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Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ June 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aalberts, R. J., & Jennings, M. M. (1999). The Ethics of Slotting: Is this Bribery, Facilitation Marketing or Just Plain Competition? Journal of Business Ethics, 20(3), 207–215. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006081311334 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Ab Lo, A. (2019). Actors, networks and assemblages: Local content, corruption and the politics of SME’s participation in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. International Development Planning Review, 41(2), 193–214. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2018.33 Abada, I., & Ngwu, E. (2019). Corruption, governance, and Nigeria’s uncivil society, 1999-2016. Análise Social, 54(231), 386–408. https://doi.org/10.31447/AS00032573.2019231.07 Abadi, A. M. (n.d.). Kleptocracy, strategic corruption, and defence policymaking: The impact of Najib Razak’s 1MDB scandal on Malaysia’s defence relationship with China (2015-2017). Contemporary Politics, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2021.1917163 Abalo, E. (2019). Why does inaccessibility widely exist in healthcare in Ghana? Understanding the reasons from past to present. Journal of Public Health, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10389-019-01019-x Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture 1 Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus. (2005). Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption. In Kokinov & Boicho (Eds.), Advances in Cognitive Economics. Sofia: NBU Press. https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2002-05.pdf Abbink, Klaus. (2006). Laboratory Experiments on Corruption. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 418–440). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P60nmWlJWEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&d q=Laboratory+Experiments+on+Corruption,%E2%80%9D+in+Susan+Rose-Ackerman+ ed.+International+Handbook+on+the+Economics+of+Corruption+(Edward+Elgar&ots=j 9agtH21zb&sig=2ojEcFGAw5WeEuD5KDd_f7alhb4 Abbink, Klaus, & Ellman, M. (2010). The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment. Journal of Development Studies, 46(8), 1327–1344. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380903428407 Abbink, Klaus, Freidin, E., Gangadharan, L., & Moro, R. (2018). The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 34(3), 457–474. Abbink, Klaus, & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006). Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. Experimental Economics, 9(2), 103–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z Abbink, Klaus, Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An Experimental Bribery Game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(2), 428–454. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.2.428 Abbink, Klaus, Ryvkin, D., & Serra, D. (2020). Corrupt police. Games and Economic Behavior, 123, 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.001 Abbink, Klaus, & Serra, D. (2012). Anticorruption policies: Lessons from the lab. In New advances in experimental research on corruption (Vol. 15, pp. 77–115). https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N48c72KXsD4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA77&d q=Abbink,+Klaus+%26+Danila+Serra.+2012.+%E2%80%9CAnticorruption+Policies:+ 2 Lessons+from+the+Lab,%E2%80%9D+in+Danila+Serra+%26+Leonard+Wantchekon,+ eds.,+New+Advances+in+Experimental+Research+on+Corruption+&ots=uycq5h5aMR &sig=vUixS6mxw6Zc-7lPoVpnBt-ZQB8 Abbink, Klaus, & Wu, K. (2017). Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 133, 256–272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.013 Abbott, K. W. (2001). Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of bribery and corruption. Journal of International Economic Law, 4(2), 275–296. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/4.2.275 Abbott, Kenneth W. (2009). Fight Against Corruption. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law. Abbott, Kenneth W., & Snidal, D. (2002). International action on bribery and corruption: Why the dog didn’t bark in the WTO. In D. M. Kennedy & J. D. Southwick (Eds.), The political economy of international trade law. Abbott, K. w, & Snidal, D. (2002). Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption. The Journal of Legal Studies, 31(S1), S141–S177. https://doi.org/10.1086/342006 Abdalla, H. F., Maghrabi, A. S., & Raggad, B. G. (1998). Assessing the perceptions of human resource managers toward nepotism A cross-cultural study. International Journal of Manpower, 19(8), 554–570. Abdallah, S., Sayed, R., Rahwan, I., Leveck, B. L., Cebrian, M., Rutherford, A., & Fowler, J. H. (2014). Corruption drives the emergence of civil society. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society, 11(93), 20131044. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.1044 Abdiweli, M. A. (2003). Institutional differences as sources of growth differences. Atlantic Economic Journal, 31(4), 348–362. Abdixhiku, L., Krasniqi, B., Pugh, G., & Hashi, I. (2017). Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies. Economic Systems, 41(3), 354–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2016.12.004 Abdixhiku, L., Pugh, G., & Hashi, I. (2018). Business tax evasion in transition economies: A cross-country panel investigation. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 15(1), 11–36. https://doi.org/10.25428/1824-2979/201801-11-36 Abdul‐Gafaru Abdulai. (2009). Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies: A comparative study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana. Journal of Financial Crime, 16(4), 387–417. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790910993753 3 Abdullah, S., Gray, T., & Clough, E. (2018). Clientelism: Factionalism in the allocation of public resources in Iraq after 2003. Middle Eastern Studies, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1444607 Abdulrauf, L. A. (2020). Using Specialised Anti-Corruption Agencies to Combat Pervasive Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Review of the ICPC and EFCC. African Journal of Legal Studies, 12, 2020(3–4), 215–241. https://doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12340050 Abdyli, E. (2017). Some Forms of Manifestation of Official Corruption and Crimes against Official Duty in Kosovo 2011- 2012. Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica, 13(3). http://search.proquest.com/docview/2118379145/?pq-origsite=primo Abe, K., & Wilson, J. S. (2008). Governance, Corruption, And Trade In The Asia Pacific Region (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4731). The World Bank. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4731 Abé Ndjié, A., Atangana Ondoa, H., & Ngoa Tabi, H. (2019). Governance and youth unemployment in Africa. Labor History, 60(6), 869–882. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1645320 Abed, G. T., & Davoodi, H. R. (2000). Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies (IMF Working Paper No. 00/132). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879906 Abed, G. T., & Gupta, S. (2002). Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. International Monetary Fund. Abeyagoonasekera, A. (2020). Unexplained wealth and for what purpose: A Sri Lankan perspective. Journal of Financial Crime, 27(1), 24–28. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-12-2018-0128 Abidin, I. S. Z., Jantan, M. D., Satar, N. M., & Haseeb, M. (2014). Trade Linkages between Malaysia and the OIC Member Countries: Empirical Evidence Based on Gravity Model. American Journal of Applied Sciences, 11(11), 1938–1944. Abiona, I. A., & Savage, O. (2014). Influence of Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission on Female Civil Servants in Oyo State, Nigeria. Public Policy and Administration Research, 4(12), 36–43. Abotsi, A. (2018). Tolerable Level of Corruption for Foreign Direct Investment in Europe and Asia. Contemporary Economics, 12(3), 269–284. https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.277 Aboutorabi, A., Ghiasipour, M., Rezapour, A., Pourreza, A., Sarabi Asiabar, A., & Tanoomand, A. (2016). Factors affecting the informal payments in public and teaching hospitals. 4 Medical Journal of The Islamic Republic of Iran (MJIRI), 30(1), 26–35. Abraham, J., & Giovani Pea, A. (2018). Can proneness to moral emotions detect corruption? The mediating role of ethical judgment based on unified ethics. Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kjss.2018.07.013 Abraham, J., Suleeman, J., & Takwin, B. (2018). The Psychology of Corruption: The Role of the Counterfeit Self, Entity Self-Theory, and Outcome-Based Ethical Mindset. Journal of Psychological and Educational Research, 26(2), 7–32. Abrams, D., Travaglino, G., Marques, J., Pinto, I., & Levine, J. (2018). Deviance Credit: Tolerance of Deviant Ingroup Leaders is Mediated by Their Accrual of Prototypicality and Conferral of Their Right to Be Supported.
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