalized the buildings in the city centre (Víctor Mendibil, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires). 20 December saw greater violence and it is estimated that ‘between 19 and 36 people died and more than 400 were wounded’ within the 24 hours of the arrival of the federal police (Sergio Sorin, journalist, 2/6/2009, Buenos Aires). As the violence spread, the Peronists convened their own meeting outside the city. In a desperate move at 16:00, de la Rúa again went on national television refusing to step down and calling on the Peronists to compromise and build a government of national unity. Experts close to the former president said in interviews that it seemed strange to ask for unity at a time when government defections were mounting and the president had little to offer in exchange for support from the opposition. For instance, when de la Rúa tried to order a media blackout, it is rumoured among journalists interviewed that his own media secretary refused to enact the order. Moreover as described by Schamis on the eve of 20 December:

when de la Rúa made his offer, the PJ congressional leaders took it to their UCR peers for discussion, only to hear the stunning news that the congressional wing of the president’s own party was withdrawing its support for him, and would not take part in any government he might head. (Schamis 2002a, 84–85)

Thus, the president was isolated from his own UCR party, and not even his Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright close allies would share this information with him. As noted by Schamis, de la Rúa’s brother who was sitting in the meeting and knew how isolated the government had become seemed to be unable to get through to the president.

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A second planned meeting never took place and at 17:00 the leader of the Peronist bloc in the lower house announced that the party was ready to initiate impeachment proceedings against de la Rúa. The president finally had no choice but to resign and was forced to leave the presidential palace by helicopter (‘Renunció De La Rúa: El Peronista Puerta Está a Cargo Del Poder Ejecutivo’ 2001). His final escape was a symptom of the total isolation and fragmentation of the government and his inability to strike a balanced deal with the opposition. With de la Rúa’s resignation the Peronists began to take over the institutions of government, but as explained by SMO leaders, it became obvious that they were neither willing to cooperate with the SMO leaders nor were they supported by the people in the streets, except for a few piquetero networks. Thus, the protests subsided, but did not disappear with the political turnover, and continued into January. The protests also slowly lost a cross-class and mass appeal. The moment of mass mobilization came and went. It is important to note the differences between the three phases of protests in Argentina. The first phase between 14 and 19 December was coordinated by SMO leaders (piquetero leaders D’Elía and Aldarte and MTA leader Moyano), instigated by Peronist punteros (Mariano West) and sanctioned by Duhalde, but there was nonetheless, limited formal cooperation between these groups. The second phase on 19 and 20 December represented the instance when the protests turned into mass mobilization. It was the moment when the various protests organized by SMOs sponsored by the Peronists and ‘ordinary’ citizens fused. The third phase after de la Rúa’s resignation lasted until approximately July–August 2002. The protests over time became co-opted by left-leaning parties and radical SMOs. Unlike in Ukraine, the protests continued after the regime turnover, but the political co-optation was similar.

Crisis and the defection of government insiders in Ukraine

In Ukraine, as compared to Argentina, the opposition was weaker and the party in power was stronger. In an inverted manner, the regime was supported by a strong party machine, and the opposition was made up of a loose coalition of competing elements. Before the second round of the 2004 presidential elections, the SMO leaders divided themselves into two groups: Those who would go out into the regions, continue to educate, disseminate information and monitor elections; and those who would coordinate direct action campaigns in the main cities, speciﬁcally in Kyiv. University students and journalists were recruited to travel to central, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine with press cards provided by the SMOs so that they would - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright have ‘legal’ access to monitor electoral commissions, local precincts and all election day proceedings.4 In Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv, activists set up tent

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 173 cities and coordinated daily performances and direct action campaigns to raise awareness and maintain momentum (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). As insiders explained, the interaction between the activists and the opposition grew stronger in this period. After signing a formal agreement with the Yushchenko campaign team, SMO leaders, specifically Vladislav Kaskiv, would meet with the Yushchenko, Our Ukraine and BYuT insiders on a weekly basis (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). The activist contingents needed to be capable of monitoring and reporting election fraud directly to the opposition. Second, they also needed to make sure that there was a critical mass of activists ready to be deployed in Kyiv in a protest sizable enough to tip the balance of power in favour of the opposition, and make ‘ordinary’ people feel safe to join in (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). According to Activists, this critical mass was estimated at being somewhere between 30,000 and 100,000 (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). To achieve this aim, the coordinators decided that any activist who travelled to the regions for election day would return by train to Kyiv that night in order to join their Kyiv-based peers in the Maidan Nezalezhnosty (Independence square) by the following morning. Their interaction also became more personal. SMO leaders and campaign managers had 24-hour access to each other via mobile phones. The organization of rank-and-file activists was also done with mobile phones, but through a domino chain rather than a mass text (Yaryna Yasynevych, 4/16/2008, Kyiv). This method ensured that if one activist was imprisoned he/she would not be able to compromise the entire network. The activist leaders and the opposition relied on the continuous flow of information within and between their two networks. Insiders explained that the information exchanged included reports of any violence, fraud or intimidation and was used not only to help mobilize their own members but also facilitate reaching out to ‘ordinary’ citizens. Activists described that they were to tell five of their friends any big news coming in through the pipeline. The system of information exchange worked. On 21 November, the day of the second round of the elections, activists and international monitors were able to quickly report and publicize multiple cases of electoral fraud and manipulation on a massive cross-country scale.

Everyone from campaign headquarters could not believe how far the Yanukovych team would go ...the exit polls predicted that Yushchenko would win by a margin of at minimum 5 per cent ...but as they were counting the ballots the campaigns knew that the ﬁgures in the precincts were not the same as the projections because we had insider knowledge. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright (Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv)

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Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, still based at the Central Elec- tion Commission (CEC), made a televised appeal to all the residents of Kyiv to join protest against the election fraud (‘22 Lystopada v Ukrianini Rozpochalasya Pomarancheva Revoljuciya’ 2004). By midnight of 22 December the square was ﬁlled with activists. But activists and opposition explained in interviews that they knew they needed larger numbers. They set into action a long devised plan to bring out students and rank-and-ﬁle from the regions. Yuriy Polyukhovych, a yellow Pora activist who was the Kyiv coordinator responsible for the recruitment of students, remembered his relief when in the morning of 22 November:

Thousands of students appeared from the Taras Shevchenko University and Kyiv Mohyla Academy ...we knew that there was more than a hundred thousand activists in the Maidan and on Khreshchatyk street ...we began to realise that it was impossible for the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime to maintain its power ...then like a chain reaction people began to join us. (Yuriy Polyukhovych, yellow Pora Kyiv activist, 8/3/2008, Kyiv)

Thus, it was not until the activists could secure a critical mass in the streets that ‘ordinary’ citizens began to congregate and join the protests. Reviewing video footage from local news channels and triangulating this with focus group and interview findings, it was not until 23 November – when the CEC officially announced that Yanukovych had won the elections – that the Maidan flooded with ‘ordinary’ citizens. The CEC declared that Yanukovych won 49.4 per cent while Yushchenko received 46.7 per cent of the vote (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, Report of Second Round Presidential Results 2004). This was nearly the inverse of what the national exit poll (conducted by a consortium of the KMIC, Razumkov Centre and the Democratic Initiative Foundation) had predicted, according to which Yushchenko was expected to win with 54 per cent compared to Yanukovych securing 43 per cent (‘Putin Znovu Pryvitav Yanukovycha Z Peremohoyu’ 2004). The activists, campaign managers and ‘ordinary’ citizens explained that they viewed this announcement and formalization of Yanukovych’s fraudulent win as the final trigger, the ‘point of no return’. Hundreds of thousands of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians left their jobs and homes and flooded the Maidan and Khreshchatyk, and then in cities all over western and central Ukraine many more did the same. Like in Argentina, it was at this point that the balance of power was tipped Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright by the en masse inflow of ‘ordinary’ citizens who joined the protests. Activists coordinated marches throughout the city: in front of the Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet of Ministers, the Central Election Com- mission and the Presidential Administration (where they also set up a smaller

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 175 tent city). The police were unable and some were unwilling to control the crowds and just stood at the peripheries. By 15 November, foreign governments alerted by their local embassies directly called Kuchma, warning him not to use force and to find a peaceful solution (Branigin 2004). The foreign governments (excluding Russia, which had congratulated Yanukovych on his victory, twice) refused to accept the legitimacy of second-round results. Insiders explained that at this point opposition interlocutors were in direct contact with heads of foreign governments, while activist leaders recalled being summoned to embassies to discuss events with foreign diplomats. Again, the momentum of information exchange was in favour of the opposition and SMOs and not the regime. Concurrently, according to Kuchma insiders interviewed, in an attempt to prevent the reversal of the elections, Yanukovych and Medvedchuk (then head of the Presidential Administration) tried to push Kuchma to call a state of emergency and inaugurate Yanukovych as president (Rak 2004). As mentioned earlier, insiders explained that Kuchma was never 100 per cent supportive of Yanukovych’s candidacy. As foreign pressure and increasing insider defection mounted, it was difficult to ascertain to what extent Kuchma was supporting Yanukovych. Following the outreach of foreign support, Viktor Yushchenko announced the decision to hold a nationwide political strike. Yuliya Tymoshenko, Oleksandr Moroz and Yushchenko were able to demonstrate a united front and took turns speaking to the protesters from the Maidan. Foreign support increased even more as Solidarno´sć dissident, and former Polish president Lech Wał˛esaflew in from Poland. Wał˛esa discussed with Yushchenko possible bargaining strategies and addressed the protesters from the stage in the Maidan. Seemingly ignoring the growing isolation of their administration, the Yanukovych campaign brought in tens of thousands of supporters from the eastern oblasts in trains and buses (Ostap Kryvdyk, 7/18/2007, Kyiv). Once these supporters arrived, some defected and joined opposition activist events in the Maidan, and the rest did not stay long. Observers detailed that the government’s last attempt to imitate the opposition and organize counter-demonstrations had the opposite effect and strengthened the Maidan. When the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime refused to give up, and attempted to quell opposition and control the spread of information by sending temnyky to the television channels, journalists began to dissent publicly. First, the entire production team of 5-tyi Kanal (owned by Petro Poroshenko, a ‘small’ oligarch supporting Yushchenko’s campaign) publicly stated that they were not willing to ‘lie for the regime’ anymore and would report all the news as it was unfolding (‘Shcho Robyty, Koly Nemozhlyvo Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Pracyuvaty?’ 2004). This was followed by channel 1+1, which began broadcasting the ‘real’ scenes from the Maidan (‘Na Kanali Zavivsya Cenzor’ 2004).5 Finally, on 24 November, Nataliya Dmitruk translating the news into sign language at the Ukrainian state-run television station UT-1 did not repeat

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 176 Mapping Mass Mobilization the official announcement that Yushchenko had lost. Instead she signed: ‘Yushchenko is our president. Do not believe the Central Electoral Commis- sion. They are lying’ (Zarakhovich 2005). Every instance of journalist protest further destabilized the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime. It is difficult to determine if the media had a direct effect on the mobilization of citizens, since large groups were already in the streets prior to the cited incidents. Nonetheless, the media was a useful conduit to disseminate information on a mass scale and reinforce the notion that the protesters could be successful in bringing down the regime. In Ukraine, as in Argentina, the mobilization game was in many ways an information war, and while the parties in power attempted to restrict the flow of information it was they who were restricted from the ongoing information exchange and dissemination between SMOs, the opposition and ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians. Many activists and opposition members interviewed explained that they saw themselves as engaged in information warfare. For instance, SMOs also had their own press offices and teams who publicized protest successes and planned activities through press releases (Anastasiya Bezverkha, 5/23/2007, Oxford). Yellow Pora was capable of organizing multiple press releases and conferences on a daily basis. Because of this high level of professionalism and organization, yellow and black Pora were the Yushchenko campaign team’s preferred partners when the opposition needed to shift protesters or distribute information to the crowds (Unnamed, Yushchenko Presiden- tial Administration insider 1, 2/11/2010, Kyiv). Whoever could control or spread information in a more efficient and effective manner would have the upper hand in the crisis context. With the activists’ help, the opposition was more successful at reaching ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians (in the centre and west of the country) than Kuchma and Yanukovych were, despite the opposition’s lack of access to many of the resources that the regime enjoyed. Unlike in the Argentine case, the party in power was increasingly isolated but not completely powerless. Knowing this, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko used national institutions to defend their cause and filed a case with the Supreme Court on 25 November, disputing the validity of the election results (‘Putin Visits EU amid Ukraine Poll Tension’ 2004). As the battle over the dissemination of information turned in favour of the opposition, foreign support also continued to funnel in, as European digni- taries and heads of IGOs took the lead in attempting to help their Ukrainian counterparts resolve the crisis by striking an elite pact (European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 2007). Kuchma did not want to completely sully what was left of his international reputation and was ready to strike Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright a deal, while Yanukovych considered Kuchma’s willingness to engage in a dialogue with the opposition as a betrayal (Stolbunov 2004). Three roundtables were held in total, with the first taking place on 26 November. The key players involved in the dialogue sessions were: Yushchenko and his team;

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Kuchma and Yanukovych and their campaign and administration teams; Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski and Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus; the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana; the Secretary General of the OSCE, Jan Kubis and the Chairman of the Russian Duma, Boris Gryzlov (European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 2007). Again unlike in Argentina, though losing support, the party in power could still count on a minimum of 40 per cent of the vote, as well as the support of top-ranking oligarchs and generals. At this point the government still had the option to deploy the military and repress the protesters. The suspected planned use of the military to suppress protests was referred to in the majority of interviews conducted. On the evening of 28 November, Our Ukraine and BYuT insiders explained that they were cooperating with embassies as well as with interlocutors in the Kuchma administration. Oppo- sition members and activists received information through their networks that Yanukovych and Medvedchuk were pressuring Kuchma to employ violence to disband the protests (Yevhen Zolotariov, 7/9/2008, Kyiv). As noted by a yellow Pora coordinator:

We waited in the cold, we thought that the military would step in and kill us all ...but the coordinators told everyone to stay ...I knew they knew something ...they were constantly on the phone with Yushchenko’s people. (Yuriy Polyukhovych, 8/3/2008, Kyiv)

Kaskiv explained that it was not clear if an order had indeed been issued by Kuchma (or Medvedchuk) or not, but that at some point, thanks to the cooperation of interlocutors who leaked the regime’s intention to the embassies and campaign headquarters, the SBU and other forces never followed through on the orders (Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv). Chivers has famously reported that as orders were made ‘an undercover colonel from the SBU moved among the protesters’ tents. He warned opposition leaders that a crackdown was afoot’ (Chivers 2005). Chivers concluded that, according to his information, there was an internal battle of a ‘clique of Ukraine’s top intelligence ofﬁcers ...known as the siloviki’, who ‘chose not to follow the plan ...to pass power to ...Yanukovich ...and worked against it’. Volodymyr Vyatrovych, who until February 2010 was the director of the Central SBU Archive, supported the notion that there was internal dissent within the security forces, ‘I had my suspicions that within the SBU there were individuals who did not agree with the unlawful actions taken by Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Kuchma and Yanukovych’ (Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv). This break in the chain of command was an unprecedented event, speciﬁcally because members of the SBU were suspected to be involved in the poisoning of Yushchenko in September. Furthermore, after a decade of

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Kuchma’s presidency, and his specific semi-authoritarian control, it would seem implausible that the SBU did not follow his orders. As the momentum grew in favour of the opposition, there were informal shifts within government administration members and its oligarch backers, whose allegiance by December 2004 was unclear. Kuchma administration insiders related in interviews that Kuchma was reluctant to end his presidency on a violent note. He was reluctant to support Yanukovych at whatever cost, opening up a rift between the outgoing president and his chosen successor. The opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko and President Kuchma used Serhiy Levochkin (who in 2010 became Yanukovych’s Head of the Presidential Administration and is a business partner of RosUkrEnergo) as an interlocutor to strike a compromise between the opposition and government (‘U Partiyi Rehioniv Pidozryuyut’, Shcho L’ovochkin Zradyt’ Yanukovycha’ 2010). Other Yanukovych administration insiders such as Inna Boholoslovs’ka and Valeriy Konovalyuk temporarily cooperated with Yushchenko during the October–December 2004 crisis (Leshhenko 2009). Yushchenko even seemed to receive support from former Yanukovych allies in eastern regions. On 30 November, it was reported that Kharkiv Gover- nor Kushnaryov was accused of betraying Yanukovych by holding a private meeting with Yushchenko insiders (‘Xar’kovskyi Hubernator Kushnarev Predal Yanukovycha’ 2004). This expansion of internal defections was a critical tipping point for the regime, occurring in close succession to the foreign-pressure-filled roundtable discussions. Unlike in the case of Argentina, where a second meeting never took place, a second roundtable was held on 1 December. By this time the opposition knew that the protesters would not simply ‘go home’ and that the government was experiencing dissent and isolation. As explained in interviews, the opposition also had more information-based power and convinced the members of the roundtables to hold off any decisions in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision. Insiders re-iterated that Kuchma was more concerned about his own image (and future immunity) than securing a victory for Yanukovych (Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, 2/7/2010, Da Vinci, Kyiv). After the meeting, he was eager to present the 1 December roundtable document signed by all its participants to the media, and publicly assure ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians that their political elite would find a peaceful resolution to the crisis (‘Opposition to End Ukraine Blockade’ 2004). If Yanukovych doubted Kuchma’s support, this act demonstrated how divided the party in power actually was, making it difficult even to identify who was still in power. As the party in power was becoming less stable, on 3 December the oppo- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sition won a major victory – the Supreme Court declared the election results invalid. In a landmark swing of institutional control from the government, the Supreme Court annulled the 21 November election results and set the date for a re-run of the second round to be held on 26 December (Verkhovnyi

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Sud 2004). This was the ﬁnal moment when the Kuchma and Yanukovych teams realized that they could not manipulate the political institutions of Ukraine as they had done from 1999 onwards. On 6 December, the last roundtable was held; it resulted in an 8 December settlement that included changes in the composition of the Central Election Commission; changes in the presidential election law for the re-run of the second round; and an agreement on constitutional reform that would favour the parliament vis-à- vis the presidency and would come into effect in 2006. As detailed in focus group discussions, the 3 December court ruling was perceived as a success by ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians who stopped attending protests because they saw their aim achieved. Like the Peronists, once the Yushchenko team knew they would win, they began to distance themselves from activists and co-opted a few leaders into their party structures, offering some positions. This highlights that the interaction of the two groups was only ‘moment’ bound and pragmatic.

SMO leaders and elite in Argentina and Ukraine compared and contrasted

There are four main differences between the Argentine and Ukrainian cases at the level of SMO leaders and politico-economic elite. First, the type of activists and the trajectories of directly preceding activism varied. Second, the relationship between political parties and activists was more informal and class-speciﬁc in Argentina, but in Ukraine was more formalized and almost completely partisan. Third, the strength of the opposition vis-à-vis the government was different as the Peronists could rely on party unity, the strength of the governors and their clientelist networks. And fourth, the fact that in the case of Ukraine ‘ordinary’ citizens had a candidate who they could rally around (Yushchenko) and in Argentina there was no such political alternative and a general lack of support for all politicians made for different focal points of mobilization. In Ukraine, activists are part of the intellectual elite and therefore have a different connection to the political-economic elite as well as to society. In Argentina, although there are ‘intellectual’ activists, the piqueteros and leftist groups are more working class and their rhetoric or repertoires generally do not appeal to the middle classes. In Ukraine activists had their main ofﬁces in large cities and were highly educated middle-class youth connected to liberal NGOs and party youth wings. In Argentina piquetero SMOs, the CTA and MTA had greater support in the interior of the country rather than in large cities. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright In both cases the SMOs have had strong relationships with political parties but these have been far from uniform in each country. Although the piqueteros do have strong ties to different political parties such as the Peronist and Socialist parties, and previously FrePaSo (now the Coalicion

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Civa), these interactions are framed by clientelist systems, which reproduce unequal relationships. In Ukraine the political parties also have an upper hand in the interaction between politicians and activists, but this relationship has become more reciprocal. This more egalitarian interaction can be rooted in the fact that many activists are trained in youth-wings and the politicians tend to see this new generation as their future successors, a ‘politico-economic elite in training’. The fact that the activists do not come from one socio-economic class and tend to have a high level of education and professional skills also makes it more difficult, though not impossible, for the politicians to ignore the activists. In 2004, the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime was much more secure than de la Rúa’s 2001 government. The Party of Regions that supported Yanukovych (and Kuchma by extension) was more comparable to the Peronists. The party heavily relied on clientelistic networks and the support of powerful oligarchs. Even if also racked by internal divisions, the Party of Regions, like the Peronists, has been able to unite its members and reach out to their base for support, even during a crisis.6 Equally, any conflicts or divisions tend to occur at the elite or leadership level rather than among the local bosses or base constituency. The opposition in Ukraine in 2004 was still quite fragmented and divided into three party blocs: BYuT, Our Ukraine and the Socialists. Its weak structure can be compared to the loose coalition of the Alianza in Argentina. These internal structural issues made the government in Argentina more susceptible to divisions and thus institutionally weaker, while the Peronist opposition was more capable of coordinating itself and did not need to compromise with the government. On the other hand, in Ukraine Yushchenko acknowledged that his coalition was weak and it was sensible for them to strike an elite pact with the government. The size, type and trajectory of the mass mobilization were affected by these differences in activist protests, structural composition of the opposition and party in power as well as the level and type of interaction between the SMO leaders and opposition. The context of an election versus a general politico-economic crisis had an important impact on the duration and trajectory of the mass mobilization. Yushchenko was seen as the electoral alternative to a regime that was disenfranchising a large portion of ‘ordinary’ citizens, thus making it easier for the opposition to co-opt the protest events and claim complete political legitimacy. In Argentina, although ‘ordinary’ citizens were protesting de la Rúa’s infringement of their basic civic rights after his declaration of a state of siege, the general context of the economic and political crisis dated back to the mid-1990s and all the politicians were seen as unaccountable political managers. Thus, it was dif- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ficult for ‘ordinary’ citizens to accept an established politician like Duhalde as a legitimate alternative. Understandably, protests continued throughout his interim presidency. As the protest grew so did the problem that there was no ‘real’ alternative to status quo politicians. Despite the differences

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch An Information Exchange Game 181 between the two cases, the basic mechanism of actor interaction and information exchange was similar in Ukraine and Argentina and had a similar impact – the isolation of the party in power.

Conclusions

If we compare again the history of past mobilizations in both countries, this chapter underscores four elements that need to be in place for mass mobilization to occur. First, activists must be already engaged prior to the intensification of a crisis. Second, the party in opposition must be united and have insider information from either the government or SMO leaders. Third, the type of access that the opposition party has to these two actors defines their interaction and level of cooperation in the process. Fourth, the level of isolation and institutional incapacity of the party in power affects whether the protests will be repressed through violent means, if the government will choose to reach out to the opposition and if the opposition will be willing to make a compromise. The interaction between SMO leaders and the opposition was high during the Orange Revolution. The government and opposition were divided and the party in power was isolated both internally (suffering from defections) and externally (foreign governments and organizations did not support the government). Because of the isolation and defection the party in power was not capable of managing the crisis through the use of machine politics and force, and its attempts to do so exacerbated the effects of the crisis. The opposition was well coordinated and worked closely with the SMOs. By offering the SMO leadership access to party posts, they were able to later co-opt activist mobilizations in an attempt to demonstrate their broad support to ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians. This coordination between the SMO leaders and opposition was formalized through meetings and the signing of a cooperation pact. Some SMO leaders like Vladislav Kaskiv of yellow Pora accepted political posts. The SMOs intensified their protest and recruitment activities as their leaders exchanged information with the opposition and government insiders. As will be further explored in Chapter 8 ‘ordinary’ citizens saw the attempts of Kuchma and Yanukovych to disenfranchise them as unacceptable. Adding to popular disapproval, the party in power began to lose its ability to control the channels of information dissemination when journalists began fully reporting on the crisis, and not respecting any attempts at censorship. Furthermore, a group of rogue generals in the Secret Services of Ukraine allowed for a breakdown in the chain of command and, honouring the oath they swore to protect the Ukrainian people, did not enact the orders Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to repress the protesters. Even in this revolutionary moment, the opposition decided to take part in roundtable talks in order to strike a compromise with the government. As the SMO leaders became more formally connected to political parties and as they attempted to convince their rank-and-file

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 182 Mapping Mass Mobilization members to join the political party movement, they lost legitimacy, which led to the fragmentation of the largest SMOs. The mass mobilization began to subside after the re-run election was ordered and then even more so after the foreign observers commended the Ukrainians for holding free and fair elections on 26 December sanctioning a Yushchenko win. The 2001 events in Argentina saw an informal level of cooperation between the SMO and the political opposition. The party in power was extremely isolated, incompetent and incapable of managing the crisis. The opposition, while enduring their own internal fragmentation, was well coordinated and was able to work in tandem with CTA, MTA and Piquetero mobilizations. Although direct coordination was limited, communication occurred through informal means via common interlocutors and was based on precedents created through party puntero-piquetero interaction in the 1990s. The opposition offered the piquetero groups money, transporta- tion and informal protection from arrests during the initial pickets and lootings. De la Rúa’s government attempted to bargain with the Peronists but because of his administration’s weakness the opposition mostly ignored these attempts. The government wanted to maintain control and thus used violent measures to quell the protests and called a ‘state of siege’. This was a severe miscalculation. As will be further explored in Chapter 8 ‘ordinary’ people saw the measures taken as unacceptable even in the case of acute crisis management, as they infringed on basic civic rights. SMOs continued to organize multiple protest events and attempted to coordinate the ‘ordinary’ citizens. Because the information exchange and cooperation between SMO leaders and the opposition was informal or weak, the protests did not subside when the government was deposed. Thus, when the opposition took over government they attempted to co-opt or even repress and prosecute some of the SMOs to stabilize the situation. The ‘ordinary’ citizens and SMO protests took time to subside because neither group was formally connected to or supportive of the opposition. The perceptions and recollections of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ own protest participation will be analysed in Chapter 8 and will supply the ﬁnal and most important piece of the mass mobilization puzzle. How did ‘ordinary’ citizens view the mobilization process? And What motivated them to ﬁnally join in? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 8 The Duty to Protest: Participation of ‘Ordinary’ People in Mass Mobilization

Introduction

Even in the presence of the key variables discussed earlier, without the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens we can, at most, expect to observe a large protest event organized by activists and opposition insiders. Activists represent a small portion of the population and are expected to take part in some form of collective action. As noted earlier, ‘ordinary’ citizens are composed of various socio-economic classes, ages, genders, ethnicities and races. They are connected to each other only by their citizenship or residence in a country. Moreover, while social scientists emphasize ‘ordinary’ citizens’ role in democracy, their participation in the political sphere is usually limited to voting and/or paying taxes. We have accepted that the majority are generally not very politically active, and in our theories we place them somewhere between the public and private spheres. As noted in Chapter 2, when ‘ordinary’ citizens are engaged in collective associations, this is analysed within the framework of the tenuous civil society, and thus are understood as participating in the building of ‘social’ rather than ‘political’ capital of new democracies. Protests are generally seen by analysts and the general public as irrational or risky endeavours, and their payoffs are difﬁcult to predict. Moreover, without adequate information, the possibility of regime violence, imprisonment and/or social free-riders is high. In addition, in democracies citizens know they can punish the incumbent with their vote. Voting is a less risky undertaking, the outcome of which they are likely to be able to predict better than that of a protest. ‘Ordinary’ citizens have also displayed a historic ability to be patient, tolerant and endure different regimes and their policies, even during times of crisis. Thus, when citizens who do not generally Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright engage in collective action join activists and contribute to the making of a moment of mass mobilization, these extraordinary moments are in need of a nuanced explanation. And thus, we return to the central question of this book: How can we explain mass mobilization? What motivates ‘ordinary’ citizens’

183

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 184 Mapping Mass Mobilization behaviour to join in en masse? This chapter digs even deeper and accesses the triggers, patterns and trajectories of the mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ people. By allowing the citizens to speak for themselves, we are better able to understand how they viewed their own participation. To do so in a systematic manner, I triangulate data collected from multiple sources including focus group discussions, mapping exercises, surveys, personal communications and video footage, allowing us to get around the pitfalls of post-protest framing and recollections and access how participants view their participation through the lens of both individual and collective rights. First, we will brieﬂy revisit Hirschman’s ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ model. Then the cases of mass mobilization in Ukraine (2004) and Argentina (2001) are traced by dividing the analyses into four phases of protest ranging from small activist protests to mass mobilization. The primary focus of this chapter will be the moment at which the collective threshold of political patience is broken and ‘ordinary’ citizens join in the protests en masse. Finally, a theoretical framework for analysing future moments of mass mobilization is laid out. But ﬁrst we must return to theories of the micro foundations of mass protest.

Habermas and the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in protests

In democracies or democratizing contexts, by being members of the citizenship club, ‘ordinary’ people expect that the political contract with the state will secure their basic civic rights. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that if these rights are abused en masse, citizens may see this event through a collective rather than an individual lens, and their decision to join in a protest may reach beyond self-centred calculi or emotions. Hirschman’s ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ model has been highly influential in understanding individual citizens’ protest participation. As noted in Chapter 2, Hirschman postulated that any disgruntled citizen can withdraw from a relationship with the abu- sive state and emigrate (exit); or can ‘voice’ their disapproval in an attempt to repair or improve the relationship with the state through protesting or voting (Hirschman 1970). Thus, Hirschman saw power in citizenship, not only as a way to receive benefits and protections from the state, but something the state also gains from through political (voting) and financial support (taxes). Hirschman envisioned that strong loyalty to the state, such as patriotism, can significantly reduce the option of ‘exit’, but may also reduce the speed at which a citizen chooses to ‘voice’, especially if ‘voice’ refers to protest, which is costly or risky. On the other hand, while non-participation could equally be interpreted as political apathy, I argue that it is more likely to be political patience or political tolerance. Political patience can be inter- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright preted as the level of faith or confidence a citizen has in a country’s political institutions (or the perception of a lack of viable alternatives). Thus, the stronger the faith or confidence in institutions, the more likely that citizens are going to be willing to wait it out when things get tough. For instance,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 185 if citizens believe that in the long run economic mismanagement or political oppression will subside, and the measures being taken by the regime are reasonable or even required, citizens will be capable of being patient and will tolerate hardships without ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. Moreover, in a democracy, or even in a democratizing context, citizens may also expect that if the politico-economic elite do not deliver over time, they will be able to punish the government in future elections; thus, relieving the necessity to ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. Yet, when citizens lose their faith in political institutions and the regime goes beyond acceptable crisis management tactics, it is possible that its actions will break a collective threshold of political patience, and ‘ordinary’ citizens will be more likely to join protests en masse. For the purpose of this analysis, because we are interested in mass mobilization and not migration, we will from this point on focus on the build up to ‘voice’.

How can we deﬁne a collective threshold of political patience?

In Chapters 3 and 4, it was explained that a collective conception of rights and how they are framed in claims by activists and politicians is shaped by both context and historical legacies of mobilization. Historical events or legacies of how the rights discourse is formed, protected or infringed upon in the past can affect the contemporary social rhetoric of rights (social, political or economic as well as individual and collective). The contemporary context can either reproduce or alter a society’s conception of a right. Thus, while affected by historical precedents, the social conception of what constitutes a civic right can also be quite dynamic. Based on the recollections of interviewees and focus group participants, it is clear that the basic conception of the most fundamental rights in democratizing Argentina and Ukraine, namely the right to vote and the freedom of assembly, was framed by the collective memories of the 1983 and 1991 transitions to democracy, respectively. In 1983 or 1991 citizens in both countries reclaimed or acquired basic civic rights, and legitimized, through their votes, new rules of the democracy game. These moments can be understood as critical junctures for collective rights framing. Respondents in focus groups stressed the importance of these moments and explained that for many citizens there was a rights shift, a recalibration of expectations and new conceptualization of citizenship. In Argentina, 1983 was a moment of the reclamation of the right to oppose regime violence and mismanagement through public protest. This political freedom, won back after years of deaths and the disappearance of thousands of Argentines, had a signiﬁcant effect on the rhetoric of post-1983 democracy and civic rights in Argentina. Conversely, in 1991, after indepen- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright dence, transition to democratic rule and the instatement of new political institutions, Ukrainians acquired the most basic freedom of electoral choice. When the ﬁrst elections were held in 1990 and 1991, each Ukrainian voter acquired new political power through participation. Although activists in

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 186 Mapping Mass Mobilization each country developed their rights-based rhetoric and broadened their claims, these two basic civic rights, of political reclamation through protests (Argentina) or vote through the ballot (Ukraine), were ingrained into the collective memory of the ‘ordinary’ citizens in Argentina and Ukraine. In both cases these rights were understood to be shared by all citizens and as ones that should be applied equally. Respondents explained that it did not matter if a person had voted or protested in the time since 1983 or 1991, what mattered was that they had the right to do so. It was explained that in 2001 and 2004, the governments overstepped this boundary and infringed on these most basic rights, after having already imposed repressive socio-economic hardship on their citizens. Thus, it is important to trace the phases of mobilization through ‘ordinary’ citizens’ eyes in the lead up to mass protest, to better understand this compounding process and what ﬁnally triggers mass participation.

Phase I: Small activist protest and beginnings of political crises

The first phase of mobilization can be identified as beginning between one and two years prior to the moments of mass participation. As shown in Chapter 6, in Ukraine this period began in September 2003, and in Argentina it began after the presidential elections in 2000. This first phase of protests was coordinated by and included predominantly experienced activists. The initial protests were grounded in the political context of repression and crisis. In both countries, the political repression of the Kuchma regime or Menem’s economic policies and corruption (continued under de la Rúa) affected a particular group of society directly (unemployed workers in Argentina and journalists and activists in Ukraine) and ‘ordinary’ citizens only (at this stage) indirectly. These events, while seen by citizens through limited media coverage, did not yet lead to their recruitment or participation. As the protest events multiplied, the regime was pushed into taking bigger risks to quell the opposition. These actions incrementally increased the levels of hardship or disapproval felt by ‘ordinary’ citizens. For instance, as explained by respondents in Argentina, they expected the newly elected de la Rúa to embark on a political and economic path divergent from Menem’s government. They were ‘severely disappointed by the President’s decision to continue with the same neo-liberal policies and corrupt style of political management’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires). Over time, as the regimes in Argentina and Ukraine repeated the same repressive practice, their actions started to affect a somewhat larger portion of the general population. As reit- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright erated by one focus group respondent, ‘you would hear of ...the violence against journalists ...you would see the state’s corruption ...this was not the country I wanted to live in, it became more and more difficult to take’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). During this period activists gained sympathizers, who may or may not have

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 187

Kuchma’s approval de la Rúa’s approval data data from ‘SOCIS’ and from I La Nación and Gallup Poll Gallup Poll 57% 55%

37% 37% 32% 26% 21% 24% 19% 15% 11% 10% 9% 9% 7% 8% 00

1997 June 2001 June 2001 June 2001 March 1996 October 2003 October2004 October 1999 October2000 October 1995 December 2000 December 2004 December 2000 September2000 December 2001 November2001 December

Figure 8.1 Approval ratings for Presidents de la Rúa and Kuchma Source: Author’s calculation of Gallup poll data. been directly affected, but disagreed with the Regime’s handling of politics and the economy. Unsurprisingly perhaps, as the political or economic crisis was increasingly mismanaged, approval ratings of the presidents fell in each country (see Figure 8.1). In Argentine focus group participants explained that de la Rúa was a ‘lame duck’ from the moment he became president, meaning they had little faith in his ability to turn the crisis around. On the other hand Ukrainian participants were less concerned with the regime’s ability to act, but rather were more inﬂuenced by signals of the possibility that the opposition was gaining strength. In discussions they made references to the formal amistad between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko in spring 2004. Thus, political dissatisfaction was coupled with the realization that the regime is weakening and the opposition is getting stronger. In both countries, the increasingly visible division of the government of the opposition had a compounding effect on the ‘ordinary’ citizens’ approval of the regime as well as the institutions they ran. Simultane- ously, as government pressure increased and more people disapproved of the regime, a new generation of activists joined the rank-and-ﬁle members, and the protests expanded to a broader network of student and activist SMOs. At this time, activists began to coordinate small- to medium-size protest campaigns (estimated at 100–5000 participants in Ukraine and 5000–20,000 in

Argentina). - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Phase II: The extension of hardships to ‘ordinary’ citizens

The second phase of mobilization comes as the political or economic crisis deepens and activists prepare the way for ‘ordinary’ citizens to enter into the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 188 Mapping Mass Mobilization mobilization equation. Although the general crises had begun earlier, by this time the effects of these crises were increasingly felt by a larger portion of the population. As was explained in great detail in focus groups discussions, this expansion involved a three-step process. First, the ﬂow of information increased both in the media and from alternative sources, and a larger subset of the population were better informed about the government’s mismanagement of the crisis. Second, social ties between activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens were actively strengthened. And third, crisis-related hardship was experienced ﬁrsthand by ‘ordinary’ citizens. Thus, gradually, local citizens were able to relate to opposition insiders and the SMOs as they increasingly lost support for and faith in the regime and state institutions.

Phase II: The extension of hardships in Ukraine In Ukraine this period can be traced between the Mukachevo mayoral elections in April and the first round of the presidential elections in October 2004. The dissemination of information about the Mukachevo election fraud was an attempt to bring the political crisis of the regime’s semi- authoritarian practices and their abuse of civic rights to the attention of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians. Activists explained in interviews that it was important to bring this information to central Ukraine, where, in contrast to Western Ukraine, locals did not have strong social network ties to either national liberation or ethno-cultural-linguistic civil organizations. Thus, not able to rely on pre-existing networks (as described in Chapters 3 and 5), activists had to build wider cross-national networks and recruit activists. Through their recruitment tactics SMOs were able to increase their presence in rural as well as urban areas in the centre of Ukraine. As a happy coincidence, because the SMOs used local youth and students to disseminate their message they were better received by local residents and not seen as outsiders. Many focus group participants explained how they saw the activists as ‘our children and our local youth’, and that they saw this activism as ‘touching’ because, as explained by one participant, ‘they were fighting for our rights, when we seemed to have let them down’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #2, 7/27/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). Thus, feeling strongly connected to the activists, local citizens in the centre and west of the country were more open to the information bestowed upon them. The spike in the use of violence against activists, journalists and opposition members in September further tried the patience of the citizens. This included the 5 September poisoning of Yushchenko, mid-September arrests and the 15 October raids on SMO offices and leaders’ homes. Focus group respondents explained that by this time, when the regime was becoming Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright more desperate, ‘ordinary’ citizens already had ‘access to sources of alternative information’. As explained by one activist, ‘no-one believed the regime when they tried to tell us that the opposition and the students were ter- rorists ...we already knew better’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 189

#1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). As mentioned in Chapter 7, in an attempt to stiﬂe the growing support for the opposition the regime organized a fake assassination attempt on Yanukovych and released temnyky about alleged terrorist plots and bombs found in activist headquarters and homes. These events were exposed as fraudulent, publicized widely and disseminated to ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians via local newspapers and television channels, notably Ukrains’ka Pravda, and 5-Tyi Kanal. An exchange about the terrorist and assassination rumours between Lesia, a 40-year-old teacher; Oleksandr, a 22-year-old journalist; and Iryna, a 46-year-old instructor, explained:

– These kids were our children, our neighbours ...our friends – We knew that they [the activists] were ﬁghting for our rights – Did they [the government] really think we were so stupid that we would not ﬁnd out about the egg (pro yayechnytsyu1)? (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv)

As detailed in focus group discussions, because they already knew ‘the truth’ and experienced first hand how the regime ‘insisted on spreading lies’, citizens saw the regime as being ‘less and less legitimate’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). But this was still very much a social networks story. ‘Ordinary’ Ukrainians living in central and western oblasts benefited from denser social networks and access to liberal or alternative media sources (although still limited). They had better information about the SMOs and opposition than Ukrainians living in southern and eastern oblasts. During a focus group mapping exercise in Kyiv, Andryi, an executive assistant from Donets’k, a Yanukovych stronghold in eastern Ukraine, explained that the media coverage in his oblast was much more controlled than in Kyiv, and he was surprised how early participants from central and western Ukraine had access to alternative information (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #4, 8/4/2009, Lviv). The lack of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ access to SMOs and opposition in eastern oblasts and the tighter control over the local media not only made it more difficult to expose the regime’s infringements but also made it less likely that discourse critical to the regime would infiltrate throughout the public sphere. Thus, the diffusion of information in 2004 relied on social networks and local ties. When the regime’s attempts to stifle ‘ordinary’ citizens’ access to information was unsuccessful, Kuchma and Yanukovych increasingly used clientelis- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tic networks to extend the violence and intimidation to ‘ordinary’ citizens, particularly in the central and western regions. Focus group participants explained that directly prior to the first round, they noticed that their colleagues at work were being intimidated. Several individuals recounted in

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 190 Mapping Mass Mobilization interviews and focus group discussions that they heard about or knew of people losing their jobs for openly supporting Yushchenko’s candidacy. One lively exchange between Oksana, a 40-year-old historian, and Dzvinka, a 50-year-old NGO worker, illustrates the increasing state of fear that citizens lived in. They explained:

– Bosses would tell people that there would be layoffs. In some cases bosses would come with people to vote. Anyone that would voice a political opinion favouring the opposition could expect difﬁculties with their job ...their children’s place in school ...or university ...we all felt the pressure. – Even if we were lucky enough not to personally live through the repercussions, it was all around us. (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv)

Thus, in their failure to manage the growing political crisis, the party in power extended hardships to a broader portion of the general population, in central and western Ukraine; as well as, and possibly even more severely, according to political insiders, to opposition supporters in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Phase II: The extension of hardships in Argentina Similarly in Argentina during this second period, the effects of the political and economic crises expanded to the middle and upper-middle classes living in large urban areas. This shift began on 6 October 2000, when Vice- President Álvarez resigned, and lasted until the Congressional elections that were held on 14 October 2001. When Álvarez resigned, de la Rúa’s fragile political alliance fell apart. From this point onwards the president grew increasingly isolated. As explained by Hernán, an NGO worker living in Buenos Aires, while the loss of Vice President Álvarez’s support meant that de la Rúa was alone ‘...when people put ham in the ballot boxes’ that was a sign that protest had moved from the streets of the interior to the capital (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). While de la Rúa was perceived as an ‘old school’ politician, Álvarez and his FrePaSo party managed to present themselves as a ‘third way’, a political alternative (Carlos March, 1/29/2009, Belgrano, Buenos Aires). Álvarez’s departure was interpreted by focus group participants as the end to insti- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tutional alternatives, and signalled the continuity of Menem-style politics of corruption and economic liberalism. As detailed by Susana, a 55-year-old biochemist, ‘people voted for de la Rúa hoping for change ...he delivered more of the same ...he was so out of touch that he did not know what

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 191 he was losing when he lost the Vice-President’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). Concurrent with the political crisis was a downward spiral of the economy into recession. By this time, approximately one-third of the population was living below the poverty line and unemployment was growing exponentially. As detailed in Chapter 6, support for de la Rúa’s government was drop- ping from month to month, and the mixture of political and economic disappointments was exacerbated by political resignations and internal disputes among the political elite. De la Rúa seemed less in control, and more oblivious to or ignorant of the increasing hardships of ‘ordinary’ Argentines. While the majority living in the capital and other large cities was not yet directly affected by the economic decline, by April–May 2001 the urban middle classes were confronted with daily protest events and road blockades by activists. These were described in focus groups as the ﬁrst exchanges between the protesters and local residents. Those who lived in Buenos Aires experienced the protest events ﬁrsthand, and others explained that they would turn on their televisions and see the protest coverage from around the country. Through greater exposure to the protests the middle classes began empathizing with the activists, working class and unemployed workers. Pablo, a private business owner from Belgrano, a prosperous neighbourhood in the capital, explained:

I remember seeing the protests [when driving] and thinking what is going on now?! I was annoyed ...when I got home I was watching the news, they were showing the protests I saw earlier ...I thought about what it would take for me to join the protests ...I tried putting myself in their place ...on the 19th of December I found the answer to my question. (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires)

Pablo explained that these initial moments of empathy would turn into shared conceptions of hardship when he was ﬁnally pushed to join in. Although the participants of the protest were still predominantly activists and union members, their numbers expanded as more individuals joined the protests. The last event of the period that marked a dramatic shift in the social rhetoric and, according to focus group participants, had a big effect on their ability to remain tolerant of the regime’s economic and political mismanagement was the 14 October 2001 congressional election. This election was the clearest signal to the ruling coalition that they were losing any politi- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright cal legitimacy that they once had. Twenty-ﬁve per cent of the participating voters cast a protest vote. Not only did the Alianza effectively lose its political mandate, the Peronists increased their majorities in Congress. As Alianza members deserted the government, de la Rúa refused to acknowledge the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 192 Mapping Mass Mobilization connection between his party’s electoral failures and his governance record. All focus group participants agreed, and it was confirmed by the majority of survey respondents, that the 14 October elections were a turning point. Speaking about the elections, Tomas, a 27-year-old economist, who voted for the first time in 2001, stated that ‘...it was as if de la Rúa could not get the message ...we were angry’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires). The president seemed not to realize that, as he no longer had any political legitimacy, if he continued to govern in isolation he would push their collective political patience to the brink. An important difference as compared to the Ukrainian case was that the activists in Argentina were not as strongly connected to the same social networks as the people living in middle-class urban areas. These divisions were not only along class lines but also between the interior of the country and Buenos Aires province. And since the province comprises over 25 per cent of the Argentine population, the spread of activism and information to the Capital was crucial, but also difficult for SMOs to achieve. While SMOs were capable of reaching out to people in rural and suburban areas, as well as the working poor, they were less able to reach out to the middle class in the Capital. This perhaps was less of a problem, because in contrast to Ukraine, information did not have to be tied to social networks alone. The media in Argentina was not only freer but also represented a more plural- istic spectrum than in Ukraine. Argentine journalists could freely criticize politicians, politics and specifically the de la Rúa regime. Watchdog agencies such as Human Rights Watch have referred to violations against the media in Argentina, but this was nowhere close to the level of media repression in Ukraine in the 1990s and early 2000s (Human Rights Watch Argentina 2001). Furthermore, by 2001 Argentina already had professional 24-hour news-only channels and six nationally read newspapers – Clarín, La Nación, Cronica, Diario Popular, Página/12 and La Prensa. The access to critical appraisals of the political and economic crisis could easily be attained through mainstream media sources. Protest coverage was also much more widespread in Argentina than in Ukraine. In Argentina, ‘ordinary’ citizens trusted the mainstream media more than their counterparts did in Ukraine. As explained by journalists interviewed, including those from Clarín, Página/12 and La Nación, the general media coverage of the de la Rúa regime throughout 2001 was quite negative. Regime and opposition insiders agreed that the media coverage was overwhelmingly negative. One former minister explained that he felt that every misstep, corruption allegation, protest or picket was not only reported Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright but also, depending on the source, ‘exaggerated’ in the media (Domingo Cavallo, 12/6/2008, Buenos Aires). Cristina, a 54-year-old public relations expert explained that, ‘you could not get away from it ...it was on the news all the time ...pickets, protests, marches, strikes, lootings ...you felt like the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 193 world was falling apart ...I could not believe this was my country’ (‘Ordi- nary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires). While news channels continuously reported pickets as part of their general practice of sensationalizing protest events, the newspapers covered the political corruption and resignation scandals.2 It is particularly noteworthy that the newspaper Clarín covered the cooperation between the Union, CTA and Piquetero leaders and the Duhalde Peronists to a greater extent than its major competitor La Nación or the left-leaning Pagina 12. The newspapers helped to create and then maintain an easily accessible rhetoric of crisis and urgency about the countries’ socio-economic failures and mismanagement by the political elite. During this period medium- and large-sized activist protests (estimated at 2000–40,000 participants in Ukraine and 5000–50,000 participants in Argentina) spread throughout both countries, as did information about the failures of the regime. At the same time the approval ratings of both regimes continued to fall from already low double digits to single digits, causing further division within the regimes (see Figure 8.1). Moreover, as described in Chapter 7, when defectors joined the opposition this information was disseminated to the general public by activists, and with more information the protests became larger and better coordinated.

Phase III: Large protests and the loss of political faith

The third and final phase before the en masse mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens was marked by the intensification of protests (estimated at 10,000–50,000 in Ukraine – mostly in capital cities, and 20,000–100,000 in Argentina – diffused throughout the country) and the total isolation of the party in power. In this compounding crisis context the governments in each case made a last-ditch attempt to stay in power. Concurrently, the activists also expanded their direct action repertoires and used more visible means of communicating with the citizens. In Ukraine this phase lasted from the first (31 October) to the second (21 November) round elections. In Argentina this phase lasted between the 14 October congressional elections and the announcement of the state of siege on 19 December. As explained in previous chapters, both the regimes resorted to drastic measures to tame or control the crisis, and did so unsuccessfully. These events propelled the loss of faith in political institutions and distrust of politicians.

Phase III: Large protests and the loss of political faith in Ukraine Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright In Ukraine the Kuchma and Yanukovych administration continued to use its clientelistic networks to intimidate voters during and directly after the ﬁrst round of elections. This heightened the people’s loss of faith in the regime. In an emotional exchange during a mapping exercise, three focus

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 194 Mapping Mass Mobilization group participants from Kyiv tried to pinpoint the most important moments leading up the mass mobilization of 24 November. They explained:

– The fraud and manipulation was obvious. – The media coverage was biased ...they were throwing it in our faces. – They were laughing at us. – Local state agencies and police pressured and intimidated people ...we did not even need to talk about it with our neighbours and friends because we all knew what was happening . . . – But at home in my family no one could stop talking about it . . . – After seeing the ﬁrst round’s intimidation of voters, people lived in fear. – But mostly people were getting fed up. (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #2, 7/27/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv)

Participants in other focus group conversations agreed that the shift in people’s support of the regime, or a ‘conscious awakening to how bad things really were’, came after the ﬁrst round of the elections (‘Ordinary’ Citi- zens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). One participant, Zorian, a 28-year-old NGO worker in Kyiv, said that in 2004 Ukrainians were:

playing their best game of cards, they were almost daring the regime [vlada] ‘go ahead show us your hand’, we hoped they were blufﬁng, they were convinced we did not know how to bluff ...in the end the people turned out to be better players than the regime [vlada]. (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #2, 7/27/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv)

After 2001 ‘ordinary’ citizens already had low levels of trust in the regime, but as explained in discussions, Ukrainians could not have imagined that the Kuchma and Yanukovych teams would go as far as they did on 21 November. The government effectively disenfranchised millions of voters.

Phase III: Large protests and the loss of political faith in Argentina Focus group participants, in agreement with survey respondents, identified the ongoing crisis as a key trigger of protests in 2001, but the respondents explicitly blamed politicians, and specifically de la Rúa, for the mass cap- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ital flight and economic failures. Focus group participants explained that they saw it as happening under the president’s ‘supervision ...’, explaining that he allowed ‘the Argentine economy to be pillaged ...’(‘Ordinary’Cit- izens, Focus Group, Argentina #2, 2/17/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos

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Aires). Participants in focus group discussions also saw the corralito restrictions as a desperate move that broke a contract between the government and their citizens. Alejandra, a 40-year-old social worker living in Buenos Aires, explained that the government’s actions were seen as unjustiﬁed and were not protecting the citizens. She explained: ‘The corralito felt like the president was punishing us ...for the politicians’ mistakes ...they were supposed to protect us, not rob us and then send us to our rooms’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires). Thus, citizens, like Alejandra, not only disapproved of the President’s actions but they also saw them as not meeting their expectations of what the government ‘owes’ its citizens. During most focus groups, the discussion over the importance of the corralito was heavily debated. Supporting the analysis in Chapter 6, in every focus group the majority of participants agreed that the corralito was ‘a symptom of the political crisis, a disease that had long plagued Argentina’ (NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires). Prior to the announcement of the corralito the citizens of Argentina already felt they were faced with the problem of a ‘crisis of representation’, and those who claimed to represent them increasingly lacked political legitimacy or accountability. The approval ratings for Kuchma and de la Rúa fell dramatically during this phase. According to various polls conducted for the La Nación (Gallup) and Clarín (Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública (CEOP)) newspapers, de la Rúa began his presidency with 70–75 per cent approval and by Decem- ber 2001, after the announcement of the corralito, it was estimated to have fallen to around 8 per cent. And while President Kuchma’s support had declined notably throughout his second term, his public approval fell to approximately 9 per cent in December 2004 (see Figure 8.1).

Phase IV: Moment of mass mobilization

The fourth phase began with the moment when the government overstepped the threshold of what was acceptable or tolerated by ‘ordinary’ people. This moment was not just about the hardships of the crisis but the actions of calling a ‘state of siege’ in Argentina on 19 December, and the Central Electoral Commission’s (CEC) formalization of the fraudulent second-round election result on 24 November in Ukraine. During the days prior to these two events (16–19 December in Argentina and 21–23 Novem- ber in Ukraine), activist and youth participation in protests was extremely high (estimated at 100,000–500,000) and in the case of Argentina very violent. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright But the fatal ﬂaw was that the governments failed to see that ‘ordinary’ citizens were already standing on the side of the activists, even before the last of their basic civic rights were taken away. The televised address by de la Rúa on the night of 19 December and the CEC’s ofﬁcial announcement

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 196 Mapping Mass Mobilization were perceived and then quickly articulated as an ‘ofﬁcial’ and publicized abuse of rights. In Ukraine the images were dramatic because of the presence of nearly a million people standing in the Maidan in sub-zero temperatures. In Argentina this mobilization was shocking because of the mass presence of people who were obvious protest amateurs, who took to the streets still wearing slippers and housecoats and even bringing their children (Sergio Kiernan, journalist, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires). Throughout these two days the threshold of patience was broken, but decidedly 19 December 2001 and 24 November 2004 were the two days when the ‘ordinary’ citizens, specifically those living in Buenos Aires and Kyiv, joined in the making of a moment of mass mobilization.

What were the ‘ordinary’ people’s motivations for participation?

Most of the interview and focus group participants who did join the protest in their respective countries described having a ‘gut feeling’ when they heard de la Rúa’s speeches, or when they saw that the fraud was ‘official’. They described that they felt they needed to protest, that if they did not protest the situations would get exponentially worse. They reiterated that they felt they had no choice – but rather a responsibility or duty to defend their fledgling democracies. It is difficult to investigate why ‘ordinary’ citizens protest, when we study protest events retroactively and are not privy to the decision process as it unfolds. Participants’ personal recollections are the main source of evidence, to which interviews, surveys and focus groups try to gain access, but memories of events can change over time. In the absence of (in the moment) protest participant surveys, we must allow the participants to speak for themselves. The survey evidence presented below was used to test the main findings of focus group discussions. The most typical or most controversial responses were then listed as multiple choice options in surveys. This coupled with excerpts of private communications provides a fuller picture of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ mobilization. In the case of Argentina, while the mainstream rhetoric in the media blames only the corralito for the mass protests, 27 per cent of survey respondents believed that the protests were related to political causes, 12 per cent thought the main cause was the economy and the majority, 55 per cent thought the events were best explained by a combination of political and economic factors (see Figure 8.2). The group discussions focused on the intensity of the outrage and betrayal felt by individuals when de la Rúa, a president who championed progressive change and an alternative to corrupt regimes of the past, decided to Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright call a ‘state of siege’. Susana, a 70-year-old lawyer, explained poignantly ‘I lived through the junta, I know what that means ...I think many people saw this as the first step in the return of political repressions ...something we were not ready to allow back into our lives’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 197

Why did people protest? Ukraine n = 689 Argentina n = 608

The protesters were paid 56% They wanted Yushchenko to be president 67%

They did not want Yanukovych to be president 80% In defence of civic rights 85%

They wanted a free and democratic future 87%

They took our money ! 8% De la Rúa was trying to punish us like his 43% children and took away our only rights left. The government no longer represented us. 16% The political elite was corrupt 16% The economy was in shatters and we 7% the people had to pay? No way! They had enough of the elites thinking they can 15% get away with anything and everything. Combination of political and economic factors 55% Economy/corralito 12%

Political causes 27%

Figure 8.2 Perceived causes of protest Source: Survey data collected by the author.

Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). Many focus group participants explained that they feared that a momentary limitation of rights under the guise of quelling riots could lead to protracted stalemate in democratic progress, or worse, the regression to military coups. In Ukraine in reply to the question, ‘In your opinion why did people protest? (Choose all that apply)’, 87 per cent of survey respondents agreed that they did so because they wanted to protect their future in a free and democratic Ukraine, 86 per cent agreed that those who protested were defending their rights as citizens of Ukraine, 80 per cent agreed that those who protested did not want Yanukovych to be president, but only 68 per cent said that those who protested wanted Yushchenko to be president. And a surprising 56 per cent of respondents believed that some of the protesters were paid for their participation, even though they were protesting in defence of democracy. In focus group discussions only one group, in Kyiv, had a heated debate about the reasons behind the act of protesting, all the others claimed that people went out in defence of democracy. When one respondent insisted that he believed the protesters were paid to protest, he was severely attacked by the other members of the group, who insisted he prove or explain why he thought so. Interestingly, when asked (by another member of the focus group) if he joined the protests – he said he Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright did. When asked, did you get paid? – he objected that he had not been paid because he was only observing (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). The great majority of participants saw the Orange Revolution as a culmination of a multi-year political crisis, the failure

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 198 Mapping Mass Mobilization of a corrupt elite to improve people’s daily lives, and most importantly, as a defence of democracy and their civic right to vote. Lesia in Lviv explained that ‘it became clear that if we would not stand up for democracy – we were no longer going to live in [a democracy] ...and no one but us could defend our rights’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). Thus, both the Argentine and Ukrainian respondents focused on their individual rights and on the ‘elite’ that was taking these rights from them. Respondents agreed that citizens’ protest was a signal to the ‘politicians that they had gone too far’ and thus that ‘the people’ would ‘defend democracy’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). The discussions were framed by their understanding that the politicians needed to be taught a lesson for acting outside the bounds of what was acceptable practice in a democracy, even in the context of a severe crisis.

‘Ordinary’ citizens’ perceptions of the moment of mass mobilization

An interesting question to consider is how ‘ordinary’ citizens classify what occurred, speciﬁcally the degree to which the protests were spontaneous or planned. For instance, survey respondents in Ukraine were divided and found it difﬁcult to answer questions about what happened in November– December 2004. When they were asked: ‘How would you describe the Orange Revolution? (Choose all that apply)’. Respondents ranked the options, all taken from focus group discussions, in the following way: 38 per cent agreed that the protests were ‘a Ukrainian response to the political corruption and abuse of power by politicians and oligarchs’; 38 per cent saw the events as ‘a series of planned mass protests’; almost the same percentage of respondents (30 per cent) thought the protests were spontaneous. Twenty- nine per cent said they thought that the events were a revolution; 29 per cent agreed that the events were part of ‘politically motivated actions by the opposition’; 29 per cent saw the events as ‘political games: one of the typical moments of the country’s political life’; 25 per cent saw it as the beginning of a political coup, and 21 per cent thought it was a coup coordinated by the Americans. Surprisingly, only 18 per cent though it was series of coordinated protest by activists (see Figure 8.3). When we cross-tabulate these responses, we see that people who participated in protest events were also more likely to see the events as spontaneous and a revolution, while non-participants were more likely to view the events as planned political games. But perhaps Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright surprising was that both participants and non-participants equally saw the events as a response to the political corruption and abuse of power by the regime. It is important to note that focus group respondents sharply disagreed with this outcome. In pre- and post-focus group questionnaires, 52 per cent

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 199

How would you describe the 'Orange Revolution'? (choose the top three that apply)

Per cent of respondents that agree n=689 38% 38%

30% 29% 29% 29% 25% 21% 18%

Ukrainian Series of Protests Actions by Revolution Political Political US coup Series of response to planned were opposition games: coup activist corruption mass- spontaneous typical protests and protests moment abuse of power

Figure 8.3 Description of protests, Ukraine Source: Survey data collected by the author. thought that the protests were ‘spontaneous and authentically Ukrainian’ and yet 53 per cent also agreed that the events were ‘coordinated by activists’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). This anomaly can be explained by the fact that the focus groups targeted more protest participants rather than a random sample of citizens. Focus group participants initially described the events as spontaneous, but after some debate they generally came to an agreement that the protests were ‘spontaneous with some planning’. As noted by a deﬁant Valentyna from Kyiv, in response to another participant who was distrustful of the authenticity of the protest: ‘the activists planned ...the opposition planned ...but people – they did not plan, they just got up and went to the Maidan ...you could not plan that ...they brought thermoses, they offered their homes ...no one could have planned that’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). Thus, focus group participants stressing the central role played by ‘ordinary’ citizens in the ﬁnal stage of the mobilization process. In Argentina survey respondents were similarly divided. Sixty-seven per cent saw the protests on 19 and 20 December as ‘a series of spontaneous mass protests’ but 50 per cent believed these were ‘acts coordinated by activists’ and SMOs. Thirty per cent agreed that at least a portion of the events were only ‘disorganized protests and lootings’, 21 per cent agreed the actions were motivated by and coordinated by the opposition, but only Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 3 per cent saw the events as a state coup. When we cross-tabulate the responses, again we see that those individuals who did not participate in the protest events were more likely to see them as coordinated and contrived by the opposition and activists. Interestingly though, there was no socio-economic or residential distinction between those who believed the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 200 Mapping Mass Mobilization events were manipulated and those who saw them as spontaneous – the only distinguishing factor was participation in the protest events on 19 December. To further the question of how ‘ordinary’ citizens view the protest events under study, I was able to test common assumptions made by politico- economic elite and academics. For instance, many experts reiterated in interviews that large protests occur every seven years in Argentina, many stating ‘this is just the way things are – Argentines love to protest’. And yet, only 7 per cent of survey respondents agreed that the events were ‘one of the typical moments of the country’s political life’ (see Figure 8.4). Focus group respondents were also mainly supportive of the idea that the ‘protests of “the people” were provoked but spontaneous’, as noted by Santiago and Susana respectively: ‘the lootings and the rest could have been planned by the Peronists ...but protest [of 19 December] were unplanned’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires).

How would you describe the 19/20 protests? (choose the top 3 that apply)

Percentage of respondents that agree n = 608

A state coup 3%

Typical moments in Argentina 7%

Coordinated by the opposition 21%

Planned protests 28%

Disorganized protests and lootings 31%

Coordinated by SMOs 50%

Spontaneous protests 67% Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Figure 8.4 Description of protests, Argentina Source: Survey data collected by the author.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 201

Focus group participants agreed that what was ‘spontaneous’ on 19 Decem- ber became coordinated from 20 December onwards by local neighbours and activists and was then co-opted by larger movements. Interestingly, both Argentine and Ukrainian focus group participants explained that they felt the word ‘spontaneous’ did not encapsulate the essence of the events. In each case they chose the word spontaneous to show that they were not coerced by political forces into participation. But also they were aware that spontaneity was momentary and emotional, and thus participants stressed that theirs were ‘the rational actions of citizens’ motivated by the desire to ‘defend their rights’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). The concept of civic rights was very important to focus group discussions. The participants in both countries did not want their actions to be seen as unprovoked. The participants wanted to convey that they made a conscious decision to stand up to a repressive and/or corrupt regime, which had crossed a political boundary unacceptable in a democracy. While one can argue that these are justiﬁcations post fact, and that citizens are employing popularized rights frames to rationalize their past participation, a quick overview of media coverage does not ﬁnd a focus on rights, but rather a focus on ‘crisis’, ‘elite corruption’ and ‘democracy’. Based on a variety of materials collected, the assumption that the comments are editorialized in hindsight to include a rights discourse is faulty for two reasons. Firstly, focus group participants described the long-term process of their loss of faith in the government, an incremental increase in hardships experienced and then the loss of political legitimacy. They saw their participation in this longer context and not sudden or surprising; they explained that they reached the limit of what they could tolerate in 2001 and 2004. Second, individuals came to focus groups (and to interviews) prepared with historical materials (including personal correspondences) from the time of their protest participation. Although this was a typical occurrence among participants, two women in particular stand out in this respect: Alevtyna from Donets’k oblast and Graciella from Buenos Aires. These two women brought large boxes full of notes, emails, posters from protests, letters and emails from loved ones and news clippings. I had a chance to copy the entirety of Alevtyna’s email exchanges with her friends who were in Kyiv and Donets’k oblast and scan some of Graciella’s materials. In these exchanges, and in protest paraphernalia, the rationale for protest is clear – the mass abuse of civic rights by the regime. Conceptually, spontaneity does not do justice to the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens, as it downplays their political motivation. Through mapping exercises, I was able to look at each Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright participant’s personal timeline of events, from which we could identify when they chose to join in the protests, be it in discussion with colleagues at work or sitting around the kitchen table and debating with loved ones, and decid- ing what to do. While a great majority talked about the fear that citizens

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 202 Mapping Mass Mobilization lived in, the hope for a better future (economic and political) and abstract ideas of ‘normal democracy’, the moments when they chose to ﬁnally join in were when they saw ‘no other choice, but to defend democracy’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 8/04/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv).

Who was the key actor of mass mobilization?

In both cases, focus group participants explicitly referred to ‘the people’ as a united group when discussing the 19 December protest in Argentina and those after 24 November in Ukraine. Interestingly, most Ukrainian respondents distinguished between ‘the people’ [liudy] in the Maidan and ‘the youth’ [molod’] in the tent cities, and the ‘orange’ political-elite [pomarachevi/pomarancheva elita] on the stage. It is clear that respondents saw these groups as separate but interacting in a shared protest space. While in Argentina ‘the people’ were seen as being on the opposing side to the government and political class as a whole. Some important distinctions were made about ‘the people’ in discussions. In some debates the ‘blue’ [syni] Yanukovych supporters were also considered ‘the people’ but more often they were referred to as paid-for thugs [bandyty, piyani] brought in by the regime. Surprisingly, such comments were made even by participants who claimed to have voted for Yanukovych and were supporters of the regime. The Argentine respondents divided ‘the people’ into the middle-classes and the poor/piqueteros. They also explained that buildings of the administration and parliament/congress were targets of violent attacks but few respondents said they participated in these more direct action protest events. Thus, like the level of participation in the preceding three phases, ‘ordinary’ citizens saw their participation as different if not entirely separate from that of activists, and in the case of Argentina from the lootings and violent protests. Oddly enough focus group participants on the whole responded negatively to and were reluctant to identify themselves as ‘protesters’. This was the case for both focus group and survey respondents. Only 22 per cent (Argentina) and 29 per cent (Ukraine) of survey respondents said that they participated in protests. A distinction was made among Argentine respondents who felt they did not protest but still joined cacerolazos (pot banging protests) or asambleas. Equally, in Ukraine a portion of individuals who did not feel they protested said they wore orange colours or made donations to those living in the tent cities and came to ‘observe’ the Maidan. This response is curious, as orange was the colour of protest, and considered by most at that time to be a clear declaration against the regime (see Figure 8.5). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright In both cases people were more likely to say that they participated in activities seen as less ‘activist’. In focus group discussions participants vaguely differentiated between different degrees of participation and did not see contradictions in stating ‘no I did not participate’ and following up the asser- tion with ‘when we were walking around banging pots’. Thus, ‘ordinary’

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 203

Did you participate in protests and if so which ones? (choose all that apply)

Argentina n = 608 Ukraine n = 689

4% Caserolazos

6% Assemblies (all kinds)

9% Protests 18%

15% Marches 11%

Meetings (term for protests used by Ukrainians) 31%

Per cent that said they participated in 23% protests out of all those surveyed 29%

Figure 8.5 Participation in protests Source: Survey data collected by the author. citizens tended not to see or did not want to present themselves as activists or protesters. In their view, it seems that ‘the people’ are separate from the politics of politicians and activism, but can be provoked by the actions of either. This observation that such groups coming together during a moment of mass mobilization retain their distinctive perspectives of their actions and motivations is something that previous studies fail to capture, and only this kind of deep qualitative empirical research can demonstrate. Like the long process as described in the different phases leading to mass protest, the distinct groups’ participation in protest activities are different, and thus, each actor plays a separate role. Yet, this does not mean that just because their activities are seen as sepa- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright rate or distinct, other actors did not inﬂuence the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Survey respondents made clear distinctions between what they called activist protests predating 19 December or 24 November and people’s protests. Moreover, focus group participants who never participated in protests prior to the 2001 or 2004 events described joining in the protests

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 204 Mapping Mass Mobilization when there were already large numbers of protesters in the streets. They explained that they felt safe to ‘join a large crowd’. Furthermore, people living outside the capital cities (or city centre), in la Matanza or Lviv, said that when they saw protesters already in the streets in Buenos Aires or Kyiv it was easier for them to make the trip to these city centres (or continue to mobilize in the regional cities). The size and geographic diffusion of protests gave them a feeling of conﬁdence. Watching the protests unfold, they were more convinced that their effort to protest locally could potentially aid in defending their rights or deposing the regime. Thus, as initially hypothesized, activist protests set the stage for the mass mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens even if the two groups continued to see themselves as separate actors.

The role of territoriality and conceptions of private and public protest

As we have seen, although focus group participants found it difﬁcult at times to put into words what happened, they found it much easier to describe the territoriality and diffusion of political contention. Focus group participants decidedly chose three key protest locations during the mapping exercise: The central squares (Maidan and Plaza de Mayo), the buildings associated with the politico-economic elite (the Presidential Administrations, Parlia- ment, Congress) and the private homes and work places of the people. When depicting the events in the main city squares during mapping exercises, they did not focus on the presence of activists or politicians but used a variety of symbols (a stick man or a sea of circles and faces) to denote where ‘the people’ were protesting. One group in Kyiv chose to draw a ballot box and on the ballots they drew the many faces of the people of Ukraine. They explained that the citizens were the real ‘candidates’ and that the election was a moment when they voted for themselves, for their political futures. They claimed it was this political identity of ‘citizen’ that the regime tried to take away from them. Another group in Buenos Aires drew pots and pans and arrows to denote the marching of the middle classes, who took part in cacerolazos, throughout the city streets. Even if they could not explain the events in their totality, the participants were able to visualize the territorial dimensions and the type and meaning of their participation with ease. One of the main differences between the activist respondents and ‘ordinary’ citizens is that ‘ordinary’ citizens also saw the home and neighbourhoods, as opposed to just the streets, as spaces of contention. In Ukraine the respondents were proud to say that they let activists or out-of-town Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright visitors sleep on their ﬂoors, that they prepared meals for the protesters and that they coordinated with their neighbours and co-workers to ‘march down to the Maidan together ...every day ...in shifts’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #2, 7/27/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv). Thus, the home was

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 205 no longer a private space but was interpreted as a site of political engagement. Similarly, in Argentina the initial participation of the middle classes included the banging of pots out of their windows. Moreover, the first evening of mass protests, 19 December, was also the beginning of the formation of neighbourhood assemblies and community groups. Graciela, an asamblea member in Parque Centenario, recalled: ‘that night I met some of my neighbours for the first time ...outside our homes ...we banged pots and decided together as a community as to what we should do next ...’(Activist focus group Argentina #6, Asamblea De Cid, 3/11/2009, Parque Centenario, Buenos Aires). The Members of Asamblea Colgan agreed with this description. All focus group participants saw the neighbourhoods and their homes as the sites of initial protests. Or as one participant put it, it was the site of protest ‘from pot-banging to planning’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires). What was at first spontaneous in Argentina quickly became collective and coordinated at the community level. Similarly, in Ukraine ‘ordinary’ citizens described how they drove from the regions to Kyiv, or joined the protests in groups, with family, friends and neighbours by their sides. As the events became a social and communal phenomenon, more ‘ordinary’ citizens joined the marchas and asambleas in Buenos Aires and the Maidan protests in Kyiv.

Slogans and claims of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ protests

While we can read placards and watch video footage to get an impression of claims of mass mobilization, it is also important to reach deeper beyond a few catchy slogans. It is difﬁcult to analyse systematically the claims of the broad range of protest participants. Slogans can provide a window to the claims, but they are usually ‘produced’ by activists or a political elite. The majority of survey respondents in Ukraine (51 per cent and 42 per cent respectively) chose ‘Yushchenko-Yes’ (Yushchenko-Tak) and ‘Together we are many, we cannot be defeated’ (razom nas bahato nas ne podolaty)asthemain slogans summing up their motivations for protest. Although 57 per cent said they agreed with ‘Yushchenko-Yes’, only 37 per cent said they used it. And while 68 per cent said they agreed with the non-partisan ‘Together we are many, we cannot be defeated’, only 46 per cent said they actively used the slogan in November–December 2004. Survey respondents in Argentina had no trouble identifying que se vayan todos (‘may they all go’) as the central slogan (69 per cent). And 57 per cent of survey respondents said they agreed with the slogan at the time. Surprisingly, while only 39 per cent of focus group participants agreed with Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the slogan, 43 per cent said they used it. When asked what they thought the slogan meant, participants agreed that the slogan ﬁrst called for a complete turnover of politicians, and second for a change of de la Rúa’s government. Nonetheless, they acknowledged that they knew at the time of the protests

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 206 Mapping Mass Mobilization that throwing out all the politicians was never going to be possible, and thus saw the slogan as catchy but impractical. Focus group participants in Argentina also remembered that Piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola (the picket and the pan/pot, the struggle is one) was a central slogan, but they were reluctant to say that they truly believed in the longevity of cross-class camaraderie that it pronounced. They agreed that this cooperation was fleeting, during a moment when they saw each other as citizens first, and not as people from different socio-economic backgrounds. Likewise, Ukrainian focus group participants reiterated that the partisan slogan ‘Yushchenko–Tak’ was not in fact the most important, nor the most representative, one. Participants explained that the slogan could have been ‘hurrah’ (yay) and it would have united the people in the Maidan. Respon- dents saw Yushchenko as an alternative to Kuchma or Yanukovych and their semi-authoritarian rule, so the slogans could just as easily have been ‘Kuchma/Yanukovych-No!’. Because the Yushchenko team and SMO leaders were literally on stage leading the speeches and chants, many people admitted that once they arrived at the Maidan they just ‘went along with the programme’. Thus, the most important step was to join the protests in the first place, and the degree of passivity (being guided during the protests) or being swept away by the unfolding events thereafter was seen as less important. In Argentina the slogans were negative (not in support of the opposition) and demanded dramatic change. In Ukraine on the other hand, slogans were at least at face value positive, as they were in favour of a partisan group. The key finding regarding claims and slogans of protest participants is that while slogans temporarily unite people, they can be misleading if used alone to explain protest participation. When discussing the main claims in greater detail, in both cases participants focused on civic rights and their expectations for a ‘normal democracy’. Nonetheless, even if the slogans cannot be taken literally, they point to the political nature of the claims in both countries.

How did politicians, activists and the media affect participation?

Based on previous research outlined in Chapter 1 and discussed at greater length in Chapter 7, it was hypothesized that the actions and interaction of the political elite, activists and even media had a facilitating effect on mass mobilization. This was indeed conﬁrmed in focus group discussions and survey ﬁndings. As noted above, the preceding activist protests gave ‘ordinary’ people a sense of security and signalled that there was a serious crisis Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright afoot. ‘Ordinary’ people still had to be convinced that their rights were being abused before they would join the protests. As explained by focus group participants in Belgrano, ‘protests happen all the time ...but “people” do not join the protests ...when everyone was affected ...it was too much even for

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 207 a middle class person living in Belgrano’ (‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires). In Ukraine the sentiment about the importance of activist protests was similar, speciﬁcally when the discussion turned to whether or not the Ukrainian activists were trained and paid by foreign/western NGOs and experts. While they tended to have mixed opinions on the matter, most focus group participants did not care if these allegations were true. They referred to their own personal participation and would say things like ‘no one paid me’, ‘no one paid that babushka who made soup to give to those kids’. Thus, while the activists set the scene for the protests, the ‘ordinary’ citizens interviewed saw their participation as a sequence of personal decisions based on their desire to defend their rights and their country’s democracy. Participants also mentioned that media coverage was important in their decision to protest. In surveys 88 per cent and 82 per cent of respondents in Argentina and in Ukraine, respectively, used the mainstream media to obtain information about the protests. In Ukraine when asked which sources they used (they were allowed to choose all that applied), 63 per cent chose television, 58 per cent chose alternative sources (activist, internet, local), while 33 per cent and 36 per cent of respondents chose radio and newspaper respectively. Among the Argentine respondents, 82 per cent chose television, 64 per cent newspapers, 37 per cent radio and only 16 per cent chose other sources (see Figure 8.6). Thus, Ukrainian respondents used alternative sources second only to television while Argentine respondents were more likely to rely solely on mass media sources. The fact that the Internet was not as widely used in 2001 as in 2004 is a possible explanation, but so is the fact

What media sources did you use to get information about the protests? (choose all that apply)

Argentina n = 608 Ukraine n = 689

16% Alternative sources 58%

37% Radio 33%

64% Newspaper 36%

82% Television 63% - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Figure 8.6 Media sources for protest information Source: Survey data collected by author.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 208 Mapping Mass Mobilization that mainstream media was more independent and more professionalized in Argentina than in Ukraine at the time. Media coverage of protests was crucial as it quickly conveyed where the protests were taking place, how large they were and who was already taking part. Moreover, in both countries, Kuchma/Yanukovych and de la Rúa used the media to personally send messages to their citizens, as did the opposition. This direct channel of information dissemination was seen as highly valuable by the politico-economic elites, the activists and ‘ordinary’ citizens alike. The majority of focus group participants in each case were reluctant to give credit to the opposition as the masterminds behind the protests. Although several focus group participants explained that while they knew or believed that the ‘orange team’ or the Peronist punteros were responsible for some of the coordination, instigation or planning of the protest, they agreed that the opposition was not in control of the en masse mobilization of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Participants wanted to make clear that ‘the people’ came out to protest against the regime, or the politicians in general, and their abuses. Furthermore, the great majority of Ukrainian and Argentine focus group participants agreed that there was coordination between the activists and the political opposition and that the politicians beneﬁted from this cooperation because it made their claim to power seem more legitimate. Yet, the respondents in both Ukraine and Argentina also agreed that the opposition (prior to, during or after the protests) co-opted the activists and the protests. The Argentine focus group participants felt that piqueteros were used by Peronist bosses. And the Ukrainian respondents felt betrayed by the activists who failed to continue to monitor politics and hold the ‘orange’ leaders accountable from 2005 onwards. The feeling of having been distinct from activists and elites in protests enables ‘ordinary’ citizens to also separate their actions and accountability of ‘what went wrong’ and ‘how politicians and activists did not live up to people’s expectations’. Thus, while affected by the activists, media and the opposition as facilitators, ‘ordinary’ citizens see their participation and motivations as exceptional and separate from these other actors and focused on the infringement of rights as the trigger for participation.

Trajectories and aftermath of mass mobilization

Through detailed process tracing, we can state that the trajectories of the mass mobilization and their aftermath were closely related to the level of the SMO and opposition cooperation, the degree of connectivity between the ‘ordinary’ citizens and the activists, and the level of their support for Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the opposition. In Ukraine the activists had closer ties to the ‘ordinary’ people and after spending days together on the Maidan, the activists tried to blend into the crowd. In Argentina activists attempted to bring the ‘ordinary’ citizens closer to their networks (especially in the case of the popular

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 209 assemblies), but were unable to do so because their attempts included the imposition of ideology. Furthermore, the CTA and piquetero SMOs are part of two distinct groups of Argentine society that do not overlap with the average Porteños (residents of Buenos Aires City). Focus group participants, in particular those who participated in assemblies, thought the leftist party militants were too pushy with their political rhetoric and too disrespectful of the assemblies’ non-militant members.3 Even if not all Ukrainian respondents agreed, the majority of the protesters were at least sympathetic towards if not actively supporting the Yushchenko team. Because of the election context, it was logical that the protest would subside once the rights of the voters were upheld, which hinged on a Yushchenko victory as a marker of a fair election. In Argentina the crisis was more acute and included the infringement of socio-economic as well as political rights, and thus the overturning of the ‘state of siege’ was not enough. Since neither the opposition nor the activists had the ‘ordinary’ citizens’ unconditional support or were only tied to them via loose networks, they struggled to manage the protests. While the Peronist opposition had more support than de la Rúa, they did not have the unlimited support of the majority of Argentine citizens. As noted by focus group participants, the opposition was also seen as part of the problem in both economic and political terms. They argued that the protests stopped when people felt their rights had been defended. This period of uncertainty was extended in Argentina, while in Ukraine, when the election results were compatible with exit polls, rights were seen as having been returned to the electorate. Unlike activists, who wanted to play down the exceptionality of the event in Ukraine in 2004 and in Argentina in 2001/2002, repeatedly referring to them as the continuation of activism or of ‘revolutions’ in their respective countries, focus group participants thought of these moments as exceptional ‘moments’ in the lives of ‘ordinary’ people. This conﬁrms the initially hypothesized distinction between ‘revolutionary’ movements and moments. In Argentina participants agreed that the actors, the size of protests (the en masse and non-violent participation of ‘the people’), and the consequences (the fact that the military did not step in) distinguished the 2001–2002 protest from similar crises in the past. In Ukraine, participants agreed that the size of the protests was unprecedented and the results of the protests were the most important factors that made the Orange Revolution exceptional, when compared to past events. But most participants were disappointed with the long-term aftermath. Since they expected to see dramatic changes, they were disenchanted by how quickly politics returned to ‘normal’. Focus group participants explained that they now believed ‘the people’ Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright were overly naïve in 2001–2002 or 2004. Thus, as presented in Chapters 3 and 4, while the historical legacies and continuity of mobilization (in movements) matter to activists, ‘ordinary’ citizens see these events as separate moments in time, as unique examples of civic engagement.

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The moments were exceptional, in that they brought unlikely groups of people together and formed new social and civic networks at the local level. In Argentina most asamblea participants did not continue their initial engagement, but they explained that – like their Ukrainian counterparts – they still keep in touch with people alongside whom they ‘protested’ in 2001–2002 or 2004. Furthermore, focus group participants in both countries agreed that they would protest again if they felt it was necessary, in order to defend their rights as citizens.

Conclusion: A theoretical framework of mass mobilization

‘Ordinary’ citizens view their actions as political but not as activist and can articulate their experiences employing an eloquent rights-based discourse. Even though they view their actions as political and facilitated by activist protests and the political context, they see their actions as separate from those of politicians and activists. ‘Ordinary’ citizens are far more likely to join pre-existing activist protests and in each case have highlighted the role of SMOs as important structures for support and sources of information. While people united under the banner of being citizens, they viewed their experiences through a personal lens, valuing the specific exchanges they had with other individuals. Their protest engagement fused the political and the personal. Yet, at the same time they found security in the communal nature of the protest, making it easier for them to march to the protest site with their neighbours, knowing that other neighbourhoods were doing the same. Following the logic of the analyses in Chapters 5–7, this chapter has explored the final piece of the puzzle, namely mass mobilization as a result of the breaking of a collective threshold of political patience. A theoretical framework can be developed based on this empirical analysis. As demonstrated, a political and/or economic crisis can provide opportunities for activist protests, the government’s weakness and isolation, the strengthening of the opposition – if it is united – and finally actor interaction and informational exchange. Together, these four variables exacerbated the crises; they are all necessary for mass mobilization to occur. Thus, as the crisis becomes acute it is more likely that the government will not be able to manage the crisis and in their failed attempts will impose greater hardships on the citizens. Accordingly, as political mismanagement of a crisis and socio-politico- economic hardships increase, the faith in democratic institutions declines reciprocally. As faith in democratic institutions declines, the people are less and less patient or tolerant of further increases in mismanagement and hard- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ships. The use of political violence and repression matters, in that it can prevent ‘ordinary’ citizens from participating; this is why the combination of activist protests and SMO leader and opposition interaction are so important. When these two groups cooperate they tend to isolate the regime,

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch The Duty to Protest 211 empower their networks and provoke defections; this would signal that the opposition is stronger than the party in power. This shift in the power dynamic makes it less likely that the regime will be able to use violence effectively. Finally, because the crisis is acute, the government oversteps the mark, and acts in a manner that completely infringes or takes away collective civic rights of ‘ordinary’ people. At this point, when patience is low, there is no more faith in the political institutions, and people view their hardships collectively as citizens and not as individuals. Thus, the collective threshold of political patience is broken, and the probability of ‘voice’ increases exponentially. If all these things occur then it is highly probable that mass mobilization will follow. Thus, mass protest is a response to the breaking of the political contract between the government and its citizens. Mass mobilization occurs at the moment when the government’s actions are seen as illegitimate and directly affect the majority of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ rights. Based on the evidence presented, while ‘ordinary’ citizens were predominantly observers of the protests leading to the moment of mass mobilization in November 2004 and December 2001, they were increasingly negatively affected by the same economic and/or political hardships as the activists. The ongoing crisis had a cumulative effect on ‘ordinary’ citizens’ faith in their political elite and in democratic institutions. Even if the triggers of their hardships were felt by a broader section of the population, as in the Kuchma regime, or more socio-economic as in Argentina, ‘ordinary’ citizens felt that their politicians were breaking their contract with the people. As the protests intensiﬁed and the party in power seemed unable or unwilling to change their political practice, the willingness of the ‘ordinary’ citizens to endure the crisis and its effects faded. And ﬁnally, when the regime, in an attempt to hold on to political power, took away or infringed the rights of ‘ordinary’ citizens, their actions broke the collective threshold of political patience, and the people felt the need to protest in order to defend their rights and their young democracies. Not all the citizens protested or agreed with the protesters but the mobilization was of the masses, with up to two million people in each country engaged in some level of protest throughout the days and months of winter 2004 and summer 2001/2002. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 9 Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements

Introduction

As we now see, crisis-related mass mobilization is a multi-actor, multi-step phenomenon. It does not come out of nowhere but rather is built upon a long-term process of mobilization. Different actors enter into the mobilization equation at different stages, their motivations and access to information are also different and they are affected by their interaction with other actors as well as by past precedents. In this concluding chapter we can pull together the key findings and identify the main empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions to the study of mass mobilization, and more broadly the field of comparative politics. I will also briefly discuss the two theoretical frameworks (‘Actor Interaction and Information Exchange Game’ and ‘The Protest Patience Threshold Calculus’) constructed throughout the book. As this book was being completed we witnessed a wave of mass protests in Southern Europe, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Eastern Europe. I will thus draw on the findings and conclusions of this study and make comparative references to recent cases of mass mobilization, such as the austerity-related protests in Greece in 2010–2012 and the Arab Spring protests in Egypt in 2011–2012, thereby highlighting the findings’ explanatory power to a wider set of cases. In a separate epilogue, I will address the EuroMaidan mass mobilization that erupted as this book was going to press. I will connect the past history of mobilization, outline the actors involved and draw some brief comparisons between the motivations and participation of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians in 2004 and 2013/2014. Finally, I will identify how the findings of this book open up new avenues for further research on mass mobilization and in comparative politics more broadly. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Conclusions

As noted in the opening chapters, this book is rooted in a critique of comparative democratization literature’s focus on elite-centred

212

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 213 and structural/contextually-based explanations of social movements and moments of mass mobilization. Transition and democratization studies have cautioned against inter-regional comparisons of mobilization. Such caution- ary tales are based on assumptions of the explanatory value of illusive concepts, like a communist versus an authoritarian legacy, in explaining the hyper-presence of SMO activity and protest in Latin America, and its perceived weakness or even absence in EE. These overly deterministic approaches explain the apparent surprise of ‘transitologists’ focusing on EE, when as noted by Kuran, ‘out of never’ we were faced with ‘revolutionary’ moments in 1989 and the 2000s. Rather than re-conceptualizing mobilization and questioning the importance of vague catch-all cate- gories such as civil society and historical legacies, social scientists have continued to analyse phenomena like the Orange Revolution through an elite-centred and structural lens, or focused on exogenous factors. The result has been the acceptance of ‘diffusion’ theories, which over- emphasize the role of the politico-economic elite and foreign actors, and underestimate the role of local agency and legacies of past mobilization. Furthermore, these theories have been unable to adequately explain how and why ‘ordinary’ citizens came to participate in the mass mobilization. Similarly, in the case of Argentina, as well as a series of similar mass protests in LA between 1995 and 2002, researchers have focused on economic and materialist explanations of mobilization. Social scientists have placed emphasis on the role of an acute economic crisis, or restrictive economic policy, and its production of material deprivation as causes of mass mobilization. These theories are not equipped to explain why not all economic crises ‘cause’ mass protest in LA (specifically at different periods in Argentina), nor are they able to elucidate the variation of mobilization outcomes in Eastern European cases (specifically the exceptional scale and duration of participation in Ukraine). In this book I have explained the occurrence of mass mobilization in two concrete cases. Through a paired comparison, I have identified a sequence of conditions under which mass mobilization becomes more likely. As noted, political participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in politics usually tends to be limited in theories of politics to voting and paying taxes. Yet, during the democratization phases in Ukraine and Argentina, citizens have repeatedly faced political and socio-economic exclusion. Post-transition politics have not been participatory, and the national politico-economic elites have not been fully accountable (outside of electoral turnovers, if then) to their citizens for any political or economic mismanagement. This is why Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the December 2001 (Argentina) and November 2004 (Ukraine) instances of en masse participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens were surely extraordinary. Both moments were ‘revolutionary’, as they represented a shift in popular (cross-class, cross-regional) political participation. But alas, these two mass

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 214 Mapping Mass Mobilization mobilizations did not lead to systemic revolutions per se. Instead these were moments of civic reclamation of what is deemed to be ‘political’, as well as an expansion of the role of citizens in post-transition politics. These phenomena tested the democratic resilience of these ‘young’ democracies and created new or reafﬁrmed boundaries of what is considered acceptable political behaviour on the part of the politico-economic elite. This book identiﬁed three key groups of actors involved in the mass mobilization process: Social movement organizations and their leaders, the politico-economic elite (subdivided into party in government and party in opposition) and ‘ordinary’ citizens. In order to adequately distinguish between the role of longer-term activist engagement and ‘moments’ of mass mobilization, the book embedded the medium- and short-term events leading to mass mobilization in a historical overview of SMO mobilization over the preceding century. This overview mapped the patterns and trajectories of ideological rights-based claims of activism and the institutions through which they travelled. It was demonstrated that activists help challenge, produce and disseminate rights-based rhetoric and claims, which over time contribute to the collective understanding of civic rights in a society. In turn, this understanding informs the collective threshold of political patience of citizens. Equally, this historical overview highlights a number of instances when interaction between actors either facilitated or impeded ongoing mobilization. Thus, the historical context frames the main argument of the book: ‘revolutionary’ moments, the moments at which ‘ordinary’ citizens join activists in mass mobilization, are contextually framed by crises and structural variables of activist engagement in SMOs, but they are critically shaped by the interaction between SMO leaders and the opposition, as well as the infringement of civic rights by the government. These are moments in time, when non-politically engaged individuals join protests en masse,but vary from ‘revolutionary’ movements which are part of an ongoing process of activism.

Main ﬁndings and arguments reviewed

The main research questions of this book were divided into two parts. The ﬁrst question was contextual and dealt with mobilization in social movements over time and asked: Do the patterns of mobilization differ in democratizing states with differing authoritarian legacies such as those in EE and LA? Or put differently: Can we identify similar patterns and types of social mobilization despite variation in historical legacies? The central question of the book focused on ‘moments’ of mass mobilization: How can we explain the occur- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright rence of mass mobilization? This question was further directed into: What are the processes, structural factors and actors involved in the making of ‘moments’ of mass mobilization? And ﬁnally: What are the motivations of ‘ordinary’ citizens, who join in mass mobilizations?

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The book first presented a humble challenge to the deterministic regional legacy-based assumptions. Chapters 3 and 4 investigated the long-term historical patterns of mobilization in social movements in LA and EE. Based on the empirical evidence it is possible to confirm the initial hypothesis that mobilization in Argentina and Ukraine follow regional patterns and trajectories in LA and EE respectively. Based on this longitudinal analysis it is evident that mobilization in social movements is a drawn-out historical process. This process is composed of underground planning phases and moments of heightened protest activity. Furthermore, if we break down the mobilization of activists into phases connected over time by ideas and the institutions and actors carrying these ideas, we can also conclude that the historical trajectories of mobilization follow similar patterns in Argentina and Ukraine. In both cases we can identify an important foundational moment when particular rights-based claims were institutionalized. These ideas then travelled through institutions, which benefited from intergenerational learning between individual actors. At particular points in time, because of the dynamic nature of socio-political engagement, these ideas were expanded by actors to include broader claims and incorporate larger constituencies. In Argentina socio-economic rights and the right to protest have been historically reproduced by labour and leftist SMOs. In Ukraine socio-political rights of liberation and political liberalism have been historically maintained by national liberation, dissident and human rights SMOs. While ideologically diverse, the two countries experienced peaks in mobilization which not only correspond to regional trends but also follow a similar pattern at the inter- regional level. In both countries these SMOs were based in civil associations, from which activists drew their membership. The most significant difference was in the size of the mobilizations and the use of violence. Since the 1960s, activists in Ukraine have relied on non-violent methods, whereas labour and leftist SMOs in Argentina (following a regional trend of guerrillerismo) became more militant. More visible and violent repertoires have been maintained and reproduced in Argentina, while activists in Ukraine have actively decided to maintain peaceful protest repertoires. This variation in repertoires of violence, or the reproduction of violent versus non-violent repertoires, could be investigated in future comparative research. However, the distinction between a mixture of violent and non-violent repertoires of mobilization in Argentina and peaceful repertoires in Ukraine did not change the build-up towards mass mobilization. With regard to the role of legacies, the first section of the book presented the argument that the historical legacy of social mobilization itself mattered more, rather than broad political historical legacies such as communism ver- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sus authoritarianism. The first two empirical chapters demonstrated that in EE and in LA, and specifically in the two case countries, social mobilization has followed a similar pattern of waves of booms and busts of activity and that there are only a few ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. And although

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 216 Mapping Mass Mobilization mobilization in social movement organizations is historically connected, it fluctuates in size, scope and visibility. The second part of the book analysed the role of structural variables in the process of mass mobilization. Chapter 5 explored how medium-term structural variables are only possible impediments or opportunities for mobilization. Medium-term structural factors set the stage for contention in a given country and foster institutional and relational ‘rules’ or ‘play books’ of the mobilization ‘game’. SMOs, through experience, created precedents for future interaction with the politico-economic elite. Although such ‘rules’ may change over time and are affected by ‘new’ experiences, they can also be reproduced and sustained. Chapter 6, going one step closer to the moment of mass mobilization, investigated the role of short-term structural variables, such as the context of political and economic crises. The empirical evidence presented confirms that like other structural variables, acute economic and political crises can only exacerbate or facilitate political divisions, and therefore act as catalysts for the interaction between the elite and activists. This interaction, in turn, can set in motion a series of actions that can trigger mass mobilization. The crisis itself does not cause the mass mobilization. This overtly materialist (in the case of economic crisis) explanation puts too much emphasis on the general hardships people face. As elucidated in Chapters 6 and 8, economic hardship can be ongoing and compounded, but by itself does not motivate all protesters. It is possible that the government and opposition are able to manage the crisis and even cooperate with each other, and thus avoid a mass mobilization response from ‘ordinary’ citizens. As explained, in both Ukraine and Argentina political and economic hardships had been felt for several years, and even previous acute crises, such as those in 2001 (Ukraine) and 1990 (Argentina), did not produce a cross-class mass mobilization. Conversely, an overt mismanagement of a political or economic crisis can feed into the process of mass mobilization. As presented in Chapter 7, sustained interaction, cooperation and exchange of information between activists, the opposition and ‘ordinary’ citizens, can create momentum for the political destabilization of the regime. Thus, crises create opportunities for political instability, political defections and new alliances, thereby making it more likely that in an attempt to maintain political power, the government will cross an acceptable threshold and infringe on collective civic rights. It was suggested that ‘ordinary’ citizens can be generally patient or even tolerant of socio-economic hardships – if they are confident that the political institutions and the elite that run them will be able to manage crises in the long-run. As the government (or multiple governments in the case of Argentina) continues to disappoint the general Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright population, citizens will begin to lose their faith in the government, or in the political elite. As was demonstrated in Chapter 8, if in this crisis context – with a divided and weak government, activist protests and the loss of faith in political elite and their ability to manage the crisis coming together – the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 217 government infringes on civic rights, then it is very likely that ‘ordinary’ citizens will join protests. The perceptions of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ own protest participation was revealing in this respect: They do not see (or portray) themselves as ‘protesters’ but rather as citizens defending a civic right, which should be guaranteed for every citizen regardless of class or social status. They see it as their duty to protest. While they are able to see themselves collectively as citizens whose rights have been infringed, they personalize their participation by focusing on how the infringements affected or could have affected their family and friends or them personally. Thus, it seems that protest participants are motivated by a complicated intersect of private concerns and a public conception of citizenship-hood, and the duties that come with it.

Main contributions

The contributions made by this book to the study of social mobilization and comparative politics of democratization more broadly are threefold: Methodological, empirical and theoretical. First, this book demonstrated that it is possible, even necessary, to compare within and between regional trends of mobilization, as well as democratization more broadly, to better understand how structural and agency-based variables combine in the making of socio-political processes. Surprisingly, and opposed to mainstream theoretical assumptions presented in Chapter 2, the processes leading to mass mobilization are very similar, even in two different and distant countries such as Ukraine and Argentina. Further inter-regional investigation and theory development will help us understand the convergence of processes in different contexts and their divergence in the same regional or national setting. When social scientists attempt cross-regional and inter- regional comparisons, we are forced to look outside structural assumptions of cultural, geographical or historical legacies and explain the similarities that occur in different regions and during different time periods by developing a common theoretical framework. The coupling of the cross- geographical and cross-temporal comparative perspectives has also allowed us to move towards a broader understanding of the process leading to mass mobilization. Second, this book has made a contribution to a meaningful ‘deep’ notion of process tracing. The book traced a sequence of connected events and processes across space and time. Thus, the book problematized a number of claims about straightforward causality that links historical legacy, foreign ﬁnancing or economic/political crisis to mass mobilization. Instead, based Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright on in-depth process tracing, each chapter of the book has built parts of a complex chain – best understood as a chain of increased likelihood. Each step can be understood as increasing the likelihood of mass mobilization at a particular juncture. Moreover, the book extended the notion of process

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 218 Mapping Mass Mobilization tracing by including a systematic focus on the perspective of the actors involved. The perceptions and recollections of key actors were used rather than explanations imposed from outside. Through triangulation, whenever possible, the book thereby achieves a more comprehensive analysis of the different layers and perspectives of the processes of mass mobilization. It is nevertheless useful to reflect on some of the limitations of this approach. First, not every aspect highlighted by a particular actor can be triangulated or substantiated with other sources. Citizens’ memories change over time and there is a risk of the respondents forgetting or misrepre- senting their participation, whether accidently or deliberately. It is difficult to evaluate the ‘value’ of each individual statement. Individuals tend to use colloquial discourse shrouded in cultural mythology. Because I am a native Ukrainian speaker, it was much easier for me to evaluate the senti- ments presented by interviewees in Ukraine, while this was more difficult in Argentina. For this reason, the mapping exercise preceding all focus group discussions was very useful, as it forced the participants to go beyond the mainstream discourse and use physical symbols to express their memories of key events, actors and their own participation. Moreover, it was necessary to make judgements about the validity of the information detailed in interviews or focus groups. In order to do this no information was quoted that was not said or implied in at least two different interviews. A key issue is that while activists will always overestimate the continuity, strength or ‘revolutionary’ nature of ongoing mobilization, in reality moments of cross-class mass mobilization involving ‘ordinary’ citizens are very rare. Thus, it was most useful to compare or combine politico-economic elite and activist interviews with in-depth focus group responses of ‘ordinary’ citizens. Equally, it was useful to contrast SMO leaders’ interviews with rank-and-file activists’ interviews and participation in focus groups. The most useful information did not come from SMO leaders (especially in the Ukrainian case) but from closely connected, but lower ranking activists who had some inside knowledge but felt safe and distant enough to express their views openly. Thus, while this methodology has its drawbacks, I feel confident that because I accessed three different groups of actors (politico-economic elite, ‘ordinary’ citizens, activists) and through three different methods (interview, surveys, focus groups), I was able to avoid some of the methodological weaknesses of qualitative research that depends on the recollections of individuals representing only one category of actors. The methodology of process tracing has allowed me to investigate the occurrences of mass mobilization in both countries in great detail. Like a Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright magnifying glass, each chapter has provided a deeper look at the different phases and levels of interaction in the complex chain leading to mass mobilization. This book has presented hitherto unknown ‘facts’, specifically about Ukrainian SMO activity at different stages of the mobilization chain. A key

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finding was that actor interaction in the crisis context can facilitate mass mobilization. There were several differences between the cases; contextually the types of crisis triggers (financial and electoral cycles), and the level of formality of the interaction and cooperation between the opposition and SMOs (more formalized in Ukraine) were different. Yet, the main similarity was that because of actor interaction and informational exchange, the party in power was increasingly isolated and in a reaction to its growing weakness vis-à-vis the opposition infringed on collective civic rights. Furthermore, the book has triangulated evidence from three different types of actors: Activists, politico-economic elite and ‘ordinary’ citizens. By allowing each group of actors to speak for themselves, this book provides a more holistic analysis of these actors’ varied participation in the mobilization process in the long-, medium- and short-term. Few studies are able to access such a wide array of participants and adequately explain their different and overlapping roles in the mobilization process. This book has dealt with four conceptual themes. The first theme concerns the methodological and conceptual difficulties involved in inter-regional comparisons of the ‘east’ and the ‘south’. This included the regionalized nature of the transition literature; the assumption that historical legacy is a sufficient explanatory variable of the presence or absence of social mobilization; and the problem of using civil society as a proxy for comparing mobilization in moments and movements in EE and LA. The argument was made that inter-regional analysis is possible and necessary to enrich our understanding of the role of mobilization in formal politics. Second, the book has demonstrated that it is necessary to lay out a nuanced understanding of two interlinked phenomena: The ongoing process of networks of social mobilization in long-lasting social movements, and the individual ‘moments’ of mass mobilization. Once we see these as two distinctive though interconnected socio-political phenomena, we can arrive at a better understanding of the trajectories, processes and actors involved in mobilization. This second theme questioned the usefulness of structural explanations of mobilization. The evidence presented in this book demonstrated that structural factors only set the stage and can be facilitating but not causal factors in the process of mobilization. The third theme focuses on the role of crises as a catalyst for actor interactions, which trigger a process that makes mass mobilization more likely. The fourth theme relates to how ‘ordinary’ citizens fit into the mass mobilization equation. Based on the recollections of ‘ordinary’ citizens themselves, a framework was created to explain how they are affected by the long-term delegitimization of the regime, leading to the breaking of the collective threshold of polit- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ical patience. Two theoretical frameworks have been constructed based on the empirical evidence. The first theorizes actor interaction and information exchange, and the second theorizes the threshold of collective political patience.

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Theorizing actor interaction The interaction between actors, based on an exchange of information, increases conﬁdence in each actor’s perception of the probability of their success. For the opposition, success may be perceived as the ability to take over power in a time of crisis. For SMO leaders, success at a minimal level may be coordinating large protests of ‘ordinary’ citizens and inferring popular support for a particular claim. As argued in Chapter 5, while this interaction is exacerbated by an acute crisis, it is not new, but rather based on previous and preceding patterns of interaction between activists and politico-economic elites. The heightened interaction between the activists and the opposition can signal to ‘ordinary’ citizens that these two groups see the government as increasingly isolated, acting beyond its means, unable to manage the crisis and losing its political legitimacy. This provision of information and attempts at mobilization further exacerbate the crisis and destabilize the government, making it more likely that the government will resort to desperate actions to maintain power and quell opposition. Such interaction and cooperation can increase the size and scope of protests, seriously destabilize the government and even lead to political turnover. On its own, interaction does not have a causal but rather a facilitating effect on mass mobilization. For mass mobilization to occur, ‘ordinary’ citizens need to believe that the government has crossed a boundary of reasonable governance and has impinged on their collective civic rights, to the point where their threshold of tolerance is crossed; only then are ‘ordinary’ citizens more likely to participate in protest activities en masse. The actor interaction and exchange of information between the opposition and activist leaders aims primarily to push the government to its limit and let it implode so that the opposition can take over, and secondly to inform and mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens by convincing them that the opposition is more politically legitimate and will protect their civic rights. Even if the outcome is mass mobilization, its style, trajectory and consequences are still affected by the type and strength of the interaction between the opposition and SMO leaders. The nature of the interaction between the different actors can also affect the long-term trajectories and outcomes of activism in SMOs. Thus, the role of the politico-economic elite, in particular its interaction with the SMO leaders, signiﬁcantly shapes the prospects for and the nature of immediate and future mobilizations. For instance opposition cooperation with SMO leaders can be short-lived or derailed. The opposition elite might co-opt the protests and make broad claims as to their new mandate and legitimacy, as the rightful ‘government’ of the ‘ordinary’

citizens who took to the streets. Conversely, once in power, it could prove - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright unable or unwilling – due to institutional constraints (in Ukraine) or the severity of the economic recession (in Argentina) – to follow through on its earlier ‘promises’. Or, in some cases (in Ukraine) the opposition can ‘betray’ their alliances, increase interaction and share insider information with the government. It may even strike a compromise to share power or to concede

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 221 control over some state or government institutions. Furthermore, in a situation where there is a breakdown in interaction and information between the activist leadership and the opposition, the actors can opt for a radical alternative action. In the case of SMO leaders, they may take their members to the streets when the risk of violence and severe repression is high, and the likelihood of their using violent repertoires can increase as well. Or the party in power may use violent repression to maintain power at all costs, and the party in opposition may use violent means, possibly even an armed coup, to overthrow the government.

Four scenarios of actor interaction

Even if we keep the general context of an acute crisis constant, the type and level of interaction and information exchange that takes place between the opposition, government, SMO leaders and the ‘ordinary’ citizens can have multiple outcomes. The contextual trigger that sets the interaction and informational exchange in motion is understood to be an acute crisis. The level of the proliferation of the crisis effect, its scope and severity, the pre-existing rules of interaction set by precedents can expedite or stifle the information exchange and coordination process. Based on three experiences of large mobilizations in both countries (Argentina: 1983, 1989 and 2001–2002; Ukraine: 1990/1991, 2001–2002 and 2004), with similar types of triggers (economic crises and political crises, respectively), I have identified four possible outcomes of actor interaction.1 These are: (a) no mass mobilization and no violence, (b) violent large-mobilization (strong government), (c) non-violent mass mobilization (strong SMO-opposition cooperation), (d) non-violent mass mobilization (weak or informal SMO-opposition cooperation) (see Table 9.1). The first scenario has been experienced in both countries during the 1983 and 1990–1991 transitions between Junta and communist to democratic governments. In this case there is no moment of mass mobilization observed, but protest events could be large. The party in power, weakened by crisis and internal divisions, is willing to strike an elite pact with the opposition. Thus, though weak, the government is not completely isolated and sees bargaining as mutually beneficial. ‘Ordinary’ citizens’ engagement depends on whether they see the bargaining as acceptable, at least in the short term, and it they feel that their rights will be protected by the elite pact. The resulting size of the protests will depend on structural strength of the SMOs and their ability to access resources (public, private or NGO) and ability to mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens. Even during a severe crisis, there is Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright always the possibility that the opposition will be willing to strike a compromise or support the government. The assumption is that the ruling elite will usually seek compromises at the elite level first – politico-economic elites are much closer to their political opposition than to fringe SMOs and activists.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 222 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Table 9.1 Scenarios of large protest to mass mobilization based on actor action

No mass Violent Non-violent Non-violent mobilization large- mass mass and not mobilization mobilization mobilization violent (strong (strong SMO- (weak or government) opposition informal cooperation) SMO- opposition cooperation) √√√√ SMO protests √√√ Weak party in power √ Strong party in power √ Weak opposition √√ Strong opposition √ Initial elite pact √ Post-protest elite pact √√ Party in power uses violence √√ SMO and opposition interaction √√√√ ‘Ordinary’ citizens join some protests √√ ‘Ordinary’ citizens join protests en masse √√ International maybe involvement

The second scenario is a violent repression of activist protests, similar to the repression of large protests in 1990 in Argentina (under Menem) and in Ukraine in 2001. Even though there is a severe crisis, if the party in power is strong and the opposition is weak or divided, government is more likely to be willing to use violence to quell disruptions. The party in power is Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright not isolated and is either able to govern or able or willing to use whatever means necessary to retain control. The government may or may not have foreign support. In such a scenario the opposition is usually weak, divided and unable to acquire resources or support (local or foreign). Because of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 223 its divisions it is difficult for the opposition to coordinate with activists, or the two actors simply do not see each other as compatible partners. The SMOs and their leaders struggle to maintain activities with minimal resources, information or protection from political insiders. ‘Ordinary’ citizens may or may not feel that their rights have been abused, but their decision to join protests will depend on the severity of political repression of the activists. The third scenario is most similar to the case of the Orange Revolution: A non-violent mass mobilization where the interaction between SMO leaders and the opposition is high. The party in power is increasingly isolated both internally (suffering from defections) and externally (foreign governments, with the exception of Russia, and organizations do not support the government in Ukraine). As a result, the party in power becomes incapable of managing the crisis and its actions exacerbate the effects of the crisis. The opposition is well coordinated and is willing to work with SMO leaders to demonstrate to citizens that they have broad support. The SMO leaders intensify their protest and recruitment activities as they exchange information with the opposition and government insiders. With increased information and resources SMOs are able to stage larger marches, strikes and protests in public places. If they receive assurances (of safety or cooperation) from the party in opposition they begin to recruit and reach out to ‘ordinary’ citizens on a mass scale. The government – because of its lack of information – assumes incorrectly that it is not as isolated as it is and that it has control over crucial means of repression. This miscalculation can lead to imposing highly unpopular policies, or unsuccessfully attempting to repress the protests. ‘Ordinary’ citizens see the attempts of the party in power to manage the crisis as insufficient and unacceptable. If ‘ordinary’ citizens feel that their rights have been infringed upon, they can join the protests en masse. When confronted with mass mobilization, the party in power can reach out to the opposition seeking to strike a compromise. If such a compromise is achieved and if the opposition is able to bargain for key activist leaders to receive resources or access to political office, it is likely that the SMO leaders can tone down their activities. If such a compromise is not reached and/or if the SMOs do not feel confident in the opposition’s ability to deliver, protests can continue. As the opposition takes over power it can try to co-opt the SMO leaders in order to attempt to stabilize the political situation and quell the protests. The fourth and last possible scenario identified is similar to the 2001– 2002 events in Argentina, when the outcome is a relatively non-violent mass Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright mobilization, but the level of cooperation between the SMO leaders and opposition is weak or informal. The party in power is isolated, incompetent and incapable of managing the crisis, thus actually exacerbating its effects and their isolation. The opposition is well coordinated and is working in

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 224 Mapping Mass Mobilization tandem with activist mobilizations. Although direct coordination is limited, communication happens through informal networks via interlocutors. The opposition may offer informal protection or support to the SMOs. The party in power may try to bargain with the opposition, but because of their weakness the opposition is unlikely to compromise. The government, because of its increasing isolation, uses extreme measures to maintain control over state institutions and attempt to repress their opposition. ‘Ordinary’ citizens see the measures taken as unacceptable even in the case of acute crisis management. When the government’s actions cross this threshold and ‘ordinary’ citizens feel that their rights are infringed upon they can join activist protests. Because the informational exchange and cooperation between the SMO leaders and the opposition was informal or weak it is unlikely that the protests will subside when there is a transfer of power. It is likely that the ‘ordinary’ citizens and activist protests will take time to subside because neither group was strongly connected to, or supportive of, the opposition. Fringe opposition parties and radical SMOs are likely to continue the protest events. Over time the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens fades away as political or economic order is restored or ‘ordinary’ citizens simply succumb to protest fatigue.

Theorizing the collective threshold of political patience

Following the logic of the above framework a political or economic crisis can provide opportunities for: Activist protests, government’s weakness and isolation, strengthening of the opposition (if it is united) and ﬁnally, actor interaction and informational exchange. These four variables combine and exacerbate the crisis. Thus, as the crisis becomes acute it is more likely that the government will not be able to manage it and in their failed attempts will impose greater hardships on the citizenry. Accordingly, as political mismanagement of a crisis and socio-politico-economic hardships increase, the faith in democratic institutions declines reciprocally. As faith in democratic institutions declines the people are less and less patient or tolerant of further increases of mismanagement and hardships. Finally, because the crisis is acute, the government oversteps and acts in a manner that completely infringes upon or takes away collective civic rights of ‘ordinary’ citizens, when patience is low. At this point there is no more faith in the political institutions and people view their hardships collectively as citizens and not as individuals, and thus the collective threshold of political patience is broken. In this situation the probability of ‘voice’ increases exponentially. If all the above is true then it is highly probable that mass mobilization will occur. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Thus, mass protest comes as a response to the breaking of a political contract between the government and its citizens. Mass mobilization occurs at the moment when the government’s actions are seen as illegitimate and directly affect a broad majority of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ rights.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 225

Understanding recent mobilizations in Southern Europe and MENA

As the research for this book was being completed, two significant waves of large protests spanned two continents. The debt crisis–related protests in Southern Europe and the ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region left many well-informed journalists, academics and pundits in a state of shock and awe (Joffé 2011). Yet, again the economic deprivation and the foreign NGO diffusion theses reared their heads (Abdalla 2012, Donadio and Kitsantonis 2011, ‘Egypt Profile’ 2013). And when ‘ordinary’ Egyptians and Greeks joined in large protests, it was clear to many observers that the people were protesting because the economy broke their barrier of patience, and at least in the case of Egypt, foreign NGOs and activists had been collaborating on overthrowing Mubarak (Nixon 2011). While it is true that American and European NGOs as well as foreign activists were engaged in trainings in the Middle East, specifically in Palestine, Iran and Egypt (even Ukrainian activists took part in several training colloquia),2 and surely the global economic and European sovereign debt crises created a perfect storm of contextual variables which could destabilize the parties in power, these two structural variables alone cannot explain the presence of hundreds of thousands if not millions of people in the streets of Cairo and Athens. Struc- tural variables alone cannot explain the dramatic variation in protest events in Southern Europe and MENA. Nor can they explain the strength and coordination – particularly in Egypt – of activist SMOs. In this final section using the above theoretical framework, I will briefly present the Greek 2010/2011 and Egyptian 2011 protests, placing them in comparative reference to the cases of mass mobilization in Ukraine 2004 and Argentina 2001, highlighting similarities and difference between the cases, and accentuating what areas still need to be investigated. First, I will briefly touch on the Greek mobilizations, which began in December 2008 with youth-led riots and became mass protests in May 2010 and May 2011. I will assess the political nature of the protests which were clearly associated with a particular global economic crisis context. Second, I will examine the wave of Egyptian mass mobilization, which began around 25 January 2011. This case will be examined in slightly more detail, as it is a case of mass mobilization quite comparable to both the Ukrainian and Argentine mobilizations, being one moment in a long-term struggle by social movements for democratization, and is contextually framed by a confluence of both economic and political triggers. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Greek protests 2010–2012: A different case of crisis mobilization

The recent wave of mobilization in Greece can be divided into at least four phases of protest events. The ﬁrst was dubbed the ‘Greek Riots’ which

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 226 Mapping Mass Mobilization took place in December 2008 (Karamichas 2009). The second included the largest and most heterogeneous group of participants and can most be called a moment of mass mobilization. This was the moment when activists, labour unions and students united forces with a cross-class coalition, starting around 4–5 May 2010 (Kitsantonis 2010). The third phase started approximately in February 2011, with several movements active well into the spring and summer of that year. And ﬁnally, a fourth phase of protests beginning in February–March 2012. While smaller, class or sector-speciﬁc, and increasingly violent protest events (including strikes, boycotts and marches) still take place on a regular basis, the four phases represent the largest protest events to date. Yet, while studies have grappled with the economic nature of the protests, several aspects still need to be disentangled and analysed in greater depth, something that this brief analysis is unable to provide. We need to better focus on: What were the main groups of participants in each protest event? How did they vary between the different protest events? What were their different motivations for participation? And which if any of these mobilizations can be considered a moment of mass mobilization, where the majority of protestors are not students, activists and union members but average citizens demanding change?

Moments and movements in Greece – the role of student and labour unions

As in the Argentine case, labour unions and student militants were integral to the mobilization process in Greece. Moreover, the larger protests in 2010 and 2011 were preceded by several strikes and protest events coordinated by the two groups over a two- to three-year period (Kretsos 2011, Sotiris 2010). Historically these two groups, as in the case of Argentina, were inﬂuential in bringing down the military Junta and have had a large mobilization capacity. While I will not present a historical overview of ideas, actors and institutions related to moments and movements in Greece, it is useful to think of the Greek mobilization history as comparable to that of Argentina (Katsanevas 1985, Kretsos 2011). But the comparative compatibility of the two cases ends there. There are several important variables which make the cases quite different. Impor- tantly, the economic crisis in Greece is very different to that in Argentina, as it was predominantly caused by ballooning sovereign debt, and not capital ﬂight and a currency convertibility crisis (although it may also lead to this). Different types of economic crises affect different sectors of the population in a divergent manner and can help explain why a majority of the protests Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright remained divided sectorally and along socio-economic class lines. What is common to both cases is that the protests, though couched in ongoing and deteriorating economic crises, were very political in nature and occurred in response to concrete policies and actions of the politico-economic elite.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 227

As is now well known, the Greek political and economic elite not only completely mismanaged the Greek economy but they also repeatedly mis- represented the economic health of the country. It is now known that the ministry of economy reported lower debt levels and adjusted other economic indicators in annual reports (Balzli 2010, Schwartz and Story 2010, ‘Timeline of a Crisis: How Greece’s Tragedy Unfolded’ 2011). As the global ﬁnance and banking crisis destabilized the European economy in 2007–2008, the cracks in the Greek elite’s corruption and mismanagement began to show. Unem- ployment and inﬂation grew and it became clear that austerity measures would soon be imposed on the Greek people. What ensued in the years to come should be interpreted similarly to the Argentine case, as a crisis of representation, rather than solely an economic deprivation story. More analyses should focus on the claims made by Greek protest participants and voters, which squarely place blame on corrupt politicians for their political and economic mismanagement. There are several instances in contemporary history when the imposition of dramatic austerity measures did not result in mass protest – most notable have been cases in EE and in some Latin American countries. The lack of political representation and accountability of the politico-economic elite and the perceived illegitimacy of the austerity policies are central to understanding why a broader cross-class coalition of citizens was motivated to protest in May 2010 and May 2011.

Four waves of protests – one moment of mass mobilization

It is also difﬁcult to identify if and when a moment of truly mass mobilization took place in Greece between 2008 and 2012. Protests began to grow to particularly high levels in 2008. A large proportion of students and youth, notably affected by rising unemployment and economic decline, and triggered by a 15-year-old boy being killed by police, joined protests and strikes after 6 December 2008. This younger subset of the population felt they were not represented or were forgotten and ignored by the politico-economic elite of Greece. What seems to have triggered their larger participation was that youth were not only economic victims, but also lacked protection of their basic rights from the state. These protests turned violent, descended into riots and were severely repressed by the government. Though protest events and assemblies organized by students continued in waves, over time they subsided until 2010. When in 2010, it was announced that more cuts would be made to social services and the public sector, in line with further austerity measures to be imposed, a call was made by labour unions in cooperation with some student organizations, for national strikes on 5 May. Alas Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright after several protesters were killed, the protest expanded to a broader subset of the population (Bilefsky 2010, ‘Three Killed in Greece Protests’ 2010). Again, beyond economic decline, it was the political mismanagement of the economic crisis and the increasingly illegitimate government’s inability to

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 228 Mapping Mass Mobilization protect the basic rights of its citizens, which is likely to have triggered a mass protest response. The protests of May 2010 are reported to be some of the largest since the Athens Polytechnic Uprising in 1973, against the abuse by the military Junta. It is possible that these protests can be understood as a moment of mass mobilization as student and labour unions were joined by a broader coalition of ‘ordinary’ Greeks. Once more, while the protests started out as peaceful they rapidly turned violent and descended into riots that were repressed by armed forces. Smaller protest events sprung up in waves throughout 2010, but were isolated and consisted of particular student, activist or union labour groups. More investigation and analysis is needed to understand exactly who joined the protest events, when and why. Furthermore, it is still unknown how opposition parties cooperated, if at all, with activist and labour union groups. Lastly, in-depth process tracing is required to confirm if and how the party in power was destabilized by informal defections and interlocutors. A third wave of protests started in May 2011. The 25 May protests did at least in some instances include a cross-sectoral base and were not generally seen to be partisan. The protests were not spontaneous and were coordinated by divergent civic and activist groups, which readily employed social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to mobilize participants. The protests seemed to involve increasingly fewer ‘ordinary’ citizens, who by then were suffering from crisis fatigue. It is difficult to identify an end to the mobilization, as smaller strikes and protest events have continued through 2011, 2012 and 2013. In summation, while there is little room to debate the contextual role of economic factors, not all instances of even severe economic crisis breed protests. Thus, the specific nature of austerity measures used to correct what was caused, at least in part, by elite mismanagement and fraud created a crisis of representation and political legitimacy in Greece. These two variables need to be further investigated and analysed, as key motivating factors in ‘ordinary’ citizens’ decisions to join in the 2010 and 2011 protests en masse. Furthermore, the role of key SMOs, including but not restricted to student organizations and labour unions, as well as the role of politico-economic elite requires in-depth process tracing, in order to elucidate the role these two types of actors played in the process leading to mass mobilization. Finally, it is worth once again testing the diffusion thesis, as the protest waves in Greece and Spain seem to be connected temporally. Next, I will provide a brief analysis of the 2011 January Revolution in Egypt. Most media and some practitioner reports were surprised by the protest events, labelling them as ‘spontaneous’. Observers assumed that Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Egypt (as they did with Ukraine) had no serious history of mobilization and civic engagement, and thus the protests had to be the result of either diffusion, foreign training or a purely spontaneous response of sheer rage and emotions (Abdelrahman 2011, Anderson 2011, Starbird and Palen 2012).

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 229

In order to at least problematize this assumption, I will provide a brief historical background to activism and recent mobilization in Egypt to show that the moment of mass mobilization in January 2011 that caught the world’s eye was part of a long and ongoing process of mobilization for democratization and civic freedom.

The January 25 Revolution in Egypt

Shortly after protests erupted in Tunisia, we witnessed one of the largest ever protests in Egypt. The revolutionary moment, dubbed January 25 Revolu- tion, took place between 25 January and 11 February 2011. The key SMOs and political groups involved were Kifaya (Enough), Revolutionary Youth Coalition, the April 6th Movement, National Association for Change and the Muslim Brotherhood (among others). Nearly two million Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square and other plazas in Cairo (Chivers and Henderson 2001). The main slogan and claims could be summarized as ‘freedom, social justice and dignity and ‘enough of Mubarak (Revolutionary Egypt 2011). The protestors’ stated main aim was to rid Egypt of authoritarian rule and leader Hosni Mubarak. Yet, as noted in initial interviews with Egyptian activists, from the beginning there was disagreement between con- flicting activist groups as to whether a liberal or Islamic democracy should replace the regime. The protest repertoire swiftly moved from non-violent to direct action and then to violent militant protests. The regime used extensive and excessive violence to repress the protesters, instilled a curfew and shut down Internet sites and mobile communication. After the police had been moved to protest hotspots and stopped policing suburban middle-class neighbourhoods, the protests expanded to include a portion of the Cairo-based middle classes, bringing the protests to a broader level of cross-class mass mobilization. Not all participants spent their days in the violent streets, some coordinated discussion groups and others coordinated neighbourhood assemblies. Protest and defiance of the regime took many forms, as in Ukraine in 2004 and Argentina 2001. When it became clear that violence alone would not quell the growing protests, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down – and the military became a guardian of the state, followed by the first democratic elections in Egypt. In 2012 the first democratically elected parliament and president were again faced with discontented opposition groups, for the perceived dramatic turn to Islamic democracy. Three key debates arose in practitioner, journalist and academic circles following the Egypt protests (Abdelrahman 2011, Anderson 2011, Bhuiyan Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 2011, Nadine Abdalla 2012). The first debate focused on the role of diffusion. Were foreign NGOs again the main trainers and financiers of local activism? Did the Eastern European protest events (velvet and colour revolutions) and actors influence their Middle East counterparts? And in terms of

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 230 Mapping Mass Mobilization modular diffusion, others asked, did ‘ordinary’ citizens join protests because they saw Tunisians protest a few weeks before? The second debate focused on how spontaneous, organized or orchestrated the protests were. To this end, the role of social media sites in mobilizing ‘ordinary’ Egyptians was highlighted. Finally, the third debate focused on the role of economic deprivation. As noted in the cases of Argentine and Ukrainian mass mobilizations, in order to understand why, we must also try to understand how, who and when? Importantly we must identify – how far back we can trace activist mobilization and when did ‘ordinary’ Egyptians really join in the protests.

Identifying key past moments and movements in Egypt

While this study does not focus on Egypt and it is thus not possible to provide a full analysis of the mobilization in January 2011, I can use what we have learned about mass mobilization, to better understand the Egyptian ‘revolutionary moment’. First, in order to contextualize activism in Egypt, we must go back to the future and trace the longer term history of activism and mobilization. In this instance we can draw multiple comparisons with the Ukrainian case and the role of nationalism. There are several key moments of mobilization that need to be better analysed by those studying mobilization in MENA and Egypt specifically. The first is the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, which was a countrywide revolution against the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan. The second would be the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 called the ‘23rd of July Revolution’, which was a military coup d’état by the Free Officers Movement, who adopted a nationalist, anti-imperialist agenda. And during this early period of 20th- century mobilization the development and expansion of The Society of the Muslim Brothers, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, should be traced and connected to institutions and other actors involved in Arab nationalist and Islamic movements. If through process tracing these key ideas, institutions and actors, network links can be identified, they can help in our understanding of contemporary activists and the SMO networks that they form. As in the cases of Ukrainian and Argentine activist and opposition mobilization, national liberation and labour unionism can be potentially identified as two key ideational foundations of contemporary mobilization in Egypt.

Medium-term variables in Egypt: Structures, actors

and protest events - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

As in the cases of Ukraine and Argentine mass mobilization, it is also important to identify key medium-term actors and structural variables. The rise of three main SMOs and their connectivity to political parties, elite groups and

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 231 citizens needs particular attention. These are the Kifaya (Enough), April 6th and other student movements, which have helped organize anti-Mubarak and anti-succession demonstrations; the liberal Ghad Party, which advanced an opposition candidate against Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections; and ﬁnally the ongoing strengthening of the labour movement through the decade prior to 2011 (Abdalla 2009, Cheeseman 2011, El-Mahdi 2011, Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011, Rootes 2013). Based on initial process tracing, these three networks and their member organizations can be considered mobilizing structures for activist coordination in 2011. Furthermore, from 2000 onwards activist engagement increased and the networks grew in size, increasingly interacting and cooperating in the organization of protest events. As in Argentina, the labour movement was particularly active in the decade prior to the moment of mass mobilization in 2012, with a series of expansive labour strikes in 2004, 2005 and 2006 (workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, a large industrial city and home to the largest textile factory) (Abdalla 2012, ‘Chronology of Events: 2008’ 2009, Kamel 2010, Mahjoub 2009, Ragheb, Nabil and el-Saadani 2009). By 2008 workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra were joined by other professionals including teachers and doctors leading to a call for a small national strike. As in the case of Argentina the strikes grew in size and expanded to different industries. Similarly to the case of Ukrainian activist networks, youth and student SMOs also expanded and increasingly coordinated their activities in the decade prior to the moment of mass mobilization. A key mobilizational structure was the creation of Student Committees during the second Intifada in 2000 on university campuses all over Egypt. Students created a variety of local, regional and national clubs and organizations, which united together to coordinate protests against the United States-led Iraq war in 2003 (Abdalla 2012). The development of a strong student component in activist networks, which cooperated with union leaders and coordinated protest in solidarity with workers, highlights a moment of increasing cross-class collaboration and unity. The most speciﬁc example is the April 6th Movement in 2008, where students supported a labour strike in El-Mahalla El-Kubra. An important SMO is Kifaya (Enough), seemingly in part modelled on Serbian and other EE social movement organizations, possibly playing a very similar role in Egyptian mobilization as the two Poras did in Ukraine. The origins of Kifaya can be initially traced to activities in Solidarity Commit- tees following the start of the Second Intifada in October 2000. Some of the same actors and organizations later took part in anti-Iraq war protests on 20 March 2003. The disparate organizations evolved into Kifaya during the Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright summer of 2004 when 300 signatories called for ‘democracy and reform in Egypt’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010). As in Ukraine this period allowed young activists to enter political life and get trained in socio-political participation.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 232 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Crisis context and the process leading to mass mobilization

As in Ukraine and Argentina the years and months preceding the moment of mass mobilization included a severely turbulent period of a growing political (and economic) crisis. As in Argentina after years of economic liberation, Egyptians faced rising poverty and unemployment rates. The economic tur- bulence including rising food prices laid the foundations for elite fragmentation. Furthermore, smaller, activist and union-coordinated protest events, while not mobilizing enough ‘ordinary’ Egyptians, created or strengthened cross-sectoral ties between different SMO networks and politico economic elite. In the year prior to mass mobilization, as in Argentina and Ukraine, we can identify an intensiﬁcation of protest events. There was an increase in activist and opposition coordination in the case of the El-Baradei Cam- paign for Change Movement in 2010, which promoted Mohamed El-Baradei as an alternative candidate in the 2011 elections, and the Call for Dignity in 2010 following the death of Khaled Said, a student beaten to death by police (Ezbawy 2012). Similarly to the cases of Argentina and Ukraine, by 2010 the activist and opposition were increasingly willing to cooperate and coordinate protest events and activities. An important political trigger was the 2010 mass fraud observed during the autumn 2010 Parliamentary elections, where the ﬂedgling regime lost the last of its credibility among a large portion of the population.

The ‘revolutionary moment’ that came early

According to initial interviews by activist insiders, the moment of mass mobilization and its size and ferocity came as a surprise to the activists themselves, even though from the elections onwards activists were trying to mobilize a broader subset of the population, while the call for a nationwide strike and protest for 25 January 2011 was expected to be large. The success and size of the protest has been attributed by some to Facebook, which was used by the April 6th Movement, Kifaya, student groups, labour unions and the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most effective tool for disseminating the call – but as noted by local activists – this was far from being the only method for mobilization. Activists have reiterated that ‘word of mouth’ was seen to be more effective. As noted by several foreign activists who were in Egypt in 2011, activists were preparing for an electoral revolution and saw the strike as the ﬁrst step, and thus where surprised by the high level of response to their attempt at mobilizing people. The Egyptian revolutionary moment should be divided into two phases. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright The ﬁrst phase from 25–26 January until 7 February 2011, when there was overwhelming activist and youth mobilization in response to the strike appeal and when massive crowds gathered in Tahrir Square. These initially peaceful protests were met with mass repression on behalf of the Mubarak regime. But as the regime lost control over some sectors of the police and

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 233 could not contain the protests, or stop them from spreading, the regime, as in the cases of Argentina 2001 and Ukraine 2004, was faced with defections by politicians and security forces. It was during the dramatic onslaught of violent repression and defections that police were shifted from middle-class neighbourhoods of Cairo to the Centre. One activist noted in interviews that in his neighbourhood women coordinated tending to children and cooking together, while men patrolled their neighbourhood at night in groups. These small instances of civil engagement and coordination broke the threshold of patience of the Egyptian middle class. As noted by the activist, ‘the only thing they could rely on Mubarak for was safety, security, stability and now he could not provide any of it ...that was the ﬁnal right that was taken away from average people’ (Unnamed, April 6th Movement activist, 1/29/2012, Skype Interview). It is suspected by insiders interviewed that this was the moment when the regime lost the support of the middle classes who then joined in the protests. Activists made repeated calls for civil disobedience, which as in Ukraine and Argentina took different forms, from volunteering to provide medical attention to injured protestors to defying curfews and patrolling local neighbourhoods. By 8 February, activists were able to organize strikes across all economic sectors in different regions of the country. And so, with mounting defections, unrelenting strikes and protests, and the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens, Mubarak was forced to step down.

What we still need to investigate

While it is evident that the Egyptian protests of 2011 seem to follow a similar pattern to those in Ukraine and Argentina, several processes, events and actors still need to be thoroughly investigated. Few studies focus on elite coordination and defection and the role of the Cairo-based middle class in the moment of mass mobilization. At the elite and activist level, actor interaction and Party in Power defections need to be better investigated. It is likely that these will better explain the trajectory of mobilization in Egypt, as well as the regional divergence between the Egyptian mobilization and those in Libya and Syria. At the ‘ordinary’ citizen level, it is still necessary to disen- tangle the different actors’ participation and identify when exactly there is a cross-class, cross-cleavage coalition in the streets. Moreover, a thorough process tracing is needed to investigate which ideas, actors and institutions were inﬂuential over time, and provided mobilizational structures for engagement in 2011.

Directions for future research - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Both the Greek and Egyptian cases require further intensive process tracing of key actors and structures involved in the making of the moments of mass mobilization. But this study also identiﬁes and opens up opportunity for broader study of protests as well as other themes of democratization politics

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 234 Mapping Mass Mobilization in EE and LA. I will now identify some further directions for research that can be drawn out of the paired comparison of mass mobilization in Ukraine in 2004 and Argentina in 2001. From an empirical perspective, the findings of this book could be tested by comparing two protest moments in each country (within case comparison). The case selection would include two similar types of crisis triggers but with different results in terms of the presence or absence of mass mobilization. An example would be the Ukraine Without Kuchma protest in 2001 and the 2004 Orange Revolution. And in Argentina, it would be useful to compare the 1983, 1989 and 2001 economic crises, which had divergent protest outcomes. Such paired comparisons could isolate some of the uncer- tainties related to the role of contextual variables, found in inter-regional comparison. Second, the long-term interaction and information exchanges between the politico-economic elite and SMOs could be traced in order to gain a better understanding of the effects of the political opportunity structures in long-term mobilization in the post-transition settings in LA and EE. The case of the Polish Solidarno´sć movement, which turned into a political party, and the case of the Brazilian Labour movement and Landless Rural Work- ers’ Movement (MST) and their interaction with the Worker’s Party (PT) in Brazil, could equally be investigated comparatively. These SMOs (as in the case of labour unions and Peronists, or the Pora SMOs and Nasha Ukraina) were instrumental in the parties’ electoral political co-optation as well as anti-government contention. Beyond LA and EE, the book findings can be extended by looking longitudinally at the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress SMOs in apartheid South Africa and the ANC party in government today. In this case the fragmentation of the ANC movement into corrupt party politics has created a system of clientelist control over the SMO networks (similar to the Peronists in Argentina). Future research could also formally model the theoretical contributions of this book. The first model is an information exchange and interaction game between three players (the party in power, the party in opposition, SMOs) where a higher degree of interaction and information exchange between two of the players isolates and weakens the third player. The second model would expand on Albert Hirschman’s ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ model, where we can replace the ‘loyalty’ parameter with a threshold based political ‘patience’ or ‘tolerance’ variable in order to model the participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens in mass mobilization.

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Mass mobilization will continue to puzzle us if we do not separate and assess activists’ and ‘ordinary’ citizens’ actions, participation and motivations in a systematic way. I argue that to better understand activists’

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Conclusions 235 mobilization we need to look back in time and trace social mobilization historically. And while all political and economic historical legacies should not be ignored, the most important of all may be the legacy of activism (institutions, ideas, actors). When it comes to moments of mass mobilization we should not jump to simple structurally based explanations like diffusion, foreign funding or economic crisis. Such contextual variables can only create opportunities or openings for a sequence or cluster of events that in different combinations can lead to the making of a moment of mass mobilization. A focus on crises puts too much emphasis on materialist calculation based on increased deprivation rather than on the actions of politicians and activists as explanatory factors. A focus on foreign financial and technical support places too much emphasis on the protracted role of exogenous factors, overlooks the agency of local activists and does not explain the en masse participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens. As demonstrated, contextual variables provide opportunities for activist protests, the government’s weakness and isolation, the strengthening of the opposition – if it is united – and finally actor interaction and informational exchange. Thus, as the crisis becomes acute it is more likely that the government will not be able to manage the crisis, and in their failed attempts will impose greater hardships on the citizens. Accordingly, as political mismanagement of a crisis and socio-politico-economic hardships increase, the faith in democratic institutions declines reciprocally. As faith in democratic institutions declines the citizens are less and less patient or tolerant of further increases of mismanagement and hardships. As SMO protests grow they are more likely to cooperate with the opposition. This interaction isolates the regime and provokes defections. Defections in turn signal to the citizens that the opposition is stronger than the government. This shift in the power dynamic makes it less likely that the regime will be able to use violence and control information effectively. The isolation and lack of information can lead the government to miscalculate its strength, completely infringing upon or taking away collective civic rights of ‘ordinary’ citizens, at a time when patience for the government is low. At this point, there is no more faith in the political institutions, and citizens view their hardships collectively as citizens and not as individuals, and thus the collective threshold of political patience is broken. If all the above occurs then it is highly probable that mass mobilization will occur. Mass mobilization occurs at the moment when the government’s actions are seen as illegitimate and directly affect a broad majority of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ rights. Long-term processes of an ongoing crisis had a cumulative effect on ‘ordinary’ citizens’ faith in their political elite. Even if the triggers of their Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright hardships were felt by a broader section of the population, as in the case of the Kuchma regime, and more socio-economic as in Argentina, the ‘ordinary’ citizens felt that their politicians were breaking their contract with the citizenry. As the protests intensified and the party in power seemed

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 236 Mapping Mass Mobilization unable or unwilling to change their political practices, the willingness of the ‘ordinary’ citizens to endure the crisis and its effects faded. And ﬁnally, when the regime, in an attempt to hold on to political power, took away or infringed upon the rights of ‘ordinary’ citizens, these actions broke the collective threshold of political patience and citizens felt the need to defend democracy. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Epilogue: It Happened Again – The 2014 EuroMaidan Mass Mobilization in Ukraine

A new moment of mass mobilization in Ukraine

In the months just prior to this book going to press, on 24 November 2013, exactly nine years after the Orange Revolution, a new moment of mass mobilization stunned observers of Ukrainian democratization. The first calls to protests by activists and journalists began on 21 November, following Pres- ident Yanukovych’s government’s announcement that he will not go ahead with signing the Trade Association Agreement with the European Union, an agreement that was planned and negotiated over several years. Yet, it was not until Sunday, 24 November, when the political opposition coordinated a march throughout Kyiv, that approximately 500,000 citizens across the country joined in protests, with approximately 300,000 in the capital alone. Protests quickly spread to regional city centres, and while larger protests were organized in the centre and west of the country, smaller protest events were reported in Crimea, Donets’k, Kharkiv, Odesa and Sumy. In the days that followed, the protests seemed to lose their steam (only 2000–3000 individuals were actively taking part throughout the following week). Yet, after a brutally violent attack by Berkut (riot police) on peaceful protesters (mostly students and journalists) in the early hours of 30 November, the protests exploded to approximately 800,000–1,000,000 participants by the next Sun- day, 1 December. Simply put ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians were at it again; this time they called their protests EuroMaidan (European Square). At first citizens made claims for foreign policy change (urging the government to make a ‘European’ choice) and socio-economic development and well-being (demanding the better future that would come with greater access to European markets and freer movement in the EU). Yet, they later came out, and in much larger numbers, following the unjustified attack on students and foreign journalists by Berkut, to defend their basic - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright rights and against the regime itself. Unfortunately, no resolution to the crisis has been found. The protests continued throughout December and turned violent in mid-January 2014. At the time of writing this epilogue,

237

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 238 Mapping Mass Mobilization based on Hromadianskyi Sektor (Civic Sector) press releases provided by Anastasia Bezverkha, 54 people were reported missing, 103 journalists were injured (reports detailed that riot police targeted journalists who wear neon orange vests to protect them from attacks), 231 activists, bystanders and passers-by were detained, and over a thousand people were injured in clashes. In the brief overview that follows, based on informal interviews with activists and political insiders and a large protest participant survey, I will unpack how the protests were perceived and understood in initial media reports and academic briefs. Next, in order to contextualize the EuroMaidan protests I will draw on the findings in this book and place it in comparative reference to the Orange Revolution. I will first trace the role of mobilizational structures and contextual variables in the lead up to this new moment of mass mobilization. A brief analysis of the different groups of actors involved in this mobilization process will then be provided. The role of activists, the politico-economic elite and ‘ordinary’ citizens’ involvement will be discussed in separate sections, but any interaction between the actors will be identified, and key defections within the regime will be highlighted. I will then focus on protest participants. Here I will begin to answer the following questions: Who joined in the EuroMaidan protests? When? Why? How? To do so I will present an empirically rich but quite preliminary analysis employing data from a protest participant survey collected by the author in Kyiv, between 27 November 2013 and 10 January 2014 (n = 1203). This will be triangulated with some preliminary data from rapid interviews with protesters and onsite poster/slogan analysis. Finally, engaging with current debate in the mass media, I will address how networks and social media matter in the mobilization process.

What was said about the protests

Almost instantly, comparative statements were made about these new protests: It was deemed a #hashtag revolution, led by Millennials who were coordinated through Facebook and other social media; it was grassroots, self- organized and non-partisan (Barberá and Metzger 2013, ‘European Square: Ukraine’s Protest Hashtag?’ 2013, Kravets 2013). Other news reports focused on the political games being played between the EU, US and Russia over Ukraine’s political fate (‘EU Blames Russia for Failure of Deal with Ukraine’ 2013, Grytsenko 2013, ‘How the EU Lost to Russia in Negotiations Over Ukraine Trade Deal’ 2013, ‘Russia Woos Ukraine with Major Offer’ 2013, ‘Russian PM Weighs In Over Ukraine’s EU Row’ 2014). And although techno- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright logical advances allowed activists and journalists to disseminate information more quickly, and foreign powers were for sure at the centre of the crisis, in the lead up to and during the mass mobilization these are but two variables.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Epilogue 239

Mobilizational structures, context and foreign actors

Again, as in 2004, this mass mobilization was linked to the involvement of foreign actors, who set the scene for the crisis and the role of mobilizational structures and resources, but this time rather than focusing on foreign NGO money the focus was on the role of Facebook and Twitter. Both factors are clearly important and have played a part in the making of this moment of mass mobilization. It is clear that while the EU was not ready to further engage with Yanukovych in November 2014 to go forward with the signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement, Russia was able to provide an offer that Yanukovych could not or would not refuse (the details of which are still not known to political observers). Thus, the ongoing competition between these two regional powers facilitated a political crisis in Ukraine. Consequently, the realities of contemporary geo-politics created the perfect storm for a crisis in Ukraine. But this is merely context, the instantaneous reaction of activists and journalists calling for protests in response to the crisis and then ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians joining in needs to be further investigated. While it is true that several activists and journalists (and not only Mustafa Nayem as credited in the media) wrote on their Facebook pages attempting to motivate ‘ordinary’ citizens, if activists and journalists were not already organized, coordinated and connected via ofﬂine social networks, they would not have been able to use adequately the information technology available to them. Since 2004, Ukrainian activist networks have been going through, yet again, a restructuring phase. The post-Orange Revolution political co-optation and disenchantment, while weakening network ties, did not destroy activist SMO networks. Several SMOs changed names and switched around some of their members (such as black Pora to Opora), activists previously engaged in different SMOs united in initiatives such as Chesno,and several activists went back to being well-respected journalists. The rise of the radical feminist group FEMEN, the anti-privatization and preservation initiatives such as the Save Old Kyiv and Save Old Lviv, and then the Podatkovyin Maidan (Tax Maidan)andAutoMaidan are but a few examples of protest events and activities coordinated by activists between 2005 and 2013. Since the election of Yanukovych, protest activity has in fact risen incrementally (Ash 2011), and activists and the opposition have actively coordinated protest events against the selective prosecution and imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, the re-signing of the Black Sea Fleet accords with Russia, and the new language law ‘On the Principles of the State Language Policy’ in 2012. Thus, while momentum was building over the last few years, since activist network ties were weak and there - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright were no clear front runner representing the political opposition but a weak coalition of inconvenience between different political leaders (Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party bloc lead by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Udar (Hit) party bloc lead

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 240 Mapping Mass Mobilization by Vitali Klitchko and the nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party lead by Oleh Tyahnybok), any coordination and common plan was difﬁcult to achieve.

The role of activists in the EuroMaidan mobilization process

Activists and specifically those connected to journalistic networks were hugely important in framing claims, informing the public, using a variety of tactics to motivate and mobilize ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, and importantly being the first ones to step out onto the Maidan in November, and continuing protests over the winter holiday season. Although it is true that student activists have also at first taken a lead role in mobilizing youth, many former leaders of previous mobilizations, like Volodymyr Viatrovych (former leader of black Pora), have helped coordinate protest events and motivated the crowd from an impromptu stage in the first ten days of protests. One of the central SMO coordinating activities and disseminating information to local and foreign journalists was the Hromadianskyi Sektor (Civic Sector), the membership of which looks like a who’s who of some of the most engaged activists from 2004 (one can make the say assessment of other key organizations on the Maidan). A quick tracing of currently engaged activist networks shows a significant overlap with the activities of the cru- cially important internet news sites such as Hromadske (Citizens TV), Spilno (Together TV) and Espresso TV among others. Some former activists interviewed for this study are now news anchors on these sites, which provide 24-hour news coverage to the protest events. The majority of these activists have promoted non-violent and non-partisan protests. Yet, activists have welcomed cooperation with the representatives of the opposition party leaders after the first instances of violent repression. A key development and shift in activist mobilization has been the expanding role of nationalist and radical SMOs. These SMOs promoted the use of violent direct actions in Kyiv. The most well-known of these is Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector), although several groups exist. As opposed to 2004, these groups gained more prominence and have been able to recruit, coordinate and maintain groups of protesters. But, much like in the main analysis of this book, these different activist networks are not new. The novelty is that they have diligently employed new mobilization resources, namely online social media (YouTube, UStream, VKontakte, Facebook and Twitter), blogs and Internet news sites, to facilitate faster dissemination of information. At the same time people have been inundated with information, and it is not clear how Ukrainians are digesting the sea of information available to them. Whether these new technologies have improved activists’ ability to mobilize ‘ordinary’ citizens is not yet clear. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

The role of elite in the EuroMaidan mobilization process

The main concern among observers of the EuroMaidan crisis moved from the initial lack of coordination among opposition leaders to the issue of the

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Epilogue 241 coalition of inconvenience (which includes liberal and right wing parties), to the problem that it is not clear if opposition leaders have the support of, or the ability to control, the protesters. Unlike in 2004, when there was one clear ‘leader’ of the opposition, today the leadership is almost evenly split in a three horse race. While these leaders have appeared to show a united front in most press conferences and meetings, they are clearly political competitors and seem to be thus far unwilling to choose one spokesperson. Moreover, while the electoral support for Yatsenyuk and Klitschko overlaps, a large portion of their supporters do not support Tyahnybok’s Svoboda party, which has been tied to nationalist groups. Thus, much like in 2001, the political opposition is not united and does not have clear or overwhelming support of the electorate. Moreover, according to activists interviewed, although there is coordination between opposition parties and SMOs, the activist networks are still rather distrustful of the opposition leaders and want to distance themselves from partisan projects. While some formal agreements have been made, many activists continue to organize their own initiatives. The Regime on the other hand has refused to negotiate with the opposition until recently. Unlike in 2004, it appears that the regime has become entrenched, the president is encircled by party faithful and a small group from within his administration. While there has not been an avalanche of defections, key members of the administration and government have defected. The two most important of these have been by former Vice Prime Minister Serhiy Tyhipko, who along with his party left the Party of Regions coalition, and former head of the administration Serhiy Lyovochkin, who resigned shortly after the protests started. Much like in 2004, this is a signal that the Dnipropetrovsk economic and political clan is slowly moving away from the Donbas economic and political clan. Perhaps even more interesting has been the reaction from oligarchs, who were seen to be strong supporters of the regime. Rinat Akhmetov’s System Capital Management (SCM) holding company released a strongly worded letter where it was acknowledged that the company supported closer ties to the EU and protection of human rights. It was reiterated that ‘the SCM Group is built on the fundamental European values. The rule of law, respect for the rights to private property, freedom of speech, personal liberty and freedom of peaceful assembly are among our top priorities. We are totally against any violence’ (‘Yanukovych and the Tycoons’ 2013). Others like Viktor Pinchuk, owner of EastOne Group Ltd., also made statements as to their dismay about the use of violence by police. Insiders from the administration have explained in informal interviews that Yanukovych, while not yet completely isolated, is facing increasing pressure Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright from Pinchuk, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, the leading partner of the Pryvat Group, and Akhmetov, to ﬁnd a swift constitutional solution to the EuroMaidan crisis. At the time of writing this book, it was not yet clear how much pressure there was from insiders, or how much pressure the Yanukovych regime

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 242 Mapping Mass Mobilization was willing and capable to withstand. The 28 January resignation of Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov was a clear sign that the regime had succumbing to some of the pressures (both internal and external). Finally, the willingness to use violent repression is different from 2004. Former president Kuchma was either unwilling (in order not to further tarnish his international reputation) or unable (due to isolation and defections) to use violent means of repression against peaceful protesters. The Yanukovych regime not only allowed for extreme violence and the use of hired thugs in repressions, but used torture tactics against the activists and there were 100 conﬁrmed deaths.

Ukrainian Protest Survey ﬁndings about citizens’ participation

Three important differences should be highlighted about the protest of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians in 2013/2014: There is no clear partisan project that can claim legitimacy to the protest events; protests were diffused throughout the country, and even taking place in eastern provinces which did not see much protest in 2004; and the protests turned violent, in terms of both police repression and in the protesters response by increasingly employing violent repertoires, including a minority of protesters using Molotov cocktails and storming government buildings. But unlike in 2004, I was able to conduct a live survey of actual protest participants. Since 27 November, 20 interviewers have been conducting surveys at Kyiv protest sites, for two to three hours each day. A strict random sampling strategy has been used, whereby every sixth protester was approached (n = 1203). I have complemented the survey data with daily documentation of protest slogans and signage (digital video and photography), as well as rapid interviews with a smaller sample of protesters (n = 200). I have begun coordinating focus groups with Kyiv-based protest participants; the first one was conducted on 11 December 2013. Some of the preliminary findings from the study are surprising, and not quite supporting the media’s focus on the role of social media in mobilizing citizens. There are five main findings thus far. (1) The median protester is a well-educated professional in his/her mid- 30s. (2) The main claims made by protesters shifted from foreign policy to civic and human rights, and with this shift protest participants became more diverse. (3) Social media alone do not mobilize, although they inform and maybe motivate. (4) Off-line social networks are more likely to mobilize people to join protests. (5) New technologies and specifically Internet news sites have been highly influential in framing protest discourse and disseminating information in real time. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Who are the protesters?

The EuroMaidan protests represent an interesting shift in protest participation in Ukraine. While many reports have championed Ukrainian students

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Epilogue 243 and youths for being the predominant actors in the protests, the majority of the respondents (69 per cent) were in fact over the age of 30. The average age of the Ukrainian protester in Kyiv was closer to 36. Moreover, the protesters made up a diverse cross-cleavage group, with differing and at times competing demands. Thirty-three per cent of protesters were members of the Ukrainian Orthodox church and 25 per cent were Greek Catholics. Surprisingly while the broad majority (83 per cent) of protest participants chose Ukrainian as their mother tongue, only 67 per cent used it in their private life. Also surprisingly, a significant portion (38 per cent) of protest participants has not previously participated in protest events, including the Orange Revolution (this holds even when cross-referenced for age of respondent). When I account for the date when individuals first joined the protests after the violent repression of students and journalists on 29–30 November, the number of protesters with no or little experience grew exponentially. Thus, not only can we identify an impressive cross-cleavage coalition among protesters, but the large number of first-time protest participants signifies an expansion of the engaged and democratic electorate in Ukraine.

Why did they protest?

My team of researchers also were given the task of conducting rapid interviews with each of the different age groups represented in the survey. Participants were quickly asked: Why are you here today? Why did you decide to protest? Why is your protesting important? Three explanations were most often repeated in responses. Protesters under the age of 30 employed what can be considered political savvy language. They were able to speak in a more nuanced manner about EU accession, global human rights, use popular discourse of abstract concepts such as freedom and democratic liberalism. They clearly saw themselves as the central driving force behind the protests. The middle-aged group of protest participants, on the other hand, focused on ‘economic security’, ‘opportunities for their children’ and their desire to live in a ‘normal, European democracy’. This group clearly saw themselves as the key electoral cohort who they believe are being ‘courted by all political factions’ in Ukraine. They saw the elite’s need for their votes as being their key power vis- à-vis the elite. Finally, the oldest group of protesters, aged over 55, stressed that because they had lived through different repressive regimes and are now retired with more time on their hands, they ‘can protest in the place of the young, who have to work and raise families’. This last group, rather than seeing themselves as drivers of the revolution or a powerful electoral cohort, Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright see themselves as protectors of the protests – they were on duty when the younger ones could not be there. Most of the interviews demonstrate a desire for a better economic and democratic future, with closer ties to the EU. But the question remains: What mobilized people to join in?

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 244 Mapping Mass Mobilization

Most participants came to protest events with family or friends and thus it is clear that social networks (and especially close ties) are central to understanding how people are mobilized. Only 18 per cent of respondents came to the protests alone; these were predominantly youth and activists, who are known to have a low-risk threshold, and all have previous protest experience. In line with work by Beissinger (2013); Saunders et al. (2012), first-time protesters all came with a group of friends or family members. Seventy-nine per cent of protesters came with friends, family or co-workers. Forty-nine per cent use Facebook and 51 per cent used the Internet media described above to stay informed about the protests. Not surprisingly, when we cross- reference age with source of information, we can identify a strong age divide, where younger protesters used social media more often than older protesters. Perhaps more surprisingly, when we account for the number of times someone protested, more frequent protesters relied on communication from friends and family more than they did on social media. It was found that the broad majority of the first-time protesters received text messages, emails and telephone calls from friends and family members motivating them to join in and telling them where to go. These findings lead us to suspect that off-line social networks rather than simply social media usage are more instrumental in mobilizing individuals to join in, rather than simply informing them. But most importantly it is clear that more people, and from more diverse backgrounds, joined in the protests after the violent repression of youth and journalists on the night of 29–30 November. As was explained in rapid interviews, this repression was seen as an ‘illegitimate use of force’ and an ‘illegitimate abuse of civic rights’. Protesters stressed that those beaten were peaceful, young and even foreign journalists. They could not imagine how the riot police could commit such violent acts against peaceful protesters. The fact that young women were among those beaten was repeatedly mentioned as something unbelievable that signalled that ‘anyone could have been beaten’; thus the respondents explained that they saw themselves and their family as possible targets of state violence. Thus, much like in the case of 2004, ‘ordinary’ people joined in and sustained their participation after they saw that the regime abused a universal civic right en masse. This was the moment of the breaking of political patience in Ukraine. While we only have preliminary data, we can trace that with each increase in the use of violence by the regime, the protests spread and have grown more violent.

Differences and similarities: Orange Revolution and EuroMaidan

Based on the original survey ﬁndings, en masse participation of the mid- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright dle class in the EuroMaidan is signiﬁcant for Ukrainian democratization in four ways. First, the median protester is linguistically diverse, thus breaking down politico-linguistic divisions and displaying a new cosmopolitanism. The median protester has also voted in previous elections, but may or may

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Epilogue 245 not have voted for the Party in Power. Therefore, he/she forms part of an electoral constituency that can be won over by an organized political party and is not devoutly partisan. The median protester is 36-years-old, but the protesters are made up of several diverse electorally active age groups, who are motivated by slightly different protest claims. And finally while the median protester has participated in previous protests, a large portion of protesters are first-time participants, showing that the democratic/western leaning constituency in Ukraine is growing larger. This unique insight into the nature of the EuroMaidan protest participants, based on statistical analysis, draws valuable implications from the protest participation for democratization in Ukraine. But importantly if we take into consideration the model presented in this book, we see that the opposition is not united enough, the activists have been unable to maintain control of the protest events and have been at times even sidelined by the opposition, and the party in power has thus far demonstrated sufficient strength to become entrenched. Finally, we have seen far more instances of violence than ever before in the history of Ukrainian mobilization and we have seen a diffusion of protest engagement to regions of Ukraine where ‘ordinary’ citizens have been far more reluctant to join in. These are significant developments that need to be further explored in a systematic manner in future research. Moreover, these developments only further problematize and present a challenge to the dominant theses discussed in this book. The EuroMaidan is yet another example of Ukrainian coordinated mobilization and of a reaction by citizens to the en masse infringement of civic rights, and not simply the result of foreign funding, diffusion or relative deprivation. It is hoped by the author that the findings in this book will provide a road map for the future analysis of the EuroMaidan protests. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices

Appendix 1: List of interviews conducted in Ukraine cited in the book

Alex ‘Daddy’ Popov, activist, Maidan Inform,andBlok Yuliyi Tymoshenko Kyiv headquarters, author’s interview, 8/18/2009, Kupidon, Kyiv. Alexander (Sean) Severin, activist and journalist, Maidan Inform, author’s interview, 8/18/2009, Kupidon, Kyiv. Anastasiya Bezverkha, yellow Pora activist and press ofﬁcer, author’s interview, 5/23/2007, Oxford. Anatoliy Bondarenko, journalist and activist, author’s interview, 7/23/2008, Kyiv. Andriy Kohut, black Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/16/2008, Kyiv. Andriy Shevchenko, National Deputy Blok Yuliyi Tymoshenko, journalist and civic activist, author’s interview, 8/10/2008, Kyiv. Andriy Shevtsiv, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/16/2008, Lviv. Andriy Yusov, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 8/13/2008, Kyiv. Andriy, black Pora activist and member of media team, author’s interview, 7/25/2007, Lviv. Anton Berezhnyi, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/13/2008, Kyiv. Anton Kushnir, yellow Pora activist and Nasha Ukrayina Party campaign assistant, author’s interview, 7/23/2007, Kyiv. Anton Stepyuk, journalist and activist, author’s interview, 8/05/2008, Kyiv. Bohdana Kostyuk, journalist and activist, author’s interview, 7/25/2008, Kyiv. Boris Berezovsky, Russian business oligarch, author’s interview, 1/31/2006, LSE, London. Dmytro Potekhin, Znayu activist and NGO practitioner, author’s interview, 8/14/2008, Kyiv. Dzvinka Kachur, former member of NaUKMA student strike committee, researcher and UNDP practitioner, author’s interview, 7/10/2007, Kyiv. Igor Soboliev, journalist, author’s interview, 7/18/2008, Kyiv. Iryna Chupryna, yellow Pora activist and administrator, author’s interview, 4/9/2008, Kyiv. Ivanna Kolushtribna, yellow Pora media and PR team, author’s interview, 7/28/2008, Kyiv. Kostyantyn Kanishev, yellow Pora activist, and Nasha Ukrayina campaign headquarters coordinator in Kharkiv, author’s interview, 7/14/2007, Kyiv. Mykhailo Plotnikov, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/09/2008, Kyiv. Mykhailo Svystovych, activist, journalist and founder of Maidan Inform website, author’s interview, 7/30/2007, Kyiv. Mykola Yakovyna, National Deputy Nasha Ukrayina Party Bloc, author’s interview, 7/7/2007, Kyiv. Natalia Shapovalova, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 8/10/2009, Kyiv. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Oleksandr Doniy, National Deputy (unafﬁliated) and former student leader of Rev- olution on the Granite and the Last Barricade Movement, author’s interview, 07/06/2008, Kyiv.

246

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Oleksandr Solontay, yellow Pora activist, 7/21/2008, Kyiv. Oleksandr, Znayu activist and coordinator of call centre, author’s interview, 7/13/2008, Kyiv. Oleksiy Parakhin, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/16/2007, Lviv. Olena Hanstiak-Kaskiv, yellow Pora PR team coordinator, author’s interview, 8/06/2008, Kyiv. Olya Domasn’ska, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 8/1/2007, NaUKMA, Kyiv. Olya Salo, black Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/19/2007, Lviv. Orest Rak, Sprotyv activist, author’s interview, 7/20/2008, Lviv. Ostap Kryvdyk, yellow Pora activist and journalist, author’s interview, 7/18/2007, Kyiv. Pavlo Kachur, former National Deputy and Minister of Construction and Architecture of Ukraine, Rukh Party, author’s interview, 2/20/2009, Kyiv. Pavlo Zabiuk, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/13/2007, Kyiv. Pavol Demeš, German Marshall Fund, author’s interview, 5/23/2008, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Roman Rak, Sprotyv activist and leader, security at Maidan, author’s interview, 4/28/2008, Kyiv. Roman, market vendor Zhytnyi Rynok, author’s interview, 7/17/2006, Podil, Kyiv. Serhiy Chernikov, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/24/2007, Kyiv. Serhiy Salnikov, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/24/2007, Kyiv. Tamara Martsynyuk, former student activist and sociologist, author’s interview, 8/18/2007, NaUKMA, Kyiv. Taras Ratushnyi, journalist, author’s interview, 8/12/2008, Kyiv. Unnamed, Akhmetov PR team insider, author’s interview, 4/27/2009, Cosmopolite, Kyiv. Unnamed, assistant to Minister of Education, author’s interview, 7/23/2008, Lviv. Unnamed, BBC journalist, author’s interview, 4/13/2007, Cosmopolite, Kyiv. Unnamed, black Pora activist 1, author’s interview, 7/15/2009, Baraban, Kyiv. Unnamed, black Pora activist 2, author’s interview, 7/16/2009, Kyiv. Unnamed, black Pora activist 3, author’s interview, 7/16/2009, Kyiv. Unnamed, Canadian Embassy in Ukraine insider, author’s interview, 9/13/2008, telephone interview. Unnamed, Canadian journalist, author’s interview, 4/18/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, Channel 5 anchor, author’s interview, 8/8/2009, Podil, Kyiv. Unnamed, IBRD/World Bank in Kyiv insider, author’s interview, 7/30/2008, Kyiv. Unnamed, Kuchma Pesidential Administration insider 1, author’s interview, 2/7/2010, Da Vinci, Kyiv. Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 2, author’s interview, 7/7/2008, Bankova, Kyiv. Unnamed, Kuchma Presidential Administration insider 3, author’s interview, 7/07/2008, Bankova, Kyiv. Unnamed, National Deputy Blok Yuliyi Tymoshenko, author’s interview, 8/16/2008, Pantagruel, Kyiv. Unnamed, National Deputy Nasha Ukrayina Party, author’s interview, 8/16/2008, Pantagruel, Kyiv. Unnamed, Open Society Institute worker, author’s interview, 07/30/2008, Kyiv. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Unnamed, Party of Regions insider 1, author’s interview, 4/23/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, Party of Regions insider 2, author’s interview, 4/23/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, Polish Embassy in Ukraine insider, author’s interview, 7/13/2008, Warsaw.

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Unnamed, Renaissance Foundation insider 1, author’s interview, 7/30/2008, Kyiv. Unnamed, Renaissance Foundation insider 2, author’s interview, 7/25/2008, Kyiv. Unnamed, Rukh activist, author’s interview, 7/23/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yanukovych Presidential Campaign insider 1, author’s interview, 4/23/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, yellow Pora activist 1, author’s interview, 2/15/2010, Zoloti Vorota,Kyiv. Unnamed, yellow Pora activist 2, author’s interview, 7/23/2008, Kaffa, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 1, author’s interview, 4/22/2007, Bankova, Kyiv. Valentyna, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 2, author’s interview, 4/25/2008, Bankova, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Administration insider 3, author’s interview, 2/11/2010, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Campaign assistant manager, author’s interview, 4/22/2007, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yushchenko Presidential Campaign insider 2, author’s interview, 7/2/2007, Bankova, Kyiv. Unnamed, Yushchenko PR Rep, author’s interview, 7/23/2007, Kafe House,Kyiv. Viktor, market vendor Zhytnyi Rynok, and community activist, author’s interview, 7/17/2006, Podil, Kyiv. Vladyslav Kaskiv, yellow Pora activist and National Deputy Pora Party, author’s interview, 4/19/2008, Kyiv. Volodymyr Chemerys, coordinator of Ukraine Without Kuchma Campaign, activist, National Deputy, author’s interview, 7/10/2008, Kyiv. Volodymyr Viatrovych, black Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv. Volodymyr Yareyev, journalist and activist, author’s interview, 7/29/2008, Kyiv. Yaroslav Zen, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 7/7/2007, Kyiv. Yaroslav, Sprotyv activist, author’s interview, 4/17/2008, Lviv. Yaryna Yasynevych, black Pora activist, author’s interview, 4/16/2008, Kyiv. Yevhen Bystrytsky, Director of the Renaissance Foundation, author’s interview, 8/20/2008, Kyiv. Yevhen Zolotariov, yellow Pora and human rights activist, author’s interview, 7/9/2008, Kyiv. Yuriy Polyukhovych, yellow Pora activist, author’s interview, 8/3/2008, Kyiv. Yuriy Zakalyuzhnyi, yellow Pora activist, assistant Lviv Mayoral Administration, author’s interview, 3/22/2008, Lviv.

Appendix 2: List of interviews conducted in Argentina cited in the book

Alberto Amato, editor at Clarín, author’s interview, 1/26/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Anna Dinerstine, researcher, author’s interview, 3/10/2009, Skype. Carlos Chile, National Coordinator of the Movimiento Territorial de Liberación (MTL-

CTA), author’s interview, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Carlos March, Director of AVINA, 1/29/2009, Belgrano, Buenos Aires. Cecilia Fernandez, researcher, author’s interview, 2/6/2009, Buenos Aires. Cesar Ottaviani, Deputy for Coalicion Civica, 2/4/2009, Congresso, Buenos Aires. Claudia Penia, cooperative member, 2/4/2009, Buenos Aires.

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Damian Fernandez Pedemonte, Professor Facultad de Comunicación Universidad Austral, author’s interview, 12/4/2008, Buenos Aires. Daniel Pomerantz, Director of AMIA, author’s interview, 2/10/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Daniel Schweimler, journalist BBC, author’s interview, 11/16/2008, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Domingo Cavallo, former Minister of Economy, author’s interview, 12/6/2008, Buenos Aires. Edgardo De Petri, Secretary of Organisation of the CTA, Deputy for Frente para la Victoria, author’s interview, 3/19/2009, Buenos Aires. Esteban Magnani, NGO worker La Base, author’s interview, 1/21/2009, Buenos Aires. Esteban Marino, NGO worker, author’s interview, 3/12/2009, Buenos Aires. Facundo Orqueida, Deputy for Coalicion Civica, author’s interview, 2/04/2009, Buenos Aires. Felipe Noguera, political consultant, author’s interview, 11/26/2008, Puerto Madero, Buenos Aires. Fernando Grill, Peronist party insider, author’s interview, 1/23/2009, Palermo-Barrio Parque, Buenos Aires. Fernando Ruiz, researcher and journalist, author’s interview, 11/24/2008, Buenos Aires. Filippe Guerrero, Director of the cooperative Desde Pie, author’s interview, 2/19/2009, La Matanza. Gabriel Chamorro, researcher and human rights lawyer, author’s interview, 3/9/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Gaston, Member of Co-op Pupore, MTL, author’s interview, 2/19/2009, La Matanza. Graciela Gurvitz, Assambelista, author’s interview, 2/23/2009, Parque Centenario, Buenos Aires. Gustavo Vera, Director of Cooperative 19th of December, author’s interview, 1/26/2009, Barrio Parque. Gustavo Yabarra, journalist La Nación, author’s interview, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires. Héctor Flores, leader of MTD la Matanza, Deputy for Coalicion Civica, author’s interview, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires. Hector Palomino, researcher and union activist, author’s interview, 1/22/2009, Buenos Aires. Hernan Alberro, project manger CADAL, author’s interview, 11/11/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Javier Hermo, Executive Director ‘Foundation for Community’, author’s interview, 3/5/2009, Buenos Aires. Jose Guerrero and Filippe Guerrero, managers of Cooperatives Pupore and Desde el Pie, MTL, author’s interview, 02/19/2009, La Matanza, Gran Buenos Aires. Juan Carlos Torre, researcher, author’s interview, 12/4/2008, Belgrano, Buenos Aires. Juan Gonzales, Secretary of National Integration and National Congress of CTA, author’s interview, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires. Juan José Cantiello, FTV (La Matanza), General Secretary of CTA for the province of Buenos Aires, author’s interview, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires. Juan Wahren, former activist and researcher Gino Germani Institute, author’s inter- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright view, 2/25/2009, Buenos Aires. Juanita, cooperative member, author’s interview, 3/10/2009, La Boca. Julian Bertranou, UNDP practitioner, author’s interview, 11/14/2008, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires.

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Julio Gambina, economist, author’s interview, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires. Lucas Guagnini, journalist and editor at Clarín, author’s interview, 2/11/2009, Buenos Aires. Lucianna Ghiotto, activist and researcher, author’s interview, 3/3/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires. Luciano Alvarez, activist and coordinator Comedor Los Pibes de la Boca (FTV), author’s interview, 2/20/2009, La Boca, Buenos Aires. Luis Borello, Director of Comedor De Pibes La Boca and FTV leader, author’s interview, 2/20/2009, la Boca, Buenos Aires. Luis Oviedo, journalist and member of Polo Obrero Party, author’s interview, 2/5/2009, Barracas, Buenos Aires. Maria Julia Normandez, activist El Ceibo, author’s interview, 2/21/2009, Palermo Viejo, Buenos Aires. Maria Matilde Olier, researcher, author’s interview, 1/20/2009, Buenos Aires. Maria Pia Devoto, Director of NGO, author’s interview, 1/29/2009, Buenos Aires. Maria Rosa Lojo, author and member of the ‘Committee for Truth About the 20th of December 2001’, author’s interview, 2/26/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Mariana Grass, ‘Dirección Nacional de Juventud – Desarrollo Social, Coalicion Civica’, former JP militant, author’s interview, 3/25/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Martin Armelino, researcher, author’s interview, 1/28/2009, Buenos Aires. Matias Triguboff, researcher, author’s interview, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires. Maximiliano Pelusosi, activist and Asamblea Palermo Viejo member, author’s interview, 2/16/2009, Racolletta, Buenos Aires. Monica Peralta, Deputy with Coalicion Civica, 2/4/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires. Norberto Rodríguez, Director of YMCA Argentina, author’s interview, 2/6/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Oscar Ensink, Peronist insider, author’s interview, 3/6/2009, telephone interview, Buenos Aires. Pablo Queiruga, Director of cooperative, author’s interview, 1/21/2009, Gran Buenos Aires. Pascual, activist and coordinator at Barrios de Pie, author’s interview, 3/10/2009, Buenos Aires. Patricia Bullrich, Deputy for Unión por Todos, author’s interview, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires. Patricia, university worker and former militant, author’s interview, 2/17/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires. Paula Lenguita Saavedr, former activist and researcher, author’s interview, 1/23/2009, Plaza Once, Buenos Aires. Rodolfo Yanzón, lawyer and member of Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre, author’s interview, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires. Sergio Crivelli, journalist La Presna, author’s interview, 2/2/2009, Buenos Aires. Sergio Ivaldi, Deputy for Coalicion Civica, author’s interview, 2/4/2009, Congreso, Buenos Aires. Sergio Kiernan, journalist, author’s interview, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires. Sergio Sorin, journalist, member of the Committee for Truth ‘December 20’, 2/6/2009, Buenos Aires. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Serran Gregorio, cooperative member, author’s interview, 3/27/2009, Gran Buenos Aires. Unnamed, activist and researcher, author’s interview, 1/23/2009, Plaza Once, Buenos Aires.

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Unnamed, activist 1, author’s interview, 2/18/2009, Almirante Brown. Unnamed, activist 2, author’s interview, 2/18/2009, Almirante Brown. Unnamed, Alianza Coalition insider 1, author’s interview, 3/13/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Alianza Coalition insider 2, author’s interview, 3/14/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Alianza Coalition political analyst, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, associate of Duhalde, author’s interview, 2/10/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Unnamed, associate of Mariano West, author’s interview, 2/10/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Unnamed, de la Rúa Presidential Administration insider 1, author’s interview, 2/17/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, de la Rúa Presidential Administration insider 2, author’s interview, 12/10/2008, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Deputy for Unión por Todos, author’s interview, 3/18/20, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, economist, advisor to Nestor Kirchner Administration, author’s interview, 12/7/2008, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, former Joventude Peronista member, working for Coalicion Civica, 2/16/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Justicialista Party insider 1, author’s interview, 3/23/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, militant and researcher, UBA, author’s interview, 3/21/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Partido Justicialista insider 2, author’s interview, 3/23/2009, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, Partido Justicialista political consultant, author’s interview, 11/26/2008, Buenos Aires. Unnamed, piquetero activist 1, author’s interview, 2/19/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Unnamed, piquetero activist 2, author’s interview, 2/19/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Víctor Mendibil, Secretary General Judicial Union, CTA National Committee, author’s interview, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires. Ximena Abeledo, economist and journalist, author’s interview, 29/1/2009, Caballito, Buenos Aires.

Appendix 3: General questions for Ukrainian interviews

Ukraine general questions for interviews 1. Please state your name and profession for the record. 2. Please describe your political activity, participation (politychnu dialnist’).

1. Please describe your civic activity, participation (dialnist’/aktyvnist’).

Section about deﬁning the moment 1. What happened in October–December 2004? 2. How would you describe the events of the Orange Revolution? • A series of planned mass protests • A series of spontaneous mass protests

• A political motivated and coordinated action by the opposition - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Chaotic uncoordinated protest • Coordinated acts of protest by activists and social movements • Politics as usual: this was one moment in a long and ongoing history of protest • A revolution

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3. Could you describe these events? 4. What were the causes? [or] What mobilized the people?

• Were they political? • Were they economic? • Was it a mixture of the two? 5. Did you participate in these events? • If yes in what manner? 6. In your opinion and based on your experience, why do you think people entered into the streets en mass? • What were the ‘causes’? • Was it only about the elections? • Was it only about supporting Yushchenko?

Section about the actors (groups or individuals involved) 7. Who were the most important actors? • Social movements, •Media • Activists, • What about the Poras •Unions, • What about Yushchenko • ‘Ordinary’ people, •WhataboutTymoshenko • Politico-economic elite, •WhataboutKuchma • Foreign actors, governments • If activist – can you list all the and NGOs (ﬁnancial or social movements involved political)

8. What was the role of each actor involved? 9. Do you think actions between the various actors you described were coordinated? a) If so how? b) Do you know of any direct or indirect, formal or informal, coordination or interaction between the different actors you mentioned? c) What was the interaction between the party insiders and the activists, protestors and social movements? d) Was this relationship equally balanced or was it asymmetrical? 10. Did the politicians co-opt the social movements? The protests? 11. What other similar moments of mass-protest were there? 12. Did you participate in any previous moments of mass-protest? 13. Did you participate in Ukraine without Kuchma? 14. Did you participate in 1989–1991 protest? 15. How does the Orange Revolution differentiate from the UBK? • Was the role of politicians different? • Were these events connected? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 16. Do you think that civil society exists in Ukraine? • From 1991? • Why and why not?

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17. Do you think that social movements (from 1991 Rukh), 2001–2002 (UBK) and 2004 (Orange Revolution)

• Helped build a civil society? • They helped connect the growing civil society? • Both? •How?

18. What has been the role of social movements in creation/making of:

• Civil society in Ukraine? • Democratic culture? • A democratic society? • Has not helped?

19. What are you reactions to the claims that foreign NGOs, activists and governments ﬁnanced and help coordinate the Orange Revolution?

IV. SMOS and NGOS speciﬁcally 20. How was your organization funded?

21. Who did your organization fund? NGO only

• How much funding did your organization give? NGO only

22. How many members did you have? 23. Which cities and regions did you organize in? 24. Did you ever meet with Serbian or Georgian Activists?

• If so how would describe your interaction?

25. Did you or your organization cooperate with political parties or politico economic elite?

• If so how would describe your interaction?

Appendix 4: General questions for interviews in Argentina

General questions for interviews in Argentina 1. Please state your name and profession:

II. Section for people who specialize in civil society or social movements in general or for academics 2. How would you describe the state of popular participation and the role of civil society in Argentina – speciﬁcally as a factor in the transition to and in the ongoing

process of consolidation of democracy? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 3. How does social mobilization fit in to this equation? 4. How does collective protest fit into this equation? 5. How do social movements fit into this equation? 6. How do ‘ordinary’ people fit into this equation?

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IV. Section about deﬁning the moment 7. What happened in December–November 2001? 8. How would you describe the events of 19/20?

• A series of planned mass protests • A series of spontaneous mass protest • A politically motivated and coordinated action by the opposition • Chaotic uncoordinated riots and looting • Coordinated acts of protest by activists and social movements (marches/riots/looting) • Politics as usual: This was one moment in a long and ongoing history of protest

9. Could you describe these events? 10. What were the causes? [or] What mobilized the people?

• Were they political? • Were they economic? • Was it a mixture of the two?

11. Did you participate in these events?

• If yes, in what manner?

12. In your opinion and based on your experience, what do you think people entered into the streets en mass?

• What were the ‘causes’?

V. Section about the actors (groups or individuals involved) 13. Who were the most important actors?

• Social movements • Activists • Labour unions • ‘Ordinary’ people • Political economic elite • Foreign provocateur (Financial or Political) • What about the piqueteros? • What about the cacerolazos?

14. Do you think actions between the various actors you described were coordinated?

•Ifso,how? • Do you know of any direct or indirect, formal or informal, coordination or interaction between the different actors you mentioned? • What was the interaction between the peronist party insiders and the activists, protestors, and social movements? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Was this relationship equally balanced or was it asymmetrical?

N.B: The following subsections are interview speciﬁc and may or may not apply to all interviews.

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VI. Subsection about media’s role in 19/20 1. What was the speciﬁc role of different media in mobilization?

• In information provision • In coordination of events • In providing security to the protestors • In providing means of communication between different groups of actors

2. What was the relationship of the media with the other actors involved? 3. What were the different media actors involved?

a. Were there any particular ones that deserve special mention?

4. How was print media different to radio and to television coverage? 5. Was the portrayal of the events varied in the different media?

a. If yes how so? [or] What was the difference?

6. Did the participation of the media have a lasting effect of how the media engages with protests and social movement activity now? 7. Do you feel there are any speciﬁc contacts in the media that I should contact?

VII. Subsection about political parties’ roles in 19/20 1. What were the different party actors involved?

a. Which political parties were involved?

i. Or on what side did participating political parties stand?

b. Were there any particular ones that deserve special mention? c. How was your party involved? d. Were you directly involved in these events? e. With whom did you work?

2. What was the speciﬁc role of different political parties in mobilization?

• In information provision • In coordination of events • In providing security to the protestors • In providing means of communication between different groups of actors • Other roles?

3. What was the relationship of the political parties with the other actors involved? 4. What was the role of individual political elites versus the role of political parties and subparty groups? 5. What role did De La Rúa Play in the 19/20?

a. What do you think was the effect of his speech on television the night of the 19th of December? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 6. What role did Cavalo play in the 19/20?

a. Do you think his policies or the manner of his enactment of the policies was the main concern for the people?

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7. Did the participation of the political elites and political parties have a lasting effect on how such elites and parties engage with protests and social movement activity now? 8. Do you feel there are any speciﬁc contacts in the formal political sphere that I should contact?

VIII. Subset-section about the role of business in 19/20 1. What were the different business actors involved?

a. Which businesses were involved?

i. Or on what side did participating businesses groups stand? ii. What was the difference between small and large businesses?

b. Were there any particular ones that deserve special mention? c. Were you directly involved in these events? d. With whom did you work?

2. What was the speciﬁc role of different businesses [large, medium, small] and business groups/associations in mobilization?

a. In information provision b. In coordination of events c. Financial support of events and protests d. Role in looting e. In providing security to the protestors f. In providing means of communication between different groups of actors g. Other roles

3. What was the relationship of the businesses [large, medium, small] and business groups/associations with the other actors involved? 4. What was the role of individual business economic elites versus the role of businesses [large, medium, small] and business groups/associations? 5. Did the participation of the business economic elites and businesses [large, medium, small] and business groups/associations have a lasting effect of how they engage with protests and social movement activity now? 6. Do you feel there are any speciﬁc contacts that I should contact?

IX. Subsection about the role of formal unions in 19/20 1. What were the different unions involved?

a. Which unions were involved?

i. Or on what side did participating unions stand? ii. What was the difference between small and large unions?

b. Were there any particular ones that deserve special mention?

c. Were you directly involved in these events? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright d. With whom did you work?

2. What was the speciﬁc role of different unions in mobilization?

a. In information provision b. In coordination of events

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c. Financial support of events and protests d. Role in looting e. In providing security to the protestors f. In providing means of communication between different groups of actors g. Other roles

3. What was the relationship of unions with the other actors involved? 4. What was the role of individual union leaders versus the role of unions? 5. Did the participation of unions have a lasting effect of how unions engage with protests and social movement activity now? 6. Do you feel there are any speciﬁc contacts in unions that I should contact?

X. Subsection about the role of social movements in 19/20 1. What were the different social movements/grassroots organizations involved?

a. Which social movements/grassroots organizations were involved?

i. Or which side did which social movements/grassroots organizations stand? ii. What was the difference between the different social movements/grassroots organizations?

b. Were there any particular ones that deserve special mention? c. How was your social movements/grassroots organizations involved? d. Were you directly involved in these events? e. Who did you work with?

2. Describe the structure of your social movements/grassroots organizations 3. How was your social movements/grassroots organizations ﬁnanced? 4. How did you organize your events/ actions? 5. Can you describe a timeline of events leading to during and after the 19/20? 6. What was the speciﬁc role of different social movements/grassroots organizations in mobilization?

7. What was the relationship of social movements/grassroots organizations with the other actors involved? 8. What was the role of individual social movements/grassroots organizations

leaders versus the role of Unions? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 9. Did the participation of social movements/grassroots organizations have a lasting effect of how such social movements/grassroots organizations engage with protests and social movement activity now? 10. Do you feel there are any speciﬁc contacts in social movements/grassroots organizations that I should contact?

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XI. Section about the exceptionality of the 19/20 moment 11. What was difference between these events and previous crises of this nature?

• The actors involved • The size of the protests • The political reaction • The aftermath • The extent of the collective mobilization – regional vs. localized

XII. Section about the aftermath of the events 12. How would you describe the aftermath of these events?

• Many observers have described the autoconovocados self-organization in the after math of these events, what role did these play in argentine politics and society?

13. Does protest as well as coordinated collective action in social movements continue to play an important role in the everyday politics of Argentina? 14. What social movements are important today? 15. Do they relate/interact with/to formal political economic elites?

•How?

XIII. Section about further materials and contacts 16. What further questions do you think I should ask? 17. Do you have any suggestions as to print material I should read and/or audio video material I should watch/listen to? 18. Do you have any suggestions as to who I should speak with? Who I should contact?

• Do you have his/her direct contact?

Appendix 5: List of activist focus groups in Ukraine

First name at times changed or anonymized (year of birth if available), City of residence, SMO and role.

Activist focus group Ukraine #1, Znayu, 7/4/2009, Kyiv Sasha (N/A) Znayu member Andriy (N/A) Znayu member Dymytro (N/A) Znayu member Oleksandr (N/A) Znayu member

Activist focus group Ukraine #2, yellow Pora (men only), 8/5/2007, Lviv

Mykhailo (1981) Kyiv/Donets’k, YP Coordinator Head of Maidan - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Ostap (1979) Kyiv, YP Design Coordinator Pavlo (1982) Kyiv, YP Design Team Yaroslav (1980) Kyiv, YP Design Coordinator Yuri (1980) Kyiv, YP Coordinator

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Activist focus group Ukraine #3, yellow Pora (men only), 8/5/2007, Kyiv Andryi (1985) Kyiv, YP Media and Art Coordination Teams Anton (1980) Kyiv, YP Art Coordination Team Anton (1983) Kyiv, YP Coordinator and Nasha Ukrayina Campaign team Dymytro (1984) Kyiv, YP Coordinator Kostyantyn (1971) Kyiv/Kharkiv, YP Kharkiv Coordinator

Activist focus group Ukraine #4, yellow Pora (women only), 7/7/2008, Kyiv Anastasia (1982) Kyiv, PR and Media Team Iryna (1980) Kyiv, YP PR and Media Team Natalia (1982) Kyiv, YP Coordination Team Olena (197?) Kyiv, YP PR and Media Team Olya (1985) Kyiv, YP Design Team Ania (1981) Kyiv, YP Coordination Team

Activist focus group Ukraine #5, Sprotyv, 8/8/2008, Lviv Andryi (1982) Lviv, Member of Sprotyv Mykhailo (1983) Lviv, Member of Sprotyv Orest (1982) Lviv, Activist Founder of Sprotyv Roman (1983) Lviv, Co-founder of Sprotyv Yaroslav (1982) Lviv, Member of Sprotyv Zakomoynyi (1985) Lviv, Member of Sprotyv

Activist focus group Ukraine #6, mixed SMOs, 7/11/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv Oles (N/A) Kyiv, Student Movement Mykhailo (N/A) Kyiv, Maidan Aleksandr (N/A) Kyiv, Maidan Volodymyr (N/A) Odessa, UBK Taras (N/A) Kyiv, UBK Olena (N/A) Kyiv, UBK Andriy (N/A) Kharkiv, Human rights organization

Activist focus group Ukraine #7, black Pora, 7/13/2008, Lviv Andryi (1980) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Andryi (1986) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Ihor (1981) Lviv, black Pora Member Marta (1986) Lviv, black Pora Member Ania (1981) Lviv, black Pora Member Oleh (1977) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator

Activist focus group Ukraine #8, black Pora, 7/13/2007, Lviv Olya (1982) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Ruslan (1975) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Shymansky (1987) Lviv, black Pora Member Volodymyr (1971) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Yaryna (1982) Lviv, black Pora Coordinator Yuliya (1987) Lviv, black Pora Member

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Journalist focus group Ukraine, 8/19/2008, NaUKMA, Kyiv Unnamed male (1980) Kyiv, Channel 5 Unnamed male (1974) Kyiv, Kyiv Post Unnamed male (1973) Kyiv, 1 + 1 Unnamed male (1982) Kyiv, Ukraiynska Pravda Unnamed male (1981) Kyiv, Komersant Unnamed female (1960) Kyiv, Radio Svoboda Unnamed female (1976) Kyiv, 1 + 1

NGO practitioner focus group Ukraine #8, 7/17/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv Unnamed female (197?) Kyiv, Renaissance Foundation Unnamed female (1985) Kyiv, Renaissance Foundation Unnamed female (1981) Kyiv, World Bank Unnamed male (1981) Kyiv, USAID Unnamed male (1978) Kyiv/Moscow, Renaissance Foundation Unnamed male (1976) Kyiv, OSCE Unnamed male (1982) Kyiv, UNDP

University student and activist focus group Ukraine, mixed organizations, 8/16/2007, NaUKMA, Kyiv Dzvinka (1982) Kyiv, NaUKMA Natalia (1982) Kyiv, NaUKMA Volodya (1979) Kyiv, NaUKMA Sasha (1980) Kyiv, Taras Shevchenko University Nastya (1983) Kyiv, Taras Shevchenko University Oleh (1983) Kyiv, Taras Shevchenko University

Appendix 6: List of activist focus groups in Argentina

First name at times changed or anonymized (year of birth if available), City of residence, SMO and role.

Activist focus group Argentina #1, CTERA, 2/17/2009, CTERA /ADEMAS, Buenos Aires Paula (NA) Buenos Aires, CTERA Miriam (NA) Buenos Aires, CTERA Gustavo (NA) Buenos Aires, CTERA Radolfo (NA) Buenos Aires, CTERA

Activist focus group Argentina #2, MTD La Matanza, 2/17/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Anna (NA) La Matanza, Member of MTD and Co-op Claudia (NA) La Matanza, MTD member

Graciela (NA) La Matanza, MTD member - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Jorge (older) (NA) La Matanza, MTD Co-founder Jorge (NA) La Matanza, MTD member Julia (NA) La Matanza, MTD member Soledad (NA) La Matanza, MTD member

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Activist focus group Argentina #3, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca, 2/17/2009, La Boca, Buenos Aires Elena (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Luciano (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Maria (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Marian (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Raul (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Marta (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca Soledad (NA) Buenos Aires, Comedor de Los Pibes and FTV La Boca

Activist focus group Argentina #4, CTA, 2/16/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires Unnamed female (197?) Rosario, CTA Unnamed male (1961) Rosario, CTA Unnamed male (1956) GBA, CTA Unnamed male (1975) GBA, CTA Unnamed male (1957) Buenos Aires, CTA Unnamed male (1954) Buenos Aires, CTA

Activist focus group Argentina #5, Piqueteros MTL, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Filipe (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member Jose (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member Juan (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member Julio (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member Anna (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member Silvia (NA) La Matanza, MTL Member

Activist focus group Argentina #6, Asamblea De Cid, 3/11/2009, Parque Centenario, Buenos Aires Daniel (1956) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid Diego (1978) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid Florencia (1985) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid Graciela (1964) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid Susana (1962) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid Victoria (1984) Buenos Aires, Assamblea De Cid

NGO practitioner focus group Argentina #7, 2/25/2009, CADAL, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires Hernán (NA) Buenos Aires, NGO Ignacio (NA) Buenos Aires, UCA Marcos (NA) Buenos Aires, Foro Republicano María (NA) Buenos Aires, Political Scientists Marina (NA) Buenos Aires, Foro Republicano

Micaela (NA) Buenos Aires, Generación Democrátic - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Santiago (NA) Buenos Aires, UCA Susana (NA) Buenos Aires, NA

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Appendix 7: List of ‘Ordinary’ citizen focus groups in Ukraine

First name at times changed or anonymized (year of birth if available), City of residence, SMO and role.

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv Alicia (1979) Kyiv, Lecturer Hanya (1982) Kyiv, NGO worker Ivan (1982) Kyiv, Manager Oleksandr (1981) Kyiv, Investment Analyst Mykhailo (1958) Kyiv, Taxi Driver Sasha (1962) Kyiv, Store worker Velentyna (1973) Kyiv, Manager Yaroslav (1983) Kyiv, NGO worker

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #2, 7/27/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv Andriy (1980) Kyiv, Manager Nikova (1979) Kyiv, Kherson, (NA) Okesandr (1984) Kyiv, Manager Stanislav (1973) Kyiv, Translator Viktoria (1968) Kyiv, Activist Oleksiy (1960) Kyiv, State worker Zorian (1982) Kyiv, NGO worker

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #3, 7/29/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv Andryi (1977) Donets’k, Assistant Andryi (1958) Kyiv, Worker Inna (1960) Odessa, Business owner Kyrylo (1967) Kyiv, Journalist, actor Maria (1971) Kyiv, Ethnographer Olena (1958) Kyiv, Project manager Olha (1957) Kyiv, Mathematician Yuriy (1981) Kyiv, Journalist

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #4, 8/4/2009, Lviv Oksana (1971) Lviv, Principle Oksana (1970) Lviv, Teacher historian Oleksandr (1988) Vinnytsia, Unemployed Ostap (1979) Lviv, Journalist Roman (1949) Lviv, Teacher and linguist Yuri (1966) Lviv, Carpenter

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #5, 8/5/2009, Lviv Dana (1954) Lviv, Teacher

Dzvinka (1960) Lviv, NGO worker - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Ihor (1963) Lviv, Journalist Iryna (1965) Lviv, Teacher Kateryna (1957) Lviv, State worker Lesia (1971) Lviv, Teacher

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‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #6, 8/6/2009, Lviv Liubova (1958) Lviv, Teacher Nazar (1985) Lviv, Sales Taras (1963) Lviv, Journalist Volodya (1965) Lviv, Teacher Olesya (1959) Lviv, (NA) Tania (1964) Lviv, (NA)

Appendix 8: List of ‘Ordinary’ citizen focus groups in Argentina

First name at times changed or anonymized (year of birth if available), City of residence, SMO and role. ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires Antonia (NA) Buenos Aires, Lawyer Carolina (NA) Buenos Aires, Bank teller Diego (NA) Buenos Aires, Hairdresser Federico (NA) Buenos Aires, Cook Fransisco (NA) Buenos Aires, Bank teller Gustavo (NA) Buenos Aires, Teacher Hector (NA) Buenos Aires, Teacher

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #2, 2/17/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires Alejandra (1968) Buenos Aires, Social Worker Cristina (1956) Buenos Aires, Public relations Diego (1983) Buenos Aires, Unemployed Ignacio (1984) Buenos Aires, Student Maria Paula (1984) Buenos Aires, Researcher Natilia (1978) Buenos Aires, Contadora Publica

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #3, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires Clara (1968) Buenos Aires, Private Business Julio (1938) Buenos Aires, Retired Military Laura (NA) Buenos Aires, Private Business Martin (1962) Buenos Aires, N/A Miriam (1963) Buenos Aires, Teacher Nestor (1943) Buenos Aires, Building Manager

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #4, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, GBA. Blanca (NA) La Matanza, Factory worker Jorge (NA) La Matanza, Factory worker Margaruta (NA) La Matanza, Factory worker

Maria (NA) La Matanza, Factory worker - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Nina (NA) La Matanza, Factory worker Santiago (NA) La Matanza, IT specialist Silvia (NA) La Matanza, Teacher Veronica (NA) La Matanza, Teacher

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‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #5, 3/4/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires Pablo (1978) Buenos Aires, INA Reinaldo (1954) Buenos Aires, Building Porter Susana (1935) Buenos Aires, Lawyer Susana (1954) Buenos Aires, Biochemist Tomas (1983) Buenos Aires, Economist Male (NA) Buenos Aires, Cleaner

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #6, 3/12/2009, Universidad Di Tella, Buenos Aires Mariano (1966) Buenos Aires, Technician Daniela (1948) Buenos Aires, University Professor Olga (1953) Buenos Aires, Writer Diego (1954) Buenos Aires, Security grocery store Roberto (1936) Buenos Aires, Retired Esteban (NA) Buenos Aires, Policeman Julio (1938) Buenos Aires, Former Ministry of Interior worker

‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #7, 3/10/2009, Micro Centro, Buenos Aires Alejandra (1981) Buenos Aires, Student Milton (1971) Buenos Aires, Language teacher Gabriel (1982) Buenos Aires, Designer Sergio (1953) GBA, Journalist Judith (1974) Buenos Aires, Language teacher Kristina (1956) GBA, Housewife Hugo (1969) Buenos Aires, Factory manager Ana (1957) Tigre, Dentist

Appendix 9: Sample focus group activity and questions: Ukraine

I. Questionnaire: During arrival 1. An individual questionnaire to be ﬁlled out while participants show up on premises. 2. Signing of the permission and privacy and conﬁdentiality forms.

II. Mapping exercise (20 minutes) refreshments provided Instructions: In groups, please complete the following task: Draw a physical representation of the Orange Revolution. You have a limit of 20 minutes you should spend no more than 5 minutes on reading the questions and planning.

1. Demonstrate visually the actor(s)/participant(s).

a. Who were the main actors/participants? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

i. What social groups did they represent?

b. Which group do you associate yourself with?

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2. Locate key sights of events. Include:

a. Planning sites b. Meeting sites

i. Between local groups of participants, social movements, organizations, normal people

c. Action types

i. List ii. Ex. March, protest etc.

3. Demonstrate an event chronology, or if applicable, in your opinion, simultaneity.

a. You can include events from beginning of 2004, if you feel any are important, but focus on the October–November and December months.

4. Demonstrate a location hierarchy, if applicable in your opinion.

a. What locations were most important? b. Where did events take place?

5. Demonstrate an event hierarchy, if applicable in your opinion.

a. Which events were most important to you?

6. If useful in your opinion, demonstrate size of event.

a. Roughly how many people were there?

7. Demonstrate your involvement/participation.

III. Group discussion of mapping exercise (15 minutes) 1. Each group presents their map to the larger group. 2. Open discussion of the presented material.

a. With prompts from focus group facilitator (if necessary) such as:

1. What do you ﬁnd most interesting about this representation? 2. What do you agree with/disagree with and why?

IV. Focused discussion (50 minutes)

• The following questions are a guide to encourage your discussion. • The discussion is between yourselves and not between your group and myself. • Feel free to express your opinions or answer to the best of your personal Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright knowledge/ understanding. There are no wrong or right answers. • If you agree or disagree with each other, feel free to say so and explain your position.

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1. Describe the Orange Revolution. 2. What were the causes of the Orange Revolution?

a. Political: Election only b. Political: corruption, political chaos, illegitimate government, bad policy c. Economic: post-Soviet decline, unemployment, growing poverty d. Both political and economical you can not separate e. Other:

3. Describe your participation in the Orange Revolution

a. Did you participate? b. How did you participate?

4. In what kind of events or activities did you participate in?

a. Meetings b. Protests c. Wore orange d. Other:

5. Why did you participate?

a. Election b. Yushchenko? c. Other: d. Your rights as a citizen: vote e. The future of democracy in Ukraine

6. When did your Participation start? 7. Who did you go to the protests with? 8. Did you see yourself as a:

a. Activist b. Politician c. Mediocrity

9. Describe how you/your group organized yourself/ves? 10. What slogan did you used? 11. What does this slogan mean?

a. Did you really think that things will change?

12. Who else was involved in the Orange Revolution? 13. What was the role of the mass media?

a. Which newspaper did you read? b. Which TV channels did you watch?

14. What was the role of activists?

15. What was the role of social movements? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 16. What was the role of the middle class? 17. What was the role of ‘ordinary’ people? 18. What was the role of the students?

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19. How different groups interact?

a. They worked together?

20. Was the Orange Revolution?

a. If so why? What kind?

21. The Orange Revolution is a?

a. Success? b. Failure? c. Neither? d. Success and failure? e. Describe why you think so.

22. What is the most important part of the Orange Revolution?

a. Which were the consequences?

23. Would you like to add something else?

V. Collection of materials and notes taken by participants

Appendix 10: Sample focus group activity and questions: Argentina

I. Questionnaire: During arrival 1. An individual questionnaire to be ﬁlled out while participants show up on premises. 2. Signing of the permission and privacy and conﬁdentiality forms.

II. Mapping exercise (20 minutes) refreshments provided Instructions: In groups, please complete the following task: Draw a physical representation of the ‘November–December Crisis of 2001’. You have a limit of 20 minutes you should spend no more than 5 minutes reading the questions and planning.

1. Demonstrate visually the actor(s)/participant(s).

b. Who were the main actors /participant

i. What social groups did they represent?

c. Which group do you associate yourself with

2. Locate key sights of events. Include:

d. Planning sites

e. Meeting sites - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

i. Between local groups of participants, social movements, organizations, normal people

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f. Action types

i. Demonstrate type(s) if applicable.

1. Ex. March, protest, caserolozo, riot, looting, piquet

3. Demonstrate an event chronology, or if applicable, in your opinion, simultaneity.

g. You can include events from the beginning of 2001 to the end of 2002 if you feel any are important, but focus on the November–December months.

4. Demonstrate a location hierarchy, if applicable in your opinion.

h. What locations were most important? i. Where did events take place?

5. Demonstrate an event hierarchy, if applicable in your opinion.

j. Which events were most important to you?

6. If useful in your opinion, demonstrate size of event.

k. Roughly how many people were there?

7. Demonstrate your involvement/participation.

III. Group discussion of mapping exercise (15 minutes) 1. Each group presents their map to the larger group. 2. Open discussion of the presented material.

a. With prompts from focus group facilitator (if necessary) such as:

1.What do you ﬁnd most interesting about this representation? 2.What do you agree with/ disagree with and why?

IV. Focused discussion (40–50 minutes)

• The following questions are a guide to promote your discussion. • The discussion is between yourselves and not between your group and myself. • Feel free to express your opinion or answer to the best of your personal knowledge/ understanding. There are no wrong or right answers. • If you agree or disagree with each other feel free to say so and explain your position.

1. Describe the ‘Crisis November–December of 2001’. 2. What were the causes of the ‘Crisis November–December of 2001’ Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright a. Political: corruption, political mismanaged, illegitimate government politicians b. Economic: corralito, unemployment, growing poverty c. Both political and economic you can not separate the two

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 269

3. Describe your involvement in the ‘crisis of 2001’

a. Did you participate? b. How did you participate? c. What types of events or actions did you participate?

i. Mention: assemblies, protests, marches, cacerolozos, pickets, looting

4. Why did you join in? 5. When did your involvement begin? 6. Describe how you or your group organized? 7. What did the main slogan ‘throw them all out’ mean?

a. Did you really believe it was possible to throw all politicians to out? b. If you believed this what did you expect to happen after?

8. Who else was involved in the December 19/20 protests?

a. Who (individual) or Which (major groups actors, organizations)

9. What was the role of the media?

a. What newspapers did you read? b. What TV Channels did you watch?

10. What role did the activists play? 11. What role did the party militants play? 12. What role social movements play? 13. What role did ‘ordinary’ people play? 14. What role did students play? 15. What role did the piqueteros play? 16. What was the dynamic between the various participants/actors (groups or individuals)?

a. did the different groups interact?

17. Was the December 19/20 protest a revolution?

a. yes why? And what kind?

18. December 19/20 protests

a. A success? b. A failure? c. Neither? d. A success and a failure? e. Why? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 19. Was the most important part of the December 19/20 protests?

a. What were the consequences? b. Would you like to add something else?

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V. Collection of materials and notes taken by participants

Appendix 11: Translated on-street survey questionnaires: Ukraine

UKRAINE SURVEY QUESTIONS:

These questions are translations of the original questions in Ukrainian. These questions were answered on-street. On-street location: Neighbourhoods in Kyiv, key transit points as designated by local city geographers. On-street time frame: Six to eight days, Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays 16:00–21:00 On-street sample is random, every sixth person approached.

1. Did you reside in Ukraine from January 2004 to January 2005? 2. In this time period, did you participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Marches • Political parties • Union strikes • Other – please specify • Did not participate

3. Before September 2004 did you ever participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Marches • Political parties • Union strikes • Other – please specify • Did not participate

4. Before September 2004 how many times and how often did you participated in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times

vi. Every day - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Marches

i. 0 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 271

ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Union strikes

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Other: Specify

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Did not participate

5. Since January 2005 have you ever participated in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Neighbourhood Organizations • Political parties

• Union strikes - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Other: Specify • Did not participate 6. Did you participate in either of the October, November, December 2004 protests?

•Yes •No

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 272 Appendices

7. Did you participate in protests in October?

•Yes •No

8. Did you participate in protests in November?

•Yes •No

9. Did you continue to participate in protests in December?

•Yes •No

10. Do you remember any speciﬁc dates when you began participating in protests?

•Yes

i. Which ones please list:

•No

11. (Answer only if chose yes for one of 23, 24, 25) Why did you choose to participate?

• My rights as a citizen were abused by the government • The election was stolen/fraudulent • It looked like fun • My friends/family members told me I should • Other – please specify • I can not remember

12. Why did you protest?

• To protect their rights as voters/citizens • To protect their futures in a free a democratic Ukraine • Because they wanted Yushchenko to be president • Because they did not want Yanukovych to be president • Political mismanagement and corruption by the politicians in power • Other please specify

13. (Answer only if chose no for all of 23, 24, 25) Why did you choose not to participate?

• My rights as a citizen were not abused by the government • I preferred Yanukovych • I thought Yanukovych won •Ihadtowork • The election was not stolen/fraudulent

• My friend/family member told me I can not / should not - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • The weather • I was afraid • Other please specify • I can not remember

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 273

14. In your opinion, why did other people protest?

15. What was the main slogan of the protests?

• ‘Yushchenko TAK’ • ‘PORA Stavaty’ • ‘POMARANCHEVI TAK’ • ‘RAZOM NAS BAHATO NAS NE PODYLATY’ • ‘UKRAINA CHAMPION’ • ‘YANUKOVYCH TAK’ •a,bandd •fande • Other: please specify • I do not remember

16. Did you agree with the slogan ‘yushchenko tak’?

•Yes •No

17. Did you agree with the slogan ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty’?

•Yes •No

18. Did you agree with the slogan ‘Pora stavaty’?

•Yes •No

19. Did you used the slogan ‘yushchenko tak’?

•Yes •No

20. Did you use the slogan ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty’?

•Yes •No

21. Did you use the slogan ‘Pora stavaty’?

•Yes •No

22. Why did you protest? - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

• To protect their rights as voters/citizens • To protect their futures in a free a democratic Ukraine • Because they wanted Yushchenko to be president

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 274 Appendices

• Because they did not want Yanukovych to be president • Political mismanagement and corruption by the politicians in power • Other please specify

23. In your opinion, why did other people protest?

24. What did you think would happen after the elections were successfully overturned (select up to two potions)?

• I thought my rights would be protected • I thought Ukraine would be a better place to live in • I thought Ukrainian politics would be more honest more open • Yushchenko would be president • Other – please specify

25. Did you vote in the 2004 presidential elections?

•Yes • No, abstained • No, forgot • No, do not vote • No, can not vote not a citizen • No, can not vote not of legal voting age

26. Who did you vote for in the 2004 presidential elections? 27. Are you the member of:

• A political party

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

•Aunion

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

• A social movement Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 275

• A local community organization

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

28. What happened in October, November December 2004 (select 2)?

• An economic crisis • A political crisis • A political coup • A fraudulent election • A people protecting their political rights • A revolution • None of the above • All of the above • Other please specify

29. How would you describe the events of the Orange Revolution (choose all that apply)?

• A series of planned mass protests • A series of spontaneous mass protest • A politically motivated and coordinated action by the opposition • The beginning of a political coup • Uncoordinated riots and looting • A coup coordinated by the Americans • A Ukrainian response to political corruption and the abuse of power by politicians and oligarchs • Coordinated acts of protest by activists and social movements (marches/riots/ looting) • Politics as usual: this was one moment in a long and ongoing history • A revolution • Other – please specify

30. What was different about these events from previous crises of this nature?

• The actors involved • The size of the protests • The political reaction • The aftermath • The extent of the collective mobilization – regional vs. localized

31. Who were the most important actors in December 2004 (pick your top 4)?

• Social movements • Activists • Labour unions

• ‘Ordinary’ people/ ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Politico-economic elite • Foreign inﬂuence (ﬁnancial or political) •Themedia • Other – please specify

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 276 Appendices

32. Did you turn to the media to get information about the protests?

•Yes •No

33. If yes what type of media source did you turn to learn about the protests?

• Radio • Television • Newspapers

34. Which television channels did you turn to?

• Please specify

35. Which newspapers did you turn to?

• Please specify

36. What Radio stations did you listen to?

• Please specify

37. Do you think the media played a speciﬁc role in mobilization?

•Yes •No

38. Date of Birth? 39. Are you citizen of Ukraine?

•Yes •No

40. Are you a resident of Ukraine?

•Yes •No

41. What is your mother tongue?

• Ukrainian • Russian • Other Please specify

42. What is your language do you speak daily?

• Ukrainian • Russian • Other Please specify

43. Please select your level of education:

• Primary Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright •Secondary • Post Secondary / Institute / College Degree • University Degree

i. Bachelor degree ii. Masters degree

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 277

iii. Candidate degree iv. Doctoral degree v. Law Degree vi. Medical degree

44. Please select your current level of employment:

• Employed full time

Appendix 12: Translated online survey questionnaires: Ukraine

UKRAINE SURVEY QUESTIONS: These questions are translations of the original questions in Ukrainian. These questions were answered on-line and on-street. Questions marked in italic were only asked Online. Online location: Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk Online time frame: August 2009 and November, February 2010 Online sample targeted focus group participants and individuals who were unable to make it to the focus groups due to scheduling conﬂicts.

1. Did you reside in Ukraine from January 2004 to January 2005? 2. Did you reside in Kyiv from January 2004 to January 2005? 3. In this time period, did you participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Marches • Political parties • Union strikes • Other – please specify • Did not participate

4. Between January 2004 to September 2004 how many times and how often did you participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Once a week vii. Once a month

viii. Every day - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

• Marches

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 278 Appendices

iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Once a week vii. Once a month viii. Every day

• Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Once a week vii. Once a month viii. Every day

• Union strikes

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Once a week vii. Once a month viii. Every day

• Other – specify:

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Once a week vii. Once a month viii. Every day

• Did not participate

5. Before September 2004 did you ever participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Marches • Political parties • Union strikes • Other – please specify - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Did not participate

6. Before September 2004 how many times and how often did you participated in any of the below? Check all that apply:

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 279

•Protests i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Marches i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Political parties i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Union strikes i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Other: Specify i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times

v. 10 + times - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month • Did not participate

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 280 Appendices

7. Since January 2005 have you ever participated in any of the below? Check all that apply:

•Protests • Neighbourhood Organizations • Political parties • Union strikes • Other: Specify • Did not participate

8. After January 2005 how many times and how often did you participate in any of the below? Check all that apply:

• Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Marches

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Union strikes Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 281

v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Other- specify:

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. Every day vii. Once a week viii. Once a month

• Did not participate

9. Did you participate in either of the October, November, December 2004 protests?

•Yes •No

10. Did you participate in these in October?

•Yes •No

11. Did you participate in these in November?

•Yes •No

12. Did you continue to participate in these in December?

•Yes •No

13. Do you remember any speciﬁc dates when you began participating in protests:

•Yes

i. Which ones please list:

•No

14. (Answer only if chose yes for one of 23, 24, 25) Why did you choose to participate?

• My rights as a citizen were abused by the government

• The election was stolen/fraudulent - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • It looked like fun • My friends/family members told me I should • Other–please specify • I can not remember

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 282 Appendices

15. (Answer only if chose no for all of 23, 24, 25) Why did you choose not to participated?

• My rights as a citizen were not abused by the government • I preferred Yanukovych • I thought Yanukovych won •Ihadtowork • The election was not stolen/fraudulent • My friend/family member told me I can not / should not • The weather • I was afraid • Other please specify • I can not remember

16. What was the main slogan of the protests?

• ‘Yushchenko TAK’ • ‘PORA Stavaty’ • ‘POMARANCHEVI TAK’ • ‘RAZOM NAS BAHATO NAS NE PODYLATY’ • ‘UKRAINA CHAMPION’ • ‘YANUKOVYCH TAK’ •a,bandd •fande • Other – please specify • I do not remember

17. Did you agree with the slogan ‘yushchenko tak’?

•Yes •No

18. Did you agree with the slogan ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty’?

•Yes •No

19. Did you agree with the slogan ‘Pora stavaty’?

•Yes •No

20. Did you used the slogan ‘yushchenko tak’?

•Yes •No

21. Did you use the slogan ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty’?

•Yes Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright •No

22. Did you use the slogan ‘Pora stavaty’?

•Yes •No

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 283

23. What did the ‘yushchenko tak’ slogan mean to you? • Fill in the blank

24. What did the ‘razom nas bahato nas ne podelaty’ slogan mean to you? • Fill in the blank

25. What did the ‘Pora stavaty’ slogan mean to you? • Fill in the blank

26. In your opinion, why did people protest? • To protect their rights as voters/citizens • To protect their futures in a free a democratic Ukraine • Because they wanted Yushchenko to be president • Because they did not want Yanukovych to be president • Political mismanagement and corruption by the politicians in power • Other – please specify

27. What did you think would happen after the elections were successfully overturned (select up to two potions)? • I thought my rights would be protected • I thought Ukraine would be a better place to live in • I thought Ukrainian politics would be more honest more open • Yushchenko would be president • Other – please specify

28. Did you think this would come true?

• Yes, in that a moment I thought it could come true. • I thought it could possibly happen but was sceptical • I knew at the time that it would never happen. There would be no change, business as usual • I can not remember • Other – please specify

29. Did you vote in the 2004 presidential elections?

•Yes • No, abstained • No, forgot • No, do not vote • No, can not vote not a citizen • No, can not vote not of legal voting age

30. Who did you vote for in the 2004 presidential elections? 31. Do you consider yourself a/n (choose up to 2):

• Politician - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Large business owner • Member of the elite • Activist • ‘Ordinary’ person • Underprivileged person on the outskirts of Ukrainian society

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 284 Appendices

32. Are you the member of:

• A political party

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

•Aunion

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

• A social movement

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

• A local community organization

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

33. What happened in October, November, December 2004 (select 2)?

34. How would you describe the events of the Orange Revolution (choose all that apply)?

• A series of planned mass protests • A series of spontaneous mass protest • A politically motivated and coordinated action by the opposition • The beginning of a political coup • Uncoordinated riots and looting • A coup coordinated by the Americans • A Ukrainian response to political corruption and the abuse of power by politicians and oligarchs - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Coordinated acts of protest by activists and social movements (marches/ riots/looting) • Politics as usual: this was one moment in a long and ongoing history

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 285

• A revolution • Other – please specify

35. What was different about these events from previous crises of this nature?

• The actors involved • The size of the protests • The political reaction • The aftermath • The extent of the collective mobilization – regional vs. localized

36. How would you describe the after math of these events?

• Business as usual – nothing changed • People were reawakened and became more politically active • People were more politically active in 2005 but things went back to normal after that • People are scared to protest now they have bad memories of those days • Other please specify

37. Who were the most important actors in December 2004 (pick your top 4)?

• Social movements • Activists • Labour unions • ‘Ordinary’ people/ ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians • Politico-economic elite, • Foreign inﬂuence (ﬁnancial or political) •Themedia • Other – please specify

38. Was there interaction/coordination between the orange party insiders and the activists, protestors and social movements?

• Yes • No

39. Did you turn to the media to get information about the protests?

•Yes •No

40. If yes what type of media source did you turn to learn about the protests?

• Radio • Television • Newspapers

41. Which television channels did you turn to? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Please specify

42. Which newspapers did you turn to?

• Please specify

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 286 Appendices

43. What Radio stations did you listen to?

• Please specify

44. Do you think the media played a speciﬁc role in mobilization?

•Yes •No

45. If yes, then how (pick up to two):

a. Information provision b. Coordination of events c. Providing security to the protestors d. Providing means of communication between different groups of actors e. Other – please specify

46. What role did Yushchenko play in the 2004 Protests? 47. What role did Timoshenko play in the 2004 Protests? 48. What role did Yanukovych play in the 2004 Protests? 49. What role did Kuchma play in the 2004 Protests? 50. What role did ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians play in the 2004 Protests? 51. What role did social movements and or activists play in the 2004 Protests? 52. Did the participation of the business economic elites and businesses [large, medium, small] and business groups/associations have a lasting effect of how such businesses and groups/associations engage with protests and social movement activity now?

• Please specify

53. Date of Birth? 54. Are you citizen of Ukraine?

•Yes •No

55. Are you a resident of Ukraine?

•Yes •No

56. What is your mother tongue?

• Ukrainian • Russian • Other please specify

57. What language do you speak most often on a daily basis?

• Ukrainian • Russian • Other please specify Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

58. Please select your level of education:

• Primary •Secondary

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 287

• Post Secondary / Institute / College Degree • University Degree

i. Bachelor degree ii. Masters degree iii. Candidate degree iv. Doctoral degree v. Law Degree vi. Medical degree

59. Please select your current level of employment:

• Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

60. Please select your level of employment in December 2004:

• Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

61. Please choose your profession sector:

•Academia • Private Sector • State Sector • Not-for-Proﬁt Sector

62. Please type in your profession

• Please specify: • Has this changed in the past eight years

i. Yes ii. No

63. Please choose your annual income in UAH: 64. Has your income changed in the past ﬁve years

a. Yes b. No

65. Has your income gone:

a. Up? b. Down? Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 66. Please type your location of residence:

•Typeincity

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 288 Appendices

Appendix 13: Translated on-street survey questionnaires: Argentina

ARGENTINA ON-STREET SURVEY QUESTIONS:

These questions are translations of the original questions in Spanish. These questions were answered on streets. Location: Key transit points in various Barrios in the Federal Capital, Buenos Aires City, as chosen by local geographers. Time Frame: Six to eight Days, Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays 16:00–21:00, March 2009 and March–April 2010

1. Did you reside in Buenos Aires from September 2001 to January 2002?

•Yes •No

2. In this time period did you participate in any of the following activities? (Check all that apply):

•Protests • Marchas • Caserolozos • Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes • Did not participate • How often:

3. Before September 2001 did you ever participate in any of the following activities? (Check all that apply):

•Protests • Marchas • Caserolozos • Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes • Did not participate • How often

4. Since January 2002 have you ever participated in any of the following activities? (check all that apply): Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright •Protests • Marchas • Caserolozos

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 289

• Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes • Did not participate • How often

5. Did you participate in either of the December 19/20 protests, marchas and caserolozos?

•Yes •No

6. Why did you choose to participate? 7. What was the main slogan of the protests?

• ‘todos somos argentinos’ • ‘que se vayan todos’ • ‘no a el corralito’ • ‘que se vayan De La Rúa y Caballo’ • ‘que se vayan todos los Banqueros’ • do not remember

8. Did you agree with the slogan ‘que se vayan todos’?

•Yes •No

9. Do you consider yourself (choose up to 2):

• a Politician • a Large Business Owner • a member of the elite • an Activist •an‘ordinary’person • a poor person • other

10. Are you a member of:

• a political party

i. Yes ii. No

•Aunion

i. Yes ii. No Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • A social movement

i. Yes ii. No

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 290 Appendices

• A popular assembly

i. Yes ii. No

11. What happened in December–November 2001?

iii. An economic crisis iv. A political crisis v. A political coup vi. Both i and ii vii. Both ii and iii viii. Both a and b ix. I, ii and iii x. Neither i, ii or iii

12. Which television channels do you watch? 13. Which newspapers do you read? 14. What radio stations do you listen to? 15. What was different about these events from previous crises of this nature?

xi. the actors involved xii. the size of the protests xiii. the political reaction xiv. the aftermath the extent of the collective mobilization – regional vs. localized

16. Are you a citizen of Argentina?

•Yes •No

17. Please select your current level of employment:

• Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

18. Please select your level of employment in December 2001:

• Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

19. Where do you live - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

• City of Buenos Aires

20. Where do you work?

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Appendix 14: Translated online survey questionnaires: Argentina

ARGENTINA ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONS: These questions are translations of the original questions in Spanish. These questions were answered online. Location: Buenos Aires City, and GBA, Rosario, Santa Fe Time Frame: March 2009 and March–April 2010 The sample targeted focus group participants and individuals who were unable to make it to the focus groups due to scheduling conﬂicts.

1. What year were you born in? 2. Are you a citizen of Argentina?

•Yes •No

3. Are you a permanent resident of Argentina?

•Yes •No

4. Are you a foreign national on a visa?

•Yes •No

5. Are you a foreign national not on a visa?

•Yes •No

6. Please select your level of education:

• Educación Primaria Básica (EPB I): Primero, Segundo y Tercer año escolar • Educación Primaria Básica (EPB II): Cuarto, Quinto y Sexto año escolar • la Educación Secundaria Básica (ESB) • la educación superior o universitaria.

i. Licenciat ii. Masters degree iii. Doctoral degree iv. Law Degree v. Medical degree

7. Please select your current level of employment: Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 292 Appendices

8. Please select your level of employment in December 2001:

• Employed full time • Employed part time • Unemployed • Student

9. Please choose your professional sector:

•Academia • Private Sector • State Sector • Not-for-Proﬁt Sector

10. Please type in your profession

• Has this changed in the past eight years?

i. Yes ii. No

• Please choose your annual income in pesos:

i. Has your income changed in the past eight years

1. Yes 2. No

ii. Has gone:

1. Up 2. Down

11. Please choose your location of residence:

• City of Buenos Aires

i. Commune: ii. Barrio:

• Greater Buenos Aires Area: • The Province of Buenos Aires:

i. Partido: Other Province

12. Please choose your location of employment: • City of Buenos Aires i. Commune: ii. Barrio:

• Greater Buenos Aires Area: • The Province of Buenos Aires: Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright i. Partido:

• Other Province: i. Type in City:

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13. Please choose your location of birth:

• Outside of Argentina • City of Buenos Aires

i. Commune: ii. Barrio:

• Greater Buenos Aires Area: • The Province of Buenos Aires:

i. Partido:

• Other Province:

14. Did you reside in Argentina from September 2001 to January 2002? 15. Did you reside in Buenos Aires from September 2001 to January 2002? 16. In this time period did you participate in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

•Protests • Marches • Caserolozos • Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes • Did not participate

17. Between September 2001 to January 2002 how many times and how often did you participate in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

•Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Marches

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times

iv. 5–10 times - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 294 Appendices

• Caserolozos

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day • Neighbourhood assemblies

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day • Popular assemblies

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day • Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day • Union strikes

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 295

18. Before September 2001 did you ever participate in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

•Protests • Marches • Caserolozos • Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes • Did not participate

19. Before September 2001 how many times and how often did you participate in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

•Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Marches

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Caserolozos

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Neighbourhood assemblies - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 296 Appendices

v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Popular assemblies

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Union strikes

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Did not participate in any

20. Since January 2002 have you ever participated in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

•Protests • Marches • Caserolozos • Neighbourhood assemblies • Popular assemblies • Political parties • Union strikes - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Did not participate

21. After January 2002 how many times and how often did you participate in any of the following activities? (check all that apply):

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 297

•Protests

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Marches

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Caserolozos

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Neighbourhood assemblies

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. every day vii. once a week viii. once a month

• Popular assemblies

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 298 Appendices

• Political parties

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Union strikes

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Food riots

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Looting

i. 0 times ii. 1 time iii. 2–5 times iv. 5–10 times v. 10 + times vi. once a month vii. once a week viii. every day

• Did not participate in any

22. Did you participate in either of the December 19/20 protests, marches and caserolozos?

•Yes - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright •No

23. Did you participate in these on the 19th?

•Yes •No

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 299

24. Did you participate in these on the 20th?

•Yes •No

25. Did you continue to participate in these after the 21st?

•Yes •No

26. Why did you choose to participate? (answer only if chose yes for questions 23, 24, 25)

• Options TBA

27. What was the main slogan of the protests?

• ‘todos somos argentinos’ • ‘que se vayan todos’ • ‘no a el corralito’ • ‘que se vayan De La Rúa y Caballo’ • ‘que se vayan todos los Banqueros’ • Do not remember

28. Did you agree with the slogan ‘que se vayan todos’?

• Yes • No

29. Did you use the slogan: ‘que se vayan todos’?

• Yes • No

30. What did the ‘que se vayan todos’ slogan mean to you?

• Fill in the blank • Changing the government of De La Rúa • Changing all of the politicians for new ones • Getting rid of democratic government • Getting rid of all of the elites

31. Did you really want to have all the politicians thrown out of government?

•Yes •No

32. What did you want to happen if these protest calls came true?

• I wanted the entire political structure of Argentina to change and to start again • I wanted De La Rúa to step down along with his entire government

• I wanted the people to become more powerful and have more access to - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright political and economic decision making.

33. Did you think this would come true?

• Yes, in that a moment I thought it could come true. • I thought it could possibly happen but was sceptical

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 300 Appendices

• I knew at the time that it would never happen there would be no change, business as usual • I can not remember

34. Did you vote in the 14th October 2001 elections?

•Yes • Yes, spoiled ballot • No, abstained • No, forgot • No, do not vote • No, can not vote not a citizen • No, can not vote not of legal voting age

35. Who did you vote for in the 14th October 2001 elections?

• Senadores Nacionales

i. Protest ballot ii. Alianza iii. U.C.R. iv. Justicialista v. Distritales

• Diputados Nacionales

i. Protest ballot ii. A.R.I iv. Provincial v. Alianza v. Justicialista

36. Did you vote in the 1999 presidential elections?

•Yes • Yes, spoiled ballot • No, abstained • No, forgot • No, do not vote • No, can not vote not a citizen • No, can not vote not of legal voting age

37. Who did you vote for in the 1999 presidential elections?

• DelaRúa–Alvarez • Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educacióna • Alianza T.J.E. – Unión Cívica Radical – El Frente País Solidario, Santa Fe • Alianza T.J.E. – Demócrata Progresista, Santa Fe •Duhalde–Ortega b

• Alianza Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright • Unión de Centro Democrático • Alianza Partido Justicialista, Mendoza • Frente Justicialista de la Esperanza, San Juan

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• Frente de Integración Federalc • Alianza Partido Federal, Mendoza • Cavallo – Caro Figueroa • Alianza Acción por la Republicad • Unión de Centro Democrático de Santa Fe • Walsh – Leonardi (Alianza Izquierda Unidae) • Altamira – Rieznik • Obrero • Frente de Unidad Trabajadora • Mendez – Pompei (Humanista) • Reyna–Moccia(AlianzaFrentedelaResistenciaf) • Mussa – Herrera (Alianza Social Cristianag) • Montes – Hernández (De los Trabajadores Socialistas) • Quarracino -Rearte • Socialista Autentico • Por un Socialismo Autentico

38. Do you consider yourself an (choose up to 2):

• A politician • A large business owner • A member of the elite • An activist •An‘ordinary’person • An underprivileged person on the outskirts of argentine society

39. Are you the member of:

• A political party

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

•Aunion

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

• A social movement

i. Yes ii. No

1. If yes which one:

• A popular assembly

i. Yes - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ii. No

1.If yes which one:

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 302 Appendices

40. What happened in December–November 2001?

• An economic crisis • A political crisis • A political coup •Bothaandb •Bothbandc •Bothaandb •A,BandC • Neither A, B or C

41. How would you describe the events of 19/20 (choose all that apply)?

• a series of planned mass protests • a series of spontaneous mass protest • a political motivated and coordinated action by the opposition • the beginning of a political coup • uncoordinated riots and looting • coordinated acts of protest by activists and social movements (marches/riots/ looting) • politics as usual: this was one moment in a long and ongoing history of protest

42. What were the causes of the protests, riots, marches and coralozos? [or] What mobilized the people?

• Political mismanagement and corruption by the politicians in power? • The economic crisis? • The corralito? • De La Rúa’s call for a state of emergency via televised address • Was it a mixture of all of the above?

43. Who were the most important actors in December 2001 (pick your top 4)?

• social movements, • activists, • labour unions, • ‘ordinary’ people, • politico-economic elite, • foreign inﬂuence (ﬁnancial or Political) • the media. The press • piqueteros • cacerolazo

44. What was the interaction/ coordination between the peronista party insiders and the activists, protestors and social movements?

•Yes •No Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 45. Did you turn to the media to get information about the protests and caserolozos?

•Yes •No

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Appendices 303

46. If yes what type of media source did you turn to?

• Radio • Television • Newspapers 47. Which television channels did you turn to? 48. Which news papers did you turn to? 49. What Radio stations did you listen to? 50. Do you think the media played a speciﬁc role of different medias in mobilization? •Yes •No 51. If yes the how pick up to two: f. Information provision g. coordination of events h. providing security to the protestors i. providing means of communication between different groups of actors 52. What role did De La Rúa Play in the 19/20? 53. What role did Cavalo play in the 19/20? 54. What role did Duhalde play? 55. What role did Carlos Alberto ‘Chacho’ Álvarez play? 56. What was different about these events from previous crises of this nature? • the actors involved • the size of the protests • the political reaction • the aftermath • the extent of the collective mobilization – regional vs. localized 57. How would you describe the aftermath of these events? • Business as usual – nothing changed • People were reawakened and became more politically active • People were more politically active in 2002 but things went back to normal after that • People are scared to protest now they have bad memories of those days

Appendix 15: Transliteration of Ukrainian cyrillic to roman alphabet

BGN/PCGN 1965 system The United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Ofﬁcial Use (PCGN) system. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 304

Ukrainian Romanization Ukrainian Romanization

Aa Hn B bOo Bv p hPr gCs D dTt Ee Yu ye/je f zh X kh z Ts I y q Ch Ii X Sh Ïyi/ji W Shch y/j yu/ju K k ya/ja L l ’ Mm ’ ”

N.B.: The character sequences 3,k,c,tcandc may be romanized z-h, k-h, s-h, t-s and ts-h in order to differentiate those romanizations from the digraphs zh, kh, sh, ts and the letter sequence tsh, which are used to render. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Notes

1 Introduction: The Shock and Awe of Moments of Mass Mobilization

1. ‘Ordinary’ citizens is a term adapted from Nancy Bermeo’s book, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy (2003). The term ‘ordinary’ citizens is used to denote the non-activist, non-politicized citizens of a polity, who tend to be regularly disengaged from politics, other than when (and if) they vote in elections. Generally, they have not been active members of a Social Movement Organization, nor have they consistently participated in previous protests. Included are individuals of all socio-economic, employment and education levels. The term is used to avoid ‘the masses’, ‘average people/citizens’ or even ‘median voter’ as they depict different concepts of actors. 2. The term ‘revolutionary moment’ initially came out of the naming of recent Eastern European mass mobilizations as colour ‘revolutions’. I decided to employ the term ‘revolutionary moment’ as is used by Aya (1990) and Tilly (1995), rather than revolution, as it implies that while a ‘revolutionary moment’, when people rush into the streets en masse, makes major social, political or economic systemic change possible, it by no means makes such an outcome certain. Thus, a ‘revolutionary moment’ provides enough social and political instability for a revolution to be possible but not certain. 3. La Unión Cívica Radical party leader in Alianza coalition. 4. Government coalition including FrePaSo and UCR. 5. FrePaSo party leader in Alianza coalition. 6. Cavallo was also previously President Menem’s Minister of Economy and was the key mastermind behind the 1991 Convertibility Plan that enacted a currency board that ﬁxed the dollar-peso exchange rate at 1:1. 7. El Conurbano Bonaerense consists of the 24 partidos (counties) that surround the autonomous city of Buenos Aires. Often referred to as the Gran Buenos Aires or Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). 8. Piqueteros can be translated as ‘those that picket’, but it has been used to label the social movement of unemployed workers that developed in the mid-1990s in the Argentine interior. 9. Peronism (Peronismo) or Justicialism (Justicialismo) is an Argentine political movement founded by President Juan Perón. The political party has always been formally called the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party) but is often referred to as the Peronist Party and the members are called the Peronists or PJ shortly. There is also the Joventude Peronista a militant/activist youth wing, but there are also other militant/activist organizations connected to the Party. Several other parties such as the Justicialist Front (which was a vehicle of Presidents Duhalde and Saa in the GBA) and the Justicialist Front of Entre Ríos are made up of Peronists, but their connection to the JP is not clear. In Argentina, Peronism is considered a move- - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ment and encapsulates almost every aspect of its members’ lives. The Peronist ‘Movement’ is sustained by a clientelist network and closely tied to Argentine unions.

305

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 306 Notes

10. A militant is typically a party activist, but can also be non-partisan. Militancia, while translated as militancy, is closer to our understanding of activism in English. 11. For examples of foreign media coverage, see ‘Argentina’s Crisis Explained’ 2001 ‘Who Next in Argentina after Cavallo?’ 2001 ‘Argentina Drifts, Leaderless, as Economic Collapse Looms – New York Times’ January 2002. 12. Yushchenko was prime minister under Kuchma 22 December 1999–29 May 2001. 13. Both Yanukovych (member and leader) and Kuchma (informally) were associated with the Party of Regions, a clientelist-based party representing the industrial complexes of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. Yanukovych and Kuchma represented an oligarchic network of business interests in metallurgy and energy; Kuchma was closely associated with the Dnipropetrovsk network, while Yanukovych represented the Donets’k network. 14. Ukraine is divided into 24 oblasts (provinces). 15. Independence Square. 16. So named because the colour of the Yushchenko campaign was orange; the colour was therefore omnipresent in the protests. 17. A term used to describe a series of large post-election protest events in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and 2000s. These events took place predominantly after elections, perceived to have been corrupt and/or fraudulent. Activists, mostly youth and opposition social movement groups, organized get-out-the vote campaigns and employed non-violent civil resistance. In most cases a speciﬁc colour or ﬂower was the symbol of opposition. Examples are Serbia’s Bulldozer Rev- olution (2000), Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004) and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution (2005). 18. In this book, Eastern Europe includes all former communist and soviet states. 19. The survey was organized by Dr. Gwendolyn Sasse. The author worked on the project in the capacity of Researcher.

2 Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis of Mass Mobilization

1. A few important studies of social mobilization in Eastern Europe include (Beacháin and Polese 2010, Bunce and Wolchik 2011, Ekiert and Kubik 2001, Greskovits 1998, Howard 2003, Osa 2003, Robertson 2011). 2. By unequal reciprocity I mean that while mutually dependent and closely tied patron–client relationships existed, the punteros, the politicians and the party, usually had more structural power vis-à-vis the SMOs/activists. 3. Governors of all oblasts, all appointed by President Kuchma. 4. FrePaSo was composed the Frente Grande, the PAIS Party (Open Policy for Social Integrity), the Unidad Socialista Party (composed of the Socialista Popular Party,

Socialist Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party headed by Carlos - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Auyero), The ‘Group of 8’ Justicialista (Peronist) Party deputies who had defected from Menem (their leader was Carlos ‘Chacho’ Álvarez), groups related to Human Rights Movement (headed by Graciela Fernandez Meijide) and other smaller parties and groups.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Notes 307

5. The CTA was created in 1991 in opposition to the traditional union (Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (CGT)) dealings and closeness to certain political groups. 6. At the individual level Humberto Roggero, head of the Peronist bloc of the House of Deputies; the President Pro-Tempore of the senate Ramon Puerta; speaker of the house Eduardo Camano and key governors Carlos Ruckauf, Jose Manuel de la Sota, Carlos Reutemann, Adolfo Rodriquez Saa, Eduardo Duhalde and Nestor Kirchner were the most important actors. 7. According to both Thucydides’ and Tilly’s deﬁnitions, a revolution can mean a revolutionary movement, a revolutionary outcome and a revolutionary situation. Instead of using the term ‘revolutionary situation’, I prefer to use the term ‘revolutionary moment’, which has the possibility of a revolutionary outcome and involves a revolutionary movement, but also involves the en masse mobilization of ‘ordinary’ people. 8. Hirschman uses the example of the mass exodus of East Germans in 1989; this however is inappropriate. Not only did the political opportunity to migrate present itself by the opening of certain border crossings but the majority of those individuals who left were part of a population of economic migrants between the ages of 20 and 55 who had been planning on leaving East Germany throughout the 1980s, and had social network ties in West Germany and other Western European and North American countries. Thus, the risk associated with ‘exit’ was minimized.

3 Mapping Moments and Movements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe 1920–2004

1. OGPU is the ‘Ob’edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie’ (Uniﬁed State Political Administration). 2. I take ‘ideological politicization’ to mean the process of engagement in/discussion of/acceptance of political rhetoric/ideology. I take ‘institutional politicization’ to mean making something formally political, to attach something to formal political actors or the institutions they run, such as political parties. 3. The OUN never had complete command over the UPA.

4 Mapping Moments and Movements in Argentina and Latin America 1920–2001

1. Azucena Villaﬂor de De Vincenti, Berta Braverman, Haydée García Buelas; María Adela Gard de Antokoletz, Julia Mercedes, María Mercedes and Cándida Gard; Delicia González, Pepa Noia, Mirta Baravalle, Kety Neuhaus, Raquel Arcushin, and Senora De Caimi. 2. The Argentine Currency Board pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar between 1991 and 2002 in an attempt to eliminate hyperinﬂation and stimulate economic growth.

5 Setting Precedents: Medium-term Structural Factors - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in the Mobilization Process

1. Other factors detailed in the literature include economic recessions, internal divisions among political elite in power and policy failures of the governments.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 308 Notes

2. The semi-authoritarian nature of the Kuchma presidency, ‘machine politics’ and the extra-legal mechanisms of control as well as incidents of violence have been extensively covered in (D’Anieri 2006a, Kuzio 1997). 3. However, only the leaders of the first group founded the name UBK and are reluctant to call the second group by the same name. 4. Mentioned by Mykhailo Svystovych, 7/30/2007, Kyiv; Vladyslav Kaskiv, 4/19/2008, Kyiv; Volodymyr Chemerys, 7/10/2008, Kyiv; Volodymyr Viatrovych, 7/10/2007, Zoloti Vorota, Kyiv. 5. A puntero is a political punter, someone who formally works for a politician. These are individuals that mobilize constituents for important politicians. They give incentives to vote and can punish those who do not support a candidate with restricting access to social programmes and so on. Punteros have been identified as the main coordinators of political clientelism. 6. This point was emphasized by all the piquetero and CTA interviewees. And particularly stressed by Carlos Chile, 3/9/2009, Buenos Aires; Héctor Flores, 3/18/2009, Buenos Aires; Juan Gonzales, 2/26/2009, Buenos Aires; Víctor Mendibil, 2/20/2009, Buenos Aires. 7. Smaller factions included: Christian Democrat: Christian People’s Union, For- ward Ukraine Republican Christian Party. Nationalist: Ukrainian Nationalists’ Congress, Ukrainian National Party, Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian Nationalistic Self Defense (UNA-UNSO), Reforms and Order Party, Conservative Republican Party, Patriotic Party of Ukraine, Sobor Party. Liberal: Liberal Party of Ukraine, Solidarity Party (Petro Poroshenko). Other: Unity Party (Oleksandr Omelchenko). 8. Manzaneras have been mostly associated with Duhalde former Governor of Buenos Aires. Manzaneras are (usually) female delegates that have the responsibility to organize political support in distinct manzanas (blocks) in poor areas. Generally the manzaneras do this in exchange for political or financial favours which they can distribute to their neighbours. These are the localized coordinators of political clientelism.

6 Context Is Only Part of the Puzzle: Short-term Structural Factors in the Mass Mobilization Process

1. Referred to by participants in discussions during ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #4, 2/27/2009, La Matanza, GBA; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens Focus Group, Ukraine #1, 7/26/2009, NaUKMA, Kyiv; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Ukraine #5, 8/5/2009, Lviv. 2. From the opposition (PJ), representatives from Rio Plata, Moreno, La Matanza y Hurlingham, el Grupo Federal del Norte, six representatives from Entre Ríos, the Governnor of Santa Cruz Néstor Kirchner, the Minister of the Government of Buenos Aires Raúl Otacehé, groups representing the Buenos Aires Peronists led

by Duhalde. From the government (Alianza: UCR-FrePaSo): Deputies Elisa Carrió, - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Alicia Castro, Alfredo Bravo, Héctor Polino, Marcela Bordenave, Jorge Rivas, Ramón Torres Molina and Gustavo Cardessa. Left parties represented included: Izquierda Unida, el Foro Social orientado por el cura Farinello, el Perro Santillán, anarquistas, MST, PO, MAS, PTP, PTS, Patria Libre, Partido Humanista, and PSA.

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Notes 309

7 The Activist and Elite Interaction and Information Exchange Game

1. The author acknowledges that some SMOs and individual activists want radical and complete regime, system, ideological, revolutionary change and are not satisfied with amended or ‘new’, more favourable government policies. The author also acknowledges that while conducting participant observation in Buenos Aires and Kyiv, even the SMOs/Activists that used very radical (communist or nationalist respectively) rhetoric were willing to accept and benefit from the small and incremental changes/benefits that party policy amendments offered, even if these did not meet the demands of their ideological rhetoric. Like politicians, activists have displayed a tendency to act in a pragmatic manner and take what they can get. 2. This includes interviews conducted with: Juan Gonzales (CTA), Víctor Mendibil (CTA), Carlos Chile (MTL), Luis Borello (FTV), Juan March (Director of AVINA), Lucianna Giotto (activist), Anna Dinerstine, Julio Gambina (researchers), Domingo Cavallo, Héctor ‘Toti’ Flores (MTD la Matanza), Patricia Bulrich (former member of Alianza,nowCoalicion Civica), Monica Perlata (Coalicion Civica) (politician), Filipe Noguera (private consultant) and Sergio Kernin (editor and journalist). 3. Khakhly or khakhol is a derogatory term used by Ukrainians to describe themselves, and by Russians to describe Ukrainians. Rjab, Ryab or Rab means slaves or servants and is understood as meaning that Ukrainians cannot govern themselves but always end up the victims or slaves of other rulers. The term also has a religious connotation as servants of God, but not in this context. 4. In Ukraine it is forbidden for nationals to act as election observers unless they are an official representative of a party or candidate. Since the 1990s activists and NGOs registered ‘fake’ press cards in order for nationals to act as election observers. 5. The channel was originally owned by Oleksandr Rodnyanskyy, a small Ukrainian oligarch, and after 2005 in part owned by Igor Kolomoyskyy, partner of PrivatGroup and one of the world’s top-ranking billionaires. In the run-up to the election 1 + 1 was highly critical of Yushchenko and favourable to Yanukovych. 6. Both parties find their ‘base’ in poor constituencies in industry-rich regions.

8 The Duty to Protest: Participation of ‘Ordinary’ People in Mass Mobilization

1. Literally translated as fried or scrambled eggs. 2. The protest events referred to included, piquetero, CTA and campo protests between September 2008 and April 2009 and 2006 political crisis, anti-NATO and economic crisis related protest between March 2006 and April 2006, June 2006 and September 2006, March 2007 and May 2007, June 2007 and September 2007, March 2008 and May 2008, June 2008 and August 2008, June 2009 and September 2009 and December 2009 and March 2010. Small protest events in the spring of 2010 against the Yanukovych presidency, as reported by my activist interlocutors, are also not

receiving media coverage in Ukraine. - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 3. Lengthy discussion about this matter took place during two focus groups: (Activist focus group Argentina #6, Asamblea De Cid, 3/11/2009, Parque Centenario, Buenos Aires; ‘Ordinary’ Citizens, Focus Group, Argentina #1, 2/12/2009, Collegiales, Buenos Aires).

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 310 Notes

9 Conclusions: Understanding Revolutionary Moments and Movements

1. Although I acknowledge that 2001 protests were not sparked by elections even if the actual trigger was in both cases corruption, fraud and political violence, a good argument can be made in favour of the thesis that the attempted suppression of electoral rights can become a more personal attack on civic rights and thus have a greater impact on the general voting population. 2. I have located several examples of PowerPoint presentations, newsletters and pamphlets translated into Arabic from Ukrainian and Russian that were used at conferences and meetings in the Middle East by Ukrainian activists. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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1989 revolutions, 33, 49, 70, 71, 81, 229, Brotherhood of Kozak Independence, 60 231, 307 Buenos Aires, xii, xvii, 6, 9, 17–19, 42, 5-Tyi Kanal, 20, 175, 189, 311, 321 119, 161, 162, 191 Bullrich, Patricia, 161 activists, 4, 11–14, 17, 37–40, 46–9, Bystrytsky, Yevhen, 120, 126, 145 Chapters 3–5, Chapter 7 Akhmetov, Rinat, 41, 241 Alfonsín, Raul, 94–6, 114 cacerolazo, 6, 83, 96, 171, 202, 204 Alianza, xiv, 5, 42, 101, 122, 143, 144, Calculus, 212 147, 16, 168, 180, 191 Cardessa, Gustavo, 308 Álvarez, (‘Chacho’) Carlos, 5, 42, 49, Carrió, Elisa, 308 143, 161, 190 Casa Rosada, 6, 91 Anarchist Movement in Italy, 83 Castro, Alicia, 308 Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, 62 Castro, Fidel, 58 Arcushin, Raquel, 307 Cavallo, Domingo, 6, 137, 138, 146, Argentinazo, 7, 89, 140 161, 192 asambleas, 6, 7, 83 Central del Trabajo de la República Association of Workers of the State Argentina (Union of Argentine (ATE), 100, 114, 123 Workers)(CTA), xiv, 40, 42, 83, 84, authoritarianism, 29, 33, 62, 88, 86, 99, 100, 101, 103, 114, 115, 119, 104, 215 123–5, 147–9, 163, 164, 169, 171, autoconvocado/s, 56, 83, 90, 97, 99, 179, 192, 198, 209 100–2, 116 Chamoro, Gabriel, 91 Charter 77, 59, 63, 70 Bandera, Stepan, xv, 62 Chavez, Hugo, 83, 98 Baravalle, Mirta, 307 Chavizmo, 98 Barrios de Pie, 83 Chemerys, Volodymyr, 55, 77, 78, 112, Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), 239, 121 121, 122 Berezovsky, Boris, 145 Chornovil, Viacheslav, 55, 65, 67, 68, Berizka, 16 69, 71 Beryslavsky, Mykola, 66 Bezsmertnyi, Roman, 166 The Chornovil Papers, 67 Bezverkha, Anastasiya, xii, 127, 176 Chysta Ukraina, 39 Birch Revolution, 74 Znayu 39, 80, 126, 167 black Pora, 39, 58, 68, 80, 150, 151, 152, Civic Organization Pora, 80 167, 176, 239, 240 civic rights, 12, 22, 36, 50, 51, 56, 57, 62, Bloc Piquetero, 30 80, 82, 97, 104, 111–13, 140, 144, Blok Yuliyi Tymoshenko (Yuliya 180, 182, 184–6, 188, 195, 198, 201, Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), 43, 172, 206, 211, 214, 216, 219, 220, 224, 177, 180 235, 244, 245, 310

Bolivian Partido Obrero civil rights, 32, 35, 58, 68, 71, 76 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Revolucionario, 88 The Civil Rights Movement, 32, 58 Bordenave, Marcela, 308 civil society, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 73, 75, Braverman, Berta, 307 76, 94, 95, 109, 111, 113, 127, 146, Bravo, Alfredo, 308 147, 169, 183, 213, 219

328

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Index 329 claims, 10, 14, 23, 24, 34, 35, 36, 38, 49, crisis context, 16, 49, 58, 63, 128, 130, 51, 55–7, 59, 61, 62, 69, 70, 74, 79, 139, 142, 144, 153, 22, 193, 216. 80, 82, 84, 104, 105 225, 232 clans, 41, 75, 116 Cronica, 192 Clarin, 20, 21, 95, 138, 162, 192, Crooked Circle Club, 63 193, 195 Cutral-Có, 101 clientelism, 41, 86, 308 clientelist, 10, 24, 33, 40, 75, 84, 87, 105, D’Elía, Luis, 123 116, 124, 126, 163, 168, 179, 180, De Bonaﬁni, Hebe, 91, 147, 314 234, 306, 306 De Caimi, Senora, 307 Coalicion Civica, 90, 101, 143, 163, 309 De la Rúa, Fernando, 5–9, 42, 101, 124, Cold War, 12, 83, 88 136, 139, 143, 146, 147, 148, 150, 161, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, colour revolutions, 12, 13, 33, 74, 127 180, 182, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, Committee for Truth, see Za Pravdu, 194, 195, 196, 197, 205, 208, 209 Komitet De Petri, Eduardo, 84 Committee of Ukrainian Voters, 77 Democratic Dialogue, 146, 147 Communist Bloc, 63 democratization, 15, 25, 27–30, 49, 56, communist legacy, 33, 57 57, 71, 72, 74, 75, 83, 98, 99, 104, Communist Party, xiv, 59, 166 111, 113, 126, 212, 213, 217, 225, Confederación General del Trabajo de la 229, 233, 237, 244, 245 República Argentina (CGT), xiv, 40, Denim Revolution, 22 42, 85, 87, 93, 97, 100, 103, 115, deprivation, 4, 5, 7–9, 16, 35, 49, 129, 147, 164, 307 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, Confederation Obrera de Argentina 138, 139, 141, 153, 213, 227, (COA), xiv, 85, 87, 90, 93, 97, 103 235, 245 Congress Ukrainian Nationalists, 73, 81, Diario Popular, 192 133, 163, 176, 191, 202, 204, 234 diffusion, 5, 12, 13, 22, 127, 130, 147, Conselho Episcopal Latino Americano 189, 204, 213, 225, 228, 229, (Latin American Episcopal 235, 245 Council), 88 Dirty War, 91 Conservative Republican Party, 308 dissident, 31, 56, 58, 60–73 contentious politics, 34, 35, 36, 49, 131 Dniprodzerzhynsk, 68 contextual variables, 14, 15, 25, 46, 49, Dnipropetrovsk, 66, 68, 116, 241, 306 129, 130, 131, 139, 153, 154, 157, Donbas, 61, 73, 76, 81, 113, 241 214, 225, 228, 234, 235, 238 Donets’k, xvi, 64, 76, 77, 116, 189, 201, 237, 306 conurbano, 95, 96, 101, 305 Doniy, Oleksandr, 72 convertibility plan, 8, 97, 99, 101, Drach, Ivan, 65, 71 119, 305 Duhalde, Eduardo, 9, 119, 161, 307 cooperatives, 38, 40, 99, 123, 125, 249 Córdoba, xvii, 6, 83, 89, 90, 93, 95, 96, Eastern Europe, 5, 12, 15, 22, 25, 33, 55, 97, 103, 114, 118, 139, 148 56, 58, 62, 69, 72, 116, 126, 212, Córdobazo, 83, 89, 90, 93, 97, 103 213, 229, 305, 306, 307 corralito, 5–10, 129, 132, 137, 138, 143, Eastern Ukraine, 64, 76, 77, 189

165, 171, 195, 196, 197 economic crisis, 5–7, 9, 16, 25, 44, 63, - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Corrientazo, 83, 89 70, 92, 101, 119, 129, 130, 131, 132, Corriente Clasista y Combativa (CCC), 136, 138–41, 143, 144, 146, 147, xiv, 40, 83, 147, 171 149, 153, 187, 192, 210, 216, 224, Crimea, xvi, 113, 152, 237 225–9

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 330 Index

El Foro Social orientado por el cura Great Peasant Uprising, 59 Farinello, 308 guerrilla, 62, 89, 90 El Grupo Federal del Norte, 308 guerrillero, 88 El Perro Santillán, anarquistas, 308 Guevara, Che, 58, 83 elections, 5, 10, 11, 20, 29, 138–40, 142, Guevarist mobilization, 87, 89 143, 145, 150, 151, 153, 161, 165, 166, 172, 173, 175, 182, 185, 186, Habermas, 30, 49, 184, 231, 318 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 229, 231, Havel, Vaclav, 58, 63 232, 244, 305, 306, 310 Helsinki Accords, 65 electoral fraud, 132, 139, 140, 142, 151, Helsinki Human Rights Group, 58, 68 166, 173 Hirschman, 50, 184, 234, 307, 318 electoral revolutions, 5, 12, Horska, Alla, 66 73, 139 Horyn, Bohdan, 66 elite, 13, 28, 131, 197, 208 Horyn, Mykhailo, 66 Entre Ríos, 305, 308 human rights, 10, 20, 35, 38, 39, 40, 50, exit and voice, 51, 184, 185, 234 70, 95–8, 113–15, 147, 192, 215, 241, 306 Falklands, 94 hunger strike, 72 Federación de Tierra y Vivienda (FTV), 14, 40, 83, 100, 123, 147, 148, IBRD, 75 164, 309 industrial interior, 114, 115 Federación Obrera Regional de Argentina interviews, 16–21, 44, 57 (FORA), 84, 85, 87, 93, 97 Ivano-Frankivsk, 165 Federal Capital, 114 Izquierda Unida, 171, 308 Flores, Hector, 100, 101, 118, 123, 124, 125, 143, 308, 309 focus groups, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 44, 57, Joventude Peronista (JP), 40, 82, 86, 87, 58, 112, 141, 168, 185, 188, 191, 89, 93, 96, 97, 103, 305 195, 196–7, 199, 201, 309 Junta, 88, 90–2, 94, 114, 196, 221, foreign funding, 73, 75, 76, 235, 245 226, 228 free-rider, 3 FreNaPo (Frente Nacional contra la Kaskiv, Vladyslav, 117, 153, 165, Pobreza), 148, 164 173, 177 French Unionism, 83 Khmara, 45, 58, 74 FrePaSo, 40, 42, 99, 119, 123, 124, 143, Khvylia Svobody, 80 190, 305, 306, 308 Kirchner, Néstor, 138, 147, 307, 308 Klub Tvorchoyi Molodi, 64 García Buelas, Haydée, 307 Kostenko, Yuri, 121 Gard de Antokoletz, María Adela, 307 Kozak Brotherhood, 58, 60 Gard, Cándida, 307 Kryvyi Rih, 68 German Marshall Fund, 44, 45, Kuchma, Leonid, 10, 13, 41, 42, 56, 58, 75, 145 60, 70, 71, 72, 74–81, 122, 126, 139, glasnost, 68, 70, 71, 111 140, 141, 142, 150, 165, 166, Gongadze, Georgiy, 77–9, 116, 312 174–81, 186–9, 193–5, 206, 208, González, Delicia, 307 211, 234, 235, 242, 306, 308

Gorbachev, 70, 320 Kuchmizm, 80, 116, 122, 150, 168 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Gran Buenos Aires (GBA), 9, 96, 100, Kyiv, xii, xvi, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 39, 58, 111, 114, 118, 124, 138–9, 148, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 77, 80, 117, 151, 305, 316 172, 173, 189, 194, 196, 197, 199, grants, 24, 75, 76, 120, 126, 127 201, 204, 237–43

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Index 331

La Matanza, 18, 99–101, 124, 162, 163, Menem, Carlos, 5, 9, 40, 42, 95, 96, 99, 204, 309, 318 100, 114, 115, 119, 124, 136, 186, La Nación, 20, 138, 168, 187, 192, 190, 222, 305 193, 195 Mercedes, Julia, 307 La Prensa, 192 Mercedes, María, 307 labour union, 85, 113, 115, 119, 228 militants, 6, 40, 83, 86, 87, 89, 91, 94, labour movement, 56, 87, 89, 231, 234 96, 98, 123, 149, 209, 226 Latin America, 5, 15, 20, 22, 23, 33, 56, militia, 14, 45, 117, 151 82, 83, 87, 88, 92, 98, 213, 307, 313, mobilizational networks, 15 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, mobilizational resource, 113, 119, 120 322, 323, 324, 325, 326 mobilizing structures, 35, 110, 111, 112, Law on the Repression of 115, 118, 231 Communism, 89 Moloda Prosvita, 58, 61, 71, 72, 80 Liberal Party of Ukraine, 308 Molodyi Rukh, 39, 71 Liberation Theology Movement, 32, 88, Morales, Evo, 17 314, 324 Moreno, 162, 169, 308 looting, 86, 90, 95, 96, 138, 161, 162, Moroz, Oleksandr, 42, 77, 121, 142, 164, 165 165, 175 Lyovochkin, Serhiy, 241 Moroz, Valentyn, 65, 67 Luhansk, 64, 76 Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 98 Association, 95 Lutsenko, Yuriy, 78, 79, 117, 121, 166 Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo–Founding Lviv, 11, 17, 18, 19, 66, 69, 73, 78, Line, 95 79–81, 112, 117, 150, 151, 153, 173, Motoneros, 83 198, 204, 239 Movimiento Convergencia Socialista, 88 Movimiento de Izquierda machine politics, 77, 116, 181, 308 Revolucionaria, 88 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, 40, 91, 313 Movimiento de Trabajadores Maidan (SMO website), 39, 58, 76, 29, Argentinos, 40 113, 167 Movimiento Obrero, 83, 88 Maidan Inform, 78 Movimiento Obrero Independiente y Maidan Nezalezhnosty (Independence Revolucionario, 88 Square-a location), 11, 72, 166, 173, Movimientos de Trabajadores 174, 175, 196, 199, 202, 204, 205, Desocupados, 101 206, 208 Movimiento Territorial Liberación Maidan, (protest wave) (MTL), 40, 164, 100, 114, 123, 148, AutoMaidan, 239 149, 10, 16, 309, 313 EuroMaidan, 212, 237–245, 239 The MST Brazil, 83, 98, 308 Podatkovyi Maidan, 239 Mukachevo, 151, 188 Makukh, Vasyl, 66 Mykytka, Yaroslav, 67 Malvinas, 83, 92, 94 Manzaneras, 123, 124, 161, 162, 308 Narodnyi Rukh (People’s Movement), March Crisis, 63 42, 58, 65, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 81, March, Carlos, 94, 95, 114, 115, 146, 147 112, 113, 121 The MAS Bolivia, 83, 98, 308 Nasha Ukrayina, 176 mass mobilization, 3, 305 nationalist, 14, 21, 42, 59–62, 70, 73, 81, - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Medvedchuk, Victor, 41, 166, 175, 177 82, 84, 104, 112, 121, 230, 240, 241, Melnyk, Andryi, 62 308, 309 Memorial, 77 National Liberation Movement (NLM), Mendibil, Víctor, 123, 164, 309 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 69

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 332 Index national march, 148, 149 Partido Justicialista, xv, 114 The National Salvation Committee, 121 Partido y Movimiento Obrero, 88 National University of Kyiv Mohyla party in opposition, 24, 25, 37, 41, 42, Academy Student Activist 151, 181, 221, 223, 234 Committee, 39 party in power, 24, 25, 37, 41, 42, 117, NED, 44, 45 130, 131, 139, 141, 142, 145, 146, networks, 9, 13, 22, 23, 24, 31–39, 41, 147, 158–61, 166, 168, 172, 176, 46, 49, 51, 55–7, 59–64, 69, 71, 72, 181, 190, 193, 211, 219–24, 233, 74–80, 83–91, 95, 96, 98, 101–5, 234, 236, 246 109, 110, 112–19, 122–5, 127, 132, Party of Regions, 41, 180, 241, 306 142, 143, 147, 148, 151, 158–65, Patagonia Rebelde, 84 168, 170, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180, Patria Libre, 308 188, 189, 192, 193, 208–11, 219, Patriotic Party of Ukraine, 308 224, 230, 231, 232, 234, 238–44, Peasant Order Guard, 308 313, 315, 316, 319, 322 Perestroika, 57, 70, 72, 111, 117 Neuhaus, Kety, 307 Peron, Eva, 86, 313 Neuquén, 101, 118 Peron, Isabel, 90 NGOs, 5, 17, 18, 20, 24, 36, 30, 72, 113, Peronismo, 82–7, 93, 97, 103, 105, 115, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 138, 115, 305 139, 143, 144, 148, 190, 194, 195 Peronists, 40, 42, 115, 124, 125, 143, Noia, Pepa, 307 144, 147, 149, 191, 193, 200, 305, 308 Ob’edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Peron, Juan, 84–90, 305 Politicheskoe Upravlenie, 307 Pinchuk, Viktor, 41, 241 oblast, 11, 17, 41, 45, 151, 189, piqueteros, 83–90, 98–101, 111, 112, 201, 306 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 138, October Revolution, 66 150, 161–4, 167, 179, 202, 208, 305 Odesa, 64, 79, 80, 112, 113, 117, 152, Pitelinskii Uprising, 59 167, 237 Plan Trabajar, 40, 124, 125 OK98, 58, 74 Plotnikov, Mykhailo, 24, 25 oligarchs, 48, 116, 177, 180, 198, 241 Omelchenko, Oleksandr, 308 Polino, Héctor, 308 Opir Molodi, 39 political opportunity structure, 63, 64 opportunity structure, 36, 63, 64, political prisoners, 65, 66, 67 68, 140 Polo Obrero, 89, 123 ordinary citizens, 49–50, 183–211, 305 Pomerantz, Daniel, 94 Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Pora, see black Pora; yellow Pora (OUN), 61 Poroshenko, Petro, 42, 175, 308 Osadchy, Mykhailo, 67 Postup, 20, 67, 73, 81 Otacehé, Raúl, 308 Prague Spring, 63 Otpor, 45, 58, 74 Process tracing, 21, 22, 31, 38, 39, 217 OUN-B, 62 Prosvita, 58, 60–71 OUN-M, 62 protest event, 25, 33, 42, 50, 119, 182, Our Ukraine, 142, 173, 177, 180 183, 226 Oviedo, Luis, 89 protest patience threshold, 25, 51, 184,

185, 195, 196, 210, 211, 212 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Pagina, 12, 20, 170, 192, 193, 312 Puebladas, 83, 89, 105 The Paris Commune, 58 Punteros, 95, 123, 124, 125, 150, 161–4, Partido Comunista, 123 172, 208, 306, 308 Partido Humanista, 208 Pupore, 164

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Index 333 radical, 59, 65, 86, 87, 88, 113, 115, 123, Shestydesiatnyky, 55, 58, 65, 66, 69, 71, 136, 305, 309, 324 81, 83 Radicalismo (leftist militants) of the Shevchenko, Taras 61, 66, 78, 174 1960s, 83 Skochok, Pavlo, 67 rational choice, 50 SMO (social movement organization), 6, Reforms and Order Party, 308 34–9, 42, 43, 46–51, 56–61, 62–81, regime, 3, 4, 7, 9. 10, 25, 28, 33, 41, 51, 82–104, 112–27 115, 116, 121, 122, 139, 140, 141–7, Sobor Party, 308 150, 154, 183, 185–9, 191–4, 198, Socialist party, 40, 42, 63, 77, 121, 142 201, 202, 204, 208, 210, 211 Solidarity Party, 308 repertoire, 62, 64, 92, 100, 101, 150, 229 Solidarnos´c,´ 45 repression, 10, 14, 36, 44, 63, 65, 68, 69, Soros, George, 44, 73, 75, 126, 145 75, 77, 79, 85, 88, 89, 91, 101, 117, Soviet Union, xiv, 31, 59, 65, 58, 83 124, 139, 140, 186, 192, 210, 223, Sprotyv, 39, 58, 152, 153, 162 232, 233, 240, 242–4 Stalin, 63, 64 Repsol, 101 Stalinism, 64 Revolution, 4, 13, 27, 33, 39, 46, 47, 48, Stasyuk, Volodymyr, 165 123, 199, 228 strikes, 11, 24, 40, 58, 59, 63–70, 72, 73, Revolution of 1956, 63 78, 81, 83–5, 95, 101, 102, 117, 123, revolutionary moment, 5, 6, 10, 48, 181, 124, 147, 150, 192, 223, 226–8, 229, 230, 232, 305 231–3 revolutionary movement, 48, 307 Studenske Bratstvo, 76 Revolutionary Peronist Montoneros, 9 student hunger strike, 72 Revolution on the Granite, 55, 59, 70, Studentska Khvylia, 39, 153 72, 76, 78, 117 Stus, Vasyl, 65 rights, 111, 114, 115, 126, 130, 131, 140, Sumy, xvi, 11, 39, 58, 69, 73, 76, 81, 144, 147, 150, 151, 152, 183, 186, 153, 237 188, 189, 192, 195–8, 204, 206–11, Sumy University Student Activist 217, 227, 228, 235 Committee, 39 Rio Plata, xvii, 100, 308 Supreme Court, 11, 176, 177 riots, 6, 11 surveys, xii, 16–21, 32, 33, 133–6, 184, Rivas, Jorge, 83, 90, 95, 96, 103, 104, 192, 194, 196–207, 210, 238, 242–4, 114, 149, 161, 162, 197, 225, 270–91, 306 227, 228 Svitlychnyi, Ivan, 65 road block, 191 Syla Narodu, 142 Rosariazo, 83, 89, 90, 93, 95, 97 Symonenko, Petro, 121, 166 Rosario, 6, 17, 95, 96, 114, 138–9 Symonenko, Vasyl, 65, 67 Rose Revolution, 74, 306 RosUkrEnergo, 178 temnyky, 77, 112, 175, 189 Ruckauf, Carlos, 42, 162, 307 tent city, 11, 70, 76, 78, 153, 173, Russiﬁcation, 61, 64, 66, 73, 81 175, 202 The thaw, 64 Salta, 118 Third Worldist, 87 samizdat, 63, 65 Tilly, Charles, 4, 35, 36–8, 48, 110, 132, samvydav, 65, 67 141, 157, 159, 305, 307 - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Santa Fe, xvii, 46, 55, 56 Torres Molina, Ramón, 308 Santiangazo, 89 training (of activists, key aspect of Save Old Kyiv, 58, 239 diffusion theses), 13, 15, 36, 49, 120, SBU, 41, 42, 165, 177, 178 124–7, 150, 152, 153, 180, 225, 229

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch 334 Index trigger (of a protest), 9, 15, 48–50, 105, Unity Party, 308 130, 132, 140, 150, 174, 194, 208, Uriburu, 85 216, 219, 221, 232, 310 USAID, 45, 145 Triple A (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), 90 Velvet Revolutions, 33, 71, 229 Trotskyist, 84, 88, 123 Viatrovych, Volodymyr, 61, 112, Tulip Revolution, 13, 74, 306 177, 240 Tusovka, 39, 78, 113–15 Villaﬂor de De Vincenti, Azucena, 307 Tymoshenko, Yuliya, 42, 121, 122, 142, Voto bronca, 143 174–6, 187, 239 Wałesa, ˛ Lech, 59, 175 Udovenko, Hennadi, 121 Washington Consensus, 99 Ukraine without Kuchma, 10, 60, 70–3, Western Ukraine, 11, 60, 61, 167, 188, 77–9, 112, 234 189, 190 Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 65, 68 Westminster Foundation, 45, 145 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union Workers Party (PT), 98, 234 (UHHRU), xv, 16 World Bank, 75 Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 60, 61, 69, 73, 81, 207 Yanukovych, Viktor, 11, 41, 140, 141, Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), 142, 144, 165, 166, 173–181, 189, xv, 61 193, 194, 197, 202, 206, 208, 237, Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian 239, 241, 242, 306, 309 Nationalistic Self Defense Yasynevych, Yaryna, 71, 150, 151, 152 (UNA-UNSO), 308 yellow Pora, 39, 76, 120, 127, 150, 152, Ukrainian National Party, 308 165–7, 174, 178, 179, 181 Ukrainian Republican Party, 121 YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Ukrains’ka Pravda, 20, 189 Fiscales), 101 Ukrains’ke Bratstvo (Ukrainian Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc, see Blok Brotherhood), 39, 58, 60, 76, 77, 80 Yuliyi Tymoshenko Ukrains’kyi vistnyk (Ukrainian Yushchenko, Viktor, 10, 11, 13, 41, 42, Gazette/News Letter), 65, 67 79, 120, 121, 142, 144, 145, 153, Unidades Basicas, 63 165, 166, 168, 173–80, 182, 187, union, see labour union 188, 190, 197, 205, 206, 209 Unión por Todos, 146, 169 Unión Civica Radical, xv, 94, 95, Zapatistas, 83, 98 300, 305 Za Pravdu, Komitet (Committee for Unión Sindical de Argentina (USArg), 85 Truth), 39, 58, 71, 79, 80, 81, 117, Union of Ukrainian Nationalist 118, 122 Youth, 60 Zolotariov, Yevhen, 59, 67, 76, 79, Union of Ukrainian Writers, 71 113, 117 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zurich - PalgraveConnect - 2015-01-01 - PalgraveConnect Zurich / Zentralbibliothek - licensed to UZH Hauptbibliothek www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9781137409775 - Mapping Mass Mobilization, Olga Onuch Mapping Mass Mobilization

Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine Olga Onuch ISBN: 9781137409775 DOI: 10.1057/9781137409775 Palgrave Macmillan

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