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DISSERTATION FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT and CORRUPTION Submitted by Ferry Ardiyanto Department of Economics in Partial Fulfillm

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DISSERTATION FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT and CORRUPTION Submitted by Ferry Ardiyanto Department of Economics in Partial Fulfillm DISSERTATION FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CORRUPTION Submitted by Ferry Ardiyanto Department of Economics In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado Fall 2012 Doctoral Committee: Advisor: Harvey Cutler Elissa Braunstein Ramaa Vasudevan Stephen Koontz ABSTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CORRUPTION Corruption is the abuse of public authority and discretion for private gain. Corruption is perceived as detrimental to investment as it acts like a tax on investment by increasing the cost of doing business. However, the efficient grease hypothesis argues that corruption could increase investment as it acts as grease money that enables firms to avoid bureaucratic red tape and expedite the decision making process. This study attempts to build empirical models to investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and corruption and identify the determinants of corruption itself. As tolerance towards corruption tends to vary from country to country, countries are disaggregated into developed economies and developing economies. Additionally, there are four regions within the developing economies group to take into account intrinsic differences in perceptions of and attitudes towards corruption, as well as cultural and geographical differences. The dissertation finds that corruption is deleterious for FDI inflows in developed countries, but is somewhat beneficial for attracting FDI inflows in developing economies. However, when developing countries are disaggregated into several regions, the effect of corruption on FDI inflows fades away. Furthermore, corruption can be caused by both economic and institutional factors. It is also confirmed that factors influencing corruption vary among developed countries, developing countries and within regions of developing countries. The importance of institutional factors makes it clear that the institutional framework is important for explaining corruption, no matter whether a country is a developed or developing one. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor and the chair of my dissertation committee, Professor Harvey Cutler, for his valuable guidance and very helpful discussion. His contributions to this dissertation are greatly appreciated and will never be forgotten. I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Professor Elissa Braunstein, Professor Ramaa Vasudevan, and Professor Stephen Koontz for their constructive comments and suggestions. I am especially indebted to Fulbright Program for providing me with financial support throughout my study. Lastly, heartfelt thanks are extended to my family and my friends for their constant support and encouragement. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT………………………………...…………………..…………………………..…….ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ………………………………………...……………………………iii LIST OF TABLES………………………………...…………………………………………..…vii LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………...…………………………………..viii Chapter 1. Introduction…..…………………………………………………………………….1 1.1. Background………………..……………………………………………………….…...1 1.2. Organization of the study…………………………..…………………………………...6 Chapter 2. Literature Review.........…………………………………...………………….…...11 2.1. FDI theories……………...…………………………………………………………....12 2.1.1. The monopolistic advantages theory………………………………………….…12 2.1.2. Transaction cost and internalization theory…..………………………………….16 2.1.3. Ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) advantages theory….………......18 2.1.4. Product life cycle (PLC) theory…..…………………………………………...…20 2.1.5. Horizontal FDI, vertical FDI and knowledge-capital theory…….....….……...…23 2.2. Types of FDI: horizontal, vertical and export-platform…….….……………………....26 2.3. Theoretical framework of corruption………….………………………….…………....30 2.4. Empirical findings………..…..………………………………………………………...43 2.4.1. The effect of corruption on FDI……………………………..…………………...43 2.4.2. The determinants of corruption………….…....………………………………….47 Chapter 3. Data and Methodology……….………...…………………………………………53 3.1. How to measure FDI inflows………..……………………………….………………...54 3.2. How to measure corruption……..………………………………………………….…..56 3.3. Explanatory variables for FDI equation…..………………………….………………...62 iv 3.4. Explanatory variables for corruption equation……………………………….….…….66 3.5. Country sample……………………………….……………………….……………….74 3.6. Panel data………………………………………….………………………….….…….75 Chapter 4. The Effect of Corruption on FDI Inflows..……………………….………….…..80 4.1. Preliminary results of OLS fitted line………………………………………...……….80 4.2. Theoretical model…………………………………………………..………...……….88 4.3. Empirical framework……………………………………………..…………..……….94 4.4. Developed and developing countries: results and discussions ……………...………..99 4.4.1. Model 1…………………………………………………...……………………...99 4.4.2. Model 2.…………………………………………………..…………………….106 4.4.3. Model 3……………………………………..……………………………….….107 4.4.4. Model 4……………………..……………………………………………..……108 4.4.5. Model 5……………………..……………………………………………..……109 4.5. Regions within developing countries category: results and discussions..……...……109 4.5.1. Africa……………………………………………………...……………………109 4.5.2. Latin America and the Caribbean.………………………..…………………….112 4.5.3. Asia and Oceania.………………………………………………………….…...115 4.5.4. Southeast Europe and the CIS……………………………………………..……119 Chapter 5. The Determinants of Corruption.………………………………………….…..124 5.1. Developed and developing countries: results and discussions ……………...………127 5.1.1. Model 1…………………………………………………...…………………….127 5.1.2. Model 2.…………………………………………………..…………………….132 5.1.3. Model 3…………………………………………………………………….…...133 5.1.4. Model 4……………………..……………………………………………..……135 5.2. Regions within developing countries category: results and discussions……...…..…139 5.2.1. Africa……………………………………………………...……………………139 v 5.2.2. Latin America and the Caribbean.………………………..…………………….143 5.2.3. Asia and Oceania.………………………………………………………….…...148 5.2.4. Southeast Europe and the CIS…………………………………………………..156 Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks………………………………………………………….....163 6.1. Summary of findings………………………..………………………………...……...163 6.2. Policy recommendations………………………………………..………...…….……165 6.3. Suggestions for future research………………………………..……………..………170 References………………………………………………………….……………………...…...172 vi LIST OF TABLES 1.1. Top Twenty FDI Flows Destination, 2010 and 2009………………………..……..…….….4 1.2. TI Corruption Index, 2010 and 2009.…………………………………………………….….5 3.1. Summary of Data Sources……………….………………………………………………....74 4.1. FDI Inflows and Corruption: Developed and Developing Countries…………………..…..98 4.2. Differing Productivities in the United States and China……………………………..……105 4.3. FDI Inflows and Corruption: Africa…………………………….………………...…..…..110 4.4. FDI Inflows and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean .………………...…..…..112 4.5. FDI Inflows and Corruption: Asia and Oceania………………...………………...…..…..116 4.6. FDI Inflows and Corruption: Southeast Europe and the CIS………...…………...…..…..120 5.1. Determinants of Corruption: Developed and Developing Countries……………………...127 5.2. Determinants of Corruption: Africa.…………………………….………………...…..…..139 5.3. Determinants of Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean .…….…………...…..…..144 5.4. Determinants of Corruption: Asia and Oceania………….……...………………...…..…..149 5.5. Determinants of Corruption: Southeast Europe and the CIS…….…...…………...…..…..157 vii LIST OF FIGURES 2.1. Corruption without Theft…………………………...………………………..……..………37 2.2. Corruption with Theft…………………………...………………………..……...…..……..38 4.1. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Developed Countries...…………………..……..………….81 4.2. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Developing Countries...……………..……...…..……........82 4.3. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Africa...…………………..……...…..……….....................83 4.4. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Latin American and the Caribbean .……...…………….....84 4.5. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Asia and Oceania ………………….……..……..………...86 4.6. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Asia and Oceania excluding Hong Kong and Singapore….86 4.7. FDI Inflows and Corruption in Southeast Europe and the CIS………………………….....87 viii Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1. Background Corruption is the abuse of public authority and discretion for private gain. Corruption has become an important topic among economists and international development institutions.1 Corruption is perceived as detrimental to investment as it acts like a tax on investment by increasing the cost of doing business (Wei 2000; Svensson and Fisman 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi 1998, 1997). Corruption also reduces the private marginal product of capital, thus decreasing private investment and lowering economic growth (Keefer and Knack 1996; Mauro 1995). However, some say that corruption could have a positive effect on investment. The efficient grease hypothesis argues that corruption could increase investment as it acts as grease money that enables firms to avoid bureaucratic red tape and expedite the decision making process (Huntington 1968; Leff 1964). As Elliot (1997: 186) points out “bribes are viewed not only as reasonable but as enhancing efficiency in situations where red tape or state control of the economy may be strangling economic activity”. Whether corruption is harmful or beneficial for investment is therefore an empirical matter, which is a question this dissertation will address. In particular, this dissertation will investigate the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI). The dissertation finds that corruption is deleterious for FDI inflows in developed countries, but is somewhat beneficial for attracting
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